Volume 232 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The defendant J, the owner of the defendant trucking companies, appealed from the default judgment rendered by the trial court, following a hearing in damages, for the plaintiff on his breach of contract action. J claimed, inter alia, that, at the hearing in damages, the trial court improperly denied her the opportunity to present evidence to mitigate damages pursuant to the relevant rules of practice (§§ 17-34 (a) and 17-40). Held: The trial court improperly denied J the opportunity to present evidence at the hearing in damages, as she was not permitted to engage in a full cross- examination of the plaintiff, to submit evidence repudiating the damages sought by the plaintiff, or to participate in a meaningful way other than to offer unsworn representations regarding the damages. This court concluded that, because the lack of an adequate record to review the harm caused by the trial court's failure to provide the defendant an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing in damages was not due to any fault of J, who was self-represented, a new hearing in damages was warranted based on the unique circumstances of this case. The trial court used an incorrect measure of damages for the value of the truck that was the subject of the contract that was breached, as it improperly relied on the amount of the plaintiff's investment in the truck two years prior to the breach of contract, rather than the truck's fair market value at the time of the breach, and, thus, had misinterpreted expectation damages. This court concluded that, because the rights of all parties were interwoven and the erroneous legal decision of the trial court formed the basis for the award of damages against all defendants, the damages award cannot stand, even as to the nonappearing defendant companies. Argued January 13—officially released April 15, 2025

The defendants, a union and a former police officer, appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court granting the plaintiff city's application to vacate an arbitration award that required the city to reinstate the officer in its police department and denying the defendants' application to confirm the award. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law. Held: The trial court's conclusion that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law was erroneous because the panel properly evaluated the defendant officer's use of force under the objective standard set forth in Graham v. Connor (490 U.S. 386), determined that the use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and did not rely on the officer's subjec- tive perspective in making its determination. This court, having considered the four factors set forth in Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199 (316 Conn. 618) for determining whether termination of employment was necessary to vindicate public policy, concluded that, although the defendant officer's employment implicated public safety and the public trust, his use of force was objectively reasonable and, thus, the trial court improperly vacated the arbitration award. Argued February 10—officially released April 15, 2025

The defendant appealed from the trial court's approval of the committee sale and the committee deed in a residential foreclosure action on certain real property owned by the defendant. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in granting the committee's motion for approval without providing him with an evidentiary hearing. Held: The defendant's claim that the trial court erred in approving the committee sale because the motion for approval did not attach the committee report reflecting the bidding history or the successful bid was inadequately briefed, and, therefore, this court deemed that claim abandoned. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by approving the committee sale without providing the defendant with an evidentiary hearing, as the record reflected that the defendant did not actually request an evidentiary hearing prior to the court's approval of the committee sale and there had been a prior evidentiary hearing on the motion for judgment of foreclosure that addressed the issue of valuation. Submitted on briefs February 11—officially released April 15, 2025

The plaintiffs, S, a licensed real estate broker, and D Co., a real estate brokerage owned by S, appealed from the judgment of the trial court award- ing them damages in their breach of contract action arising from an asset purchase agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant and from the trial court's judgment in an interpleader action, awarding a contested real estate commission to the defendant. They argued, inter alia, that the court improperly found that the defendant had proven its special defense and was entitled to a setoff for the overpayment of a commission that it had previously paid to S pursuant to the agreement. Held: The trial court's finding that the sale of a certain property was not pending as of the date required by the parties' agreement and, thus, that the defendant was entitled to a setoff for its payment to S as a commission for the sale of that property was not clearly erroneous, as the court's finding was sup- ported by the evidence. This court declined to review the plaintiffs' inadequately briefed claim that the trial court improperly concluded that S was personally liable for the set- off. The trial court properly concluded that the parties' agreement, which included a schedule of excluded assets, limited assets excluded from the sale to those leases renewed on or about the dates listed next to each lease renewal on the schedule. Argued January 16—officially released April 15, 2025

