Volume 229 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment adjudicating several postjudgment motions in the underlying custody action involving the parties' minor children. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for the modification of custody. Held: This court declined to consider the propriety of certain factual findings made in connection with the trial court's earlier judgment because the defendant's challenge to those findings amounted to an impermissible collat- eral attack on the prior judgment. The trial court's finding that the defendant had made another false accusation of abuse against the plaintiff was supported by abundant evidence and, thus, was not clearly erroneous. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion for modification because the court's factual findings supported a determina- tion that there was a material change in circumstances and that it was in the best interests of the parties' children to grant the motion. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claim that the trial court improperly denied her motion to disqualify the judi- cial authority. Submitted on briefs May 29—officially released November 5, 2024

The defendant filed a motion with this court to dismiss the state's appeal from the decision of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed that the appeal, which was taken before he was resentenced, was not from a final judgment. This court granted the defendant's motion and subsequently issued its opinion. Held: This court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the trial court's decision granting the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence was an interlocutory order and not an immediately appealable final judgment. Considered September 4—officially released November 5, 2024

The defendant property owner appealed from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court for the plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action. Held: This court dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot because, after the trial court had terminated the appellate stay, it approved the committee's sale of the defendant's property, which extinguished his right of redemption and, thereafter, title to the property vested in the successful bidder. Submitted on briefs September 17—officially released November 5, 2024

The petitioner appealed, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Held: This court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, as he exclusively challenged the habeas court's credibility determinations concerning the testimony at trial. Argued October 23—officially released November 5, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant condominium unit owner in its foreclosure action for the defendant's alleged nonpayment of common fees. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded that it had not met its burden of proof. Held: The trial court's finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy its burden of proving that the defendant had failed to pay common charges for her unit was not clearly erroneous because it was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Argued September 18—officially released November 12, 2024

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's grant of the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that the petitioner's right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated by the failure of his counsel, M, to investigate adequately and to present an alibi witness, G, at the petitioner's criminal trial. Held: The issue raised in the habeas petition of whether M rendered ineffective assistance by failing to secure G's testimony at the criminal trial included within it the issue of whether M's investigation into G as a potential witness was reasonable. The habeas court did not err in finding M's performance deficient, as it determined that, pursuant to the factors set forth in Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction (329 Conn. 1), M's failure to investigate and present the testi- mony of G was not reasonable and that G was a credible witness. The habeas court correctly concluded that M's deficient performance preju- diced the petitioner, as the state's case was not particularly strong, the theory of the defense rested on the petitioner's alibi, and G would have offered noncumulative alibi testimony that the court determined was credi- ble. Argued September 11—officially released November 12, 2024

The defendant, who had been convicted of various crimes in connection with two incidents of arson, and sentenced to a total effective term of twenty-five years of incarceration, execution suspended after fifteen years, and five years of probation, appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion for sentence modification. The defendant claimed that the court abused its discretion in finding that he had failed to establish good cause to modify his sentence. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defendant failed to establish good cause to warrant a sentence modification, the court having conducted an appropriate review of the information before it when it determined that the devastation and harm resulting from the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and the fact that he had only served less than one third of his sentence outweighed his rehabilitative efforts. Argued September 4—officially released November 12, 2024

The defendant, who had been granted permission to be made a party defen- dant, appealed from the trial court's denial of her motion to open the judg- ment of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the plaintiff city in a municipal tax lien foreclosure action. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying her motion without a hearing. Held: This court dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot because it could not afford her any practical relief and, accordingly, lacked subject matter juris- diction over her claims, as the defendant, during the pendency of the appeal, conveyed the property to a third party, leaving her with no legal or equitable interest in the property in her individual capacity. The appeal was not saved by the collateral consequences doctrine, as the defendant's proposed collateral consequences were inadequately briefed and asserted nothing more than abstract, purely speculative injuries. Submitted on briefs September 20—officially released November 12, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court ordering the equitable distribution of real property that he jointly owned with the defen- dant and ordering the defendant to pay him $2000 as just compensation for his interest in the property pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-500 (a)). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in determining that he had only a minimal interest in the property. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiff had only a minimal interest in the property for purposes of § 52-500 (a) because that determination was supported by the legislative history, which indicated that the plaintiff's one-half fee interest in the property did not preclude such a finding, and the relevant equitable factors. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of just compensation to the plaintiff for his interest in the property because his one-half ownership interest did not entitle him to 50 percent of the equity, and the court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not contribute financially to the property's purchase, mortgage, taxes, or insurance, that he provided only $2000 in maintenance expenses, and that his claims of other contribu- tions to the maintenance of the property were not credible. Argued May 20—officially released November 19, 2024

