Volume 234 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The defendants appealed from the trial court's judgment admitting to probate the purported will of the decedent, which named the plaintiffs as executors of the decedent's estate. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied their motion to dismiss the action on timeliness grounds because the action, which had been brought by the plaintiffs as an appeal from a decree of the Probate Court pursuant to statute (§ 45a-186 (b)) was not filed within thirty days. Held: The trial court improperly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, as the plaintiffs failed to file their appeal of the Probate Court's decree within the thirty day appeal period set forth in § 45a-186 (b), and the plaintiffs' claim that the appeal period ran from the date the Probate Court issued a second decree was unavailing, as that decree, which merely added a statutory reference and elaborated on the factual findings made in the first decree, was issued pursuant to the Probate Court's inherent power to correct its records and was not a modification of the first decree, and, thus, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Argued March 12—officially released July 29, 2025

The plaintiff landlord appealed from the trial court's judgment with respect to its award of attorney's fees and costs to the defendant tenant on the count of his counterclaim alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) in connection with the plaintiff's handling of his security deposit. The plaintiff claimed that the court improp- erly awarded the defendant attorney's fees and costs for matters not author- ized under CUTPA. Held: The trial court abused its discretion in calculating the amount of attorney's fees and costs the defendant was entitled to recover, as pursuant to the statute (§ 42-110g (d)) providing for an award of attorney's fees and costs under CUTPA, such fees and costs are limited to work reasonably performed by an attorney related to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim and, on review of the defendant's affidavit, his request for attorney's fees included fees for matters unrelated thereto. Argued April 16—officially released July 29, 2025

The defendant contractor appealed from the judgment of the trial court discharging a mechanic's lien that the defendant had placed on certain real property owned by the plaintiffs. The defendant claimed that the court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant by requiring it to prove that it did not breach a contract entered into between the parties, rather than requiring it to prove only that there was probable cause to sustain its lien. Held: This court concluded that, although the trial court articulated the correct burdens of proof delineated in the statute (§ 49-35b) governing the hearing on the plaintiffs' application for the discharge of the mechanic's lien, the trial court's determinations rested on legally erroneous grounds, as the trial court incorrectly determined that its finding that the defendant had breached the parties' contract precluded the defendant from establishing a valid mechanic's lien, because, even though the defendant had not substantially performed under the parties' contract, the defendant could properly rely on the contract price, and the invoices and change orders submitted there- with, to demonstrate the value of its materials and services for the purposes of establishing that there was probable cause to sustain the lien. Argued January 13—officially released July 29, 2025

The defendant homeowners, C and H, appealed from the trial court's judg- ment of foreclosure by sale rendered for the substitute plaintiff, M Co. The defendants executed and delivered a note payable to B Co., which endorsed the note in blank and assigned the note and mortgage to the plaintiff, H Co., which later merged into M Co. B Co. remained the servicer of the loan. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied their motion for a continuance in order to conduct further discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its discovery rulings or in denying the defendants' motion for a continuance, as the defendants failed to seek timely remedies available under our rules of practice and their request for relief on the eve of trial was untimely. The trial court correctly determined that M Co. had sustained its burden of proof, as there was sufficient evidence to establish that M Co. had authorized B Co. to act on its behalf. The trial court's conclusion that M Co. had established that a notice of default had been sent to the defendants by first class mail was not clearly erroneous, as it was supported by ample evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding certain testimony as to conversations between C and agents of B Co. as inadmissible hearsay, as the defendants failed to establish the scope of the authority or the identity of the purported agents of B Co. This court declined to address the defendants' inadequately briefed claim that the trial court improperly overruled the defendants' objection to testi- mony that addressed certain business practices. The trial court's sua sponte comments as to the sufficiency of M Co.'s evidence and regarding testimony from a witness for M Co., although unnec- essary, did not rise to the level of judicial bias, as the comments were situated within the context of a scheduling concern and did not rise to the level of being so egregious as to demand a reversal of the court's judgment pursuant to the plain error doctrine. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant the defendants' equitable relief under the doctrine of unclean hands, as the defendants offered little evidence to establish that special defense. Argued October 16, 2024—officially released July 29, 2025

The plaintiffs appealed from the Superior Court's judgment dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Department of Agriculture, which had affirmed a disposal order, issued by an animal control officer for the defendant town, to euthanize the plaintiffs' dog. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 22-358 (c)) authorizing the euthanizing of the dog was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the town in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Held: The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that § 22-358 (c) violated the separation of powers doctrine because, pursuant to Bottone v. Westport (209 Conn. 652), the separation of powers doctrine does not pertain to delegations of powers from the state legislature to a municipality, and it was clear under the statute (§ 22-331) governing the appointment of munici- pal animal control officers that the legislature has delegated the enforcement of dog bite statutes to municipalities pursuant to § 22-331 (b), and the animal control officer who issued the disposal order regarding the plaintiffs' dog was an employee of the town. The plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the department's hearing officer violated their procedural rights under the Uniform Adminis- trative Procedure Act (§ 4-166 et seq.) and deprived them of a fair hearing. Argued April 14—officially released July 29, 2025

