************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
ROBERT J. SICIGNANO, JR. v.
BARBARA PEARCE ET AL.
(AC 46370)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Prescott, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff attorney, who represented a will beneficiary in a probate matter,
appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his complaint
against the defendants, a residuary beneficiary of the will, and its chief
executive officer, who had sent a private email to other attorneys involved
in the litigation that the plaintiff claimed was defamatory. The plaintiff
claimed that the court improperly granted the defendants’ special motions
to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a) after determining that
his complaint was based on the defendants’ exercise of their constitutional
right to petition the government on a matter of public concern. Held:
The trial court properly concluded that the email was a protected communication made ‘‘in connection with’’ an issue under review by a judicial body
pursuant to § 52-196a (a) (3) (A) that related to substantive issues in the
litigation and was directed to persons having some interest in that litigation.
The trial court correctly determined that § 52-196a (a) (3) (A) did not require
that the email occur during an official proceeding to constitute protected
communication.
The trial court properly concluded that the email’s content was a matter of
public concern that related to economic or community well-being pursuant
to § 52-196a (a) (1) (B).
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s unpreserved claim that the trial
court incorrectly determined that he had failed to demonstrate probable
cause to believe he would prevail on the merits of his complaint.
The trial court did not violate the separation of powers doctrine or the
ex post facto clause of the United States constitution when it considered
California law in interpreting and applying § 52-196a.
Argued May 20—officially released October 15, 2024
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the
court, Stewart, J., granted the defendants’ special
motions to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Sicignano v. Pearce
from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
John Kardaras, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Todd R. Michaelis, with whom were Eric J. Herst
and, on the brief, Stephen J. Conover, for the appellee
(named defendant).
Michelle M. Seery, with whom was Michael T. McCormack, for the appellee (defendant Connecticut Hospice, Inc.).
Opinion
BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiff, Robert J. Sicignano, Jr.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing
his complaint against the defendants, Barbara Pearce
and Connecticut Hospice, Inc. (Connecticut Hospice),
pursuant to Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP1 statute, General
Statutes § 52-196a. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
the trial court erred by: (1) ‘‘concluding [that] the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants fall within the ambit
of protected constitutional conduct as defined by . . .
§ 52-196a’’; (2) ‘‘adopting language in the California anti-SLAPP statute and California case law not contained
in the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute in violation of
the separation of powers under the constitution’’; and
(3) ‘‘adopting definitions of language in the Connecticut
anti-SLAPP statute based upon California case law
[interpreting] the California statute in violation of the
rule against ex post facto legislation as applied to the
1
‘‘SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation,
the distinctive elements of [which] are (1) a civil complaint (2) filed against
a nongovernment individual (3) because of their communications to government bodies (4) that involves a substantive issue of some public concern.
. . . The purpose of a SLAPP suit is to punish and intimidate citizens who
petition state agencies and have the ultimate effect of chilling any such
action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn.
332, 337 n.4,
246 A.3d 429 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. ,
141 S. Ct. 2467,
209 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2021).
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
courts through the due process clause.’’2 We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.3
The following facts, either as set forth by the court
in its memorandum of decision4 or as undisputed in
the record, and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal.5 ‘‘The plaintiff, who is both a
Connecticut attorney and a licensed certified public
2
Although styled as distinct constitutional claims in the plaintiff’s principal
appellate brief, which is not a model of clarity, the plaintiff’s separation of
powers and ex post facto claims essentially challenge the court’s construction and application of § 52-196a, which we address in part I of this opinion.
Nevertheless, insofar as these claims are distinct from the statutory construction claim, we briefly address the alleged constitutional violations together
in part II of this opinion.
3
The plaintiff argues that the judgment of dismissal also is ‘‘reversible
under the plain error doctrine’’ pursuant to Practice Book § 60-5, due to the
court’s failure to apply the correct law. Given that the plaintiff’s claims
challenging the court’s construction of § 52-196a are preserved, we have no
reason to resort to the plain error doctrine, which ‘‘is an extraordinary
remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that,
although unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that they threaten
to erode our system of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice
on the aggrieved party.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taveras, 219 Conn. App. 252, 269,
295 A.3d 421, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 903,
301 A.3d 527 (2023).
4
The court noted that it considered the plaintiff’s complaint, including
the exhibits appended thereto, the plaintiff’s affidavit and accompanying
exhibits in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and Connecticut
Hospice’s affidavits in support of its motion to dismiss. See General Statutes
§ 52-196a (e) (2).
5
Pearce notes in her appellate brief that the plaintiff’s ‘‘statement of facts
contains a voluminous number of ‘facts’ which are not supported by citations
to the record in violation of [Practice Book §] 67-4 (d), and this failure
is grounds for [the] Appellate Court to refuse to consider [this] appeal.’’
Connecticut Hospice similarly argues that the plaintiff ‘‘misrepresents as
fact that [he] is a party to’’ the settlement agreement and ‘‘asserts as facts
other matters that are not contained in the record’’ while ‘‘omit[ting] mention
of other facts that he did allege in his complaint . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) We acknowledge that there are some facts alleged in the
plaintiff’s principal brief on appeal that are not supported by references to
the record and for which our own review of the record has not uncovered
any such support. Putting the accuracy of the plaintiff’s recitation of the
facts and the defendants’ characterization thereof aside, our review is based
on the pleadings and exhibits in the record.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Sicignano v. Pearce
accountant, was counsel to the executrix in the matter
of In re Estate of Spirito while it was pending in the
Wallingford Probate Court. The executrix, a grandniece
of the decedent, was one of four specific beneficiaries of
the will. Connecticut Hospice, a charitable corporation,
was the sole residuary beneficiary of the will. At all
times relevant for this [appeal], Pearce, a Connecticut
licensed attorney, was the chief executive officer of
Connecticut Hospice. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Connecticut Hospice was represented by Attorney Andrew Knott and Attorney Gregory Pepe.
‘‘The original will provided that each of the four beneficiaries would receive $50,000 and that Connecticut
Hospice would receive the residue of the estate. While
the matter was pending before the Probate Court, the
executrix found an unsigned codicil that the decedent
mailed to his previous counsel. That unsigned codicil
increased the bequests to each of the beneficiaries from
$50,000 to $100,000, thereby decreasing the share of
the estate that would go to Connecticut Hospice. After
much back and forth in 2018 and 2019, the individual
beneficiaries moved to compel a settlement they
claimed they had reached regarding the codicil. This
resulted in a hearing in the Probate Court pursuant
to Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v.
Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804,
626 A.2d 729
(1993). [The plaintiff alleges that], [a]t that hearing6
6
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court indicated that Pearce
made this statement at the hearing held pursuant to Audubon Parking
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804,
626
A.2d 729 (1993). The plaintiff’s principal brief on appeal, however, states
that this statement was made ‘‘on September 24, 2019, prior to the start of
[the] hearing before the Probate Court . . . .’’ Consequently, the plaintiff
argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that the court incorrectly stated
that fact: ‘‘Obviously [Pearce] did not threaten the plaintiff and counsel
during the hearing in the presence of the probate judge.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s complaint suggests otherwise, as it alleges that,
‘‘[o]n September 24, 2019, a hearing was held before the Probate Court,
which hearing became quite contentious when [Pearce] stated that she
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
. . . Pearce stated that she wanted to ‘extract a pound
of flesh.’
‘‘After that hearing, the parties executed a document
entitled Settlement Agreement, Mutual Distribution
Agreement and Release [(settlement agreement)]. The
Probate Court approved that agreement on October 31,
2019. The [settlement] agreement provided for distributions of an additional $23,000 to each of the individual
beneficiaries and an interim distribution of $800,000 to
Connecticut Hospice. It also included a nondisparagement clause that prevented the ‘parties’ to the agreement from making ‘[any negative or] disparaging oral
or written statements about the other parties to this
Settlement Agreement [to any parties who are not a
party to the Settlement Agreement’ and from making
‘any false or misleading statements about any other
party or their career, reputation, business finances, salaries, or clients].’ The . . . agreement [identified the
parties as] Connecticut Hospice and the individual beneficiaries.7 Pearce signed the [settlement] agreement,
but only in her capacity as chief executive officer of
Connecticut Hospice. The plaintiff did not sign the [settlement] agreement.
‘‘Connecticut Hospice’s counsel [Pepe] executed and
filed a waiver of notice and hearing for final distribution
wanted to ‘extract a pound of flesh.’ ’’ (Emphasis added.) It appears that
the trial court reasonably read the plaintiff’s complaint as alleging that the
threat was made at, or at least in relation to, that hearing, and there is no
evidence in the record to support a contrary conclusion. Regardless, any
uncertainty as to when the statement was made does not alter our resolution
of this appeal, as we conclude that the plaintiff inadequately briefed, and
thus abandoned, any claim on appeal that Pearce’s alleged statement on
September 24, 2019, does not fall within the scope of conduct protected
under the anti-SLAPP statute. See part I A of this opinion.
7
We find no support in the record for the plaintiff’s argument that the
phrase ‘‘any other party’’ in the nondisparagement clause ‘‘was understood
to include counsel to the parties,’’ including himself as counsel to one of
the individual beneficiaries. The agreement expressly and unambiguously
identifies the only parties to the agreement as Connecticut Hospice, the
fiduciary, and four specific beneficiaries under the Spirito will.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Sicignano v. Pearce
in January, 2020. The next month, Connecticut Hospice’s other counsel, [Knott], filed a petition to remove
the fiduciary. That petition was denied by the Probate
Court at a hearing on March 3, 2020.
‘‘[The plaintiff alleges that], ‘[a]t subsequent hearings,’ Connecticut Hospice’s counsel ‘began knowingly
and/or recklessly making false claims before the Probate Court concerning allegations of ‘‘irregularities
[and] missing funds,’’ [and] falsely and maliciously
accusing the plaintiff of ‘‘borrowing from the funds’’ of
the estate without any evidence whatsoever.’ On or
about April 9, 2020, Pearce sent an email to the individual beneficiaries’ counsel that stated in part: ‘I guess
that means that the rumor I heard that [the plaintiff]
was ‘‘borrowing’’ from the funds isn’t true.’
‘‘In November, 2020, after a hearing about the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, the plaintiff, counsel for the individual beneficiaries, and [Pepe] held a settlement conference. [The plaintiff alleges that] [Pepe] demanded
an additional distribution of $80,000 to Connecticut
Hospice prior to the approval of the financial report.
The plaintiff alleges that this payment would have been
precluded by language in the agreement that any subsequent distribution after the interim distribution of
$800,000 would be made after the conclusion of the
final accounting and approval by the Probate Court.
[The plaintiff further alleges that] [Pepe] then threatened to grieve the plaintiff if he did not make the $80,000
disbursement. On November 30, 2020, the plaintiff e-
filed a letter with the Probate Court, requesting sanctions against [Pepe] for his threat to grieve the plaintiff
and against Pearce for her threat to ‘extract a pound
of flesh.’
‘‘On December 18, 2020, Pearce, in her capacity as
chief executive officer of Connecticut Hospice, filed a
grievance against the plaintiff, [which the plaintiff
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
alleges contained false statements]. In that grievance,
Pearce complained about the fees charged by the plaintiff, the delays in filing accountings with the Probate
Court, and the failure to pay Connecticut Hospice at
least $100,000 of the additional $200,000 it expected to
receive after the interim payment of $800,000.
‘‘In a separate grievance brought by the plaintiff
against Pearce, the [grievance] panel found probable
cause that Pearce had engaged in misconduct when she
sent the email referring to the rumors about ‘borrowing
from the [e]state funds’ and when she filed the grievance
against the plaintiff.
‘‘[The plaintiff alleges that], [i]n December, 2020, the
defendants contacted the Office of the Attorney General, which filed another appearance in the Probate
Court [in reliance on the defendants’ false claims].
‘‘[The plaintiff further alleges that], [a]fter the plaintiff
and the executrix consulted with Attorney Paul Knierim
in January, 2021, [Knierim] [allegedly] called the executrix and then held a conference call with both the executrix and the plaintiff to tell them that [Knott] was alleging that funds were missing from the estate. . . . Later
that same month, [Knott] stated in a letter to the Probate
Court that Connecticut Hospice had no other objections
to the final account other than the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.
‘‘In addition to the grievance he filed against Pearce,
the plaintiff also filed a grievance against [Knott]. The
[grievance] panel found probable cause that [Knott]
engaged in misconduct, including allegations that the
plaintiff may have been involved in forging a signature
and ‘inaction’ in connection with his client’s ‘comments/
innuendos’ as to the plaintiff borrowing estate funds.
The litigation at issue in the grievance was the In re
Spirito Estate Probate Court matter.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Sicignano v. Pearce
‘‘[Finally, the plaintiff alleges that], [o]n May 14, 2021
[Pepe] sent an ex parte communication to the Probate
Court that ultimately caused the presiding probate
judge to recuse himself.’’ (Footnotes added; footnote
in original.)
The plaintiff brought the underlying action against
the defendants in September, 2022. In the operative five
count complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ conduct during the pendency of the underlying
probate matter constituted breach of the settlement
agreement, defamation, defamation per se, fraud, and
violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.
