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State v. Randolph
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
ANTHONY RANDOLPH
(AC 46385)
Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
finding him in violation of his probation and revoking his probation. The
defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied his counsel’s
motion to withdraw her appearance and failed to conduct an adequate
hearing into his competency to stand trial and, thus, improperly denied
his motion for a competency evaluation pursuant to statute (§ 54-
56d). Held:
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
withdraw filed by the defendant’s counsel: the court’s ruling made clear
that the timing of the motion was central to its determination because,
although the court stated at a hearing more than one month before the
scheduled violation of probation trial that it had no objection to counsel’s
proposed motion to withdraw, counsel indicated she would file that
motion within one or two days of the hearing, and, at the time she
ultimately filed the motion, it was only nine days before the trial date;
moreover, the court properly concluded that exceptional circumstances
did not exist to justify granting the motion so close to trial, as the record
reflected that the defendant had the capacity to communicate with the
court and that it was the defendant’s choice to refuse to communicate
with his counsel.
2. The trial court properly evaluated the defendant’s motion for a competency
evaluation and, thus, did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion:
although the defendant’s counsel disagreed with the defendant’s decisions not to accept a plea offer and not to attend the trial, it was the
defendant’s right to do so and did not reasonably suggest that he lacked
an understanding of the facts of the case or the nature of the proceeding
and there was no indication that he could not assist with his defense;
moreover, the court observed the defendant’s demeanor and conversed
with him over the course of a lengthy colloquy regarding the defendant’s
participation in the hearing, and it reasonably could have determined
that his statements did not reflect an inability to grasp the nature of
the proceeding or the facts related to the case.
Argued March 4—officially released September 3, 2024
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with violation of
probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
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State v. Randolph
district of New Haven, geographical area number
twenty-three, where the court, Iannotti, J., denied the
motion to withdraw filed by the defendant’s counsel;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Fischer,
J.; judgment revoking the defendant’s probation, from
which he appealed to this court. Affirmed.
J. Christopher Llinas, assigned counsel, for the
appellant (defendant).
Raynald A. Carre, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s
attorney, and Thomas Funnican and Sarah Jones,
assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Anthony Randolph,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court finding him
in violation of his probation and revoking his probation
pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32. The defendant
claims that the court improperly (1) denied his counsel’s
motion to withdraw her appearance and (2) failed to
conduct an adequate inquiry into his competency to
stand trial and, consequently, erred in denying his
motion for a competency evaluation pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the claims raised in this appeal. On
November 20, 2020, the defendant pleaded guilty to
assault of a public safety officer in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-167c. The court, Vitale, J., sentenced the
defendant to a ten year term of incarceration, execution
suspended after four years, and a three year term of
probation. Among the special conditions of probation
imposed by the court at the time of sentencing in accordance with General Statutes § 53a-30 were that the
defendant submit to (1) substance abuse evaluation and
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State v. Randolph
treatment as deemed appropriate and (2) mental health
evaluation and treatment as deemed appropriate.
On April 13, 2022, the defendant was released from
prison and began serving his term of probation. Under
the direction of adult probation services, the defendant
entered Alternative in the Community (AIC) in Waterbury, a halfway housing facility. The defendant was also
assigned to complete outpatient services offered by
Wellmore Behavioral Health (Wellmore), an organization that provides both substance abuse and mental
health services.
On May 26, 2022, the defendant’s probation officer,
Allison Chance, filed an application for an arrest warrant for the defendant based on his having violated one
or more conditions of his probation. In support of the
warrant, Chance averred that, on May 11, 2022, the
defendant was unsuccessfully discharged from AIC and
that the discharge report stated that ‘‘[the defendant]
was discharged due to his inability to abide by [the
program’s] rules and regulations. It was reported that
[the defendant] had committed sexually inviting acts
towards female staff during female visual pat searches.
When . . . he was addressed by supervision he
became hostile. In the midst of [the defendant’s] anger
he broke several more of this program’s rules. The
police were contacted later that night due to [his] not
following the direction of staff when he was asked to
leave the program’s premises. He has been told he is
not allowed back on the premises again.’’ Chance also
averred that, on May 25, 2022, the defendant was unsuccessfully discharged from Wellmore. Chance stated that
‘‘[a] staff member [of Wellmore] reported that [the
defendant] was escorted out of the building after saying
racial and homophobic slurs to one of their clinicians.
[The defendant] is not allowed back on the premises.’’
