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State v. Barnes
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEFFREY BARNES
(AC 46513)
Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Cradle, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, who had previously been convicted, following a guilty plea,
of, inter alia, the crime of burglary in the second degree, filed a motion
for sentence modification pursuant to statute (§ 53a-39 (a)). Although
the defendant was living at a halfway house at the time he filed his
motion, by the time of the hearing before the trial court the defendant
was on special parole. The court dismissed the motion, finding that,
because the defendant was on special parole, the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the motion. On the defendant’s appeal to this
court, held that, although the trial court properly determined that the
defendant was not entitled to a modification of his sentence pursuant
to § 53a-39 (a) because he was no longer serving an ‘‘executed period
of incarceration,’’ the form of the judgment was improper; because the
language of § 53a-39 (a) providing that a trial court may act ‘‘at any time
during an executed period of incarceration’’ is a limit to the court’s
statutory authority, not its subject matter jurisdiction, the court should
have denied the defendant’s motion rather than dismissed it.
Argued May 30—officially released September 3, 2024
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of burglary in the second degree, criminal
mischief in the third degree, threatening in the second
degree, and assault of an elderly person in the second
degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, geographical area number fourteen,
where the defendant was presented to the court, Williams, J., on a plea of guilty to burglary in the second
degree; judgment of guilty in accordance with the plea;
thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the
remaining charges; subsequently, the court, Schuman,
J., dismissed the defendant’s motion for sentence modification, and the defendant appealed to this court.
Improper form of judgment; reversed; judgment
directed.
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State v. Barnes
Chad L. Edgar, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s
attorney, and Edward R. Azzaro, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
CRADLE, J. The defendant, Jeffrey Barnes, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, his motion for modification of his sentence pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-
39 (a).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
erred in determining that it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s motion because he
had been released on special parole and, therefore, was
no longer serving ‘‘an executed period of incarceration’’
as prescribed by § 53a-39 (a). We conclude that the
court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s motion but correctly concluded that the defendant was not entitled to
relief under § 53a-39 (a) because he was no longer serving an ‘‘executed period of incarceration.’’ The form of
the judgment is improper, as the court should have
denied rather than dismissed the motion. Accordingly,
we reverse the judgment dismissing the defendant’s
motion for modification and remand the case with direction to deny that motion.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In 2017, the defendant pleaded
guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree in
1
General Statutes § 53a-39 (a) provides: ‘‘Except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, at any time during an executed period of incarceration,
the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown,
reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant
discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed
that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.’’
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State v. Barnes
violation of General Statutes § 53a-102 and three counts
of burglary in the third degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-103. On November 27, 2017, the court,
Williams, J., imposed a total effective sentence of six
years of incarceration and five years of special parole.
On June 6, 2022, the defendant, through counsel, filed
the present motion for sentence modification, seeking
to have his sentence reduced to time served and either
elimination of his special parole or a reduction of it
to two years.2 At the time he filed his application for
sentence modification, the defendant was residing in
The Open Hearth, a halfway house, in Hartford. By
February 3, 2023, however, when the court, Schuman,
J., held a hearing on the defendant’s motion for sentence modification, the defendant had been released
on special parole. At the hearing, the court raised the
question of ‘‘whether this is a motion within the meaning
of paragraph (a) of [§ 53a-39] that would authorize the
court at ‘any time during an executed period of incarceration’ to modify the sentence,’’ explaining that, because
the defendant ‘‘has completed his incarceration and is
now on special parole,’’ the court had ‘‘a question as
to whether [it could] hear this motion because it’s not
‘any time during an executed period of incarceration.’ ’’
The court heard argument from the parties on this issue
of subject matter jurisdiction and then issued an order
for the parties to submit memoranda on it.
On March 1, 2023, after memoranda had been submitted by both parties, the court held a limited hearing on
the question of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s motion for sentence modification. On March 9, 2023, the court issued a memorandum of decision, dismissing the defendant’s motion for
2
On his motion, the defendant checked the box that indicated that he
sought modification of his sentence by ‘‘suspending execution of the unexecuted portion of the jail sentence.’’ He also asked that his sentence be
modified by ‘‘re-sentencing the defendant to a total effective sentence of
time served and changing special parole to probation.’’
