Volume 228 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered in his favor, following a hearing in damages in connection with his action seeking damages for identity theft pursuant to statute (§ 52-571h) and for a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.). The plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly failed to award him treble damages in light of mandatory language in § 52-571h (b) following the default judgment rendered against the defendants. Held: The plaintiff was entitled to an award of treble damages under § 52-571h, but he was not entitled to recover those damages in addition to the damages that the trial court awarded under CUTPA. The trial court's award of damages under CUTPA was vacated, as that award was based on the same transaction, occurrence or event on which the plaintiff based his action for damages resulting from identity theft under § 52-571h, and, thus, that award violated the principle that the plaintiff is entitled to recover only once for the losses he sustained. Argued April 10—officially released September 17, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgments of the trial court following his convictions of several weapons related charges. He claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motions to dismiss and to suppress because it had incorrectly determined that the applicable statutes (§§ 53-202b, 53-202w and 53a-211) did not violate his second amendment right to bear arms. Held: The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying the defendant's motions to dismiss and to suppress; accordingly, this court reversed the judgments and remanded the cases to the trial court for reconsideration of the defendant's motions under the standard announced in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1). In adjudicating the defendant's as applied constitutional challenge on remand, the trial court was directed to apply the text and history test set forth in Bruen, under which the defendant bears the initial burden to show that the plain text of the second amendment presumptively protects his right to keep and bear the items at issue. This court directed that, if the trial court finds that the second amendment presumptively protects the defendant's conduct, the state then bears the burden to establish the constitutionality of the statutes at issue through historical analogues of firearm regulation that imposed a comparable burden that is comparably justified. Argued March 4—officially released September 17, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and issuing various orders. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court failed to address her pendente lite motions for alimony and counsel fees in a separate and distinct manner prior to considering the final financial orders. Held: The trial court properly considered all of the plaintiff's pendente lite motions for alimony and counsel fees, independently adjudicated those motions, and incorporated its ruling on those motions in its final financial orders as part of the dissolution of the parties' marriage, and it declined to award alimony or attorney's fees pendente lite. This court concluded that the defendant's claim that the trial court applied an improper legal standard to her claim for alimony and the division of the marital property was without merit, as the trial court properly cited to and applied the relevant statutes (§§ 46b-81 and 46b-82) in issuing its finan- cial orders. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney's fees to the defendant. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the trial court did not take judicial notice of facts regarding the defendant's employment opportunities and future earnings as part of its determination that the defendant had the ability to support herself following the dissolution judgment and financial orders. The trial court rejected the defendant's testimony regarding the cause of the dissolution of the marriage as not credible, and, contrary to the defen- dant's claim, it did not discredit that testimony due to a lack of corroborat- ing evidence. Argued May 14—officially released September 17, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction of assault in the third degree and two counts of criminal violation of a protective order. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss or to transfer the case for improper venue because the court, inter alia, incorrectly had concluded that the state constitution did not mandate that a criminal defendant be tried in the judicial district in which the offense occurred. Held: This court declined to consider the merits of the defendant's constitutional and statutory (§ 51-352c (a) and (b)) claims in light of its conclusion that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant had committed the charged offenses, at least in part, in the judicial district in which he was tried. The defendant waived his unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on venue, and, as a result of such waiver, the unpreserved claim also failed under the third prong of Golding. Argued March 21—officially released September 17, 2024

The defendant father appealed from the trial court's judgment denying his postjudgment motion for an order seeking a passport for the parties' minor child and granting the plaintiff mother's postjudgment motion to modify the custody of the child. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for an order seeking a passport for the child, as there was evidence to support the court's finding that it was not in the child's best interest to grant the motion. The trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for modification of custody of the child, as that court improperly determined that the language of the parties' agreement was clear and unambiguous as to their intent with respect to the child's schooling, and the case was remanded for a determination of the parties' intent after consideration of relevant extrinsic evidence. Argued May 13—officially released September 17, 2024