On the basis of these facts, Chance averred that there
was probable cause to believe that the petitioner had
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State v. Randolph
violated the standard condition of his probation that
he ‘‘[s]ubmit to any medical and/or psychological examination, urinalysis, alcohol and/or drug testing, and/or
counseling sessions as required by the [c]ourt or the
[p]robation [o]fficer.’’ Chance also averred that there
was probable cause to believe that the defendant had
violated the special conditions of his probation obligating him to submit to ‘‘substance abuse evaluation and
treatment as deemed appropriate’’ and ‘‘mental health
evaluation and treatment as deemed appropriate.’’
On June 30, 2022, the court, Zagaja, J., issued the
warrant. On July 8, 2022, police executed the warrant
and arrested the defendant. Following the defendant’s
arrest, he was represented by the Office of the Chief
Public Defender. Thereafter, the defendant was represented by Attorney Kimberly Coleman, who was
appointed by the Office of the Chief Public Defender
as assigned counsel.
The court, Fischer, J., held a trial on the violation of
probation charge on January 19, 2023. The court heard
testimony from Joseph Murolo, an assistant clerk, as
well as Chance. The court also received documentary
evidence. Following the evidentiary phase of the trial,
the court found that the petitioner had violated the
terms of his probation.1 The court based this finding
1
‘‘[R]evocation of probation hearings, pursuant to § 53a-32, are comprised
of two distinct phases, each with a distinct purpose. . . . In the evidentiary
phase, [a] factual determination by a trial court as to whether a probationer
has violated a condition of probation must first be made. . . . In the dispositional phase, [i]f a violation is found, a court must next determine whether
probation should be revoked because the beneficial aspects of probation
are no longer being served.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367, 375–76,
944 A.3d
276 (2008). A court’s findings in the evidentiary phase are governed by the
preponderance of the evidence standard. See State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285,
302,
641 A.2d 370 (1994) (‘‘a trial court may not find a violation of probation
unless it finds that the predicate facts underlying the violation have been
established by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing—that is, the
evidence must induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not
that the defendant has violated a condition of his or her probation’’).
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State v. Randolph
on its subordinate finding that the defendant had been
discharged for disciplinary reasons from AIC as a result
of his having acted in a sexually inappropriate and hostile manner toward staff. The court also found that the
defendant had not successfully completed the program
offered by Wellmore as a result of his having uttered
inappropriate racial slurs to clinicians. The court further found that, following his discharge from these programs, the defendant had ‘‘several new arrests.’’ In the
dispositional phase of the trial, the court found, in light
of the defendant’s inability to comply with the conditions of his probation and his extensive criminal record,
that the beneficial aspects of probation were no longer
being served. The court, finding that the defendant was
‘‘not a good candidate for probation,’’ revoked the
defendant’s probationary status and committed him to
the care and custody of the Commissioner of Correction
to serve the remainder of his six year term of incarceration. This appeal followed.
I
First, the defendant claims that the court improperly
denied his counsel’s motion to withdraw her appearance. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is relevant to this claim. The court, Iannotti, J., held a pretrial
hearing on November 28, 2022, at which time the defendant was represented by Attorney Coleman not only in
the violation of probation case but in connection with
additional criminal charges that arose subsequent to
the violation of probation charge. At the hearing, the
defendant entered a not guilty plea to a pending assault
charge. Thereafter, the defendant personally addressed
the court to request that Attorney Coleman be ‘‘removed
from [his] case’’ on the ground of ineffective representation. During a lengthy colloquy with the court, the defendant represented that Attorney Coleman did not immediately recognize him earlier that day when she visited
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State v. Randolph
with him, ‘‘did not explain anything’’ to him, did not
communicate whether there was a pending offer from
the state, and did not take steps to have the case moved
‘‘to another jurisdiction.’’ The court informed the defendant that Attorney Coleman was appointed to represent
him as a special public defender and that he did not
have the right to decide who his appointed counsel was.
The court informed the defendant that he had the right
to hire private counsel of his choice and that he would
afford him time to do so. The court, however, cautioned
the defendant not to ‘‘waste [its] time’’ in that respect
if the defendant did not sincerely intend to hire private
counsel.
After the defendant complained that he did not know
what was happening, the court discussed the violation
of probation charge. The court also discussed a pending
plea offer for two and one-half years of incarceration
on the violation of probation charge. Attorney Coleman
then addressed the court with respect to her efforts on
behalf of the defendant, including the circumstances of
her interactions with the defendant earlier that day in
the courthouse. Attorney Coleman stated that since she
was assigned to work on the case, she had filed a court
appearance on behalf of the defendant on October 31,
2022, she received police reports, she talked to the
prosecutor, and she obtained a background check on
the defendant. Attorney Coleman stated that she spent
forty minutes with the defendant in a private room
earlier that day and explained ‘‘how the court works
. . . .’’ Attorney Coleman also stated that she recognized the defendant and that, following her private
meeting with him, she believed that he understood the
matters that they had discussed.
