Volume 233 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

Convicted, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree and other crimes, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence, pursuant to State v. Gore (342 Conn. 129), testimony by B, a nonpercipient witness, identifying him from surveillance video foot- age she was shown in the courtroom during the trial. Held: This court declined to review the defendant's argument that the trial court should have considered that the manner in which B was shown the video was suggestive because it was the first time she had seen the footage, there having been nothing in the record to establish when B had first viewed the video evidence. This court was not persuaded that the circumstances of the defendant's case warranted the trial court's consideration of B's purported bias against him and that the admission of her testimony would result in an undue restriction of the defendant's constitutional right to confront B, as those matters, which pertained to trial tactics and the weight to be accorded to her testimony, were beyond Gore's requirement that, in determining whether a witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant than is a jury, the trial court should consider factors pertaining to the witness' familiarity with the defendant and his appearance, as well as the video's quality and the extent to which it depicts the defendant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting B's identification testimony, which was more probative than it was prejudicial in light of her past history and familiarity with the defendant, with whom she had two children, and the defendant provided no authority to show that B's testimony was rendered unduly prejudicial because his counsel might have had to inquire into prior domestic violence between B and the defendant to be able to fully establish her bias against him. Even if this court were to assume that the admission of B's identification testimony was improper, the defendant did not establish that he was harmed by the trial court's failure to preclude that testimony, as the state presented a strong case against the defendant that included DNA evidence, surveillance In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of domestic violence, we decline to identify the defendant or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e; see also footnote 9 of this opinion. video footage, and testimony from the victim and B, and defense counsel was permitted unfettered cross-examination of B. The defendant could not establish that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury about how to use B's identification testimony, as Gore does not require trial courts to instruct juries concerning nonpercipient witnesses. Argued February 4—officially released June 3, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her action against the defendants for damages arising from her ejection from a residence during the enforcement of a summary process execution for possession. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the trial court granted the defendants' motions to enforce the agreement, from which the plaintiff filed an amended appeal. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the defendants' motions because the draft settlement documents the defendants submitted to her did not reflect material aspects of the parties' agreement. Held: The trial court properly granted the defendants' motions to enforce the settlement agreement, as any dispute as to purported deficiencies in the draft settlement documents was immaterial to the formation of the settlement agreement, and, thus, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's action. Argued February 11—officially released June 3, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of, inter alia, murder, appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying in part his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to show that his claim involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve them in a different manner or that they were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner's second habeas counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim that the petitioner's trial counsel failed to adequately advise him regarding the state's plea offers, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the habeas court used an incorrect legal standard in its analysis of the question of whether he was prejudiced by the assumed deficient performance of trial counsel. Argued March 27—officially released June 3, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted, following a jury trial, of murder, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed count one of his petition on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Held: The habeas court improperly dismissed count one of the petition on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as the operative petition in the present case raised a legal ground for relief different from that raised in a previous petition. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333), which was issued while this appeal was pending, and which held that ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute an external, objective factor sufficient to establish good cause to excuse the late filing of a habeas petition pursuant to statute (§ 52-470), the habeas court did not apply the correct legal standard when deciding whether the petitioner had demonstrated good cause and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing at which the court must apply the proper legal standard with respect to § 52-470 (d) and (e). Argued January 6—officially released June 3, 2025

Pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 12-63c (a) and (d)), in determining the present true and actual value in any town of real property used primarily for purposes of producing rental income, the town's assessor may require the submission of certain information regarding such property ''on a form provided by the assessor'' and any property owner who fails to submit such information ''shall be subject to a penalty . . . .'' The plaintiff property owner appealed from the trial court's judgment ren- dered for the defendant town upholding a municipal tax assessment of a penalty imposed pursuant to § 12-63c (a) and (d). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly determined that the word ''provided'' in § 12-63c (a) does not require that an income and expense form actually be received by the property owner and/or its agent. Held: The trial court properly determined that the word ''provided'' in § 12-63c (a) does not require that an income and expense form actually be received by the property owner and/or its agent, as the term is plain and unambiguous and simply means to be made available, there having been no indication that it was intended to impose specific requirements on assessors with respect to how they must make the income and expense forms available to property owners, and, in light of the legislature's comprehensive statutory tax scheme, this court declined to add any such requirements onto the clear statutory language. The trial court properly determined that the mailing of the income and expense form by the defendant's assessor to the plaintiff's last known address satisfied the requirements of § 12-63c (a), as the court deemed the evidence presented regarding the plaintiff having taken reasonable measures to ensure that the assessor had an up-to-date mailing address to be uncertain and speculative, the evidence presented at trial with respect to the proce- dures that the defendant followed in sending a bulk mailing demonstrated that they were consistent with the statutory and regulatory taxing scheme, and the assessor provided the form pursuant to § 12-63c (a) by making it available to the plaintiff using the most current information that she had concerning the plaintiff's mailing address, the unambiguous language of § 12-63c having required nothing further. Argued October 7, 2024—officially released June 10, 2025

The defendant town appealed from the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff city with respect to the plaintiff's action to collect certain unpaid fees for the use of its water and sewer services. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that, in the absence of a contractual agreement, the plaintiff was authorized by statute (§§ 7-239 and 7-255) to set the rates it charged properties located in the defendant municipality for the continued use of its water and sewer services. Held: The trial court properly construed §§ 7-239 and 7-255 as authorizing the plaintiff to set just and equitable rates for the continued use of its water and sewer systems by properties located in the defendant municipality following the expiration of contracts between the parties relating to such use. The trial court properly concluded that, pursuant to statute (§§ 7-239, 7-255 and 7-258), the plaintiff was permitted to bring an action against the defen- dant to recover unpaid water and sewer service charges incurred by proper- ties within the defendant municipality because the defendant had elected to collect payment for such charges. The trial court's finding that the rates set by the plaintiff for water and sewer services were reasonable and equitable was not clearly erroneous. Argued January 8—officially released June 10, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing his action for, inter alia, breach of contract, for lack of standing. The plaintiff claimed that the court erred in concluding that, as a member of a limited liability company, A Co., he did not have derivative authority to act on behalf of L Co., a limited partnership of which A Co. was the general partner. During the pendency of this appeal, A Co. was dissolved and ceased to act as general partner for L Co., and L Co. was dissolved, and a receiver was appointed to act on L Co.'s behalf. Held: This court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal for lack of standing, as the plaintiff did not have a specific personal or legal interest in this appeal from the dismissal of his action concerning L Co.'s rights with respect to a certain mortgage refinance, A Co. and L Co. having been dissolved and a receiver having been appointed pursuant to statute (§ 52-509 (a)) for L Co., and the receiver, rather than the plaintiff, is the only person authorized pursuant to statute (§ 52-511) to act on L Co.'s behalf. Argued February 18—officially released June 10, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Held: The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction because the jury reasonably could have found, on the basis of the evidence presented and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the defendant engaged in an act of deliberate, blatant abuse that was likely to endanger the victim's physical well-being. This court dismissed as moot the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a bill of particulars, as the defendant's motions pertained solely to a count of the operative information on which the defen- dant had been acquitted. This court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a mistrial on the alternative ground that the defendant failed to establish that certain impeachment evidence was suppressed by the prosecutor in violation of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83), as the defendant failed to point to persuasive evidence that demonstrated that the prosecutor had prior knowl- edge of how the victim would testify and, even if this court assumed that the prosecutor knew prior to trial that the victim's testimony would differ from his previous statements to the police and to others, that information was elicited during the direct examination of the victim and, on the basis of the record, this court could not conclude that the defendant was preju- diced by his lack of knowledge of a portion of the victim's testimony prior to trial. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. This court could not conclude from the record that the trial court clearly abused its broad discretion in determining that a proper foundation had been established to admit into evidence certain photographs depicting the victim's injuries that were affected by lighting distortions, as the portions affected by lighting distortions were identified and the jury was instructed to disregard them. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's request to recuse himself from presiding over the case, the defendant having failed to meet his burden of establishing a factual basis that created a reasonable appearance of impropriety. Argued February 5—officially released June 10, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing its action sounding in, inter alia, tortious interference with prospective business rela- tions, following the court's grant of the defendant's special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The plaintiff, which was seeking to open a substance abuse treatment facility in Kent, where the defendant operated its own such facility, claimed that the court erroneously dismissed the action because it had established that there was probable cause that it would prevail on its claims against the defendant for the defendant's conduct in opposing the plaintiff's opening of the facility. Held: The trial court did not err in granting the defendant's special motion to dismiss, as the court properly concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish probable cause that it would prevail on its claims in light of the defendant's first amendment defense and, accordingly, the plaintiff's claims were barred by the first amendment to the United States constitution. This court concluded that the plaintiff's claim that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and should have analyzed the issue of whether the defendant's conduct was protected activity under the sham litigation exception, established by California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (404 U.S. 508), to the doctrine of immunity for petitioning activity pursuant to Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (365 U.S. 127) and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington (381 U.S. 657), was unavailing, as the record showed that the defendant had an objectively reasonable basis for challenging the plaintiff's application seeking to open a substance abuse treatment facility. Argued March 11—officially released June 10, 2025