The defendants, a gasoline retailer and its guarantor, appealed from the trial court's award of damages to the plaintiff, a wholesale petroleum dealer, for breach of contract and breach of guarantee and from the grant of the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred in awarding certain damages. Held: This court declined to review the defendants' unpreserved claim that they were not liable for point of sale fees charged after the plaintiff had stopped delivering fuel under the contract because the claim was inadequately briefed and because the defendants failed to provide the trial court with an eviden- tiary foundation to support their argument. Contrary to the defendants' assertions, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's damages determination with respect to the cost of unpaid fuel deliveries. The trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiff damages for the unreim- bursed sales tax that it had prepaid or for the balance of the cost of two fuel dispensers it had delivered because the court previously had granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability with respect to those claims and the hearing in damages did not constitute an opportunity for the defendants to attempt to undo the liability findings. The trial court incorrectly granted the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs because, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the defendants were deprived of their ability to litigate fully the issue of the reasonableness of the requested fees and costs. Argued February 1—officially released September 17, 2024

The plaintiff appealed following the trial court's denial of her motion to open the dissolution judgment to allow discovery on her claim that the defendant had fraudulently procured an arbitration award that was incorpo- rated into that judgment pursuant to statute (§ 46b-66). The plaintiff claimed that the trial court incorrectly determined that she had failed to establish probable cause to substantiate her fraud allegations. Held: The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's motion to open, even though it was filed outside the applicable statutory (§ 52-420 (b)) time frame. The trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment based on fraud, as the plaintiff presented evidence of the defendant's making of false statements or his failure to disclose facts, which was sufficient to establish probable cause to substantiate her claim of fraud, thereby war- ranting discovery and further proceedings. Argued January 29—officially released September 17, 2024

The defendant, in her individual capacity and as the executrix of the estate of the decedent, the former fire chief of the plaintiff city, appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and improperly denied her motion for summary judg- ment. Held: The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the decedent, under the terms of his employment contract, was entitled to receive pension benefits under the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's municipal administrators association, rather than the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the firefighters union. In light of the record and the plain and unambiguous language in the dece- dent's employment contract, this court concluded that the trial court prop- erly denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment as no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff's retirement board possessed authority under the city charter to unilaterally confer a pension benefit on the decedent pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement with the firefighters union. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for reargument and reconsideration on the ground that the defendant did not properly preserve her claim that the plaintiff was not permitted to utilize the decedent's pension benefits to offset heart and hypertension benefits due to him, and the defendant did not demonstrate that the trial court committed plain error. Argued February 5—officially released September 24, 2024

The defendant city appealed from the judgment of the Compensation Review Board affirming in part the decision of the workers' compensation commis- sioner awarding certain workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to interest pursuant to statute (§ 7-433c). Held: In light of this court's resolution of the related appeal in Waterbury v. Brennan (228 Conn. App. 206), this court could afford the defendant no practical relief and, therefore, the present appeal was rendered moot and the appeal was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Argued February 5—officially released September 24, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting an annulment of her marriage to the decedent. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the substitute plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent's estate, lacked standing to con- tinue the annulment action after the decedent's death. Held: The trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the action pursuant to statute (§ 52-599 (a)). The exception set forth in § 52-599 (c) (1) was inapplicable to the circum- stances presented by this case as the annulment action was not rendered useless by the death of the decedent, the administrator of his estate having had a legitimate fiduciary interest in establishing the identity of the rightful heirs as well as a duty to carry out the wishes of the decedent. The plaintiff's continuation of the action to annul the marriage following the death of the decedent did not constitute an impermissible collateral attack on a legally valid marriage. The defendant failed to preserve her claim, and induced any error, with respect to the applicable standard of proof and could not prevail under the plain error doctrine. Argued January 8—officially released September 24, 2024

