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Fredo v. Fredo
THOMAS FREDO v. KRISTIN FREDO
(AC 46803)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Moll, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved, appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant’s
motion for contempt with respect to the plaintiff’s failure to transfer two
lots of real property, one to the defendant and one to a trust for the benefit
of the parties’ children, pursuant to court orders. The plaintiff claimed, inter
alia, that the defendant did not have standing to assert a claim regarding
the lot that he was supposed to transfer to a trust for the benefit of their
children. Held:
The trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant with respect
to her claim regarding the lot that was supposed to be transferred to a trust
for the benefit of the parties’ children, as the defendant failed to demonstrate
a direct or personal interest in the lot or a direct injury she had suffered
as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to transfer that lot and, accordingly, the
defendant lacked standing to assert a claim as to that lot.
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred
in finding him in contempt because his failure to transfer the lots was not
wilful, as the plaintiff failed to provide this court with a transcript of the
contempt hearing and, thus, the record was inadequate for review.
The trial court’s monetary award to the defendant, following its finding of
contempt, did not constitute an impermissible modification of a property
settlement, as the award was not in response to a motion that sought
modification of the court’s orders but, rather, a motion for contempt that
sought to effectuate those orders by transfer of the lots at issue and, because
the court could not effectuate its prior orders or make the defendant whole
by ordering the transfer of the lots due to the plaintiff’s delay in complying
with those orders, the monetary award was necessary to vindicate the court’s
prior orders.
This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court’s
monetary award to the defendant for lost financial opportunities resulting
from the plaintiff’s failure to transfer the lots was not supported by the
evidence, as the plaintiff failed to provide this court with the entire trial
court record, without which this court would be left to speculate as to the
basis of the trial court’s award.
Argued April 30—officially released July 29, 2025
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Fredo v. Fredo
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Gruendel, J., rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting
certain other relief in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement; thereafter, the court, Alfano, J.,
granted the defendant’s motion for contempt and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Vacated in part; judgment
directed.
C. Michael Budlong, for the appellant (plaintiff).
John C. Lewis III, with whom, on the brief, was
Mario Cerame, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
CRADLE, C. J. In this postjudgment marital dissolution matter, the plaintiff, Thomas Fredo, appeals from
the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for
contempt filed by the defendant, Kristin Fredo, alleging
that the plaintiff wilfully violated unambiguous court
orders to transfer two lots of real property, one to her
and another to a trust for the benefit of the parties’
children. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the
defendant did not have standing to assert a claim regarding the lot that he was supposed to transfer to a trust
for the benefit of their children; (2) the court erred in
finding him in contempt; (3) the court’s monetary award
to the defendant constituted an impermissible postjudgment modification of the parties’ property settlement;
and (4) there was no evidentiary basis for the court’s
award to the defendant of compensation for lost financial benefits stemming from the plaintiff’s failure to
transfer the lots.1 We agree with the plaintiff’s claim
1
We address the plaintiff’s claims in a different order than they are set
forth in his appellate brief.
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Fredo v. Fredo
that the defendant lacked standing to assert a claim as
to the lot that was supposed to be transferred into a
trust for the benefit of the parties’ children and vacate
the portion of the judgment related to that lot. We affirm
the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts
and procedural history. The parties married on July 17,
1993. They have three children of the marriage: a son
born in January, 1994; a daughter born in October, 1995;
and a daughter born in February, 1998. In July, 2004, the
plaintiff filed the underlying complaint for dissolution
of marriage. On November 24, 2004, the court rendered
judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. The judgment incorporated by reference the terms of a separation agreement that the parties had entered into on the
same date. The separation agreement provided, inter
alia, that the plaintiff was entitled to several family
businesses free from any claims of the defendant. One
of those businesses owned real property in North
Granby that it planned to subdivide. In consideration
of the defendant relinquishing any claims that she had
to those businesses, the agreement provided that, upon
obtaining approval for the subdivision of the North
Granby property, as well as zoning approval, the plaintiff was required to transfer one lot from the subdivision
to the defendant and another lot from the subdivision
to a trust for the benefit of the parties’ children to be
used for the children’s post high school education, of
which the plaintiff would be the trustee.
