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Brookfield v. Gohn
TOWN OF BROOKFIELD v. HOLLENE GOHN
(AC 46897)
Clark, Seeley and Harper, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiffs, the town of Brookfield and its zoning
enforcement officer. On appeal, the defendant made various claims that the
trial court erred by enjoining her from violating certain of the Brookfield
Zoning Regulations. Held:
This court thoroughly reviewed the claims raised by the defendant and
concluded that they lacked merit.
Submitted on briefs September 12—officially released October 8, 2024
Procedural History
Action seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction
compelling the defendant to bring her property into
compliance with certain of the plaintiff’s zoning regulations, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Danbury, where the court,
Brazzel-Massaro, J., granted in part the plaintiff’s
motion to cite in additional parties; thereafter, Francis
W. Lollie was added as a party plaintiff; subsequently,
the matter was tried to the court, Medina, J.; judgment
for the plaintiffs, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Hollene Gohn, self-represented, submitted a brief as
the appellant (defendant).
Barbara M. Schellenberg, submitted a brief for the
appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The self-represented defendant, Hollene Gohn, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
granting injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiffs, the
town of Brookfield (town) and Francis W. Lollie, the
town’s zoning enforcement officer.1 On appeal, it appears
1
This action originally was commenced by the town only. On July 22,
2022, the town filed a motion to cite in additional parties in which it sought,
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Brookfield v. Gohn
that the defendant is claiming that by enjoining her from
violating certain of the Brookfield Zoning Regulations
(zoning regulations), the court erred by (1) incorrectly
interpreting the applicable regulatory provisions, (2)
violating her constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection, (3) holding an evidentiary hearing
after the close of trial, (4) granting the relief sought
by the plaintiffs despite insufficient evidence, and (5)
failing to render its decision within 120 days. We are not
persuaded by the defendant’s claims and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The defendant resides at a property
that she owns in a residentially zoned area of the town,
where she and her husband operate a landscaping business. The underlying dispute arose out of a neighbor’s
complaint filed with the town’s land use office concerning construction equipment and vehicles that were
being stored on the defendant’s property. Lollie investigated potential zoning violations by the defendant following receipt of the complaint and, during his investigation, observed and photographed equipment and
vehicles related to the defendant’s landscaping business
in the front of the property, as well as vehicles parked
outside of designated driveway areas. Lollie subsequently issued a notice of a zoning violation dated
March 25, 2021, alleging that the defendant was impermissibly using her property as a ‘‘contractor’s yard,’’2
inter alia, to add Lollie as a plaintiff in this matter. The court granted the
motion, as it pertained to Lollie, on August 23, 2022.
2
Specifically, the notice alleged that the defendant was ‘‘running a [contractor’s] yard from the property . . . which is a violation of [the zoning
regulations] and is not a permitted use in a [r]esidential [z]one,’’ and notified
her that ‘‘any and all contractor’s equipment should be removed promptly.’’
The notice also informed her that ‘‘the parking of vehicles needs to be within
the designated driveways.’’
The term ‘‘contractor’s yard’’ is defined in article 2 of the zoning regulations
as follows: ‘‘A commercially or industrially zoned lot, with or without support
structures and buildings, limited to the storage and maintenance of equipment commonly used in the construction industry, including but not neces-
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Brookfield v. Gohn
notifying her that the vehicles needed to be parked in
designated driveway areas, and giving her until April 5,
2021, to bring the property into compliance with the
zoning regulations.
Because the defendant did not bring the property into
compliance or respond to the notice, Lollie investigated
further on April 7, 2021. On that date, he observed and
photographed construction equipment and vehicles that
were being stored at the defendant’s property, as well
as other vehicles that were parked outside of designated
driveway areas. Lollie subsequently issued a cease and
desist order to the defendant, which was delivered to
her residence on April 14, 2021, ordering the defendant
to bring the property into compliance with the zoning
regulations. The defendant continued not to bring the
property into compliance or to respond and, on April
11 and 16, 2021, additional complaints of the same
nature as the first regarding the defendant’s property
were received by the town’s land use office. On April
26, 2021, Lollie sent a letter to the defendant, notifying
her that the town’s zoning commission was giving her
until May 26, 2021, to remove all commercial equipment
from the property or risk further enforcement. The
defendant’s noncompliance and unresponsiveness continued, resulting in Lollie issuing another cease and
desist order to the defendant on August 9, 2021. On
September 17, 2021, he issued her a citation which
alleged violations of §§ 4.2 (A)3 and 6.12 (B) (1) (e)4 of
sarily limited to dump trucks, bucket loaders, excavators, bulldozers, and the
like. The lot may also store construction materials acquired in anticipation
of their use at remote locations.’’ Brookfield Zoning Regs., art. 2, § 2.2.
3
Section 4.2 of the zoning regulations is titled, ‘‘Permitted Uses,’’ and
provides a table specifying that a ‘‘contractor’s yard’’ is permitted only
in commercial and industrial zones. Brookfield Zoning Regs., art. 4, § 4.2
(A) (11).
4
Section 6.12 of the zoning regulations is titled, ‘‘Neighborhood AntiBlight,’’ and provides in relevant part: ‘‘(B) (1) Unless otherwise determined
by the [Zoning] Commission, uses, items, or materials to be specifically
prohibited from placement within any residential front yard are . . . (e)
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Brookfield v. Gohn
the zoning regulations and assessed a $150 fine against
the defendant. The defendant, during a subsequent
phone call with Lollie, responded by referring to him
as ‘‘the devil,’’ and alleging that he was biased against
her based on their contacts during a prior zoning dispute
in Danbury.5 She did not, however, otherwise appeal,
act on the citation or pay the fine. From December 8,
2021, to June 8, 2022, Lollie periodically investigated
the defendant’s property and continued to find that the
defendant was in violation of the zoning regulations.
