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Rettman v. Rettman
JOHN C. RETTMAN v. MAURA L. RETTMAN
(AC 46429)
Moll, Clark and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dissolved, appealed from, inter alia, the trial court’s judgment denying her
motion to open the judgment denying her motions to open the dissolution
judgment with respect to financial orders. She claimed, inter alia, that the
court abused its discretion in denying her motion to open because the court
had abused its discretion in denying the motions to open the dissolution
judgment after depriving her of her right to complete the hearing on those
motions that had begun before a different trial court judge and was never
concluded. Held:
This court concluded, on the basis of the unique circumstances presented,
including the unusual procedural history of the case, that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to open the judgment denying
the motions to open the dissolution judgment, as the hearing held on the
defendant’s motions to open the dissolution judgment on the basis of fraud
did not conclude because the trial judge conducting the hearing was later
reassigned and, despite the defendant’s efforts to comply with that judge’s
orders to take steps to ensure that the hearing would conclude at a later
date at which the defendant would be able to present evidence and be heard
with respect to the merits of her motions to open, the hearing never resumed,
and a different trial judge thereafter denied the motions to open, without
an evidentiary hearing, on the basis of facts that were not in evidence.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, this court did not lack subject matter
jurisdiction over the defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for contempt because there was practical relief
that this court could afford to the defendant in connection with that claim,
and, thus, this court was not persuaded that this portion of the appeal should
be dismissed on mootness grounds.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for contempt with respect to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with his obligation to pay alimony, as the court reasonably concluded, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, that the plaintiff’s conduct was not wilful and
reasonably declined to impose the harsh penalty of contempt in favor of
requiring the plaintiff to pay the unpaid portion of his alimony obligation.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for contempt with respect to the plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with
the court’s order that he quitclaim the marital home to the defendant, as
the order was unclear and ambiguous and the court properly considered
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Rettman v. Rettman
the plaintiff’s rationale for his alleged noncompliance, which supported the
court’s finding that the plaintiff’s failure was not wilful.
Argued March 19—officially released August 5, 2025
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, where the court, Maureen M. Murphy, J., rendered judgment dissolving the
marriage and granting certain other relief; thereafter,
the court, Price-Boreland, J., denied the defendant’s
motions to open the judgment; subsequently, the court,
Price-Boreland, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion to open
the judgment denying the motions to open, and the
defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, the court,
Price-Boreland, J., denied the defendant’s motion for
contempt, and the plaintiff filed an amended appeal.
Reversed in part; vacated; further proceedings.
Jeffrey D. Brownstein, for the appellant (defendant).
John C. Rettman, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
WILSON, J. In this marital dissolution action, the
defendant, Maura L. Rettman, brings this amended
appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying her
motion to open the court’s denial of several motions
to open the financial orders entered at the time of its
final decree. The defendant also appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for contempt
that was based on the alleged noncompliance of the
plaintiff, John C. Rettman,1 with the financial orders.
The defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in denying (1) the motion to open, (2) the motion
1
The plaintiff is a self-represented party before this court and, at times,
appeared as a self-represented party during the relevant proceedings before
the trial court.
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Rettman v. Rettman
for contempt insofar as it was based on (a) the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with his obligation to pay alimony,
and (b) the plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with the
court’s order that he quitclaim the marital home to her.
We reverse the judgment denying the motion to open
and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. We affirm the judgment denying the motion
for contempt.
It is useful to set forth at the outset of this opinion
the following procedural history relevant to the claims
raised on appeal. On February 5, 2013, the court, Maureen M. Murphy, J., rendered a judgment dissolving the
parties’ marriage and incorporating into its judgment
the terms of the parties’ written dissolution agreement,
with some modifications made directly by the court.
Pursuant to the terms of the judgment, the plaintiff
was required, among other things, (1) to make alimony
payments of $600 per month to the defendant for two
years, and (2) to ‘‘quitclaim [the marital home] to the
defendant.’’
Thereafter, the defendant filed several motions to
open the judgment based on the plaintiff’s alleged failure, during the dissolution proceeding, to disclose on
his financial affidavit the existence of his military pension. On October 5, 2022, the court, Price-Boreland, J.,
denied three such motions on the ground that they were
untimely. On March 8, 2023, the defendant filed a motion
to open the judgment denying her motions to open,
which Judge Price-Boreland denied on that same day.
Thereafter, the defendant appealed from Judge Price-Boreland’s March 8, 2023 ruling.