On January 27, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for
contempt alleging that the plaintiff wilfully violated the
dissolution judgment in that he had failed to convey to
her and failed to convey into a trust, for the benefit of
the parties’ children, the subdivision lots. Following a
two day hearing, the court, Hon. John R. Caruso, judge
trial referee, issued a memorandum of decision in which
it declined to find the plaintiff in contempt but ordered
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Fredo v. Fredo
that he transfer the lots within thirty days. The plaintiff
filed an appeal of that decision, which he withdrew
after the parties entered a stipulation dated October 7,
2010 (2010 stipulation), whereby they agreed, inter alia,
that the defendant would release the lis pendens she
had filed on the land records in the town of Granby
as to all but lots 512 and 615 of the subdivision. The
stipulation further provided: ‘‘In satisfaction of his obligation contemplated in [the dissolution judgment], the
[p]laintiff shall, in his discretion, transfer either Lot 615
or Lot 512 to the [d]efendant as soon as the existing
development mortgage to Windsor Federal Savings
Bank . . . has been satisfied . . . . The [p]laintiff
shall transfer Lot 616 to the trust contemplated in [the
dissolution judgment]. Such transfer shall take place
as soon as the existing mortgage referred to above has
been satisfied.’’
On March 12, 2021, the defendant filed a motion for
contempt alleging that the plaintiff violated the dissolution judgment and the 2010 stipulation in that he failed
to transfer the subdivision lots to her or to create a
trust and transfer a lot to that trust for the benefit
of their children. On December 30, 2022, following an
evidentiary hearing, the court, Alfano, J., issued a written order finding that the plaintiff wilfully had violated
the orders that he transfer the lots at issue. The court
reasoned: ‘‘The court finds that the plaintiff had the
legal authority to transfer the lots to the defendant.
Moreover, he did so with the specific knowledge and
agreement of his business partner in the property. . . .
‘‘The plaintiff acknowledges that the lots discussed
in the [2010 stipulation] have not been transferred to
the defendant. He explained that he does not want to
and does not think he currently can transfer one or
more of these lots to the defendant but that he does
want to make her whole in some way. . . .
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Fredo v. Fredo
‘‘The subdivision approval for [the North Granby
property] is currently expired. It expired on July 26,
2019. . . . [U]pon the expiration date, the subdivided
lots . . . effectively merged into a singular parcel.
Thus, the remaining unsold ‘500’ lots merged into a
singular land parcel, now approximately 8.5 acres in
size, and the remaining unsold ‘600’ lots merged into a
singular land parcel of approximately fifteen acres in
size. The plaintiff and [his business partner] are currently, through their company . . . in the process of
working to obtain subdivision approval for the property
again. However, right now, the land previously demarcated into individual lots cannot be transferred as individual lots. . . .
‘‘The plaintiff acknowledged that he should have
transferred the lots outlined in the [2010] stipulation to
the defendant after fully satisfying the mortgage [which
was paid off in full on April 19, 2016]. The conditions
outlined in the [2010] stipulation for the transference
of the lots existed from the date of the mortgage release
in April of 2016 until the expiration of the subdivision’s
approval in 2019. Yet, the lots were not transferred
during that time period by the plaintiff to the defendant.
The plaintiff testified that he thinks he has met his
obligations in supporting his children. It appears he was
suggesting that the transference of the lot designated
to be for the benefit of the children might therefore be
moot as he has satisfied his obligation in another way.
The court does not agree as neither the 2004 [dissolution] judgment nor the 2010 stipulation contemplate
that the plaintiff could satisfy his lot obligation relative
to the children in another way. . . .
‘‘The court has been presented with clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff wilfully violated a
clear and unambiguous court order.’’
Having found the plaintiff in contempt, the court then
faced the task of fashioning a remedy for that contempt.
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Fredo v. Fredo
The court explained: ‘‘The current status of the [subdivision] properties leaves the path to rectifying the plaintiff’s contempt less clear. . . .
