Volume 233 — United States Reports

The facts, which involve the authority of the Postmaster General to cancel postal contracts and the rights of a contractor for a mail route in Alaska in that respect, are stated in the opinion. The regulations of the Post Office Department applying to this route gave the Postmaster General authority to discontinue the contract. The petition does not allege facts upon which damages may be assessed.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the commerce clause of the Federal ConstitutioU of a municipal occupation tax on hghtning rod agents and dealers, are stated in the opinion.

Held: in this case, not to have been deprived of his property without due process of law by the attachment of such bonds under process issued by the state court in accordance with the law of the State as determined by its highest court.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Subd. 3 of § 10 of Act No. 318 of the Public Acts of 1909 of Michigan has been held to be in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment by the court of last resort in Michigan; therefore the case at bar must be. considered as though this act had never been passed by the legislature.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>■ The facts, which involve the construction of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 and the validity of a judgment for personal injuries obtained thereunder, are stated in the opinion,</p> <p>The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in' affirming the judgment below upon a, theory other and different from that upon which the case was tried. The Circuit Court of Appeals apparently conceded that upon the theory upon which the judgment .was obtained it was erroneous and should be reversed.</p> <p>Under either, the theory adopted by the trial court or the Circuit Court of Appeals upon rehearing, the refusal to give the instruction requested by defendant in. reference to the “ come-ahead” signal by plaintiff was erroneous.</p> <p>The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court in refusing the fifth instruction requested by plaintiff. It also erred in refusing to sustain each and every error assigned upon the record and urged by defendant in court.</p> <p>In support of these contentions, see American R. R. Co. v. Birch, 224 U. S. 557; Atchison &c. Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U. S. 1; Beutler v. Railway Co., 224 U. S. 85; Caswell v. Worth, 5 Ellis & Bl. 848; Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. McKean, 40 Illinois, 229; Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 229 U. S. 317; Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. King, 222 U. S. 222; Cincinnati &c. Ry. Co. v. Mealer, 50 Fed. Rep. 725; Cooley on Torts, 99; Delk v. Railway Co., 220 U. S. 580; Hatcher v. Insurance Co., 184 Fed. Rep. 23; Indianapolis &c. Ry. Co. v. Blackman, 63 Illinois, 121; Louis. & Nash. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 63 Fed. Rep. 407; Mobile &c. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 176 Fed. Rep. 127; New York R. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 692; Miner v. McNamara, 72 Atl. Rep. 138; Norfolk Ry. Co. v. United States, 177 Fed. Rep. 630; Schafer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249; St. Louis &c. Ry. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702; San Juan Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 97; Schlemner v. Railway Co., 220 U. S. 590; Thornton on Fed. Emp. Liability Act, 104; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Callaghan, 56 Fed. Rep. 988; Yazoo &c. Ry. v. Greenwood Co., 227 U. S. 1.</p>

The facts, which.involve the construction and constitutionality of the second offense statute of New York and the effect of a pardon of the accused by the President of the United States for the first offense, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the ownership of sand in the' bed of the Mississippi river within the, boundaries of the State of Mississippi, are stated in the opinion. This suit cannot be sustained in equity. Even if equitable jurisdiction exist, plaintiff has not such title to the sand and gravel dredged in the bed of the Mississippi River as will sustain the action. Plaintiff had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, and there is no ground for equitable relief.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment rendered by the courts of Hawaii and based on service of process under § 2114, Rev, Law of Hawaii, are stated in the opinion;

The facts, which involve the construction and validity, under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, of orders of the state courts of Kansas directing railroad companies to remove bridges on lines of interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the statutes of Arizona regarding valuation assessments for taxation, are stated in the opinion;

SACHUSETTS. The facts, which involve the construction of the Car-mack Amendment to the Hepburn Act and' the right of a comm on carrier which has filed schedules containing regulations as to passengers’ baggage to limit its liability for loss of such baggage caused by its own negligence to the extent and in the manner specified in the schedules, are stated in the opinion.