The defendant property owner appealed from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly failed to find that one of the plaintiff's predecessors in interest had abandoned the mortgage that the plaintiff sought to foreclose. Held: The trial court did not improperly find that the defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's predecessor had abandoned the mortgage, as the court's various subordinate findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and it was free to decline to draw the inferences sought by the defendant. Argued December 9, 2024—officially released April 22, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of possession of a controlled substance and operation of a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content, the defendant appealed. The defendant claimed, inter alia, for the first time on appeal, that the state improperly joined the two offenses into a single information because they were not offenses of the same character and that the trial court's failure to sever them, sua sponte, constituted plain error. Held: The trial court's failure to sever the offenses, sua sponte, did not constitute plain error, as the remedy to the purportedly improper joinder was available to the defendant via a motion to sever pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 41- 18), and there was no obligation on the court to consider what might have been a tactical choice by the defendant or his counsel not to pursue a motion to sever. The jury had ample evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated his motor vehicle with an elevated blood alcohol content in violation of statute (§ 14-227a (a) (2)), including the testimony of the arresting officer, body camera footage of the defendant's failed field sobriety tests, the results of the defendant's two breath tests, and expert testimony thereon. Argued October 21, 2024—officially released April 22, 2025

The plaintiffs, following a jury trial, appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendants in their medical malpractice action. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in sustaining the defendants' objection to their amended revised complaint. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the defendants' objection to the plaintiffs' amended revised complaint, which had been filed during jury selection and on the eve of the presentation of evidence, as the court reasonably determined that the new allegations in the proposed complaint would have worked an injustice to the defendants, who had no prior notice regarding the proposed new claims. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the plaintiffs' request to charge the jury that the plaintiff in a medical negligence case may prove the standard of care and its breach through the testimony of the defendant, as, even if this court were to agree with the plaintiffs that the court's charge was improper, the plaintiffs failed to brief the issue of harm adequately and, thus, demonstrate that the alleged instructional error affected the verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' request to give a consciousness of liability instruction to the jury, as the record was devoid of any evidence that supported the giving of such an instruction. Argued January 15—officially released April 22, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dissolving her marriage to the defendant and granting the defendant's motion for contempt. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly entered an order into the judgment of dissolution prohibiting contact between the parties' minor child and the plaintiff's boyfriend, A. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering, as part of its custody and visitation orders, that the plaintiff shall not allow the child to have contact with A, as the court weighed the evidence before it in finding that contact with A was not in the child's best interests. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the defendant final decision-making authority with respect to medical and educational issues for the parties' child. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff in contempt of its order prohibiting contact between the parties' child and A, as the court found that the plaintiff was aware of the order and had wilfully violated it, its finding having been supported by the unrebutted documentary evidence that A was living at the marital residence with the plaintiff and the child. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the defendant in connection with the defendant's motions for contempt, as portions of those fees were for counsel's time spent on other motions and proceedings, and, accordingly, the awards were vacated and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. The trial court's factual findings underlying its child support and marital property division orders were clearly erroneous, and, because those orders were not severable from its alimony orders, the case was remanded to the trial court to refashion all of its financial orders. Argued February 3—officially released April 22, 2025 In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

Convicted, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree and attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal, made at the close of all the evidence, because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes of which he was con- victed. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, as the state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who entered the victim's apartment, engaged in the physical alterca- tion with the victim, and attempted to sexually assault her. Argued January 7—officially released April 22, 2025