The defendants filed separate special motions to dismiss the action pursuant to § 52-196a (b).8 In their
accompanying memoranda of law, the defendants
claimed that the plaintiff’s complaint is based on the
exercise of their right of free speech and right to petition
the government in connection with a matter of public
concern within the meaning of § 52-196a (a) and that,
because the complaint is barred by Connecticut’s absolute litigation privilege, the plaintiff could not satisfy
his burden to show that there was probable cause that
he would prevail on the merits of his complaint pursuant
to § 52-196a (e) (3). The defendants also requested attorney’s fees pursuant to § 52-196a (f) (1).9
8
General Statutes § 52-196a (b) provides: ‘‘In any civil action in which a
party files a complaint, counterclaim or cross claim against an opposing
party that is based on the opposing party’s exercise of its right of free
speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern, such opposing party may file a special
motion to dismiss the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim.’’
9
General Statutes § 52-196a (f) (1) provides: ‘‘If the court grants a special
motion to dismiss under this section, the court shall award the moving party
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, including such costs and fees incurred
in connection with the filing of the special motion to dismiss.’’
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants’
special motions to dismiss, to which Connecticut Hospice filed a reply. In his memorandum of law in support
of his objection to the motions, the plaintiff argued that
the defendants’ alleged conduct did not constitute the
exercise of the defendants’ rights to petition the government. He also asserted that his complaint is not barred
by the litigation privilege because (1) the complaint is
not based on the defendants’ statements and conduct
during a proceeding in the Probate Court, and (2) ‘‘[t]he
defendants’ statements and conduct fall under an
exception to absolute immunity for causes of action
alleging an improper use of the judicial system.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
On January 19, 2023, following a hearing, the court
issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendants’ special motions to dismiss. In its analysis, the
court identified the defendants’ conduct and communications as alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. Specifically, as to Pearce, individually or on behalf of Connecticut Hospice, the court identified the following conduct
and communications: ‘‘Pearce’s statement . . . that
she wanted to ‘extract a pound of flesh’; Pearce’s April
9, 2020 email to the individual beneficiaries’ counsel
that stated in part: ‘I guess that means that the rumor
I heard that [the plaintiff] was ‘‘borrowing’’ from the
funds isn’t true’; and Pearce’s filing of a grievance
against the plaintiff.’’ As to communications made by
counsel on behalf of Connecticut Hospice, the court
highlighted the following: ‘‘Knott’s filing of a petition
to remove the fiduciary; counsel’s making false claims
of irregularities and missing funds and accusing the
plaintiff of borrowing from the funds of the estate ‘at
subsequent hearings’ before the Probate Court; [Pepe’s]
demand for $80,000 to be paid to Connecticut Hospice
before the approval of the final accounting and his
threat to grieve the plaintiff if the $80,000 was not paid;
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Sicignano v. Pearce
counsel’s contact with the Office of the Attorney General that caused it to file another appearance with the
Probate Court; [Knott’s] statement to [Knierim] that
funds were missing from the estate [Knott’s] allegation
that the plaintiff may have been involved in forging a
signature and[Knott’s] inaction in response to his client’s comments or innuendos about the plaintiff’s borrowing estate funds; and [Pepe’s] sending an ex parte
letter to the Probate Court.’’
The court determined that all of the communications
alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint ‘‘were [made] in connection with a matter of public concern’’ as defined in
§ 52-196a (a)10 because they ‘‘related to a charitable
organization that was named as the sole residual beneficiary receiving its share of an estate and [to] the possible
actions of the plaintiff and his client that might have
interfered with that organization’s rights under the
will.’’ As to the statements that the plaintiff was borrowing estate funds or was responsible for irregularities
or missing funds, the court found that they also ‘‘raised
matters of public concern’’ because ‘‘[p]ublic allegations that someone is involved in crime generally are
speech on a matter of public concern’’ and because
‘‘the public has an interest in being informed of the
outcome of disciplinary proceedings involving attorneys licensed to practice law in this state.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) See Gleason v. Smolinski,
319 Conn. 394, 415,
125 A.3d 920 (2015) (noting that
crimes are matter of public concern); Elder v. Kauffman, 204 Conn. App. 818, 830 n.3,
254 A.3d 1001 (2021)
(noting that there is public interest in disciplinary proceedings).
10
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As used in
this section: (1) ‘Matter of public concern’ means an issue related to (A)
health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or community well-being, (C)
the government, zoning and other regulatory matters, (D) a public official
or public figure, or (E) an audiovisual work . . . .’’
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
As to the particular constitutional right at issue, the
court concluded that only some of the communications
constituted exercises of the defendants’ right of free
speech as defined in § 52-196a (a) (2),11 but it nonetheless concluded that all the communications constituted
exercises of the defendants’ right to petition the government ‘‘in connection with an issue under consideration
by a judicial body’’ within the meaning of § 52-196a (a)
(3) (A).12 At the outset of its analysis, the court noted
that ‘‘[t]he questions raised by the parties’ dispute over
the right to petition the government definition [were]
(1) whether ‘in connection with’ requires that the communications actually occur during a Probate Court hearing, and (2) whether that same language requires that
the communications must be explicitly about ‘the issue
under consideration or review.’ ’’
As to the first issue, the court concluded that the
phrase ‘‘communication in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a . . . judicial . . .
body’’ in § 52-196a (a) (3) (A) ‘‘does not require that
the communication happen during a hearing.’’ The court
noted that its conclusion was ‘‘consistent with Connecticut case law on the litigation privilege, which construes
11
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (2) provides in relevant part: ‘‘ ‘Right of
free speech’ means communicating, or conduct furthering communication,
in a public forum on a matter of public concern . . . .’’
The court concluded that the email from Pearce to the individual beneficiaries’ counsel, the in-person conversations, and the phone calls among
lawyers during the probate litigation ‘‘were not made in a public forum’’
because they ‘‘were private communications sent from one individual to
another’’ rather than ‘‘freely transmitted to a large number of people and
. . . accessible to the public.’’ The court noted, however, that its conclusion
did ‘‘not foreclose the possibility that these communications were exercises
of the defendants’ rights to petition the government.’’
12
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(3) ‘Right to
petition the government’ means (A) communication in connection with an
issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body . . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Sicignano v. Pearce
‘judicial proceeding’ ‘liberally to encompass much more
than civil litigation and criminal trials.’ ’’13
As to the second issue, the court noted that, although
its research revealed no relevant Connecticut case law
regarding whether the communications must be explicitly about the ‘‘issue under consideration or review’’;
General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (3) (A); it had found
several cases from courts in California applying a provision in its anti-SLAPP statute that is ‘‘almost identical
to § 52-196a (a) (3).’’ See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16
(e) (2).
The court relied on Neville v. Chudacoff, 160 Cal.