Thereafter, the court passed the matter to permit
the defendant and Attorney Coleman an opportunity to
pursue having the Office of the Chief Public Defender
reassign the case to another special counsel. When the
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State v. Randolph
court took up the matter later that day, Attorney Coleman informed the court that the violation of probation
trial had been scheduled for January 19, 2023, and that
Attorney Bevin Salmon, the supervising attorney for
the Office of the Chief Public Defender in the judicial
district of New Haven, geographical area number
twenty-three, had spoken with the defendant but that
there was ‘‘just no meeting of the mind[s] . . . .’’ Then,
Attorney Coleman stated, ‘‘after twenty-five years, I
think I know what I’m talking about and he’s asking
me to do something that I can’t do for him. And maybe
there is a lawyer out there that can get him what he
wants, but it’s not me. So, I’m going to be filing a motion
to withdraw.’’ Attorney Coleman informed the court
that she intended to file the motion in ‘‘the next day or
two.’’ The defendant once more interjected, expressing
his belief that Attorney Coleman was not ‘‘communicating properly’’ with him, that Attorney Coleman was
making misrepresentations to him, and that he was not
receiving due process. The court stated that it had ‘‘no
objection’’ to the proposed motion provided that the
Office of the Chief Public Defender was able to substitute another attorney to represent the defendant.
On January 10, 2023, Attorney Coleman filed a motion
to withdraw. In her motion, Attorney Coleman stated
that (1) the defendant has expressed his desire that she
not represent him, (2) she had discussed the meetings
that she had had with the defendant with the director
of assigned counsel for the Office of the Chief Public
Defender, (3) the Office of the Chief Public Defender
had expressed its willingness to reassign the matter to
another attorney if the court granted the motion, (4)
there was a complete breakdown of the attorney-client
relationship, and (5), in the absence of a change in
representation, holding the upcoming hearing on the
violation of probation charge, which was scheduled for
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State v. Randolph
January 19, 2023, would amount to ‘‘a waste of the
court’s time . . . .’’
On January 12, 2023, the court, Iannotti, J., held a
hearing on the motion to withdraw. Attorney Coleman
expressed her belief, based on discussions with the
Office of the Chief Public Defender that, if the court
granted the motion, another attorney would be assigned
to represent the defendant. In ruling on the motion, the
court stated that it was mindful of the fact that the
violation of probation hearing was scheduled for January 19, 2023, which was merely a week away. The court
stated that it was inclined to deny the motion in light
of the fact that that the presiding judge had communicated to him that the hearing on January 19, 2023, before
Judge Fischer, ‘‘must go forward . . . .’’ The court
noted that the state had made an offer to the defendant
and that it was still available to him. Attorney Coleman
stated that the defendant was aware of the offer but
that she was not comfortable meeting alone with the
defendant because, earlier that morning, she met with
the defendant and that, during their discussion, ‘‘he put
his hands in his pants and started fondling himself
. . . .’’ Attorney Coleman stated that she feared for
her safety.
The defendant repeatedly addressed the court to
express his belief that he did not want Attorney Coleman to represent him. He stated that she was disrespectful to him, had lied to him, was lying to the court, and
was upset with him for his comments at the pretrial
hearing. The court responded: ‘‘Lawyers, as [Attorney]
Coleman knows, [who have been] doing this for quite
some time and quite successfully for some time, realize
regardless of her making the motion [to withdraw] that
there sometimes [are] individuals that they have to represent for a variety of reasons if they are less than
comfortable representing them. Regardless of that, that
does not mean . . . in this particular situation that she
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State v. Randolph
will not zealously represent you even [though] she may
not wish to do so. But she will.
‘‘Now, she is your court-appointed lawyer. As the law
states, and [Attorney] Coleman’s aware of this and that’s
why she understands, that . . . you don’t get to choose
your court-appointed lawyer in this case.’’ When the
defendant stated that he wished to hire private counsel,
the court told him that he had the right to do so by
the hearing on January 19, 2023. The court denied the
motion to withdraw, and Attorney Coleman stated on
the record that she intended to zealously represent the
defendant at the violation of probation trial.2
The defendant claims that the court’s denial of Attorney Coleman’s motion to withdraw her appearance
amounted to an abuse of its discretion because (1)
the court was presented with evidence of a complete
breakdown in communication between him and Attorney Coleman, (2) the court suggested at the hearing on
November 28, 2022, that it would be inclined to grant
a motion to withdraw if the Office of the Chief Public
Defender could reassign the case to another attorney,
and (3) Attorney Coleman informed the court at the
January 12, 2023 hearing on the motion to withdraw that
the Office of the Chief Public Defender would assign
the case to another attorney if the court granted the
motion.