Convicted of the crimes of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree as a result of his abuse of the minor victim, T, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly limited its disclosure of certain of T's confidential medical and mental health records and refused to conduct a second in camera review of those records in light of the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Juan A. G.-P. (346 Conn. 132). Held: The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction with respect to one count each of risk of injury to a child and fourth degree sexual assault, predicated on the defendant's conduct in touching T in her buttock area, as T's testimony at trial was consistent with her statements during her forensic interview by a clinical social worker describing how the defendant had contact with her buttock while she was asleep. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence portions of a video recording of T's forensic interview with a clinical social worker under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule in a provision (§ 8-3 (5)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, as an objective observer reasonably could conclude that T's disclosures during the inter- view, in particular her statement regarding DNA, were made, at least in part, for the purpose of receiving medical treatment and were pertinent to that end. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to release portions of T's confidential medical and mental health records or by redacting por- tions of those records it did disclose, and, in rejecting the defendant's request that it conduct a second review of those records in light of Juan A. G.-P., the court correctly concluded that Juan A. G.-P. did not alter the standard applicable to in camera review of confidential records and indicated that, in conducting its review, it had searched the records for both relevant exculpatory and inculpatory material. Argued February 11—officially released June 10, 2025

Convicted of the crimes of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a pistol, and of being a persistent felony offender, the defen- dant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had violated his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the prosecution when it allowed him to be tried and sentenced for being a persistent felony offender after he failed to appear in court for both the trial on that charge and his sentencing. Held: The trial court violated the defendant's right to be present at trial and sentencing with respect to part B of the state's substitute information, which charged the defendant with being a persistent felony offender, when the proceedings concerning that charge were conducted in the defendant's absence, as the defendant had never been notified of the contents of part B of the substitute information, and, therefore, any waiver by the defendant of the right to be present during those proceedings could not have been knowing and intelligent. Because the state failed to demonstrate that this constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this court reversed the defendant's conviction of being a persistent felony offender and remanded the case for resentencing. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had violated his right to counsel of his choice when the court denied his request for a continuance, immediately prior to the commencement of jury selection, for the purpose of replacing his court-appointed counsel with private counsel, as the defendant was afforded the opportunity to retain substitute counsel almost three years prior to the commencement of jury selection, when he first raised the issue of replacing his court-appointed counsel with the trial court, but failed to do so, and at no point did the defendant assert a substan- tial complaint concerning his court-appointed counsel's representation of him. Argued March 27—officially released June 12, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, appealed following the habeas court's granting in part of his petition for certification to appeal from the court's partial dismissal of his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Held: This court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the habeas court's partial dismissal of the habeas petition was not an appeal- able final judgment pursuant to State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27). Under Curcio, the dismissal of only a portion of the habeas petition was merely a step along the road to a final judgment on the entire habeas petition and would not result in the irreparable loss of the petitioner's appellate right to challenge the partial dismissal if he were not permitted an immedi- ate appeal. Furthermore, contrary to the petitioner's contention, he did not have a statutory (§ 52-470 (g)) right to appeal, as § 52-470 (g) creates only procedural appellate prerequisites and provides no express right to an interlocutory appeal from the partial dismissal of a habeas petition and the subsequent granting in part of a petition for certification to appeal. Argued April 28—officially released June 12, 2025

