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State v. Rosa
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HUGO ROSA
(AC 46610)
Alvord, Elgo and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of the crimes of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in
the fourth degree as a result of his abuse of the minor victim, T, the defendant
appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly limited its
disclosure of certain of T’s confidential medical and mental health records
and refused to conduct a second in camera review of those records in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Juan A. G.-P. (346 Conn.
132). Held:
The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction with
respect to one count each of risk of injury to a child and fourth degree
sexual assault, predicated on the defendant’s conduct in touching T in her
buttock area, as T’s testimony at trial was consistent with her statements
during her forensic interview by a clinical social worker describing how
the defendant had contact with her buttock while she was asleep.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence portions
of a video recording of T’s forensic interview with a clinical social worker
under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule
in a provision (§ 8-3 (5)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, as an objective
observer reasonably could conclude that T’s disclosures during the interview, in particular her statement regarding DNA, were made, at least in
part, for the purpose of receiving medical treatment and were pertinent to
that end.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to release portions
of T’s confidential medical and mental health records or by redacting portions of those records it did disclose, and, in rejecting the defendant’s request
that it conduct a second review of those records in light of Juan A. G.-P.,
the court correctly concluded that Juan A. G.-P. did not alter the standard
applicable to in camera review of confidential records and indicated that,
in conducting its review, it had searched the records for both relevant
exculpatory and inculpatory material.
Argued February 11—officially released June 10, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
five counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child and
two counts of the crime of sexual assault in the fourth
degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
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State v. Rosa
district of New Haven, geographical area number seven
at Meriden, and tried to the jury before Chaplin, J.;
thereafter, the court granted in part the defendant’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal and denied the defendant’s motion for in camera review of certain confidential records; verdict and judgment of guilty of three
counts of risk of injury to a child and two counts of
sexual assault in the fourth degree, from which the
defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Trent A. LaLima, assigned counsel, with whom was
Virginia Gillette, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s
attorney, and Nichol Peco, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Hugo Rosa, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of two counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1), two
counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General
Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2), and one count of risk of injury
to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal,
the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient
evidence for the jury to reasonably find that he had
contact with the ‘‘buttock area’’ of the victim, T,1 as
1
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be
ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106,
136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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State v. Rosa
alleged in the information with respect to one count of
sexual assault in the fourth degree and one count of
risk of injury to a child under § 53-21 (a) (2); (2) the
trial court improperly admitted portions of T’s videorecorded forensic interview under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the rule against hearsay;
and (3) the trial court improperly limited the disclosure
of certain of T’s confidential medical and mental health
records following an in camera review of those records.2
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found on the basis of the evidence presented, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. In April, 2015, the defendant began sharing a
residence with his girlfriend, L, and her two children,
T and E, when T was ten years old and E was five years
old. During this time, T and E visited their biological
father every other weekend, and L worked night shifts
from 6 p.m. until 12 a.m. In March, 2016, T and E’s
brother, J, was born, and he also lived with the defendant and L.
One night in June, 2017, while L was working, T, who
was then eleven years old, woke up while lying on her
stomach with her underwear pulled down to her midthigh and the defendant rubbing directly underneath
her left buttock. Before T had gone to sleep, her underwear had been fully on. T told L about the incident, but
L did nothing about it. On another occasion, when T
was twelve years old, she awoke to the defendant rubbing her vaginal area. T told L about this incident as
2
Although the defendant addresses his claim of evidentiary insufficiency
last in his brief to this court, we will address that claim first because, if he
were to prevail on that claim, he would be entitled to a directed judgment
of acquittal, rather than to a new trial, and it would not be necessary to
address his other claims. See, e.g., State v. White, 215 Conn. App. 273, 276
n.1, 283 A.3d 542 (2022), cert. denied,
346 Conn. 918,
291 A.3d 108 (2023).
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State v. Rosa
well, but L, again, took no action. In October, 2018, at
approximately 5 a.m., T was asleep on a couch with E
when she awoke to the sound of a picture frame falling
and saw the defendant walking away from her. T looked
down and noticed that her shirt was ‘‘rolled up just
above [her] chest.’’ E told T that he had seen the defendant take a blanket off T, roll up her shirt, and touch
her breasts. T immediately told L what had happened,
and, on this occasion, L confronted the defendant. The
defendant, however, denied what had happened.