The plaintiff judgment creditor appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant judgment debtor's motion to exempt from execution certain accounts at a financial institution containing retirement funds. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in crediting as prima facie evidence a form containing false information that had been executed by the defendant. Held: This court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion, the plaintiff having failed to file his appeal within the seven day appeal period set forth in the statute (§ 52-367b (i)) governing orders determining issues raised by a claim of exemption with respect to accounts held by financial institutions. Argued May 21—officially released July 29, 2025

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant's motion for contempt with respect to the plaintiff's failure to transfer two lots of real property, one to the defendant and one to a trust for the benefit of the parties' children, pursuant to court orders. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the defendant did not have standing to assert a claim regarding the lot that he was supposed to transfer to a trust for the benefit of their children. Held: The trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant with respect to her claim regarding the lot that was supposed to be transferred to a trust for the benefit of the parties' children, as the defendant failed to demonstrate a direct or personal interest in the lot or a direct injury she had suffered as a result of the plaintiff's failure to transfer that lot and, accordingly, the defendant lacked standing to assert a claim as to that lot. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt because his failure to transfer the lots was not wilful, as the plaintiff failed to provide this court with a transcript of the contempt hearing and, thus, the record was inadequate for review. The trial court's monetary award to the defendant, following its finding of contempt, did not constitute an impermissible modification of a property settlement, as the award was not in response to a motion that sought modification of the court's orders but, rather, a motion for contempt that sought to effectuate those orders by transfer of the lots at issue and, because the court could not effectuate its prior orders or make the defendant whole by ordering the transfer of the lots due to the plaintiff's delay in complying with those orders, the monetary award was necessary to vindicate the court's prior orders. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court's monetary award to the defendant for lost financial opportunities resulting from the plaintiff's failure to transfer the lots was not supported by the evidence, as the plaintiff failed to provide this court with the entire trial court record, without which this court would be left to speculate as to the basis of the trial court's award. Argued April 30—officially released July 29, 2025

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis- solved, appealed from the trial court's judgment ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for certain medical and dental expenses incurred by their child after she had reached the age of majority. The plaintiff claimed that the court erred when it ordered him to pay 96 percent of those expenses in the absence of any express language in the parties' separation agreement requiring the parties to pay postmajority medical and dental expenses. Held: The trial court erred in construing the parties' separation agreement unam- biguously to require the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for the child's postmajority medical and dental expenses because, as there was more than one reasonable interpretation of the agreement, the agreement was ambigu- ous as to whether the parties were obliged to pay those expenses, and, accordingly, the case was remanded for the trial court to make a factual determination regarding the intent of the parties, after consideration of any extrinsic evidence presented by the parties concerning that issue. Argued April 24—officially released August 5, 2025

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis- solved, appealed from, inter alia, the trial court's judgment denying her motion to open the judgment denying her motions to open the dissolution judgment with respect to financial orders. She claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to open because the court had abused its discretion in denying the motions to open the dissolution judgment after depriving her of her right to complete the hearing on those motions that had begun before a different trial court judge and was never concluded. Held: This court concluded, on the basis of the unique circumstances presented, including the unusual procedural history of the case, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to open the judgment denying the motions to open the dissolution judgment, as the hearing held on the defendant's motions to open the dissolution judgment on the basis of fraud did not conclude because the trial judge conducting the hearing was later reassigned and, despite the defendant's efforts to comply with that judge's orders to take steps to ensure that the hearing would conclude at a later date at which the defendant would be able to present evidence and be heard with respect to the merits of her motions to open, the hearing never resumed, and a different trial judge thereafter denied the motions to open, without an evidentiary hearing, on the basis of facts that were not in evidence. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim, this court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discre- tion in denying her motion for contempt because there was practical relief that this court could afford to the defendant in connection with that claim, and, thus, this court was not persuaded that this portion of the appeal should be dismissed on mootness grounds. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for contempt with respect to the plaintiff's failure to comply with his obliga- tion to pay alimony, as the court reasonably concluded, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that the plaintiff's conduct was not wilful and reasonably declined to impose the harsh penalty of contempt in favor of requiring the plaintiff to pay the unpaid portion of his alimony obligation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for contempt with respect to the plaintiff's failure to timely comply with the court's order that he quitclaim the marital home to the defendant, as the order was unclear and ambiguous and the court properly considered the plaintiff's rationale for his alleged noncompliance, which supported the court's finding that the plaintiff's failure was not wilful. Argued March 19—officially released August 5, 2025