App. 4th 1255, 1266,
73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383 (2008), review
denied, California Supreme Court, Docket No. S162917
(June 11, 2008), in which the California Court of Appeals
held that ‘‘a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation
under [California’s anti-SLAPP statute] if it relates to
the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed
to persons having some interest in the litigation.’’ Noting
that the test articulated in Neville ‘‘is consistent with
Connecticut case law,’’ the court applied it in the present case and concluded that ‘‘the communications at
issue here were made ‘in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a . . . judicial or other governmental body.’ All of the communications, including
13
Additionally, the court concluded that, ‘‘even if Pearce’s statements in
the grievance that she filed against the plaintiff were not ‘in connection
with’ the Probate Court proceeding, they were ‘in connection with’ an issue
under consideration by another judicial body—the grievance panel.’’ See,
e.g., Carter v. Bowler, 211 Conn. App. 119, 125,
271 A.3d 1080 (2022) (holding
‘‘that the statewide bar counsel’s review of complaints of attorney misconduct is quasi-judicial in nature under Connecticut law’’); Cohen v. King, 189
Conn. App. 85, 90,
206 A.3d 188 (2019) (concluding that ‘‘[a]n attorney
who is the subject of a grievance proceeding is a party to a quasi-judicial
proceeding, and, therefore, relevant statements made by the attorney are
shielded by the litigation privilege’’), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 925,
246 A.3d
986 (2021); see also Noble v. Hennessey, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S,
2021
WL 830014, *12 (Conn. Super. January 12, 2021) (filing grievance complaint
constitutes petitioning government).
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
those that alleged that the plaintiff was borrowing funds
or that funds were missing from the estate, relate to
the substantive issues in [the probate matter] and were
directed to persons having some interest in those probate proceedings.’’ Accordingly, the court held that the
defendants met their burden under the statute, thereby
shifting the burden to the plaintiff to set ‘‘forth with
particularity the circumstances giving rise to the complaint . . . and [to demonstrate] to the court that there
is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that
[he would] prevail on the merits of the complaint
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-196a (e) (3).
As to the plaintiff’s burden, the court concluded that
the plaintiff’s breach of contract, fraud, and CUTPA
counts were legally insufficient because he failed to
plead essential elements of those causes of action. In
particular, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked
standing to sue for breach of the settlement agreement
because he did not, and could not, allege that he was
a party to it. As to his fraud count, the court concluded
that the plaintiff failed to allege ‘‘that any of [the defendants’] communications . . . were made to him, that
he relied on any of those communications, or that he
suffered harm as a result of that reliance.’’ Finally, as
to his CUTPA count, the court found that, even if the
plaintiff could allege an unfair or deceptive act or practice that caused him to suffer an ascertainable loss,
‘‘he could not allege the trade or commerce element’’
because, inter alia, ‘‘the practice of law is not considered
to be [a] trade or commerce, and attorneys may only
be held liable under CUTPA for the ‘entrepreneurial’
aspects of their practice.’’ In addition, the court concluded that ‘‘all five of the counts . . . are barred by
the defense of absolute immunity based on the litigation
privilege’’ because all of the communications alleged in
the plaintiff’s complaint ‘‘occurred in statements during
Probate Court hearings, in filings made [in] the Probate
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Sicignano v. Pearce
Court, and in emails or phone calls with other lawyers
and the Office of the Attorney General.’’14 The court
reasoned that the litigation privilege is not limited to
‘‘hearings in court when the judge is on the bench’’
but also applies to ‘‘communications preliminary to a
proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or
during the course and as part of, a judicial proceeding.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
After noting that ‘‘[t]he privilege applies if the statement has some reference to the subject matter of the
proposed or pending litigation, although it need not be
strictly relevant to any issue involved in it,’’ the court
reasoned that, ‘‘[e]ach of the communications here,
including those that alleged that the plaintiff had borrowed funds from the estate or that funds were missing,
all had some reference to the estate that was the subject
of the probate litigation.’’ For that reason, the court
concluded that all of the alleged communications are
protected by the litigation privilege and that, consequently, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his complaint.15
Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint and
14
The court noted that ‘‘[t]he one possible exception would be the grievance filed by Pearce, but that, too, was part of a judicial proceeding,’’ given
this court’s holding in Carter v. Bowler, 211 Conn. App. 119, 125,
271 A.3d
1080 (2022). See footnote 13 of this opinion.
15
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants’
statements fall under an exception to the litigation privilege for causes of
action alleging an improper use of the judicial system. The court explained:
‘‘In those situations where a defendant is being sued for words used in a
judicial proceeding, our courts have applied the privilege and dismissed the
action. By contrast, where a defendant is being sued for causes of action
such as abuse of process or vexatious litigation because they made improper
use of the judicial system, our courts have declined to apply absolute immunity. . . . The complaint in this case does not include any causes of action
that challenge the underlying purpose of the probate matter. Instead, each
cause of action is based on the communications made by Connecticut Hospice’s lawyers and by Pearce.’’ (Citations omitted.) On appeal, the plaintiff
does not challenge the court’s conclusion in this regard.
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
invited the defendants to submit affidavits of their attorney’s fees and costs.16
The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and reconsider
the dismissal, asserting that ‘‘the court’s decision
deprive[d] [him] of his due process rights by relying
upon and adopting California statutory language and
case law . . . [on] which [he] could not rely . . . [at
the] time of filing the complaint and [which he had] no
opportunity to refute by brief or oral argument.’’ In a
written order denying the plaintiff’s motion, the court
stated: ‘‘The plaintiff’s motion to reargue does not identify any factual mistakes or inconsistencies with the
court’s decision. . . . Instead, [he] argues that he
should be allowed to do additional research because
the court relied on other states’ anti-SLAPP case law
. . . . To determine whether the communications were
within the scope of [§ 52-196a], the court had to construe the statutory definitions. Because Connecticut’s
anti-SLAPP statute was so recently enacted, Connecticut courts routinely refer to other states’ case law,
including California and Nevada, to interpret the Connecticut statute. None of this should have been a surprise to the plaintiff. Nothing in the plaintiff’s motion
to reargue demonstrates that it was incorrect for the
court to rely on this out-of-state case law or that there
is any controlling authority that contradicts the case
law on which the court relied. Therefore, the motion
to reargue is denied.’’17 This appeal followed.18
16
The defendants separately filed affidavits of attorney’s fees on February
9, 2023, which they subsequently supplemented. The court, Stewart, J.,
issued a memorandum of decision on June 14, 2023, awarding Connecticut
Hospice attorney’s fees of $33,400 and costs of $2469.52, and awarding
Pearce attorney’s fees of $20,875.
17
The plaintiff’s appeal form indicates that he also appeals from the court’s
denial of his motion to reargue. In his principal appellate brief, however,
the plaintiff does not challenge the court’s denial of his motion to reargue.