In between Lollie’s periodic investigations, counsel
for the plaintiffs sent a letter to the defendant dated
January 28, 2022, demanding that she bring her property
into compliance with the zoning regulations by February 27, 2022, or a lawsuit would be commenced against
her seeking court enforcement of the zoning regulations, along with fines, penalties, attorney’s fees and
costs. The defendant’s property was not brought into
compliance, and the town brought an action against
the defendant by way of a verified complaint filed on
April 18, 2022, which later was amended on July 22,
2022, to include Lollie as a plaintiff. In their amended
complaint, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and
civil penalties pursuant to General Statutes § 8-126 due
The parking of any vehicle except within the designated driveways and turnarounds. . . .’’ Brookfield Zoning Regs., art. 6, § 6.12 (B) (1) (e).
5
As to this prior zoning dispute, Lollie testified that ‘‘long ago,’’ while he
was employed as an ‘‘[Assistant] Construction Manager, Permit Inspector,
for the city of Danbury,’’ he had issued citations to the defendant and her
husband for ‘‘cut[ting] an illegal driveway in . . . their property without a
permit,’’ having an illegal fence on their property, and having a ‘‘landscaping
contractor’s yard also.’’ He further testified that he was one of the plaintiffs
in a subsequent zoning enforcement lawsuit filed by the city of Danbury
against the defendant and her husband.
6
General Statutes § 8-12 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If . . . any building,
structure or land has been used, in violation of any provision . . . of any
bylaw, ordinance, rule or regulation made under authority conferred [by
chapter 124 of title 8 of the General Statutes], any official having jurisdiction,
in addition to other remedies, may institute an action or proceeding to
prevent such . . . use or to restrain, correct or abate such violation or . . .
to prevent any illegal act, conduct, business or use in or about such premises.
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Brookfield v. Gohn
to the defendant’s failure to comply with certain zoning
regulations, to wit, articles 4 and 6, specifically, §§ 4.2
and 6.12 (B) (1) (e), of the zoning regulations. The
basis of these violations was the defendant’s storage
of vehicles and equipment used for the landscaping
business in the front of her property, and her parking of
vehicles on the property outside of designated driveway
areas. The defendant filed an answer in which she raised
sixty-seven special defenses.
At the court trial held on September 8 and November
18, 2022, the plaintiffs were represented by counsel and
the defendant appeared in a self-represented capacity.
The court heard testimony from three witnesses: the
defendant, Lollie and Courtney George, an attorney
employed by counsel for the plaintiffs. The defendant
extensively cross-examined Lollie. The court, Medina,
J., issued an order on March 17, 2023, for a supplemental
evidentiary hearing to be held for the purpose of
affording the parties an opportunity to enter the zoning
Such regulations shall be enforced by the officer or official board or authority
designated therein, who shall be authorized to cause any building, structure,
place or premises to be inspected and examined and to order in writing the
remedying of any condition found to exist therein or thereon in violation
of any provision of the regulations made under authority of the provisions
of this chapter . . . . The owner or agent of any building or premises where
a violation of any provision of such regulations has been committed or
exists . . . who commits, takes part or assists in any such violation or who
maintains any building or premises in which any such violation exists, shall
be fined not less than ten dollars or more than one hundred dollars for each
day that such violation continues; but, if the offense is wilful, the person
convicted thereof shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars or more
than two hundred fifty dollars for each day that such violation continues
. . . . Any person who, having been served with an order to discontinue
any such violation, fails to comply with such order within ten days after
such service . . . or continues to violate any provision of the regulations
made under authority of the provisions of this chapter specified in such
order shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five
hundred dollars . . . . If the court renders judgment for such municipality
and finds that the violation was wilful, the court shall allow such municipality
its costs, together with reasonable attorney’s fees to be taxed by the
court. . . .’’
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Brookfield v. Gohn
regulations into evidence in full, which neither party
had done previously. The defendant filed an objection
to the court’s order, which the court overruled on April
19, 2023, and the supplemental evidentiary hearing was
held on April 20, 2023.
On August 18, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision granting a permanent injunction and
enjoining the defendant from continuing to violate
§§ 4.2 and 6.12 (B) (1) (e) of the zoning regulations.
Further, the court ordered the defendant ‘‘to cure all
existing violations of [§§ 4.2 and 6.12 (B) (1) (e) of
the zoning regulations] by no later than September 25,
2023.’’ The court also denied the defendant’s special
defenses7 and deferred ruling on the damages requested
by the plaintiffs until after a hearing could be held on
the issue. This appeal followed.
The defendant’s appeal raises a number of claims.
We have thoroughly reviewed the claims raised on
appeal and conclude that they lack merit.
The judgment is affirmed.
7
The court determined that: ‘‘Many of [the special defenses] are not
defenses but evidentiary claims or attacks on [Lollie]. Utilizing a generous
definition of a ‘special defense’ this court considers paragraph numbers
[two, four, eighteen, twenty-seven, thirty, thirty-one, forty-four] and [fiftytwo] as containing sufficient substance to be construed, in a light most
favorable to [the] defendant as a defense. As to each and every one of those
defenses, this court finds the defendant failed to satisfy her burden of proof.’’
Furthermore, the court ‘‘found no evidence to support [the defendant’s]
accusation’’ that Lollie was biased against her due to his involvement in a
prior zoning action in Danbury.
