Volume 232 — United States Reports

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of an assessment for taxation under authority of the State of shares of stock owned by residents of .the State of foreign corporations which did no business and has no property within the State, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution of certain ordinances of the City of New York as applied to the interstate business of express companies, are stated in the opinion. There was no basis for separation because the various specific provisions upheld below cannot be regarded as regulations as to the usd of the streets.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution of certain ordinances of the City of New York as applied to the interstate business of express companies, , are stated in the opinion.

Held: embraces proceedings to enforce penalties and forfeitures as well as criminal prosecutions and is of broader scope than are the guaranties in Article III and the Sixth Amendment governing trials in criminal prosecutions. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S, 547 , 563; United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475 , 481; Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103 , 112.

Held: in this case, not to be a bar to a subsequent suit in the state court on the same cause of action, and the refusal of the state court to treat the decree as conclusive on points left open did not deprive the defendant of any Federal right. 27 So. Dak. 296, affirmed.

By the act of July 1,1909, the Illinois legislature passed an Inheritance Tax Law like that considered in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283.

The Grand Jury for the District of Colorado indicted Buchanan for a violation of the act “to prevent unlawful occupancy of the public land.” The indictment charged that in February, 1907, one Edward Scott made a homestead entry, at the proper office, of a quarter-section of land in Colorado, and died, March 28, 1910, leaving the homestead entry in full force and effect; that thereafter “his heirs were in lawful possession of and were engaged in cultivating the said homestead…

Held: that the use of the word “immigration” in the title of the act of 1907 cannot overcome the fact as evidenced by the act itself that Congress intended its provisions to apply to all aliens and not exclusively to alien immigrants. Taylor v. United States, 207 U. S. 120 , distinguished. 179 Fed. Rep. 839 , affirmed.

Held: not chargeable as matter of law with assumption of risk on the ground of presumed knowledge of a defect in the condition of the equipment, there being no direct evidence that he knew of it. Where the fact is in dispute as to whether a defect in a machine is such as to render its use dangerous, it cannot be properly held as matter of law that the risk is obvious even to one who knew of the defect.

<p>In this case this court thinks there was sufficient evidence as to the authority of the agent to make the agreement to support the verdict against the principal, and that the jury was warranted in finding that an agreement had been reached before certain questions reserved for further consideration had been raised.</p> <p>The evidence tending to show that the agreement was a compromise between a mortgagee and a lienor in view of doubts that had arisen as to which had priority, this court agrees with the lower courts that there was no guaranty as to the exact status of the lien either as to amount or priority.</p> <p>Improprieties in remarks of counsel in addressing the jury may be cured by the instructions of the trial judge.</p> <p>Where the record does not show that an objection was raised upon the appeal to the territorial Supreme Court it cannot be considered by this court. Gila Valley Ry. v. Hall, ante, p. 94.</p>

The facts, which involve the title to certain lands allotted under the Cherokee Indian Allotment Act of July 1, 1902, are stated in the opinion. The jurisdiction and powers of the Secretary of the Interior in allotment of Cherokee lands were like those exercised by the Land Department over public lands.

The facts, which, involve the validity of a judgment obtained by the defendants in error against the plaintiff in error in the courts of the Territory of Arizona, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and effect of §§ 29 and 38 of the Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion. This court has jurisdiction of this writ of error. Judicial Code, § 238; Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437; Davis v. Cleveland, 217 U. S. 157. Proceedings for removal are wholly the creature of statute, and the amendment of the Removal Acts (25 Stat. 433, §§ 108,109,110,1 Desty’s Fed.

The facts, which involve the validity of an order concerning a passenger station made by the Public Service Commission of Vermont, are stated in the opinion.

Patsone v. Pennsylvania , 232 U.S. 138 (1914) was a U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld Pennsylvania's Act of May 8, 1909, deeming it unlawful for "unnaturalized foreign born residents" to kill wild animals, except for when defending their property or person and only by means of a pistol; the Pennsylvania statue barred unnaturalized foreign born residents from possession of shotguns or rifles for any reason. Although the case was directly addressing Second Amendment rights of noncitizens in the context of wild game, it also brought forward discussions of Fourteenth Amendment rights for noncitizens, State's rights to wildlife, and symmetry of justice.

<p>. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY. •</p> <p>The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky and the construction of the statutes relative to removal of causes from the state to the Federal court, are stated in the opinion.</p>

United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914), is a United States Supreme Court case holding that the Criminal Code of 1909 does not require indictments for mail fraud to show that the fraudulent mailed statements were directly shown to the defrauded party.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment of the Supreme jCourt of the State of Louisiana, and the determination whether that court was required to give full faith and credit to a judgment of the probate court of Texas, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity under the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of a judgment for' double damages entered under a railroad claim statute of South Dakota, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP ALABAMA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Sections 16 in this State were granted by Congress to the inhabitants of the several townships for the specific use of schools. Acts of March 2, 1819, 3 Stats. 489, and March 2, 1827, 4 Stats. 237.</p> <p>This grant which was in the form of a proposal to the people of the Alabama Territory,, the acceptance of which was a prerequisite for the admission of the State into the Union, was accepted, as made, by the inhabitants of the State, in convention assembled, on August 2, 1819. Ordinance, Const. Conv. of 1819; 1 Code, Alabama, 1907, pp. 82-83.</p> <p>Upon the acceptance of these proposals, the State was admitted into the Union., 3 Stats. 608.</p> <p>By the grant of these lands for the particular use, the United States retained title for all other purposes or uses. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267.</p> <p>The State of Alabama, in accepting the proposals upon which its admission into the Union was made contingent, disclaimed all right and title to waste or unappropriated lands lying within said Territory. Clause in fourth proposal in act of Congress of March 2, 1819, 3 Stats. 489; Ordinance of 1819, supra; 1 Code, p. 82.</p> <p>All other uses or purposes to which said Sections 16 might be put, except the use for schools, being unappropriated by the United States, came within the above disclaimer.</p> <p>A state statute of limitations, whereby lands granted by the United States to a specific use, are diverted from, that use into private ownership, are in conflict with the act of Congress making the grant, and void.</p> <p>The State has no power to divert sixteenth section lands from the specific use; for schools, to which they were dedicated by. the act of Congress. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267; Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 269; Springfield v. Quick, 6 Indiana, 83; S. C., 22 How. 56; Davis v. Indiana, 94 U. S. 792; Morton v. Granada Academies, 16 Mississippi, 773.</p> <p>The acceptance of the proposals of the act of March 2, 1819, created a contract between the United States and the State of Alabama, and the attempted diversion of these lands from the use to which granted, by a state statute of limitations,- violates the obligation of this contract, and is void. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Fenn v. Kinsey, 45 Michigan, 446, 8 N. W. Rep. 64; Covington v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204; United States v. Great Falls, 21 Maryland, 119; Lowery v. Francis, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 534.</p> <p>The acts of Congress making the grant are construed most strongly against the grantee, and in favor of the United States. United States v. Michigan, 190 U. S. 379.</p> <p>The acts of March 2, 1819, and March 2, 1827, are in pari materia, and must be construed as if passed at the same time. Plummer v. Murray, 51 Barbour (N. Y.), 201; People v. Aichison, 7 How. Pr. 241.</p> <p>The grant of Sections 16 for the use of schools, is a part of the land system of the United States. 2 Kent.. Com. (13th ed.) 196, note e, and see act of Congress of 1875, providing that lot . No. 16 of every township shall be so reserved. And see also § 3 of the Ordinance establishing the North West Territory*</p>

Held: that the established practice of. the distillery business to issue warehouse receipts for whiskey deposited in the distillery warehouse and pledge such receipts as security for loans is not one opposed to public policy.