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment vesting in the plaintiff city ownership of certain dogs seized from a barn that was leased by the defendant and J, after the court found that the dogs were neglected. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution were violated because the evidence pre- sented did not permit a finding that the police reasonably believed a war- rantless entry was necessary to help an animal in immediate need of assis- tance. Held: The trial court properly applied the applicable statute (§ 22-329a (a)) in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, and, because the evidence supported the court's finding that the plaintiff's animal control officers reasonably concluded that the dogs confined in the barn were in imminent harm and were neglected, the warrantless search did not violate the defen- dant's rights under the fourth amendment. The applicable statutes (§§ 22-329a and 53-247) afforded the defendant and J adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited thereby, and, accordingly, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the statutes were unconstitution- ally vague. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claim that the police did not provide J with fair notice of the law because they failed to notify her that the lack of ventilation in the barn constituted neglect under § 22-329a. The trial court applied the proper legal standard in determining that the dogs in the barn, having been neglected by the defendant and J, were properly subject to a warrantless seizure pursuant to § 22-329a (a) because it was clear from the plain language of § 53-247 that the neglect referred to in § 22- 329a included neglect committed by individuals, not just neglect committed by commercial kennels or large breeding operations. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the dogs in the barn were neglected because, pursuant to § 22-329a, the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant and J failed to supply the dogs with whole- some air, food and water. Argued March 7—officially released September 24, 2024

The petitioner appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the habeas court erred in finding that no agreement existed between the state and certain witnesses, H and J, in exchange for their testimony at the petitioner's criminal trial. Held: The habeas court's conclusion that the petitioner had failed to establish that an implied or express agreement existed between the state and H and J regarding their testimony at the petitioner's criminal trial was not clearly erroneous. The habeas court's finding that H's bond modification was not a benefit given to H in exchange for his testimony was not clearly erroneous. The petitioner's claim that his due process rights were violated by the state's failure to correct misleading testimony was untenable because the testimony of H and J in question was not misleading. Argued April 10—officially released October 1, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court following her conviction of, inter alia, manslaughter in the first degree. She claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of intentional man- slaughter and that the trial court committed error in its jury instruction concerning the element of intent. Held: The state presented evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant collided with the vic- tim's vehicle intending to cause serious physical injury to another person. The defendant, having implicitly waived any objection to the trial court's instruction to the jury on the element of intent, was unable to demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred that deprived her of a fair trial, and she failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine. Argued May 23—officially released October 1, 2024

The defendant restaurant appealed from the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff awarding her damages as a result of injuries she sustained when she slipped on a loose decal and fell in the defendant's premises. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied its motions to overturn the jury's verdict. Held: The trial court correctly denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict, as the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant had constructive notice of the loose decal and that the decal in fact caused the plaintiff's injuries. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the definitions of negligence and reasonable care constituted harmless error, the court's instructions having set forth the plaintiff's allegations of negligence, the relevant elements of a premises liability claim and the applicable duties that the defendant owed to the plaintiff. Argued May 22—officially released October 1, 2024

The defendant town appealed from the trial court's judgment declaring that, pursuant to a pension agreement between the defendant and a police union, the plaintiffs, all retirees who formerly had been employed by the defendant, were entitled to the same deductible contribution payments to their health savings accounts as those received by the defendant's active employees. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that, in making its determination, the trial court misinterpreted the language of a collective bargaining agreement between the defendant and the union. The plaintiffs cross appealed from the trial court's judgment denying their motion for sanctions. Held: The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action because the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for demonstrating standing, as it was clear that they were intended third-party beneficiaries of the pension agree- ment, and that their claims were ripe. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to strike the complaint because the defendant failed to establish that the police union was a neces- sary party to the action. The trial court correctly determined that the defendant's payment of a certain percentage of the annual deductible for its group health insurance plan to the health savings accounts of only its active employees contravened the terms of the pension agreement because the effect of such payments was that the plaintiffs did not receive the same nature and scope of health care coverage as the active employees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiffs damages, as the evidence supported the trial court's rejection of the defendant's request that it offset the award by the amount of the increase in health insurance premiums that the plaintiffs would have incurred had they received the deductible contributions to their health savings accounts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney's fees to the plaintiffs as a sanction for the defendant's alleged bad faith litigation conduct because the court reasonably could have determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the claims raised in the defendant's motion to dismiss were entirely without color and that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued May 29—officially released October 1, 2024

