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State v. Hamilton
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVON HAMILTON
(AC 47239)
Cradle, C. J., and Clark and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of criminal
possession of a pistol or revolver, the defendant appealed. He claimed that
the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence
that had been seized from his apartment following the execution of a search
warrant. Held:
The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress as,
applying the totality of the circumstances test, the search warrant application
contained sufficient information from which the court reasonably could
have inferred that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime would be found at the defendant’s apartment.
Argued March 7—officially released May 27, 2025
Procedural History
Information charging the defendant with two counts
of the crime of criminal possession of a pistol or
revolver, two counts of the crime of carrying a pistol
without a permit, and one count each of the crimes of
possession of a controlled substance, risk of injury to a
child, criminal possession of a large capacity magazine,
and improper storage of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, where the court, B.
Fischer, J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress
certain evidence; thereafter, the defendant was presented to the court, Hon. Patrick J. Clifford, judge trial
referee, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the
charge of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver;
subsequently, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to
the remaining charges; judgment of guilty in accordance
with the plea, from which the defendant appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
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State v. Hamilton
Dina S. Fisher, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Raynald A. Carre, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, state’s
attorney, and Sarah Jones, assistant state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Opinion
SEELEY, J. Following his conditional plea of nolo
contendere, entered pursuant to General Statutes § 54-
94a,1 the defendant, Davon Hamilton, appeals from the
judgment of conviction of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to
2021) § 53a-217c.2 The defendant entered his conditional plea after the court denied his motion to suppress
evidence seized following the execution of a search
warrant at an apartment in which he resided. On appeal,
1
General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: ‘‘When a defendant,
prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to suppress . . . the defendant after the imposition of sentence may
file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided a trial court has
determined that a ruling on such motion to suppress . . . would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be
limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied the motion
to suppress . . . . A plea of nolo contendere by a defendant under this
section shall not constitute a waiver by the defendant of nonjurisdictional
defects in the criminal prosecution.’’
2
General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver when such
person possesses a pistol or revolver, as defined in section 29-27, and (1)
has been convicted of a felony committed prior to, on or after October 1,
2013, or of a violation of section 21a-279, 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62,
53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d committed on or after
October 1, 1994 . . . .
(b) Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver is a class C felony, for
which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced
by the court, and five thousand dollars of the fine imposed may not be
remitted or reduced by the court unless the court states on the record its
reasons for remitting or reducing such fine.’’
All references herein to § 53a-217c are to the 2021 revision of the statute.
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State v. Hamilton
the defendant claims that the court improperly denied
his motion to suppress because the search warrant
application and affidavit failed to establish probable
cause for the search of his apartment and the seizure
of property therein. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On
June 8, 2021, Detective Elizabeth White and Officer
Frank Grillo of the New Haven Police Department
applied for a warrant to search the premises located
at 320 Quinnipiac Avenue, apartment 3-E, in New Haven
(premises) and to seize, inter alia, any firearms, ammunition and firearm related items found therein. They
submitted an affidavit and application for a search and
seizure warrant to the court, Calistro, J., and the court
issued the warrant the same day. The affidavit in support of the application consists of six paragraphs, only
the third, fourth, and fifth of which are pertinent to the
issue of probable cause.3 Those paragraphs provide:
‘‘(3) During the week ending June 12, 2021 [White] and
[Grillo] spoke to a [c]onfidential [i]nformant . . .
regarding an individual in possession of a firearm. The
[confidential informant] is familiar with firearms and
knows the difference between facsimile firearms and
actual firearms. The [confidential informant] has provided information in the past that has been corroborated by law enforcement and deemed to be reliable
and credible.
‘‘(4) According to the [confidential informant], during
the week ending June 5, 2021, he/she observed a firearm
3
The first paragraph of the affidavit introduces White and Grillo, the
second paragraph describes their training, experience and assignments,
and the sixth paragraph avers that the information in the prior paragraphs
establishes probable cause to believe that the defendant resides at the
premises, is subject to an active warrant and is in illegal possession of
a firearm.
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State v. Hamilton
within [the premises]. The [confidential informant]
stated [that] the individual in possession of this firearm
was a [B]lack male who resides at this location and
who is on parole. A single photograph of this individual
from social media was sent by the [confidential informant] to [White and Grillo]. [White] identified the individual in the photograph as [the defendant] . . . .