The facts, which involve the construction of a patent for swamp lands to a State and the extent of the lands conveyed thereby, are stated in the opinion. Complete title to the entire township passed to the State of Arkansas under the Swamp-Land Act (9 Stat. 520; Hev. Stat. § 2479), and see 11 Stat. 251. The Swamp-Land Act did not require that the lands be surveyed but only identified as coming within the terms of the act.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMERCE COURT.</p> <p>In 1909, Associations, representing California fruit-growers, filed with the Commerce Commission complaints against numerous railroad companies attacking the freight and refrigeration charges on citrus fruit shipped from California to Eastern points. Much testimony-was taken, from which it appeared that the orange crop amounted to about 50,000 cars per annum, of which the 20,000, shipped in warm weather, required some form of refrigeration in order to keep the fruit in condition for use at the end of the journey. At the close of the first hearing June 11, 1910, the Commission held (19 I. C’. C. 148) that $1.15 per cwt. was a reasonable freight-rate on oranges. Other questions in the case were postponed until January 14, 1911, when the Commission made a report (20 I. C. C. 106) as to the reasonableness of the carriers’ charges of $62.50 per car. for refrigeration and $30 for services in shipments pre-cooled by the consignor.</p> <p>The Commission found that in refrigeration by the carriers they furnished all the ice and performed all of the services, including re-icing.en route. It found that there was a total of about 11 tons of ice furnished, but owing to the melting the average weight of ice hauled was 8,000 lbs., the freight on which to Chicago, was .25 per 100. It cost something to repair the bunkers, and the Commission recognized the right to include an additional sum to cover risk and profit.</p> <p>• The total revenue of $345.30 from such shipments was made up of the following items:</p> <p>Freight on 27,200 lbs. of oranges @ $1.15... $312.80</p> <p>Cost of 11 tons of ice................ $30.</p> <p>Freight on 8,000 lbs. average weight of</p> <p>ice hauled @ .25................... 20.</p> <p>Damage to bunkers.................. 5.</p> <p>Sum to cover risk and profit.......... 7.50</p> <p>62.50</p> <p>Gross Receipt............................$375.30</p> <p>Less cost of ice... f...................... 30.00</p> <p>Freight and refrigeration charges...........$345.30</p> <p>The Commission found that the charge of $62.50 for refrigeration services-was reasonable.</p> <p>It further appeared that the Government had conducted certain experiments with a view of determining whether an advantage would not be derived from pre-cooling the fruit before the bunkers were filled with ice. There was testimony that the carriers had reached the conclusion that if the fruit was pre-cooled before the movement of the car began, there would be a corresponding saving in the amount of ice needed in the bunkers. They accordingly had erected plants at which the fruit could be precooled and included such pre-cooling service in the regular refrigeration charge of $62.50.</p> <p>Certain shippers claimed that better results were obtained where the fruit was pre-cooled immediately after it was taken from the grove and before it was placed in the car. They therefore adopted a method in which the shipper chills the fruit, cools the car, furnishes the ice and fills the bunkers at a cost to himself of $32.50. The carrier for its services in connection with hauling such pre-cooled shipment charged $30, intending thereby to make the rates on pre-cooled fruits the same, whether the pre-cooling was by the shipper or the carrier. In determining whether this $30 was a reasonable charge for service rendered by the carrier in hauling fruit pre-cooled by the shipper, the Commission said (20 I. C. C. 120) that no re-icing was necessary en route and that “it would be a liberal estimate to put the average weight of the ice during the entire journey at 5,000 lbs. For the hauling of this ice the carriers are entitled to fair compensation, as they are in the case of Standard Refrigeration.” There is also an “expense in providing and keeping in repair the ice bunkers. . . The carrier is, therefore, entitled to this additional cost, which is about $5 per car per trip one way.” (20 I. C. C. 120.)</p> <p>Where the fruit is pre-cooled by the shipper, the boxes are packed so much closer together that the load is one-sixth greater than in case of shipments'pre-cooled and refrigerated by the carrier. The .result is that the revenue from a car of fruit pre-cooled by the shipper would be— Freight on 33,000 lbs. of oranges at $1.15......$379.50 Freight on 5,000 lbs. of ice at 25 cents per hundred 12.50 Damage to bunkers (and profit allowed?)....... 7.50</p> <p>$399.50</p> <p>or, $54 more than the revenue of $345.30 from a car precooled and refrigerated by the carrier.</p> <p>The Commission further said: “As bearing upon the reasonableness of the rate, the carriers showed the cost of the movement - of these oranges per gross ton — that is, per ton of combined weight of car and-, of contents as compared with other articles — claiming that this was the true basis upon which to fix rates. So treating these pre-cooled shipments, it will be found that the carrier receives more per ■ gross ton for handling the pre-cooled car than for either the ventilated or . the refrigerated shipment. By every canon of rate-making which has been applied by carriers in the-past, or which-is-relied upon by them now, these pre-cooled shipments at the standard rate without additional compensation are better business than either the ventilated or the refrigerated movement. Clearly these growers who have devised and perfected this system of shipment, should not be compelled to pay for the privilege of using it more than the fair cost to the carrier of providing the additional facilities which are not included in the ventilated rate with a fair profit.” 20 I. C. C. 121.</p> <p>The report concluded as follows: “We are of the opinion that the present pre-cooling charges of the defendants of $30 per car are. unjust and unreasonable, and that these charges should not exceed for the future $7.50 per car, but the defendants may, as a condition of making this charge, require that pre-cooled cars be loaded seven tiers wide and two tiers high, and may provide by their tariffs a proper minimum to accomplish this result, the amount of which would depend upon the length of the car.” 20 I. C. C. 123.</p> <p>The carriers, in obedience to this order, put in a tariff of $7.50 for pre-cooling services, but- at once filed another tariff, effective July 1, 1911, reciting that “the privilege heretofore permitted to shippers of citrus fruit to pre-ice carload shipments is withdrawn, the carriers' retaining and exercising the exclusive right and control of furnishing and doing all icing and refrigeration of citrus fruit in all cases where shipper does not specifically -request or direct shipments to move solely under ventilation.”</p> <p>Immediately thereafter the orange-growers’ associations filed proceedings to cancel this withdrawal tariff and to compel the carriers to continue to extend to shippers the old privilége of pre-cooling at the new rate of $7.50. At the hearing the evidence and reports of the Commission in the former case were stipulated into .the record and, on April 8, 1912 (23 I. C. C. 267, 271), the Commission held that the shippers had the right to the pre-cooling privilege and again ruled that $7.50 was a reasonable charge for the services rendered by the carriers.</p> <p>The Railroad Companies then filed a petition in the Commerce Court attacking the original order of January 14, 1911 (fixing $7.50 as a reasonable charge on precooled shipments) and the last order of April 8, 1912, (requiring the roads to permit pre-cooled'shipments at that sum), contending that shippers had no right to ice the bunkers. They also insisted that the $7.50 rate was confiscatory and did not equal the $17.50, which the Commission itself had found to be the actual cost of services rendered in connection with pre-cooled shipments. The carriers, thereupon prayed that both orders should be annulled and set aside.</p> <p>The Commerce Court (204 Fed. Rep. 647, 651) adopted the finding of the Commission that in pre-cooled shipments the revenue was $54 greater than in the Railroads’ method of refrigeration, and concluded by saying that, in view of that fact, “we do not think that the petitioners have any valid complaint to make of the charge of $7.50 per car established by the Commission.” It further held that under the facts appearing in the record, the shipper had the right to furnish the ice in pre-cooled shipments and thereupon it dismissed the petition. The case was then brought here by appeal. ■</p> <p>The order of January 14,1911, is fully supported by the evidence- contained in the record made by the parties in the proceedings before the Commission.</p> <p>The charge of $7.50 covers only services of carriers in keeping ice bunkers in repair.</p> <p>To vary charge of repairing ice bunkers according to variations in distances over which traffic is transported would be impracticable and improper.</p> <p>The Commission’s finding concerning cost to shippers of pre-cooling and pre-icing is fully supported by evidence upon which it is based.</p> <p>The reasons advanced by counsel in support of their contention that the order is invalid are based upon an erroneous view concerning matters covered by the charge of $7.50.</p> <p>The order of April 8, 1912, is not based upon an erroneous construction of the Act to Regulate Commerce.</p> <p>Pre-icing can be done more economically and satisfactorily by shippers than by carriers.</p> <p>Shippers, within certain limits, have control of the condition in which traffic may be delivered to carriers for transportation.</p> <p>The cases cited in their brief by counsel for the carriers are inapposite.</p> <p>Carriers cannot compel shippers to pay for refrigeration services they do not ask for and do not need.</p> <p>The right of carriers to re-ice in order to protect themselves against damages which would otherwise result from delays en route- is freely admitted.</p> <p>The shippers’ right to pre-ice does not depend upon carrier’s view of result which will ensue if shippers avail themselves of such right.</p> <p>To serve their own interests the carriers are seeking to compel shippers to adopt an unnecessarily expensive method of shipment.</p> <p>The Hepburn Act did not make the pre-icing in ques- ' tion a part of transportation.</p> <p>Such pre-icing is an indispensable element of the precooling process.</p> <p>If the Commission had permitted cancellation tariffs of carriers to become operative, shipments of fruit would have been thereby subjected to new rates in excess of those formerly in effect.</p> <p>Carriers may not. render ineffective an order of the Commission by canceling tariffs voluntarily published and filed by them upon which the order is based.</p> <p>In support of these contentions see Int. Comm. Comm. v. Del.j Lack. & West. R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235; Int. Comm. Comm. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42; Investigation and Suspension of Certain Regulations, 23 I. C. C. 267; Pacific Coast Lumber Assn.- v. Atchison &c. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 154.</p>