On April 24, 2019, E was in the home, standing on a
counter that had lights hanging overhead. E was swinging a toy around the lights when, according to T, the
defendant said to E, ‘‘if you break that I’m going to
break your face.’’ T then took E to a bedroom, locked
the door, and called their father. During this phone call,
T told her father that the defendant had been touching
her inappropriately. On April 26, 2019, T’s father picked
up T and E for his scheduled visitation and went to
the Meriden Police Department, where T provided a
statement regarding the defendant’s abuse.
On May 30, 2019, on the basis of a referral from the
Department of Children and Families (department), T
met with Maria Silva, a clinical social worker at the
Yale Child Abuse Clinic, for a forensic interview to
assess T’s safety, mental health, and medical well-being.
The interview was observed by Silva’s colleagues from
the clinic, as well as the police and a department
employee. After the interview, Silva informed the clinic’s nurse practitioner that T was ready to be seen for
an assessment of any medical needs, and, through T’s
father, referred T to a trauma therapy program to connect her with both short-term and long-term mental
health services.3
3
T later received treatment from Julia Savio, a licensed marriage and
family therapist, and Mariyah Charlton, a clinical mental health counselor,
to whom T was referred due to depression, suicidal ideations, self-injurious
behavior, and trauma as a result of sexual abuse.
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State v. Rosa
Following the forensic interview, both the department and the police conducted concurrent investigations into T’s allegations.4 On October 11, 2019, the
police arrested the defendant, and, on December 9,
2019, he was charged in a long form information with
two counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree in
violation of § 53a-73a5 and five counts of risk of injury
to a child in violation of § 53-21.6 Counts one and three
charged the defendant with sexual assault in the fourth
degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) for, respectively, touching T in her buttock area and rubbing her
vaginal area. Counts two and four charged him with
risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2)
for, respectively, touching T in her buttock area and
rubbing her vaginal area. Counts five, six, and seven,
charged him with risk of injury to a child in violation
of § 53-21 (a) (1) for, respectively, rolling up T’s shirt
According to the police officer’s affidavit submitted with the arrest war-
4
rant application for the defendant, which was not presented to the jury, the
department substantiated allegations of physical neglect by L of T and
E, and also substantiated allegations of sexual abuse by the defendant
regarding T.
5
General Statutes § 53a-73a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1) Such person subjects
another person to sexual contact who is (A) under thirteen years of age
and the actor is more than two years older than such other person . . . .’’
6
General Statutes § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who
(1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of
sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such
child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the
morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to
impair the health or morals of any such child, or (2) has contact with the
intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of
sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with
the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and indecent manner likely
to impair the health or morals of such child . . . shall be guilty of (A) a
class C felony for a violation of subdivision (1) . . . of this subsection, and
(B) a class B felony for a violation of subdivision (2) of this subsection,
except that, if the violation is of subdivision (2) of this subsection and the
victim of the offense is under thirteen years of age, such person shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence
imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.’’
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State v. Rosa
and exposing her breasts, physically assaulting E, and
physically assaulting J. The defendant entered not guilty
pleas on all counts.
The case was tried to a jury beginning on February
8, 2023. On February 9, 2023, after the close of the state’s
case-in-chief, defense counsel made an oral motion for
a judgment of acquittal as to counts one, two, six, and
seven, arguing that the evidence presented did not support the factual allegations in the information. After
hearing counsel’s arguments, the state conceded that
the court should dismiss count seven but otherwise
opposed the motion. Thereafter, the court, Chaplin, J.,
dismissed count seven but denied the motion as to
counts one, two, and six. On February 10, 2023, the
state filed a substitute long form information reflecting
this change.
On February 14, 2023, the jury found the defendant
guilty of both counts of sexual assault, both counts of
risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2),
and the count of risk of injury to a child in violation
of § 53-21 (a) (1) predicated on the defendant’s having
exposed T’s breasts. The jury found the defendant not
guilty on the remaining count of risk of injury predicated
on his alleged physical assault of E. The court sentenced
the defendant to a total effective term of twenty years
of incarceration, suspended after seven years, with ten
years of probation and lifetime sex offender registration. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set
forth as necessary.