White knows [that the defendant] is on [state] [p]arole
for [a]ssault [in the first degree]. . . . White confirmed
through Connecticut Parole that [the defendant] resides
at [the premises].
‘‘(5) A records check, through [the records division
of the] New Haven Police [Department] . . . confirmed [that] [the defendant] . . . is a convicted felon,
which prohibits him from lawfully possessing firearms.
This records check also revealed [that] [the defendant]
has an active . . . warrant out of New Haven for
[t]hreatening in the [first] [d]egree, [a]ssault in the
[third] [d]egree, and [b]reach of [the] [p]eace in the
[second] [d]egree—stemming from a domestic violence
incident where a black firearm was displayed.’’
The police executed the warrant on June 10, 2021,
and seized two firearms,4 several rounds of ammunition,
four firearm magazines, ten ‘‘baggies containing a white,
rock-like substance,’’ and $1.60 in change from the
premises. The defendant, who was present during the
execution of the search warrant, was arrested and
charged in an information with two counts of criminal
possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of § 53a-
217c, two counts of carrying a pistol without a permit
in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a), possession
of a controlled substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a) (1), risk of injury to a child5 in violation of General Statutes § 53-21, criminal possession of a
4
Specifically, the two firearms seized from the premises were described
as semiautomatic handguns manufactured by Glock and Smith and Wesson.
5
Two women and two children were also present at the premises when
the search warrant was executed.
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State v. Hamilton
large capacity magazine in violation of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2021) § 53-202w (c), and improper storage of
a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2021)
§ 29-37i.
On August 1, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized from the premises,
arguing, inter alia, that the search warrant application
‘‘[did] not contain information sufficient to support [a]
. . . finding of probable cause . . . .’’ The state filed
a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s
motion to suppress. The court, B. Fischer, J., held an
evidentiary hearing and heard oral argument on the
motion to suppress on January 12, 2023.6 On February
17, 2023, the court issued a memorandum of decision
denying the motion to suppress, finding that ‘‘[t]he information the [confidential informant] gave to the police
was sufficient to establish probable cause for the search
of [the premises].’’
Following the denial of the motion to suppress, the
defendant entered a written, conditional plea of nolo
contendere to one count of criminal possession of a
pistol or revolver in violation of § 53a-217c, conditioned
on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. In accordance with the plea agreement, he was
6
At the January 12, 2023 hearing, the prosecutor indicated that defense
counsel had filed a motion for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 155–56,
98 S. Ct. 2674,
57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978) (holding that
when defendant makes substantial preliminary showing that false statement
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for truth, was
included by affiant in warrant affidavit, and, if allegedly false statement is
necessary to finding of probable cause, fourth amendment requires that
hearing be held at defendant’s request), and argued that the defendant was
not entitled to a Franks hearing. After the court inquired, however, defense
counsel clarified that she was not pursuing a Franks motion at that time.
The court acknowledged this and informed defense counsel that the motion
for a Franks hearing could be renewed at a later date if so desired, but
there is no indication in the record that the defendant subsequently pursued
a Franks motion. Indeed, at oral argument before this court, defense counsel
conceded that a Franks motion was never pursued.
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State v. Hamilton
sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years
and six months of incarceration, two years of which
were a statutory mandatory minimum, followed by four
years of special parole. This appeal followed.
The defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the court
improperly denied his motion to suppress because the
information provided in the search warrant affidavit
was insufficient to establish probable cause. Specifically,
he argues that ‘‘the warrant suffers from deficiencies as
to both the reliability and credibility of the [confidential
informant] [because] [t]he search was predicated entirely
on a single unsworn, uncorroborated and undetailed
statement allegedly given to [White and Grillo] by an
unnamed [confidential informant] whose reliability was
only indirectly vouched for’’ and that ‘‘[t]his information
falls far short of the information needed to justify a
lawful search.’’7 The state counters that ‘‘[t]he court
properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress
because there was ample evidence establishing probable cause that he possessed at least one handgun in
violation of his special parole.’’ We agree with the state.8
7
The defendant argues that this is true because the information in the
search warrant affidavit was insufficient (1) to establish the credibility of
the confidential informant in that it contained only ‘‘the bald and indirect
statement that the [confidential informant] ‘had provided information in the
past that has been corroborated by law enforcement and deemed to be
reliable and credible,’ ’’ (2) to establish the basis for the confidential informant’s knowledge because it ‘‘has no convincing details to support the
[confidential informant’s] knowledge about the defendant or his ‘possession’
of a firearm,’’ and (3) to confirm that the information provided by the
confidential informant was reliable, as ‘‘[t]he only step that appears to have
been taken by the police [to corroborate the information provided by the
confidential informant] was to confirm that the defendant resided at that
location, was on parole and was a convicted felon.’’