<p>When the purpose of Congress is stated in such plain terms that there is no uncertainty, and no construction is required, it is unnecessary to inquire into the motives which induced the legislation. The only province of the courts in such a case is to enforce the statute in accordance with its terms.</p> <p>Limitations specified in the statute creating a new liability are a part of the right conferred and compliance therewith is essential to the assertion of the right conferred by the statute.</p> <p>An amendment dates back to the filing of the petition and is to supply defects in the petition with reference to the cause of action then existing, or at most to bring into the suit grounds of action which did exist at the beginning of the case.</p> <p>Under the act of August 13, 1894, as amended by the act of February 24,1905, a materialman or laborer may not bring suit on the contractor’s bond in the Federal court in the name of the United States for his use and benefit, within six months from completion and settlement, even though the United States has not asserted any, and has no, claim against the contractor or his sureties.</p> <p>Where the original bill was prematurely filed, an intervention after the six month, and before the twelve month, period is not effectual as such or as an original bill.</p> <p>An amended bill filed more than one year after completion of the work and settlement, if treated as an original bill, is filed too late.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of a Government contract for public work and the rights of the contractor thereunder, are stated in the opinion. As to the effect of pars. 20 and 70, there is no real contradiction and the special provisions control the general ones. There was no assignment of contract. In support of these contentions, see Atlantic Dredging Co. v. United States, 35 Ct. Cls. 463; Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628; New York v. Am.

Held: “Where a shipment of live stock is made under a verbal contract, and where every move made, every step taken toward a shipment, up to and including a complete consignment and surrender of control by the shipper, the starting in transit of the shipment and the assumption of liability for negligence by the carrier, is all under and pursuant to such parol agreement, and after this a printed shipping contract is…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity of a verdict for death of an employe claimed to have been occasioned by the negligence of the master, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality under the contract clause of the Federal Constitution of provisions of the constitution of California in regard to right of gas and water companies to excavate streets in municipalities for their mains, and the application of such provisions to such corporations in the City of Los Angeles, are stated in the opinion.

<p>In determining its constitutionality a state statute must be read in the light of the construction given to it by the state court; and if the state court has held a described use for which property may be taken thereunder to be a public one, this court will accept its judgment unless it is clearly without ground..</p> <p>Even though a spur track at the outset may lead only to a single industry, it may constitute a part of the transportation facilities of the common carrier operated under obligations of public service, and as such open to all and devoted to a public use.</p> <p>There is a clear distinction between spurs operated as a part of the system of a common carrier under public obligation and mere private - sidings. The former are limited to public use and may be the basis for exercise of eminent domain.</p> <p>It is within the power of the State to invest railway corporations with power of eminent domain to acquire land for a spur track necessary for its transportation business and subject to regulation and open alike to all, even though such track at the outset may serve only a single industry which is to defray the cost thereof subject to reimbursement by others subsequently availing of it; and so held as to § 1797-llm, Wisconsin Statutes, providing for construction of spin tracks under conditions specified therein.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity of indictments under §§ 39 and 117, Criminal Code, for giving and accepting bribes, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of certain patents for lands entered as non-mineral, but which were known to be chiefly valuable for mineral when entered, and the right, of the Government to have the same annulled as having been fraudulently obtained, are stated in the opinion.

In proceedings brought by McKnight to try the right of possession to conflicting mining locations, it appeared that the defendant, the El Paso Brick Company, was in possession of the Aluminum International and Hortense claims, constituting what was known as the Aluminum group of placer mines. It held under locations made prior to January, 1903. In 1905 the company decided to apply for a patent to the land which embraced about 411 acres.

Held: in the rare instances where the assets ultimately proved sufficient for the purpose, that creditors were entitled to interest accruing after adjudication. 2 Blackstone’s Comm. 488; Cf. Johnson v. Norris, 190 Fed.

The facts, which involve the effect of the deed of an, intermarried Choctaw to an allotment tó be subsequently-acquired, and the construction of acts of Congress affecting the right of allottees to convey, are stated in the opinion.

Held: as to this, that the result was right, and hence the judgment ought not to be reversed, though the-instruction as given might be open to criticism as to its form, and even though the jury might have based their verdict upon an incorrect theory. • But it was held that the measure of damages as applied by the trial court was erroneous in failing to deduct from the valuation of the four-sevenths a proper allowance for…

The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Alien Immigration Act in. regard to deporta-, tion of undesirable aliens, are stated in the opinion.

