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Middletown v. Wagner
CITY OF MIDDLETOWN v. JUSTIN WAGNER ET AL.
(AC 46940)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Suarez, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment vesting in the plaintiff
city ownership of certain dogs seized from a barn that was leased by the
defendant and J, after the court found that the dogs were neglected. The
defendant claimed, inter alia, that his rights under the fourth amendment
to the United States constitution were violated because the evidence presented did not permit a finding that the police reasonably believed a warrantless entry was necessary to help an animal in immediate need of assistance. Held:
The trial court properly applied the applicable statute (§ 22-329a (a)) in
denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, and, because the evidence
supported the court’s finding that the plaintiff’s animal control officers
reasonably concluded that the dogs confined in the barn were in imminent
harm and were neglected, the warrantless search did not violate the defendant’s rights under the fourth amendment.
The applicable statutes (§§ 22-329a and 53-247) afforded the defendant and
J adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited thereby, and, accordingly,
the defendant failed to demonstrate that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague.
This court declined to review the defendant’s inadequately briefed claim
that the police did not provide J with fair notice of the law because they
failed to notify her that the lack of ventilation in the barn constituted neglect
under § 22-329a.
The trial court applied the proper legal standard in determining that the
dogs in the barn, having been neglected by the defendant and J, were properly
subject to a warrantless seizure pursuant to § 22-329a (a) because it was
clear from the plain language of § 53-247 that the neglect referred to in § 22-
329a included neglect committed by individuals, not just neglect committed
by commercial kennels or large breeding operations.
The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the dogs
in the barn were neglected because, pursuant to § 22-329a, the plaintiff
demonstrated that the defendant and J failed to supply the dogs with wholesome air, food and water.
Argued March 7—officially released September 24, 2024
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Middletown v. Wagner
Procedural History
Verified petition seeking, inter alia, custody in favor
of the plaintiff of certain animals taken from the defendants’ possession that were allegedly neglected, and for
other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Middlesex, where the court, Shah, J., granted
the plaintiff’s application for an order to show cause,
vesting temporary care and custody of the defendants’
animals in the plaintiff; thereafter, the named defendant
filed a motion for the return of his property and to
suppress evidence; subsequently, the matter was tried
to the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial
referee; judgment denying the named defendant’s
motion to suppress and granting the plaintiff’s petition
in part; thereafter, the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial referee, denied the motion for a new trial
filed by the named defendant, and the named defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Justin Wagner, self-represented, the appellant
(named defendant).
Kori Termine Wisneski, deputy general counsel, for
the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. In this animal welfare action, the self-represented defendant Justin Wagner1 appeals from the
judgment of the trial court vesting ownership of the
dogs seized from a barn leased by the defendant and
Destiny Jennings, together with the puppies subsequently born to those dogs, in the plaintiff, the city of
Middletown, after it found that the dogs were neglected.
On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court
erred when it denied the defendant’s motion to return
property and suppress evidence obtained pursuant to
1
Destiny Jennings was also named as a defendant in the underlying action
but is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, all references in this opinion
to the defendant are to Wagner only. The defendant represented himself in
both the trial court and this court.
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Middletown v. Wagner
a warrantless search and seizure of the property, (2)
General Statutes §§ 22-329a and 53-247,2 as applied to
the defendant and Jennings, are void for vagueness, (3)
the police did not provide Jennings with fair notice of
the law, (4) the court did not apply the proper legal
standard, and (5) there was insufficient evidence presented at the hearing to support a finding that the dogs
in the barn were neglected.3 We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The following facts, as set forth in the court’s August
21, 2023 memorandum of decision, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. ‘‘On
2
Although § 22-329a has been amended by the legislature since the events
underlying this appeal; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-149, § 5; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of
simplicity, unless otherwise indicated, we refer to the current revision of
the statute.
Although § 53-247 has been amended by the legislature since the events
underlying this appeal; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-149, § 7; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of
simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
3
In his appellate brief, the defendant raised eight claims of error related
to the trial court’s August 21, 2023 judgment and two claims of error relating
to the court’s September 20, 2023 order denying his motion for a new trial.
Specifically, the defendant characterized his claims of error as follows: (a)
‘‘[t]he court erred when it improperly denied [the defendant’s] motion to
return property and suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless
search and seizure’’; (b) ‘‘[t]he court erred in concluding [§] 22-329a authorized a warrantless search and seizure as [there is] no objective evidence on
the record to support the court’s conclusion that a reasonable officer would
determine the dogs were both in ‘imminent harm and neglected’ ’’; (c) ‘‘the
court was persuaded to erroneously apply [§ 22-329a], when it omitted the
statutory requirement of being ‘neglected’ ’’; (d) ‘‘[t]he statutory language
of [§] 53-247 is impermissibly vague when applied to the specific facts of
the case’’; (e) the ‘‘[p]olice . . . did not provide . . . Jennings with fair
notice of law’’; (f) ‘‘[t]he court abused its discretion when it applied an
improper legal standard’’; (g) ‘‘[t]he false statements provided by [Animal
Control Officer Gail] Petras should be enough to grant the [defendant and
Jennings] a new trial, as it’s clear the false statements [affected] the court’s
conclusion’’; (h) ‘‘[t]he new evidence, specifically the police body camera
footage, should be enough to grant the [defendant and Jennings] a new
trial’’; (i) ‘‘[t]he [judgment] is not supported by the clear weight of the
evidence, as there is no proof on the record of the dogs being deprived,
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Middletown v. Wagner
June 27, 2023, the Middletown Police Department
responded to a domestic violence call at 797 Washington Street, [in] Middletown . . . . [The defendant] was
arrested and taken into custody as a result of the incident. The police officers found the house on the premises to be in very poor condition. In response to these
conditions, the police officers contacted the Department of Health, and the department condemned the
home as unfit for human occupancy. The two dogs in
the house, a German shepherd named Leanna and a
golden retriever named Ruby, were placed with a neighbor that night. The neighbor later decided he could not
care for the dogs, and he turned them over to an animal
control officer.