‘‘While the plaintiff currently has control of open land
in the [North Granby] property expanse, which was
previously designated to be the lots in question, the
specific lots do not currently exist. They may be reapproved as subdivision lots within the next number of
months. They may not. Currently, the identified lots are
merged with others into a larger parcel of land.2 In
addition, even assuming the subdivision approval is
reinstated, thereby effectively making the lots in question discrete ‘lots’ again, there remains the question of
their alienability and accessibility because of the lack
of required public improvements. Specifically, there is
no approved, existing road accessing at least one of
the preexisting lots. The court is concerned about
awarding a potential, rather than an immediate and
tangible, award to the defendant. . . .
‘‘Testimony and evidence was presented to the court
of the value of four lots in 2021 similarly situated to
the lots at issue in this case. The fair market value for
the lots at that time was approximately $50,000 per lot.
No evidence was presented regarding the value of the
lots at the time of the dissolution in 2004, or at the time
of the [2010] stipulation . . . or at the time that the
2
The court noted: ‘‘The defendant’s perspective is that this agreement
regarding the lots has been in place since 2010 and the plaintiff has thus
had at least nine years to effectuate the contemplated transfer. The defendant
argues that the two merged parcels of land which have now subsumed the
lots at issue (Lots 512 or 615; Lot 616) should now be transferred to the
defendant in satisfaction of the terms of the [2010 stipulation]. The defendant
points out that these larger, merged lots are alienable and without restriction
as to conveyance at this time. While the expert testimony supports this
position, the two merged lots are also significantly greater in size and more
valuable than the lots initially designated to be transferred to the defendant.
The previously existing Lot 512 was approximately 2.5 acres, Lot 615 approximately 1.3 acres and Lot 616 approximately 1.8 acres.’’
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Fredo v. Fredo
mortgage was fully satisfied in 2016. It is clear to the
court that regardless of the market value of the lots,
the defendant has also lost out on any potential financial
benefit of being an owner of the two lots in question
for the past six years. . . .
‘‘Under these facts and circumstances, the court must
fashion an equitable remedy to compensate the defendant for the plaintiff’s contempt of the court order and
the current impracticability of specific performance of
the terms of the [2010 stipulation].’’ (Footnote added.)
On the basis of the foregoing, the court ordered, inter
alia: ‘‘The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum
of $125,000 as follows: $50,000 no later than April 1,
2023; $50,000 no later than June 30, 2023; and $25,000
no later than September 30, 2023. . . . This judgment
shall be in full satisfaction of the terms in the initial
2004 [dissolution] judgment and the 2010 stipulation
related to the properties in question.’’
The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration or reargument on the ground that his noncompliance with the 2010 stipulation was not wilful because
compliance was impossible or impracticable ‘‘due to
certain town of Granby regulations.’’ The plaintiff further argued that the defendant did not have standing
to assert any claim regarding the lot that was supposed
to be transferred into a trust for the benefit of the
parties’ children, who had all reached the age of majority. On that basis, the plaintiff claimed that the court
improperly compensated the defendant for two lots
instead of one.3 The court denied the plaintiff’s motion
3
The plaintiff stated: ‘‘With regard to this issue, the plaintiff is not
requesting reconsideration and/or reargument with regard to the court’s
valuation of the lots, nor with the court’s decision to order him to make
the defendant whole via payment; instead, the plaintiff’s contention is that
but only for a misapprehension of the facts could the court have fashioned
its order compensating the defendant for two lots when, pursuant to the
2010 [stipulation] and the court order approving such, the defendant only
has an interest in one.’’
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Fredo v. Fredo
as to its finding of contempt but held an evidentiary
hearing limited to the issue of whether the lot that was
supposed to be transferred into a trust for the benefit
of the parties’ children ‘‘was properly made part of
the court’s award in its decision on the motion for
contempt.’’