Held: in this case, subject to the liability imposed by § 322, Civil Code of the latter State. Under the laws of California a stockholder is liable for his proportion of the debts of the corporation as a principal and not as a surety; nor in this case was he relieved of liability on notes held by a bank which had deposits to the credit of the corporation and did not apply the same to.payment of the notes. 192 Fed.

The facts, which involve the validity under the due .process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of a judgment based on a false return of service made by a sheriff, are stated in the opinion.

<p>In order to bring a case within the terms of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, the defendant must have been, at the time of the occurrence, engaged as a common carrier in interstate commerce and the injured employé must have been employed by such carrier in such commerce.</p> <p>Where the defendant is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce and the employé for whose injuries the suit is brought was employed by the defendant in such commerce, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 governs to the exclusion of the state statutes.</p> <p>Where the state court improperly refuses to apply the provisions of the' Federal Employers’ Liability Act in an action for injuries to an employé of a common carrier while both employer and employé were engaged in interstate commerce and the result might have been different, the judgment must be reversed.</p> <p>The persons related to the deceased employé as specified in the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 are the beneficiaries of an action prescribed by the act and the damages are to be based upon the pecuniary loss sustained by such beneficiaries.</p> <p>Whether the question of employment by the deceased employé in interstate commerce was properly raised in the state court as a bar to the action in accordance with the local code, is a question of state practice, and if .the -highest court of the State assumed or decided that the record presented that question and decided it against the party asserting it, this court has jurisdiction to review the judgment under § 237, Judicial Code.</p> <p>A railroad company, leasing its entire line, which is wholly intrastate, to another railroad company doing an interstate business creates the latter its agent and becomes a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce; and if under the local law the lessor remains responsible for the lessee’s acts, the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 controls as to liability for injuries to employés of the lessee engaged in interstate commerce.</p> <p>Where, upon the evidence, any essential matter bearing on the question of whether an employé of a railroad company was, at the time of the injury, engaged in interstate commerce is in doubt, it should bo submitted to the jury under proper instructions.</p> <p>Where the state court refused to submit questions to the jury on the ground that there was no evidence to sustain the Federal right asserted, this court will analyze the evidence to the extent necessary to give plaintiff in error the benefit of such Federal right'if it was improperly denied. Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601. When a freight train for an intrastate point is being made up of cars including some from a train which started from another State, it is a reasonable inference that such cars were being carried forward as a part of a through movement of interstate commerce.</p> <p>Hauling empty cars from one State to another is- interstate commerce within the meaning of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908.</p> <p>The Employers’ Liability Act is in pari materia with the Safety Appliance Act, and this court, following its rulings in regard to the latter, holds that the hauling of empty cars from one State to another is interstate commerce within the meaning of the act. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 146- U. S. 1.</p> <p>Acts of'an employé in preparing an engine for a trip to’move freight in interstate commerce, although done prior to the actual coupling up of the interstate cars, are acts done while engaged in interstate commerce.</p> <p>Although absent temporarily from his train for a short time for a purpose not inconsistent with his duty to his employer, a railroad employé may still be on duty and engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908.</p>