18
On November 24, 2023, the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss
this appeal for the plaintiff’s alleged ‘‘repeated failure to file papers within
deadlines . . . .’’ The plaintiff objected to the motion, asserting that he ‘‘has
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Sicignano v. Pearce
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
concluded that his ‘‘claims against the defendants fall
within the ambit of protected constitutional conduct as
defined by . . . § 52-196a.’’ More specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly concluded that the
defendants’ conduct constituted the exercise of their
right to petition the government in connection with a
matter of public concern within the meaning of § 52-
196a and that the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden
of demonstrating that there is probable cause that he
would prevail on the merits of his complaint. We
address each subclaim in turn.
A
First, the plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly
concluded that the defendants satisfied ‘‘their threshold
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff’s suit was based on the defendants’
exercise of their state or federal constitutional rights
in connection with a matter of public concern.’’
On appeal, the plaintiff does not address all of the
conduct that was the basis for his complaint in the
underlying action. Although he argues that ‘‘not all the
conduct on which [his claims] are based . . . involve’’
protected communications, his arguments in his principal appellate brief focused exclusively on Pearce’s private email that stated: ‘‘I guess that means that the
rumor I heard that [the plaintiff] was ‘borrowing’ from
the funds isn’t true.’’ Thus, we consider any claim as
to conduct other than Pearce’s email abandoned.19
complied with the rules and orders of this court and has met all deadlines
. . . .’’ On January 17, 2024, this court denied the motion to dismiss.
19
Despite the narrow focus of his arguments in his principal appellate
brief, during oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel insisted
that he was challenging the trial court’s judgment as to all of the defendants’
alleged conduct. The plaintiff’s principal brief simply does not support such
a statement, as it provides no analysis of any of the defendants’ conduct
other than Pearce’s email. ‘‘Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion,
is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
issue properly. . . . Where a claim receives only cursory attention in the
brief without substantive discussion, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kawecki v. Saas, 132 Conn. App. 644, 646
n.2, 33 A.3d 778 (2011).
Furthermore, the defendants contend that the plaintiff’s claims are inadequately briefed or were raised for the first time in the plaintiff’s reply brief
and that this court should therefore decline to review them. We agree that
the plaintiff has failed to provide meaningful analysis of the issues raised
on appeal, as his entire argument section consists of conclusory assertions
without analysis and with minimal citations from the record. See, e.g., Estate
of Rock v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 323 Conn. 26,
33,
144 A.3d 420 (2016) (‘‘[c]laims are . . . inadequately briefed when they
. . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant
authority and minimal or no citations from the record’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the plaintiff’s brief, we
exercise our discretion to review the claims raised in his principal appellate
brief challenging the trial court’s construction and application of the recently
enacted anti-SLAPP statute to Pearce’s email, which involves a question of
law subject to our plenary review. See, e.g., Avon v. Sastre, 224 Conn. App.
155, 169 n.7,
312 A.3d 40 (‘‘[w]e agree with the commission that the claim
was inadequately briefed; however, while we are not required to review an
issue that has not been adequately briefed, in the interest of thoroughness
in explaining why the log is a public record under the act and in our
plenary review, we will address the relation between the log and the public’s
business’’ (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 349 Conn. 905,
312 A.3d
1058 (2024).
Nevertheless, we decline to consider arguments that the plaintiff raised
for the first time in his reply brief. See State v. Griffin, 217 Conn. App. 358,
375 n.9, 288 A.3d 653 (‘‘it is well established that we do not entertain arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief’’), cert. denied,
346 Conn.
917,
290 A.3d 799 (2023). ‘‘Arguments must be raised in an appellant’s original
brief . . . so that the issue as framed . . . can be fully responded to by
the appellee in its brief, and so that [an appellate court] can have the
full benefit of that written argument.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Benjamin v. Corasaniti, 341 Conn. 463, 476 n.8,
267 A.3d 108 (2021).
In his reply brief, the plaintiff argued for the first time that the court erred
in concluding that he did not establish probable cause that he would prevail
on the merits because he was a third-party beneficiary to the settlement
agreement. He also argued that Pearce’s statement that she would ‘‘extract
a pound of flesh’’ is not an exercise of her right to petition the government
in connection with a matter of public concern. In addition, the plaintiff
rephrased his ex post facto claim in his reply brief, arguing that the ‘‘court
erred by violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
requirement of fair notice as to what conduct is prohibited when it adopted
case law of sister jurisdictions and tests used by California courts to punish
the plaintiff by the award of attorney’s fees.’’ In support of that argument,
the plaintiff cited the vagueness doctrine, which he did not apply in his
principal appellate brief. During oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel suggested that the ex post facto argument in his principal brief
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
Sicignano v. Pearce
With respect to Pearce’s email, we understand his
claim to be that the court misconstrued § 52-196a (a)
in concluding that Pearce’s email constituted a communication in connection with (1) an issue under consideration by a judicial body pursuant to § 52-196a (a) (3)
(A), and (2) a matter of public concern.
The plaintiff argues in cursory fashion that ‘‘[a] private email does not fit within the ambit of the protected
constitutional conduct as defined by the anti-SLAPP
statute [and] is not connected to a matter of public
concern.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) He further argues that, ‘‘[t]o the extent that the trial court’s
decision can be interpreted as adopting the defendants’
position equating the knowingly false allegation in a
private email that the plaintiff was ‘borrowing from
the funds’ to the exercise of a constitutional right in
connection with a matter of public concern, it is legally
erroneous. The trial court cited no case supporting such
a novel proposition, nor is there any credible argument
that the defendants’ alleged conduct qualifies as protected speech or petitioning activity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
As previously noted in this opinion, the plaintiff
alleged that Pearce ‘‘sent an email to Attorney David
Crotta, Jr. [who represented the individual beneficiaries
in the probate matter], which read in part, ‘I guess that
means that the rumor I heard that [the plaintiff] was
‘‘borrowing’’ from the funds isn’t true.’ ’’ The subject
line of the email is ‘‘RE: update on spirito estate,’’ and
it was sent in response to Crotta’s update about the
status of the administration of the Spirito estate.
and the due process argument in his reply brief are one and the same. To
the extent, however, that the plaintiff argues in his reply brief that § 52-
196a violates the due process clause because it is unconstitutionally vague,
that argument was raised for the first time in his reply brief. Accordingly,
we decline to consider these belated arguments. See Benjamin v. Corasaniti, supra, 341 Conn. 476 n.8.
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
We begin our analysis with the applicable standard
of review and relevant legal principles. ‘‘[W]hether conduct falls within the province of a statute is a matter
of statutory construction presenting a question of law
over which our review is plenary.’’ Chapnick v.
DiLauro, 212 Conn. App. 263, 269–70,
275 A.3d 746
(2022).
