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Moore v. Ferguson
LARRY ALLEN MOORE v. STEVEN G. FERGUSON
(AC 47481)
Seeley, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his
motion to open the judgment dismissing his appeal from a Probate Court
decree that determined ownership interests in a decedent’s limited liability
company. He claimed, inter alia, that the Superior Court improperly dismissed his appeal on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge the
Probate Court’s decree. Held:
This court concluded that, because the plaintiff failed either to appeal the
judgment of dismissal or to file his motion to open the judgment within
twenty days after the Superior Court dismissed his probate appeal, he could
not challenge, on appeal to this court, the merits of the Superior Court’s
judgment of dismissal, namely, his lack of standing.
The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s
untimely motion to open the judgment, as the court reasonably could have
concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing that the
judgment of dismissal was obtained by fraud on the court.
The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s
request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to open the judgment, as
the court reasonably could have concluded that there was no basis to hold
such a hearing to allow the plaintiff to present testimony regarding his claim
that the limited liability company’s operating agreement was fraudulent, the
operating agreement having had no bearing on the court’s decision to dismiss
the plaintiff’s probate appeal for lack of standing.
Argued March 17–officially released May 27, 2025
Procedural History
Appeal from the decree of the Probate Court for
the district of Norwalk-Wilton granting the defendant’s
petition to determine ownership interests in the decedent’s limited liability company, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,
where the court, Hon. Edward T. Krumeich, judge trial
referee, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and
rendered judgment thereon; thereafter, the court denied
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Moore v. Ferguson
the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment, and the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
John T. Irick, pro hac vice, with whom was Herbert
I. Mendelsohn, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Colin B. Connor, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
WESTBROOK, J. The plaintiff, Larry Allen Moore,
appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to
open the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his
probate appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
He claims that the trial court improperly (1) dismissed
his appeal on the ground that he lacked standing to
challenge the Probate Court’s decree, (2) denied his
motion to open the judgment of dismissal on the
grounds that his motion was untimely and failed to
demonstrate fraud on the court, and (3) denied his
request for an evidentiary hearing with respect to his
motion to open the judgment.1 We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the Probate Court,
and procedural history are relevant to our resolution
of this appeal. This dispute concerns the ownership
of 40 Wall Street, LLC (company). After the decedent,
Clifton Dewayne Bryant, died, his will was admitted to
probate. The will devised his interest in the company to
his wife. Thereafter, the defendant, Steven G. Ferguson,
who is the decedent’s former business partner, petitioned the Probate Court to determine the ownership
interests of the company.
The decedent’s will provides in relevant part: ‘‘I
hereby give, devise and bequeath my real property
located and known as 107A William Street, Bridgeport,
1
In his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff sets forth four claims. For
ease of discussion, we address certain claims raised by him together.
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Moore v. Ferguson
Connecticut, to my cousin [the plaintiff]. . . . I hereby
give, devise and bequeath all the rest residue and
remainder [of] my worldly possessions, my property,
both real and personal of every nature and wheresoever
situated, including . . . any and all of my interest in
the [company] to my wife, Chelsea Bryant, or if she
does not survive me, I give and bequeath the same
equally to my daughters, Chloe Bryant and Cailyn Bryant. The business affairs of the [company] shall be managed by [the plaintiff]. The devise bequeathed to Chloe
Bryant and Cailyn Bryant if she is a minor, shall be in
trust to my hereinafter Trustee . . . .’’ The decedent,
in his will, appointed the plaintiff as executor and as
trustee of any trust created by the will.
The Probate Court held an evidentiary hearing on
the defendant’s petition to determine the ownership
interests of the company. It subsequently issued a
decree (probate decree) in which it determined that, on
the basis of the company’s operating agreement dated
March 3, 2017 (operating agreement), the defendant
and the decedent’s estate were equal owners of the
company, each holding a 50 percent interest.
Thereafter, the plaintiff, in his individual capacity and
proceeding as a self-represented litigant, appealed the
Probate Court’s ruling to the Superior Court. In his
appeal to the Superior Court, the plaintiff claimed that
the defendant procured the probate decree by falsification of documents, forgery, and fraud. Specifically, he
alleged that the decedent ‘‘was a sole member and manager’’ of the company after ‘‘removing [the defendant]
in 2016,’’ and that the operating agreement listing the
defendant as a member is fraudulent.
In response, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the plaintiff’s probate appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant argued that the
plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the appeal because
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Moore v. Ferguson
he had no beneficiary interest in the company that is the
subject of the probate decree. As such, the defendant
argued, ‘‘the plaintiff has not been aggrieved by the
Probate Court’s determination of the ownership interests [in the company] because the plaintiff has no legally
protected interest in the estate’s ownership interest in
[the company] which could be adversely affected.’’
