Pichler v. UNITE’s Empirical Analysis
2005
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 2 district ·
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 69 (Fur Products Labeling Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (§ 2 of the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988) · 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (§ 300002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (§ 300002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 26 U.S.C. § 7431 · 29 U.S.C. § 411 · 29 U.S.C. § 412
Relies on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife · Warth v. Seldin · Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor · Fw/pbs Inc II v. City of Dallas Mjr Inc · Liparota v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500; (2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law; (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and (4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“If one could not violate the DPPA without “knowing[]” that the purpose for which he “obtain[ed],” “disclose[d]” or “use[d]” motor vehicle information was unlawful, then every defendant would get at least one free bite at the violation-of-privacy apple. After all, anyone could claim that he did not “know” his purpose to be impermissible until a court interpreted the DPPA to proscribe that purpose. Even after such a ruling, a defendant could manufacture a slightly different purpose for his conduct and then claim ignorance of whether the DPPA prohibited the new purpose. A plaintiff could recover only if the defendant repeatedly violated her privacy and lacked sufficient creativity to conjure up some conceivable purpose that no court had yet considered.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Roth v. Guzman“The DPPA provides a private cause of action to “the individual to whom [unlawfully obtained, disclosed, or used] information pertains.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (a) (2005). If the information does not “pertain” to an individual, then that individual may not sue under the DPPA. In other words, the only “interest” that the DPPA protects is an individual’s interest in the privacy of motor vehicle records that include information about her. If a motor vehicle record does not include information about a person, then that person has no “legally protected interest” in the confidentiality of that motor vehicle record.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.