The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to modify alimony and child support and its grant of his motion for contempt, claiming, inter alia, that the court improperly failed to impose sanctions on the plaintiff after finding her in contempt for violating the terms of the dissolution judgment. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to modify alimony and child support, as its finding that the distributions the defendant took from the retained earnings of the S corporation in which he was the sole shareholder constituted income for purposes of his alimony and child sup- port obligations was not clearly erroneous, and it correctly determined that there had been no substantial change in circumstances to warrant a modification. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to impose sanctions on the plaintiff for her contemptuous behavior because its remedial response was well within the scope of its discretionary authority. Argued May 23—officially released October 8, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered following its granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant police officers. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants used excessive force when they arrested him. Held: The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants with respect to the plaintiff's battery claim because, after viewing the evi- dence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, this court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the force the defendants used during the altercation with the plaintiff and, thus, the plaintiff was entitled to have a jury review the evidence and determine whether the force employed by the defendants was justified and reasonable. The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment for the defendants with respect to the plaintiff's false arrest claim because the undisputed facts established that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for interfering with an officer. Argued April 25—officially released October 8, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court for the defendants on the plaintiff's claim of adverse possession. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly raised the issue of permissive use of the disputed property sua sponte despite the defendant W's failure to raise it by way of a special defense. Held: W was not required under the facts of this case to raise permissive use or consent as a special defense, as W's answer denying that the plaintiff's use was hostile and leaving the plaintiff to his proof, together with the fact that the complaint alleged facts suggestive of some cotenancy or familial relationship between the parties, sufficiently put the plaintiff on notice that permissive use, as a matter of law, was a potential issue to overcome. The trial court's sua sponte posttrial inquiry into the issue of permissive use was a proper exercise of judicial discretion. The trial court did not apply an incorrect legal standard when it considered whether the plaintiff had demonstrated that he affirmatively undertook to dispossess, extinguish or steal another's property rights because, in an action in which the plaintiff and W shared some ownership rights in the subject property, the party seeking to establish adverse possession must show that their intent to disseize was clear and unmistakable. The trial court did not erroneously find that the plaintiff failed to prove his case by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court did not improperly fail to comply with the statute (§ 47-31) governing actions to quiet title by not making findings pursuant to § 47-31 (f) regarding the precise nature of the parties' respective interests in the disputed parcel, the court only having been required to affirmatively adjudi- cate the dispute of the parties as it had been presented to the court and on the basis of the evidence presented. Argued May 16—officially released October 8, 2024

The defendant, a former police officer, appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting an application for a civil protective order for the plaintiff, a police chief, filed pursuant to statute (§ 46b-16a (a)) on the basis of stalking. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order of civil protection, as modified, because the trial court did not make the requisite factual findings. Held: The trial court abused its discretion in issuing the modified order of civil protection without having made the necessary factual findings that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant both had stalked the plaintiff and would have continued to stalk the plaintiff. Argued September 5—officially released October 8, 2024

The plaintiff attorney appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismiss- ing his appeal from the decision of the defendant finding that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to act competently in his repre- sentation of a client and ordering a sanction. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly dismissed his appeal because the record did not provide clear and convincing evidence that he acted incompetently. Held: The trial court properly determined that clear and convincing evidence supported the defendant's finding that the plaintiff had violated rule 1.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct when he acted incompetently in filing a complaint for a client without naming that client's business as a party. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the defendant abused its discretion by ordering him to complete three hours of continuing legal education, as the plaintiff raised this claim for the first time on appeal and failed to assert any arguments or facts demonstrating exceptional circum- stances that would justify review of his unpreserved claim. Argued September 6—officially released October 8, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting injunc- tive relief in favor of the plaintiffs, the town of Brookfield and its zoning enforcement officer. On appeal, the defendant made various claims that the trial court erred by enjoining her from violating certain of the Brookfield Zoning Regulations. Held: This court thoroughly reviewed the claims raised by the defendant and concluded that they lacked merit. Submitted on briefs September 12—officially released October 8, 2024