Following an evidentiary hearing on the plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration, the court issued an order
denying ‘‘the plaintiff’s requested relief of removing the
second lot from the court’s December 30, 2022 order
. . . .’’ The court recounted: ‘‘The plaintiff testified that
his understanding of the language in the parties’ underlying agreements was that a trust was to be established
for the children for which he would be the trustee and
that trust was to own one of the subdivision lots. From
his perspective, the purpose of that trust was to fulfill
his obligation to support the children in college. The
plaintiff believes that he has met this obligation to his
children, thus obviating the purpose of the trust. . . .
‘‘No language in the parties’ 2004 [dissolution judgment] or their subsequent 2010 stipulation specifically
mentions an educational support order. The plaintiff
argues that, although the underlying [dissolution judgment] and the [2010] stipulation may not be well drafted,
it was the parties’ intent that the second lot to be held
in a trust was to pay for college. In fact, the plaintiff
never established the trust. He testified that he spoke
with counsel about it and realized it was a contractual
obligation. However, he unilaterally decided not to
establish the trust and to take care of his view of the
trust’s obligations in a different fashion. . . .
‘‘The defendant’s position is that the plaintiff had a
legal obligation under both the 2004 [dissolution judgment] and the 2010 [stipulation] to convey two lots. In
agreeing to the terms of those agreements, she factored
in the lot that would be put in trust for the benefit of
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Fredo v. Fredo
the children. It was a bargained for point. Arguably,
the defendant therefore forfeited some other potential
financial benefit in securing that transfer for the benefit
of the children. She contracted for that conveyance to
occur, and it never has. Not only did the conveyance
of the lot for the benefit of the children never occur,
the underlying condition of the plaintiff setting up a
trust never occurred. This court cannot look into the
parties’ states of mind when the agreement was initially
made nineteen years ago and then reiterated thirteen
years ago and analyze what they were thinking and
intending. As the plaintiff’s counsel said at the hearing,
unfortunately, it is not a well drafted contract with
respect to the issue at hand. However, the parties were
both represented by counsel and reached the agreement
as written. It would be inequitable for this court to now
undermine the parties’ agreement so many years ago
to find that what was written was not really what they
were thinking or what was meant. It would further be
inequitable to deny one of the parties their bargained
for rights under the agreements. Although the second
lot in question was designated as being held in trust
for the children, the children are not and have never
been a party to the contract.’’
The court further stated that it ‘‘does not find that
the plaintiff was attempting to shirk responsibility for
funding his children’s higher educations. However, the
court cannot help but find that he failed to meet his
contractual obligations of both setting up the trust for
the children and conveying a lot to the trust for their
benefit. The plaintiff has consistently treated the lot
which was to be placed in trust for the benefit of his
children as his own asset. His obligation to perform
these two actions was something that the [defendant]
bargained and gave consideration for, and which did
not occur. Transferring the value of the lot that was to
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Fredo v. Fredo
be held in trust to the defendant enables her to distribute that value to the intended beneficiaries, if she sees
that as appropriate.’’ This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the defendant lacked
standing to assert a claim related to the order requiring
the transfer of a lot into a trust for the benefit of the
parties’ children. We agree.
‘‘Standing . . . is a practical concept designed to
ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits
brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that
judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others
are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and
vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are
ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant
makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered
or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative
capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of
concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . .
Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is
consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the cause. . . . The general rule is that one
party has no standing to raise another’s rights. . . .
When standing is put in issue, the question is whether
the person whose standing is challenged is a proper
party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . .
[Standing is] ordinarily held to have been met when a
complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury
he . . . is likely to suffer . . . .’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Freccia v. Freccia,
232 Conn. App. 353, 368–69, A.3d , cert. denied,
352 Conn. 957, A.3d (2025), and cert. granted,
352 Conn. 957, A.3d (2025), and cert. denied,
352 Conn. 958, A.3d (2025). ‘‘The [movant] bears
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Fredo v. Fredo
the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Emerick v. Glastonbury, 145 Conn. App. 122,
128,
74 A.3d 512 (2013), cert. denied,
311 Conn. 901,
83
A.3d 348 (2014).