‘‘On the evening of June 27, 2023 . . . Jennings left
the premises with her minor child to go stay with a
relative in Massachusetts. Before she left the premises,
Jennings informed the police officers that there were
three dogs in a padlocked barn behind the house and
that two of the dogs were pregnant. She told the police
officers that she did not have a key for the padlock,
and she would not allow the police officers to enter
the barn. The next day, June 28, [2023, the defendant]
was still in custody and Jennings had not returned to the
and because the substantial evidence contradicts the allegation of ‘neglect’ ’’;
and (j) ‘‘[t]he court abused its discretion because the [judgment] is not
supported by any empirical or objective evidence, nor by substantial evidence.’’
The defendant has not appealed from or amended his appeal to include
the court’s September 20, 2023 order denying his motion for a new trial.
Accordingly, we will not review the defendant’s claims related to the September 20, 2023 court order. See OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Ceslik, 202 Conn. App.
445, 465–66,
246 A.3d 18 (declining to review claim because defendant did
not appeal from or amend appeal to include court’s denial of motion related
thereto), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 936,
249 A.3d 39 (2021). We have reframed
the defendant’s remaining claims, in some instances condensing closely
related claims, to more accurately reflect the arguments in the defendant’s
brief. See, e.g., Doe v. Quinnipiac University, 218 Conn. App. 170, 173 n.4,
291 A.3d 153 (2023).
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Middletown v. Wagner
premises. The animal control officers were concerned
about the conditions in the barn because it was their
understanding that the dogs had not been tended to
since the previous morning. The officers attempted to
contact Jennings without success.
‘‘On the afternoon of June 28, [2023] the weather was
hot and humid with temperatures in the mid-eighties.
The officers returned to the premises because they were
concerned about the condition of the dogs locked inside
the barn. The officers understood that the dogs in the
barn had been left unattended for at least thirty-six
hours. Police officers broke the door frame and entered
the barn. It is undisputed that they did not have a warrant. The barn floor was covered in urine and feces and
there was a strong smell of ammonia and feces that
affected the officers’ breathing. The officers reported
a burning sensation in their eyes and noses from the
strong smell in the barn. There was no active ventilation
in the barn.
‘‘There were five dogs in the barn, all German shepherds. [The defendant] later provided the names of the
dogs and they can be referred to here. Deacon and Ruby
were running free in the barn. Mitzi was chained to a
post in the barn with two padlocks on her collar. Mitzi
was confirmed to be pregnant. Because of the way Mitzi
was chained, the officers were concerned that the dog
could wrap the chain around the post and be strangled.
These three dogs did not have access to water or food.
‘‘Two other German shepherds, Luna and Lily, both
pregnant, were located within a fenced off area of the
barn. Lily had an injury above her eye. These two dogs
did not have access to food, they did have access to
water. The fur on the dogs was wet and matted and
smelled of urine. All five dogs were taken into the custody of the animal control officer. After they were taken
into custody, the three pregnant German shepherds
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Middletown v. Wagner
delivered a total of twenty-two puppies, of which, nineteen have survived.
‘‘On [June] 30, 2023, an animal control officer also
took custody of three corgi puppies, approximately ten
weeks old, that were kept in the basement of the house.
The names of the puppies were not part of the evidence.
Jennings did not inform the animal control officers of
these puppies before she left the premises. These puppies were left unattended until Jennings asked her
neighbor to retrieve them. The neighbor turned the puppies over to animal control on June 30, 2023.’’
On July 11, 2023, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 22-329a,
filed an application for an order to show cause and a
verified petition as to the custody of the dogs seized
from the property leased by the defendant and Jennings.
In its petition, the plaintiff requested, inter alia, orders
that (1) the dogs and unborn puppies at issue were
neglected and/or were treated cruelly in violation of
§ 53-247, (2) the court vest temporary and permanent
ownership and custody of the dogs and unborn puppies
with the plaintiff pursuant to § 22-329a (g), and (3) the
defendant and Jennings, pursuant to § 22-329a (h), pay
the plaintiff the expenses incurred in providing proper
food, shelter, and care to the dogs of which it took
custody under § 22-329a. On July 12, 2023, the court,
Shah, J., granted the plaintiff’s application for an order
to show cause, vesting temporary care and custody of
the dogs in the plaintiff, and scheduled an evidentiary
hearing within fourteen days.