The plaintiffs jointly appealed from the trial court's rendering of summary judgment, in each of seven cases, for the defendant town with respect to the plaintiffs' claims of negligence and negligent supervision. The plaintiffs claimed that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in each case despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a work order request for maintenance made by a town employee created a ministerial duty to perform that maintenance in a prescribed way, thereby abrogating the town's governmental immunity protection and exposing the town to liability pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n) for its failure to complete the requested maintenance. Held: The plaintiffs failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the nature of the town's duty because it was legally and logically correct for the trial court to conclude that the acts and omissions alleged in each complaint with respect to the requested maintenance were discretionary in nature, rather than ministerial, and, accordingly, the court properly determined that the town was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its governmental immunity defense in each action. Argued March 11—officially released August 5, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of sexual assault in the second degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed. He claimed that he was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial as a result of improper remarks the prosecutor made during closing and rebuttal arguments to the jury. Held: The prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the victim's credibility when he referred to the defendant by his nickname, ''Zeus,'' as that reference was based on the victim's testimony, as well as a message and a video the defendant had sent her that was admitted into evidence, and the prosecutor never made a statement that could be construed as his personal opinion concerning the victim's veracity. The defendant's assertion that the prosecutor's statements that the defen- dant had threatened the victim and that she cried when he sexually abused her were comments on facts that were not in evidence and improperly appealed to the jurors' emotions was unavailing, as those statements were based on the evidence or reasonable inferences that could be drawn there- from. This court was not persuaded that the prosecutor's statement that the victim ''got victimized in the hospital,'' made during the prosecutor's discussion of the medical examination that the victim underwent at the hospital after disclosing the sexual abuse, improperly appealed to the jurors' emotions, as the jury reasonably could have inferred from the prosecutor's statement that the defendant had continued to victimize the victim while she was at the hospital, in that his presence there compounded the vulnerable state she was in while undergoing an invasive medical examination. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. There was no merit to the defendant's unsupported claim that the prosecutor injected the trial with sarcasm by referring to the defendant by his nickname, ''Zeus,'' which was based on the victim's testimony, and the trial transcript demonstrated that the prosecutor merely substituted the nickname in place of referring to the defendant. Although the prosecutor improperly stated that the victim's mother had known that the defendant had been referring to himself as ''Zeus,'' that single, isolated transgression did not substantially prejudice the defendant or deprive him of a fair trial, as it was not severe when considered in the context of the entire trial, defense counsel did not perceive it as warranting an objection, it was neither egregious nor inexcusable, and the prosecutor's improper statement was not, as the defendant contended, central to the victim's credibility but was one aspect of her extensive, detailed testimony about the defendant's sexual abuse of her that did not affect the jury's consideration of the evidence. Argued April 16—officially released August 5, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of assault in the second degree and breach of the peace in the second degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly excluded as irrelevant a uniform arrest report that included evidence of his physical appearance six months after the crime. Held: The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the uniform arrest report as irrelevant, as the central question before the jury was the identity of the perpetrator of the assault, it was vital to the defendant's theory of defense of mistaken identification that he be able to dispute the notion that he was the person depicted in a video of the perpetrator admitted into evidence, which necessarily involved a comparison of the appearance of the perpetra- tor in the video to that of the defendant, and the fact that the uniform arrest report was prepared six months after the assault was a matter concerning the weight of the evidence to be afforded by the jury, not its admissibility, and it did not diminish its relevance to the issue of the identity of the perpetrator. The trial court's erroneous exclusion of the uniform arrest report rose to the level of a constitutional violation of the defendant's right to present a defense, as the information pertaining to the defendant's appearance in the uniform arrest report was highly probative, material and potentially exculpatory, the record suggested that the excluded evidence was the most compelling evidence available to the defendant to establish his misidentifica- tion defense because it was the only evidence from an independent, objective party that the defendant could have offered at trial concerning his appear- ance closer to the time of the incident, the defendant took the steps necessary to exercise his right to present a defense, and nothing in the record indicated that there were other means by which the defendant was permitted to adequately present his misidentification defense. The state failed to meet its burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial court's erroneous evidentiary ruling was harmless and, thus, the defendant was entitled to a new trial, as there was no independent overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the uniform arrest report was substantially the only evidence regarding the lack of tattoos on the defendant that he sought to present in support of his defense of mistaken identity, and the harm resulting from the court's exclusion of the evidence was compounded by the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument about the defendant's appearance, some of which were based on facts that were not in evidence. Argued November 20, 2024—officially released August 5, 2025

Convicted, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crimes of illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle and possession of narcotics with intent to sell, the defendant appealed. He claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized without a warrant during a motor vehicle stop. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress, as the court properly determined that the police officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to initiate the motor vehicle stop and proba- ble cause to search the vehicle, thus, the warrantless search of the vehicle and the seizure of items found therein was not a violation of the defendant's rights pursuant to the federal and state constitutions. Argued May 27—officially released August 5, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dant's special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The plaintiff had sought to recover damages for, inter alia, defamation by the defendant in connection with a report the defendant made to the pediatrician of the plaintiff's stepchild, J, regarding the plaintiff's alleged abuse of J. The defendant's report led to an investigation by the Department of Children and Families, which issued a finding substantiating the abuse. Following a hearing, an administrative hearing officer reversed the department's finding. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the special motion to dismiss, at which three witnesses testified. Held: This court concluded, in light of the plain mandate of § 52-196a, which is intended to quickly dispose of meritless litigation at minimal cost through consideration of the pleadings and supporting affidavits of the parties, that the evidentiary hearing and the trial court's reliance on testimony adduced at that hearing in its ruling were improper, as § 52-196a cannot reasonably be read to authorize a court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a special motion to dismiss. The trial court's decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's special motion to dismiss and to predicate its ruling on testimony from that hearing constituted reversible error, as this court concluded, on the basis of the plain language of § 52-196a, its legislative history, the policy it was designed to implement, and persuasive authority from other states, that the legislature did not intend to permit a trial court to conduct such evidentiary hearings and, thus, this court remanded the case to permit the parties an opportunity to file any supplemental pleadings or affidavits and to permit argument thereon. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the defendant, in further proceedings, from claiming that her report of abuse was truthful and made in good faith, as the issue of whether the defendant made her report of abuse truthfully and in good This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of Judges Elgo, Clark and Prescott. Subsequent to oral argument, Judge Bishop replaced Judge Prescott on the panel, and he has reviewed the record, the briefs and appendices, and the recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this opinion. faith was neither fully litigated nor definitively determined in the administra- tive proceeding, and privity between the defendant and the department was lacking. Argued March 27—officially released August 12, 2025