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court violated his right to due process under the state constitution when it denied his pretrial motion to dismiss the charges against him, in which he alleged that the police improperly failed to preserve and to collect certain evidence. Held: The defendant's due process claim that the police failed to preserve the contents of a certain clothes hamper, which was predicated on his claim that the police failed to seize that hamper, failed as a matter of law, as the failure by the police to collect and preserve that evidence did not implicate the defendant's right to due process pursuant to State v. Morales (232 Conn. 707). The defendant was not deprived of his state constitutional right to due process by the state's failure to preserve certain evidence, namely, two photographs, as all four factors of the balancing test set forth in State v. Asherman (193 Conn. 695) weighed against the defendant with respect to the lost photographs. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to engage in extensive inquiry into an allegation of juror misconduct, as the inquiry it conducted was adequate pursuant to State v. Brown (235 Conn. 502). Argued September 17—officially released November 19, 2024

Convicted, on pleas of guilty, of criminal trespass in the first degree, assault in the third degree, and violation of a protective order, the defendant appealed. He asked this court to allow him to withdraw his pleas, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his competence and to request a competency evaluation. Held: This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claims, as he failed to move to withdraw his pleas in accordance with the applicable rules of practice (§§ 39-26 and 39-27) and he failed to adequately brief the claims in accordance with the mandates for the review of unpreserved constitutional claims pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233). Argued September 9—officially released November 19, 2024

The petitioner appealed, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that the court erred in concluding that his criminal trial counsel, B, had not provided ineffective assistance in failing, inter alia, to properly present evidence regarding the petitioner's drug and alcohol abuse on the night the petitioner committed the crimes at issue. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, as B, in determining not to emphasize evidence regarding the petitioner's cocaine use on the night of the crimes, reasonably relied on the advice of an expert witness for the defense and the petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that B's decision to pursue an intoxication defense based solely on his alcohol use was sound trial strat- egy. Argued September 20—officially released November 19, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, appealed following the habeas court's denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner's sole claim on appeal was that the court improperly granted his appellate counsel's motion to withdraw her appearance. Held: The habeas court's ruling on appellate counsel's motion to withdraw her appearance was not a proper subject for an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition, and, as the petitioner did not raise or adequately brief any claim that directly challenged the trial court's judgment of convic- tion, any possible claims he may have had were abandoned. Argued October 17—officially released November 19, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court following his plea of nolo contendere to the crime of disorderly conduct. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that a certain statute (§ 54-94a) and rule of practice (§ 39-18) governing pleas of nolo contendere were unconstitutional because they violated the common-law presumption of innocence. Held: The defendant waived his claims that § 54-94a and Practice Book § 39-18 were unconstitutional, as his plea of nolo contendere operated as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and barred the later assertion of constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings, and neither of his claims of error chal- lenged either the exercise of jurisdiction by the court or the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claims that the charges against him lacked probable cause, that the trial court erred in not complying with the requirements of Practice Book § 39-18, that the court violated his due process rights by failing to hold a hearing on certain postjudgment motions and that the judges who presided over his case acted without authority. The defendant's claim that the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing terms to his conditional discharge was moot, as it was undisputed that this appeal was not heard until after his one year term of conditional discharge had expired, and there was no practical relief this court could provide to the defendant. Argued September 17—officially released November 19, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open the judgment of dismissal rendered for the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to open. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to open the judgment, as the court reasonably could have concluded that, although an alleged calendaring mistake by the plaintiff's counsel led to the plaintiff's absence from the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it did not excuse the plaintiff's failure to respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss in the previous three months, well beyond the thirty day time period specified in our rule of practice (§ 10-31 (a)). Argued September 13—officially released November 26, 2024

The defendant, who had been convicted, following pleas of guilty, of various crimes, appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Held: This court dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot, as he had successfully completed his sentence and, thus, there was no practical relief this court could afford him. Argued September 12—officially released November 26, 2024

