J-A08029-20
2020 PA Super 63
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
HAL HARRIS, :
:
Appellant : No. 1888 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Dated May 31, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County Criminal,
Division at No(s): CP-52-CR-0000246-2015.
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2020
Hal Harris appeals, pro se, from an order that the Court of Common
Pleas of Pike County entered on May 31, 2019, which purportedly expunges
Mr. Harris’ criminal record pursuant to an opinion that this Court filed two days
earlier. However, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction on May 31, 2019,
the order it issued that day is without legal force or effect. As such, we vacate
the appealed-from order.
In this Court’s May 29, 2019 opinion, we related the procedural posture
of Mr. Harris’ case as follows:
[T]he Commonwealth filed an information, charging [Mr.
Harris] with sixty-six counts. In September 2017, trial
commenced, resulting in [his] acquittal on all counts.
On October 6, 2017, [Mr. Harris] filed a petition for
expungement. The trial court granted expungement.
Shortly thereafter, [Mr. Harris] filed a motion for
J-A08029-20
reconsideration and two supplements thereto, asserting
several errors and/or omissions in the expungement order.
[On November 26, 2018, Mr. Harris] timely appealed.
Commonwealth v. Harris, 212 A.3d 64, 66 (Pa.Super. 2019) (hereafter,
“Harris-I”), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___,
2020 WL 219106 (Pa. 2020)
(citations to the record omitted). Mr. Harris raised eight issues in that appeal.
See
id. at 66-67.
In Harris-I, this Court found some of those issues to be meritorious.
We therefore concluded the expungement order required corrections, vacated
that order, and remanded with instructions. See id. at 70. In the disposition
line, the opinion stated, “Jurisdiction relinquished.”
Id.
Two days later, the trial court issued an order granting Mr. Harris’
expungement in accord with the specific instructions from our opinion in
Harris-I. However, this Court had not remanded the record or its judgment
to the trial court at that time.
Believing that the Superior Court had erred by finding that some of his
appellate issues did not warrant relief, Mr. Harris petitioned the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania for an allowance of appeal. The Supreme Court denied
that petition on January 15, 2020. Commonwealth v. Harris, ___ A.3d ___,
2020 WL 219106 (Pa. 2020) (hereafter, “Harris-II”).
Although that appeal was still pending, Mr. Harris also filed the instant
appeal to this Court, challenging the trial court’s May 31, 2019 order of
expungement.
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Mr. Harris raises many claims of error in this appeal. See Harris’ Brief
at 3-5. We only address the first issue, because it resolves the case.
Mr. Harris asks:
Did the trial court [err] by issuing the 2nd [expungement
order] with blinding speed on May 31st, 2019 . . . when the
trial court was fully aware an appeal of [its] denial of [Mr.
Harris’] motion . . . was pending, at that time, before
Superior Court of Pennsylvania under Docket No. 3397 EDA
2018?
Id. at 3. Although Mr. Harris argues other reasons for the trial court’s error,
we conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the May 31, 2019 order.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has long held that “lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction can never be waived; it may be raised at any stage in
the proceedings by the parties or by a court in its own motion.”
Commonwealth v. Little, 314 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. 1974) (emphasis added).
We sua sponte raise that jurisdictional question here.1
“Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of review
is de novo, and the scope of review plenary.” Commonwealth v. Seiders,
11 A.3d 495, 496–97 (Pa. 2010).
____________________________________________
1 This Court often sees, especially in matters involving pro se litigants, trial
courts not pausing to ask whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction before
proceeding to address the merits of a case. We cannot stress enough that
this question, while easily neglected by the parties, should always remain the
quintessential threshold issue that every judge must ponder at the outset of
a case. And, if the trial judge finds jurisdiction to be lacking, that judge should
either (a) take no action or (b) transfer an improperly filed matter to the
appropriate tribunal.
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Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701(a), “the filing of
a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v.
Cooper, 27 A.3d 994, 1005 (Pa. 2011). Except in situations not applicable
here, Rule 1701(a) dictates that, “after an appeal is taken . . . the trial court
. . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701.
On November 26, 2018, Mr. Harris appealed the trial court’s November
7, 2018 order to this Court. Mr. Harris thereby divested the trial court of its
original jurisdiction over this case and invoked our appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, unless some event intervened to return jurisdiction to the trial court, it
lacked jurisdiction to issue any order in this case on May 31, 2019.
A Superior Court decision and order of remand with instructions, like the
disposition in Harris-I, does not automatically and immediately revest a trial
court with jurisdiction, nothwithstanding this Court’s use of the phrase
“jurisdiction relinquished” in the decision. Procedurally, our decisions are not
necessarily the final word on appeal. Thus, our phraseology is actually
shorthand for, “jurisdiction relinquished, if and when remand becomes
appropriate by an operation of law.”
Regarding the timing of a remand to a lower court, the appellate rules
provide, “Remand is stayed until disposition of: (1) an application for
reargument; (2) any other application affecting the order; or (3) a petition for
allowance of appeal from the order. The court possessed of the record shall
remand 30 days after either the entry of a final order or the disposition of all
post-decision applications, whichever is later.” Pa.R.A.P. 2572(b).
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We have construed Appellate Rule 2572 as setting the earliest possible
date for remanding a record to the trial court. “Quite simply, the prothonotary
may remand the record any time after thirty days have passed from the
Superior Court’s judgment.” Commonwealth v. Sisneros, 692 A.2d 1105,
1109 (Pa.Super. 1997). Hence, the earliest date for remand to the trial court
was 30 days after the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Mr. Harris’
petition for allowance of appeal. The High Court denied his request for an
allowance of appeal on January 15, 2020 in Harris-II, at which point Harris-
I became a final, binding appellate decision. Thus, the record was not due for
remand to the trial court until February 15, 2020, at the earliest.
We therefore hold that, under Appellate Rules 1701 and 2572, a trial
court has no jurisdiction over a case until an appellate court returns the record
to it with instructions for the trial court to proceed. Otherwise, as the
procedural posture of this case demonstrates, the trial court risks following an
appellate decision that may not ultimately be the final law of the case. When
the trial court issued its May 31, 2019 order, our appellate process had not
yet fully run its course. At the time the trial court acted (two days after this
Court published its opinion in Harris-I), both Mr. Harris and the
Commonwealth still had the right to seek panel reconsideration, en banc
reargument, and/or review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and
ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States.
Thus, the trial court’s original jurisdiction had not revested by May 31,
2019. Any “act taken by a court without proper jurisdiction is null and void.”
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Commonwealth v. Miller, 452 A.2d 820, 821 (Pa.Super. 1982). As such,
the May 31, 2019 order at bar is a legal nullity.2
Order vacated.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/13/20
____________________________________________
2 The trial court may reenter an order in accordance with Commonwealth v.
Harris, 212 A.3d 64, 66 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___,
2020
WL 219106 (Pa. 2020), to expunge Mr. Harris’ criminal record, once the official
record from Harris-I returns to it and our judgment vacating its appealed-from order becomes final, under Pa.R.A.P. 2572 and our above analysis. In
other words, if no party seeks reconsideration in this Court or petitions for
allowance of appeal in the Supreme Court, the trial court may proceed once
both records have returned to it.
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