The defendant contends that she has standing to pursue a claim to the lot that was supposed to be transferred into a trust for the benefit of the parties’ children
because she was a party to the separation agreement,
which provided for the transfer, and that she gave up
any interest in the plaintiff’s businesses in consideration
for the transfer of the two lots. This court considered
a similar situation in Hamburg v. Hamburg, 182 Conn.
App. 332,
193 A.3d 51, cert. denied,
330 Conn. 916,
193
A.3d 1211 (2018). In Hamburg, the parties had entered
into a separation agreement, which was incorporated
into the judgment of dissolution, that provided that their
children were to be the beneficiaries of certain financial
accounts intended to fund their private school and college educations.4 Id., 335. The defendant father withdrew funds from those accounts for his own use and
failed to repay them. Id., 336. The defendant’s failure
to repay those funds resulted in various findings of
contempt and orders providing for repayment. Id., 336–
40. In 2015, the substitute plaintiff, the temporary
administrator of the estate of the plaintiff, filed an application for order to show cause why an order should not
enter that the defendant, inter alia, commence making
payments on the debt owed to the children resulting
from the defendant’s failure to repay the funds that he
had withdrawn from the children’s education funds.
Id., 340. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
4
Specifically, ‘‘the [plaintiff] and the defendant agreed that each of them
‘shall maintain any and all custodial accounts held in his or her individual
name for the benefit of the children. Said accounts shall be used only for
the educational expenses of the children . . . .’ ’’ Hamburg v. Hamburg,
supra,182 Conn. App. 335 n.1.
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Fredo v. Fredo
substitute plaintiff’s application for order to show
cause, arguing that the substitute plaintiff was neither
classically nor statutorily aggrieved by the debt he owes
the children, and, therefore, that he lacked standing to
pursue any claim related to it. Id., 340–41. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, and the defendant
appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court ‘‘erroneously concluded that the substitute plaintiff has
standing to prosecute an action for repayment of the
funds he took from the children’s education accounts.’’
Id., 345.
This court agreed with the defendant, reasoning that
‘‘[t]he substitute plaintiff has not directed us to any
evidence presented at the time the court ruled on the
motion to dismiss that would demonstrate a personal
and direct interest in the moneys the defendant owes
the children, and our review of the record did not disclose any such evidence. The substitute plaintiff also
does not claim that he has a fiduciary relationship with
the children. . . . More importantly, however, the
court made no factual finding that the substitute plaintiff has a direct and personal interest in those moneys
or the right to collect the funds on behalf of the children,
unlike a direct interest in the money the defendant
owed the [plaintiff]. The substitute plaintiff, therefore,
failed to carry his burden to demonstrate standing with
respect to the moneys the defendant owes his children.’’5 Id., 349–50.
5
We note that this court also affirmed the judgment of the court granting
the motion to intervene filed by one of the children. The court held that
‘‘[t]he substitute plaintiff has no fiduciary relationship with the children and,
therefore, cannot adequately represent them. Because [the parties’ daughter]
has a direct and personal interest in having the defendant reimburse the
education funds, she has carried her burden and the court properly granted
her motion to intervene.’’ Hamburg v. Hamburg, supra,182 Conn. App. 352.
The court held that ‘‘[n]o other party has standing to pursue repayment
from the defendant of the funds he took from the accounts for his own
use.’’ Id.
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Fredo v. Fredo
As in Hamburg, the defendant here has not demonstrated a direct or personal interest in the lot that was
ordered to be transferred into a trust for the benefit of
the parties’ children.6 Although the defendant may have
been the party who entered into the agreement that
provided for the transfer of that lot, she has not demonstrated, or even claimed, a direct injury that she has
suffered as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to transfer
it. We therefore conclude that the defendant lacked
standing to assert the claim as to the lot that was supposed to be transferred into a trust for the benefit of
the parties’ children. Accordingly, the judgment of contempt related to that lot and the associated award of
damages must be vacated.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court erred in finding him in contempt because his failure to transfer the
lots was not wilful.7
‘‘To constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party
has merely violated a court order; the violation must
be wilful. . . . It is the burden of the party seeking an
order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the
alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful
noncompliance with that directive.’’ (Internal quotation
6
The plaintiff also argues that any claim related to the lot that was to be
transferred to the children is moot because the trust was intended to finance
the children’s college educations and he paid for their education by other
means. Because we conclude that the defendant did not have standing to
assert the claim as to the lot that was to be transferred into a trust for
the benefit of the parties’ children, we need not address the plaintiff’s
mootness claim.