The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, arguing that he ‘‘has made substantial financial investments in the real property [located
at 40 Wall Street in Norwalk] and that the defendant
illegally forged [the decedent’s] signature on the
operating agreement.’’ The plaintiff also submitted his
own affidavit in which he averred, inter alia, that the
defendant ‘‘is using his access to [the decedent’s] financial information he received as [an employee of the
bank] . . . as well as one of [the decedent’s] former
business associates in his effort to steal an ownership
interest in [the company].’’ The plaintiff additionally
alleged that he has operated a barbershop business
from the company’s property for fifteen years and has
invested ‘‘finances, energy, time and efforts’’ into the
company. Therefore, the plaintiff argued, he is
aggrieved by the probate decree determining that the
defendant owns 50 percent of the company.
On May 1, 2023, the court, Hon. Edward T. Krumeich,
judge trial referee, conducted a hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the plaintiff’s
counsel2 stated: ‘‘I would agree with [the defendant’s]
counsel’s argument that [the plaintiff] would not have
any interest [in the company] under the facts that are
currently being presented by the court.’’ Rather, the
plaintiff’s counsel argued that the plaintiff had filed
2
Attorney Andre Cayo filed a limited appearance for the purpose of, inter
alia, representing the plaintiff at the hearing on the defendant’s motion
to dismiss.
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Moore v. Ferguson
with the Probate Court a motion to open and vacate
the admission of the decedent’s will and that the court
in the present matter should stay the proceedings on
the motion to dismiss pending resolution of his motion
in the Probate Court. In response, the court stated:
‘‘[T]he other approach could very well be to dismiss
this appeal, and if he succeeds . . . or if he fails in the
Probate Court, then you appeal from that decree. In
this matter . . . the court is limited to the decree
appealed from.’’
Later that same day, the court issued an order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered a
judgment of dismissal of the plaintiff’s probate appeal.
The court’s order provided: ‘‘The plaintiff lacks standing
to appeal the decree that recognized the decedent’s
[wife’s] interest in [50] percent . . . of the subject limited liability company pursuant to the bequest in the
will admitted to probate.’’
More than seven months later, on December 13, 2023,
the plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment, stating:
‘‘I, [the plaintiff] in my capacity as trustee for the estate
of [the decedent] hereby move that this court open the
judgment entered in this case on May 1, 2023.’’ The
plaintiff, in his motion, made the following allegations
of fraud: (1) the defendant and his attorney presented
a fraudulent operating agreement to the Probate Court
to induce a determination that the defendant owns 50
percent of the company, (2) the operating agreement
was filed with the town clerk after the decedent died,
(3) the decedent’s signature on the operating agreement
does not match his signature on mortgage loan documents, (4) the town clerk told the plaintiff that he
believed that the operating agreement is fraudulent, and
(5) the defendant’s coworker notarized the operating
agreement.
The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s
motion, arguing that the plaintiff’s motion was untimely
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Moore v. Ferguson
because it was filed more than four months after the
court rendered the judgment of dismissal. The plaintiff
subsequently filed a reply and an additional reply to
the defendant’s objection, arguing that the court should
open the judgment because, although his motion was
untimely, the defendant and the defendant’s counsel
committed fraud on the Probate Court by falsifying the
operating agreement. The plaintiff also filed a request
for argument on his motion to open the judgment.
The court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to
open the judgment. At the hearing, the plaintiff argued
that the four month rule set forth in General Statutes
§ 52-212a3 and Practice Book § 17-434 should not apply
to him because the defendant had committed fraud.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the decedent did
not have the mental capacity to sign the operating agreement, and that Richard McQuaid, the town clerk, told
him that the operating agreement was fraudulent. The
plaintiff thereafter requested that the court grant him
an additional hearing to subpoena the town clerk, the
decedent’s doctor, and the defendant. The defendant’s
counsel countered that, even if everything the plaintiff
said was true, there was no fraud on the trial court
with respect to the standing issue and, therefore, the
3
General Statutes § 52-212a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless otherwise
provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing
jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may
not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed
within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment or
decree was sent. . . .’’
4
Practice Book § 17-43 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside within
four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent, and the case
reinstated on the docket . . . upon the written motion of any party or
person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause
of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition
of such judgment or the passage of such decree, and that the plaintiff or
the defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause
from prosecuting or appearing to make the same. . . .’’