<p>The jurisdiction of this court on direct writ of error is not confined to the constitutional questions, but embraces every issue in the case. Williamson v. United, States, 207 U. S. 425.</p> <p>The Circuit Court of Appeals has no power to ask instructions upon an issue which it has no right to decide, nor has this court authority to instruct on such a subject.</p> <p>This court cannot refuse to decide questions which are properly before it for judgment.</p> <p>Where one party has taken a writ of error direct from this court to the Circuit Court based on the constitutional question decided against it, and the other party has obtained a writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals as .to other questions decided against it, which court has certified that question to this court, and the record is in such condition as to enable this court to decide the whole case, this court may treat the writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals as a cross-writ and so determine all the issues involved.</p> <p>Under § 37 of the Tariff Act of August, 1909, imposing a tax on the use of foreign-built yachts owned or chartered for more than six months by citizens of the United States, to be collected annually on September 1, the tax became due on the first day of September next occurring after the act became effective; further held that the six months’ clause relates only to the chartering of the yachts, and the word “annually” indicates continuity and that the tax is not a sporadic one to cease after a single payment.</p> <p>Where words are used in a statute in their every-day sense and not in a , technical one, they should be so construed.</p> <p>The use of a foreign-built yacht which renders the owner subject to the tax imposed by § 37 of the Tariff. Act of 1909 is active and actual use and not the potential use arising from the mere fact of ownership. See Pierce v. United States, p. 290, post.</p> <p>The fact that a tax statute operates retroactively does not necessarily cause it to be unconstitutional. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107.</p> <p>The rule that statutes should be construed if possible so as not to operate retroactively does not authorize a judicial reenactment of the statute to. save it from acting retroactively if Congress intended it so to do.</p> <p>Section 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909,, imposing a tax on foreign-built • yachts, is not unconstitutional because it operates retroactively as to the tax levied for the year 1909, and the use of yaghts within the meaning of the statute during the year 1909, renders the owner or charterer liable for the tax for that year.</p> <p>The requirement of uniformity imposed by the Constitution on Congress in levying excise taxes is not intrinsic but geographic.</p> <p>The Constitution is not.self-destructive — it does not take away by one provision powers conferred by another, and the express authority to tax is not limited or restricted by subsequent provisions or amendments, especially the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27.</p> <p>The difference between things domestic and things foreign is recognized by the Constitution itself, and a classification for taxation of foreign-built yachts is not so repugnant to justice as to amount to denial of due process of law because domestic-built yachts are not subject to the same tax; nor is § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, unconstitutional for lack of uniformity.</p> <p>The state rule as to interest on taxes differs from the United States rule — the former excludes interest unless the statute so provides; the latter allows interest unless forbidden by statute, This court will not now apply the state rule, as to do so would repudiate settled principles and disregard the sanction expressly or impliedly given by Congress to the. rule adopted by the Federal courts.</p> <p>The Government is entitled to interest on taxes on use of foreign-built yachts under § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, from the date when the taxes become due, and may maintain an action against the owner or charterer therefor.</p>

<p>CERTIFICATE. FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Billings v. United States, ante, p. 261, followed and distinguished, to the effect that the owner of a foreign-built yacht is not liable-for the tax imposed by § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, if the yacht was not actually used at all during the preceding year.</p>

<p>Decided on authority of Pierce v. United States, ante, p. 290.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909, imposing a tax on foreign-built yachts and the application of that section to a yacht owned by -an American citizen permanently domiciled abroad and which had not been within the jurisdiction of the United States during a part of the period for which the tax was levied, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909 imposing a tax on foreign-built yachts and its application to a yacht owned by an American citizen but which had not been within the jurisdiction of the United States during any part of the period for which the tax was levied, are stated in the opinion.

<p>United States v. Goelet, ante, p. 293, followed to effect that the tax imposed by § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909 does not apply to the use of a foreign-built yacht owned by a citizen of the United States who was permanently resident and domiciled in a foreign country for more than one year prior to September 1, 1909, and to the levy of such .tax.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of § 37 of the Tariff Act of 1909 imposing a tax on the use of foreign-built yachts and the liability of the owner for such tax, are stated in the opinion. Defendant’s use of the yacht prior to August 5, 1909, tax free, was property..