The petitioner, who had been convicted of crimes he committed in 2005, including conspiracy to commit murder, appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court's judgment dismissing his habeas petition. The petitioner claimed that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, had misinterpreted and misapplied certain 2013 amendments to the statute (§ 54-125a) pertaining to parole eligibility hearings, as set forth in Nos. 13-3 and 13-247 of the 2013 Public Acts (P.A. 13-3 and P.A. 13-247), which made parole eligibility hearings discretionary rather than mandatory and eliminated the application of risk reduction credits pursuant to statute (§ 18-98e) to advance the parole eligibility date of inmates convicted of certain violent crimes, including conspiracy to commit murder. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal, as he failed to show that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve them in a different manner or that they were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court did not commit clear error, as the petitioner claimed, when it adopted a prior habeas court's finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his habeas petition and that he had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, as the commencement of his probationary period in 2021 did not render his petition or the present appeal moot, and had no bearing on the propriety of the court's judgment, which was not based on mootness. The habeas court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion over the petitioner's due process and state liberty interest claims, as he did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in earned risk reduction credits or in having such credits applied to further his parole eligibility date under §§ 18-98e and 54-125a, and the respondent's decision as to whether to award those benefits was discretionary in nature. The respondent's retroactive application of P.A. 13-247 to the petitioner did not, as he claimed, violate the federal constitution's ex post facto clause, The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. the petitioner having committed his crimes prior to the passage of No. 11- 51 of the 2011 Public Acts, which amended § 54-125a to limit inmates' parole eligibility. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's claim that the respon- dent's application to him of § 54-125a, as amended by P.A. 13-3, violated the separation of powers doctrine, as the petitioner's claim was speculative in that it was possible that he would never be required to serve the suspended portion of his sentence. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to state a claim that his right to equal protection was violated, as there was a rational basis for excluding indigent individuals held in presentence confinement from the risk reduction credit program. The respondent's retroactive application to the petitioner of P.A. 13-247 did not violate the petitioner's statutory (§ 55-3) right against the retrospective effect of new statutory obligations, as the petitioner, who was serving a period of probation at the time, was not eligible for parole. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's claim that the respon- dent incorrectly interpreted § 18-98e to exclude a retroactive award of risk reduction credit for the time the petitioner had spent in presentence confine- ment, as § 18-98e applies only to sentenced inmates. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's claim pertaining to his right to rely on governmental representations, as that claim was pleaded deficiently, and his claims sounding in breach of contract and promissory estoppel, which did not implicate a cognizable liberty interest. Contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the habeas court had no obligation, sua sponte, to amend the petitioner's habeas petition following this court's reversal of a prior habeas court's judgment dismissing the petition and remanding the case for further proceedings, as it was through the petitioner's own neglect that he failed to act to amend the petition in the five weeks between this court's remand order and the habeas court's subsequent order identifying its proposed grounds for dismissal. Argued November 20, 2024—officially released April 29, 2025

Convicted of illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle. Held: This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court should have suppressed the machete that had been seized from his vehicle because the record was not adequate for review, and, accordingly, the claim failed under the first prong of the test for reviewing a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial set forth in State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233). This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that his conviction of illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of statute (§ 29-38) violated his right to bear arms under the second amend- ment to the United States constitution because the claim was unreviewable under the first prong of Golding. The defendant's unpreserved claim that § 29-38 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him in violation of his due process rights failed under the third prong of Golding because the defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that an alleged constitutional violation existed. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that § 29-38 was unconstitutionally overinclusive in violation of his right to due process because the record was inadequate to review the claim, and, accordingly, it failed under the first prong of Golding. Argued January 13—officially released April 29, 2025

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying her postjudg- ment motion for modification of child support and custody and granting the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for contempt. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that she had engaged in parental alienation. Held: The defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling on her motion for modifi- cation was moot, as there was no practical relief that this court could afford the defendant because the challenged custody order had been superseded by an order of the trial court issued after the appeal had been filed. This court declined to address the merits of the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt, as the defendant failed to provide an adequate record for review. This court dismissed the defendant's claim with respect to the trial court's order that she pay attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff for the preparation and prosecution of his motion for contempt, as the appeal challenged only the reasonableness of the fees sought, which had not yet been awarded, and not the court's decision to award fees and, thus, was unripe for review. Argued February 18—officially released April 29, 2025

The defendant property owner appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his sixth motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in determining that the plaintiff was the holder of the subject note and mortgage. Held: This court dismissed the appeal as moot because the defendant's sixth motion to open the judgment was not accompanied by an affidavit, pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 61-11 (g)), averring good cause that arose since the trial court's previous ruling on the defendant's most recent motion, and, thus, no automatic appellate stay arose, the law days passed, and title vested absolutely in the plaintiff. Submitted on briefs February 20—officially released April 29, 2025

Convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury not to consider the victim's delayed reporting of the sexual assault when evaluating her credibility. Held: The trial court improperly instructed the jury that it should not consider the victim's delayed reporting when evaluating her credibility because, although the court's instruction was proper at the time that it was given, the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in State v. Adam P. (351 Conn. 213), which was released while the defendant's appeal was pending before this court, reinstated the standard, articulated in State v. Troupe, (237 Conn. 284), that a defendant in a sexual assault case is entitled to an instruction that ''any delay by the victim in reporting the incident is a matter for the jury to consider in evaluating the weight of the victim's testimony.'' The defendant met his burden of demonstrating that the trial court's improper jury instruction regarding the victim's delayed reporting was harm- ful and that he was entitled to a new trial because, as the verdict turned on the victim's credibility and the defendant's theory of defense related the victim's delayed reporting to her credibility, it was reasonably probable that the jury was misled into thinking it could not consider the delay in assessing the victim's credibility and that it could therefore not consider the defen- dant's principal theory of defense. The trial court properly instructed the jury regarding evidence of certain uncharged misconduct, as, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Cutler (293 Conn. 303), the trial court was not required to instruct the jury that, before it may consider such evidence, it must find that the state proved the uncharged misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. Argued March 11—officially released April 29, 2025

Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of assault in the third degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because the state's ten month delay in executing the arrest warrant constituted an unreasonable delay that violated his right to due process. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that the state's delay in executing the arrest warrant caused actual substantial prejudice and was wholly unjustifiable. Argued March 10—officially released April 29, 2025

In each of three summary process cases, the respective defendants appealed from the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff, either in her individual capacity or as representative of the estate of her husband, the decedent. Each of the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly failed to conclude that they had a present right to remain in the respective real property or that equitable considerations precluded the plaintiff from obtaining a judgment in her favor. Held: In each of the three appeals, this court declined to reach the merits of the respective defendants' unpreserved claim that the trial court had abused its discretion and had prejudiced them by consolidating for trial the action underlying their respective appeal with four other related summary process actions brought by the plaintiff because the defendants' attorney did not articulate that claim with sufficient clarity before the trial court and the defendants did not demonstrate that it warranted an extraordinary level of review. The trial court's failure to conclude, in each of the three cases, that the defendants had a present right to remain in the real property or that equitable considerations precluded the plaintiff from obtaining judgment in her favor was not improper, as the court did not find credible testimony that the decedent had promised the defendants that they could remain in the property beyond his death, this court would not second-guess that determination, The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. and the trust and the will of the decedent did not reflect that he had contemplated such an outcome. In the first case and the third case, the plaintiff, in her representative capacity, had the legal right to seek possession of the real property at issue and, accordingly, had standing to commence the respective underlying summary process action. In the second case, the plaintiff, in her individual capacity, properly invoked the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, despite the fact that the notice to quit served on the defendants did not accurately identify the plaintiff in such capacity as the owner of the real property at issue, because the notice complied with the statute (§ 47a-23), as it accurately identified the plaintiff's attorney-at-law. Argued December 4, 2024—officially released May 6, 2025