Appellant, which, is a New Jersey corporation carrying on a mercantile business in many places in the State of Alabafna in the sale and renting of sewing machines, in part from regularly established places of business and in part by means of delivery wagons going from place to place in the respective counties in which its stores are located, filed its bill of complaint against appellees, who are the agents of the State charged with the administration of the tax laws, and…

The facts, whiqh involve the construction and application of the statute of limitations of the State of Louisiana to claims for damages for personal assaults, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of a statute of Arkansas allowing double damages and attorney’s fee to be awarded against railway corporations under certain conditions, are stated in the opinion. The record properly presents Federal questions which may be reviewed here. Act 61, of Arkansas of 1907, p. 144; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 104 Arkansas, 500; St. L., Iron Mtn. & So. Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of a statute of Montana imposing a license tax on the carrying on of the business of selling oleomargarine, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that shipments of. coal when reshipped, after arrival from points without the State and acceptance by the consignees, to points within the State on new and regular billing forms constituted intrastate shipments and were subject to the jurisdiction of the State Railroad Commission.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of the statutes regarding limitation of liability of vessel owners, are stated in the opinion. The limited liability acts of Congress do not extend to appellant’s cause of action, as that cause of action is disclosed by the record. Section 4283, Comp. Stat. 1901, р. 2943. As additional or supplementary thereto, see § 18, с. 121, act of June 26, 1884; Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96.

Held: to cases in which the power of the court, as a Federal court, to hear and determine the cause is in controversy. Fore River Shipbuilding Co. v. Flagg, 219 U. S. 175 , 178; United States v. Congress Construction Co., 222 U. S. 199 ; Darnell v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 225 U. S. 243 . No such issue is here disclosed. The power of the court, as a Federal court, to hear and determine the case was not questioned.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment of the courts of the State of Georgia and the determination of whether those courts gave full faith and credit to a statute of the State of Alabama affecting the cause of action, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that as reversion of property to the State was contingent on compensation, the statute should be construed as making payment a condition precedent of the reversion, as it could not be intended to remit the owner to a mere claim against the State which mould not be enforced as the sovereignty of the State would give immunity from suit. 129 Louisiana, 279, reversed.

Held: and the further right to fix the price if it is to be sold. To deprive any person of either is to take property, since there can be no liberty of contract and true private ownership if the price of its use or its sale is fixed by law. That right is an attribute of ownership. State Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232 , 278, top.

The facts, which involve the power of a State to tax promissory notes located in the. State although neither the owner nor the maker are residents thereof, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of title to land in Porto Rico, and determination of the date when the Civil Code of 1902 went into effect, are stated in the opinion. The new Civil Code did not go into effect until July 1, 1902, and the controlling conveyance of June 2, 19t)2, under the then existing Spanish Civil Code was properly made by the husband without the consent of the wife.

The facts, which involve the validity under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of orders establishing water rates of an irrigation company in California, are stated .in the opinion.