The named defendant in the first action and the plaintiff in the second action, L, the trustee of a family trust established by her former husband as grantor, appealed from the trial court's judgments in two separate actions that were consolidated for trial. In the first action, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, several of L's children who were beneficiaries of the trust, on their claims of, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty with respect to L's termination of an insurance policy held by the trust and the transfer of the policy proceeds to her personal bank and investment accounts. In the second action, the trial court denied L's claim for indemnifi- cation under the trust agreement for damages awarded in the first action. L claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that she was liable for wilful misconduct. Held: The trial court properly concluded in the first action that L breached her fiduciary duty to the trust, as the evidence was sufficient to support the court's findings that L knowingly misrepresented to the insurance company that the bank account to which she transferred the policy proceeds was titled in the name of the trust when she knew that she was directing the funds to her personal account, that L did not advise the plaintiffs or the grantor that the policy had been terminated or that the policy proceeds had been invested in her personal accounts, and that L opened a trust account for the policy proceeds only after being advised by the grantor's attorneys that she had improperly transferred the policy proceeds to her personal accounts, and, thus, the court's resulting damages award was not clearly erroneous. The trial court's findings supported its conclusion in the first action that L's conduct was wilful, as, although the court found that L did not have the requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds for purposes of the statutory theft count in their complaint, that finding did not require a conclusion that L's conduct was not wilful. L could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erroneously awarded punitive damages to the plaintiffs in the first action because the court found that she did not have the requisite intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the policy proceeds for purposes of the statutory theft count, as that finding did not compel a conclusion that L's conduct was not wilful and the court made numerous findings showing that L exhibited a reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiffs or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights. The trial court in the first action did not improperly remove L as a trustee or act contrary to the terms of the trust in establishing procedures regarding the appointment of a successor trustee, as the court's findings regarding L's removal as trustee were supported by the record and supported the court's conclusion that, pursuant to statute (§ 45a-499ww), removal was necessary to prevent future harm to the trust, and the court properly applied the provisions of the statute (§ 45a-499uu) governing the procedures to appoint a successor trustee. The trial court in the first action did not abuse its discretion in denying L's request for a trustee fee, as the court's factual findings were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous, and the court properly considered the factors set forth in Hayward v. Plant (98 Conn. 374) in making its determination. The trial court in the second action properly concluded that L was not entitled to indemnification under the circumstances of this case, as her conduct did not fall within the parameters of the indemnification clause in the trust. Argued February 10—officially released August 12, 2025

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendants on their complaint alleging, inter alia, vexatious litigation. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly found that there was probable cause for the prosecution of a prior action against the plaintiffs. Held: This court dismissed the appeal as moot, the plaintiffs having failed to challenge one of the two grounds that the trial court expressly and correctly identified as being independently sufficient to support its judgment for the defendants. Argued April 15—officially released August 12, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment rendered after it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on his complaint, which alleged that he fell and was injured when he stepped on a defective wooden floorboard at the defendants' property, which had been leased to a tenant. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly deter- mined that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the defendants were in possession or control of the area where the plaintiff allegedly was injured. Held: The trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judg- ment, as there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff's alleged injury occurred in an area of the leased property over which the defendants did not have possession or control and which the tenant was responsible for maintaining and repairing. This court did not need to address the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly relied on evidence outside of the lease, as the clear and unambiguous language of the lease itself was sufficient to demon- strate that the defendants did not have possession or control of the area where the plaintiff allegedly was injured. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly found facts and miscon- strued the lease in determining that the area where he allegedly fell was not part of the structure or foundation of the premises was unavailing, as the documents the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment did not relate directly to whether the defendants retained possession or control of the relevant area of the property and, thus, did not demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute concerning possession or control. Argued April 22—officially released August 12, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court denying his appeal from the decree of the Probate Court removing him as executor of the estate of the defendant's decedent. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the Superior Court improperly limited the scope of its review of his appeal and thus failed to allow him to present evidence to refute the defendant's allegations of misconduct against him and to challenge the admission of the decedent's will to probate. Held: The Superior Court did not improperly limit the scope of its review of the plaintiff's appeal, as the court's jurisdiction extended only to the matter that the plaintiff challenged on appeal, which was the Probate Court decree removing him as the executor of the decedent's estate, and the requirement that the Superior Court conduct a trial de novo in a probate appeal did not mean that it could decide matters beyond what was appealed. This court declined to review the plaintiff's inadequately briefed claim that the Superior Court precluded him from presenting evidence to refute the defendant's allegations of his misconduct in the administration of the estate, as the plaintiff did not identify any particular evidentiary ruling with respect to his claim or any specific erroneous factual findings that followed there- from. The Superior Court did not commit plain error by failing to overrule the Probate Court's admission of the decedent's will to probate, as the plaintiff did not appeal from the admission of the will to probate, and, thus, the Superior Court could not have overruled or reviewed the merits of a Probate Court decree that was beyond the scope of what was before it on appeal. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by quashing subpoenas he issued to nonparties who had knowledge about the execution and filing of the decedent's will, the plaintiff having abandoned those claims due to inadequate briefing. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion by holding him responsible for the failures of attorneys he retained to assist with the administration of the estate, as he did not cite any legal authority or provide any legal analysis in support of his claim, which would fail even if it were reviewed, the Superior Court having found that the plaintiff was unable to administer the estate, failed to cooperate and follow the legal advice given by the attorneys he had engaged as counsel for the estate, was unwilling to comply with court orders and was motivated to pursue his self-interest over the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries. Argued March 17—officially released August 12, 2025