The law firm L Co. appealed from the judgment of the Compensation Review Board affirming the decision of the administrative law judge denying L Co.'s motions to dismiss and to stay proceedings in an attorney's fee dispute. In 2016, L Co., which had represented the claimant in the underlying workers' compensation claim from 2007 to 2018, had an arrangement approved by the workers' compensation commissioner by which the employer's workers' compensation insurer would send the claimant's weekly benefits checks, and any other workers' compensation benefits to which she was entitled, to L Co. so that L Co. could deduct an attorney's fee from the checks. In 2018, the claimant dismissed L Co. and retained the law firm W Co. In 2019, as part of a full and final settlement of the underlying workers' compensation claim, the workers' compensation commissioner approved a lump sum attor- ney's fee, which he ordered W Co. to hold in escrow pending an agreement on the allocation of the fee between L Co. and W Co. On appeal, L Co. claimed, inter alia, that the board improperly affirmed the administrative law judge's conclusion that L Co., with regard to the 2016 arrangement, lacked an enforceable award of attorney's fees pursuant to statute (§ 31- 327 (a)). Held: This court dismissed the appeal as nonjusticiable for lack of ripeness with respect to L Co.'s claim that the board improperly affirmed the administrative law judge's conclusion that the statute (§ 1-84b (b)) governing certain activi- ties of public officials or state employees after leaving office or employment could not serve as a basis for denying W Co.'s claim for attorney's fees because, as W Co.'s receipt of some portion of the attorney's fee held in escrow may never interfere with L Co.'s cognizable legal interest in its own fee, any injury to L Co. resulting from a determination regarding W Co.'s entitlement to a fee was purely hypothetical. The board did not improperly reject L Co.'s contention that the 2016 fee approval constituted an award of attorney's fees subject to enforcement in the Superior Court pursuant to § 31-327 (a) because the transfer of funds contemplated by the 2016 fee approval flowed directly from the claimant to her attorneys and was not a fee to be paid by an employer or insurer, as required by § 31-327 (a). L Co.'s claim that the administrative law judge's authority to modify the 2016 fee approval was limited by statute (§ 31-315) was unavailing, as § 31- 315 does not address attorney's fees and the proposition found no support in the unambiguous statutory text of or in this court's case law interpreting § 31-327 (b), which gives administrative law judges broad power over attor- ney's fees in workers' compensation cases. L Co.'s claim that the entire Workers' Compensation Commission should have disqualified itself from the present case was foreclosed by the doctrine of necessity, as this court has held that the adjudication of fee disputes between successive counsel concerning their representation of a claimant before the commission rests squarely within the jurisdiction of the commis- sion and disqualification of the entire commission would destroy the only tribunal in which relief could be had. The board did not improperly overlook the administrative law judge's alleged violation of L Co.'s due process right to be heard because, even assuming arguendo that the administrative law judge's decision to mark all of the parties' exhibits for identification only and to base his ruling solely on the items of which he had taken administrative notice violated due process, any error was harmless. Argued January 13—officially released May 6, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing his applica- tion for relief from abuse, which had sought the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order against the defendant, his former domestic part- ner. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that the defendant was not exercising coercive control and/or stalking the plaintiff pursuant to statute (§ 46b-1 (b) (2) and (4)). Held: This court, concluding that the language of § 46b-1 (b) (4) was clear and unambiguous and that the examples set forth therein did not constitute an exhaustive or exclusive list, applied a broader definition of the term than used by the trial court, and determined that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that the defendant had, in purpose or effect, unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's free will and personal liberty, as any coercive control contemplated by § 46b-1 (b) (4) had ended by the time the plaintiff filed the application for a domestic violence restraining order. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case that the defendant had stalked the plaintiff pursuant to § 46b-1 (b) (2), as there was a legitimate purpose for all of the defendant's communications to the plaintiff, including emails with attachments of judg- ment liens and mortgage related documents for a property the parties owned, and they were not sent with the intent to harass, terrorize or alarm. This court concluded that the plaintiff's unpreserved claim that he was denied his federal and state constitutional right to equal protection when he was treated differently than similarly situated heterosexual or female victims was not supported by any evidence of discrimination or bias by the trial court, as the record was devoid of any evidence that the trial court had selectively treated the plaintiff for impermissible reasons, and the plaintiff's reliance on the outcome of other cases involving different facts did not suggest otherwise. In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103 § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. The trial court improperly dismissed this action for failure to diligently prosecute pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 14-3) because the defendant should have moved for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 15-8), rather than for a directed verdict, the case having been tried to the court and not to a jury, and, accordingly, this case was remanded with direction to render a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8. Argued December 9, 2024—officially released May 6, 2025

The plaintiff homeowners appealed following the trial court's granting of the defendant town's motion for summary judgment in the plaintiffs' breach of contract action to recover for damage to their property that allegedly resulted from the defendant's failure to maintain its stormwater drainage system that runs through the plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs contended that the court improperly determined that their claim was barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n) and the common law because it sounded in tort rather than in contract. Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, as the court erroneously construed the plaintiffs' claim as alleging tortious conduct when, instead, it arose directly out of the defendant's alleged breach of a specific contractual provision in a right-of-way agreement it had entered into with the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest to maintain the stormwater drainage system that the defendant owned and operated. Argued January 7—officially released May 6, 2025

The defendant property owner appealed from the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in the plaintiff's fourth foreclosure action brought against the defendant. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure because a 2010 loan modification agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was not signed by the plaintiff's agent and, thus, was invalid and unenforceable. Held: The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure because the 2010 loan modification agreement was never signed by the plaintiff's agent as required under the terms of the original mortgage deed and was therefore invalid and unenforceable failed because, even if the loan modification was deemed invalid, the plaintiff nevertheless would have been entitled to a judgment of foreclosure because the plaintiff produced evidence that the defendant was in default under the terms of the original note and mortgage. The trial court properly determined that a judgment of strict foreclosure was not precluded under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel because the record did not support a finding that any material issue or claim raised and decided on the merits in the third foreclosure action had also been raised and adjudicated in the present action, which was brought following the issuance of a new notice of default. There was adequate evidence presented to support the trial court's finding that the defendant was in default on the note and mortgage as modified by the 2010 loan modification agreement. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claim that the plaintiff had failed to provide him with proper notice of default. Argued October 7, 2024—officially released May 6, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dants' motion for a directed verdict in the plaintiff's action seeking damages in connection with an oil leak from a tank on the named defendant's property that impacted the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in granting the defendants' motion on the ground that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence in support of its claims. Held: The plaintiff waived its claims challenging the trial court's ruling with respect to the counts of the operative complaint alleging statutory causes of action and negligence per se, as the plaintiff failed to raise or brief any claim challenging the court's ruling with respect to those counts. The trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants on the counts of the operative complaint alleging common-law negligence and common- law negligent nuisance, as there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendants were negligent, had control of the oil tank, and their negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's damages. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the redaction of portions of certain account notes maintained by the oil company servicing the defen- dants' property following the oil spill, as the redacted portions were relevant to the issue of the defendant M's possession or control of the oil tank, and, even assuming that the redacted portions of the account notes constituted evidence of subsequent remedial measures, that evidence was admissible to prove M's control of the oil tank. Argued January 6—officially released May 13, 2025