On December 14, 2022, before the court had finally
disposed of the defendant’s motions to open the dissolution judgment, the defendant filed a motion for contempt in which she alleged that the plaintiff had violated
the court’s financial orders by failing to pay alimony
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Rettman v. Rettman
from February, 2013, until February, 2015; failing to
timely comply with the order that he quitclaim the marital home to her; and failing to pay certain household
bills. On May 30, 2024, following an evidentiary hearing,
Judge Price-Boreland denied the motion for contempt.
Thereafter, the defendant amended her existing appeal
to include the judgment rendered on the motion for
contempt. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
I
First, we address the defendant’s claim that the court
abused its discretion in denying her motion to open.
We agree with the defendant.
The following additional procedural history is relevant to this claim. On June 30, 2016, September 9, 2019,
February 28, 2020, and July 26, 2021, the defendant filed
motions to open the judgment.2 On August 17, 2021, the
parties appeared remotely before the court, Tindill, J.,
who was then sitting at the Superior Court in Meriden,
for a hearing that addressed pending matters before the
court, including the defendant’s outstanding motions
to open. The defendant was represented by an attorney,
but the plaintiff appeared as a self-represented litigant.
At the beginning of the hearing, the plaintiff stated that
the attorney he intended to represent him had recently
returned from a deployment and the attorney intended
to file an appearance on his behalf, but he was unable
to do so because he had contracted COVID-19. The
plaintiff stated, however, that he wished to proceed
that day as a self-represented litigant because he desired
to put this case to rest.
Thereafter, the defendant presented evidence in support of the motions to open, which included her own
2
On July 16, 2021, the court, Tindill, J., dismissed the motion to open
that was filed on September 9, 2019. That ruling is not at issue in this appeal.
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Rettman v. Rettman
testimony. After the defendant’s attorney concluded his
direct examination of the defendant, the plaintiff stated
that he ‘‘would like to postpone [the hearing] until I get
my lawyer involved and he files his appearance.’’ The
defendant’s attorney responded by reminding the court
that, at the beginning of the hearing, the plaintiff stated
that he wished to proceed without the assistance of
an attorney. Judge Tindill asked the plaintiff when his
attorney would be able to file an appearance on his
behalf. The plaintiff replied that he believed that could
occur ‘‘by the end of the week . . . .’’ Judge Tindill
notified the parties that, as of September 7, 2021, she
would be assigned to another judicial district and would
be sitting at the Superior Court in Milford. Judge Tindill
stated that her reassignment would require the caseflow
coordinator at the Superior Court in Meriden to coordinate scheduling the matter with the caseflow coordinator at the Superior Court in Milford. The proceeding
then was adjourned.
Consistent with what transpired at the hearing, on
August 17, 2021, Judge Tindill issued an order stating:
‘‘A remote hearing was held on August 17, 2021, regarding the defendant’s motions to open judgment . . . and
the plaintiff’s objection . . . . The plaintiff appeared
pro se; the defendant appeared with counsel.
‘‘The plaintiff testified that his attorney has returned
from his deployment in Jordan, but was ill with COVID-
19. The plaintiff expects his counsel to file an appearance on his behalf when he is well and no longer in
quarantine. The plaintiff indicated that he wanted to
proceed with the hearing in his counsel’s absence since
there has been such a delay in the postjudgment proceedings.
‘‘Both parties testified. The defendant submitted eight
exhibits into evidence and the court took judicial notice
of its July 16, 2021 order . . . the parties’ February 5,
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Rettman v. Rettman
2013 financial affidavits . . . and the judgment file
. . . and the transcript of the divorce proceedings
. . . .
‘‘The hearing did not conclude. The plaintiff indicated
that he did not wish to continue without the assistance
of his attorney with whom he expected to be able to
communicate this week. The plaintiff completed crossexamination of the defendant’s direct testimony; counsel for the defendant indicated [that] he had additional
questions on redirect examination.’’ Judge Tindill ordered
the plaintiff to have his attorney file an appearance as
soon as was practicable and ordered the parties to
arrange with the court caseflow clerk to schedule a
hearing date to complete the hearing on the motions
to open.
The record reflects that, following the hearing, the
defendant made several attempts to schedule a hearing
date to complete the hearing on the motions to open.