The defendant father appealed from the trial court's judgment awarding him joint legal custody of the parties' minor children and issuing certain other orders on the plaintiff mother's application for custody. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly required him to proceed with the trial in the absence of his counsel of record, who had requested and been denied a continuance. Held: This court, having determined that the defendant's unpreserved due process claim was reviewable pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), con- cluded that the trial court deprived the defendant of his procedural due process rights under the test established in Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319) by requiring him to proceed with trial in the absence of his counsel of record, and, thus, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Argued March 12—officially released June 17, 2025

The defendant, who had been on probation in connection with his convic- tions, in two separate criminal dockets, of larceny in the second degree and sexual assault in the second degree, appealed to this court from the judg- ments of the trial court revoking his probation and imposing an effective sentence of seven years of incarceration. He claimed, inter alia, that the court violated his constitutional due process right to cross-examine adverse witnesses by failing to engage in a balancing analysis pursuant to State v. Shakir (130 Conn. App. 458) before admitting certain hearsay evidence. Held: The trial court's finding that the defendant violated his probation in the sexual assault case was not based on his discharge from a certain sex offender treatment program and, thus, the defendant's claim that the court violated his constitutional right to due process by admitting certain evidence concerning his discharge from that program failed. The trial court, having properly admitted into evidence, under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay, a discharge report from a domestic violence program that the defendant was required to attend as a special condition of his probation in the larceny case was not required, under Shakir, to balance the defendant's interest in cross-examination against the state's good cause for denying the right to cross-examination prior to admitting the report into evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant's probation in each case, as the record demonstrated that the court properly considered the beneficial purposes of probation and balanced the defen- dant's interests in liberty and rehabilitation against the need to protect the public in rendering its judgments. Argued February 10—officially released June 24, 2025

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting in part her postjudgment motions for modification of alimony and for fees and costs. She claimed, inter alia, that the court failed to properly consider all of the criteria set forth in the statute (§ 46b-82) governing alimony. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting in part the plaintiff's motions to modify alimony and for fees and costs, as the court expressly stated that it considered the factors set forth in § 46b-82 and its thorough and well reasoned decision reflected that careful consideration, and, to the extent that the court did not expressly address certain factors in its memorandum of decision, it is well settled that it was not required to do so. Argued April 15—officially released June 24, 2025

The defendant property owner, against whom the plaintiff bank sought to foreclose on a judgment lien for unpaid property taxes, appealed from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure by sale following its granting of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss her special defenses and a three count counter- claim sounding in vexatious litigation. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss her coun- terclaim on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In a prior foreclosure action brought by the plaintiff, the court rendered judgment for the defendant on all counts of the complaint except the plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment for property tax payments that the plaintiff had made on the property. Held: The trial court properly dismissed the defendant's special defenses because they constituted impermissible collateral attacks on the judgment in the prior action, as each special defense sought to contest the validity and enforceability of the judgment in the prior action, a judgment which the defendant did not appeal or seek to open, and none of those special defenses established an entirely obvious lack of jurisdiction on the part of the render- ing court, such that they were not subject to dismissal. The trial court improperly concluded that the defendant's counterclaim was barred by res judicata, as a claim alleging vexatious litigation may not be brought in the same action as that which the defendant claims is vexatious, and, therefore, the defendant was required to wait until the prior action had terminated before bringing her vexatious litigation claims. The trial court improperly concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was applicable to the defendant's counterclaim, as none of the issues that the defendant sought to litigate by way of her counterclaim were determined by the court in the prior action, nor were they necessary to its decision. Argued April 23—officially released June 24, 2025