‘‘The process of statutory interpretation involves the
determination of the meaning of the statutory language
as applied to the facts of the case, including the question
of whether the language does so apply. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine,
in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory
language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including
the question of whether the language actually does
apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text
of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall
not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Deer v. National General Ins. Co., 225 Conn. App. 656,
670–71, 317 A.3d 19 (2024).
In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin with the relevant
statutory language. Section 52-196a (e) (3) provides in
relevant part: ‘‘The court shall grant a special motion
to dismiss if the moving party makes an initial showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the opposing
party’s complaint . . . is based on the moving party’s
exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the
government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state
in connection with a matter of public concern . . . .’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
Sicignano v. Pearce
In order to satisfy this initial burden, the moving party
must show that the complaint is based on the exercise
of one of the constitutional rights defined in § 52-196a
(a) and ‘‘that the exercise of that right is in connection
with a ‘matter of public concern,’ as defined in § 52-
196a (a) (1).’’ Robinson v. V. D., 346 Conn. 1002,1009,
293 A.3d 345 (2023).
Our reading of the plain language of § 52-196a (a)
confirms the trial court’s conclusions that Pearce’s
email was a communication ‘‘in connection with’’ (1) an
issue under consideration or review by the Wallingford
Probate Court and (2) a matter of public concern.
1
The statute defines ‘‘[r]ight to petition the government’’ as any ‘‘communication in connection with an
issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, administrative, judicial or other governmental body . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes
§ 52-196a (a) (3) (A).
We agree with the trial court that the phrase ‘‘in
connection with’’ in § 52-196a (a) (3) (A) does not
require that the conduct occur during an official proceeding. In Key Air, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue
Services, 294 Conn. 225, 235,
983 A.2d 1 (2009), our
Supreme Court interpreted the same phrase in a different statutory context. As in the present case, the statute
at issue in Key Air, Inc., did not define the phrase ‘‘in
connection with,’’ and our Supreme Court therefore
looked to the common understanding of the phrase as
expressed in a dictionary. Id. The court explained that
‘‘[t]he dictionary defines the word ‘connection’ as, inter
alia, a ‘causal or logical relation or sequence . . . contextual relation or association . . . [or] relationship in
fact. . . .’ Accordingly, the plain meaning of the statutory phrase ‘in connection with’ necessarily includes
any factual, contextual or causal relationship. . . .
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
Had the legislature intended there to be a narrower
meaning of the phrase ‘in connection with’ . . . it
could have either: (1) used clarifying language to narrow the scope of the phrase ‘in connection with’; or (2)
used language other than ‘in connection with’ that has
a more restrictive meaning.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 235–36.
Similarly, in the present case, had the legislature
intended to limit the protections afforded under the
anti-SLAPP statute to communications made during
an official proceeding, it could have used clarifying
language to that effect. See Costanzo v. Plainfield, 344
Conn. 86, 108,
277 A.3d 772 (2022) (‘‘the legislature
knows how to convey its intent expressly . . . or to
use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to do
so’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, construing the phrase ‘‘in connection with’’ broadly in
accordance with its plain meaning is consistent with
our precedent applying the litigation privilege. As this
court has observed, ‘‘[t]here is no requirement under
Connecticut jurisprudence that to be considered part
of a judicial proceeding, statements must be made in
a courtroom or under oath or be contained in a pleading
or other documents submitted to the court. Indeed,
[t]he privilege extends beyond statements made during
a judicial proceeding to preparatory communications
that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding. . . .
In addition . . . the absolute privilege that is granted to
statements made in furtherance of a judicial proceeding
extends to every step of the proceeding until final disposition.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Kenneson v. Eggert, 196 Conn. App. 773, 783,
230 A.3d 795 (2020); see also Hopkins v. O’Connor,
282
Conn. 821, 832,
925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (‘‘[t]he scope of
privileged communication extends not merely to those
made directly to a tribunal, but also to those preparatory
communications that may be directed to the goal of the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 21
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 23
Sicignano v. Pearce
proceeding’’). Because the litigation privilege and the
anti-SLAPP statute have similar goals of protecting a
person’s right to seek relief through the judicial process
or by otherwise petitioning the government without
fear of being sued for doing so, it makes sense that the
scope of protection each offers should be the same.
Thus, we are not persuaded that Pearce’s email falls
outside the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute simply
because it did not occur during a hearing before the
Probate Court.
As to whether Pearce’s statement suggesting that the
plaintiff was ‘‘borrowing funds’’ from the estate was
made ‘‘in connection with’’ the issue under consideration or review by the Probate Court, the plaintiff argues
that the court improperly relied on the California Court
of Appeals’ construction of California’s anti-SLAPP statute in Neville v. Chudacoff, supra, 160 Cal. App. 4th
1255. According to the plaintiff, ‘‘[w]hile the court may
look to other states for guidance if the statute is unclear
or case law is absent on certain meanings, the trial
court cannot wholesale add meanings based on another
state’s interpretation of its statute, which contains different language and substantially broadens the
[breadth] and scope of the Connecticut statute which
was not intended by the legislature.’’ We conclude that
the test adopted by the trial court is the proper construction of the statutory language.
Again, the statutory phrase ‘‘in connection with’’ is
not defined, and the plain meaning of this phrase ‘‘necessarily includes any factual, contextual or causal relationship.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Key Air, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra,294 Conn. 235.
In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the communication had to relate to the specific issue under consideration or review, the trial court considered whether a
greater degree of relevancy was required in the context
of the anti-SLAPP statute. Given the absence of any
Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
statutory definition or relevant precedent interpreting
the phrase in the context of our anti-SLAPP statute, the
trial court reasonably looked to California case law
interpreting a provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute that has nearly identical language to § 52-196a (a)
(3) (A). Compare General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (3)
(A) (‘‘ ‘[r]ight to petition the government’ means . . .
communication in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial . . . body’’
(emphasis added)), with Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16
(e) (2) (‘‘ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California
Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes
. . . (2) any written or oral statement or writing made
in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a . . . judicial body’’ (emphasis added)).
As noted previously in this opinion, the court adopted
the test employed by California courts, which provides
that a communication is made ‘‘in connection with’’ an
issue under consideration by a judicial body if it relates
to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed
to persons having some interest in the litigation. See
Neville v. Chudacoff, supra,160 Cal. App. 4th 1266. As
the trial court noted in its decision, this test is consistent
with Connecticut’s application of the litigation privilege, which includes a similar relevancy requirement.
See, e.g., Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 470,
935 A.2d
103 (2007) (‘‘we consistently have held that a statement
is absolutely privileged if it is made in the course of a
judicial proceeding and relates to the subject matter
of that proceeding’’ (emphasis added)); Kenneson v.