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State v. Barnes
sentence modification. In so doing, the court noted
that ‘‘[t]here is no statutory definition of the phrase
‘executed period of incarceration.’ . . . The term ‘executed’ in the phrase ‘executed period of incarceration’
generally refers to the time when the defendant is in
custody, as opposed to ‘unexecuted’ or ‘suspended,’
when a defendant is released on probation or conditional discharge. . . . The ordinary meaning of the
term ‘incarceration’ is ‘confinement in a jail or prison.’ ’’
(Citations omitted.) The court then concluded that,
‘‘when read as a whole, the phrase ‘executed period of
incarceration’ refers to a time when a person is in custody in a jail or prison’’ and that ‘‘that period of time
does not include the time when a person is released
on special parole.’’
The court also noted, however, that subsection ‘‘(a)
of § 53a-39, under which this case arises, stands in contrast to [subsection] (b), pursuant to which a court has
authority to modify a sentence at any time during the
period of a sentence in which a defendant has been
sentenced prior to, on or after October 1, 2021, to . . .
an executed period of incarceration of more than seven
years as a result of a plea agreement3 . . . . [Subsection] (b) would apparently allow the court to modify a
sentence while the defendant is on probation, conditional discharge, or special parole following a seven
year or more term of incarceration. Although the reasoning for the different language used in [subsections]
3
General Statutes § 53a-39 (b) provides: ‘‘On and after October 1, 2021,
at any time during the period of a sentence in which a defendant has been
sentenced prior to, on or after October 1, 2021, to an executed period of
incarceration of more than seven years as a result of a plea agreement,
including an agreement in which there is an agreed upon range of sentence,
upon agreement of the defendant and the state’s attorney to seek review
of the sentence, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for
good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged,
or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge
for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been
originally sentenced.’’
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State v. Barnes
(a) and (b) is not clear or obvious, the court must
construe the statute so that no word, phrase, or clause
will be rendered meaningless.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; footnote added; footnotes omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) The court, therefore, concluded that the differently worded subsections of the
statute have different meanings and held that, ‘‘[b]ecause
the defendant was on special parole and not incarcerated at the time that the court heard this motion . . .
the court lacks jurisdiction to act on the motion.’’ This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant challenges the court’s interpretation of § 53a-39 (a). ‘‘The defendant’s claim raises
a question of statutory interpretation, over which our
review is plenary. . . . Relevant legislation and precedent guide the process of statutory interpretation.’’
(Citation omitted.) State v. Boyd, 272 Conn. 72, 76,
861
A.2d 1155 (2004). ‘‘[T]o ascertain and give effect to the
apparent intent of the legislature . . . General Statutes
§ 1-2z directs this court to first consider the text of the
statute and its relationship to other statutes to determine its meaning. If, after such consideration, the meaning is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd
or unworkable results, we shall not consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute. . . . Only
if we determine that the statute is not plain and unambiguous or yields absurd or unworkable results may we
consider extratextual evidence of its meaning such as
the legislative history and circumstances surrounding
its enactment . . . [and] the legislative policy it was
designed to implement . . . . The test to determine
ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context,
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Bischoff, 337 Conn. 739, 746,
258 A.3d 14 (2021); see
also General Statutes § 1-2z. ‘‘In determining whether
the plain language of [a statute] leads to an absurd or
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State v. Barnes
unworkable result, we are limited to considering its
plain language and its relationship to other statutes.’’
State v. Bischoff, supra, 759.
We have recognized that ‘‘[a] cardinal rule of statutory
construction is that where the words of a statute . . .
are plain and unambiguous the intent of the [drafters]
in enacting the statute . . . is to be derived from the
words used. . . . Where the court is provided with a
clearly written rule, it need look no further for interpretive guidance. . . . It is our duty to interpret statutes
as they are written. . . . Courts cannot, by construction, read into statutes provisions which are not clearly
stated. . . . The legislature is quite aware of how to
use language when it wants to express its intent to
qualify or limit the operation of a statute.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fetscher, 162 Conn.
App. 145, 152,
130 A.3d 892 (2015), cert. denied,
321
Conn. 904,
138 A.3d 280 (2016). ‘‘Simply put, [i]t is the
duty of the court to interpret statutes as they are written
. . . and not by construction read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 154.