The plaintiff, who had been involuntarily civilly committed to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to statute (§ 17a-498), appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendants in her action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with her continued confinement. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Held: This court, having concluded that the plaintiff did not have a specific personal and legal interest that had been specially and injuriously affected in order to have standing to assert her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to dismiss the action. This court, having concluded that the plaintiff lacked individual standing to raise her claims in the underlying action, determined that she also lacked the requisite typicality to raise those same claims on behalf of a class as required by the rule of practice (§ 9-7) for class certification. Argued March 10—officially released July 1, 2025

Pursuant to Duperry v. Solnit (261 Conn. 309), in all cases ''in which a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and the state substantially agrees with the defendant's claim of mental disease or defect, with the result that the trial essentially is not an adversarial proceed- ing, the trial court must canvass the defendant to ensure that his plea is made voluntarily and with a full understating of its consequences.'' The petitioner, who had previously been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of mental disease or defect and committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the habeas court improperly determined that the underlying criminal proceeding was contested and adversarial in nature and, thus, he was not required to be canvassed pursuant to Duperry. Held: The habeas court did not improperly deny the habeas petition with respect to the petitioner's claim that his plea of not guilty with the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, made pursuant to statute (§ 53a-13 (a)), was not made knowingly and voluntarily because he was not canvassed pursuant to Duperry, as the evidence in the record supported the court's finding that, because the prosecutor did not substantially agree with the petitioner's affirmative defense, the underlying criminal proceedings were adversarial and contested, and, thus, a canvass pursuant to Duperry was not required. The habeas court did not improperly deny the habeas petition with respect to the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as the court correctly determined, on the basis of its assessment of the credibility of the testimony of trial counsel and the petitioner, that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to advise him properly regarding his affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, and, because this court determined that the canvass requirements of Duperry were inapplicable, his claim that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to advise him regarding those requirements necessarily failed. Argued February 19—officially released July 1, 2025

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment granting in part the peti- tioner's habeas corpus petition, in which the petitioner claimed, inter alia, that he was actually innocent of the murder of the victim. The respondent contended that the court improperly concluded that M, the petitioner's trial counsel, had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena the petitioner's brother, I, and to present I's testimony that he had committed the murder. Held: The habeas court improperly granted in part the habeas petition, as the petitioner failed to overcome the strong presumption that M's informed, strategic decision not to subpoena I or to present I's testimony was reason- able trial strategy, which the court improperly concluded amounted to defi- cient performance. At the time of trial, it was reasonable for M to have concluded that I had been uncooperative and that his testimony would be unpredictable in light of I's steadfast, pretrial reluctance to meet with and to admit to M's investiga- tors his responsibility for the crime, as well as I's failure to come forward at the petitioner's criminal trial and his avoidance in speaking about his role in the victim's murder until he was subpoenaed to testify at the habeas trial nine years later. The habeas court also failed to consider, from M's point of view, the risk that I's testimony could corroborate that of the state's witnesses identifying the petitioner as the gunman or, if confronted with videos I had made in which he confessed to the crime, that I could testify that the videos were false and had been made at the petitioner's direction, which might have undermined the central theory of the defense case, which was that the state's witnesses were not credible. Argued February 3—officially released July 1, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant, rendered following its grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's complaint alleging, inter alia, employment discrimination based on disability. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect to her claims. Held: The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant, as the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's position, at the time of her hiring, required some measure of in person work in the office, and the same evidence also established, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's proposed accommodation to work entirely from home was not reasonable because that accommodation would elimi- nate an essential job function. Argued November 12, 2024—officially released July 1, 2025