The defendant tenant appealed from the trial court's judgment for the plain- tiff landlord in the plaintiff's summary process action, and the plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because it was jurisdictionally late pursuant to statute (§ 47a-35 (b)). Held: The defendant's appeal was timely pursuant to § 47a-35 (b), as new five day appeal periods with respect to the judgment of possession and the denial of the defendant's motion to reargue arose following the trial court's grant of the defendant's fee waiver application pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 63-1 (c) (1)), this court having determined, under the limited and unique circumstances presented in this appeal, that, when the defendant attempted to file a timely and proper appeal during the appeal periods, the appeal should have remained pending, rather than having been rejected, notwithstanding an error on the appeal form, and, treating the appeal form as if it had been returned on the basis of the error, the defendant corrected it within the time allowed pursuant to the rule of practice ((2024) § 62-7 (a)). The defendant's appeal was not moot, even though he was no longer in possession of the leased premises, because the parties' lease did not expire until 2027, and, accordingly, if the defendant were successful on the merits of his appeal, he could be afforded practical relief in the form of a writ of restoration. Considered February 5—officially released May 13, 2025

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his postdissolu- tion motion for contempt and granting the defendant's postdissolution motion for contempt. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied his motion because the defendant prevented him from retrieving certain of his property from the marital residence and wilfully violated court orders by disposing of that property. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's postdisso- lution motion for contempt with respect to his claim that the defendant violated the court's order to provide him access to the marital residence to retrieve his personal property, as the court's property distribution orders were ambiguous as to whether the property at issue belonged to the plaintiff, and the record demonstrated that a dispute existed between the parties as to the ownership of that property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's postdisso- lution motion for contempt with respect to his claim that the defendant violated the court's property distribution orders, as the court reasonably could have found, on the basis of the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the motion, that the defendant did not wilfully violate the court's orders when she disposed of the property at issue for no value after having offered the plaintiff the opportunity to retrieve that property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's postdissolution motion for contempt, as evidence in the record substantiated the court's finding that the plaintiff wilfully ignored the court's escrow order requiring him to pay $15,000 to the defendant's counsel on or before a specified date. Argued February 19—officially released May 13, 2025

The plaintiff, a retired firefighter who had been employed by the defendant town's fire department, appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant, rendered following its granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly con- cluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff's breach of contract claim alleging that the defendant had breached the terms of a pension plan. Held: The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judg- ment, as there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff was not entitled to a disability retirement pension on the basis that he did not have certifications from at least three physicians that he was disabled so as to be permanently disqualified from service of all duties as a regular full- time firefighter, which was required by the plain and unambiguous language of the pension plan. Argued March 5—officially released May 13, 2025

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment dissolving her mar- riage to the plaintiff and issuing certain financial orders. The defendant claimed that the financial orders were based on a clearly erroneous factual finding with respect to the plaintiff's income. Held: The trial court's finding as to the plaintiff's gross weekly income was without evidentiary support and thus clearly erroneous, as that finding was based on the plaintiff's financial affidavit, which significantly underreported his gross base income from one of his employers. Because the trial court expressly considered its erroneous factual finding as to the plaintiff's income when issuing its alimony and child support orders, which were not severable from the court's property distribution orders, the judgment was reversed as to all financial orders and the case was remanded for a new trial on all financial issues, including the court's award of attorney's fees to the defendant's former counsel. Argued March 18—officially released May 13, 2025