For example, on October 24, 2021, the defendant filed
a caseflow request for that purpose, noting that the
matter needed to be scheduled as soon as possible. On
October 28, 2021, Judge Tindill denied the request. On
May 23, 2022, the defendant requested a status conference and a date to resume the hearing that had begun
before Judge Tindill. The court, however, did not act
on this request. Attached to the request were emails to
show correspondence between the defendant’s attorney and the attorney who was then representing the
plaintiff, in which the defendant’s attorney discussed
his attempts to have the matter heard. Attached to the
request was also a copy of an email, dated September 12,
2021, that the defendant’s attorney sent to the caseflow
coordinator at the Superior Court in Meriden in an
attempt to schedule a date on which the hearing could
resume. The email shows that the caseflow coordinator
at that court had instructed the defendant’s attorney
simply to await contact from the caseflow coordinator
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Rettman v. Rettman
at the Superior Court in Milford. Attached to the request
was also a copy of a fax, dated November 19, 2021,
sent by the defendant’s attorney to the caseflow coordinator at the Superior Court in Milford, seeking the continuation of the hearing before Judge Tindill. In the
motion, counsel noted that ‘‘[t]here is nothing more I
can [possibly] do’’ to have the matter heard and avoid
a judgment of dismissal.
Eventually, a hearing on the outstanding motions was
scheduled in the Superior Court in Meriden for September 22, 2022. The parties appeared before the court,
Price-Boreland, J., on that date. At the hearing, the
defendant was represented by an attorney and the plaintiff appeared in a self-represented capacity.
From the onset of the proceeding, there was confusion between the court and the parties as to whether
the defendant’s motions to open were properly before
the court for consideration. Specifically, Judge Price-Boreland questioned whether Judge Tindill had declared
a mistrial with respect to the motions to open, whether
the parties were before the court to ‘‘complete the . . .
hearing on the [motions] to open,’’ or whether the parties were before the court to ‘‘start’’ a new hearing on
the motions.3 The court expressed its belief that, if the
motions to open were properly before it, it could not
resume the hearing that began on August 17, 2021, but
that it would need to conduct a new hearing. The defendant’s attorney emphatically represented that he had
3
At one point during the court’s colloquy with the defendant’s attorney,
the defendant’s attorney referred to a ‘‘note’’ in the file indicating that Judge
Tindill had declared a mistrial with respect to a motion for contempt. He
stated that he was concerned that this note might lead to ‘‘confusion’’ about
what had been disposed of by Judge Tindill. The record reflects that, on
November 3, 2021, Judge Tindill declared a mistrial with respect to a motion
for contempt that the defendant filed on September 9, 2019. The defendant’s
counsel further represented to the court that Judge Tindill’s November 3,
2021 ruling only pertained to the September 9, 2019 contempt motion and
did not pertain to any of the pending motions to open the judgment of
dissolution.
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Rettman v. Rettman
not received notice that Judge Tindill had declared a
mistrial with respect to the motions to open and that
the matter had merely been continued at the request of
the plaintiff. After a lengthy discussion with the parties,
Judge Price-Boreland stated that it was necessary that
she receive additional information directly from Judge
Tindill. The court stated that ‘‘[w]e need to put some
closure on how this file’s being handled for the court
to even step in and move forward.’’ The court further
stated: ‘‘There are too many moving parts and too many
unanswered questions. And I think the best person to
probably give us what we need is Judge Tindill.’’ Judge
Price-Boreland stated that, in the interest of not leaving
the motions to open unresolved, she would dismiss
the motions with prejudice ‘‘subject to [Judge Tindill’s]
decision’’ as to whether Judge Tindill had afforded the
parties an expectation that their hearing would continue
before Judge Tindill.
On September 23, 2022, Judge Price-Boreland issued
an order stating: ‘‘A hearing was held on September
[22], 2022,4 regarding all pending motions before the
court . . . . The court refers the matter to Judge Erika
Tindill for review, subject to continuing of hearing the
matters that were previously before Her Honor. The
court enters separate orders on the motions to open
judgment.’’
By order dated October 3, 2022, Judge Price-Boreland
denied the defendant’s motions to open as untimely.5
The court stated: ‘‘The defendant has filed four motions
to open in this dissolution [action], which went to judgment on February 5, 2013, by stipulation. The first
motion was filed on June 30, 2016 . . . but was not
4
The court, in its order, referred to a hearing date of September 23, 2022,
but we consider this to be a scrivener’s error as the record unequivocally
reflects that the hearing occurred on September 22, 2022.
5
We note that, although the court’s order is dated October 3, 2022, the
record reflects that it was filed on October 5, 2022.
