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State v. Greene-Pendergrass
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARQUE
GREENE-PENDERGRASS
(AC 45493)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Flynn, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the judgments of the trial court revoking his
probation in two separate dockets and sentencing him to an additional period
of incarceration, claiming, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in
considering pending charges against him when making its decision. Held:
The trial court did not improperly rely on various pending charges against
the defendant in revoking his probation and imposing a term of incarceration,
as, during a probation revocation hearing, a court may consider evidence of
crimes for which the defendant was indicted but neither tried nor convicted.
In light of the entire record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it imposed a total effective sentence representing nearly all of the defendant’s
remaining suspended sentences.
Argued September 5—officially released October 15, 2024
Procedural History
Substitute information in the first case charging the
defendant with possession of narcotics with intent to
sell, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Ansonia-Milford, geographical area number twentytwo, where the defendant was presented to the court
on a plea of guilty, and substitute information in the
second case charging the defendant with possession of
narcotics with intent to sell, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical
area number twenty-three, where the defendant was
presented to the court, Scarpellino, J., on a plea of
guilty; judgments of guilty in accordance with the pleas;
thereafter, information in each case charging the defendant with violation of probation, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical
area number twenty-three, and tried to the court, B.
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State v. Greene-Pendergrass
Fischer, J.; judgments revoking the defendant’s probation, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Kirstin B. Coffin, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, state’s
attorney, and Melissa Holmes, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The issue presented in this appeal is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking
the probation of the defendant, Marque Greene-Pendergrass, and sentencing him to five years of incarceration.
We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts. On January
18, 2017, in the Superior Court in the judicial district
of New Haven, the defendant was convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to sell and was sentenced
to seven years of incarceration, execution suspended
after twenty-one months, and two years of probation
(New Haven matter). On January 19, 2017, in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford,
the defendant was convicted of possession of narcotics
with intent to sell and was sentenced to seven years of
incarceration, execution suspended after twenty
months, and three years of probation (Milford matter).
The sentences in the New Haven and Milford matters
were concurrent. In both matters, the defendant physically was released from the custody of the Department
of Correction on September 7, 2018, and, at that time, his
two year term of probation commenced. The defendant
signed the conditions of his probation, which included
submitting to any required psychological counseling,
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State v. Greene-Pendergrass
reporting as required by his probation officer, and keeping his probation officer informed of his current
address. Subsequently, in both the New Haven and Milford matters, the defendant was charged with violation
of probation.
Following a hearing, the court found that the defendant had violated the conditions of his probation in the
following ways: (1) he was negatively discharged twice
from a substance abuse counseling and treatment program; (2) he failed to report to his probation officer
on three separate occasions; and (3) he provided his
probation officer with an invalid address for his residence.
In determining whether the defendant’s probation
should be revoked and what sentence to impose, the
court considered multiple factors. The court discussed
the defendant’s ‘‘substantial criminal history,’’ noting
that he pleaded guilty in September, 2013, to assault,
robbery, and violation of a protective order and, following his release from incarceration as to those offenses,
he pleaded guilty in the New Haven and Milford matters
to criminal possession of narcotics with intent to sell.
Once on probation in those two matters, the defendant
violated three conditions of his probation. The court
detailed the defendant’s additional criminal cases,
which were pending at the time of the violation of
probation hearing. The court stated that it had reviewed
the four arrest warrants in those pending matters and
noted there had been findings of probable cause. The
court explained that the warrants concerned allegations
that the defendant had stolen an envelope containing
$1760; had been involved in a ‘‘very violent domestic
matter’’ that involved the assault with a firearm and
strangulation of a pregnant woman while children witnessed the incident, and culminated in the defendant
driving away in the victim’s car; had been in contact
with the victim in violation of a protective order in an
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State v. Greene-Pendergrass
attempt to influence her version of events; and had
tampered with witnesses by encouraging them to lie
about the assault. The court revoked the defendant’s
probation in both the New Haven and Milford matters
and sentenced him to five years of incarceration in each
matter. This appeal followed.