The defendants, commercial property owners, appealed from the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff, a cleaning and restoration construction company, on its breach of contract claim and on the defendants' counterclaim, and from the court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. The defendants claim, inter alia, that the court made clearly erroneous factual findings in connection with its conclusions that the plaintiff had proved its claim that the defendants failed to pay the plaintiff for work performed to repair and remediate the defendants' property after it was damaged in a fire. Held: The trial court's finding that the plaintiff had substantially performed its contractual obligations, despite the defendants' allegation that the plaintiff failed to obtain a warranty for the property's roof, was not clearly erroneous, as this finding was supported by evidence in the record that the plaintiff was unable to obtain the roof warranty due to the defendants' failure to provide instructions to the plaintiff that would have allowed the plaintiff to obtain a final inspection from the roof manufacturer, and this court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed. The trial court's finding that the plaintiff's completion of phase two of the contract constituted substantial performance was not clearly erroneous, as, although the plaintiff's work took longer than the four months specified in the contract, the timeliness of the plaintiff's work was never an issue, from which the court could have concluded that the parties did not intend for time to be of the essence. The trial court's finding that the plaintiff substantially performed under the contract, despite having failed to obtain a certificate of occupancy, was not clearly erroneous, as the court reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiff's failure did not deprive the defendants of a benefit reasonably expected in light of the terms and scope of the contract, and that the plaintiff, nonetheless, attempted in good faith to procure certificates of occupancy, but was thwarted by the defendants' failure to provide necessary informa- tion. The trial court's finding that the plaintiff substantially performed under the contract, despite having failed to complete work on the restaurant portion of the property, was not clearly erroneous, as the court was entitled to reasonably conclude that the plaintiff's failure to complete the work only minimally deprived the defendants of a benefit that they reasonably expected under the contract, the defendants had been adequately compensated for the unfinished work by virtue of a credit that the plaintiff provided and honored in pursuing its breach of contract claim, and the plaintiff acted in good faith in attempting to complete all of its required work under the contract. This court concluded that it did not need to reach the merits of the defen- dants' claim that the trial court disregarded evidence supporting their valua- tion of damages in connection with its analysis of the defendants' breach of contract counterclaim, as the defendants failed to challenge the trial court's finding that they bore responsibility for any damages to the property, a finding that was fatal to the defendants' breach of contract claim. The trial court improperly calculated the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, as the plaintiff was not authorized under the language of the parties' contract to recover fees in connection with a third-party complaint it had filed against its insurer because that litigation was not an attempt to recover sums due under the contract and the third-party defendant was not a party to the contract and did not owe the plaintiff any money thereunder. The trial court properly awarded the plaintiff a full recovery of reasonable attorney's fees in connection with both its prosecution of its own breach of contract claim and its defense of the counterclaim, as the plaintiff's breach of contract claim and the defendants' breach of contract counterclaim arose out of the same factual nucleus, which was the parties' performance of their respective obligations under the contract, and the defendants' counterclaim threatened the plaintiff's ability to enforce the contract and to recover the sums it was owed. Argued April 14—officially released August 19, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's rendering of summary judgment for the defendant landlord with respect to the plaintiff's claims of negligence based on premises liability in connection with her alleged slip and fall on a front porch stairway leading to a tenant's apartment. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rendered summary judgment despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant owed a duty of care to her. Held: Although the trial court committed error in failing to provide an oral or written statement of decision containing its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties and the factual basis therefor, as required by our rule of practice (§ 64-1 (a)), this court was not precluded from considering the plaintiff's claims on the merits because its review was plenary, there was an adequate record, and it was in the interests of judicial economy and fairness to the parties to proceed. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant, as there was no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant did not exercise possession and control of the illumination of an operational light fixture in the front exterior entryway of the premises, the defendant's tenant having exclusive possession and control of the light switch, located inside his demised apartment, that operated the light fixture, and, therefore, she did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. Argued April 15—officially released August 19, 2025

Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying his postverdict motion for a new trial, in which he claimed that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Held: Contrary to the defendant's contention, the evidence was sufficient to sup- port the jury's verdict finding him guilty of the crimes with which he was charged and that his abuse of the minor victim, an infant, occurred within the applicable statute of limitations (§ 54-193 (c)), as the jury reasonably could have credited the testimony of a witness who had watched the defen- dant cause the victim to hit his head on a granite countertop, drag the victim on a rug and slam him several times on a floor. The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial to the extent that the court's statement that it could not reject the jury's findings and substitute its own view of the evidence applied the legal standard used to adjudicate sufficiency of the evidence claims, as the proper inquiry in adjudicating a motion for a new trial required the court to determine if there was a substantial question regarding the reliability of the verdict and to make its own credibility determinations, and the court's summary statement that it agreed with the jury's findings based on the evidence did not alter this court's conclusion that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard; accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial was reversed and the case was remanded to the trial judge who presided over the trial to make his own assessment of the jury's credibility determinations. Argued May 19—officially released August 19, 2025