The defendants, W Co. and D, appealed from the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure rendered for the plaintiff. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rendered summary judgment as to liability only because the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that the defendants could not prevail with respect to their special defense alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42- 110a et seq.). This court concluded that D, as a guarantor who was not a party to the notes, amended notes, mortgages, or mortgage modification agreement, lacked standing to challenge the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure, and, accordingly, this court dismissed the appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure as to D. The trial court properly determined that a CUTPA violation may not be asserted as a special defense in a foreclosure action and did not preclude the rendering of summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor. This court declined to review W Co.'s claim that the trial court should have construed its special defense alleging a CUTPA violation as alleging unclean hands, as W Co. failed to plead or raise a claim of unclean hands at any time before the trial court and, thus, the claim was not properly before this court. Argued November 19, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of criminal violation of a protective order, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly granted the state's motion to join for trial the information charging him with violation of a protective order with a separate information charging him with breach of the peace. Held: This court declined to address whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the state's motion for joinder because the defendant failed to show that he was substantially prejudiced or harmed by the joinder. The trial court abused its discretion in requiring the defendant to comply with family court orders as a condition of his probation because the condition was overly broad such that it lacked a reasonable connection to the defen- dant's reformation and rehabilitation. This court could not conclude, on the basis of the information the trial court appropriately considered before sentencing the defendant, that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a forty year standing criminal protec- tive order that prohibited the defendant from coming within 100 yards of his former wife and prohibited contact with her. Argued November 21, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff. He claimed that the court abused its discretion in making its property distribution orders because the court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. Held: The trial court's factual finding as to the defendant's income was not clearly erroneous, as the defendant's evidence as to his income was internally inconsistent and incomplete, and the court's findings regarding the plaintiff's testimony and the defendant's representations made in his applications to mortgage lenders were supported by the record. The trial court's factual finding as to the value of the parties' marital home was not clearly erroneous, as the court's determination was based in part on exhibits the defendant entered into evidence at trial, including an appraisal of the property, a hypothetical real estate closing statement created by the defendant's counsel for the purpose of aiding the court, and a tax assessor's card, and the court was not required to credit the defendant's testimony regarding the fair market value of the property. Argued December 10, 2024—officially released May 20, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed. The defendant, who had a confrontation with M in a brewery and repeatedly stabbed M in the head and face with a broken beer glass, claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Held: The evidence provided a sufficient basis from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant acted with the specific intent to cause M serious physical injury, as surveillance video depicted the defen- dant's attack on M, and the defendant testified that he knew the glass could pose a danger to M and that what he was doing could seriously injure M. Testimony from a paramedic and a physician who treated M provided ample evidence from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant caused M serious physical injury, either in the form of serious disfigurement or a serious loss or impairment of the function of M's skin and left ear, which hung from his face as a result of the defendant's attack. The defendant's contention that the state failed to disprove his claim of self-defense was unavailing, as none of the evidence, including surveillance video of the incident, supported his assertion that M had threatened to use physical force against the defendant, a text message the defendant sent to his date that evening after the stabbing supported the reasonable inference that the defendant did not believe he had acted in self-defense, and the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant's belief that he used the degree of physical force necessary to defend himself was not objectively reasonable in light of his testimony that he had no reason to believe that M possessed a weapon and that he continued attacking M with the glass even as he saw that M was not trying to defend himself. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court's jury instruction on serious physical injury was not constitutionally deficient because it included the statutory (§ 53a-3 (4)) definition of only one type of serious physical injury or because it failed to include his proposed definitions of certain terms, as the instruction was correct in law, adapted to the issues in the case and sufficient for the guidance of the jury. The prosecutor's closing arguments to the jury were not improper and, thus, did not violate the defendant's due process right to a fair trial, as the The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. 0 Conn. App. 687 ,0 3 State v. Leveille prosecutor's contentions that the defendant intended to kill M and had testified falsely and fabricated evidence were properly rooted in the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Argued February 3—officially released May 20, 2025