8
We also observe that, at the January 12, 2023 hearing, the state argued
that the defendant was not ‘‘entitled to [present] testimony’’ and that the
hearing should ‘‘be limited solely to arguments by counsel, given that this
is a motion to suppress based on a search warrant, and the defendant is
limited to asking any questions related to the four corners of the affidavit
. . . [which] would be sufficient in this case . . . [because] [t]here would
be nothing further to elicit since all of the information contained in the
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State v. Hamilton
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
legal principles that govern our resolution of this claim.
‘‘When reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, the standard of review to be applied depends
on whether the challenge asserted on appeal is to the
factual basis of the trial court’s decision or to its legal
conclusions. . . . Where . . . the trial court has
drawn conclusions of law, our review is plenary, and
we must decide whether those conclusions are legally
and logically correct in light of the findings of fact. . . .
Whether the trial court properly found that the facts
submitted were enough to support a finding of probable
cause is a question of law. . . . Accordingly, [o]ur
review of the question of whether an affidavit in support
of an application for a search [and seizure] warrant
provides probable cause for the issuance of the warrant
is plenary. . . . Because this issue implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights . . . we engage in a careful
examination of the record to ensure that the court’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence. . . .
‘‘Both the fourth amendment to the United States
constitution9 and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut
[warrant] affidavit is sufficient for Your Honor to make a determination [of]
whether there was probable cause for the search here.’’ We agree that the
only relevant consideration to the court’s probable cause determination was
the information contained in the warrant affidavit, as it is well established
that our review ‘‘may consider only the information set forth in the four
corners of the affidavit that was presented to the issuing judge and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Joseph E., 231 Conn. App. 556, 564,
333 A.3d 522, cert.
denied, 351 Conn. 927, A.3d (2025). Thus, to the extent that the
defendant argues that certain questions asked by defense counsel at the
January 12, 2023 hearing support the conclusion that the court’s probable
cause determination was improper, we do not consider this argument.
9
The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides: ‘‘The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.’’
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State v. Hamilton
constitution prescribe that a search warrant shall issue
10
only upon a showing of probable cause.11 Probable
cause to search exists if . . . (1) there is probable
cause to believe that the particular items sought to be
seized are connected with criminal activity or will assist
in a particular apprehension or conviction . . . and (2)
there is probable cause to believe that the items sought
to be seized will be found in the place to be searched.
. . . Although [p]roof of probable cause requires less
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . .
[f]indings of probable cause do not lend themselves to
any uniform formula because probable cause is a fluid
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. . . . Consequently, [i]n determining the existence of probable
cause to search, the issuing [judge] assesses all of the
information set forth in the warrant affidavit and should
make a practical, nontechnical decision whether . . .
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place. . . . The
determination of probable cause is reached by applying
a totality of the circumstances test. . . .
‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has recognized that because
of our constitutional preference for a judicial determination of probable cause, and mindful of the fact that
[r]easonable minds may disagree as to whether a particular [set of facts] establishes probable cause . . . we
evaluate the information contained in the affidavit in
the light most favorable to upholding the issuing
10
Article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘The people
shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to
seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly
as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.’’
11
‘‘[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Holley, 324 Conn. 344, 354,
152 A.3d 532 (2016).
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State v. Hamilton
judge’s probable cause finding. . . . We therefore
review the issuance of a warrant with deference to the
reasonable inferences that the issuing judge could have
and did draw. . . . In evaluating whether the warrant
was predicated on probable cause, a reviewing court
may consider only the information set forth in the four
corners of the affidavit that was presented to the issuing
judge and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Joseph E., 231 Conn. App. 556, 562–64,
333 A.3d 522,
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 927, A.3d (2025); see
State v. Smith, 344 Conn. 229, 243–45,
278 A.3d 481
(2022); see also State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631, 646–47,
262 A.3d 44 (2021) (acknowledging that our appellate
courts ‘‘will uphold the validity of [a] warrant . . . [if]
the affidavit at issue presented a substantial factual
basis for the [issuing judge’s] conclusion that probable
cause existed’’ and ‘‘will not invalidate a warrant . . .