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Rettman v. Rettman
pursued due to alleged issues with serving the plaintiff
while he was residing in Turkey. This motion alleged
that the plaintiff committed fraud by failing to disclose
his vested military retirement on the financial affidavit
he submitted at the time of dissolution.
‘‘Over three years later, subsequent motions to open
were filed on September 9, 2019 . . . February 28, 2020
. . . and July 26, 2021 . . . . All three of these motions
are exactly the same, with the exception of a different
heading date. These motions also relate to the plaintiff’s
alleged failure to disclose his military pension to the
court on his financial affidavit at the time of judgment.
‘‘After careful consideration of the relevant pleadings,
case law, and statutory authority, the court denies the
motions to open . . . for failure to comply with the
requirements of General Statutes § 52-212 and Practice
Book § 17-43 relating to timeliness of bringing a claim.
‘‘Public policy favors the finality of judgments.
LaPenta v. Bank One, N.A., 101 Conn. App. 730, 763
n.3, [924 A.2d 868], cert. denied,
284 Conn. 905, [
931
A.2d 264] (2007). More specifically, ‘[our courts] have
strongly disfavored [collateral] attacks upon judgments
because such belated litigation undermines the
important principle of finality. . . . The law aims to
invest judicial transactions with the utmost permanency
consistent with justice. . . . Public policy requires that
a term be put to litigation and that judgments, as solemn
records upon which valuable rights rest, should not
lightly be disturbed or overthrown.’ [(Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)] Meinket v. Levinson, 193 Conn. 110, 113,
474 A.2d 454 (1984). In addition,
it is well cited that the court has an inherent authority
to manage its docket as it sees fit.
‘‘In the instant action, the defendant was aware of
and/or was of the belief that the plaintiff had a military
pension at the time of the dissolution and was also
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Rettman v. Rettman
aware that the plaintiff was not disclosing this pension
on his financial affidavit . . . . The defendant did not
file a motion to open regarding the plaintiff’s alleged
failure to disclose these assets until three years later,
in 2016. That motion was not prosecuted, and the defendant states that this was because she was unable to
effectuate service on the plaintiff while he was living
in Turkey . . . . To the court’s knowledge, no additional steps were taken to attempt to effectuate or remedy the issue of service of this motion. Indeed, the
defendant did not refile her motion to open for the
same issue until over three years later, in 2019.
‘‘The court does not find that the defendant diligently
attempted to serve her 2016 motion to open because it
has no objective evidence showing that she attempted
to remedy the issue of effectuating marshal service on
the plaintiff in Turkey. Even if the court accepted the
[defendant’s] claim that she was unable to serve the
[plaintiff] until he returned to the United States in
December of 2018, the [defendant] was still remiss in
diligently prosecuting her claim in that she did not file
her subsequent motions to open until over nine months
later . . . .
‘‘In light of the aforementioned, the court finds that
the defendant does not have good cause for the delay
in prosecuting her claim. More specifically, the court
does not find that the defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting her action or making her defense. The amount of
time that elapsed between the defendant’s filings is not
timely and is contrary to the public policy that upholds
the importance of maintaining the integrity of the finality of judgments.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote added.)
On October 5, 2022, Judge Tindill issued an order
stating: ‘‘A hearing was held on August 17, 2021, regarding the defendant’s motions to open judgment . . . and
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Rettman v. Rettman
the plaintiff’s objection . . . . The hearing did not conclude on those motions on that day. No further hearing
was held on these motions until [thirteen] months later,
at which time the judge that was overseeing the proceedings was no longer assigned to the [Superior Court
in] Meriden [in the] judicial district [of New Haven].
‘‘In light of the aforementioned, the court hereby
declares a mistrial regarding the above motions.’’
On October 24, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to
reargue Judge Price-Boreland’s order of October 3,
2022. The defendant argued, in part, that Judge Price-Boreland was mistaken about the fact that Judge Tindill
had declared a mistrial with respect to the pending
motions to open. In this regard, the defendant relied
on what transpired at the unfinished hearing before
Judge Tindill on August 17, 2021, as well as her attorney’s ensuing correspondence with the caseflow coordinator at the Superior Court in Meriden. The defendant
also challenged the court’s finding that the defendant
had not pursued the motions to open with due diligence.
On November 9, 2022, Judge Price-Boreland issued
an order denying the defendant’s motion to reargue the
court’s denial of the motions to open. The court stated
in its order that it ‘‘clarifies one of the misstatements
within the motion claiming that a mistrial has not been
declared by Judge Tindill on the motion to open.’’ In its
order, the court specifically referred to Judge Tindill’s
order of October 5, 2022.