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, a corporation chartered under the laws of Missouri and a citizen and resident of that State, owned, controlled or operated, for the purpose of interstate and intrastate commerce, many hundreds of miles of railway in Oklahoma and extending into adjoining States and beyond. These lines existed and were operated by the company, some, it may be, before the Territory of Oklahoma was organized and most, if not all, before Oklahoma was endowed with Statehood. The lines composing the system originated ,in various charters, some enacted by Congress accompanied with grant of land, and others by territorial grant. The unified system resulted from foreclosures, consolidations, etc. In 1908 the company was sued by a citizen and resident of Oklahoma, in a court of that State. On the ground of diversity of citizenship a petition and bond in due form and seasonable time were filed by the company for removal to the Circúit Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma. What action was taken by the state court does not appear, but presumably the petition was denied — the following document having been issued by the Secretary of State.</p> <p>“State of Oklahoma.</p> <p>Revocation of Charter of St. Louis efe San Francisco Railroad Company in Oklahoma.</p> <p>Guthrie, Oklahoma, August 29th, 1908.</p> <p>In the District Court.</p> <p>Gertrude Goode, Administratrix of the Estate of Frank R. Goode, Deceased, Plaintiff, vs.</p> <p>St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, a Corporation, Defendant.</p> <p>Petition for Removal to the Circuit Court of the United</p> <p>States.</p> <p>State of Oklahoma,</p> <p> Comanche County: </p> <p>Having received due and legal notice from J. T. Johnson, Judge of the-District Court of Comanche County, that the above named corporation defendant, St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company has filed a petition for removal to the United States Court, a certified copy of which is on record in the office of the Secretary of State at the Capitol in the City of Guthrie in the State of Oklahoma.</p> <p>Therefore, I, Leo Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State and now Acting Secretary of State of the State of Oklahoma'by authority invested in me under section four of' House Bill No. 131 approved by the Governor of the State-of Oklahoma, C. N. Haskell, May 26th, 1908, do hereby declare the license of the said St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company to transact business in the State of Oklahoma forfeited and revoked.</p> <p>In testimony whereof, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the great Seal of the State.</p> <p>Done at the city of Guthrie this twenty-ninth, day of August, A. D., 1908.</p> <p>[seal] LEO MEYER,</p> <p> Acting Secretary of State.” </p> <p>Thereupon the suit which is now before üs was commenced by the Railroad Company against the Secretary of State and his assistant, seeking to enjoin them from giving effect to the certificate or in any way disturbing or interfering with the company in carrying on business in the State. With much amplitude of statement the source and history of the title of the various railroads forming part of the complainant’s system in Oklahoma were enumerated. In addition to asserting that rights secured to the corporation by the state constitution had been denied by the action complained of, violations of the Constitution of the United States were specifically asserted on the following grounds: First, because the state law under which the Secretary of State had purported to act and the action taken thereunder constituted an unwarranted interference on the part of the State and its officers with the judicial power of the United States; second, because the attempt to exclude the Company from the State and prevent it from doing business therein, under the circumstances stated, was repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the contract clause, the latter being based on the assertion' that the congressional and legislative acts by which the roads forming part of the system of the company had been incorporated, constituted contracts giving a right to do business in Oklahoma which that State had no power to impair. The court allowed a restraining order. The bill was. demurred to on the ground of want of jurisdiction and want of equity. The demurrer was overruled. The court, in an elaborate opinion, expounded its reasons for so doing, holding that it had jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship, the complainant being a citizen of Missouri and the defendants, citizens and residents of Oklahoma. In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the various transactions, foreclosure, ánd consolidations, etc., by which the railroad company had acquired the lines .composing its system and held that there was nothing in any of them which destroyed the Missouri citizenship of the complainant. It moreover held in any event there was ample ground for jurisdiction because of the constitutional rights asserted.</p> <p>' As to the alleged want of equity in the bill, the court, after stating that the obvious purpose of the legislation under which the Secretary of State had acted as deduced from its text was to prevent the removal of causes from •the State to a court of the United States, declared that the defendant in argument had so conceded. It was decided that the State was without authority to legislate to that effect and therefore the law in question and the action of the Secretary of State taken under it were void because of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States. The answer which was then filed, admitted the incorporation of the complainant in Missouri and the citizenship in Oklahoma of the defendants, as. well as the jurisdictional amount. The allegations of the complaint as to interference with the authority of the courts of the United States as to the commerce and contract clauses of the Constitution and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, were sought .to be traversed by copious averments concerning the subject. Finally it was asserted, 1, that the Missouri corporation was never authorized to acquire any railroad in either the Indian or Oklahoma Territory and it therefore had no standing to assert as a Missouri corporation, its ownership and control of such roads as a basis for removal; 2, that in forming the line or lines of railway which constituted its system, the complainant had consolidated parallel and competing roads in violation of the anti-trust laws of the Territory and of the State of Oklahoma, as well as the law of the United States and therefore the corporation was not in a position to assert its Missouri citizenship; and 3, that the acquisition by the complainant of various</p> <p>roads forming parts of its system which were covered by charters granted by Congress or by Oklahoma Territory was in conflict with such charters, and for this reason,' moreover,, the corporation could not be heard to assert its Missouri citizenship. An, exception of the complainant to the relevancy of the three grounds just stated, was maintained, and théy were stricken from the answer. By agree- • m'ent between the parties, the present appellant, the successor in office as Secretary of State, was substituted as defendant. Thereupon, the case having been submitted to .the court on bill and answer, a decree was entered perpetually enjoining the Secretary of State from giving effect to the order of revocation or interfering with or disturbing . the complainant in the transaction of its business in the State. It was expressly decreed that the act of the legislature of Oklahoma upon which the action of the Secretary of State was taken was void and unenforceable because of its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States. This appeal was then taken.</p> <p>The purpose of the act is to enforce the State’s visitorial powers over-corporations'doing business within its borders.</p> <p>It is immaterial what any persons may have thought as to, or even what were, the motives of the legislature. Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591.</p> <p>That the-act was not intended to hinder the Federal courts is evident because it necessarily fails to accomplish that purpose. Southern Ry. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 330;</p> <p>Constitutional and other statutory provisions which are to be considered as in pari materia, urge that this is but a visitorial statute.</p> <p>The difference between the Oklahoma act and the other acts involved in former decisions of this court is that those acts discriminate against foreign corporations, while the Oklahoma act does not. It is not within the reasoning of Herndon v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 135; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; Ludwig v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Southern Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400.</p> <p>In all of those cases the statute was held to be either direct interference with interstate commerce, or else discriminated against companies doing interstate commerce, and in each instance was held to violate the obligation of a contract.</p> <p>The Oklahoma act does none of these things.</p> <p>The Oklahoma act works no discrimination, and should be sustained under Security Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 248; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; National Council v. State Council, 203 U. S. 163.</p> <p>The State may domicile within itself all corporations doing intrastate business within its limits. Thompson, Corporations, 2d ed., §§ 490 et seq.; St. L. R. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545; Matrine v. Ins. Co., 53 N. Y. App. 339; Safford v. Topeka Water Co., 52 Pac. Rep. 422; Aspinwall v. Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co., 20 Indiana, 492; Attorney General v. Lumber Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 1048; Simmons v. Norf. & Balt. Stbt. Co., 113 N. Car. 147; Attorney General v. Milwaukee Ry. Co., 45 Wisconsin, 579; Commonwealth v. Pittsburg R. R. Co., 58 Pa. St. 26; Rolling Stock Co. v. People, 147 Illinois, 234; State v. So. Pac. Co., 24 Texas, 78; People v. Oakland Bank, 1 Douglas (Mich.), 282; Huglar v. Craigin Cattle Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 392.</p> <p>The act is one properly within the police power of the State. Its purpose is to subject corporations doing intrastate business within the State to the full visitorial and regulative powers of the State, by requiring, a,domicile in the State, together with the attendant circumstances of the persons of the officers, books, papers, etc., within Oklahoma.</p> <p>The State has the same right to require a domestic domicile of a foreign corporation doing intrastate business, as it would have of its own corporations.</p> <p>The State may oust a corporation repudiating its creative powers, whether such corporation be one of its own children or one of its foster children. See Comp. Laws Oklahoma, 1909, Snyder, supra, in §§ 1400 to 1406. .</p> <p>A foreign corporation is left the right to resort to the Federal courts upon any ground that a citizen of the State might resort to those courts, and in addition to the right given by the laws of the United States for a resort to the Federal court, either by removal or original action, because the domesticity of the citizen is not taken away, although the consequence of the claim of foreign domicile will be to prevent it from doing further intra business in the State. As long as the corporation is left free to exercise the option of remaining in the State as a domestic corporation, or of repudiating the domicile of the State, and losing its domestic privilege, this cannot be an unconstitutional exercise of state power, provided, it is not administered in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.</p> <p>The act does not deprive any person of a privilege or deny any person equal protection of' the law. It does not discriminate against foreign corporations.</p> <p>The act is not an interference with interstate commerce. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 45; Louis. & Nash. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 512, 518.</p> <p>The evident purpose of the act of 1908 is to prevent foreign corporations doing business in Oklahoma from invoking jurisdiction of the Federal courts in that State. If such be the purpose of the act, it is ineffectual to that end. Buck Stove Co. v. Tickers, 226 U. S. 205; Herndon v. C., R. I. & P., 218 U. S. 135; Ludwig v. Western Union, 216 U. S. 146; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545; Southern Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400; Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202; Southern R. R. Co. v. Allison, 190 U. S. 326; Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1.</p> <p>Appellee having the right to remove the ease from the state to the Federal court, cannot be lawfully excluded from the State for exercising that constitutional right, because—</p> <p>It has a contract with the United States, permitting it to remain in the State of Oklahoma for the purpose of operating its railroad.</p> <p>It had a contract with the Territory of Oklahoma, which is protected by the Constitution of the United States and by the provision of the constitution of Oklahoma, preserving all rights previously existing.</p> <p>To exclude appellee from the State would be to impair the obligation of those contracts, in violation of Federal and state constitutional guaranties.</p> <p>To exclude appellee from the State would be to destroy its property in that State, aggregating many millions of dollars, and to deprive appellee of its property without due process of law. Am. Smelting Co., v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 103; California v. Pac. Ry. Co., 127 U. S. 1; Cessna v. United States, 169 U. S. 165; Hager v. Reclamation Dist., III U. S. 701; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. Ry., 112 U. S. 414; Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; N. Y., L. E..& W. Ry. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Co., 13 How. 518; Powers v. Detroit & G. H. Ry., 201 U. S. 559; Reagan v. Farmers’ L. & T. Co., 154 U. S. 392; Roberts v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co., 158 U. S. 1; St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. v. Phelps, 137 U.S. 528; Smith v. A., T. & S. F. Ry., 64 Fed. Rep. 272; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51; Vincennes v. State, 14 How. 263.</p> <p>The act is void because it is an indirect interference with, and imposes a direct burden upon, interstate commerce. Atl. Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328; Buck Stove Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205; Darnell v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wh. 1; Heiman v. Southern Ry. Co., 203 U. S. 270; Ludwig v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. Un. Tel, Co., 96 U. S. 1; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas,216 U. S. 1.</p> <p>Appellee did not consolidate with the various corporations specified in the amended bill.</p> <p>The order attempting to revoke the license of appellee is void. Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360.</p> <p>The act is void because in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and § 18, Art. II of the constitution of Oklahoma, forbidding the imposition of excessive fines. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123.</p>

This writ of error was directed to a district court of the State of Louisiana, as that court had jurisdiction, in last resort, over the conviction sought to be reviewed.