CERTIFICATE PROM’ THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. The facts, which involve the construction of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 and the determination of whether an injured employé was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Federal Employers’ Liability Acts of 1908 and 1910, and the effect of those statutes on state laws in regard to liability of employers, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve statutes regulating the amount of additional pay of officers of the United States Navy for service beyond the seas, are stated in the opinion. Congress had the power to repeal general salary or compensation acts through special appropriation acts. When such a repeal is claimed the question is determined by the intention of Congress.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 and the construction of statutes regulating the pay of postmasters and the power of the Postmaster General to make regulations in -regard thereto, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>This court has no jurisdiction under the act of March 2, 1907. No statute was construed or interpreted by the court below. United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 19.</p> <p>The whole case resolved itself into the question of the power to enact the regulation. If this be a construction by the lower court of Rev. Stat., § 161, it does not constitute a construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 378; United States v. Patton, 226 U. S. 525, 535.</p> <p>The words “gross receipts” were not interpreted. The only question was whether there was power in an administrative officer to make a regulation limiting its scope.</p> <p>The regulation is beyond the power of the Postmaster General to enact, .and accordingly is invalid. The regulation is, inconsistent with law, and in making it the Postmaster General has attempted to legislate. This regulation proposes to base the salary, of the postmaster upon gross receipts less unusual sales; in other words, upon something less than- gross receipts. He has no right thus to change the method which Congress has clearly provided for fixing salaries. United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 687; Morrill v. Jones, 106 U. S. 466; Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425.</p> <p>Neither ■ executive officers nor the appointing power can, during the service of an officer, either increase or diminish a salary fixed by statute. Glavey v. United States, 182 U. S. 595, 601; United States v. Wilson, 144 U. S. 24.</p> <p>Many cases in tliat connection have been decided in the Court of Claims. Rush v. United States, 35 Ct. Cls. 223; Andrews v. United States, 47 Ct. Cls. 51; Adams v. United States, 20 Ct. Cls. 115, 117; Geddes v. United States, 38 Ct. Cls. 428; Whiting v. United States, 35 Ct. Cls. 291; Sherlock’s Case, 43 Ct. Cls. 161; Jacobs v. United States, 41 Ct. Cls. 452.</p> <p>Other cases in which the validity of departmental regulations have been considered are:In re Page, 128 Fed. Rep. 317; Borden v. United States, 132 Fed. Rep. 205; United States v. Symonds, 120 U. S. 46; Patterson v. United States, 181 Fed. Rep. 970; Bruhl v. Wilson, 123 Fed. Rep. 957; Hoover v. Salling, 110 Fed. Rep. 43; Bruce v. United States, 202 Fed. Rep. 100.</p> <p>Sometimes legislation provides for departmental regulations to care for details of administration of the particular legislation and in aid of it. The regulation in issue is not of that kind. It is the expression of the views of a particular administrative officer as to salaries to be paid to second-class postmasters. The regulation is not supplementary to the statute, but inconsistent with it.</p> <p>If the regulation is invalid the conspiracy to do acts prohibited therein is not a conspiracy to defraud. United States v. Biggs, 211 U. S. 507, 519, 521; Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425.</p> <p>The cases cited by the United States do not sustain its position.</p> <p>United States v. Johnston, 124 U. S. 236, 253; Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman, 182 Fed. Rep. 13, 16; McKee v. United States, 164 U. S. 287, 293; Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 178; Petri v. Commercial National Bank, 142 U. S. 644; State v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 92 N. E. Rep. 814; United States v. Antikamnia Co., 231 U. S. 654, are not in point.</p>

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of a state court under § 237, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.

Richards v. Washington Terminal Company, 233 U.S. 546 (1914), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States resolving the question when a government-created nuisance amounted to a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.

Held: attended by all the chiefs and head men and practically all the members of the tribe, and it was agreed by and between the then Indian Trader, M. Wescott, “as one party to the agreement, and the Menominee Indian Tribe as the other party thereto, that the said M. Wescott, the duly licensed Indian Trader, at Keshéna, Wisconsin, should furnish necessary equipment' and supplies to those members of the tribe who desired…

The facts, which involve the construction of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 as amended 1910, are stated in the opinion. The fact of injury to a servant carries with it no presumption of negligence on the part of the master, under the circumstances of this cáse. Tex. &c. R. R. Co. v. Barrett, 156 U. S. 617; Patton v. Tex. &c. R. Co., 179 U. S. 658; Looney v. Met. Ry. Co., 200 U. S. 480; Labatt’s Master & Servant (2d ed.), Art. 1604, p. 4898; G. Nor. Ry.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the District Courts of Alaska in capital cases and the construction of § 134, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.

•The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the District Court under § 238, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the conflicting claims of two railroad companies to a right of way in New Mexico, are stated in the opinion.

Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914), was a contempt of court case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.</p> <p>/This case arises out of conflicting claims to 80 acres of land in O’Brien County, Iowa, under the act of March 3, 1887, c. 376, 24 Stat. 556, as amended February 12, 1896, c. 18, 29 Stat. 6, providing for the adjustment of railroad land grants, etc. The land is within the place limits of the grant made May 12,1864, c. 84,13 Stat. 72, to the State of Iowa to aid in the construction of a railroad from Sioux City, in that State, tb the southern boundary of Minnesota. The grant was in prcesenti and embraced every alternate section, designated. by odd numbers, for ten sections in width on each side of the road, with the usual exceptions and provision for indemnity. The company which was to construct the road and receive the benefit of the grant was to be designated by the State legislature. Upon the presentation of a certificate by the Governor of the State that any section of ten consecutive miles of the road was completed, the Secretary of the Interior was to issue to the State patents for one hundred sections of land “for the benefit of” the company constructing the road, and this was to be repeated as each additional ten miles was constructed until the entire road was completed and all the lands patented. If the road was not completed within ten years from the company’s acceptance of the grant, the lands “granted and not patented” were to revert to the State to enable it to secure the completion of the work; and if the road was .not completed within five years after the expiration of the ten years, then the “lands undisposed of” were to revert to the United States. The Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company was designated by the State legislature as the beneficiary of the grant in 1866, the company accepted it in the same year, and a map definitely locating the line of the road was filed with the Secretary of the Interior and approved in 1867. As so located, the road was about 80 miles in length. In 1872 the company.constructed it from the southern boundary of Minnesota to Le Mars, Iowa, a distance of 56.25 miles, but the remaining part was never constructed, a trackage right to Sioux City over another road being acquired by the company. In 1872 and 1873 the Governor certified that five sections of ten miles each, constituting fifty miles of continuous road from the southern boundary of • Minnesota, had been completed and put into operation conformably to the granting act, and. the Secretary of the Interior thereupon caused a large amount of lands within the primary and indemnity limits of the grant to be patented to the State “for the use and benefit of” the company, the tract in controversy being among those so patented. Most of the lands patented to the State were soon conveyed by it to the company, but some were not, this tract being among the latter. The company, however, 'was claiming it in virtue of the grant and the patent to the State. Litigation was had between this company and another, by reason of their overlapping land grants, to determine which was entitled to this tract and others within the overlap; and by the final decree in 1886 this tract was awarded to this company. 117 U. S. 406. In truth, more.land was patented to the State for the benefit of the company, and more land was conveyed by the State to the company, than the latter was entitled to receive for the five ten-mile sections of completed road, not counting the additional 6.25 miles, and in 1882 the State legislature passed an act declaring that the State thereby resumed all lands “which have not been earned” by the company,, but the act did not more definitely point out the lands intended to be resumed. Laws Iowa, 1882, c. 107. And in 1884 the State legislature passed an act declaring (§ 1) that all lands resumed and intended to be resumed by the act of 1882 “are hereby relinquished and conveyed to the United States,” and also (§ 2): “The governor of the State of .Iowa is hereby authorized and directed to certify to the Secretary of the Interior all lands which have heretofore been patented to the State, to aid in the construction of said railroad, and which have not been patented by the State'to the Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad Company, and the fist of land so certified by the governor shall be presumed to be the lands relinquished and conveyed by section one of this act. Provided, that nothing in this section contained shall be construed to apply to lands situated in the, counties of Dickinson and O’Brien.” Laws Iowa, 1884, c. 71. The tract in controversy, being in O’Brien County, came within the excepting words of the proviso.</p> <p>This tract was part of an odd-numbered section of land immediately adjoining the third ten-mile section of cónstructed road, the completion of which was duly certified by the Governor, and was unreserved, unappropriated and vacant at the date of the granting act and at the time the line of road was definitely located. . Thus it was not only a, part of the lands granted but was earned by actual construction. And, strictly speaking, it was rightly patented to the State for the benefit o'f the company, the excess in the lands patented being caused by the inclusion in the patents of other lands differently situated and not earned by the completion of the five ten-mile sections of road.</p> <p>September 11, 1888, while'the tract was still free from any homestead, preemption or kindred claim and while the patent therefor, issued to the State in 1873 for the benefit of the company, was still outstanding,-Ellen M. Childs purchased the tract from the company, paying $88.00 in cash and agreeing to pay ten deferred instalments with interest thereon, making the full price $1,270.64, which was the fair value of the land. At the time of her purchase the tract was in the actual and undisputed-possession of the company through a tenant named Fitzgerald, who then became her tenant, and through him she continued in the undisturbed possession until October 8, 1889, when she sold to Logan, the plaintiff in error, who paid her $228.00 in cash and took the land subject to the payment of the ten deferred instalments. Fitzgerald then became the tenant of Logan and remained in • possession in that capacity until the spring of 1890, when Davis, the defendant in error, with a gang of men and teams, went upon the land, took possession of it, and began cultivating the larger part of it. In what he did Davis acted without the consent of Logan and with knowledge of Mrs. Childs’ purchase from the company in 1888, of her sale to Logan in 1889, and of Fitzgerald’s possession as tenant of Mrs. Childs and then of Logan. Although subsequently maintaining the possession obtained in the spring of 1890, Davis did not reside upon the tract or erect any buildings upon it.</p> <p>In October, 1889, the United States brought a suit— the bill was filed October 4 and the subpoena was served October 8 — against the company under the adjustment act of March 3, 1887, supra, to regain the title to nearly 22,000 acres of land in Dickinson and O’Brien Counties, including this tract, theretofore patented., to the State for the benefit of the company, the theory upon which such relief was sought being that the company had received a larger quantity of other lands than it was entitled to receive under the granting act and therefore could not properly claim the 22,000 acres. In the Circuit Court the United. States prevailed, and this court affirmed the decree. 159 U. S. 349. The ground upon 'which-the decision rested is indicated by the following extract from the opinion (p. 370): "Our conclusion, then, is that the Sioux City company, having failed to complete the entire road, for the construction of which Congress made the grant in question, was not entitled to the whole of the lands granted, but, at most, only to one hundred odd-numbéred sections — as those sections were surveyed, whatever their quantity — for each section of ten consecutive miles constructed and certified by the governor of the State; and that, according, to the measurement of 1887, which is accepted as the basis of calculation, the railroad company had, prior to the institution of this suit, received more lands, on account of the fifty miles of constructed road, certified by the governor, than it was , entitled to receive. Under this view, it is unnecessary ' to inquire whether the particular lands here in dispute should not have been assigned to the company, rather than other land's, containing a like number of acres, that were, in fact, transferred to it, and which cannot now be recovered by the United States, by reason of their having been disposed of by the copipany. If the company has received as much, in quantity, as should have been awarded ^o it, a court of equity will, not recognize its claim to more in whatever shape the claim is presented.”