Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

228 N.C. 37

44 S.E.2d 359

State v. . Snead

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided October 8, 1947

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1947-10-08

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“If the State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the deceased with a deadly weapon, as I have said, the law presumes that it was done with malice, . . . and (if) you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed the deceased with malice, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, subject to the instructions that will be hereafter given you as to responsibility or mental capacity.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. . Creech

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1947-10-08

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently December 1974

13 state decisions

601947195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Stacy, O. J.

¶1 We are constrained to hold the following instruction for error: “If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree,- as the Court will instruct you what constitutes murder in the second degree, you would consider whether from all the facts in this case, both the State and the defendant, the defendant has offered such evidence as would reduce the crime with which he is charged to that of manslaughter. And in that case, gentlemen of the jury, the burden is upon the defendant to satisfy you from the evidence introduced by himself, or the evidence introduced by the State, or lack of evidence, that there was no malice in the killing, and thereby mitigate or reduce the crime charged to that of manslaughter.”

¶2 In this instruction, the court seems to have overlooked, for the moment, the defendant’s plea of not guilty, which called in question the State’s *39 evidence and required a finding by the jury that the defendant intentionally killed the deceased with a deadly weapon before the presumption of an unlawful homicide with malice could apply, S. v. Floyd, 226 N. C., 571, 39 S. E. (2d), 598, and place upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption — in part, if he would reduce or mitigate the offense to manslaughter, and altogether if he would gain an acquittal. S. v. Ellison, 226 N. C., 628, 39 S. E. (2d), 824; S. v. Burrage, 223 N. C., 129, 25 S. E. (2d), 393; S. v. Benson, 183 N. C., 795, 111 S. E., 869.

¶3 There was no admission on the hearing that the defendant slew the ' deceased with a deadly weapon, yet he was required to handle the laboring oar in the absence of a finding by the jury that he was “guilty of murder in the second degree.” This was an inadvertence, or else some error has crept into the transcript. In either event, a new trial seems necessary. We must take the record as we find it. Abernethy v. Burns, 210 N. C., 636, 188 S. E., 97. It is not now subject to change or correction. S. v. Moore, 210 N. C., 686, 188 S. E., 421. It imports verity, and we are bound by it. S. v. Dee, 214 N. C., 509, 199 S. E., 730; S. v. Brown, 207 N. C., 156, 176 S. E., 260.

¶4 The evidence of what the defendant is alleged to have said about the killing was challenged on the hearing, and the court was in error in assuming this evidence to be true. The plea of traverse put its credibility in issue. S. v. Stone, 224 N. C., 848, 32 S. E. (2d), 651; S. v. Peterson , 225 N. C., 540, 35 S. E. (2d), 645; S. v. Davis, 223 N. C., 381, 26 S. E. (2d), 869; S. v. Singleton, 183 N. C., 738, 110 S. E., 846.

¶5 For error in the charge, as indicated, a new trial will be awarded.

¶6 New trial.

/228/nc/37 · .json · Public domain