On July 19, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for the
return of his property and to suppress evidence. In his
motion, the defendant argued that the officers’ entry
into the locked barn and the seizure of the dogs therein
violated his rights under the fourth amendment to the
United States constitution because the police did not
have a warrant to enter the barn or probable cause that
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Middletown v. Wagner
any crime was being committed that would allow them
to enter the barn. On July 24, 2023, the plaintiff filed
an objection to the defendant’s motion to suppress. The
plaintiff argued that the officers’ decision to enter the
barn did not constitute an illegal search under the fourth
amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that § 22-
329a authorizes warrantless searches and seizures
when, as in the present case, an animal control officer
has reasonable cause to believe that an animal is in
imminent harm and neglected, or cruelly treated. The
plaintiff also argued that, even if a warrant were
required, the officers’ decision to enter the barn fell
within the consent and exigent circumstance exceptions to the warrant requirement.
On July 26, 2023, the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial referee, held an evidentiary hearing on
the plaintiff’s petition and the defendant’s motion to
suppress. The court heard testimony from Animal Control Officer Gail Petras, the defendant, and Jennings.
The plaintiff offered multiple photographs, which were
admitted into evidence, that documented the conditions
of the house and barn leased by the defendant and
Jennings, and the dogs found therein, along with a bill
for the veterinary expenses for the dogs. The defendant
and Jennings also offered photographs of the exterior
of the barn, which were admitted into evidence, that
depicted one open window, high on the gable end of
the barn.
On August 21, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision in which it granted the plaintiff’s petition,
in part, and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.
The court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish
that the dogs in the defendant’s and Jennings’ home,
including the three corgi puppies, were neglected as
required by § 22-329a. The court, however, found that
the five dogs in the barn were neglected under § 22-
329a. The court also concluded that, because it found
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Middletown v. Wagner
that the pregnant dogs in the barn were neglected, it
followed that the unborn puppies those dogs were carrying were likewise neglected. The court reasoned that
‘‘[t]he dogs had been left confined and unattended for
approximately thirty-six hours when the weather was
hot and humid. [Petras] was present when police officers entered the padlocked barn. She testified as to the
unwholesome and unsanitary conditions in the barn.
. . . Petras also testified as to the condition and appearance of the five dogs in the barn.
‘‘At the hearing, [the defendant] and Jennings stated
that the conditions in the house and barn were the result
of a ‘bad day.’ The court does not find [the defendant
or] Jennings to be credible on this issue. [Petras] testified that the conditions in the barn did not come about
in only one day. The court has considered the testimony
of [Petras] related to the conditions in the barn and
the animals therein. The court finds the testimony of
[Petras], as supported by the submitted exhibits, to be
credible.’’ (Citation omitted.)
Regarding the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence related to the police officers’ entry into the locked
barn, the court stated that it was unpersuaded by the
defendant’s arguments. The court noted that § 22-329a
(a) allows an animal control officer to act and enter
property to take custody of an animal when that animal
is in imminent harm and is neglected. The court concluded that the circumstances that existed on June 27,
2023, met the requirement of imminent harm provided
for in the statute. The court stated that, ‘‘[a]t the time
the officers entered the barn on the afternoon of June
28, 2023, it was their understanding that the dogs had
been confined and left unattended for at least thirty-six hours. The officers attempted to contact Jennings
without success. [The defendant] was still in custody
from the earlier arrest. The officers had not been
informed that someone was coming to unlock the barn
and tend to the dogs. . . . Because of the high levels of
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Middletown v. Wagner
temperature and humidity, the officers were concerned
that the dogs did not have adequate ventilation, water,
or food. . . . [U]nder §§ 22-329a and 53-247, failure to
supply confined animals wholesome air, food, and
water constitutes neglect.’’ (Citations omitted.) Accordingly, the court issued the following orders: ‘‘(1) The
dogs in the barn . . . together with the nineteen puppies . . . are found to be neglected and the court vests
ownership of these dogs and puppies in [the plaintiff].
(2) The dogs in the house . . . and the three . . . corgi
puppies, are found not to be neglected and may be
returned to an agent of the [defendant and Jennings]
. . . . (3) The [defendant and Jennings] are to pay the
[plaintiff] the sum of $1062.50 for veterinary expenses.
(4) The [defendant and Jennings] are to pay the [plaintiff] $19,020 for expenses for the care and custody of
the dogs found to be neglected.’’
On August 29, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for
a new trial and a memorandum of law in support of
his motion. On September 6, 2023, the plaintiff filed an
objection to the defendant’s motion. On September 18,
2023, the court held a hearing on the defendant’s
motion, and, on September 20, 2023, the court issued
an order denying the defendant’s motion. This appeal
followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court erred when
it improperly denied his motion to return property and
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless
search and seizure. Specifically, the defendant argues
that his constitutional rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution were violated
because the evidence presented at the hearing ‘‘did not
permit a finding that the police reasonably believed a
warrantless entry was necessary to help an animal in
immediate need of assistance.’’ The defendant also
asserts that there was ‘‘no objective evidence on the
record to support the court’s conclusion that a reason-
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Middletown v. Wagner
able officer would determine the dogs were both in
‘imminent harm and neglected.’ ’’ The defendant further
contends that the court improperly applied § 22-329a
in denying his motion to suppress because it omitted
the statutory requirement that the officers have reason
to believe the confined animals were neglected. We are
not persuaded.