</p> <p>There was no attempt to make,Mrs. Childs, Logan, of the tenant Fitzgerald a party to that suit. During its. pendency, and on May 13, 1894, Logan entered into an agreement in vjriting with the company whereby the latter extended the time for paying the ten deferred instalments . until ninety days after a decision should be rendered in the suit by this court, and whereby he agreed that if the decision should be adverse to the company he would accept from it the amount already paid, with interest, in full satisfaction of all demands against the company on account of the failure of the title.</p> <p>Shortly following the decision of this court in that suit the lands recovered by the United States, including this tract, were regularly restored to public entry in conformity with the provisions of the adjustment act, and a contest at once ensued in the Land Department over this tract. Logan, claiming to be a purchaser in good faith, applied for a confirmatory patent under § 4, and Davis, claiming to be a bona fide occupant, sought to obtain title under the homestead law. A hearing before the local land office, at which the parties presented such evidence as they had in support of their respective claims, resulted in a decision by the local officers in favor of Davis. This was affirmed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office on the theory that the agreement of March 13j 1894, was fatal to Logan’s claim as a purchaser; and upon an appeal to the Secretary of the Interior the decisions below were reversed, it being found and held by the Secretary that Logan was a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of § 4 of the adjustment act; that the agreement of March 13, 1894, did not alter his status as a purchaser; and that Davis’ possession, acquired after the purchase by Logan and with, knowledge of it, did not eliminate the element of good faith from the latter’s purchase or otherwise defeat his claim. As a result of this decision, Logan made the requisite payment to the Government (see amendatory act of February 12, 1896, supra) and was given a confirmatory patent.</p> <p>It is conceded that Mrs. Childs and Logan were both citizens of the United States and in that respect within the remedial provisions of § 4 of the adjustment act, and also that in the contest before the Land Department Logan testified that at the time of his purchase from Mrs. Childs in 1889 he had no knowledge of ány adverse claim to the tract. The present record, however, does not purport to contain all the evidence produced in that contest.</p> <p>When the proceeding in the Land Department was concluded Logan sued Davis in the local state court to recover the possession, and by the pleadings subsequent to the petition the character of the action was so far changed that Davis sought to have Logan declared a trustee .of the title for him, Davis, and directed to convey the same to him, and Logan sought to have his title quieted as against Davis, as well as to recover the possession. In Davis’ pleading Logan’s right under the confirmatory patent was assailed upon the grounds (1) that the grant of 1864 was completely and finally adjusted by the legislation and action of the State in 1882 and 1884, and so was not within the operation of the adjustment act of 1887, (2) that the remedial provisions of § 4 of that act were confined to purchases made prior to" the date of the act, and so were not applicable to Mrs. Childs’ purchase in 1888 or Logan’s purchase in 1889, (3) that Mrs. Childs and Logan were bound to take notice of the various acts and matters bearing upon the company’s right to this tract, and so it was legally impossible for either to be a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of § 4, and (4) that the decision of the Secretary of the Interior, reversing the action of the local officers and of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, was given “unlaw-., fully and without any authority of law.”. The last ground evidently was intended as a mere conclusion from the others, for nothing else was alleged to make it even color-able. The case was heard upon an agreed statement of facts, the substance of which has been recited, and a decree was rendered in favor of Davis, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 147 Iowa, 441. That court held that Logan was not a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of § 4 of the adjustment act of 1887, and this upon the theory (a) that he was presumed to have known the character of the company’s title and (b) that § 4 was not applicable to a purchase made after the date of the act. To reverse that decision Logan prosecutes this writ of error.</p> <p>Defendant cannot maintain counterclaim. Plaintiff is entitled to protection under the act of March. 3, 1887. The United States and defendant are estopped.</p> <p>In support of these contentions, see Atherton v. Fowler 96 U. S. 211; Bausman v. Eads, 48 N. W. Rep. 769; Branon v. Worth, 17 Wall. 32; Cahn v. Barnes, 5 Fed. Rep. 399; Gibbons v. United States, 5 Ct. Cls. 416; Hosmer v. Wallace, 97 U. S. 575; In re McKeag, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Knepper v. Sands, 194 U. S. 476; Knevels v. Railroad Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 224; Logan v. Davis, 147 Iowa, 442; Lyle v. Patterson, 228 U. S. 211; McCravy v. Remsen, 54 Am. Dec. 194; Olson v. Traver, 26 L. D. 350; Peters v. Jones, 35 Iowa, 512; Portis v. Hill, 98 Am. Dec. 481; 2 Pomeroy’s Eq. (3d ed.), § 813; Quimby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 180; State v. Jackson R. R. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 116; State v. Milk, 11 Fed. Rep. 389; State v. Flint Co., 51 N. W. Rep. 103; Swanson v. Sears, 224 U. S. 180; United States v. Southern Pacific R. R., 184 U. S. 49; United States v. Winona R. R. Co., 165 U. S. 463.</p> <p>There is no Federal question involved. Plaintiff in error was not a good faith purchaser. Defendant had a right to make homestead entry. Equitable estoppel is not available to plaintiff in error.</p> <p>In support of these contentions, see 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. (2d ed.), 434; 21 Id., 588; 26 Id. 397, 398; Ard v. Brandon, 156 U. S. 537; Atherton v. Fowler, 96 U. S. 513; Arkansas &c. R. Co. v. German Nat’l Bank, 207 U. S. 270; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207; Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70; Benner v. Lane, 116 Fed. Rep. 407; California Powder Co. v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389; Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674; Clements v. Warner, 24 How. 394; Clark v. Lyster, 155 Fed. Rep. 513; De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216; Delaware City Co. v. Reybold, 142 U. S. 636; Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658; Duluth &c. R. Co. v. Roy, 173 U. S. 587; Elder v. Wood, 208 U. S. 226; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 370; Fowler v. Lamson, 164 U. S. 252; Giles v. Teasley, 193 U. S. 146; Gillis v. Stinchfield, 159 U. S. 658; Gjerstadengen v. Van Duzen (Nor. Dak.), 76 N. W. Rep. 233; Hamblin v. Western Land Co., 147 U. S. 531; Hammond v. Johnson, 142 U. S. 73; Harrison v. Morton, 171 U. S. 38; Hedrick v. Atchison &c. R. Co., 167 U. S. 673; Hale v. Lewis, 186 U. S. 473; Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300; Knepper v. Sands, 194 U. S. 476; Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93; Leonard v. Vicksburg &c. R. Co., 198 U. S. 416; Logan v. Davis, 147 Iowa, 441; Lyle v. Patterson, 228 U. S. 211; Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Cunningham, 155 U. S. 354; Manley v. Tow, 110 Fed. Rep. 241; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556; Moran v. Horsky, 178 U. S. 205; Moss v. Donovan, 176 U. S. 413; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Nelson v. Nor. Pac. R. Co., 188 U. S. 108; Olson v. Traver, 26 L. D. 350; Ostrom v. Wood, 140 Fed. Rep. 294; Pierce v. Somerset R. Co., 171 U. S. 641; Pittsburg Iron Co. v. Cleveland Iron Co., 178 U. S. 270; Rakes v. United States, 212 U. S. 58; Remington Paper Co. v. Watson, 173 U. S. 443; Rutland R. Co. v. Cent. Ver. R. R. Co., 159 U. S. 630; Seaboard &c. R. Co. v. Duvall, 225 U. S. 477; Seneca Nation v. Christy, 162 U. S. 263; S. C. & St. Paul R. Co. v. Osceola County, 43 Iowa, 318; S. C. & St. Paul R. Co. v. United States, 159 U. S. 349; Speed v. McCarthy, 181 U. S. 269; Smith v. Hollenbeck, 231 Illinois, 484; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. McGee, 115 U. S. 469; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 478; Walker v. Ehresman (Neb.), 113 N. W. Rep. 218; Weyerhauser v. Minnesota, 176 U. S. 550; Wood Machine Co. v. Skinner, 139 U. S. 293; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 112.</p>