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment resolving several postdissolution motions concerning custody and visitation. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly delegated its judicial authority over visitation to the plaintiff. Held: The trial court's order authorizing the plaintiff to exercise his discretion over the defendant's visitation with the parties' minor children was an improper delegation of judicial authority, as, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in R. H. v. M. H. (350 Conn. 446), it placed the trial court's decision-making authority in the hands of a party to the litigation. The trial court abused its discretion in precluding the defendant from com- municating with her youngest child's health-care providers or therapists, as the court failed to make a finding, pursuant to statute (§ 46b-56 (g)), that the defendant should be denied access for good cause shown. Argued May 28—officially released August 19, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder, appealed after the habeas court denied his petition for certification to appeal from the court's judgment denying his third petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in requiring that his withdrawal prior to trial of certain counts and claims in his habeas petition be with prejudice. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal, as he failed to show that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve them in a different manner or that they were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court's requirement that any withdrawal of counts or claims in the petitioner's habeas petition would be with prejudice did not constitute an abuse of the court's discretion, as the petitioner's conviction was nearly twenty years old, he had withdrawn, on the eve of trial, two previous habeas petitions he had filed, and his third habeas petition was seven years old. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to demon- strate that his counsel at his criminal trial rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate and prepare an alibi defense, as the peti- tioner failed to call alibi witnesses to testify at the habeas trial and the court found that the petitioner had ''zero credibility'' regarding his claims that he never discussed an alibi defense with counsel and had told counsel that he did not want to testify at the trial. Argued December 10, 2024—officially released August 19, 2025

The plaintiff housing authority appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing its summary process action against the defendant tenant. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed the action after concluding that the pretermination notice, also known as a Kapa notice, and the notice to quit were both invalid and, therefore, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Held: The trial court improperly determined that the Kapa notice sent to the defendant was invalid on the basis that the notice alleged conduct constitut- ing serious nuisance that had occurred one year prior to its issuance, as there was no time requirement contained in the language of the statute (§ 47a-15) governing the form of a Kapa notice. The trial court improperly determined that the Kapa notice sent to the defendant was invalid because it failed to refer to specific provisions of the lease or the statutory sections that had been violated as a result of the conduct alleged in the notice, as such specificity was not required pursuant to § 47a-15 or our case law and the notice identified eight specific instances of conduct by the defendant that constituted violations of the lease, the plaintiff's rules and regulations, and his obligations as a tenant pursuant to statute (§ 47a-11), and amounted to a nuisance, which was sufficient to inform the defendant and protect against premature, discriminatory, or arbitrary eviction. The trial court improperly determined that the notice to quit was invalid or defective and, therefore, deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, as the notice sufficiently tracked the language of the relevant statute (§ 47a- 23 (a) and (b)) and informed the defendant of the reasons for the notice to quit by setting forth specific instances of his conduct. The trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's alternative argument that the plaintiff, which the defendant asserts was a federally subsidized landlord and was required to provide notices that complied with the requirements of the applicable federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1437d (l)) and regulation (24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (l) (3)), failed to provide sufficient information to the defendant regarding grievance proce- dures, as he provided no authority to support his claim that, as a result of this alleged insufficiency in the notices, the notices were invalid. Argued October 8, 2024—officially released August 26, 2025

The plaintiff landlord appealed from the trial court's judgment, rendered after a jury trial, for the defendant tenant on the complaint alleging, inter alia, negligence in connection with a fire that caused damage to the plaintiff's rental property. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion in limine to preclude certain testimony and evidence of noneconomic damages. Held: This court declined to review the plaintiff's inadequately briefed claim that the trial court improperly failed to provide the plaintiff's requested charge to the jury regarding a landlord's obligations to maintain a leased premises. This court declined to address the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion in limine, as, even if this court were to assume that the granting of the motion in limine was improper, the plaintiff could not demonstrate harm because his claim applied only to damages and the jury determined that the defendant was not liable for the fire at the plaintiff's property. Argued February 20—officially released August 26, 2025

The plaintiff mother appealed from the trial court's judgment denying her request for leave pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 25-26 (g)) to file a motion to modify custody of the parties' minor child. The plaintiff claimed that the court, without holding a hearing, improperly denied her request for leave, which alleged that the custody and visitation order in place contained an impermissible delegation of judicial authority. Held: The trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's request for leave to file a motion for modification and, on the basis of R. H. v. M. H. (350 Conn. 432), the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing on her motion for modification, as she properly raised the claim of impermissible delegation of judicial authority in her motion for modification appended to her request for leave, consistent with the requirements of Practice Book § 25-26 (g). Argued May 20—officially released August 26, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment rendered after it granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on his negligence claim relating to injuries he sustained during a hockey practice at an ice rink owned and operated by W Co. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that the defendant did not owe him a duty of care to ensure that his hockey team's practices were safe. Held: The trial court correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care, as there was no evidence presented indicating that the defendant reasonably could have foreseen the plaintiff's injuries. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether W Co. was acting as the defendant's agent or apparent agent during the practice when the plaintiff was injured, as the plaintiff did not present any evidence beyond mere assertions and conclusory statements that W Co. was acting as the defendant's agent with respect to practices and no reasonable juror could find actual or apparent agency under the circumstances of this case. Argued February 3—officially released August 26, 2025