merely because [the reviewing court] might, in the first
instance, have reasonably declined to draw the inferences that were necessary’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 873,
211
L. Ed. 2d 575 (2022).
‘‘If a search warrant affidavit is based on information
provided to the police by a confidential informant, the
issuing judge should examine the affidavit to determine
whether it adequately describes both the factual basis
of the informant’s knowledge and the basis on which
the police have determined that the information is reliable. If the warrant affidavit fails to state in specific
terms how the informant gained his knowledge or why
the police believe the information to be trustworthy,
however, the [judge] can also consider all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit to determine whether,
despite these deficiencies, other objective indicia of
reliability reasonably establish that probable cause to
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State v. Hamilton
search exists. In making this determination, the [judge]
is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts
presented. . . . Therefore, although no single factor
is dispositive, the veracity or reliability and basis of
knowledge of [the informant] are highly relevant in the
issuing judge’s analysis of the totality of the circumstances.’’12 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 645–46.
In the present case, the defendant’s challenge to the
adequacy of the warrant affidavit is based on his assertion that it does not contain sufficient information to
establish the confidential informant’s credibility, to
establish the basis for the confidential informant’s
knowledge, or to confirm the reliability of the information provided by the confidential informant. Consequently, we must apply the totality of the circumstances
test to the four corners of the warrant affidavit to determine whether it established a substantial factual basis
to justify the issuing judge’s probable cause determination. See id.; State v. Joseph E., supra, 231 Conn.
App. 562–64.
Having reviewed the warrant affidavit in the light
most favorable to upholding the issuing court’s probable cause determination, we conclude that the affidavit
established a substantial factual basis to justify the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause. The warrant affidavit in this case sets forth information given to law
enforcement by a confidential informant that provides
substantial evidence from which the issuing judge could
have determined, on the basis of the totality of the
circumstances, that a finding of probable cause was
warranted.
12
‘‘[A]n informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge are no longer independent requirements for a finding of probable cause; rather, a deficiency
in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip,
by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 652–53.
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State v. Hamilton
As our Supreme Court has recognized with respect
to the reliability of a confidential informant, although
‘‘unsupported’’ statements about the track record of an
informant ‘‘[are] entitled only to slight weight in the
probable cause analysis’’; State v. Griffin, supra, 339
Conn. 649; such statements ‘‘[provide] at least some
information about the informant’s past performance’’
because ‘‘[t]he issuing judge reasonably could have
inferred from [such an] assertion that the informant
had provided information to the police in connection
with at least one prior criminal matter that proved to
be true and reliable.’’ Id., 648. The warrant affidavit
prepared by White and Grillo states: ‘‘The [confidential
informant] has provided information in the past that
has been corroborated by law enforcement and deemed
to be reliable and credible.’’ Thus, because this statement provided ‘‘some information about the informant’s
past performance’’; State v. Griffin, supra, 648; it, at
least nominally, supported the confidential informant’s
reliability.
Moreover, other aspects of the warrant affidavit further established the confidential informant’s reliability.
For one, it is evident from the warrant affidavit that
the confidential informant’s identity was known to the
police. ‘‘[A]s [our Supreme] [C]ourt has repeatedly recognized, [t]he fact that an informant’s identity is known
. . . is significant because the informant could expect
adverse consequences if the information that he provided was erroneous. Those consequences might range
from a loss of confidence or indulgence by the police
to prosecution for . . . falsely reporting an incident
under General Statutes § 53a-180 [c], had the information supplied proved to be a fabrication.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 650; see also State v. Flores,
319 Conn. 218, 228,
125 A.3d 157 (2015) (fact that informant ‘‘could have expected adverse consequences for
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State v. Hamilton
relaying false information’’ provided ‘‘indicia of reliability’’), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 912,
136 S. Ct. 1529,
194 L.
Ed. 2d 615 (2016); State v. Johnson,
286 Conn. 427, 438,
944 A.2d 297 (‘‘[t]he first factor supporting an inference
of the informant’s reliability or veracity [in this case]
is the fact that the informant was not anonymous’’),
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 883,
129 S. Ct. 236,
172 L. Ed. 2d
144 (2008). In the present case, the warrant affidavit
does not assert that the information was the product
of an anonymous tip; rather, it states that the information was provided by a confidential informant whom the
police had used in the past. Given that the information
provided to the police was not from an anonymous
source, but from a confidential informant known to
the police, it follows that the informant ‘‘could [have]
expect[ed] adverse consequences’’ if the information he
or she provided to the police was untruthful. (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, supra, 339
Conn. 650. Thus, it was reasonable for the issuing judge
to infer that the information provided by the confidential informant—that he or she had observed at the premises a Black male, who was on parole and resided there,
to be in possession of a firearm—was not fabricated.