The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of the defendant’s claim. A motion to withdraw appearance is governed by Practice Book § 3-10
2
As the defendant was leaving the courtroom, the court overheard the
defendant state that he had not been afforded an opportunity to enter
guilty pleas to resolve his pending criminal cases. The court asked Attorney
Coleman to speak with the defendant concerning his willingness to enter
guilty pleas. The court recalled the matter later that day. Attorney Coleman
represented to the court that the defendant had not expressed a willingness
to attempt to resolve any pending matter but that he was ‘‘irate’’ and had
refused to talk to her.
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State v. Randolph
which provides in subsection (a) that ‘‘[n]o motion for
withdrawal of appearance shall be granted unless good
cause is shown and until the judicial authority is satisfied that reasonable notice has been given to other
attorneys of record and that the party represented by
the attorney was served with the motion and the notice
required by this section . . . .’’ ‘‘The standard of review
regarding a motion to withdraw as counsel is abuse of
discretion. The standard of reviewing both a motion
by a defendant to discharge counsel and a motion by
counsel to withdraw is the same. . . . It is within the
trial court’s discretion to determine whether a factual
basis exists for appointing new counsel and, absent a
factual record revealing an abuse of that discretion, the
court’s refusal to appoint new counsel is not improper.
. . . Such a request must be supported by a substantial
reason and, [i]n order to work a delay by a last minute
discharge of counsel there must exist exceptional circumstances. . . .
‘‘In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying [a] defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel, [an appellate court] should consider
the following factors: [t]he timeliness of the motion;
adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s
complaint; and whether the attorney/client conflict was
so great that it had resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.’’ (Citation omitted;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Gamer, 152 Conn. App. 1, 33–34,
95 A.3d 1223
(2014). ‘‘Discretion means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a
manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the
ends of substantial justice. . . . It goes without saying
that the term abuse of discretion . . . means that the
ruling appears to have been made on untenable
grounds. . . . In determining whether the trial court
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State v. Randolph
has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its
action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Olah, 60 Conn. App. 350, 354,
759 A.2d 548 (2000).
We first address the defendant’s reliance on the fact
that, at the November 28, 2022 hearing, the court stated
that it would not object to the motion to withdraw that
Attorney Coleman intended to file if the Office of the
Chief Public Defender agreed to appoint replacement
counsel. As stated previously, Attorney Coleman
informed the court at the pretrial hearing on November
28, 2022, that she intended to file a motion to withdraw
within one or two days. The court’s statements concerning how it might rule on the motion must be viewed in
light of that representation. Attorney Coleman, however, did not file the motion to withdraw within one or
two days but waited until January 10, 2023, just nine
days prior to the scheduled violation of probation trial.
Attorney Coleman did not provide an explanation for
the timing of the motion. Instead, in connection with
her motion, Attorney Coleman indicated that the Office
of the Chief Public Defender was willing to appoint
replacement counsel for the defendant if, in fact, the
court granted the motion. The defendant’s reliance on
the court’s statements concerning the motion at the
hearing on November 28, 2022, is misplaced. We interpret the court’s statements to be based on Attorney
Coleman’s representation that she would file a motion
to withdraw within one or two days of the hearing. That
timely motion was not forthcoming.
At the time that the court considered the motion to
withdraw on January 12, 2023, the violation of probation
trial was scheduled to take place in just seven days.
Attorney Coleman did not set forth a reason for the
timing of her motion, but it is undeniable that the delay
in filing the motion meant that the court was faced with
a motion to withdraw that was being made effectively
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State v. Randolph
on the eve of trial. There is little question that granting
the motion to withdraw at that late date would have
required that the violation of probation trial be rescheduled and significantly delayed while new counsel was
brought up to speed. As the court’s ruling makes clear,
the timing of the motion was central to the court’s
exercise of its discretion. This is because ‘‘[t]he trial
court has the responsibility to avoid unnecessary interruptions, to maintain the orderly procedure of the court
docket, and to prevent any interference with the fair
administration of justice.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn. App. 551, 562,
733 A.2d 253, cert. denied,
250 Conn. 917,
734 A.2d
990 (1999).