On March 8, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to
open the judgment denying her motions to open. Among
the myriad grounds and arguments set forth in the
motion, the defendant asserted that it was improper
for Judge Price-Boreland to have relied on the fact that
Judge Tindill had declared a mistrial with respect to her
motions to open because the defendant lacked notice
of that ruling until she received Judge Tindill’s order
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Rettman v. Rettman
of October 5, 2022, which occurred well after the hearing that took place before Judge Price-Boreland on September 22, 2022. The defendant argued that she was
not afforded an opportunity to be heard with respect
to Judge Tindill’s ruling. She also argued that the ruling
plainly contradicted the terms of Judge Tindill’s order
of August 17, 2021, which directed the parties to have
the matter scheduled for purposes of completing the
hearing on the motions to open. Moreover, the defendant argued that, among other attempts made by her to
have the motions to open heard, she had filed caseflow
requests for a new hearing date following the August
17, 2021 unfinished hearing, which undermined Judge
Price-Boreland’s observation that she had not diligently
pursued the motions for thirteen months following the
uncompleted hearing in August, 2021. According to the
defendant, she believed that the hearing that was scheduled before Judge Price-Boreland on September 22,
2022, was to be a continuation of the hearing that had
occurred on August 17, 2021. The defendant argued that
she was prepared to continue the hearing either before
Judge Tindill or before Judge Price-Boreland and that
it was unreasonable for Judge Price-Boreland to expect
that the parties would begin the hearing anew when
they appeared before her on September 22, 2022. The
defendant also argued that the court’s reliance on § 52-
212 and Practice Book § 17-43 was erroneous in light
of the fact that she had not failed to appear and had
not been either defaulted or nonsuited. The defendant
argued that ‘‘there was no basis for a mistrial in this
matter and certainly no basis for a dismissal of the
action.’’ On March 8, 2023, the same day on which the
motion was filed, Judge Price-Boreland denied the
motion to open the October 3, 2022 judgment.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for articulation of the March 8, 2023 ruling. On April 4, 2023, Judge
Price-Boreland set forth the following articulation: ‘‘A
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Rettman v. Rettman
judgment rendered may be opened after four months
if it is shown that the judgment was obtained by fraud,
in the absence of actual consent, or because of mutual
mistake.
‘‘The parties’ marriage was dissolved on February 5,
2013, pursuant to an agreement.
‘‘This court has reviewed the pleadings in the file
to include the transcript of hearings. The court takes
judicial notice of all the relevant pleadings in the file.
Of note, the court has reviewed the transcript of the
dissolution hearing with Judge Maureen Murphy, dated
February 5, 2013. The parties were divorced through
an agreement.
‘‘The initial agreement of the parties allowed for the
plaintiff and the defendant to both retain the marital
home as joint property for four years, with the payment
of the expenses similar to what they had practiced for
years. After four years, the property would be transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant and the defendant would assume all [of] the expenses of the property.
Judge Murphy rejected the agreement as not being fair
and equitable.
‘‘Nonetheless, pursuant to the parties’ subsequent
request, the matter was recalled after the parties
informed the court that they had a revised agreement
and [were] ready to proceed. The matter was passed
at 10:48 a.m. and recalled at 12:30 p.m. The agreement
now allowed for the defendant to receive alimony of
$600 per month for two years and that the plaintiff
would also cover all the expenses for the property during the two years. The parties were both fully canvassed,
and the agreement was approved, adopted by the court,
and went to judgment.
‘‘The court is limited in granting relief from a dissolution judgment secured by fraud if (1) [t]here are no
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laches or unreasonable delay by the injured party after
the fraud was discovered . . . (2) [t]here must be clear
proof of fraud [and] . . . (3) [t]here is a substantial
likelihood that the result of the new trial will be different.
‘‘After an exhaustive review of the file, the transcripts
on . . . file, and all the relevant pleadings within the
file, the court found, pursuant to its order . . . dated
October 3, 2022, that the defendant has filed the motion
to open with undue delays, there is no clear proof of
fraud as the defendant was aware at the time of dissolution of the plaintiff’s military service, and there is no
likelihood that a new trial will have a different result.
The court’s decision on the motion to open the judgment
is final.’’