See id.
Second, the issuing judge also would have been able
to consider that, as recounted in the warrant affidavit,
when White conducted a records check with the New
Haven Police Department regarding the defendant, she
learned that he was a convicted felon who was lawfully
prohibited from having firearms and had an active warrant out for his arrest in relation to a domestic violence
incident in which a ‘‘black firearm’’ allegedly had been
displayed. This investigation by White not only further
established the reliability of the information given by
the confidential informant to the police by revealing
that the suspect had engaged in past criminal behavior;
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State v. Hamilton
see State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 647 n.9 (recognizing that ‘‘the reputation and past criminal behavior of
the suspect’’ is one ‘‘of the most common factors used
to evaluate the reliability of an informant’s tip’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)); it also provided the issuing
judge with an additional indicia of reliability that justified the finding of probable cause. See id., 652–53
(acknowledging that, ‘‘in determining the overall reliability of a tip,’’ deficiency in ‘‘an informant’s reliability
[or] basis of knowledge . . . may be compensated for
. . . by some other indicia of reliability’’ (emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted)); State v.
Rodriguez, 27 Conn. App. 307, 315,
606 A.2d 22 (1992)
(characterizing ‘‘results of independent police investigation’’ as potential ‘‘indicia of trustworthiness’’); see
also United States v. May, 399 F.3d 817, 824 (6th Cir.
2005) (‘‘[t]he additional evidence substantiating an
informant’s reliability . . . may be any set of facts that
support the accuracy of the information supplied by
the informant’’).
Third, and perhaps most significant to the issue of the
confidential informant’s reliability, the warrant affidavit
indicates that the police corroborated certain information provided by the informant. ‘‘Partial corroboration
of an informant’s report by facts developed by [the]
police, as the [United States Supreme] [C]ourt emphasized in Illinois v. Gates, [462 U.S. 213,
103 S. Ct. 2317,
76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)], is another way to establish
the reliability of an . . . informant’s tip . . . . [S]ee
United States v. Greenburg, 410 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.
2005) ([c]orroboration of apparently innocent activity
can establish the reliability of the informant because
the activity might come to appear suspicious in light
of the initial tip); State v. Hunter, 27 Conn. App. 128, 134,
604 A.2d 832 (1992) (reliability of untested informant
verified and probable cause present under totality of
circumstances after independent police investigation
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State v. Hamilton
corroborated large portion of informant’s tip).’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Johnson, supra, 286 Conn. 439–40. ‘‘It is enough, for
purposes of assessing probable cause, that [corroboration] through other sources of information reduced the
chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale, thus providing a substantial basis for crediting the [informant’s
assertion].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United
States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2021),
cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 2766,
213 L. Ed.
2d 1005 (2022); see State v. Smith,
257 Conn. 216, 226,
777 A.2d 182 (2001) (‘‘police investigation confirming
details of [an] informant’s report may establish that the
informant obtained the information in a reliable way’’).
‘‘[S]tatements made by an informant are entitled to
greater weight if corroborated by evidence independently gathered by the police. . . . The theory of corroboration is that a statement which has been shown
true in some respects is reasonably likely to be true
in the remaining respects.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. DiMeco, 128 Conn.
App. 198, 205,
15 A.3d 1204, cert. denied,
301 Conn. 928,
22 A.3d 1275, cert. denied,
565 U.S. 1015,
132 S. Ct. 559,
181 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2011). Thus, ‘‘[i]f, through corroboration, it is shown that the informant has provided reliable
information, the issuing judge may credit other information provided by the informant.’’ State v. Holley, 324