I
We first address the defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction with
respect to counts one and two, which allege, respectively, sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation
of § 53a-73a (a) (1) and risk of injury to a child in
violation of § 53-21 (a) (2). Specifically, he asserts that
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State v. Rosa
no evidence was admitted from which the jury reasonably could have found that he had contact with T’s
‘‘buttock area’’ as alleged in the information as the factual predicate for those counts. We disagree.
We begin our analysis with well settled legal principles governing our review of evidentiary insufficiency
claims, including our standard of review. ‘‘In reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the
facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have
concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘[T]he jury must find every element proven beyond
a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty
of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and
inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic
fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to
consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether
the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the
defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean
proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof
beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every
hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that,
had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would
have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do
not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of
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State v. Rosa
innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of
fact’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nichols, 226 Conn. App. 359, 374–75,
317
A.3d 861 (2024).
Counts one and two of the operative long form information charged the defendant with sexual assault and
risk of injury on factual allegations that ‘‘the defendant
touched [T] . . . in her buttock area.’’ Section 53a-73a
(a) (1) provides in relevant part that a person is guilty
of sexual assault in the fourth degree if that person
‘‘subjects another person to sexual contact . . . .’’ Sexual contact, as that term is used throughout part VI of
the Penal Code governing sex offenses, is defined in
General Statutes (Rev. 2017) § 53a-65 (3), which provides in relevant part that sexual contact means ‘‘any
contact with the intimate parts of a person not married
to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of
the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating
such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the
actor with a person not married to the actor for the
purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the
purpose of degrading or humiliating such person.’’ Section 53a-65 further defines ‘‘intimate parts’’ to mean
‘‘the genital area or any substance emitted therefrom,
groin, anus or any substance emitted therefrom, inner
thighs, buttocks or breasts.’’ General Statutes § 53a-65
(8). Moreover, § 53-21 (a) (2) provides in relevant part
that a person is guilty of risk of injury to a child if that
person ‘‘has contact with the intimate parts, as defined
in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen
years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to
contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a
sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health
or morals of such child . . . .’’ Accordingly, proof of
contact with an intimate part of T’s body, specifically,
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State v. Rosa
her buttock, was an essential element of both counts
one and two.
Contrary to the defendant’s assertion on appeal, however, there was sufficient evidence presented to the
jury from which it reasonably could have found, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had contact with
T’s buttock. T testified at trial that, when she was
approximately eleven years old, ‘‘there was a night
where I’d wake up and my underwear was, like, down.
And he was—I was [lying] on my stomach and he was
rubbing this, like, the underneath my butt, like, where
my thigh, the back of my thigh. Just, like, rubbing on
my body. . . . Just below—just below my butt.’’ This
testimony was consistent with her statements at the
forensic interview, admitted at trial,7 during which she
told Silva that she ‘‘woke up with my underwear down
and [the defendant] was rubbing my leg back here.’’
Contemporaneously with that statement, T placed a
mark on a line of an anatomically correct drawing that
represented the crease between the bottom of the buttock and the top of the thigh, reiterating that the defendant had touched her on the ‘‘line between my butt and
my leg. My thigh.’’ Silvia clarified with T where the
defendant had touched her, asking: ‘‘Butt and thigh?’’
T responded: ‘‘Yes.’’ The defendant argues that the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from this evidence
is that he had touched T in the buttocks area but not
7
Although the defendant challenges on appeal the admission of the forensic interview video, a claim we reject in part II of this opinion, ‘‘in evaluating
a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we consider the totality of the evidence
that was before the trier of fact, including any evidence claimed to have
been improperly admitted by the court.’’ In re Alizabeth L.-T., 213 Conn.
App. 541, 604 n.26,
278 A.3d 547 (2022), citing State v. Chemlen,
165 Conn.
App. 791, 818,
140 A.3d 347 (‘‘[A]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence . . . properly includes hearsay evidence even if such evidence
was admitted despite a purportedly valid objection. Claims of evidentiary
insufficiency in criminal cases are always addressed independently of claims
of evidentiary error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 322
Conn. 908,
140 A.3d 977 (2016).
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State v. Rosa
on the actual buttocks. We reject such a narrow view
of the evidence.