<p>Findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts will not be disturbed by this court unless shown to be clearly erroneous.</p>

The following questions are certified: "1. In an action at law by the owner of a natural product of the soil, such as flax straw, which he lawfully stored on his own premises and which was destroyed by fire caused by the negligent operation of a locomotive engine, to recover the value thereof from the railroad company operating the engine, is it a question for the jury whether the owner was also negligent without other evidence than that the railroad company preceded the…

Held: that of two overlapping Mexican grants both confirmed by the act of June 21, 1860, the earlier grant was in all of its steps prior to the other grant and included all of the overlap. A survey was necessary to the accurate segregation and delimitation-of a Mexican grant confirmed by the act of 1860. Stoneroad, v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 240 .

The facts, which involve the construction of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 as amended in 1910, are stated in the opinion. It was error for the state court to hold that the net proceeds of the judgment recovered in the action of the administratrix against the railroad company, under the circumstances shown in the record herein, were not distribxitable under the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 as amended in 1910.

The facts, which involve the construction of the laws of Porto Rico'relating to the recognition as heirs of natural children, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the title to a Spanish grant óf land in New Mexico and the construction and constitutionality of a statute of limitation of the Territory, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals in controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings, are stated in the opinion.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that the warrantless seizure of items from a private residence constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It also prevented local officers from securing evidence by means prohibited under the federal exclusionary rule and giving it to their federal colleagues. It was not until the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that the exclusionary rule was deemed to apply to state courts as well.

The facts, which involve the construction of subdivisions 4 and 5 of § 7 of the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that the immunity given by a provision in a decree to a specified party manufacturing and selling an article as á patentable *414 combination producing new results, is not transferable, and such party, although immune himself, cannot enjoin the prosecution of suits against another as an infringer because the latter purchases from him one of the elements used in manufacturing the article. 183 Fed. Rep. 978 , reversed.

<p>Where the separate elements of the combination are all old, and it is ' only the article resulting from the combination that is protected by the patent, there is no actual infringement by one purchasing the different elements unless and until the article itself is made; but if such purchaser does make that article with the separate elements he cannot escape liability on the ground that he purchased such elements from others.</p> <p>Where none of the questions certified are apposite to the facts stated in the certificate, this court is not bound to, and will not, answer them. The certificate will be dismissed.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of a provision of immunity in the decree in a patent case and the rights of parties thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the determination of whether the condemnation of a part of the right-of-way of a railroad company, and compelling it, at its own expense, to construct a bridge over a waterway connecting two lakes within a park, amounts to a taking of property without compensation within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are stated in the opinion.

Held: continued to be under the jurisdiction and control of Congress for all governmental purposes, relating to the guardianship and protection of the Indians, is not open to controversy.

Held: first, that the land was not subject to settlement under the homestead law, because the surveyer had designated and meandered it as a lake, and, second, that *458 only the Land Department could undo and correct the wrong or error of the surveyor in that regard. 62 Washington, 572. To secure a reversal of the judgment the plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error.

Held: any rule of the court to the contrary notwithstanding.” The proceeding was initiated, under the Attorney General's direction, by a petition filed in the District Court of the United States for the district wherein the land is situate, praying for the appointment of commissioners, according to the law of the State, to ascertain the ‘ just compensation to be paid.

The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions in the treaty and statutes establishing the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation against the sale of liquor and the effect of such provisions on the sale of liquor on ceded lands forming a part of such Reservation, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE DISTRICT OP MONTANA. -</p> <p>The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District Court of- a criminal prosecution for introducing intoxicating liquor into the Indian country, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of the' Car-mack Amendment to the Hepburn Act and its effect on state statutes, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The provisions of § 20 of the act of February 4, 1887, as amended by the act of June 29, 1906, constitute an exclusive regulation of contracts for interstate shipments by railroad common carriers, superseding all state regulations upon the same subject. C., B. & Q. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; C., St. P. &c. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519.</p> <p>The liability imposed by said amended § 20, is the liability imposed by the common law upon a common carrier, and may be limited or qualified by special contract with the shipper, provided the limitation or qualification is reasonable and does not exempt from loss due to negligence.</p> <p>This is the law with reference to contracts for interstate shipments. M., K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 567, 672. A carrier is permitted by fair and reasonable agreement to limit the amount recoverable in case of loss, to an agreed value made in order to obtain the lower of two rates. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 509.</p> <p>In the present case, defendant in error agreed with the plaintiff in error, in order to get the lower of two rates, that in case of loss settlement was to be made on the agreed value of $10.00 per head for each hog. Kansas City Southern v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 652.</p> <p>An agreed valuation regulation determining a rate is, when filed and published according to law, in effect a part of the act of Congress.. Its reasonableness is not open to question in this action.</p> <p>A carrier is required by law to publish its rates and any rules or regulations which in any wise effect or determine said rates. After being so published, the carrier cannot deviate therefrom, even in the slightest particular. They stand as the law, binding as well upon the shipper as the carrier. L. & N. Ry. v. Motley, 219 U. S. 467; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Co., 204 U. S. 426; Armour v. United States, 209 U. S. 56; Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Poor Crain Co. v. C., B. & Q. Ry., 12 I. C. C. 492, 546; Blinn v. Southern Pacific Ry., 18 I. C. C. 430.</p>

<p>The Federal Constitution prohibits a Státe from regulating interstate commerce;' but at the same time authorizes it to burden that commerce by the collection of the expenses if absolutely necessary for enforcing its inspection laws.-</p> <p>There is an essential difference between policing and inspection; and a State cannot include the expense of the former as part of the expense of the latter in determining-the amount which it can raise as an inspection tax which affects interstate commerce.</p> <p>As inspection necessarily involves expense, it is primarily for the legislature to determine the amount; and even though the revenue be slightly in excess of the expense the courts should not interfere.</p> <p>There is a presumption that the legislature will reduce inspection fees tp a proper sum if the amount originally fixed proves to be unreasonably in excess of the amount required. Bed “C” Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 393.</p> <p>Effect must be given by the courts to the provisions of the Constitution; and where it does appear that the amount of inspection fees are disproportionate to the inspection service rendered or include something beyond inspection, the tax must be declared void as obstructing the freedom of interstate commerce.</p> <p>A state statute imposing an inspection tax, the proceeds of which are to be and actually are used partly for inspection and partly for other purposes such as policing state territory, is necessarily void as imposing a burden on interstate commerce in excess of the expenses absolutely necessary for inspection, and so held as to the Maryland Oyster Inspection Tax of 1910.</p> <p>The question of constitutionality of an inspection law depends not only upon whether the excess proceeds of the tax may be used for other purposes, but whether they actually are so used; and it is the duty of the courts to determine whether the tax is excessive and the excess is so used so as to protect citizens against payment of fees not authorized by the Constitution. Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38, distinguished, and Brimmer v. Bebman, 138 U. S. 83, followed.</p> <p>While the excess of a state inspection tax may be valid as a tax on property within the State, if it does not appear that the legislature would have separately imposed such a property tax, the whole tax must be declared void if it is unconstitutional as to interstate commerce.</p>