The defendant does not contest the court’s findings
that he violated the terms of his probation. He argues
instead that the court abused its sentencing discretion
in relying on pending charges when it revoked his probation and imposed a five year sentence.1 We disagree.
‘‘A revocation proceeding is held to determine
whether the goals of rehabilitation thought to be served
by probation have faltered, requiring an end to the conditional freedom obtained by a defendant at a sentencing that allowed him or her to serve less than a full
sentence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Hill, 256 Conn. 412, 427,
773 A.2d 931 (2001). In the
sentencing phase of a violation of probation hearing,
the court is vested with broad discretion to decide
whether to revoke probation and require the defendant
to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence.2
See State v. Santos T., 146 Conn. App. 532, 535,
77 A.3d
931, cert. denied,
310 Conn. 965,
83 A.3d 345 (2013).
The court considered many factors in its decision
to revoke the defendant’s probation and to impose a
sentence of incarceration, including the defendant’s
1
The defendant concedes in his brief that, because he did not object to
the introduction of the arrest warrants, any confrontation clause or hearsay
claims are unpreserved and unreviewable.
2
Pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32, violation of probation hearings
are comprised of an evidentiary phase wherein a trial court makes a factual
determination as to whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation and a dispositional phase wherein, if a violation is found, the court
then determines whether probation should be revoked because the beneficial
aspects of probation are no longer being served. See State v. Maurice M.,
303 Conn. 18, 25–26,
31 A.3d 1063 (2011).
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State v. Greene-Pendergrass
past criminal history, his three violations of probation
in connection with the New Haven and Milford matters,
and his pending criminal charges. The court explained
that ‘‘because [the charges relating to the New Haven
and Milford matters] would have been the second substantial sentence he served, you know when you’re on
probation, you’re on very thin ice. You have to be on
your best behavior and you weren’t. I’ve already found
you in violation of the probation. Now, in imposing a
fair and just sentence, our statutes and our case law
[allow] the judge to consider other pending cases
. . . .’’
The court did not abuse its discretion in considering
the pending charges. ‘‘[D]uring a probation revocation
hearing, a court may consider the types of information
properly considered at an original sentencing hearing
because a revocation hearing is merely a reconvention
of the original sentencing . . . . The court may, therefore, consider hearsay information, evidence of crimes
for which the defendant was indicted but neither tried
nor convicted, evidence of crimes for which the defendant was acquitted, and evidence of indictments or
informations that were dismissed. . . . For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts for which the
crime was committed and that there be taken into
account the circumstances of the offense together with
the character and the propensities of the offender. . . .
Included as part of this consideration is conduct arising
subsequent to the conviction and the underlying crime
and prior to final sentencing.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Pettigrew, 117 Conn. App. 173, 179–80,
978 A.2d 159
(2009). The defendant’s argument that the court improperly relied on the pending charges in revoking his probation and imposing a term of incarceration, therefore,
is without merit.
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State v. Greene-Pendergrass
The defendant further argues that the court abused
its discretion in imposing a total effective sentence of
five years, which time represented nearly all of his
remaining suspended sentences, because his violations
of probation were, according to the defendant, ‘‘technical’’ in that they were premised on violations of the
terms of his probation and not the commission of new
crimes. The court imposed a sentence requiring the
defendant to serve five years of the five years and four
months unexecuted portion of his sentences. In light
of the whole record, including the defendant’s (1) failures to provide a correct address to his probation officer
and to report to his probation officer on three separate
occasions when asked to do so, (2) being discharged
twice from a substance abuse counseling and treatment
program, (3) past criminal history, and (4) pending
charges, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a five year sentence. See, e.g., State v. Santos T.,
supra,146 Conn. App. 535 (‘‘On the basis of its consideration of the whole record, the trial court may continue
or revoke the sentence of probation . . . [and] . . .
require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or
impose any lesser sentence. . . . In making this second
determination, the trial court is vested with broad discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
After a thorough examination of the record, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
examining the defendant’s whole probation record,
including pending cases, along with other factors. The
court reasonably exercised its discretion in revoking
the defendant’s probation in each matter and sentencing
him to five years of incarceration.
The judgments are affirmed.