The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that his guilty plea in the underlying criminal trial to being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of statute (§ 53a-40) was defective. Held: The trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the motion challenged the validity of the defendant's guilty plea and the propriety of the plea proceedings, rather than the sentence or sentencing proceedings, and, accordingly, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the motion and should have dismissed the motion. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the sentencing court improperly failed to specify which portion of his sentence was attributable to the enhancement imposed pursuant to § 53a-40. Argued October 22—officially released November 26, 2024

Convicted of the crimes of attempt to commit assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence, namely, the screwdriver used as a weapon in the assault. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the testimony of a police officer at the evidentiary hearing on the motion having been sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the screwdriver the state intended to offer into evidence was the one found at the scene and that it had not been changed or altered, thereby authenticat- ing it. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly allowed the state's expert witness to opine on an ultimate issue reserved for the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state's expert witness to opine on a hypothetical question that allegedly omitted a material fact, as the court reasonably could have concluded that the question provided a fair summary of the relevant evidence and that the answer would assist the jury. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict as to the defendant's intent to cause serious physical injury as required to support his conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first degree. The evidence was sufficient to establish that the screwdriver was a danger- ous instrument as required to support the defendant's convictions of attempt to commit assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree. Argued October 8—officially released December 10, 2024

The petitioner appealed, following the granting of his petition for certifica- tion to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that the habeas court improperly concluded that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was not violated by his trial counsel. Held: The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish deficient performance by his trial counsel in conducting cross-examinations of certain witnesses, as his trial counsel's cross-examinations did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness considering all of the circum- stances. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance in deciding not to introduce certain cell phone records, as that decision reflected sound trial strategy. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to consult with or present an expert on coerced and false confessions, the petitioner having failed to establish that he was prejudiced as a result of his trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance. The habeas court properly determined that trial counsel did not render deficient performance in failing to consult with or present the testimony of an expert on crime scene reconstruction. Argued September 4—officially released December 10, 2024

The defendants, J and his company, F Co., appealed from the judgments of the trial court rendered following jury verdicts for the plaintiffs in three underlying consolidated actions that arose out of the 2012 mass shooting at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown. The court had defaulted the defendants as a sanction for their repeated, wilful failure to fully and fairly comply with the plaintiffs' discovery requests and for violating a protective order. The cases then proceeded to a hearing in damages, after which the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages, attorney's fees and costs and, pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., punitive damages. On appeal, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to support a legally viable CUTPA claim. Held: The trial court properly exercised its discretion in defaulting the defendants as a sanction for their violations of its discovery orders and a protective order. The trial court's default order was a sanction that was proportional to the defendants' wilful noncompliance and misconduct in repeatedly failing to produce critical documents that the plaintiffs needed to prosecute their case and in making highly confidential information about the plaintiffs avail- able on the Internet. The plaintiffs had no responsibility, as the defendants claimed, to prove the cause of the harm they suffered, as the effect of the trial court's default order was to conclusively establish the defendants' liability, thereby leaving the plaintiffs with only the burden of establishing their damages. The defendants' inadequately briefed claim that the trial court improperly limited the scope of J's testimony was deemed abandoned. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for remittitur, as the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's damages award, which did not shock the sense of justice in light of testimony by all of the plaintiffs about the mental anguish and emotional harm they suffered as a result of death threats and harassment conveyed to them through social media, by mail and in person that stemmed from the defendants' lies that the Sandy Hook massacre was a hoax. The conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim, namely, the defendants' dissemination of lies about the school shooting, did not consti- tute the conduct of any trade or commerce within the meaning of CUTPA, as the underlying motivation of the defendants' speech was to generate profit through the sale of products to their audience, and the plaintiffs did not allege that they were harmed by the defendants' advertising, marketing or sale of those products; accordingly, the judgments were reversed as to the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim. Argued February 8—officially released December 10, 2024

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment granting the petitioner's second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent claimed that the habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the alleged ineffective assistance of his first habeas counsel, M, for failing to present certain transcripts from the criminal trial of the petitioner's codefendant, Z, at the petitioner's first habeas trial. Held: The habeas court improperly granted the petitioner's second amended peti- tion, that court having improperly determined that the petitioner established that he was prejudiced by M's allegedly deficient performance, as the peti- tioner did not present the testimony of the witnesses who had testified at the criminal trials of the petitioner and Z at the second habeas trial and did not offer any evidence concerning how those witnesses would have testified had they been cross-examined about a reward that had been offered prior to the petitioner's criminal trial and about the recantation of certain testi- mony by one of those witnesses, and, therefore, the second habeas court improperly speculated about the prejudicial nature of their possible testi- mony and improperly assessed their credibility. Argued April 16—officially released December 17, 2024

