Volume 229 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment adjudicating several postjudgment motions in the underlying custody action involving the parties' minor children. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for the modification of custody. Held: This court declined to consider the propriety of certain factual findings made in connection with the trial court's earlier judgment because the defendant's challenge to those findings amounted to an impermissible collat- eral attack on the prior judgment. The trial court's finding that the defendant had made another false accusation of abuse against the plaintiff was supported by abundant evidence and, thus, was not clearly erroneous. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion for modification because the court's factual findings supported a determina- tion that there was a material change in circumstances and that it was in the best interests of the parties' children to grant the motion. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claim that the trial court improperly denied her motion to disqualify the judi- cial authority. Submitted on briefs May 29—officially released November 5, 2024

The defendant property owner appealed from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court for the plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action. Held: This court dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot because, after the trial court had terminated the appellate stay, it approved the committee's sale of the defendant's property, which extinguished his right of redemption and, thereafter, title to the property vested in the successful bidder. Submitted on briefs September 17—officially released November 5, 2024

The petitioner appealed, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Held: This court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, as he exclusively challenged the habeas court's credibility determinations concerning the testimony at trial. Argued October 23—officially released November 5, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant condominium unit owner in its foreclosure action for the defendant's alleged nonpayment of common fees. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded that it had not met its burden of proof. Held: The trial court's finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy its burden of proving that the defendant had failed to pay common charges for her unit was not clearly erroneous because it was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Argued September 18—officially released November 12, 2024

The defendant, who had been granted permission to be made a party defen- dant, appealed from the trial court's denial of her motion to open the judg- ment of foreclosure by sale rendered in favor of the plaintiff city in a municipal tax lien foreclosure action. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying her motion without a hearing. Held: This court dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot because it could not afford her any practical relief and, accordingly, lacked subject matter juris- diction over her claims, as the defendant, during the pendency of the appeal, conveyed the property to a third party, leaving her with no legal or equitable interest in the property in her individual capacity. The appeal was not saved by the collateral consequences doctrine, as the defendant's proposed collateral consequences were inadequately briefed and asserted nothing more than abstract, purely speculative injuries. Submitted on briefs September 20—officially released November 12, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court ordering the equitable distribution of real property that he jointly owned with the defen- dant and ordering the defendant to pay him $2000 as just compensation for his interest in the property pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-500 (a)). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in determining that he had only a minimal interest in the property. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiff had only a minimal interest in the property for purposes of § 52-500 (a) because that determination was supported by the legislative history, which indicated that the plaintiff's one-half fee interest in the property did not preclude such a finding, and the relevant equitable factors. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of just compensation to the plaintiff for his interest in the property because his one-half ownership interest did not entitle him to 50 percent of the equity, and the court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not contribute financially to the property's purchase, mortgage, taxes, or insurance, that he provided only $2000 in maintenance expenses, and that his claims of other contribu- tions to the maintenance of the property were not credible. Argued May 20—officially released November 19, 2024

Convicted, on pleas of guilty, of criminal trespass in the first degree, assault in the third degree, and violation of a protective order, the defendant appealed. He asked this court to allow him to withdraw his pleas, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his competence and to request a competency evaluation. Held: This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claims, as he failed to move to withdraw his pleas in accordance with the applicable rules of practice (§§ 39-26 and 39-27) and he failed to adequately brief the claims in accordance with the mandates for the review of unpreserved constitutional claims pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233). Argued September 9—officially released November 19, 2024

The petitioner appealed, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that the court erred in concluding that his criminal trial counsel, B, had not provided ineffective assistance in failing, inter alia, to properly present evidence regarding the petitioner's drug and alcohol abuse on the night the petitioner committed the crimes at issue. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, as B, in determining not to emphasize evidence regarding the petitioner's cocaine use on the night of the crimes, reasonably relied on the advice of an expert witness for the defense and the petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that B's decision to pursue an intoxication defense based solely on his alcohol use was sound trial strat- egy. Argued September 20—officially released November 19, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, appealed following the habeas court's denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner's sole claim on appeal was that the court improperly granted his appellate counsel's motion to withdraw her appearance. Held: The habeas court's ruling on appellate counsel's motion to withdraw her appearance was not a proper subject for an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition, and, as the petitioner did not raise or adequately brief any claim that directly challenged the trial court's judgment of convic- tion, any possible claims he may have had were abandoned. Argued October 17—officially released November 19, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court following his plea of nolo contendere to the crime of disorderly conduct. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that a certain statute (§ 54-94a) and rule of practice (§ 39-18) governing pleas of nolo contendere were unconstitutional because they violated the common-law presumption of innocence. Held: The defendant waived his claims that § 54-94a and Practice Book § 39-18 were unconstitutional, as his plea of nolo contendere operated as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and barred the later assertion of constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings, and neither of his claims of error chal- lenged either the exercise of jurisdiction by the court or the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claims that the charges against him lacked probable cause, that the trial court erred in not complying with the requirements of Practice Book § 39-18, that the court violated his due process rights by failing to hold a hearing on certain postjudgment motions and that the judges who presided over his case acted without authority. The defendant's claim that the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing terms to his conditional discharge was moot, as it was undisputed that this appeal was not heard until after his one year term of conditional discharge had expired, and there was no practical relief this court could provide to the defendant. Argued September 17—officially released November 19, 2024