‘‘[J]urors, in deciding cases, are not expected to lay
aside matters of common knowledge or their own
observations and experiences, but rather, to apply them
to the facts as presented to arrive at an intelligent and
correct conclusion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Elmer G., 176 Conn. App. 343, 376,
170
A.3d 749 (2017), aff’d,
333 Conn. 176,
214 A.3d 852
(2019). T’s description of the area where the defendant
had touched her encompassed the area of the buttocks
where it meets the upper thigh. She indicated that same
area on the anatomical drawing. When asked by Silva
to clarify whether the defendant had touched her on
the ‘‘butt and thigh’’; (emphasis added); T answered,
‘‘yes,’’ from which the jury was free to conclude that
he had touched both areas of her body. Construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict, as we must, we view the aforementioned evidence alone as supporting a reasonable inference that
the defendant had touched T on the buttocks. See State
v. Alberto M., 120 Conn. App. 104, 111,
991 A.2d 578
(2010) (victim’s testimony that defendant touched her
‘‘ ‘breast area’ ’’ was sufficient to support jury’s finding
that defendant made contact with victim’s breasts).
Moreover, T also testified that her underwear was on
when she fell asleep, and it is both logical and common
sense that, to pull down her underwear to expose her
buttocks and upper thigh, the defendant would have
made contact with T’s buttocks. See id., (irrelevant
whether contact was made through victim’s clothing
rather than against bare skin). We agree with the state
that ‘‘a person who is engaged in surreptitiously pulling
down a sleeping child’s underpants in the dead of night,
exposing her buttocks, is acting crudely in haste, unconcerned with doing so delicately enough to ensure that
his hand or hands touch only the garment, but not the
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State v. Rosa
child’s flesh.’’ Because, on the basis of the totality of
the evidence presented, it was reasonable for the jury
to infer that the defendant had touched T’s buttock, an
intimate part of her body, we reject the defendant’s
sufficiency of the evidence claim.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court abused
its discretion by admitting into evidence portions of T’s
forensic interview. Specifically, the defendant argues
that the court should have excluded the videotape of
the interview as hearsay because it did not meet the
medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the rule
against hearsay set forth in § 8-3 of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence.8 We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our discussion of this claim. During
its direct examination of Silva regarding her forensic
examination of T, the state sought to introduce into
evidence the videotape of the forensic interview.
Defense counsel objected to the admission of the videotape on hearsay grounds. The state countered that the
videotape was admissible under the medical diagnosis
and treatment exception to the hearsay rule.
8
The defendant also argues, as an aspect of his claim, that the court
abused its discretion because it admitted the videotape without first viewing
and considering its content. We agree with the state that this aspect of the
defendant’s evidentiary claim was not preserved because the defendant
never asked the court to view the videotape prior to ruling on its admission
and did not raise any objection to its admission on the ground that the court
had not viewed it prior to ruling. ‘‘In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling
for review, trial counsel must object properly. . . . In objecting to evidence,
counsel must properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise
the trial court of the precise nature of the objection and its real purpose, in
order to form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Jorge P., 308 Conn. 740, 753,
66 A.3d 869 (2013).
Because the defendant failed to properly preserve this aspect of his claim,
we decline to review it.
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State v. Rosa
The court heard argument on the objection outside
the presence of the jury. Defense counsel argued that
the medical exception did not apply in this case because
T’s forensic interview was conducted only for investigative purposes. Counsel pointed to the fact that the interview was conducted more than one month after T had
disclosed the alleged incidents of abuse and eight
months after the last alleged incident of abuse. Moreover, defense counsel argued that T, who had testified
just prior to Silva, had not established through her own
testimony that she understood the interview to have
any medical purpose, having indicated that she did not
undergo any medical examination or procedure as part
of the interview.9 Defense counsel also pointed out to
the court that, during the forensic interview, Silva had
asked T why her father had brought her to the clinic
that day and that T had responded, ‘‘[b]ecause the
[department] said to come here today so they can ask
questions . . . .’’