Thus, we turn to whether the court properly concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist to
justify granting the motion filed so close to trial. The
court inquired into the defendant’s complaints about
Attorney Coleman, and it considered the information
that Attorney Coleman conveyed to the court about her
representation of the defendant. The defendant
addressed the court to express the reasons for his dissatisfaction with Attorney Coleman. The court was in
the best position to evaluate the reasons underlying the
motion to withdraw. The record of proceedings amply
reflects that the defendant had the capacity to communicate with the court, and he repeatedly stated that he
did not want Attorney Coleman to continue to represent
him. The defendant, however, merely articulated his
belief that she was not providing him with adequate
representation and was not providing him with information about his case. Attorney Coleman, however,
refuted these representations. She believed that she had
conveyed adequate guidance to him and, moreover, that
he understood the matters that they had discussed.
Furthermore, to the extent that Attorney Coleman
stated as a ground for her motion that a breakdown in
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State v. Randolph
communication existed, it is clear from a review of
the record that the cause of this breakdown was the
defendant’s disruptive behavior toward her and his
unwillingness to converse with her. Even after Attorney
Coleman alerted the court to the defendant’s suggestive
behavior during her morning meeting with him on January 12, 2023, she stated that she would zealously represent him. Indeed, the record reflects that Attorney Coleman attempted to meet privately with the defendant on
January 12, 2023, to discuss pleas, only to later alert
the court that the defendant was irate and had refused
to speak with her. See footnote 2 of this opinion. The
record thus reflects that, although Attorney Coleman
felt uncomfortable being in the defendant’s presence,
she continued to attempt to discuss matters of trial
strategy with him. It was the defendant’s choice, not
Attorney Coleman’s, to refuse to communicate.
In State v. Gonzalez, 205 Conn. 673,
535 A.2d 345
(1987), our Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s claim
that a complete breakdown in communication between
himself and trial counsel warranted the appointment
of new counsel. In addressing the claim raised in Gonzalez, our Supreme Court reasoned as follows: ‘‘While we
have recognized that in some circumstances a complete
breakdown in communication may require a new
appointment . . . we agree with the state that this case
does not present circumstances of this sort. A defendant
is not entitled to demand a reassignment of counsel
simply on the basis of a breakdown in communication
which he himself induced. . . . The record before us
indicates that the defendant was entirely responsible
for whatever breakdown in communication occurred
between himself and his attorney. . . . We therefore
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in not permitting the defendant to discharge his lawyer.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 684; see also State v. Robinson,
227 Conn. 711, 727,
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State v. Randolph
631 A.2d 288 (1993) (reassignment of counsel was not
warranted based on breakdown in communication
induced by defendant); State v. Kerlyn T., 191 Conn.
App. 476, 493–94,
215 A.3d 1248 (2019) (same), aff’d,
337 Conn. 382,
253 A.3d 963 (2020). This same reasoning
applies in the present case to the court’s denial of the
motion to withdraw. Moreover, a change in counsel is
not warranted based solely on the defendant’s preference, for, ‘‘[a]lthough the constitution guarantees a
defendant counsel that is effective, it does not guarantee counsel whom a defendant will like.’’ State v.
Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 645,
935 A.2d 975 (2007).
For the reasons we have discussed, we conclude that
the court’s denial of the motion to withdraw was not
an abuse of its discretion.
II
Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly
failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into his competency to stand trial and, consequently, erred in denying
his motion for a competency evaluation pursuant to
§ 54-56d. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is relevant to this claim. In part I of this opinion, we discussed
some of the events that took place at pretrial proceedings before the court, Iannotti, J., on November 28,
2022, and January 12, 2023. On January 19, 2023, the
violation of probation trial was scheduled to proceed
before the court, Fischer, J. Prior to the start of the
proceeding, the court learned from the marshal and
representatives of the Department of Correction that
the defendant, who was incarcerated, refused to be
transported to the courthouse and that court personnel
had established a video connection to the correctional
facility where the defendant was incarcerated so that
he could participate virtually in the trial. At the beginning of the proceeding, a correction officer informed
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State v. Randolph
the court that the defendant had left the room in which
he could have participated virtually in the trial. Attorney
Coleman informed the court that, that morning, the
defendant, via video, observed her presence and asked
what she was doing in the courtroom. When Attorney
Coleman informed him that she was there to represent
him at the trial on the violation of probation charge,
he stated that he was there to attend a hearing on a
motion to dismiss and that she was not his attorney.
The defendant then walked out of the room.