7
The plaintiff also claims that the dissolution judgment was ambiguous.
This claim was not raised before the trial court and therefore is not preserved
for our review. Even if we were to review and agree with the plaintiff’s
claim that the 2004 dissolution judgment was ambiguous, he has failed to
claim any ambiguity as to the 2010 stipulation, which also required him to
transfer the lots at issue.
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Fredo v. Fredo
marks omitted.) Jacob-Dick v. Dick, 231 Conn. App.
404, 411,
333 A.3d 210 (2025). ‘‘Whether a party’s violation was wilful depends on the circumstances of the
particular case and, ultimately, is a factual question
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Hall, 335
Conn. 377, 392,
238 A.3d 687 (2020). We review the
factual findings that underlie a court’s contempt determination pursuant to the clearly erroneous standard.
See Talbot v. Talbot, 148 Conn. App. 279, 289,
85 A.3d
40, cert. denied,
311 Conn. 954,
97 A.3d 984 (2014).
The resolution of the plaintiff’s claim requires us to
examine the evidentiary basis for the court’s finding of
wilfulness. We are, however, unable to do so because
the plaintiff has failed to provide to this court the transcript of the contempt hearing.8 Practice Book § 61-10
(a) provides: ‘‘It is the responsibility of the appellant
to provide an adequate record for review. The appellant
shall determine whether the entire record is complete,
correct and otherwise perfected for presentation on
appeal.’’ It is well settled that ‘‘[t]he absence of such a
record is an insurmountable obstacle to review of the
claims of error in the circumstances of this case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Manzi v. Manzi, 134
Conn. App. 333, 336,
38 A.3d 1247 (2012). ‘‘The general
purpose of [the relevant] rules of practice . . . [requiring the appellant to provide a sufficient record] is to
ensure that there is a trial court record that is adequate
for an informed appellate review of the various claims
presented by the parties. . . . This court also has
explained that [a]n appellate tribunal cannot render a
8
The plaintiff provided only the transcript of the June 7, 2023 hearing on
his motion for reconsideration. As noted herein, that hearing concerned
only whether the lot that was supposed to have been transferred to a trust
for the children should have been included in the court’s earlier decision
on the defendant’s motion for contempt. The defendant provided in the
appendix to her brief a portion of the transcript of the contempt hearing,
but not the transcript of the entire hearing.
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Fredo v. Fredo
decision without first fully understanding the disposition being appealed. . . . Our role is not to guess at
possibilities, but to review claims based on a complete
factual record . . . . Without the necessary factual
and legal conclusions . . . any decision made by us
respecting [the claims raised on appeal] would be
entirely speculative.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R & P Realty Co. v. Peerless Indemnity Ins. Co., 193 Conn. App. 374, 379,
219 A.3d 429
(2019).
Without the transcript of the contempt hearing, we
cannot review the entirety of the evidentiary record
upon which the court based its finding of wilfulness.
We therefore decline to review the plaintiff’s challenge
to the court’s contempt determination.
III
The plaintiff next claims that the court’s monetary
award to the defendant constituted an impermissible
modification of a property settlement. We disagree.
It is well settled that ‘‘[t]he court’s authority to transfer property appurtenant to a dissolution proceeding
rests on [General Statutes] § 46b-81. . . . Accordingly,
the court’s authority to divide the personal property of
the parties, pursuant to § 46b-81, must be exercised, if
at all, at the time that it renders judgment dissolving
the marriage. . . . A court, therefore, does not have
the authority to modify the division of property once
the dissolution becomes final. . . .
‘‘Although the court does not have the authority to
modify a property assignment, a court, after distributing
property, which includes assigning the debts and liabilities of the parties, does have the authority to issue
postjudgment orders effectuating its judgment. . . .