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes as a result of incidents that occurred between 1995 and 2000, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, C, and his counsel in two previous habeas trials, R and B, had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a statute of limitations defense regarding the eighteen month delay between the issuance of the warrant for the petitioner's arrest in 2005 and the execution of the warrant in 2007. Held: The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner was required to present new evidence in his third habeas trial, which B had not previously introduced, to demonstrate that C and B had rendered ineffective assistance, as the petitioner's claim that the court improperly applied the law of the case doctrine was based on his misunderstanding of that doctrine. The habeas court incorrectly determined that the petitioner failed to estab- lish that C and B had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, as the new evidence presented at the third habeas trial established that the police had made no attempts at all to serve him with the arrest warrant, and an expert's testimony laid bare C's misunderstanding of the required showing of preju- dice under State v. Crawford (202 Conn. 443) that was the basis of C's failure to file a motion to dismiss the charges against the petitioner. The petitioner satisfied his burden to establish that he was prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668) as a result of C's failure to rely on the delay in the execution of the arrest warrant, and, in conjunction with other evidence adduced at the habeas trial, B's failure to introduce into evidence a blank arrest warrant service record form that had been in the possession of the police, which provided a devastating counterpoint that would have undermined the credibility of the state's vague and unsupported assertions at the criminal trial regarding its efforts to execute the warrant, left no question that the police did not exercise due diligence in executing In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the petitioner's full name or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims' identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. the warrant without unreasonable delay; accordingly, the habeas court's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to grant the writ of habeas corpus, to vacate the petitioner's conviction and to order a new trial. Argued February 19—officially released August 26, 2025

The defendant property owners appealed from the trial court's denial of their second motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure rendered for the plaintiff. The defendants had filed their first motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure on the defendants' law day, which the court denied that same day without explanation. The defendants did not appeal from the denial of the first motion to open. The defendants claimed that the court incorrectly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to open the judgment of strict foreclosure on the ground that title already had vested in the plaintiff, thereby rendering the defendants' second motion to open moot. Held: The trial court improperly denied the defendants' second motion to open, as, pursuant to the rule of practice ((2023) § 61-11 (a)) and relevant case law, vesting of title to the property could not occur during the twenty day appeal period after the denial of the first motion to open, and, because law days do not automatically reset after the conclusion of an appeal period in which no appeal is filed, the court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the motion because title had not yet vested in the plaintiff. Argued January 15—officially released August 26, 2025

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his guilty plea to a charge of risk of injury to a child was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, in violation of his right to due process, because his criminal trial counsel failed to advise him that he would be required to register as a sex offender as a consequence of the plea. Held: The petitioner's claim that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily was unavailing, as, although there was some uncertainty at the petitioner's plea proceeding as to whether his age at the time he commit- ted the offense at issue might exempt him from the requirement of sex offender registration, the record amply reflected that the trial court expressly advised him during its plea canvass that he might have to register as a sex offender, the petitioner acknowledged on the record that he understood that possibility, and the habeas court credited the testimony of his criminal trial counsel that she had advised him of the registration requirement before he entered his plea. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise him that he would be required to register as a sex offender as a result of his guilty plea, as, even if this court assumed that counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced thereby, as the habeas court, being the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses, was not required to accept the petitioner's testimony that he unequivocally would not have pleaded guilty or would have pursued a plea offer that did not require sex offender registration had he known he would be required to register as a sex offender. Argued May 21—officially released August 26, 2025

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis- solved, appealed from the trial court's judgment granting his motion for modification of unallocated child support and alimony payable to the defen- dant. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly considered the defendant's allegation that he had failed to share with her certain pro- ceeds of a postdissolution sale of stock when it was undisputed that no motion raising that issue had been filed with the court. Held: The trial court abused its discretion in considering evidence regarding the plaintiff's allegedly contemptuous conduct in failing to split the proceeds of a postdissolution stock sale with the defendant and the court's award to the defendant of a commensurate reduction in an arrearage she owed to the plaintiff was harmful and violated the plaintiff's due process rights, as the court admitted testimony regarding that conduct for the limited purposes of assessing credibility and establishing the plaintiff's total financial picture, and this issue had not been properly raised in a motion by the defendant with due notice to the plaintiff. The trial court did not improperly modify the terms of the alimony provision in the parties' separation agreement in construing the agreement to require the plaintiff to issue the final alimony payment in 2028, beyond the term of the alimony as agreed to by the parties based on the plaintiff's 2027 income, as such agreement anticipated that the final payment to the defendant would be calculated on the basis of the plaintiff's year-end bonuses for employment in 2027, which would not be calculated and awarded until 2028. Argued January 9—officially released September 2, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the state deprived him of his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony about the defendant's silence occurring after he had been informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), in violation of Doyle v. Ohio (426 U.S. 610), during the state's case-in-chief and com- mented about the defendant's post-Miranda silence during closing argu- ment. Held: This court reviewed the merits of the defendant's unpreserved claim of a Doyle violation pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as it was of constitutional magnitude and the record was adequate to review the alleged claim of error. This court, having concluded that the defendant had established the exis- tence of a constitutional violation that violated his due process right to a fair trial for purposes of the third prong of Golding, further concluded that the state failed to meet its burden of proof that the Doyle violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the state's case against the defendant was not particularly strong and the prosecutor made multiple remarks con- cerning the defendant's post-Miranda silence, which struck at the jugular of the defendant's theory of defense or suggested a connection between the defendant's silence and his guilt; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. Argued March 11—officially released September 2, 2025 In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the complainant or others through whom the complainant's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained 0 Conn. App. 718 ,0 3 State v. William A.