The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to open the judgment of possession rendered for the plaintiff in this summary process action. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to open. Held: The defendant's appeal was dismissed as moot because he was no longer in possession of the subject property, and he failed to demonstrate that any recognized exception to the mootness doctrine applied. Submitted on briefs September 20—officially released October 8, 2024

The plaintiff public housing authority appealed from the judgment of the trial court for the defendant in its summary process action. It claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly raised, sua sponte, the unpleaded special defense of cure to defeat its action. Held: The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's summary process action, as, contrary to the defendant's claim, the plaintiff's pretermi- nation notice to her was not jurisdictionally or legally defective. The trial court improperly considered the special defense of cure in rendering judgment for the defendant, as the defendant did not plead that special defense. The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by improperly placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff with respect to the defendant's unpleaded special defense. Argued May 29—officially released October 15, 2024

The plaintiff attorney, who represented a will beneficiary in a probate matter, appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendants, a residuary beneficiary of the will, and its chief executive officer, who had sent a private email to other attorneys involved in the litigation that the plaintiff claimed was defamatory. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly granted the defendants' special motions to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a) after determining that his complaint was based on the defendants' exercise of their constitutional right to petition the government on a matter of public concern. Held: The trial court properly concluded that the email was a protected communi- cation made ''in connection with'' an issue under review by a judicial body pursuant to § 52-196a (a) (3) (A) that related to substantive issues in the litigation and was directed to persons having some interest in that litigation. The trial court correctly determined that § 52-196a (a) (3) (A) did not require that the email occur during an official proceeding to constitute protected communication. The trial court properly concluded that the email's content was a matter of public concern that related to economic or community well-being pursuant to § 52-196a (a) (1) (B). This court declined to review the plaintiff's unpreserved claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that he had failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe he would prevail on the merits of his complaint. The trial court did not violate the separation of powers doctrine or the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution when it considered California law in interpreting and applying § 52-196a. Argued May 20—officially released October 15, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgments of the trial court revoking his probation in two separate dockets and sentencing him to an additional period of incarceration, claiming, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in considering pending charges against him when making its decision. Held: The trial court did not improperly rely on various pending charges against the defendant in revoking his probation and imposing a term of incarceration, as, during a probation revocation hearing, a court may consider evidence of crimes for which the defendant was indicted but neither tried nor convicted. In light of the entire record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a total effective sentence representing nearly all of the defendant's remaining suspended sentences. Argued September 5—officially released October 15, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder, appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the habeas court erroneously concluded that he failed to establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by allegedly failing to convey a plea offer to him. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal as the petitioner failed to show that his claim involved an issue that was debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve in a different manner, or that was adequate to deserve encourage- ment to proceed further. Even if this court were to assume that a plea offer had been made to the petitioner and that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him of the offer and to advise him to take it, the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that it was reasonably probable that he would have accepted a plea deal but for the deficient performance of his trial counsel and, therefore, that he was prejudiced by his counsel's allegedly deficient performance. Argued September 6—officially released October 15, 2024