<p>ERROR TO ' THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The Boyd Transfer Company of Minneapolis in addition to its regular transfer business acted as a forwarder by railroad. By collecting from different shippers small lots of goods sufficient in the aggregate to fill a car, it secured carload rates and out of the difference between carload and less than carload rates it made a profit and at the same time was enabled to offer better rates to the small' shipper. How this difference between the two rates was divided between owner and forwarder, does not appear in the record. At the time of the shipment referred to in this case, the Railroad Company had four rates on household goods (including Emigrant Movables), which vary, both according to the weight and-value of the shipment, as follows:</p> <p>Less than Carload Lots (value not stated). $3.00 per cwt. Less than Carload Lots (not to exceed $10</p> <p>per cwt.)..........................2.00 “ “</p> <p>Carload Lots (value not stated).......... 1.60 “ “</p> <p>Carload Lots (value not to exceed $10).. .. 1.00 “ “</p> <p>While these tariffs were in force, the Boyd Transfer Company was employed by the plaintiff, on terms not stated, to box, transfer and ship certain property which she desired to have sent to Portland, Oregon. The articles consisted of a typewriter, stationery, books, curtains, wearing apparel, jewelry and other personal effects. Some of them had been packed in a trunk and the balance were boxed by the Boyd Company and loaded by it into a car filled with household goods. The weight of the load was 22,000 lbs. The Boyd Company filled out a bill of lading, describing the shipment as “One car of Emigrant Movables.” “Released to $10 per cwt.” and naming “Boyd Transfer and Storage Company, shipper.” The bill of lading on presentation was signed by the agent of the Railroad Company. The goods were lost en route and the plaintiff brought suit against the Railroad Company for $598.65, their full value. The Company filed a plea setting up that the property had been destroyed without its fault, and further eonteiided that in view of the provisions of the tariff and the fact that the goods had been shipped on the $1 rate, the carrier could not be held hable beyond $10 per hundredweight.</p> <p>At the trial the plaintiff testified she did not know that there had been any valuation of her goods, as the agent of the Boyd Company in soliciting the shipment had stated that it had a through, car, but said nothing to her about shipping her effects as household goods, and she understood that they were to be shipped as a separate consignment. She testified that she had stated to the Transfer Company that her goods were new and as she had no insurance she was willing to pay the regular rates.</p> <p>• The defendant introduced the tariffs, and offered evidence to show that its agents had no knowledge of the contents of plaintiff’s boxes which had been loaded into the bar by the Transfer Company which also made out the bill of lading and endorsed thereon a statement that the car contained Emigrant Movables Released at $10 per cwt.</p> <p>A number of auctioneers and dealers in second hand furniture were introduced as witnesses for the purpose of establishing the average value of second hand furniture and household goods. They testified that they were familiar with the value of household goods and second hand furniture; testified that only a few of such effects are sold by weight, but the value being ascertained, the articles could be weighed and the value per pound then determined. This they illustrated by giving the cost, weight and value per pound of various articles, and. gave their opinion as to the average value of shipments of household goods, including furniture, carpets, wearing apparel and the like. One witness stated that the average value was about $4 per cwt., another $5 per cwt., another testified that, including a second-hand piano weighing 1500 lbs., the average value would be about $7 per cwt. There was no testimony in rebuttal, beyond the fact 'that the articles belonging to plaintiff were shown to be worth much more than $10 per cwt.</p> <p>The court charged that if the Boyd Company was the agent of the plaintiff to make the shipment she was bound by its valuation, provided such valuation was not an arbitrary attempt to limit liability and left to the jury to determine whether there had been such an arbitrary attempt to limit liability. They returned a verdict for the amount claimed in the complaint. The defendant moved for a new trial because of errors in the charge and because the verdict was in excess of the sum for which the defendant could be held responsible under the tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The judge held that the carrier was not responsible for $62.50, the value of jewelry and silverware in the trunk, and the plaintiff having written off that amount, judgment was rendered against the defendant for $533.40, a sum much in excess of $10 per cwt. The case was then taken to the Supreme Court of Minnesota which affirmed the judgment. It held that the Railroad Company was charged with knowledge that a considerable portion of the amount received by shipping at reduced rates went to the Forwarding Company and not to the various owners of the goods packed in one car; and that the Railway Company must have known that the Boyd Company was ignorant of the value and contents of the boxes belonging to the different shippers. It ruled that the Boyd Company had no implied authority to make an agreement as to the value of plaintiff’s goods. It further held that whether there had been any bona fide attempt to fix value was a question of fact and as the jury by their verdict had found that there had been no such effort, the plaintiff under Ostroot v. N. P. By. Co., Ill Minnesota, 504, was entitled to recover the full value of the goods shipped. It further held that the rule announced by it was not opposed to Adams Express Company v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Chicago &c. By. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513; Chicago &c. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519. The defendant then sued out a writ of error.</p> <p>Under the Act to Regulate Commerce, defendant in error was bound by the released valuation declared by her agent, the Boyd Transfer and Storage Company, upon which valuation she obtained a lower rate of freight in accordance with the carrier’s interstate tariff provisions. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; Wells-Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513; C., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519.</p> <p>Since this writ of error was sued out, the Minnesota Supreme Court has seen its error and has in effect overruled its decision in the case at bar. Ford v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 143 N. W. Rep. 249.</p> <p>The manager of the Transfer Company had no authority to release the value of the goods of defendant in error. Benson v. Oregon Short Line, 99 Pac. Rep. 1072.</p> <p>There was no valid contract releasing the value of the goods in question, and the judgment of the state court should be sustained.</p> <p>It has not been held in any of the eases cited by plaintiff in error that, under Federal legislation, a carrier may limit its liability for its own negligence without either a contract or acts constituting an estoppel. Mo., Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. 550, 554, 555.</p> <p>To entitle a shipper to the lower rate instead of the • higher one, it must expressly appear that the value of the goods are “declared by the shipper not to exceed $10.00 per 100 lbs.”</p> <p>There was in this case no declared valuation by defendant in error or by the Boyd Transfer Company. On the contrary it appears that the Boyd Transfer Company attempted to release the value of the goods from their true valuation to a lower value.</p>

Held: in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 , 584, that the income tax provisions of the act of August 15, 1894, were unconstitutional in that they imposed a tax upon the income derived from municipal bonds issued under the authority of the States.