The defendant property owner appealed from the trial court's judgments of foreclosure by sale rendered for the plaintiff homeowners association in its action to foreclose water liens on two of the defendant's properties located within the community served by the plaintiff. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion by not vacating her default for failure to plead. Held: The trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff's amended complaint, which was filed after the defendant had been defaulted and which sought to foreclose on an additional three years' worth of unpaid water liens, did not make any substantial changes to the cause of action or interject new material issues into the case and, therefore, did not extinguish the defen- dant's default. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not setting aside the default for good cause shown pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 17-42) because, even if the defendant were correct that her delay in pleading did not cause prejudice to the plaintiff, her motion did not allege any facts demonstrating that good cause existed to set aside the default that she failed to address for nearly three years. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claim that the trial court improperly relied on the plaintiff's affidavit of debt in rendering the foreclosure judgments. Argued March 17—officially released July 1, 2025

Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because the state's seven month delay in executing its arrest warrant violated his right to due process. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, as the defendant failed to present the court with a sufficient factual record to demonstrate that he suffered actual, substantial prejudice as a result of the state's preaccusation delay and, thus, a violation of his right to due process.. The prosecution of the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs did not violate his prior plea agreement with the state as to a charge of interfering with an officer that arose out of the same criminal incident, the defendant having presented no evidence to establish a reasonable belief that the plea agreement had terminated all of his criminal liability flowing from his conduct during that same incident. Argued April 14—officially released July 1, 2025

The defendant town appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board reversing the decision of the administrative law judge, who had dismissed the plaintiff's claim for survivorship benefits pursuant to statute (§ 31-306) following the death of her husband, a town police officer. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the board improperly substituted its own factual findings for those of the administrative law judge. Held: The board improperly substituted its judgment on causation for that of the administrative law judge, whose factual findings were not clearly erroneous and which found support in the record, as it was not the role of the board to retry the issue of causation. The board's decision could not be affirmed on the plaintiff's alternative ground that, when the decedent suffered a physical injury responding to an apartment complex fire, it aggravated a preexisting mental health condition, which, in turn, caused him to die by suicide, as the administrative law judge, faced with conflicting evidence on the question of causation, comprehen- sively summarized the evidence presented, weighed that evidence, and made appropriate credibility determinations in making its factual findings on the essential issues in the case. Argued January 8—officially released July 15, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment of possession for the defendant tenant on count one of the seven count complaint in the plaintiff's summary process action. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court failed to render a decision with respect to the remaining counts of the complaint, which contained independent grounds for eviction. Held: This court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the trial court rendered an express judgment only as to count one of the complaint and, pursuant to Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank (328 Conn. 709), the trial court's ruling on count one did not implicitly resolve the remaining counts of the complaint, all of which alleged legally consistent theories that, if proven, would support eviction of the defendant, and, thus, the appeal was not taken from a final judgment. Argued April 15—officially released July 15, 2025

The plaintiff, who owned real property adjacent to that owned by the defen- dant A and on which the defendant M resided, appealed from the trial court's judgment, rendered in favor of the defendants, A, M, and M's business entity, E Co. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that the defendants' conduct had not created a private nuisance by unreason- ably interfering with her use and enjoyment of her property. Held: The trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to establish her claim of private nuisance was not clearly erroneous, as the court considered all relevant factors in determining that intermittent noise from vehicles at M's residence and smoke from a woodstove there, which occasionally drifted toward the plaintiff's home, did not constitute an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of her property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief as part of her claim for private enforcement of city zoning regulations against the defendants, the court having found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a sufficient causal connection between her claims of harm and the defendants' conduct. Argued November 14, 2024—officially released July 15, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing his civil action against the defendants, employees of the Department of Correction, following the court's grant of their motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and was frivolous pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 1-25). Held: This court affirmed the trial court's judgment, as it was unable to undertake appellate review of any claim of error due to the inadequacy of the plaintiff's briefs, which were incomprehensible. Argued April 23—officially released July 15, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing his civil action against the defendants, assistant state's attorneys, who had success- fully prosecuted him. In the underlying action, the plaintiff had sought damages from the defendants related to their use of his cell phone records in connection with his criminal trial. Held: This court affirmed the trial court's judgment, as the deficiencies in the plaintiff's briefs left this court unable to undertake any appellate review of any claim. Argued April 23—officially released July 15, 2025