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Moore v. Ferguson
four month rule applies. The court took the matter
under advisement.
Later that same day, the court issued an order denying
the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment. In its order,
the court stated: ‘‘This motion was made more than
four months after entry of judgment and is untimely.
See Practice Book § 17-4 and General Statutes § 52-
212a. The movant has not demonstrated his standing
to appeal the probate decree or that the court was
defrauded when it granted the motion to dismiss for
lack of standing.’’ This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground
that he lacked standing to appeal from the probate
decree.5 The defendant, in opposition, argues that the
plaintiff cannot challenge the merits of the court’s decision to dismiss his probate appeal because he failed to
appeal from the judgment of dismissal or to file a motion
to open the judgment within twenty days. We agree
with the defendant.
‘‘The denial of a motion to open is an appealable final
judgment. . . . Although a motion to open can be filed
within four months of a judgment . . . the filing of
such a motion does not extend the appeal period for
challenging the merits of the underlying judgment
unless filed within the [twenty day period provided by
The plaintiff asserts a variety of arguments to support this claim includ-
5
ing, inter alia, that (1) he is an aggrieved party because he is a beneficiary
of the decedent’s estate, and a trustee and fiduciary of the company, and
(2) the court improperly limited the scope of his appeal from the decree of
the Probate Court, failed to provide him with a trial de novo as to the
ownership interests in the company, and considered the decedent’s wife’s
beneficiary interest in the company. In light of our conclusion that the
plaintiff cannot challenge the merits of the court’s decision to dismiss his
probate appeal, we do not reach these arguments.
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Moore v. Ferguson
Practice Book § 63-1].6 . . . When a motion to open
is filed more than twenty days after the judgment, the
appeal from the denial of that motion can test only
whether the trial court abused [its] discretion in failing
to open the judgment and not the propriety of the merits
of the underlying judgment.’’ (Footnote in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Searles v. Schulman,
58 Conn. App. 373, 376,
753 A.2d 420, cert. denied,
254
Conn. 930,
761 A.2d 755 (2000). ‘‘This is so because
otherwise the same issues that could have been
resolved if timely raised would nevertheless be
resolved, which would, in effect, extend the time to
appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Worth v.
Korta, 132 Conn. App. 154, 159,
31 A.3d 804 (2011),
cert. denied, 304 Conn. 905,
38 A.3d 1201 (2012).
In the present case, the court rendered a judgment
of dismissal on May 1, 2023, and the plaintiff filed the
motion to open the judgment on December 13, 2023,
more than seven months later. Because the plaintiff
failed either to appeal the judgment of dismissal or to
file his motion to open the judgment within twenty days
after the court dismissed his probate appeal, he cannot
challenge the merits of the court’s judgment of dismissal
on appeal to this court. See Searles v. Schulman, supra,58 Conn. App. 376 (‘‘plaintiff is not able to attack the
trial court’s decision dismissing her complaint because
she failed to file an appeal within twenty days after her
complaint was dismissed . . . and the motion to open
the judgment was also not filed within the twenty day
period’’); Charbonneau v. Charbonneau, 51 Conn. App.
311, 312,
721 A.2d 565 (1998) (precluding party from
appealing merits of case because neither motion to open
nor appeal from underlying judgment was filed within
6
‘‘Practice Book § 63-1 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘an appeal must
be filed within twenty days of the date notice of the judgment . . . is given.
. . .’ ’’ Searles v. Schulman, 58 Conn. App. 373, 376 n.8,
753 A.2d 420, cert.
denied, 254 Conn. 930,
761 A.2d 755 (2000).
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Moore v. Ferguson
twenty day appeal period), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 964,
724 A.2d 1125 (1999). Thus, the only issue properly
before us is whether the court abused its discretion in
denying the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment.
See Searles v. Schulman, supra, 376.
II
We now turn to the issue of whether the court abused
its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to open
the judgment on the grounds that his motion was
untimely and that he failed to demonstrate fraud on the
court. The plaintiff does not dispute that his motion
was untimely pursuant to § 52-212a and Practice Book
§ 17-43. Rather, he argues that the timeliness rule does
not apply to him because the defendant committed
fraud. We are not persuaded.
Section 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-43 provide
that a party must file a motion to open the judgment
within four months following the date on which notice
of the judgment was sent. ‘‘[T]o prevail on a motion to
open filed outside [the four month] window, a movant
must establish that the judgment was obtained by fraud,
duress or mutual mistake or, under certain circumstances, where newly discovered evidence exists to
challenge the judgment . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, 348 Conn. 796, 805,
312 A.3d 16 (2024). A party that files an untimely motion
to open based on fraud must show that fraudulent conduct induced the court to render the underlying judgment. See Hebrand v. Hebrand, 216 Conn. App. 210,
221, 284 A.3d 702 (2022).