Eggert, supra, 196 Conn. App. 782 (‘‘[W]e first determine
whether . . . the statements at issue in this case were
made during a judicial proceeding. If so, we then consider whether . . . the alleged misrepresentation is
sufficiently relevant to the issues involved in those proceedings.’’). Accordingly, we adopt it for purposes of
applying § 52-196a (a) (3) (A).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 25
Sicignano v. Pearce
Applying that test in the present case, there is no
question that Pearce’s email, which was directed to
counsel for the individual beneficiaries under the Spirito’s will and concerned the plaintiff’s handling of estate
property in connection with a pending probate matter,
is related to an issue under consideration or review by
the Probate Court overseeing the administration of that
estate. Rather than providing any arguments as to how
this test is not consistent with the plain meaning of ‘‘in
connection with’’ or why Pearce’s email does not satisfy
its requirements, the plaintiff solely challenges the
court’s reliance on California case law in reaching its
conclusion. This contention warrants little discussion.
When courts consider an issue of first impression,
they routinely consider decisions from other state and
federal jurisdictions. See, e.g., Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn., 316 Conn. 558, 573,
113 A.3d 932 (2015)
(‘‘[w]hen contemplating issues of first impression with
regard to Connecticut’s common law, we often have
sought to benefit from the collective wisdom and experience of our sister states’’); Connecticut Coalition for
Justice in Educational Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn.
240, 299,
990 A.2d 206 (2010) (‘‘[a] review of the sister
state decisions in this area is of paramount importance
to . . . a question of first impression in an area of
constitutional law that uniquely has been the province
of the states’’); Lovan C. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 86 Conn. App. 290, 299–300,
860 A.2d 1283 (2004)
(‘‘[t]o aid in our determination, we find the decisions
of our sister states persuasive’’). Moreover, in conducting an analysis of Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute, our
Supreme Court recently explained that ‘‘[a]n examination of federal and sister state case law is particularly
instructive with respect to the jurisdictional issue
before [it] because the legislative history of our anti-SLAPP statute signifies that it was modeled after anti-SLAPP statutes that came before it in other states.’’
Page 24 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 953 n.22,
293 A.3d 851
(2023). Accordingly, there is no merit to the plaintiff’s
assertion that the court improperly relied on persuasive
authority from the California Court of Appeals. The trial
court properly sought to determine the meaning of the
statutory language in a reasoned manner and its interpretation is consistent with the plain statutory language.
Consequently, we conclude that the court properly
determined that a communication is made ‘‘in connection with’’ an issue under review by a judicial body
pursuant to § 52-196a (a) (3) (A) if it relates to the
substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to
persons having some interest in the litigation. We further conclude that, under this standard, Pearce’s email
was made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by the Wallingford Probate Court and
was directed to another attorney, Crotta, who was
directly involved in the litigation. It, therefore, constituted the exercise of her right to petition the government within the meaning of the statute.
2
The plaintiff also asserts that the court’s conclusion
that Pearce’s email alleging that the ‘‘plaintiff was ‘borrowing from the [estate] funds’ [constituted] the exercise of a constitutional right in connection with a matter
of public concern . . . is legally erroneous.’’ The plaintiff’s unsupported assertion is unavailing.
‘‘Matter of public concern’’ is statutorily defined as
‘‘an issue related to (A) health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or community well-being, (C) the
government, zoning and other regulatory matters, (D)
a public official or public figure, or (E) an audiovisual
work . . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-196a (a) (1).
The trial court concluded that the defendants’ alleged
conduct and communications were made in connection
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 27
Sicignano v. Pearce
with a matter of public concern because they ‘‘related
to a charitable organization that was named as the sole
residual beneficiary receiving its share of an estate and
[to] the possible actions of the plaintiff and his client
that might have interfered with that organization’s
rights under the will.’’ As to Pearce’s email in particular,
the court concluded that ‘‘the statements that the plaintiff was borrowing estate funds or was responsible for
irregularities or missing funds in the estate raised matters of public concern’’ because ‘‘[p]ublic allegations
that someone is involved in crime generally are speech
on a matter of public concern’’ and because ‘‘the public
has an interest in being informed of the outcome of
disciplinary proceedings involving attorneys licensed
to practice law in this state.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) As support for its conclusion, the court cited
Gleason v. Smolinski, supra, 319 Conn. 415, in which
our Supreme Court observed that ‘‘[p]ublic allegations
that someone is involved in crime generally are speech
on a matter of public concern.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) The trial court also cited this court’s
decision in Elder v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App.
830 n.3, in which we stated that ‘‘[i]t is indisputable
that the public has an interest in being informed of the
outcome of disciplinary proceedings involving attorneys licensed to practice law in this state.’’ Accordingly,
the court concluded that Pearce’s email concerned ‘‘an
issue related to . . . economic or community well-being’’ pursuant to § 52-196a (a) (1) (B).
Although the plaintiff quotes the definition of ‘‘[m]atter of public concern,’’ he neither analyzes that statutory
definition nor addresses the court’s reasoning for its
conclusion that Pearce’s email concerned an issue
related to economic or community well-being. In short,
the plaintiff has failed to marshal any arguments as
to why the court’s determination that Pearce’s email
suggesting that he improperly borrowed estate funds
Page 26 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
28 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
related to a ‘‘[m]atter of public concern’’ was incorrect,
and our own review of the statutory language reveals
no error in the court’s reasoning.20 Thus, the plaintiff’s
claim fails.
B
Second, the plaintiff claims that, even if the defendants satisfied their initial burden under § 52-196a (e)
(3), the court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff
failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that there
is probable cause that he would prevail on the merits
of his complaint. We decline to review the plaintiff’s
claim due to inadequate briefing.
‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in
the statement of issues but thereafter receives only
cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be
abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously
and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on
appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
20
The plaintiff also argues that ‘‘the conduct at issue does not involve a
communication in a public forum,’’ which is required for conduct to qualify
as the exercise of the right of free speech under the anti-SLAPP statute.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Because we have determined that the
trial court properly concluded that the private email constituted an exercise
of the defendants’ rights to petition the government on a matter of public
concern, and thus brings the plaintiff’s complaint within the scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute, there is no need for us to address whether that communication also constituted an exercise of Pearce’s right of free speech. See
Robinson v. V. D., supra, 346 Conn. 1010 n.8 (having concluded that defendant asserted colorable claim under right to petition government, our
Supreme Court declined to decide whether alleged statements also fell
within statutory definitions of ‘‘right of free speech’’ and ‘‘right of association’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 27
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 29
Sicignano v. Pearce
their arguments in their briefs. . . . [B]riefing is inadequate when it is not only short, but confusing, repetitive,
and disorganized.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630,
273 A.3d 271
(2022).