The defendants in three actions to foreclose municipal tax liens appealed from the trial court's judgments denying their motions to open after the court rendered judgments of foreclosure for the plaintiff city. The defendants claimed that the court improperly failed to determine whether it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants due to insufficient service of pro- cess. Held: The trial court improperly failed to make a factual and legal determination regarding personal jurisdiction over each of the defendants, as the defen- dants clearly raised the issue of insufficient service of process as the basis for opening the judgments in their motions to open, which implicated personal jurisdiction, and, accordingly, the judgments denying the motions to open were reversed and the cases were remanded to the trial court to hold a hearing and to determine whether personal jurisdiction existed. Argued December 10, 2024—officially released May 27, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his motion to open the judgment dismissing his appeal from a Probate Court decree that determined ownership interests in a decedent's limited liability company. He claimed, inter alia, that the Superior Court improperly dis- missed his appeal on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge the Probate Court's decree. Held: This court concluded that, because the plaintiff failed either to appeal the judgment of dismissal or to file his motion to open the judgment within twenty days after the Superior Court dismissed his probate appeal, he could not challenge, on appeal to this court, the merits of the Superior Court's judgment of dismissal, namely, his lack of standing. The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's untimely motion to open the judgment, as the court reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing that the judgment of dismissal was obtained by fraud on the court. The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to open the judgment, as the court reasonably could have concluded that there was no basis to hold such a hearing to allow the plaintiff to present testimony regarding his claim that the limited liability company's operating agreement was fraudulent, the operating agreement having had no bearing on the court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's probate appeal for lack of standing. Argued March 17–officially released May 27, 2025

Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence that had been seized from his apartment following the execution of a search warrant. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress as, applying the totality of the circumstances test, the search warrant application contained sufficient information from which the court reasonably could have inferred that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found at the defendant's apartment. Argued March 7—officially released May 27, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder, appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his habeas petition. This court, in a previous decision, held that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal and erred in concluding that the petitioner's trial counsel, C, did not render deficient performance by failing to investigate and present the testimony of J, the petitioner's son, at the petitioner's criminal trial. This court retained jurisdiction over the appeal and remanded the case to the habeas court to resolve the factual question of whether there was a reasonable probability that J's testimony exculpating the petitioner would have been credited by the jury if he had testified at the petitioner's criminal trial. On remand, the habeas court found that J's testimony was credible and, therefore, there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have found that testimony credible. Held: The habeas court erred in rejecting the petitioner's claim that C rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to investigate J's testimony, and, accordingly, the judgment of the habeas court was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to vacate the petitioner's conviction of murder and to order a new trial. Submitted on briefs May 6—officially released May 27, 2025

The defendants, a real estate developer, S, and six limited liability companies that S owned or controlled, appealed from the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff on his breach of contract claim and with respect to special defenses and a counterclaim filed by the defendants. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that there was proper consideration to support the parties' written agreement relating to the plaintiff's employment. Held: The trial court's implicit finding that S had apparent authority to bind the defendant F Co. to the agreement was not clearly erroneous because F Co., by placing S in a position of authority as the manager of the company and permitting him to carry on business for the company, created an appearance that S had authority to manage the company, which could have included entering into an employment contract with an employee on behalf of F Co., and the plaintiff reasonably could have believed that S had authority to enter into the agreement on behalf of F Co. The defendants' claim that the trial court improperly determined that there was proper consideration to support the agreement as to each of the defen- dant companies failed because the defendants did not address the court's findings that the plaintiff's promises to continue to perform work for the defendant companies after the execution of the agreement and to relinquish his membership interest in one of the defendant companies constituted adequate consideration for the defendants' promise to make payments to the plaintiff as set forth in the agreement, and, accordingly, the defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating error in the court's ruling. This court declined to review the defendants' claims that the trial court improperly failed to find that the interest charged under the agreement was unconscionable and that certain correspondence between the plaintiff and S was part of the agreement, as those claims were inadequately briefed. The damages awarded to the plaintiff by the trial court incorrectly included duplicative base damages, and, accordingly, this court reversed the judgment as to the damages award and remanded the case with direction to render judgment in an amount that included base damages and the plaintiff's calcula- tion of the interest owed, which the defendants did not challenge on appeal. Argued November 14, 2024—officially released June 3, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on self-defense. Held: The trial court properly instructed the jury that self-defense did not encom- pass a preemptive strike, as this court concluded that the trial court's instruc- tions, when read as a whole, did not mislead the jury because the evidence adduced at trial raised a question of imminence and whether the defendant acted improperly by preemptively stabbing the victim in the absence of a reasonable belief that the victim posed an imminent threat of physical harm to the defendant, and the preemptive strike instruction was consistent with Connecticut law on self-defense. The prosecutor's comments during rebuttal closing argument did not improp- erly infringe on the defendant's constitutional right to remain silent following warnings issued pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) because the comments would have naturally and necessarily been taken by the jury as commentary on the discrepancies between the defendant's statements on the night of the incident, which failed to include key facts relating to the defendant's claim of self-defense, and the defendant's trial testimony. Argued February 14—officially released June 3, 2025