The defendant, through his counsel, conceded at oral
argument before this court that the language of § 53a-
39 (a) ‘‘doesn’t have a patent ambiguity’’ as to the phrase
‘‘an executed period of incarceration.’’ The defendant
acknowledges, and we agree, that ‘‘a plain reading of
§ 53a-39 (a) may lead to the conclusion that the movant
must be incarcerated or otherwise under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction during the entire
course of the proceedings . . . .’’ He nevertheless challenges the court’s interpretation of the statutory language on the ground that it ‘‘would collide with the
spirit of the statute as a whole and the legislative history
and circumstances that led to its recent amendment.’’4
4
Section 53a-39 was amended by No. 21-102, § 25, of the 2021 Public Acts
and by No. 22-36, § 1, of the 2022 Public Acts. These amendments expanded
the authority of the court to grant certain motions for sentence modification.
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State v. Barnes
He contends that ‘‘it is clear that [§ 53a-39] (a) is
intended to be the more broadly inclusive provision that
permits a wide range of movants to seek modification
of their sentences. . . . In light of the clear intent of
[§] 53a-39 (a), as amended, to provide a wide avenue
of redress for defendants and the role of [§] 53a-39 (b)
to provide a limited constraint thereto, it makes no
sense that the legislature also intended [§] 53a-39 (b), as
amended, to give courts broader jurisdiction to modify
sentences than is the case under [§] 53a-39 (a).’’ (Citations omitted.) The defendant contends that, because
‘‘the amended version of [§] 53a-39 (a) was clearly
intended to expand the previous version of [subsection]
(a) in all respects, it must be that the legislature
intended the court’s jurisdiction to be at least as robust
as in the previous version; therefore, it intended the
court’s jurisdiction to include . . . those movants . . .
on . . . special parole.’’ We disagree.
The language used by the legislature in § 53a-39 (b),5
which provides for sentence modification ‘‘at any time
during the period of a sentence in which a defendant
has been sentenced,’’ supports the conclusion that the
legislature intended relief under § 53a-39 (a) to be more
limited in that it demonstrates that the legislature knew
how to broaden the window within which a defendant
may seek relief if it intended to do so. In other words,
if the legislature intended § 53a-39 (a) to apply to defendants on special parole, it knew how to effectuate that
Specifically, prior revisions of § 53a-39 (b) required defendants serving ‘‘a
definite sentence of more than three years’’ to obtain agreement of the
state’s attorney before the court could rule on their motions for sentence
modification. General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-39 (b). Now, after the
amendments in 2021 and 2022, only a defendant serving ‘‘an executed period
of incarceration of more than seven years as a result of a plea agreement’’
must obtain such agreement. General Statutes § 53a-39 (b). In 2023, the
legislature made further changes to § 53a-39 that are not relevant to this
appeal. See Public Acts 2023, No. 23-47, § 1.
5
The court held and the parties do not dispute that § 53a-39 (a) applies
to the defendant’s motion for sentence modification.
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State v. Barnes
intent. Indeed, in amending § 53a-39 (a), the legislature
could have replaced the ‘‘during an executed period of
incarceration’’ language in § 53a-39 (a) to mirror the
language that it used in § 53a-39 (b), but it chose not
to do so. We therefore reject the defendant’s argument
that the language used in § 53a-39 (b) supports an
expansive reading of the plain and unambiguous language of § 53a-39 (a).6
Further, subsections (a) and (b) of § 53a-39 apply in
very different circumstances. Unlike § 53a-39 (a), § 53a-
39 (b) applies only to defendants who have been sentenced to ‘‘an executed period of incarceration of more
than seven years as a result of a plea agreement . . . .’’
In addition, § 53a-39 (b) requires the agreement of the
state’s attorney for the defendant to seek modification
of his sentence. By contrast, the court has the authority
to consider a motion to modify a sentence under § 53a-
39 (a) even if the state’s attorney opposes the motion.
It is not absurd to infer that the legislature could reasonably have meant to grant the court broader authority
to modify the sentences of defendants covered by § 53a-
39 (b) because the state’s attorney has agreed to the
court’s review of those sentences for modification.
