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State v. Pringle
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BARRY PRINGLE
(AC 46414)
Bright, C. J., and Westbrook and Eveleigh, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, who had been convicted, following pleas of guilty, of various
crimes, appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion
to correct an illegal sentence. Held:
This court dismissed the defendant’s appeal as moot, as he had successfully
completed his sentence and, thus, there was no practical relief this court
could afford him.
Argued September 12—officially released November 26, 2024
Procedural History
Information, in the first case, charging the defendant
with two counts of the crime of possession of narcotics
with intent to sell and one count each of the crimes
of promoting prostitution in the second degree and
interference with a search, and substitute information,
in the second case, charging the defendant with the
crime of sale of narcotics and, in a part B information,
with being a persistent serious felony offender, and
information, in the third case, charging the defendant
with the crimes of attempt to commit murder, assault
in the first degree, criminal use of a weapon, criminal
possession of a firearm, illegal discharge of a firearm
and reckless endangerment in the first degree, and
information, in the fourth case, charging the defendant
with the crimes of tampering with a witness and bribery
of a witness and, in a part B information, with being a
persistent serious felony offender, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, geographical area number four, where the defendant was
presented to the court, Fasano, J., on pleas of guilty
to the charges of assault in the first degree, promoting
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State v. Pringle
prostitution in the second degree, possession of narcotics with the intent to sell, sale of narcotics and tampering with a witness; judgments of guilty in accordance
with the pleas; thereafter, the state entered nolle prosequis as to the remaining charges and withdrew the part
B informations; subsequently, the court, Hon. Roland
D. Fasano, judge trial referee, denied the defendant’s
motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the defendant
appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Barry Pringle, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Brett R. Aiello, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s attorney, and
John Davenport, former senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The defendant, Barry Pringle, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion
to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Practice
Book § 43-22. On appeal, he makes several arguments
supporting his claim that the court improperly denied
his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We dismiss
the appeal as moot.
On February 5, 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty
in four separate dockets, which were consolidated, to
assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), promoting prostitution in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-87,
possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation
of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 21a-277 (a), and
sale of narcotics in violation of General Statutes (Rev.
to 2013) § 21a-278 (b). Additionally, he pleaded guilty
under the Alford doctrine1 to tampering with a witness
1
‘‘Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
91 S. Ct. 160,
27 L. Ed.
2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but
consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding
to trial. . . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron
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State v. Pringle
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151. On the same
day, the court, Fasano, J., canvassed the defendant and
sentenced him pursuant to a plea agreement to a total
effective sentence of ten years of incarceration followed
by ten years of special parole. On January 21, 2021, the
defendant filed the operative motion to correct an illegal
sentence in which he raised various claims. On April
8, 2021, the court denied the motion. This appeal followed.2
Thereafter, at a hearing on April 6, 2023, a prosecutor
informed the court, Schwartz, J., that an agreement
had been made between the state and the defendant to
modify the defendant’s sentence to eliminate the ten
year period of special parole. The court then found that
good cause existed to modify the defendant’s sentence
to ten years of incarceration and to eliminate from his
sentence the ten years of special parole.3 On April 5,
2024, the defendant was discharged fully from the sentence imposed on February 5, 2016.
in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s
evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry
of a guilty plea nevertheless.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 204–205,
842 A.2d 567 (2004).
2
The defendant is self-represented on appeal, and we note that, although
it is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of self-represented litigants and to allow self-represented litigants some latitude,
we cannot overlook the rules of substantive law. See, e.g., Traylor v. State,
332 Conn. 789, 806,
213 A.3d 467 (2019).
3
The state filed a motion to suspend the rules to permit the late filing of
the April 6, 2023 transcript, which this court granted. The April 6, 2023
transcript reveals that the sentence modification only pertained to the defendant’s sentence for his conviction of assault in the first degree, for which the
defendant was sentenced on February 5, 2016, to ten years of incarceration
followed by ten years of special parole. The sentencing court also sentenced
him to five years of incarceration for promoting prostitution, five years of
incarceration for possession of narcotics with intent to sell, five years of
incarceration for tampering with a witness, and five years of incarceration
for the sale of narcotics, all of which were to run concurrently for a total
effective sentence of ten years of incarceration followed by ten years of
special parole.
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State v. Pringle
After oral argument before this court, we ordered
the parties, sua sponte, to file additional supplemental
memoranda addressing: ‘‘(1) Whether the defendant is
serving any portion of the sentence imposed on February 5, 2016; and (2) [i]f not, whether the defendant’s
appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to
correct an illegal sentence must be dismissed as moot
because this court cannot afford him practical relief.
See State v. Neary, 177 Conn. App. 871 [
173 A.3d 982]
(2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 901 [
177 A.3d 564]
(2018).’’
‘‘[B]ecause mootness implicates this court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time, including by this court sua sponte, and is a threshold matter
that must be resolved first. . . . This is so because [i]t
is a [well settled] general rule that the existence of an
actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate
jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts
to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which
no practical relief can follow. . . . Because mootness
implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it presents a
question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) American Tax Funding, LLC v. Design Land Developers of
Newtown, Inc., 200 Conn. App. 837, 844,
240 A.3d 678
(2020). ‘‘In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the
. . . defendant in any way.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Marsala, 204 Conn. App. 571, 576,
254 A.3d 358, cert. denied,
336 Conn. 951,
251 A.3d
617 (2021).
‘‘[A]n appeal from a motion to correct an illegal sentence is rendered moot if the defendant completes the
sentence while the appeal is pending because this court
cannot afford the defendant any practical relief as to
that sentence.’’ State v. Neary, supra, 177 Conn. App.
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State v. Pringle
873–74; see also State v. Bradley, 137 Conn. App. 585,
587 n.1, 49 A.3d 297, cert. denied,
307 Conn. 939,
56
A.3d 950 (2012).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendant
has completed his sentence.4 The defendant’s sentence
was modified to eliminate the ten year period of special
parole and, on April 5, 2024, he was discharged fully
from his sentence. Because the defendant successfully
completed his sentence, there is no practical relief that
we can afford the defendant as to the sentence imposed
on February 5, 2016. See State v. Neary, supra, 177
Conn. App. 873–74. Accordingly, his claim and supporting arguments regarding the legality of his sentence
are moot.5
The appeal is dismissed.
4
The defendant did not file a supplemental memorandum concerning
mootness. He, however, stated at oral argument before this court that he
was not incarcerated and that he was not on special parole because the
special parole portion of his sentence had been eliminated. The state stated
in its supplemental memorandum that the defendant’s sentence was modified to eliminate the period of special parole and that he has been discharged
fully from his remaining sentence.
5
To the extent that the defendant challenges not only the legality of the
sentence, but also his underlying convictions, such a claim is beyond the
purview of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See State v. Neary, supra,
177 Conn. App. 874 n.2.