[I]t is . . . within the equitable powers of the trial court
to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the
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Fredo v. Fredo
integrity of [its original] judgment. . . . This court has
explained the difference between postjudgment orders
that modify a judgment rather than effectuate it. A modification is [a] change; an alteration or amendment which
introduces new elements into the details, or cancels
some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect
of the subject-matter intact. . . . In contrast, an order
effectuating an existing judgment allows the court to
protect the integrity of its original ruling by ensuring
the parties’ timely compliance therewith. . . .
‘‘If a party’s motion can fairly be construed as seeking
an effectuation of the judgment rather than a modification of the terms of the property settlement, this court
must favor that interpretation. . . . Similarly, when
determining whether the new order is a modification,
we examine the practical effect of the ruling on the
original order. . . . In order to determine the practical
effect of the court’s order on the original judgment, we
must examine the terms of the original judgment as
well as the subsequent order. [T]he construction of [an
order or] judgment is a question of law for the court
. . . [and] our review . . . is plenary. As a general rule,
[orders and] judgments are to be construed in the same
fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered
from all parts of the [order or] judgment. . . . The
interpretation of [an order or] judgment may involve
the circumstances surrounding [its] making. . . .
Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied
as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The [order
or] judgment should admit of a consistent construction
as a whole. . . .
‘‘Relatedly, [f]aced with a party in contempt of court,
it is within the court’s province to fashion appropriate
remedial orders. Courts have in general the power to
fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a
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Fredo v. Fredo
prior . . . judgment. . . . Having found noncompliance, the court, in the exercise of its equitable powers,
necessarily ha[s] the authority to fashion whatever
orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Walzer v. Walzer, 209 Conn. App. 604,
615–16, 268 A.3d 1187, cert. denied,
342 Conn. 907,
270
A.3d 693 (2022).
‘‘It is well established that, [i]n a contempt proceeding
. . . a trial court has broad discretion to make whole
a party who has suffered as a result of another party’s
failure to comply with the court order.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scott v. Scott, 215 Conn. App. 24,
50–51, 282 A.3d 470 (2022).
Here, the court’s monetary award to the defendant
was not in response to a motion that sought modification of the court’s orders, but, rather, a motion for
contempt that sought to effectuate those orders by
transfer of the lots at issue. As the court noted in its
decision, it could not effectuate its prior orders or make
the defendant whole by ordering the transfer of the lots
because,9 due to the plaintiff’s delay in complying with
those orders, the subdivision approval had expired, and
the individual lots no longer existed as subdivided lots.
The monetary award was necessary to vindicate the
court’s prior orders. We therefore reject the plaintiff’s
claim that it constituted an impermissible modification
of the parties’ property settlement.
IV
The plaintiff finally claims that the court’s award of
$25,000 to the defendant for lost financial opportunities
resulting from the plaintiff’s failure to transfer the lots
was not supported by the evidence.
9
Indeed, as noted in footnote 3 of this opinion, the plaintiff expressly
indicated that he was not asking the court to reconsider its decision ‘‘to
make the defendant whole via payment . . . .’’
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Fredo v. Fredo
It is axiomatic that ‘‘[d]amages are recoverable only
to the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis
for estimating their amount in money with reasonable
certainty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Argentinis v. Fortuna, 134 Conn. App. 538, 548,
39 A.3d 1207
(2012). Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim challenging the
evidentiary basis for the court’s award requires us to
review the evidence that was before the court. As noted
herein, however, the plaintiff has failed to provide us
with the entire trial court record, without which we
would be left to speculate as to the basis of the court’s
award. We decline to do so.10
The judgment is vacated as to the finding of contempt
related to the subdivision lot that was ordered to be
transferred into a trust for the benefit of the parties’
children and as to the award of damages to the defendant with respect to that lot; the judgment is affirmed
in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
10
At oral argument before this court, counsel for the plaintiff also argued
that the court’s award of damages for the loss of financial opportunities
was improper because the defendant did not allege such a loss in her motion
for contempt. Because the plaintiff did not brief this claim, it is not properly
before us.