‘‘Our review of a court’s denial of a motion to open
[based on fraud] is well settled. We do not undertake
a plenary review of the merits of a decision of the trial
court to grant or . . . deny a motion to open a judgment. . . . In an appeal from a denial of a motion to
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Moore v. Ferguson
open a judgment, our review is limited to the issue of
whether the trial court has acted unreasonably and in
clear abuse of its discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Tyler E. Lyman, Inc. v. Lodrini, 78 Conn.
App. 684, 687,
828 A.2d 681, cert. denied,
266 Conn. 917,
833 A.2d 468 (2003). ‘‘In determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion, this court must make every
reasonable presumption in favor of its action. . . . The
manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not
be disturbed so long as the court could reasonably
conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Karen v. Loftus, 228 Conn. App. 163, 193,
324 A.3d 793,
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 924,
325 A.3d 1094 (2024).
In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged, both in
his motion to open and on appeal, that the defendant
engaged in fraudulent conduct by falsifying the
operating agreement and that such fraud induced the
Probate Court to conclude that the defendant and the
decedent’s estate own equal shares of the company. The
plaintiff has failed, however, to allege facts sufficient
to demonstrate that the alleged fraud was committed
on the trial court to induce its determination that the
plaintiff, in his individual capacity, lacks standing. The
court determined that the plaintiff, in his individual
capacity, lacks standing to appeal from the probate
decree concerning the company because he has no ownership interest or beneficiary interest in the company.
Even if the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud on the Probate
Court were true and the decedent’s estate, therefore,
owned 100 percent of the company, this fact would
not lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff, in his
individual capacity, had an ownership interest or a
beneficiary interest in the company. Accordingly, even
if we assume the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations as
set forth in his motion to open, the plaintiff has failed
to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the alleged
fraud impacted the court’s judgment.
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Moore v. Ferguson
The court reasonably concluded that the plaintiff
failed to meet his burden of showing that the judgment
of dismissal was obtained by fraud on the trial court.
Thus, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to open the
judgment.
III
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
denied his request for an evidentiary hearing with
respect to his motion to open the judgment. In particular, he argues that the court’s denial of the motion to
open without an evidentiary hearing deprived him of
an opportunity to prove that the defendant committed
fraud by falsifying the operating agreement. We disagree.
‘‘When a court’s exercise of discretion [in deciding
a motion to open] depends on disputed factual issues,
such as the existence of fraud, due process requires an
evidentiary hearing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyler E. Lyman, Inc. v. Lodrini, supra,78 Conn.
App. 687. A party is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, however, when the allegations in the motion to
open itself are ‘‘insufficient to constitute the necessary
threshold showing’’ that grounds for opening the underlying judgment exist. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Tarzia, 186 Conn. App.
800, 809,
201 A.3d 511 (2019). The issue before us, therefore, is ‘‘whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to open the judgment without holding an evidentiary
hearing on the factual question raised’’ by the plaintiff,
namely, whether the defendant falsified the operating
agreement to procure the probate decree. Tyler E.
Lyman, Inc. v. Lodrini, supra, 688.
In the present case, we conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s request
for an evidentiary hearing. The plaintiff requested, and
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Moore v. Ferguson
the court granted, oral argument on the motion to open
the judgment. During oral argument, the plaintiff
requested an additional hearing to present testimony
from the town clerk and the defendant concerning
whether the defendant forged the company’s operating
agreement and from the decedent’s doctor concerning
the decedent’s mental capacity at the time the operating
agreement was signed. The court reasonably could have
concluded that the resolution of the motion to open
did not depend on the validity of the operating agreement and, therefore, there was no basis to hold an
evidentiary hearing. As we discussed in part II of this
opinion, even if the plaintiff proved that the operating
agreement was fraudulent, the operating agreement had
no bearing on the court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s probate appeal for lack of standing. See Conroy
v. Idlibi, 343 Conn. 201, 207–208,
272 A.3d 1121 (2022)
(trial court reasonably concluded that ‘‘additional evidence . . . was unlikely to have altered the [court’s
judgment]’’); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Tarzia, supra,186 Conn. App. 809 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to open without evidentiary hearing because ‘‘the information included in the motion
. . . itself was insufficient to constitute the necessary
‘threshold showing’ to entitle him to one’’). Accordingly,
we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to open the judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