The defendant acquittee, who previously had been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of mental disease or defect and who had been committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the state's petition to extend his commit- ment to the board pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593 (c)). He claimed that the court improperly determined that the state met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that, after having served his maximum term of commitment, his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or oth- ers. Held: The trial court improperly granted the state's petition to continue the defen- dant's commitment, as the state did not meet its burden of proving that the defendant's discharge would constitute an imminent danger to himself or others, and, thus, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and directed that court to deny the state's petition. Argued March 12—officially released July 22, 2025

The plaintiff property owners appealed from the trial court's judgment defin- ing the scope and location of an easement that granted the abutting defendant property owner right-of-way access across the plaintiffs' property to the beach and waters of Long Island Sound. The plaintiffs claim, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that the warranty deed at issue clearly and unambiguously reserved a general beach easement for the defendant's use of the plaintiffs' property above the mean high water line. Held: The trial court erred in concluding that the easement language in the war- ranty deed was clear and unambiguous, as the definition of ''beach'' in our case law is not consistent and both parties' interpretations of the term ''beach'' were reasonable, and, therefore, the language in the deed was ambiguous as to the easement's location and scope. The trial court erred in making findings on the basis of claims that the defendant had withdrawn prior to trial, as the language of the parties' stipulation clearly expressed an intent to abandon their respective claims that the other party engaged in conduct that exceeded the scope of the easement or impeded the defendant's use of the easement, leaving only the scope and location of the easement as the sole issue to be adjudicated, and it was improper for the court to have ruled on issues beyond that. Argued January 7—officially released July 22, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant attorney's second motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's complaint alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Held: The trial court properly granted the defendant's second motion for summary judgment, as the defendant made a showing, by way of the plaintiff's deposi- tion testimony in which he stated multiple times that the defendant was not his attorney, that there was a lack of a genuine issue of material fact as to the nonexistence of an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, which vitiated every claim in the operative complaint, and the plaintiff subsequently failed to satisfy his burden of presenting evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, thereby entitling the defendant to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court properly considered the defendant's second motion for sum- mary judgment because it was not barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel, as the court's denial of the defendant's first motion for summary judgment was not a final judgment, the defendant was not otherwise precluded from filing his second motion, and it was within the trial court's discretion to consider the renewed motion for summary judg- ment that had previously been denied where additional or new evidence had been submitted that was not before the court in ruling upon the earlier motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not improperly fail to enter a default judgment against the defendant for filing his second motion for summary judgment in an untimely manner in violation of the order of pleadings set forth in the rule of practice (§ 10-6), as the defendant's filing of his second motion for summary judgment, which was not a pleading, was not procedurally untimely pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 17-44) because no scheduling order existed at that time and the case was not assigned for trial at the time that that motion was filed. Argued April 22—officially released July 22, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her quo warranto action challenging the qualifications of the defendant law firm and the defendant attorney to serve as corporation counsel for the defendant city. She claimed, inter alia, that the dismissal was a disproportionate sanc- tion for her failure to appear at the trial management conference. Held: This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the sanction of dis- missal was a disproportionately harsh sanction for her failure to attend the trial management conference, as the claim was inadequately briefed. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding facts to conclude that a default existed or should have entered was unavailing, as the court did not make any factual findings as to the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action but, rather, entered a disciplinary dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to appear at the trial management conference. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court denied her procedural and substantive due process in dismissing her action without a hearing and notice pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 14-3) was misplaced, as the court entered a disciplinary dismissal for her failure to appear at the trial management conference, not for a failure to prosecute her action pursuant to Practice Book § 14-3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, in which she claimed that COVID-19 symptoms excused her failure to appear at the trial management conference, as the court correctly determined that a motion for reconsideration was not the appro- priate vehicle because the plaintiff did not assert a misapprehension of the law or a misapprehension of the facts underlying the court's dismissal, and her argument setting forth new facts to excuse her failure to appear should have been raised in a motion to open pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 17-43). Argued May 29—officially released July 22, 2025