The prosecutor argued to the court that it was reasonable to infer from T’s testimony that the interview had
9
The relevant portion of T’s direct testimony regarding the forensic interview was as follows:
‘‘Q. . . . [D]id you meet with Maria Silva from Yale?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. And do you remember why you met with Maria Silva from Yale?
‘‘A. She was explaining to me that she wanted to make sure I knew the
body parts. She was showing me a poster of, like, a drawing of a body,
telling me to point out what areas were which. And she would tell me that
this was a place where people have similar—children have similar cases
like mine, and they check for DNA and stuff like that.
‘‘Q. So, did you get a medical examination while you were there?
‘‘A. No. . . .
‘‘Q. Did you meet with an [advanced practice registered nurse] after you
met with Maria Silva, a nurse?
‘‘A. No.
‘‘Q. Did you start therapy soon after meeting with Maria Silva?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. Were you going to therapy before meeting with Maria Silva?
‘‘A. No.’’
The defense did not cross-examine T regarding the forensic interview.
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State v. Rosa
a medical purpose, stating that ‘‘[t]he medical issue that
she was there for was the sexual assault and the trauma
that she was experiencing because of it.’’ The prosecutor further noted that T had indicated in her testimony
that she was there to discuss her body and had ‘‘mentioned DNA.’’ The prosecutor further argued that,
because the contents of the videotape had not yet been
entered into evidence, the court, in deciding whether to
admit the videotape, should not consider T’s statement
regarding the department.
The court, after hearing from the parties, stated on the
record that the primary question before it was ‘‘whether
there is sufficient information before the court and
before the jury that the child in question, the alleged
victim, understood that this was for a medical or psychiatric purpose.’’ Thereafter, focusing on T’s testimony
regarding her understanding of why she was being interviewed by Silva; see footnote 9 of this opinion; the court
stated: ‘‘So, as to the portion regarding other children,
that has no relevance as to her understanding of what
her purpose was for that day. As to the evidence that
she began therapy after the fact, has no bearing on what
her belief of was—belief for the purpose of that event
going into it. That doesn’t connect that dot. However,
the piece regarding her being examined for DNA, the
court will find that is sufficient basis for the medical
exception provision to be satisfied, barely.’’ The videotape of the forensic interview was subsequently played,
in part, for the jury.10
We begin our analysis by setting forth relevant legal
principles and our applicable standard of review. ‘‘The
standard under which we review evidentiary claims
10
Three short segments of the videotaped interview were not played for
the jury on the basis of other objections raised by defense counsel and
sustained by the court, none of which is relevant to our discussion of the
present claim. A redacted copy of the forensic interview containing only
those portions played for the jury was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit.
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State v. Rosa
depends on the specific nature of the claim presented.
. . . To the extent a trial court’s admission of evidence
is based on an interpretation of [law], our standard of
review is plenary. For example, whether a challenged
statement properly may be classified as hearsay and
whether a hearsay exception properly is identified are
legal questions demanding plenary review. . . . We
review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence, if
premised on a correct view of the law, however, for an
abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gordon, 206 Conn. App. 70, 81–82,
259
A.3d 676, cert. granted,
339 Conn. 913,
262 A.3d 135
(2021) (appeal withdrawn April 8, 2022).
‘‘Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the
truth of the matter asserted and generally is inadmissible. . . . The rules of evidence, however, recognize
that certain out-of-court statements warrant an exception to the general rule that hearsay constitutes inadmissible evidence. . . . [S]tatements made by a sexual
assault victim to a social worker who is acting within
the chain of medical care may be admissible under
the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Freddy T., 200 Conn. App. 577, 590–91,
241 A.3d
173 (2020); see also State v. Roy D. L.,
339 Conn. 820,
834, 262 A.3d 712 (2021) (medical treatment hearsay
exception is applicable to forensic interviews if ‘‘the
surrounding circumstances could lead an objective
observer to reasonably infer that the victim’s statements
were given in order to obtain medical treatment and
diagnosis’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The medical diagnosis and treatment exception to
the hearsay rule, codified in § 8-3 of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence, provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness . . . (5)
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. . . A statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent
to the medical diagnosis or treatment.’’ As our Supreme
Court has explained, ‘‘the rationale behind the medical
treatment exception is that a person’s desire to recover
his [or her] health incentivizes them to tell the truth to
individuals involved in their medical care.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339
Conn. 833–34.