The defendant, who had been convicted, following pleas of guilty, of various crimes, appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Held: This court dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot, as he had successfully completed his sentence and, thus, there was no practical relief this court could afford him. Argued September 12—officially released November 26, 2024

The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that his guilty plea in the underlying criminal trial to being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of statute (§ 53a-40) was defective. Held: The trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the motion challenged the validity of the defendant's guilty plea and the propriety of the plea proceedings, rather than the sentence or sentencing proceedings, and, accordingly, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the motion and should have dismissed the motion. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the sentencing court improperly failed to specify which portion of his sentence was attributable to the enhancement imposed pursuant to § 53a-40. Argued October 22—officially released November 26, 2024

The petitioner appealed, following the granting of his petition for certifica- tion to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that the habeas court improperly concluded that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was not violated by his trial counsel. Held: The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish deficient performance by his trial counsel in conducting cross-examinations of certain witnesses, as his trial counsel's cross-examinations did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness considering all of the circum- stances. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance in deciding not to introduce certain cell phone records, as that decision reflected sound trial strategy. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to consult with or present an expert on coerced and false confessions, the petitioner having failed to establish that he was prejudiced as a result of his trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance. The habeas court properly determined that trial counsel did not render deficient performance in failing to consult with or present the testimony of an expert on crime scene reconstruction. Argued September 4—officially released December 10, 2024

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment granting the petitioner's second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent claimed that the habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the alleged ineffective assistance of his first habeas counsel, M, for failing to present certain transcripts from the criminal trial of the petitioner's codefendant, Z, at the petitioner's first habeas trial. Held: The habeas court improperly granted the petitioner's second amended peti- tion, that court having improperly determined that the petitioner established that he was prejudiced by M's allegedly deficient performance, as the peti- tioner did not present the testimony of the witnesses who had testified at the criminal trials of the petitioner and Z at the second habeas trial and did not offer any evidence concerning how those witnesses would have testified had they been cross-examined about a reward that had been offered prior to the petitioner's criminal trial and about the recantation of certain testi- mony by one of those witnesses, and, therefore, the second habeas court improperly speculated about the prejudicial nature of their possible testi- mony and improperly assessed their credibility. Argued April 16—officially released December 17, 2024

The petitioner appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that his criminal trial counsel were not ineffective by advising him to plead guilty to various charges arising out of the shooting death of a state trooper, including capital felony murder. Held: The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to sustain his burden with respect to both demonstrating deficient performance by his trial counsel and establishing prejudice as a result of his trial counsel's advice to plead guilty in an attempt to present a mitigating factor to prevent the imposition of the death penalty and, thus, that his counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel provided deficient performance with respect to their failure to raise a diminished capacity defense prior to his guilty plea, and, therefore, that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel failed. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice with respect to his claim that his trial counsel were ineffective in not raising the issue of his competency to elect a three judge panel for the guilt phase of his criminal trial, and, thus, that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice with respect to his claim that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to object to his guilty plea on the ground of competency and, accordingly, that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by incorrectly advising him that the trial court would not accept his guilty plea after the issue of his competency had been raised at the same proceeding, as the factual predicate for that claim did not exist, and the petitioner failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating prejudice by establishing that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been advised as he claimed he should have been. Argued January 9—officially released December 17, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder and kidnapping in the first degree, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judg- ment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that the court erred in concluding that he failed to establish good cause for his late filed petition. Held: Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333), which was issued while this appeal was pending, and which held that ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute an external, objective factor sufficient to establish good cause to excuse the late filing of a habeas petition pursuant to statute (§ 52-470), the habeas court did not apply the correct legal standard when deciding whether the petitioner had demonstrated good cause and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing at which the court must apply the proper legal standard with respect to § 52-470 (d) and (e). Argued September 12—officially released December 17, 2024

The defendant homeowners appealed following the trial court's granting of a motion filed by the substitute plaintiff, R Co., to reset the law days in accordance with this court's remand order in the defendants' previous appeal, in which this court had affirmed a judgment of strict foreclosure for R Co. The defendants objected to the motion to reset the law days, claiming that R Co. had not timely filed a new appraisal report or an updated foreclosure worksheet. Held: This court summarily reversed the trial court's judgment resetting the law day and remanded the case to that court to make updated findings as to the amount of the debt and the fair market value of the property, and to set new law days or a sale date pursuant to Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (349 Conn. 483). Considered November 26—officially released December 17, 2024