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy. The defendant claimed that the court improperly granted the application and ordered that the plaintiff could attach, garnish or encumber any of her real or personal property to a certain value because it failed to consider and apply the statutory homestead exemption (§ 52-352b (21)). Held: This court declined to reach the merits of the defendant's claim regarding the homestead exemption, as the claim was raised for the first time in the defendant's posthearing brief and was not properly preserved for appellate review, and, because no evidence was offered regarding the fair market value of the defendant's home and the court did not make any such finding, the record was inadequate for review. Argued April 23—officially released July 22, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of, inter alia, felony murder, appealed following the denial of his petition to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to show that his claim involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve them in a different manner or that they were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner did not meet his burden of demonstrating that his habeas counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim that his criminal trial counsel provided constitutionally inadequate advice on a pretrial plea offer, as the court's finding that there was not a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have accepted the pretrial plea offer but for the deficient performance of his criminal trial counsel was not clearly erroneous and, thus, the petitioner could not establish prejudice resulting from any deficiency in the advice provided by his criminal trial counsel on that plea offer. Argued February 5—officially released July 22, 2025

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant rental car company's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' com- plaint alleging, inter alia, negligent entrustment. N, whose driver's license was subject to an ignition interlock device restriction, rented a motor vehicle from the defendant and, later that same day, while driving the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, struck the plaintiff L, a pedestrian. The plaintiffs claimed that the court improperly concluded that the defendant did not have a duty to determine whether N's driver's license was subject to restrictions before renting him a vehicle. Held: The trial court properly determined that the defendant did not have a duty pursuant to the statute (§ 14-153) governing the renting of motor vehicles to use an online database to confirm whether N's license was subject to any restrictions, as the plain language and legislative history of § 14-153 indicated that the defendant was required only to inspect N's physical driver's license card to confirm that it was facially valid and unexpired. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judg- ment, as the defendant's employee who rented the motor vehicle to N submitted an affidavit in which he averred that, before renting the vehicle, he had inspected N's driver's license and confirmed that it was facially valid and unexpired, and, because the plaintiffs did not present any evidence to the contrary regarding that issue of fact in opposing summary judgment, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant fulfilled its duties pursuant to § 14-153. This court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the defen- dant did not have an affirmative common-law duty to inspect N's driver's license using an online database in the absence of readily apparent facts providing a reason to suspect that a prospective renter has any limitation on his ability to drive, and, thus, no genuine issues of material fact existed and the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claims. Argued March 26—officially released July 22, 2025

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted, following a jury trial, of, inter alia, murder, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that his criminal trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not retaining a crime scene reconstruction expert. Held: The habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice pursuant to Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668), as this court's review of the record led it to conclude that any purported error by criminal trial counsel in failing to retain a crime scene reconstruction expert did not establish a reasonable probability that the result of the petitioner's criminal trial would have been different and, thus, the petitioner's ineffective assis- tance of counsel claim against his criminal trial counsel necessarily failed. As the habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner's criminal trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to retain a crime scene reconstruction expert, the petitioner's claim that his counsel in his first habeas action rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the effectiveness of the petitioner's criminal trial counsel on that same claim necessarily failed. Argued April 21—officially released July 22, 2025