Thus, ‘‘§ 8-3 (5) [of the Connecticut Code of Evidence]
sets forth . . . a two-pronged test. The first [prong]
addresses the declarant’s purpose or motivation in the
making of the statement, and the second addresses
the pertinence of the statement to that end.11 . . . The
application of the medical treatment exception, therefore, turns in the first instance on the declarant’s state
of mind and the purpose for which each individual
statement was made. . . . The purpose prong is satisfied so long as the declarant’s statement was motivated,
at least in part, by a desire to obtain medical treatment
or a diagnosis.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added;
footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 831.
‘‘[T]he proper application of the existing medical
treatment hearsay exception . . . [can] ensure the
reliability of . . . statements made at a forensic interview. . . . In cases in which the substance of a juvenile
11
Although the record before us is silent regarding the pertinence prong
of § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, the defendant has not
raised on appeal any claim that the court failed to consider pertinence in
admitting the videotaped interview or that any admitted statements by T
failed to meet the test for admissibility under § 8-3 (5). Accordingly, we do
not address the issue further.
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declarant’s statement and the circumstances surrounding the statement support an inference that the
statement was made in furtherance of obtaining medical
treatment, a trial court can reasonably conclude that
the purpose prong of the medical treatment exception
is satisfied.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 833.
In the present case, the circumstances surrounding
the interview tend to support a reasonable inference
that T would have understood that at least one purpose
of her participation in the forensic interview was related
to her obtaining medical treatment, which would
include treatment for any potential mental health
issues. See, e.g., State v. Cecil J., 99 Conn. App. 274,
289,
913 A.2d 505 (2007) (statements made for purpose
of psychological therapy were admissible pursuant to
medical treatment exception to hearsay rule), aff’d, 291
Conn. 813,
970 A.2d 710 (2009). Silva’s interview with
T took place at a medical clinic. Upon arrival, Silva
escorted T to the second floor to be registered as a
medical patient within the Yale New Haven health care
system. T was then given a medical bracelet. Prior to
the interview, T met with a child life specialist whose
job it was to assess T for any developmental delays and
her ability to move forward with the interview process.
During the forensic interview, Silva explained to T that
she wanted to make sure that T knew different body
parts and asked her to point out the affected areas of her
body on an anatomically correct poster. Additionally,
as recognized by the trial court, T believed that one
of the purposes of the interview was to ‘‘check for
DNA . . . .’’
T also stated during the interview that the department
had sent her to the clinic. The defendant argues that,
because the department is primarily an investigative
agency, not a health care agency, the fact that the
department sent T to the clinic for the forensic interview
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undermines any conclusion that she understood the
interview to be for medical treatment purposes. The
referral by the department, however, established only
who sent her to the clinic, not why she was sent or,
more importantly, whether she reasonably believed the
interview would also address medical concerns. Stated
differently, the referral by the department did not make
it less likely that T’s statements during her interview
were in some part motivated by her desire to obtain
medical treatment, including an evaluation of her current mental health.
At the end of the interview, T was in fact told that
she would have the opportunity to ask a nurse about
any concerns that she had. The defendant argues that,
because T was not told that she could speak with a
nurse until the end of the interview, she was not aware
that her statements during the interview had any medical purpose, and thus the interview was not for medical
treatment purposes. It is true that, in Freddy T., we
noted that, ‘‘allowing the hearsay exception to be
invoked as a result of medical referrals made at the
end of a forensic interview poses a risk that the state
can ‘sanitize’ the interview and subvert the hearsay
exception.’’ State v. Freddy T., supra,200 Conn. App.
594 n.16. Ultimately, however, ‘‘the focus of the hearsay
exception is the declarant’s understanding of the interview’s purpose, i.e., was it relevant for medical purposes.’’ Id. Accordingly, Silva was not required to
expressly inform T that the interview was for medical
treatment purposes or to make medical referrals prior
to the interview in order for T to have been motivated
to participate to obtain medical treatment or a diagnosis. See id., 593 (‘‘the state need only show that the
forensic interview had a medical purpose that the
declarant reasonably understood’’).