Because we cannot conclude that the plain and unambiguous language of § 53a-39 (a) leads to an absurd or
unworkable result, we decline to consider extratextual
sources. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
properly determined that the defendant was not entitled
6
The defendant also argues that, even if he was not entitled to relief under
§ 53a-39 as a special parolee, his eligibility should have been considered as
of the date that he filed his motion for sentence modification, at which time
he was in The Open Hearth halfway house. The court assumed that, at
that time, the defendant was serving an ‘‘executed period of incarceration’’
because he was still in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction. See
General Statutes § 18-100 (e). The language of § 53a-39 (a), however, is
framed so as to provide when a court may afford relief and states that it
may only do so during the time that a movant is serving an executed period
of incarceration.
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State v. Barnes
to a modification of his sentence under § 53a-39 (a)
because he was no longer serving an ‘‘executed period
of incarceration.’’7
We agree, however, with the defendant that the court
improperly dismissed his motion for sentence modification for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Our Supreme
Court has ‘‘recognized the distinction between a trial
court’s jurisdiction and its authority to act under a particular statute. Subject matter jurisdiction involves the
authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . A court
does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has
competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once
it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action
belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is
resolved in favor of entertaining the action. . . .
Although related, the court’s authority to act pursuant
to a statute is different from its subject matter jurisdiction. The power of the court to hear and determine,
which is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused
7
The defendant also argues that ‘‘other trial courts have presided over
proceedings where movants sought a sentence modification pursuant to [§]
53a-39 while on special parole’’ and cites to State v. Farhad, Docket No.
CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2023 WL 2384806 (Conn. Super. February 14, 2023), as an
example. In Farhad, the defendant was on special parole at the time of the
court’s ruling, but the court nonetheless denied his motion for sentence
modification on the basis of his failure to establish good cause to modify
his sentence, rather than on the basis of the court’s lack of authority to
grant the motion. Id., *2. We note, however, that, although subsection (a)
of § 53a-39 would have been applicable to the defendant’s claim in Farhad,
given that he had been serving ‘‘a sentence of five years followed by five
years of special parole’’ as the result of a negotiated plea; see id., *1; the
court did not specify whether it was acting pursuant to § 53a-39 (a) or (b)
in reviewing the defendant’s motion. In fact, the court simply referenced
§ 53a-39 generally. It therefore is unclear if the question of the court’s
authority to modify the sentence of a special parolee was considered by
the court in Farhad. We therefore cannot conclude that the court’s decision
in Farhad supports the defendant’s position here. Moreover, any legal conclusions drawn by the trial court in Farhad are not binding on this court.
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State v. Barnes
with the way in which that power must be exercised in
order to comply with the terms of the statute.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Wolfork v. Yale Medical
Group, 335 Conn. 448, 463,
239 A.3d 272 (2020).
Our courts ‘‘consistently have held that under the
common law a trial court has the discretionary power
to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the
sentence has been executed. . . . [But] the court loses
jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the [C]ommissioner of [C]orrection and begins serving the sentence. . . . After this
occurs, the trial court has jurisdiction to modify or
vacate the criminal judgment if the legislature or the
state constitution grants continuing jurisdiction.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Ward, 341 Conn. 142, 149,
266 A.3d 807 (2021). ‘‘[T]he
legislature has granted criminal courts continuing statutory authority to make changes to a duly imposed sentence in two ways. First, the legislature has authorized
the courts to conduct sentence review pursuant to General Statutes § 51-196. Second, a criminal defendant may
seek sentence modification of or discharge from his
sentence pursuant to § 53a-39.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)
State v. Martin G., 222 Conn. App. 395, 406–407,
305
A.3d 324 (2023), cert. denied,
348 Conn. 944,
308 A.3d
34 (2024).
Through the enactment of § 53a-39, the legislature has
determined that a court has competence to entertain
sentence modifications and, thus, has conferred upon
the court jurisdiction to modify a sentence. The statutory language that a court may act ‘‘at any time during
an executed period of incarceration’’ is a limit to the
court’s statutory authority, not its subject matter jurisdiction. Although we agree with the defendant that the
trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over his
motion to modify his sentence, we conclude that the
court did not have authority to afford the defendant
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State v. Barnes
relief under § 53a-39 (a) because he had been released
on special parole and was no longer serving an executed
period of incarceration. Accordingly, the court should
have denied the defendant’s motion, not dismissed it.
The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment
is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to
render judgment denying the defendant’s motion for
sentence modification.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