The following legal principles and additional procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. ‘‘As a general matter, the standard of
review for a motion to suppress is well settled. A finding
of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous
in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole
record. . . . [W]hen a question of fact is essential to
the outcome of a particular legal determination that
implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights, [however] and the credibility of witnesses is not the primary
issue, our customary deference to the trial court’s factual findings is tempered by a scrupulous examination
of the record to ascertain that the trial court’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence. . . .
[W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine
whether they are legally and logically correct and
whether they find support in the facts set out in the
memorandum of decision. . . . Moreover, [i]t is by
now well settled that, in order to determine whether
the defendant’s constitutional rights have been
infringed, [w]e review the record in its entirety and are
not limited to the evidence before the trial court at the
time the ruling was made on the motion to suppress.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Leuders, 225 Conn. App. 612, 632–33,
317 A.3d
69 (2024).
The defendant does not dispute that, by virtue of
§ 22-329 (a), an animal control officer may lawfully take
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Middletown v. Wagner
physical custody of an animal if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the animal is in imminent
harm and is neglected or cruelly treated. Nor does he
claim that an imminent threat to the animals would not
justify a warrantless search under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution.4 He asserts,
instead, that the evidence and circumstances of this
case do not satisfy the imminent harm standard under
§ 22-329a (a) and, therefore, that the animal control
officers were required to obtain a warrant, pursuant
to § 22-329a (b) and the fourth amendment, prior to
entering the barn and taking custody of any animal on
the property. We disagree.
Section 22-329a is titled ‘‘Seizure and custody of
neglected or cruelly treated animals.’’ It provides in
relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any animal control officer . . . may
take physical custody of any animal when such animal
control officer has reasonable cause to believe that
such animal is in imminent harm and is neglected or
is cruelly treated in violation of section 22-366, 22-415,
53-247, 53-248, 53-249, 53-249a, 53-250, 53-251, 53-252
or 53a-73b, and, not later than ninety-six hours after
taking physical custody, shall proceed as provided in
subsection (c) of this section . . . .’’ General Statutes
§ 22-329a (a). Subsection (c) of § 22-329a provides in
relevant part: ‘‘Such officer shall file with the superior
court which has venue over such matter or with the
4
The law is clear that ‘‘[t]he fourth amendment does not bar police officers,
when responding to emergencies, from making warrantless entries into
premises and warrantless searches when they reasonably believe that a
person within is in need of immediate aid.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeMarco, 311 Conn. 510, 535,
88 A.3d 491
(2014). As this court recently noted though, neither our Supreme Court nor
this court has addressed whether the imminent threat of harm to a nonhuman
animal justifies a warrantless search. See State v. Leuders, supra, 225 Conn.
App. 636 n.22. Courts in other states that have considered the issue have
held that the risk of imminent harm to a nonhuman animal constitutes
exigent circumstances under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 Mass. 746, 751–54,
7 N.E.3d 469, cert. denied,
574
U.S. 891,
135 S. Ct. 224,
190 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2014); State v. Fessenden, 355
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Middletown v. Wagner
superior court for the judicial district of Hartford at
Hartford a verified petition plainly stating such facts of
neglect or cruel treatment as to bring such animal within
the jurisdiction of the court and praying for appropriate
action by the court in accordance with the provisions
of this section. . . .’’5 It is clear from the plain language
of § 22-329a that an animal control officer may take
physical custody of an animal when the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that such animal is in imminent harm and is neglected or cruelly treated. In such
circumstances, a warrant is unnecessary. As previously
noted in this opinion, the defendant does not claim that
the statutory imminent harm requirement is incompatible with or different from the immediate aid or exigent
circumstances requirements for warrantless searches
under the fourth amendment. Once an animal control
officer takes physical custody of such animal, she must
then seek court intervention within ninety-six hours.6
Or. 759, 775–76,
333 P.3d 278 (2014). Because the defendant has not argued
otherwise, we need not resolve that question in this case.
5
We note that, in nonemergency circumstances, an animal control officer
must first obtain a warrant, pursuant to § 22-329a (b), in order to take
physical custody of an animal. Specifically, General Statutes § 22-329a (b)
provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any animal control officer . . . may take physical
custody of any animal upon issuance of a warrant finding probable cause
that such animal is neglected or is cruelly treated in violation of section 22-
366, 22-415, 53-247, 53-248, 53-249, 53-249a, 53-250, 53-251, 53-252 or 53a-
73b, and shall thereupon proceed as provided in subsection (c) of this
section . . . .’’