Ultimately, the defendant returned and addressed the
court. The defendant stated that he had just been made
aware that a hearing was to take place and that he
believed that the case had been continued because
Attorney Coleman had filed a motion to withdraw. The
defendant stated that he did not see ‘‘eye to eye’’ with
Attorney Coleman and that she failed to file motions
pertaining to his case. He stated that she did not convey
any plea offer to him and that she failed to show him
a video related to one of the criminal charges pending
against him. The defendant stated that he was dissatisfied with Attorney Coleman, who, in his view, was not
acting in his best interest. The defendant also stated that
he did not feel safe being transported to the courthouse
because he had been assaulted by a marshal who
claimed that the defendant had assaulted him first.
The court addressed the defendant, noting that Judge
Iannotti had denied Attorney Coleman’s motion to withdraw and that the violation of probation trial had been
scheduled for quite some time. The court informed the
defendant that the trial would take place that day, the
state was ready to proceed, Attorney Coleman was
going to represent him, and the defendant had the
option of participating virtually. After the defendant
continued to protest that Attorney Coleman was not
his attorney, the court reiterated that the issue had been
resolved by Judge Iannotti and that Judge Iannotti had
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made it clear on the record that the violation of probation trial was scheduled for January 19, 2023. Thereafter, the defendant left the room from which he was
able to participate virtually in the trial and returned to
his jail cell. Correction officers notified the court that
the defendant stated to them that the hearing would
continue without him and that he was aware that he
was not going to be part of the trial. The court asked
the correction officers, in the event that the defendant
had a change of heart with respect to exercising his
right to participate in the proceeding virtually, to notify
the court immediately.
At that juncture, the following colloquy between
Attorney Coleman and the court occurred:
‘‘Attorney Coleman: Your Honor, if I could just
address the court. I’ve been representing [the defendant] since last October and I’m assigned counsel on
this matter. He had some previous counsel, public
defenders, and [the Office of the Chief Public Defender
had to assign the case to a special public defender].
And based on my interactions with him . . . he has
said we don’t get along. That’s not the issue, Judge. I’m
concerned about some of his mental health issues. I
truly believe he understands the charges, but if we ever
went to trial, I don’t think that he could aid in his
defense, so I’m requesting a [competency evaluation
under § 54-56d] at this point especially based on [the
fact that] he told me today that we’re here for my motion
to dismiss.
‘‘The Court: Has any other—have you ever made this
request before, Attorney Coleman?
‘‘Attorney Coleman: No, Your Honor. In looking back
at his records, I don’t know if there’s ever been one.
‘‘The Court: All right.
‘‘Attorney Coleman: And . . . I . . . .
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State v. Randolph
‘‘The Court: So, you have no evidence of any other
counsel or in any other proceedings, my understanding
is he has other files—
‘‘Attorney Coleman: And I have all of his files, Judge.
‘‘The Court: —that there’s never been a request for
a [competency evaluation under § 54-56d]?
‘‘Attorney Coleman: Your Honor, I always use § [54-
56d] judiciously and . . . since I started representing
him back in October, I see a decompensation in him,
Judge. And, I mean, I’ve met with him two times already.
Forty-five minutes the first time on [October 31, 2022],
and forty minutes on [November 28, 2022], and had
extensive discussions with him. And there was a very
good offer for him and actually Attorney Salmon, [the
supervising attorney with the Office of the Chief Public
Defender], went down and talked to him to help him
to understand and I just don’t know if he’s getting the
second part of the equation, Judge. I just don’t know
if he can aid in his defense especially [with] him walking off.
‘‘The Court: Well, he wouldn’t be the first disruptive
defendant in a criminal proceeding and he won’t be the
last, but disruptive behavior is . . . not correlating to
a direct § [54-56d] and . . . I would assume there’s
been many good offers made by the State of Connecticut
and judicial offers made to the defendant that have
been rejected by defendants which is their perfect constitutional right. And . . . I don’t want to hear anything
about an offer made in this case . . . .
‘‘Attorney Coleman: I—
‘‘The Court: No. I understand that and you haven’t
[divulged such information to the court]. I just wanted
to underline that. [It’s] that he declined to accept an
offer to resolve the case. That’s his perfect right. But
I’m going to deny your request for a hearing. Disruptive
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State v. Randolph
behavior . . . is not tantamount to a § [54-56d]. You
put on the record what you felt are the specific issues
that . . . entitled you to that. I respectfully disagree,
you know, especially with the timing of this. Again,
disruptive behavior, yelling at people, does not entitle
him to that hearing.