The petitioner appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that his criminal trial counsel were not ineffective by advising him to plead guilty to various charges arising out of the shooting death of a state trooper, including capital felony murder. Held: The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to sustain his burden with respect to both demonstrating deficient performance by his trial counsel and establishing prejudice as a result of his trial counsel's advice to plead guilty in an attempt to present a mitigating factor to prevent the imposition of the death penalty and, thus, that his counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel provided deficient performance with respect to their failure to raise a diminished capacity defense prior to his guilty plea, and, therefore, that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel failed. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice with respect to his claim that his trial counsel were ineffective in not raising the issue of his competency to elect a three judge panel for the guilt phase of his criminal trial, and, thus, that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice with respect to his claim that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to object to his guilty plea on the ground of competency and, accordingly, that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by incorrectly advising him that the trial court would not accept his guilty plea after the issue of his competency had been raised at the same proceeding, as the factual predicate for that claim did not exist, and the petitioner failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating prejudice by establishing that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been advised as he claimed he should have been. Argued January 9—officially released December 17, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing its action against nineteen defendants concerning the defendant city's allegedly fraud- ulent solicitation of bids for the redevelopment of a stadium. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that it lacked standing to pursue its claims. Held: The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for lack of standing because the court correctly deter- mined that the request for proposals issued by the defendant city in connec- tion with the redevelopment project was not governed by the competitive bidding requirements of the applicable statute (§ 4b-91) or the applicable provision of the Hartford Municipal Code (§ 2-548). The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims seeking monetary damages against the defendants other than the city because the root issue of those claims was that the plaintiff had participated in the request for proposals and was not awarded a contract, and the rejection of its proposal did not establish standing for the plaintiff to seek judicial intervention. Argued May 28—officially released December 17, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder and kidnapping in the first degree, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judg- ment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that the court erred in concluding that he failed to establish good cause for his late filed petition. Held: Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333), which was issued while this appeal was pending, and which held that ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute an external, objective factor sufficient to establish good cause to excuse the late filing of a habeas petition pursuant to statute (§ 52-470), the habeas court did not apply the correct legal standard when deciding whether the petitioner had demonstrated good cause and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing at which the court must apply the proper legal standard with respect to § 52-470 (d) and (e). Argued September 12—officially released December 17, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Banking revoking the plaintiff's license to do business as a mortgage lender in this state and imposing a civil penalty for multiple violations of state and federal law. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the commissioner did not have authority to revoke the plaintiff's license because it had already been revoked in a separate administrative action. Held: The trial court did not err in failing to modify or vacate the commissioner's revocation order because the commissioner had the authority to revoke the plaintiff's mortgage lender license in the present matter after the compelled revocation of the plaintiff's license in a separate administrative action. The trial court did not improperly defer to the defendant Department of Banking's statutory interpretation of the term mortgage loan originator as defined in the Connecticut SAFE Act (§ 36a-485 et seq.) in reaching its conclusion that substantial evidence supported the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff violated that act by using unlicensed individuals to take residential mortgage loan applications. The commissioner did not improperly apply a provision (§ 36a-498e (b)) of the Connecticut SAFE Act retroactively because substantial evidence supported the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff's improper conduct continued after the provision's effective date. The trial court properly concluded that substantial evidence in the record supported the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff failed to cooperate with the department's subpoena in violation of the governing statute (§ 36a-17). There was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that it was deprived of due process, as the department's hearing procedures complied with the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (§ 4-166 et seq.), the plaintiff failed to establish any facts indicating that the department's hearing officer or commissioner was biased, and this court reviewed the record to ensure that substantial evidence supported the commissioner's challenged findings. This court declined to review the plaintiff's inadequately briefed claim that the penalties ordered by the commissioner were unconstitutionally exces- sive. Argued September 12—officially released December 17, 2024

The defendant homeowners appealed following the trial court's granting of a motion filed by the substitute plaintiff, R Co., to reset the law days in accordance with this court's remand order in the defendants' previous appeal, in which this court had affirmed a judgment of strict foreclosure for R Co. The defendants objected to the motion to reset the law days, claiming that R Co. had not timely filed a new appraisal report or an updated foreclosure worksheet. Held: This court summarily reversed the trial court's judgment resetting the law day and remanded the case to that court to make updated findings as to the amount of the debt and the fair market value of the property, and to set new law days or a sale date pursuant to Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (349 Conn. 483). Considered November 26—officially released December 17, 2024