6
In Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, 211 Conn. App. 537, 548–51,
274
A.3d 203 (2022), this court had occasion to discuss the legislative history
underlying § 22-329 (a). Although we need not resort to the statute’s legislative history to resolve the issues presented in the present case, this court’s
prior discussion of the legislative history provides useful background: ‘‘The
legislative history of § 22-329a reveals that the 2007 amendment to that
statute; see Public Acts 2007, No. 07-230, § 1; substantially revised it in
response to Judge Berger’s criticism of the prior version of the statute in
State ex rel. Griffin v. Thirteen Horses, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2006
WL 1828459 (Conn. Super. June 16, 2006). In that decision, Judge Berger
noted that portions of the statute were ‘difficult to understand because if
the court has found probable cause to believe that an animal is neglected
or cruelly treated, then leaving the animal in the owner’s custody pending
a hearing would only perpetuate its suffering. . . . One could argue that
. . . the legislature did not intend to require a judicial finding in advance
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of the seizure . . . . If the legislature does intend to vest the seizure decision
in the animal control officer, rather than in the court, the statute should be
redrafted accordingly, with provisions for immediate filing of the petition
and a speedy hearing.’ . . . Id., *4–5. Judge Berger concluded with respect
to the prior revision of the statute that, ‘despite the deficiencies of the statute,
the state successfully complied with its twofold obligation of obtaining a
judicial determination of reasonable cause prior to seizure . . . and following the filing process . . . . The state obtained the search and seizure warrant from the court . . . and filed its petition with the court . . . .’ Id., *5.
‘‘When discussing the 2007 amendment on the floor of the House of
Representatives, Representative Gerry Fox explained the origins of the
amendment: ‘This bill came to us from the Commissioner of Agriculture
and requested a change to the way that animal control officers currently
handle situations where animals are treated cruelly or neglected. Presently,
when an animal control officer sees a situation that may appear to be
dangerous to an animal, they’re required to go to court and get a warrant.
What this would allow is if there’s reasonable cause to believe that an animal
[is] in imminent harm of being cruelly or negligently treated, the animal
control officer may, at that time, seize the animal.’ 50 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25,
2007 Sess., p. 8077, remarks of Representative Gerry Fox. In support of the
legislation, Representative Urban stated: ‘This bill makes it much easier
when there is an animal that is being subjected to cruel treatment or a cruel
situation to get in and to mitigate that situation and be able to move the
horse, the dog, the cat, the puppy, whatever it happens to be, out of that
situation and into a place where they will be able to receive the treatment
they need.’ Id., pp. 8078–79, remarks of Representative Diana Urban. In the
judiciary committee, the then Commissioner of Agriculture, F. Philip Prelli,
explained that ‘the Department of Agriculture is the lead agency in investigation of animal cruelty and negligence. . . . Even if it’s done on a local
level, the department is involved with those. The primary purpose of [this]
legislative proposal is to better define and clarify the section to enable
animal control officers to take physical custody of animals that animal
control officers have a reasonable cause to believe are in imminent harm
and/or are neglected or being cruelly treated. One of the things that we’ve
noticed about the law that’s there, it’s been a while since it’s been modified,
and the language tends to be language that was written a number of years
ago. . . . Usually, the animal control officers will go in there and try to
work with the people to either get the animals fed, get the treatment up
right, so they’re treated correctly, and then go to the steps. And if they still
feel they need to take those steps, they will get a warrant first. So the steps
that we’re defining here are never going to be the norm. But there are times
when our animal control officers will see an animal that is truly in jeopardy
of dying, and we’ve seen that. We’ve seen horses down, and we’ve seen
cows down, where we’ve had to try to seize those animals and then go and
get the court order. So what this does is then sets up the procedure that
will give us the opportunity to seize the animals. Then within [ninety-six]
hours, we will have to get a court order . . . .’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 14, 2007 Sess., pp. 4422–23, remarks of Commissioner of Agriculture F. Philip Prelli.
‘‘According to the legislative history, the process in § 22-329a (a) for taking
physical custody of animals in imminent harm is not the norm. Rather, the
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In its memorandum of decision, the court denied the
defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that ‘‘[t]he
circumstances that existed on June 27, 2023, as testified
to by [Petras], met the requirement of imminent harm
provided for in [§ 22-329a (a)].’’ The court reasoned
that, ‘‘[o]n June 27, 2023, Jennings told the officers that
there were three dogs in the barn. One of the dogs
was an aggressive male and the other two dogs were
pregnant. At the time the officers entered the barn on
the afternoon of June 28, 2023, it was their understanding that the dogs had been confined and left unattended
for at least thirty-six hours. The officers attempted to
contact Jennings without success. . . . The officers
had not been informed that someone was coming to
unlock the barn and tend to the dogs. . . . Because of
the high levels of temperature and humidity, the officers
were concerned that the dogs did not have adequate
ventilation, water or food. . . . Petras also stated there
was a concern that the dogs could suffer from dehydration, which could cause death. . . . The court finds
[Petras’] testimony regarding her belief that the dogs
were in imminent harm and neglected to be reasonable
and credible.’’ (Citations omitted.)
Our scrupulous examination of the entire record supports the court’s conclusion that the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the dogs contained within
the barn were in imminent harm and neglected, or cruelly treated. Petras testified that, prior to entering the
barn, the officers believed that the dogs therein had
usual process is codified in § 22-329a (b), which provides in relevant part
that ‘[a]ny animal control officer or regional animal control officer . . .
may take physical custody of any animal upon issuance of a warrant finding
probable cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly treated . . . and
shall thereupon proceed as provided in subsection (c) of this section . . . .’