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the statute of Texas of 1909 prescribing qualifications for conductors on railroad trains, are stated in the opinion. The Texas statute deprives defendant, without due process of law, of liberty to engage in a lawful occupation for which he was shown to be well fitted and denies to him the equal protection of the laws.

<p>Where a state statute has been held unconstitutional under the state constitution by an inferior state court, and subsequently has been upheld by the highest court of the State, this court, when the case is properly here under § 237, Judicial Code, must regard the statute as valid under the state constitution and consider only the question of its validity under the Federal Constitution, although intermediately this court has followed the decision of the lower state court.</p> <p>The validity of a state statute under the cómmerce clause or the Act to Regulate Commerce cannot be attacked in a suit which is not based upon a claim arising out of interstate commerce.</p> <p>A State may classify claims against persons or corporations where there is no classification of debtors and where the claims are not grouped together for the purpose of bearing against any class of citizens or corporations.</p> <p>A state police regulation designed to promote payment of small claims of certain classes and discourage unnecessary litigation respecting them should not be set aside by thé Federal courts on the ground that claims of other kinds have not been included, where the legislature was presumably dealing with an actual mischief and made the act as broad in its scope as seemed necessary from the practical standpoint.</p> <p>The Fourteenth Amendment does not require that state laws shall be perfect.</p> <p>In the absence of a construction by the state courts to that effect, this court will not concede that a state statute confers its benefits only upon natural persons who are plaintiffs in certain classes of actions and not upon corporation plaintiffs.</p> <p>A defendant corporation is not in a position to assail a state statute as denying equal protection of the law because its benefits do not inure to corporations which are plaintiffs.</p> <p>If the classification is otherwise reasonable, a state statute does not deny equal protection of the law because attorney’s fees are allowed to successful plaintiffs only and not to successful defendants. The classification is reasonable.</p> <p>A statute allowing an attorney’s fee in cases involving small amounts is not one imposing a penalty where it appears that the effect is -merely to require defendant to reimburse plaintiff for part of his expenses.</p> <p>This court follows the construction of the highest court of the State to the effect that a statute imposing an attorney’s fee on the defeated defendant is limited to claims of an amount specified in the title.</p> <p>The statute of Texas of 1909 imposing an attorney’s fee on the defeated defendant in certain classes of cases, as the same has been construed by the highest court of that State, is not unconstitutional under the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, distinguished.</p>

