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231 N.C. 106

55 S.E.2d 922

State v. Bryant

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided November 9, 1949

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1949-11-09

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“True it is, that a reasonable doubt may grow out of the evidence in the case. It is also true that it may arise from a lack of evidence, or from its deficiency.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Hammonds

“growing out of the evidence in the case.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Hammonds

Relies on State v. Fowler · State v. Braxton · State v. . Edwards

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1949-11-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently June 1974

16 state decisions

1601949195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Devin, J.

¶1 There was evidence on the part of the State that 29 January, 1949, a police officer went with one Ivy Riddick to the latter’s home, and found the defendant in a room therein and close by in a heater a quantity of tickets, or pieces of paper marked with numbers, which the officer testified were “butter and egg” lottery tickets. Apparently the defendant had unsuccessfully attempted to burn the tickets. Riddick testified he had at the direction of defendant delivered the tickets to him there. The officer also testified, over objection, that he had shortly before visited the defendant in his home and found therein lottery tickets of the same kind and type. Defendant’s objection to this testimony cannot be sustained since it throws light on defendant’s intent, guilty knowledge, system, and tends to show defendant’s purposeful possession of the lottery tickets where found, as well as supporting the State’s view that defendant was engaged in operating a lottery. S. v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470, 53 S.E. 2d 853; S. v. Edwards, 224 N.C. 527, 31 S.E. 2d 516.

¶2 The defendant assigns as error that the court in charging the jury defined reasonable doubt as one “growing out of the evidence in the case and supported by common sense and reason,” citing S. v. Tyndall, 230 N.C. 174, 52 S.E. 2d 272, and S. v. Braxton, 230 N.C. 312, 52 S. E. 2d 895, where it was pointed out that a reasonable doubt may arise out of a lack of evidence or from its deficiency. However, we observe that immediately following the use of the language complained of, the court instructed the jury, “If, after considering, comparing and weighing all *108 the evidence in the case you cannot say you have an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of defendant’s guilt, then you have a reasonable doubt about it, otherwise not.” Considering the entire charge of the court as to the burden of proof and in defining reasonable doubt, we conclude that the defendant’s exception on this ground cannot be sustained. S. v. Wood, 230 N.C. 740, 55 S.E. 2d 491. It may be noted that this case was tried below before the decisions in the Tyndall and Braxton cases were issued.

¶3 In the trial we find

¶4 No error.

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