General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (b). Accordingly, when, prior to
taking physical custody of an animal, a warrant is issued finding probable
cause that such animal is neglected or cruelly treated, there is no statutory
time frame for the filing of a verified petition.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, supra, 211 Conn. App. 548–51.
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Middletown v. Wagner
not been cared for in approximately thirty-six hours
and that the officers were concerned that the dogs’ lives
were potentially in danger on the basis of the weather,
the lack of ventilation in the barn, and the dogs’ access
to water. The court credited Petras’ testimony. On the
basis thereof, we conclude that the court properly determined that the animal control officers had reason to
believe the dogs confined in the barn were in imminent
harm and neglected, or cruelly treated, and that they
properly took physical custody of the dogs therein.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly
applied § 22-329a (a) in denying the defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence. We further conclude that,
because the evidence supported the court’s finding that
the officers reasonably concluded that the dogs were
in imminent danger, the warrantless search did not violate the defendant’s rights under the fourth amendment.7
7
Although the plaintiff has not questioned whether the fourth amendment’s exclusionary rule applies in this case, it is not entirely clear to us
that it does. This court has previously recognized the general principle that
‘‘the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil cases . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Tompkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 136 Conn. App.
496, 499 n.4,
46 A.3d 291 (2012). Both our Supreme Court and this court
have applied a balancing test based on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446–47,
96 S. Ct. 3021,
49
L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976), when addressing whether the fourth amendment
applied in a case other than a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Fishbein v.
Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 54,
743 A.2d 1110 (1999) (applying Janis balancing
test when determining whether exclusionary rule applies to driver’s license
suspension hearings); Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 570–73,
541 A.2d
504 (applying Janis balancing test when determining whether exclusionary
rule applies to probation revocation proceedings), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
898,
109 S. Ct. 242,
102 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1988); Boyles v. Preston,
68 Conn. App.
596, 612–13,
792 A.2d 878 (applying Janis balancing test when determining
whether exclusionary rule applies to civil trial), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 901,
802 A.2d 853 (2002). The Janis balancing test requires a court to ‘‘weigh
the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence against
the likely costs.’’ Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1041,
104 S. Ct. 3479,
82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984). ‘‘The question
of whether the exclusionary rule applies in a particular civil case requires
weighing the deterrent benefits of applying the rule against the societal cost
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Middletown v. Wagner
II
The defendant next claims that §§ 22-329a and 53-
247, as applied to both him and Jennings, are void for
vagueness. Specifically, the defendant argues that the
statutes do not define neglect with particularity because
the failure to provide ‘‘wholesome air, food and water’’
to a confined animal, which is prohibited by § 53-247
(a), does not identify what type of ventilation is required
to provide a confined animal with wholesome air or
how long an animal can go without food or water before
such conduct is considered to be neglect. We are not
persuaded.
As a preliminary matter, we address the plaintiff’s
argument that this claim was not preserved for appellate
review. Although we agree with the plaintiff that this
claim is unpreserved, we conclude that the claim is
reviewable under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–
40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,
317 Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015),8 but that it
nonetheless fails under the third prong of Golding.9
of excluding relevant evidence. . . . There is no ‘bright line’ to determine
when the rule should apply, and courts must apply the Janis analytic framework on a case by case basis.’’ (Citation omitted.) Ahart v. Colorado Dept.
of Corrections, 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo. 1998). Because the parties have not
undertaken a Janis analysis or otherwise addressed the applicability of the
exclusionary rule, and because we have concluded that the defendant’s
claim fails, even if we were to assume that the exclusionary rule applies to
the search in this case, we do not need to reach the question of the exclusionary rule’s applicability to the facts of this case.
8
‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim only
if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to
review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude
alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional
violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and
(4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate
harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Carlson, 226 Conn. App. 514, 532 n.15,
318 A.3d 283 (2024).
9
‘‘[T]o obtain review of an unpreserved claim pursuant to [Golding], a
defendant need only raise that claim in his main brief, wherein he must
present a record that is [adequate] for review and affirmatively [demonstrate]
that his claim is indeed a violation of a fundamental constitutional right.’’
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Middletown v. Wagner
The following additional legal principles are relevant
to our resolution of this claim. ‘‘The void for vagueness
doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process
contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States constitution. . . . The doctrine [of
void for vagueness] requires statutes to provide fair
notice of the conduct to which they pertain and to
establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aurora
H., 222 Conn. App. 307, 328,
304 A.3d 875, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 931,
306 A.3d 1 (2023). ‘‘A statute . . . [that]
forbids or requires conduct in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
first essential of due process. . . . Laws must give a
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act
accordingly. . . . A statute is not void for vagueness
unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional,
making every presumption in favor of its validity. . . .