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, and what constitutes raising the Federal question in the state court, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, to review a judgment of the state court involving a railroad right of way, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that the Hours of Service Act of 1907 is the judgment of Congress of the necessary extent of such restrictions as to ■ employés engaged in interstate commerce which admits of no supplementary regulation by any of the States.

Suit brought by plaintiff in error, the Erie Railroad Company (as it was plaintiff below we shall so designate it) to restrain the defendant in error (herein called defendant) from instituting actions to recover penalties for noncompliance with the provisions of the Labor Law of the State of New York (Laws of 1907, c. 415; General Laws, c. 32) which required plaintiff to pay its employés semimonthly and in cash.

Held: that notwithstanding the forfeiture of an original grant and the final sale relating to a new but similar grant, as there was a continuous pursuit of the end achieved, one who was entitled to a share in the profits of the enterprise as originally conceived was entitled to share in the proceeds.

- The facts, which involve claims of the vendor and the holder of a mortgage, bond to certain tanks and fixtures delivered to the owner of a bréwery under a conditional' sale, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Limited Liability Act and the right of the petitioner in this case to the benefit thereof, are stated in the opinion. The Limited Liability Act applies equally to American • and foreign shipowners; it establishes maritime law of the United States to be universally applied in our courts as an expression of our conception of justice.