Held: in effect, that the tribunal created by the statute was to be composed of “two mining engineers and a mine inspector,” or, as was said, “three mine experts”; that its jurisdiction was exclusive; and that even the act of one property owner in removing the coal from its mine up to. the boundary line, could not deprive the statutory tribunal of its authority or confer jurisdiction upon a court of equity to determine…

<p>Whether a municipal ordinance is within the power conferred by the legislature upon the municipality is a question of state law.</p> <p>A municipal ordinance within the power delegated by the legislature is a state law within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.</p> <p>Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law is a statute of the State within the pertinent clause of § 237, Judicial Code, conferring jurisdiction on this court.</p> <p>A railroad charter may embody a contract within the protection of the Federal Constitution.</p> <p>Although the state court may have held that there was a contract, but that it was subject to constitutional reserved power to alter and repeal, this court, in reviewing that judgment under § 237, Judicial Code, will determine for itself the existence or non-existence of the asserted contract and whether its obligation has been impaired.</p> <p>While a railroad company which devotes a part of its right of way to public use inconsistent with railway purposes may not lose its property right therein, the State may in the exercise of its police power and for the protection of the public so using such property, require the company to so use its other property as not to endanger the public, applying the principle underlying the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non ¡cedas.</p> <p>Neither the “contract clause” nor the “due process clause” of the Federal Constitution overrides the power of the State to establish ■ necessary and reasonable regulations under its police power, a power which can neither be abdicated nor bargained away and subject to which all property rights are held. •</p> <p>The enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a properly enacted police regulation for public health and safety is not an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation or without .due process of law.</p> <p>The constitutional validity of ordinances affecting public safety as affected by railroads must be considered not only in view of charter and property rights but also of the consent and acquiescence of the owners of railroads.</p> <p>Ordinances limiting speed of trains; requiring notice of their approach, fixing hours for shifting cars and periods of stoppage of cars, and requiring the adjustment of tracks to the established grade of the streets, in business sections of the municipality, are properly within the police power of the municipality, and when fairly designed to promote the public health and‘safety do not violate the contract clause 'or due process clause of the Federal Constitution.</p> <p>Ordinances of the City of Goldsboro, North Carolina, regulating speed of trains, notice of their approach, periods for car shifting and length of time of car stoppages and requiring adjustment of grades of tracks to grades of streets in business section of the town, held proper and reasonably suited to the purposes they are intended to accomplish and therefore that they do- not impair the obligation of the charter of a railroad occupying those streets, nor do they take any of its property without due process of law.</p>

<p>The White-Slave Act of June 25, 1910, has been sustained as constitutional. Hóke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308.</p> <p>Although the constitutional question on which a case has been brought to this court on direct writ of error has been decided since the writ of error was sued out, this court must retain jurisdiction for the purpose of passing upon the other questions in the record.</p> <p>Under the White-Slave Act the prohibition is not in terms confined to transportation by common carrier, nor need such a limitation be implied in order to sustain the constitutionality of the act.</p> <p>The White-Slave Act has the quality of a police regulation although enacted in the exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce, and it is wholly within the power of Congress to determine whether the prohibition should extend to transportation by others than common carriers.</p> <p>The agency of one employed to bring prostitutes from one State to another without definite instructions includes power to decide upon the mode and route of transportation.</p> <p>The cross-examination of a defendant in regard to taking morphine held in this case to be proper as it related'not to general character, but to the condition of the witness at the moment.</p> <p>Cross-examination as to the domestic difficulties of one of two defendants married to each other held in this case to have been material in order to corroborate the evidence of an accomplice and in other respects relevant to the testimony in chief.</p> <p>Cross-examination of a defendant in a white slave case in regard to payments made to police officers held in this case to have been competent and material to show the character of the house occupied by • defendants.</p> <p>In this case held that the charge of the trial court in regard to presumptions of innocence of the accused and their right to acquittal in case of reasonable doubt was sufficiently favorable to the accused.</p> <p>The offense under the White-Slave Act is complete when the transportation in interstate commerce has been accomplished. There is no locus posnitentice thereafter.</p>

<p>Where the owner of demised premises makes a contract with an adjoining owner for construction of a party wall, which contract cannot be carried out according to its terms without entry upon the demised premises and undermining the tenant’s wall, and the adjoining owner, or his servants, in performing the contract commit such a trespass upon the tenant’s possession and undermine the wall, the contract is evidential of a command or approval of the trespass by the landlord, such as to render him liable severally, or jointly with the adjoining owner, in an action by the tenant for the resulting damages.</p> <p>Where a trespass results in the destruction of a building with consequent interruption of a going business, the loss of future profits— reasonably certain and proved with reasonable exactitude — is a proper element for consideration in awarding compensatory damages.</p> <p>Where the contractor is required to follow instructions of the owner he is not such an independent contractor as to relieve the owner of liability for his acts.</p> <p>The “independent contractor” doctrine does not apply where the work that the contractor does 'amounts in itself to a nuisance or necessarily operates to destroy the property of another.</p>

to ascertain the scope of the decision, notwithstanding the state rules of practice require the syllabus to be prepared by the judge preparing the opinion and to be confined to the points of law arising from the facts that have been determined. The franchise of a railroad company is not necessarily to be regarded as valueless merely because its present earnings are not sufficient to pay more than high grade investments or even to pay operating expenses.

<p>The meaning of the arrangement between the parties having been matter for a finding and had the sanction of both courts below and the evidence not being reported, this court will not say that such finding was wrong.</p>

<p>APPLICATION FOB ALLOWANCE OF WBIT OF EBEOB.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the Court of.Appeals of the District of Columbia and the construction of the Osage Indian Act of 1906, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of statutes of New Mexico in regard to serving process in real estate action on unknown defendants and the effect of a judgment, based on service by publication, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the question whether a married woman may, under certain conditions, acquire a domicil different from that of her husband, are stated in the opinion. All questions of jurisdiction must be determined by the status of the parties at the time of the institution of the suit. A subsequent divorce will not aid defendant in error in maintaining jurisdiction in the Federal court.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

■ ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO. The facts, which involve the immunity of sovereignty from suit as applied to Porto Rico and the determination Of what constitutes consent to be sued, are stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the relative rights of the trustee in bankruptcy, the mortgagee and the original owner of a sprinkling plant placed on the property of the bankrupt subsequent to the making of the mortgage under an agreement of conditional sale, are stated in the opinion.

Held: does not require the State to adopt any particular form of procedure, so long as it appears that the accused has had sufficient notice of the accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself in the prosecution. Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425 , 435, and previous cases in this court there cited.

The facts, which involve the validity under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution of a conviction under the peddling and hawking license act of Michigan, are stated in the opinion. Section 8 of Art, I and § 2 of Art. IV of the Constitution are to be liberally construed for the benefit of the States and their citizens.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality, under the due process and equal protection of the law provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Woman’s Labor Act of Massachusetts, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, to review a judgment of the state court of Oklahoma against a railroad company for damages for death of an express messenger and the application of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act to such a case, are stated in the opinion. .

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the courts of a Territory of the United States over actions brought under the Employers’ Liability Act of 1906, are stated in the opinion. This suit was brought under the Employers’ Liability. Act of Congress approved June 11, 1906, and as a pending case was prosecuted to a final judgment after the passage of the act of Congress approved April 22, 1908.

Held: that the Michigan Local Option Act of 1889 is not unconstitutional under the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment on account of discrimination in making certain specific exceptions to the general prohibition.

The facts, which involve determining the relative rights to the bank balance of a bankrupt stockbroker, of the trustee and of a customer whose securities the bankrupt had sold, are stated in the opinion.

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Motion to dismiss or affirm and for damages.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District gf Illinois.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>