‘‘So, with that, I think the [record is] protected . . .
the defendant was aware that this hearing was going
to proceed without him on it. He has the perfect right
to participate. If he changes his mind, we’ll hear from
[the Department of Correction].’’
The defendant argues that the court failed to conduct
an adequate inquiry into the motion for a competency
evaluation. The defendant relies on the information that
was known to the court at the time it considered the
motion, including the statements that he made to the
court about the hearing and Attorney Coleman, the fact
that he was a probationer who was subject to mental
health evaluation, his refusal to be transported to court
on January 19, 2023, his refusal to participate virtually
in the trial, and, most importantly, Attorney Coleman’s
representations to the court in support of the motion.
He argues that this information ‘‘suggested [his] lack
of ability to communicate rationally with Attorney Coleman and assist in his own defense.’’ The defendant
argues that this information sufficiently called into
doubt his competence and necessitated further investigation by the court. Instead, the defendant argues, the
court ‘‘engaged in no inquiry in response to Attorney
Coleman’s representations but instead jumped to the
conclusion that [he] was being disruptive and obstinate.’’ On the basis of these facts, the defendant argues
that the court improperly denied the motion for a competency evaluation.
The following legal principles guide our analysis. ‘‘We
review the court’s ruling on a motion for a competency
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State v. Randolph
evaluation under the abuse of discretion standard. . . .
In determining whether the trial court [has] abused
its discretion, this court must make every reasonable
presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action.
. . . Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal
discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of
whether the trial court correctly applied the law and
could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it
did. . . .
‘‘[T]he conviction of an accused person who is not
legally competent to stand trial violates the due process
of law guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
. . . This rule imposes a constitutional obligation, [on
the trial court], to undertake an independent judicial
inquiry, in appropriate circumstances, into a defendant’s competency to stand trial . . . . [Section] 54-
56d (a) codified this constitutional mandate, providing
in relevant part: A defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while the defendant is not competent. [A] defendant is not competent if the defendant
is unable to understand the proceedings against him or
her or to assist in his or her own defense.
‘‘This statutory definition mirrors the federal competency standard enunciated in Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402,
80 S. Ct. 788,
4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per
curiam). According to Dusky, the test for competency
must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding—and whether he has
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. . . .
‘‘Although § 54-56d (b) presumes the competency of
defendants, when a reasonable doubt concerning the
defendant’s competency is raised, the trial court must
order a competency examination. . . . Thus, [a]s a
matter of due process, the trial court is required to
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State v. Randolph
conduct an independent inquiry into the defendant’s
competence whenever he makes specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence
of mental impairment. . . . Substantial evidence is a
term of art. Evidence encompasses all information
properly before the court, whether it is in the form of
testimony or exhibits formally admitted or it is in the
form of medical reports or other kinds of reports that
have been filed with the court. Evidence is substantial
if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s
competency . . . . The trial court should carefully
weigh the need for a hearing in each case, but this is not
to say that a hearing should be available on demand.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Norris, 213 Conn. App. 253, 268–69,
277 A.3d
839, cert. denied,
345 Conn. 910,
283 A.3d 980 (2022).
The defendant argues that the present case is factually analogous to State v. Dort, 315 Conn. 151,
106 A.3d
277 (2014), in which our Supreme Court affirmed this
court’s judgment, albeit on different grounds, reversing
a defendant’s judgment of conviction on the ground
that the trial court improperly denied his request for a
competency hearing. Id., 153–55. Our Supreme Court
concluded that the trial court in Dort abused its discretion in denying the motion for a competency evaluation
because it did not afford due weight to defense counsel’s statements in support of the motion and, instead,
relied heavily on a prior competency report concerning
the defendant. Id., 178. The court also reasoned that,
under the facts present, the trial court could not properly have relied on its own observations of the defendant over the representations made by defense counsel.
Id., 182.
We are not persuaded by the defendant’s reliance on
Dort. Unlike in Dort, the factual representations made
by defense counsel in support of the motion for a competency evaluation were less specific or detailed than
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State v. Randolph
those made by defense counsel in Dort. In Dort, defense
counsel made detailed allegations, including that the
defendant had a fundamental misunderstanding as to
‘‘ ‘what can be put forward as a defense in this case’ ’’
and that the defendant did not comprehend ‘‘ ‘the seriousness of the charges in light of the defense.’ ’’ Id.,
158. Defense counsel also stated that ‘‘ ‘attempting to
extrapolate the relevant information from [the defendant] in order for [counsel] to go forward with his
defense is virtually impossible.’ ’’ Id. Defense counsel
informed the court that the defendant did not comprehend the facts that were relevant to the state’s case.