The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his postdissolution motions for modification of alimony and for contempt and from its granting of the plaintiff's motion for contempt. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied his motion for a reduction of his alimony obligation. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for modification of alimony. This court declined to review the defendant's claims on appeal regarding the trial court's denial of his motion for modification that did not relate to the bases advanced in his motion to modify, that were not argued in his posttrial brief, and that the trial court appropriately did not address in adjudicating his motion, as those appellate claims were not properly before this court. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the court improperly denied his motion for contempt seeking enforcement of a provision in an arbitration award ordering the plaintiff to contribute to the postsecondary education expenses of the parties' minor son, as the claimed error was induced by the defendant's contrary position, which the court adopted, that it lacked authority to enter remedial orders with respect to noncompliance with the arbitration award on the basis that the award was not an order of the court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant in contempt, as the defendant's claim that a prior ruling precluded the court from finding him in contempt was conclusory and inadequately briefed, and his request for reconsideration of the judgment of contempt in light of his health and financial condition failed to challenge the basis for the finding of contempt. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees in connection with her motion for contempt, as the court was authorized to do so pursuant to statute (§ 46b-87), as well as in accordance with the parties' separation agreement. Argued October 9—officially released December 24, 2024

The defendants appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court reversing a Probate Court decree that declared null and void a lease executed by the plaintiffs and the owner-lessor, G. The lease instrument, which was incorporated by reference in the will of G, was executed in 2016 and com- menced on the date of G's death, which occurred in 2019. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the court improperly concluded that the lease was valid. Held: The trial court properly concluded that the lease was valid, as the lease, which conferred rights in the plaintiffs prior to the death of G, was contrac- tual rather than testamentary in nature and functioned more as a will substi- tute than a testamentary instrument. Argued September 9—officially released December 24, 2024

The plaintiff consumer appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant Internet and telephone service provider holding, inter alia, that the arbitration provision in the parties' agreement may be enforced by the defendant against the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded that his request for a declaratory judgment seeking to invalidate the ''infinite arbitration clause'' of the arbitration provision was nonjusticiable. Held: Although the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment seeking to invalidate the infinite arbitration clause of the arbitration provision was nonjusticiable, the court should have dis- missed, rather than denied, that claim because justiciability implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court did not improperly conclude that there was neither fraud nor an absence of mutual assent with regard to the formation of the parties' agreement, as the plaintiff had notice of the arbitration provision in the agreement and a duty to read the agreement, which he did not do. The trial court properly concluded that the arbitration provision was not procedurally unconscionable as applied to the underlying service dispute because the plaintiff presented no evidence of overreaching by the defen- dant, and he retained the ability not to accept or to terminate the agreement if the terms and conditions, including the arbitration provision, were unac- ceptable to him. The trial court properly concluded that the arbitration provision was not substantively unconscionable, as the plaintiff was notified of the existence of the terms and conditions, the arbitration provision was not unreasonably favorable to the defendant, and it contained an opt-out provision and a severability clause. Argued September 16—officially released December 24, 2024

The defendant tenant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to restore to the docket the summary process action filed against him and then subsequently withdrawn by the plaintiff landlord. He claimed that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion because he had acquired a vested right to litigate various allegations of malfeasance by the plain- tiff. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to restore the action to the docket, as the only outstanding filing by the defendant on the docket at the time the plaintiff withdrew the action was the defendant's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, which was purely defensive in character and which did not request affirmative relief or other redress, and, thus, the court lacked the authority to restore the case to the docket when the defendant, following the plaintiff's withdrawal, sought to revive the case to litigate requests for relief he had not made while the case was pending. Argued October 17—officially released December 24, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child, aggravated sexual assault of a minor and attempt to escape from custody, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that the court improperly concluded that he failed to establish that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by stipulating to the petitioner's competence to stand trial. Held: Even assuming, without deciding, that it was deficient performance for the petitioner's criminal trial counsel to stipulate to the petitioner's competency under the circumstances presented by this case, the habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that he had been prejudiced thereby. Argued September 16—officially released December 24, 2024