On the basis of T’s statements during the interview,
in particular her statement regarding DNA, and, more
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State v. Rosa
importantly, the circumstances in which she made
those statements, including the location and nature of
the interview, an objective observer reasonably could
conclude that T’s disclosures during the interview were
made, at least in part, for the purpose of receiving
medical treatment and were pertinent to that end. We,
therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the videotaped recording of
the forensic interview under the medical treatment
exception to the hearsay rule.
III
Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court
improperly limited the disclosure to him of certain of
T’s confidential medical and mental health records.
According to the defendant, the court’s partial disclosure and significant redactions of such records prevented him from fully cross-examining and impeaching
T about her allegations against him, which he speculates
could have been the result of animus against him and
a desire not to be separated from her father. The defendant also argues that the jury had heard harmful testimony from T’s therapists, Julia Savio, a licensed marriage and family therapist, and Mariyah Charlton, a
clinical mental health counselor, about the impact of
the alleged sexual abuse on T’s mental health, and he
posits that some of the redacted or undisclosed records
may have shed light on alternative causes of T’s mental
health issues. Finally, the defendant suggests that the
disclosed portions of the records indicate that T had
participated in family therapy sessions but that the
information about those sessions was redacted by the
court. The defendant argues that, assuming T’s father
and brother had participated in those sessions, anything
they said that was inconsistent with their testimony,
was exculpatory in any way, or gave insight into T’s
relationship with her father would have been useful in
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the defendant’s cross-examination of them as witnesses. The defendant asks us to review the undisclosed
portions of the record as well as the unredacted versions of the disclosed records ‘‘to determine whether
the undisclosed pages or redactions contained
important impeachment or exculpatory information.’’
The state responds that, without access to the undisclosed portion of the records at issue, it is ‘‘unable to
offer a meaningful response to the defendant’s speculative assertion that the trial court improperly restricted
his ability to cross-examine T, Savio, and Charlton.’’
Nonetheless, the state agrees that this court must
review the undisclosed portions of T’s medical records
to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and, if so, whether that error was harmful.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. Prior to trial, the state subpoenaed certain confidential medical and mental health
records pertaining to T. The records were submitted
to the court under seal, and, by agreement of the parties,
the court conducted an in-camera review of the records
to determine what records, if any, should be disclosed
to the parties. At a proceeding on December 5, 2022,
the court informed the parties that it had begun its
review of the records and had determined that several
documents would need to be disclosed, albeit with substantial redactions. The court indicated that, once its
review of the records was complete, it would have the
courthouse clerk’s office make copies available to the
parties of any disclosable records. The court thereafter
provided the parties with copies of a significant portion
of the reviewed records, with redactions. The court also
marked a set as a court exhibit.
On February 8, 2023, prior to the start of the first
day of evidence, the defendant filed a motion asking
the court to conduct an additional in camera review of
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the sealed records in light of our Supreme Court’s then
newly released decision in State v. Juan A. G.-P., 346
Conn. 132,
287 A.3d 1060 (2023). Although the defendant
acknowledged in his motion that the court already had
conducted an in camera review at the request of the
parties, he argued that the court had conducted that
review ‘‘without the guidance for the court provided by
Juan A. [G.-P.]. ‘‘The defendant noted that the records
the court had disclosed were heavily redacted and that
the ‘‘entire record must be reviewed to determine if
there is exculpatory information, inculpatory information, or information probative of [T’s] ability to know
and relate to the truth with respect to the event in
question, and her ability to observe, understand and
accurately narrate the events in question.’’ Defense
counsel stressed that it was particularly important to
the defense ‘‘to know fully every reason as to why [T]
is seeking mental health treatment’’ and that the records
the court had provided appeared to redact many of
those reasons. The state opposed the motion.
In response to the defendant’s motion, the court indicated on the record that it believed it already had conducted an appropriate and thorough review of the
records and had disclosed any and all records that the
court determined would ‘‘show some tendency to disprove or prove relevance as to truthfulness, any regard
to the allegations themselves and things of that nature.