Conn. 344, 357,
152 A.3d 532 (2016).
In this case, the warrant affidavit describes how
White partially corroborated the confidential informant’s assertion that the informant had observed at the
premises a Black male, who was on parole and resided
there, to be in possession of a firearm. In particular,
the warrant affidavit states that, after recognizing the
defendant from the photograph sent to White and Grillo
by the confidential informant, White was able to confirm that the defendant was on state parole and that
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State v. Hamilton
the address of the premises was the same one listed
as the defendant’s address with ‘‘Connecticut Parole.’’13
White therefore was able to successfully corroborate
the confidential informant’s assertion that a Black male
parolee resided at the premises. See State v. Griffin,
supra, 339 Conn. 647 n.9 (recognizing that ‘‘corroboration of the information by [the] police’’ is one ‘‘of the
most common factors used to evaluate the reliability of
an informant’s tip’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This partial corroboration of the information provided
by the confidential informant entitled the issuing judge
to credit the other information provided by the informant; see State v. Holley, supra,324 Conn. 357; and ‘‘to
give greater weight to the informant’s claim’’ that he
or she had observed a Black male, who was on parole,
in possession of a firearm at the premises where the
Black male resided. State v. Griffin, supra, 652.14 We
conclude that this corroboration by the police, taken
together with the aforementioned factors, provided
strong evidence of the informant’s reliability. See id.,
651–52.
Finally, the warrant affidavit also contains a ‘‘clear
showing of the informant’s basis of knowledge,’’ which
13
The issuing judge could have reasonably inferred that the reference to
‘‘Connecticut Parole’’ in the warrant affidavit referred to the Board of Pardons and Paroles. See State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 645–46.
14
See State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 644,
620 A.2d 746 (1993) (recognizing that ‘‘corroboration would be a proper ground on which to base an
inference of reliability’’); State v. Rodriguez, 223 Conn. 127, 137,
613 A.2d
211 (1992) (statement in warrant affidavit that confidential informant saw
defendant carrying revolver before shooting was entitled to reliability
because it was corroborated); see also State v. Toth, 29 Conn. App. 843,
856,
618 A.2d 536 (‘‘[a]lthough the confidential informant was not specifically
shown to be reliable or trustworthy, the information derived from all sources
and corroborated by police surveillance [and investigation] reasonably
allowed the issuing authority to conclude that the information supplied by
the informants presented a substantial factual basis on which to find that
probable cause existed’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied,
225 Conn. 908,
621 A.2d 291 (1993), and cert. denied,
225 Conn. 908,
621
A.2d 291 (1993).
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State v. Hamilton
mitigates any remaining doubts concerning the confidential informant’s reliability. Id., 652. ‘‘[O]ur Supreme
Court has assigned great weight to knowledge provided
to law enforcement by known informants who have
‘[firsthand] information’ of a crime’’; State v. Freeman,
132 Conn. App. 438, 450,
33 A.3d 256 (2011), aff’d,
310
Conn. 370,
77 A.3d 745 (2013); and ‘‘stated that ‘the
surest way to establish a basis of knowledge is by a
showing that the informant is passing on what is to him
[firsthand] information . . . .’ ’’ State v. Johnson,
supra,286 Conn. 440. As to the basis of knowledge for
the information provided by the confidential informant
in the present case, the warrant affidavit states that
the informant ‘‘is familiar with firearms and knows the
difference between facsimile firearms and actual firearms’’ and that he or she ‘‘observed a firearm within
[the premises]’’ that was possessed by ‘‘a [B]lack male
who resides at this location and who is on parole.’’ It
further states that the confidential informant provided
the police with a photograph of this individual that
was taken from social media. Given that the warrant
affidavit provided information that described the
alleged wrongdoing, along with ‘‘a statement that the
event was observed firsthand’’ by the confidential informant, we conclude that the issuing judge reasonably
could have determined that the informant’s basis of
knowledge ‘‘entitle[d] his [or her] tip to greater weight
than might otherwise be the case’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) State v. Griffin, supra, 339 Conn. 653;
and mitigated any doubts regarding the informant’s
reliability. See id. (concluding ‘‘that the issuing judge
could rely on th[e] [confidential informant’s] particularized knowledge to overcome uncertainty as to the informant’s reliability or veracity’’ when warrant affidavit
alleged, inter alia, ‘‘that the informant personally
observed [a black, rifle type firearm] and ammunition
inside the defendant’s residence’’); State v. Morrill, 205
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State v. Hamilton
Conn. 560, 566, 534 A.2d 1165 (1987) (‘‘The affidavit
states that the informant personally observed the defendant sell [marijuana] and [that] he heard the defendant
state that he had ten pounds to sell. From these statements the [issuing judge] could reasonably have
inferred that the defendant was engaged in the ongoing
criminal activity of selling [marijuana].’’).
Accordingly, applying the totality of the circumstances test, we conclude that the search warrant application contained sufficient information from which the
court reasonably could have inferred that there was a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
would be found at the premises. For that reason, the
court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