In support of this subclaim, the plaintiff argues that
his complaint ‘‘sets forth with particularity the circumstances upon which the defendants breached the [settlement agreement] to which he is a party, defamed the
plaintiff, are liable for defamation per se, committed
fraud, and violated CUTPA. Clearly the plaintiff established facts strong enough to justify a reasonable [person] in the belief that [he] has lawful grounds for prosecuting the defendant[s] under any one of the five counts
of his complaint.’’ As previously noted in this opinion,
the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing
to assert a breach of the settlement agreement because
he was not a party to it and failed to allege the necessary
elements of both his fraud and CUTPA claims. The
plaintiff, however, does not address any of the court’s
reasoning as to those counts. Moreover, he fails to
address the court’s conclusion that ‘‘all five of the
counts . . . are barred by the defense of absolute
immunity based on the litigation privilege.’’21
21
We note that, in support of his ‘‘ex post facto’’ claim, the plaintiff
argues that the trial court extended the litigation privilege ‘‘to include a
communication in the specter of litigation; apparently meaning a communication where litigation is under serious consideration, thereby triggering
the litigation privilege, which the plaintiff asserts is beyond the scope of
Connecticut’s statute.’’ Although this vague assertion as to unspecified conduct in a separate part of his appellate brief references the court’s application
of the litigation privilege, it is insufficient to save the inadequacy of his brief
as to this subclaim. Moreover, the court’s conclusion that the litigation
privilege extends to communications made outside of an official proceeding
is not an extension of the scope of the litigation privilege, which ‘‘extends
beyond statements made during a judicial proceeding to preparatory communications that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Kenneson v. Eggert, supra, 196 Conn. App. 783.
Page 28 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
30 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
Consequently, by failing to address the dispositive
bases for the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff had
failed to establish that he was likely to prevail on the
merits of his complaint, his brief is inadequate for us
to conduct any meaningful review of this claim. See C.
B. v. S. B., supra, 211 Conn. App. 630. Accordingly, we
decline to review it.
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court erred by (1)
‘‘adopting language in the California anti-SLAPP statute
and California case law not contained in the Connecticut anti-SLAPP statute in violation of the separation
of powers under the constitution’’; and (2) ‘‘adopting
definitions of language in the Connecticut anti-SLAPP
statute based upon California case law interpretation
of the California statute in violation of the rule against
ex post facto legislation as applied to the courts through
the due process clause.’’ The gravamen of both claims
is that the court’s consideration of persuasive authority
from another state in construing a Connecticut statute
somehow violates the separation of powers doctrine or
the ex post facto clause under the federal constitution.
Both claims are unavailing.
First, interpreting a statute is precisely within the
power of the judiciary, as ‘‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.’’
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177,
2 L. Ed. 60,
1
Cranch 137 (1803). As previously noted in part I A 1 of
this opinion, when faced with an issue of first impression, courts routinely consider decisions from other
state and federal jurisdictions and, in this particular
context, ‘‘[a]n examination of federal and sister state
case law is particularly instructive . . . because the
legislative history of our anti-SLAPP statute signifies
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 29
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 31
Sicignano v. Pearce
that it was modeled after anti-SLAPP statutes that came
before it in other states.’’ Smith v. Supple, supra, 346
Conn. 953 n.22. Thus, the trial court’s reliance on California case law to interpret and apply § 51-296a did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine under the
constitution.
Second, there is no ex post facto violation arising
from the court’s interpretation of § 52-196a. According
to the plaintiff, the court’s ‘‘unforeseen’’ application
of California case law ‘‘amount[ed] to a denial of due
process, as the new interpretation is retrospective, in
that the court applied the new interpretation to the
[complaint],’’ which was filed ‘‘before the memorandum
of decision was published in this case, and it disadvantaged the [plaintiff] by awarding substantial attorney’s
fees’’ to the defendants. The plaintiff’s claim is unavailing.22
‘‘[A]s the text of the [ex post facto] [c]lause makes
clear, it is a limitation upon the powers of the [l]egislature, and does not of its own force apply to the [J]udicial
22
Insofar as the plaintiff’s assertion that the court’s construction and
application of the statute in the present case ‘‘amount[ed] to a denial of
due process’’ can be construed as a distinct claim independent of his ex
post facto claim, his brief is devoid of any legal analysis in support of such
a claim, and we therefore decline to review it. See, e.g., OneWest Bank,
N.A. v. Ceslik, 202 Conn. App. 445, 467,
246 A.3d 18 (defendant’s due process
claim was unreviewable due to inadequate brief in which defendant made
only conclusory statements), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 936,
249 A.3d 39 (2021).
Furthermore, there is simply no merit to the plaintiff’s alleged due process
violation, the gravamen of which is that he did not prevail due to the
court’s interpretation of the statute. As the United States Supreme Court
has explained, ‘‘[t]he essence of judicial decisionmaking—applying general
rules to particular situations—necessarily involves some peril to individual
expectations because it is often difficult to predict the precise application
of a general rule until it has been distilled in the crucible of litigation.’’
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312,
114 S. Ct. 1510,
128 L.
Ed. 2d 274 (1994). In the present case, the trial court performed its role by
interpreting and applying the law, and the resulting disappointment of the
plaintiff’s individual expectations does not transform ‘‘[t]he essence of judicial decisionmaking’’ into a due process violation. Id.
Page 30 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
32 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Sicignano v. Pearce
[B]ranch of government. . . . Nevertheless, limitations on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process. . . . [T]he United
States Supreme Court [has] observed: If a state legislature is barred by the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause from
passing such a law, it must follow that a [s]tate Supreme
Court is barred by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause from
achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction. . . . If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the
law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in
issue, it must not be given retroactive effect.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Washington v. Commissioner of Correction,
287 Conn. 792, 805–806,
950 A.2d 1220 (2008).
‘‘It is well established that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes
which disadvantage the offender affected by them. . . .
[I]n an ex post facto analysis, a court must first determine whether the challenged law is a penal statute
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rios v. Commissioner of Correction, 224 Conn. App. 350, 360,
312 A.3d 1059, cert.
denied, 349 Conn. 910,
314 A.3d 601 (2024).
The anti-SLAPP statute is not a penal statute; rather,
§ 52-196a ‘‘provides a procedural mechanism . . . to
achieve an important substantive goal, namely, protecting the parties from expensive and time-consuming
lawsuits on the merits. In that sense, the statute provides an expedited off-ramp for a party to avoid further
litigation.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Smith v. Supple, supra, 346 Conn. 946 n.16.
The fact that the statute provides for the award of costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 31
0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 33
Sicignano v. Pearce
does not transform the law into a penal statute. Therefore, because § 52-196a is not a penal statute, the plaintiff’s ex post facto claim necessarily fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