To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to [them], the [defendants] therefore
must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
that [they] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [they were] the victim[s] of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for
vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the
right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute
. . . and the guarantee against standardless law
enforcement. . . . If the meaning of a statute can be
fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for
vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases
there lurk uncertainties. . . . Unless a vagueness claim
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bethlehem v. Acker, 153 Conn. App. 449,
471 n.16, 102 A.3d 107, cert. denied,
315 Conn. 908,
105 A.3d 235 (2014).
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Middletown v. Wagner
implicates the first amendment right to free speech,
[a] defendant whose conduct clearly comes within a
statute’s unmistakable core of prohibited conduct may
not challenge the statute because it is vague as applied
to some hypothetical situation . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State ex rel.
Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 156–57,
947 A.2d
282 (2008). ‘‘A statute is not unconstitutional merely
because a person must inquire further as to the precise
reach of its prohibitions, nor is it necessary that a statute
list the exact conduct prohibited.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Aurora H., supra, 329.
In Koczur, our Supreme Court stated that it is clear
from the language of the statute that ‘‘§ 22-329a does
not contain an independent standard of neglect but,
instead, incorporates by reference the standards of the
specific statutes enumerated therein.’’ State ex rel.
Gregan v. Koczur, supra,287 Conn. 153;
id., 157 (§ 22-
329a is not void for vagueness despite its failure to
define ‘‘neglect’’). At issue in Koczur, as in the present
case, was the portion of § 22-329a that expressly incorporates the standard of neglect codified in and prohibited by § 53-247. See id., 153–55. Section 53-247 provides
in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person who . . . deprives of
necessary sustenance . . . any animal, or who, having
impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such
animal proper care or . . . fails to supply any such
animal with wholesome air, food and water, or . . .
having charge or custody of any animal . . . fails to
provide it with proper food, drink or protection from
the weather . . . shall, for a first offense, be fined not
more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more
than one year or both . . . .’’ In Koczur, our Supreme
Court determined that ‘‘[i]t is reasonable to conclude
. . . that the neglect referred to in § 22-329a includes
the failure to provide necessary sustenance, proper
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Middletown v. Wagner
care, wholesome air, food and water under § 53-247
(a).’’ State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, supra, 154.
Even assuming, as the defendant claims, that the
phrase ‘‘wholesome air, food and water’’ as used in § 53-
247 (a) may be susceptible to some degree of interpretation, our careful review of the record satisfies us that
the defendant’s and Jennings’ conduct comes within
the statute’s unmistakable core of prohibited conduct.
In the present case, the court found that the dogs had
been left unattended in the barn for at least thirty-six
hours when the weather was hot and humid and that
Deacon, Ruby, and Mitzi did not have access to food
or water. Luna and Lily, both pregnant, also did not
have access to food; however, they had access to water.
Moreover, the court found that the barn floor was covered in urine and feces and that the smell of ammonia
and feces was so strong that it affected the officers’
breathing and created a burning sensation in their eyes
and noses. The court also found that the barn did not
have active ventilation.10 Put simply, a person of ordinary intelligence would know that confining five dogs
in a barn in these conditions for at least thirty-six hours
constituted a failure to provide proper care for the
dogs under any reasonable standard. Accordingly, we
conclude that the statute afforded the defendant and
Jennings adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited thereby and that the defendant therefore has failed
to demonstrate that § 53-247 (a) is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to his and Jennings’ conduct through
§ 22-329a.
10
The defendant argues that the court failed to give greater weight to the
evidence that he submitted of an open window in the barn that provided air
to the dogs. The court acknowledged, however, that the defendant submitted
evidence of an open window in the barn in its memorandum of decision
but concluded that, when ‘‘[c]onsidering the size of the barn, the pictures
of the interior of the barn, and the testimony regarding breathing conditions
in the barn, the court cannot find that this one window was sufficient to
provide wholesome air for the five dogs in the barn.’’
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III
The defendant next claims that the police did not
‘‘provide [Jennings] with fair notice of the law’’ because
the officers failed to notify her that the lack of ventilation in the barn constituted neglect under § 22-329a.
Specifically, the defendant argues that the officers
should have notified him and Jennings of the neglectful
conditions and provided them with an opportunity to
remedy the situation. We conclude that this claim is
inadequately briefed, and, therefore, we decline to
address it.
‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in
the statement of issues but thereafter receives only
cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be
abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously
and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on
appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
their arguments in their briefs. . . . In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized. . . .
‘‘We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of
the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the
rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice
liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . .
Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Durden, 211 Conn.
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Middletown v. Wagner
App. 416, 439–40, 272 A.3d 1129, cert. denied,
343 Conn.
921,
275 A.3d 211 (2022).
The defendant baldly asserts that the officers were
required to notify Jennings that the conditions of the
barn were neglectful and to give them a chance to
remedy the situation. The defendant, however, does not
provide any applicable legal authority or meaningful
analysis in his appellate brief, nor are we aware of
any legal authority, to support his claim. See C. W. v.
Warzecha, 225 Conn. App. 137, 147,
314 A.3d 617 (2024)
(claim was inadequately briefed when defendant provided no applicable legal authority or meaningful analysis in support of claim). Accordingly, the defendant’s
claim is inadequately briefed, and we decline to
review it.
IV
The defendant further claims that the court applied
an improper legal standard in defining neglect under
§ 22-329a. Specifically, the defendant argues that the
court applied a standard of neglect that is applicable
only to commercial kennels meant for large breeding
operations. We disagree.