We begin by setting forth the legal principles that
govern our review. ‘‘We do not undertake a plenary
review of the merits of a decision of the trial court to
grant or to deny a motion to open a judgment. . . . In
an appeal from a denial of a motion to open a judgment,
our review is limited to the issue of whether the trial
court has acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its
discretion. . . . In determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. . . . The
manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not
be disturbed [as] long as the court could reasonably
conclude as it did. . . .
‘‘Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not
be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set
aside is filed within four months following the date on
which [the notice of judgment or decree was sent].
. . . An exception to the four month limitation applies,
however, if a party can show, inter alia, that the judgment was obtained by fraud. . . .
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‘‘There are three limitations on a court’s ability to
grant relief from a dissolution judgment secured by
fraud: (1) there must have been no laches or unreasonable delay by the injured party after the fraud was
discovered; (2) there must be clear proof of the fraud;
and (3) there [must be] a [reasonable probability] that
the result of the new trial [would] be different.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Conroy v. Idlibi, 343 Conn. 201, 204–
205, 272 A.3d 1121 (2022).
Further, it is well established that ‘‘[a]ppellate review
of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the
clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s
findings are binding upon this court unless they are
clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. . . . Therefore, to
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we
must find that the court either incorrectly applied the
law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferraro v. Ferraro, 168
Conn. App. 723, 727,
147 A.3d 188 (2016).
In her March 8, 2023 motion to open, the defendant
argued that the court had abused its discretion because
it denied the motions to open the dissolution judgment
after depriving her of her right to complete the hearing
that had begun before Judge Tindill in August, 2021,
improperly relied on Judge Tindill’s October 5, 2022
ruling declaring a mistrial with respect to the motions
to open, and ultimately resolved material factual issues
concerning the motions to open in the absence of any
evidence. The defendant argued that she was denied
due process and that the court’s judgment could not
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stand. The defendant reiterates these same arguments
before this court in support of her challenge to the
court’s March 8, 2023 ruling denying the motion to
open.6
It is undisputed that an evidentiary hearing related
to the allegations of fraud set forth in the motions to
open began at the trial held before Judge Tindill on
August 17, 2021.7 ‘‘When a court’s exercise of discretion
depends on disputed factual issues, such as the existence of fraud, due process requires an evidentiary hearing.’’ Davis v. Fracasso, 59 Conn. App. 291, 299–300,
756 A.2d 325 (2000). Our careful review of the record
reflects that, when the parties appeared before Judge
Tindill on August 17, 2021, the court began to hear
evidence in support of the defendant’s motions to open
the dissolution judgment on the basis of fraud. The
hearing did not conclude. Judge Tindill, both at the
hearing and in her written order of August 17, 2021,
directed the parties to take steps to ensure that the
hearing would conclude at a later date, after she had
been reassigned to the Superior Court in Milford. The
defendant did so by sending several caseflow requests
and other correspondence to the court, to no avail.
6
In articulating her arguments, the defendant invokes the bypass doctrine
set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989),
as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015).
The defendant’s reliance on Golding is unnecessary because, in substance,
she amply articulated before the trial court her belief that the denial of the
motions to open in the absence of a completed hearing and in reliance on
Judge Tindill’s October 5, 2022 ruling deprived her of her right to due process.
To the extent that the defendant’s invocation of Golding is an attempt to
raise a constitutional claim that is distinct from her claim that the court
abused its discretion in denying her motion to open, it is unnecessary for
us to resolve it because we conclude that the ruling reflected an abuse of
discretion and should be reversed on that legal basis.
7
Thus, this is not a case in which the court determined that the information
included in the motions to open was insufficient to constitute the necessary
threshold showing to entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing. Cf.,
e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Tarzia, 186 Conn. App. 800, 809,
201 A.3d
511 (2019).
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The record clearly reflects Judge Tindill’s written
order of August 17, 2021, in which she states that the
hearing that began before her would continue. The
record further reflects that, on September 22, 2022, the
date of the proceeding before Judge Price-Boreland, no
mistrial had been declared with respect to the motions
to open. Indeed, Judge Tindill’s ruling of October 5,
2022, reveals that she had not, prior to the date of her
ruling, declared a mistrial. When the parties appeared
before Judge Price-Boreland on September 22, 2022,
however, the entirety of the proceeding was devoted
to discussing what motions were properly before the
court and, specifically, whether it was appropriate for
the parties to be afforded an opportunity to conclude
the hearing that began on August 17, 2021. When the
proceeding was adjourned on September 22, 2022,
Judge Price-Boreland made it clear that she would
obtain more information from Judge Tindill. Judge
Price-Boreland denied the motions on October 3, 2022,
two days before notice was sent that Judge Tindill had
declared a mistrial. On this record, we agree with the
defendant that she not only lacked notice that Judge
Tindill had declared a mistrial, but that Judge Tindill,
in her ruling of August 17, 2021, expressly afforded
her an expectation that she would be able to present
evidence and be heard with respect to the merits of
her motions to open.