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that the court improperly rejected his claim that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assis- tance when advising him with respect to a pretrial plea offer from the state. Held: The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner's criminal trial counsel did not render deficient performance in advising the petitioner regarding the state's plea offer, as the court credited counsel's testimony that he advised the petitioner about the offer, including that it contained a right to argue for a lesser sentence, which he explained to the petitioner, as well as the elements of the offenses at issue, the state's evidence and the maximum penalties the petitioner faced, and the petitioner did not indicate to the court or his counsel that he did not understand what a right to argue meant. Argued March 26—officially released September 2, 2025

The plaintiff nonstock corporation and five individual plaintiffs in their capacity as members of the corporation's board of directors and on the corporation's behalf appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing their action against the defendants, three members of the corporation's board of directors, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action. The plaintiffs claimed that the court improperly dismissed the action, which sought declar- atory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Connecticut Revised Nonstock Corporation Act (§ 33-1000 et seq.), because the individual plaintiffs have standing pursuant to statute (§ 33-1089 (a)). Held: The trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiffs' action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the individual plaintiffs were aggrieved persons within the meaning of § 33-1089 (a) and, therefore, had standing to bring the action. Argued June 4—officially released September 2, 2025

The plaintiff state police trooper appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant R following the granting of R's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged that R had transferred the plaintiff from his job in a certain work unit in retaliation for having filed a report three years earlier about another officer's sexual harassment of a female officer. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he had established a prima facie case of retaliation. Held: The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for R, as the plaintiff failed to establish a factual basis connecting R to the alleged retaliatory transfer, in that it was undisputed that R did not see the report until his deposition in this matter, that the plaintiff had not discussed the report with R or had any dealings at all with R, and the plaintiff's assertion that retaliatory animus on the part R could be inferred from an order that was given to another police unit to stop cooperating with the plaintiff's work unit was merely speculative, the plaintiff having presented no evidence that it was the defendant, rather than another supervisor, who gave the order or that the plaintiff was the target of the alleged retaliatory animus. Argued June 4—officially released September 2, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing his action, which sought, inter alia, an injunction requiring the defendants to cease construction on an inground pool at their property, which adjoined property owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly dismissed his action without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard following a hearing on his motion for a temporary injunction, to which the defendants had filed an objection. Held: The trial court improperly dismissed, sua sponte, the entirety of the plaintiff's complaint as moot, an issue that was not raised in the defendants' objection to the plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction, as, although the court could have raised the issue of mootness sua sponte regarding the plaintiff's action rather than considering only the motion for a temporary injunction, the court expressly informed the parties that it would decide only whether the plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction was moot and that the merits of the complaint would be determined at a later date, and, therefore, the plaintiff had no warning or notice that his entire action, rather than his motion for a temporary injunction, was subject to dismissal by the court, which deprived the plaintiff of due process. The trial court's factual findings regarding the merits of the plaintiff's com- plaint were clearly erroneous, as the court did not hold a hearing and no evidence was presented to support such findings. Argued June 2—officially released September 2, 2025

The petitioner appealed, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal, from the habeas court's judgment rejecting an amended petition and dismissing, on its own motion, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed his habeas action on the basis that his original petition failed to state a claim on which habeas relief could be granted. Held: The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certifica- tion to appeal, as the court's improper dismissal of the petitioner's habeas action on its own motion necessarily meant that the underlying claim raised in the petition for certification was debatable among jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issue in a different manner, or the question was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court improperly rejected the petitioner's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, improperly dismissed the habeas action on the basis of the original petition, as the amended petition was filed as of right before the return date, and, pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of the rule of practice (§ 23-32) governing amend- ments in habeas actions, the court did not have the discretion to reject it, and, thus, the amended petition became the operative petition, and, after its filing, the original petition could no longer serve as a basis for the court to render a judgment of dismissal. Argued April 14—officially released September 9, 2025

The plaintiff, a former client of the defendant attorneys K and G, and their law firm L Co., appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendants' motion to strike certain counts of the complaint, including, inter alia, legal malpractice and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.), as legally insufficient. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion to strike without affording it the opportunity to present oral argument. Held: This court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the portion of the appeal that challenged the plaintiff's stricken CUTPA claims against K and L Co., even though two counts of the complaint remained pending against those defendants, as the plaintiff relied on the same factual and legal issues in the stricken claim against G and the stricken CUTPA claims against K and L Co., and, therefore, the sufficiency of the stricken CUTPA claims against K and L Co. and the sufficiency of the stricken claim against G were inextricably intertwined. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendants' motion to strike without affording the plaintiff an opportunity for oral argument, as the plaintiff did not timely request oral argument pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 11-18 (a) (2)) and did not pursue a timely objection to the motion to strike pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 10-40). Argued March 26—officially released September 9, 2025