The following additional legal principles are relevant
to our resolution of the defendant’s claim. ‘‘The meaning
of neglect under § 22-329a is a question of statutory
interpretation, over which our review is plenary. . . .
When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective
is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of
the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
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Middletown v. Wagner
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is
not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative
policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles
governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, supra, 287 Conn. 152–53.
We reiterate that § 22-329a (a) provides in relevant
part: ‘‘Any animal control officer . . . may take physical custody of any animal when such animal control
officer has reasonable cause to believe that such animal
is in imminent harm and is neglected or is cruelly treated
in violation of section . . . 53-247 . . . .’’ Section 53-
247 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person who . . .
deprives of necessary sustenance . . . or who, having
impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such
animal proper care . . . or fails to supply any such
animal with wholesome air, food and water . . . or,
having charge or custody of any animal . . . fails to
provide it with proper food, drink or protection from the
weather or abandons it . . . shall, for a first offense,
be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both, and for each
subsequent offense, shall be guilty of a class D felony.’’
(Emphasis added.)
Neither § 22-329a nor § 53-247 defines ‘‘person.’’
‘‘Generally, in the absence of statutory definitions, we
look to the contemporaneous dictionary definitions of
words to ascertain their commonly approved usage.’’
Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687, 697,
258
A.3d 1268 (2021). Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary defines ‘‘person’’ as ‘‘an individual human
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Middletown v. Wagner
being . . . a human being as distinguished from an animal or thing . . . .’’ Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (2002) p. 1686. It is therefore clear from the
plain language of § 53-247 that the neglect referred to
in § 22-329a includes neglect committed by individuals
such as the defendant and Jennings, and not just neglect
committed by commercial kennels or large breeding
operations, as the defendant suggests. Accordingly, in
the absence of any indication to the contrary, we conclude that the court applied the proper legal standard
in determining that the dogs in the barn, having been
neglected by the defendant and Jennings, were properly
subject to a warrantless seizure pursuant to § 22-329a
(a).
V
The defendant’s final claim is that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the dogs in the
barn were neglected. Specifically, the defendant argues
that there was no evidence in the record to support the
court’s finding that the health or physical conditions of
the dogs were adversely affected as a result of the
defendant’s and Jennings’ alleged neglect.11 We are not
persuaded.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard
of review. ‘‘The standards governing our review of a
sufficiency of evidence claim are well established and
rigorous. . . . [W]e must determine, in the light most
favorable to sustaining the [judgment], whether the
totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences
therefrom, supports the [court’s judgment] . . . . In
making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given
11
In his appellate brief, the defendant also claims that the court abused
its discretion because ‘‘the [judgment] is not supported by any empirical or
objective evidence nor by substantial evidence.’’ We consider this claim to
be factually interrelated to the defendant’s evidentiary sufficiency claim,
and, therefore, we address both of the defendant’s claims together as a
singular claim.
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the most favorable construction in support of the [judgment] of which it is reasonably capable. . . . In other
words, [i]f the [court] could reasonably have reached
its conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even if this
court disagrees with it. . . .
‘‘We apply this familiar and deferential scope of
review, however, in light of the equally familiar principle
that the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to
remove the [court’s] function of examining inferences
and finding facts from the realm of speculation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C. W. v. Warzecha, supra,225 Conn. App. 148.
After a careful review of the record, we conclude
that the totality of the evidence was sufficient to support
the court’s judgment that the dogs confined in the barn
were neglected. During the July 26, 2023 hearing, Petras
testified that the dogs in the barn had not received care
for at least thirty-six hours prior to the officers entering
the barn. Petras also testified that, when the officers
entered the barn, they ‘‘found ripped open bags of dog
food that were empty on the floor. [Luna and Lily] had
[one] half of a five gallon pail with water in it, and we
found empty buckets tipped over [for Deacon, Ruby,
and Mitzi].’’ Petras further testified that ‘‘it was very
hot and humid in there because there was no airflow,
and there was an excessive amount of feces and urine
on the floor of the barn. . . . It was very difficult to
breathe. The officers who were in [the barn] reported
that their . . . eyes and noses were burning from the
ammonia smell of the urine.’’ In addition to Petras’
testimony, the plaintiff submitted photographs, which
were admitted into evidence, depicting the conditions
of the barn and the dogs found therein. The court specifically found that Petras’ testimony was supported by
the photographs submitted. Therefore, construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the
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Middletown v. Wagner
judgment, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to support a finding of neglect pursuant to § 22-329a.
To the extent the defendant argues that the plaintiff
was required to produce evidence that the dogs’ health
or physical conditions were adversely affected for the
court to find the dogs neglected, such argument assigns
a higher burden of proof than that which is required by
the relevant statutes. Pursuant to § 22-329a, the plaintiff
can prove that the dogs confined in the barn were
neglected or cruelly treated under § 53-247 (a) by showing that the defendant and Jennings failed to supply the
dogs with wholesome air, food and water. The statute
does not require the plaintiff to prove that the confined
animals suffered actual physical injuries or adverse
effects as a result of those conditions.
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding that the dogs in the
barn were neglected.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