Moreover, the defendant correctly argues that, in
denying the motions to open, Judge Price-Boreland
made factual findings despite the fact that the court
did not hear any evidence related to the motions to
open during the proceeding on September 22, 2022.8 At
8
We note that, at the outset of the proceeding, the parties were sworn
in by the clerk, but the court and the parties thereafter discussed what
matters were properly before the court, and neither party presented evidence
with respect to the pending motions to open. Near the end of the proceeding,
the court turned to a different topic by asking the parties about a pending
motion for contempt that had been filed by the defendant. Specifically, the
court briefly asked the parties questions about the plaintiff’s history of
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that proceeding, the court noted that, in order to reach
the merits of the motions to open, it ‘‘would need to
start an entire new . . . hearing’’ in light of the fact
that it had ‘‘not been privy to the first day of the testimony’’ that took place before Judge Tindill. These comments make clear that Judge Price-Boreland did not
have access to the evidence that the defendant presented at the uncompleted hearing before Judge Tindill,
let alone that she had relied on it. Nonetheless, in ruling
on the motions to open, Judge Price-Boreland, without
an evidentiary hearing, specifically found that, at the
time of the dissolution judgment, the defendant was
aware of both the plaintiff’s military pension and the
fact that he was not disclosing its existence to the court.
In addition, in her articulated decision of her March 8,
2023 denial of the motion to open the October 3, 2022
judgment denying the motions to open, the court once
again, without having heard any evidence, stated that
it had found ‘‘no clear proof of fraud . . . .’’ The court
also found that, at the time of the dissolution judgment,
‘‘the defendant was aware . . . of the plaintiff’s military service and there is no likelihood that a new trial
will have a different result.’’ It is well settled that a
finding of fact that is not based on the evidence cannot
withstand appellate scrutiny and, thus, a decision based
entirely on such findings reflects an abuse of the court’s
discretion. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Ferraro, supra,168
Conn. App. 727.
This case reflects an unusual procedural history. On
the basis of the unique circumstances presented, we
conclude that the denial of the defendant’s March 8,
2023 motion to open the judgment denying the motions
to open the judgment of dissolution was a clear abuse
of the court’s discretion. Accordingly, we conclude that
making alimony payments, to which they responded. We note, however,
that hearings on the defendant’s motion for contempt did not take place
until September 7 and December 1, 2023, and March 1, 2024.
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the proper remedy is to set aside the judgment denying
that motion and remand the case for a new hearing
on the defendant’s motions to open the judgment of
dissolution.
II
Next, we address the defendant’s claim that the court
abused its discretion in denying the motion for contempt insofar as it was based on the plaintiff’s failure
(1) to comply with his obligation to pay alimony and
(2) to quitclaim his rights to the marital home to her
within the time specified in the judgment of dissolution.
We are not persuaded by either subpart of this claim.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. On December 14, 2022, before
the court disposed of the defendant’s motions to open
the dissolution judgment, the defendant filed a motion
for contempt in which she alleged that the plaintiff had
violated the court’s financial orders by failing to pay
alimony from February, 2013, until February, 2015; to
timely quitclaim his interest in the marital home to her;
and to pay household expenses. The plaintiff filed a
written objection to the motion. The court, Price-Boreland, J., held a hearing on the motion for contempt on
September 7 and December 1, 2023, and March 1, 2024.
On May 30, 2024, the court rendered a judgment denying
the motion for contempt. In its memorandum of decision, the court noted the relevant portions of the dissolution judgment rendered on February 5, 2013. First, the
court noted that section 8 of the dissolution agreement
provided that alimony would be paid to the defendant
in the amount of $600 per month for two years. Next, the
court noted that section 10 of the dissolution agreement
provided that the parties’ marital home in Meriden ‘‘will
remain joint property of the plaintiff and the defendant
for four years.’’ Finally, the court noted that section 10
was modified by the court at the time of the dissolution
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judgment to include the following language: ‘‘Sentence
one shall be an order of the court. . . . [Sentence two
of section 10 now states that the] plaintiff shall quitclaim
this property to the defendant. The defendant shall be
responsible for all household bills from the date of the
[quitclaim] deed.’’