Id., 159. Defense counsel stated that, ‘‘ ‘I cannot for the
life of me extrapolate much more in the way of facts
from him at this juncture.’ ’’ Id., 174–75.
In the present case, Attorney Coleman stated that
she had observed a ‘‘decompensation’’ in the defendant
since she began representing him in October, 2022.
Attorney Coleman’s opinion of the defendant’s mental
health appears from her statements to have been based
solely on just two discussions that she had with him,
one lasting forty-five minutes in October, 2022, and
another lasting forty minutes in November, 2022. In
terms of specific facts on which her opinion was based,
Attorney Coleman stated that there had been ‘‘a very
good offer’’ that the defendant refused to accept and
that he chose not to attend the trial that day.
These specific factual allegations are vastly different
than the type of representations made by the defense
counsel in Dort. In Dort, counsel’s representations were
related to the core concerns enunciated in Dusky,
namely, whether the defendant had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. State
v. Dort, supra, 315 Conn. 170–71, 182–83; Dusky v.
United States, supra,362 U.S. 402. Here, counsel related
that the defendant chose not to accept a plea offer, as
was his right. She also noted that he chose not to attend
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State v. Randolph
the trial, which was also his right. Although she disagreed with both of these decisions made by the defendant, they, viewed in isolation or in conjunction with
the other facts known to the court, do not reasonably
suggest that the defendant lacked an understanding of
the facts of the case or the nature of the proceeding.
It is also significant to note that, although Attorney
Coleman questioned whether the defendant could aid in
his defense, such belief appears to have been primarily
based on the fact that he chose not to attend the proceeding that day. Moreover, before raising the motion
for a competency evaluation, Attorney Coleman stated
her belief that the defendant understood the charges
against him.
Turning to other information known to the court, we
note that, unlike in Dort, in the present case there was
no evidence of a prior mental health evaluation on
which Judge Fischer relied. Instead, although Judge
Fischer did not canvass the defendant, he did engage
in a lengthy colloquy with the defendant with respect
to whether the defendant would participate remotely
in the hearing that day. Although, as the court aptly
stated, the defendant had engaged in disruptive behavior and repeatedly expressed both his dissatisfaction
with Attorney Coleman and his belief that she should
not be his attorney, such conduct and beliefs did not
necessarily reflect incompetency. See, e.g., State v. Glen
S., 207 Conn. App. 56, 77,
261 A.3d 805 (‘‘defendant’s
obstreperous, uncooperative or belligerent behavior
. . . and hostility toward [his] attorney [does] not necessarily indicate defendant’s incompetency’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 909,
264 A.3d 577 (2021), cert. denied, U.S. ,
142 S.
Ct. 2685,
212 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2022); State v. Johnson,
22 Conn. App. 477, 489,
578 A.2d 1085 (defendant’s
uncooperative behavior at trial, including refusal to
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State v. Randolph
return to court, did not require competency evaluation),
cert. denied, 216 Conn. 817,
580 A.2d 63 (1990). Unlike
in Dort, the record reflects that the court made reference to its own observations of the defendant’s behavior
when ruling on the motion for a competency evaluation.
In contrast with this court, the trial court was able to
observe his demeanor and converse with the defendant.
From our examination of the record, the trial court
reasonably could have determined that the defendant’s
statements to the court did not reflect an inability to
grasp the nature of the proceeding or the facts related
to the state’s case. There also is no indication that he
could not assist with his defense, only that he chose
not to do so because he and Attorney Coleman did not
‘‘see eye to eye’’ and he believed that she was ‘‘working
with the prosecution.’’ Furthermore, the record reflects
that the defendant made his decision not to cooperate
with and assist Attorney Coleman as early as his November 28, 2022 appearance before Judge Iannotti, long
before when Attorney Coleman became concerned
about his ‘‘decompensation.’’
In sum, the reasons underlying the court’s denial of
the motion for a competency evaluation in the present
case are distinguishable from those present in Dort.
Here, the court was not presented with specific facts
that pertained to the issue of his competency to stand
trial. Moreover, the court based its decision, in part, on
its observations of the defendant’s conduct that day.
Although Attorney Coleman questioned whether the
defendant could aid in his defense, our Supreme Court
has observed that ‘‘a trial court need not automatically
defer to the opinion of defense counsel on the matter
of the defendant’s competence . . . .’’ State v. Dort,
supra, 315 Conn. 182.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court
properly evaluated the motion for a competency evalua-
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State v. Randolph
tion and did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