Convicted of, inter alia, the crime of sexual assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the prosecutor engaged in certain improprieties during rebuttal closing argument that deprived him of a fair trial. Held: The prosecutor's response to the defendant's investigative inadequacy defense was not improper, as this court was not persuaded that the prosecu- tor misstated the law or improperly appealed to the jurors' emotions, and the prosecutor's puzzle piece analogy was consistent with and tied to his proper argument that the state's flawed investigation did not raise a reason- able doubt of the defendant's guilt in light of the victim's testimony and the other evidence the state presented. The prosecutor's remark that the jury was ''given two diametrically opposed version[s] of events that [were] irreconcilable with each other'' did not violate the rule set forth in State v. Singh (259 Conn. 693) because the prosecutor did not expressly argue that, to find the defendant not guilty, the jury was required to find that the victim had lied, and he did not make a direct connection between the defendant's acquittal and the victim's credi- bility. The prosecutor's isolated reference to ''lov[ing] [the] fact that'' he could refer to the police officer who interviewed the victim as a ''former officer'' was not improper because it was ambiguous. The prosecutor's statements that implied that there existed an undetectable substance that could have been added to the alcohol or marijuana consumed by the victim and the defendant to which the defendant could have built up an immunity was improper because there was no evidence in the record to support that inference. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. Pursuant to the factors set forth in State v. Williams (204 Conn. 523), the single instance of prosecutorial impropriety did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial because it was not particularly egregious or pervasive, defense counsel did not object to it or request a curative instruction, the trial court's general jury instructions sufficiently addressed it to mitigate any harm, and the state's case was not so weak as to be overshadowed by it. Argued September 10—officially released October 15, 2024

The defendant appealed from, inter alia, the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and its grant of the plaintiff's amended motion for contempt. She claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion when it limited her presentation of her case-in-chief to only fifteen minutes during the hearing on the contempt motion. Held: The trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant's right to due process by affording her only fifteen minutes to present her case-in- chief at the hearing on the plaintiff's amended motion for contempt and motion for an injunction, the court having made no effort to divide the time equitably between the parties or to otherwise ensure that the defendant had sufficient time to put on her case; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to the award of attorney's fees and ordered a new hearing for the limited purpose of determining whether the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hear the defendant's motion to open the parties' pendente lite agreement regarding the marital home during the hearing on the plaintiff's amended motion for contempt and motion for an injunction. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial judge committed plain error by failing to recuse himself sua sponte from presiding over the parties' dissolution trial after previously holding a hearing pursuant to Matza v. Matza (226 Conn. 166) regarding her then counsel's motion to withdraw, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal, and, even if this court assumed that it was error for the trial judge not to recuse himself, this court would be unable to conclude that the error was so obvious as to be not debatable. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly applied the missing witness rule was without merit, the defendant having mischaracterized the court's decision, as the court did not draw an adverse inference as that term is understood in the context of the missing witness rule but, rather, the decision made clear that the defendant's self-serving testimony, without the benefit of corroborating evidence, was not credible. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly relied on a prior trial court's credibility finding in adjudicating the parties' dissolution, as the court's memorandum of decision made clear that it based its credibility determinations on its own observations. Argued May 20—officially released October 22, 2024

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment denying her special motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action pursuant to the anti- SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a), claiming that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff met his burden under § 52-196a of establishing probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his complaint. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, this court having concluded that, viewing the pleadings and affidavits of the parties in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff satisfied the relatively minimal burden under § 52-196a of establishing probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his complaint. Argued April 16—officially released October 22, 2024

The plaintiff attorney appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismiss- ing his appeal from the decision of the defendant Statewide Grievance Committee, which found that he had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by filing a motion that contained statements about the integrity of the judiciary with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed his appeal because the record did not provide clear and convincing evidence that his statements violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Held: The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's appeal because the griev- ance committee's determination that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct was not contrary to applicable law, as its reviewing committee applied the correct legal standard in considering whether the plaintiff had an objective, reasonable belief that his statements were true. The trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal was not improper because sufficient evidence existed to support the grievance committee's decision that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Con- duct, as his statements, in attacking the judges' competence and alleged faithfulness to the law, attacked the integrity of the Probate Court and the Superior Court, and the plaintiff failed to provide proof of an objective and reasonable basis for his statements. The trial court did not err by failing to conclude that a reprimand was not an appropriate sanction because the court was not required to make specific findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors under the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, there was no indication that the court did not take those standards into account in reach- ing its decision, and the grievance committee did not abuse its discretion in issuing the reprimand because it properly found that the plaintiff had violated rule 8.2 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Argued September 6—officially released October 29, 2024