So, exculpatory, inculpatory, and just relevance to
truthfulness or untruthfulness. So, that was my view of
those records. So, it was in line with the Supreme Court
case [Juan A. G.-P.].’’ The court also agreed with the
state’s position that Juan A. G.-P. ‘‘did not create new
law, did not expand the scope [of in camera review];
it just restated the law based on improper exercise of
that review . . . .’’ On that basis, the court denied the
defendant’s motion requesting an additional in camera
review of T’s medical records.
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State v. Rosa
We next set forth the law relevant to this claim as
well as the applicable standard of review. ‘‘A criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine
the state’s witnesses, which may include impeaching
or discrediting them by attempting to reveal to the jury
the witnesses’ biases, prejudices or ulterior motives, or
facts bearing on the witnesses’ reliability, credibility,
or sense of perception. . . . Thus, in some instances,
otherwise privileged records . . . must give way to a
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to reveal to
the jury facts about a witness’ mental condition that
may reasonably affect that witness’ credibility. . . .
[T]he linchpin of the determination of the defendant’s
access to [confidential] records is whether they sufficiently disclose material especially probative of the ability to comprehend, know and correctly relate the truth
. . . so as to justify breach of their confidentiality and
disclos[ure] . . . in order to protect [the defendant’s]
right of confrontation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis, 267 Conn. 162,
177,
836 A.2d 1191 (2003). ‘‘[E]ven inculpatory material
contained in psychiatric records is relevant information
and should be turned over to the defense. This is so
because the inculpatory information may differ from
the evidence presented at trial, or be inconsistent with
the victims’ other statements, thereby calling into question the reliability of the state’s version of events.’’ State
v. Juan A. G.-P., supra, 346 Conn. 155–56.
Upon conducting an in camera review of confidential
records, ‘‘[i]f the court discovers no probative and
impeaching material, the [records] must be sealed and
preserved for possible appellate review. . . . Once the
trial court has made its inspection, the court’s determination of a defendant’s access to the witness’ records
lies in the court’s sound discretion, which we will not
disturb unless abused. . . . Access to confidential
records should be left to the discretion of the trial court
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State v. Rosa
which is better able to assess the probative value of
such evidence as it relates to the particular case before
it . . . and to weigh that value against the interest in
confidentiality of the records.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 154.
In the present case, T’s confidential medical records
were subpoenaed by the state, delivered to the court,
sealed and properly marked as a court exhibit to preserve them for appellate review. The court conducted
an in camera review of T’s records and, on the basis
of that review, disclosed portions of the records to the
defense. When asked by the defendant to conduct a
second review following our Supreme Court’s decision
in Juan A. G.-P., the court declined to do so, explaining
that its prior review of the records was conducted utilizing the correct legal standard. We agree with the trial
court that Juan A. G.-P. did not alter the standard
applicable to an in camera review of confidential
records and that, to the extent the Supreme Court clarified that courts have a duty to search for both relevant
exculpatory and inculpatory material in conducting
their review, the trial court indicated that it had done
so in this case. Accordingly, to the extent that the defendant is claiming that there was error in the manner in
which the court conducted its review, he has failed to
demonstrate such error.
Moreover, having engaged in our own examination
of the records in question, as required; see, e.g., State
v. Delgado, 64 Conn. App. 312, 319,
780 A.2d 180 (2001),
aff’d, 261 Conn. 708,
805 A.2d 705 (2002); we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to release other portions of the records to the
defendant or by redacting some portions of the records
it did disclose. Because the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard in conducting its review and appropriately balanced the parties’ competing interests,
including the significant interest in the confidentiality
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of mental health records,12 and because, on the basis
of our own review of the records, we are not persuaded
that the trial court’s limited disclosure of T’s confidential records likely impaired the defendant’s rights to
impeach or cross-examine witnesses, the defendant’s
claim fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
12
See General Statutes § 52-146e; State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411, 424,
957
A.2d 852 (2008) (‘‘[Section] 52-146e spreads a veil of secrecy over communications and records relating to the diagnosis or treatment of a patient’s
mental condition. . . . The broad sweep of the statute covers not only
disclosure to a defendant or his counsel, but also disclosure to a court even
for the limited purpose of an in camera examination.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)).