The court thereafter made findings with respect to
the alleged instances of contempt. With respect to alimony, the court concluded that the order requiring the
plaintiff to pay the defendant alimony in the amount of
$600 per month for two years was clear and unambiguous. The court then made the following additional findings: ‘‘Pursuant to the parties’ actions and relevant to
the overall disposition of the issues before the court,
the court finds it credible that, subsequent to the dissolution, the parties practiced a financial arrangement
that was complicit and blurred the lines between the
court orders and compliance with those court orders.
‘‘The first notable incident was, despite the orders of
the court, pursuant to the dissolution, requiring the
plaintiff to quitclaim the property to the defendant in
four years, the parties jointly refinanced the home in
August of 2013, six months postdissolution. The refinancing provided for a reduction in the monthly mortgage payments to $660.
‘‘The plaintiff’s record on alimony paid to the defendant is found in his exhibits 1 and 6. Within those exhibits, the plaintiff summarized alimony payments made
to the defendant. The summary reflects payments made
from [his bank account] in the amount of $8174 from
February, 2013, [through] May, 2018, labeled as alimony
payments. The total alimony payments that should have
been paid over the two years was $14,400, however,
based on the evidence, the amount paid by the plaintiff
was $8174, with no other direct evidence that the
remaining $6226 was paid directly towards alimony.
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The court finds this accounting credible. The court also
takes judicial notice that the plaintiff never filed a
motion for modification of alimony and so the [order]
of the court at the time of dissolution stands.’’
With respect to the allegation that the plaintiff failed
to comply with his obligation to pay household bills,
the court credited evidence that, during the relevant
time period, the plaintiff had paid certain sewer
expenses, real estate taxes, mortgage payments, cable
expenses, gas expenses, and electric expenses. The
court found that, between February, 2013, and November, 2020, the plaintiff paid $95,785 in household bills.
The court acknowledged the defendant’s claim that she
had paid $32,000 in household expenses that should
have been paid by the plaintiff but noted weaknesses
in the evidence upon which the defendant relied to
support this claim. Among the court’s detailed findings,
it also noted that ‘‘[t]here was testimony from both
parties that each of them had their family members
living in the [marital] home at various times, either
consuming resources and not contributing or staying
there to supplement the expenses of the home.’’ In
particular, the parties presented conflicting evidence
with respect to an agreement, pursuant to which the
plaintiff’s sister allegedly lived at the home on the condition that she would assist the defendant with household
bills. The court found ‘‘the merit and pertinent details
of either parties’ argument on this issue to be inconsequential within the larger context of the parties’ ongoing
complicit modification of the court orders.’’
Finally, with respect to the allegation that the plaintiff
failed to quitclaim his interest in the marital home to
the defendant in a timely manner, the court stated:
‘‘The court takes judicial notice that the plaintiff filed
a motion to compel sale of the property . . . [on] July
29, 2020. The motion was never ruled on by the court
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and by that date he had already quitclaimed the property
to the defendant.
‘‘The plaintiff quitclaimed the property to the defendant on September 16, 2019, and recorded it on June
29, 2020 . . . . The court recognizes the quitclaim date
of September 16, 2019, as the operative date of the
plaintiff officially complying with the court orders. The
original order of the court was not qualified with a date
of recording, but a date to quitclaim. The court also
finds it credible that, given the history of the parties’
practice subsequent to the dissolution in meeting the
financial obligations of the marital home, the timing of
the quitclaim was perfunctory and, thus, the date that
the quitclaim was recorded is not significantly distinguishable from the quitclaim date.’’
The court then summarized its findings, as follows:
‘‘The court, pursuant to its findings above, finds that
the plaintiff has not paid the defendant alimony in the
amount of $6226 of the $14,400 he was obligated to pay.
The court does not find his actions wilful, however [it]
enters remedial orders below.
‘‘Regarding the bifurcated agreement/order on the
real estate, the court finds that the orders were not
clear and unambiguous, therefore the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the court order was not wilful.
‘‘Generally, an execution of orders to quitclaim property is subject to the party or parties who are obligated
to the financial institution for paying the mortgage, disentangling their financial obligations, thus allowing for
the party who quitclaims the property to no longer
be held accountable as a [mortgagor]. Unless stated
otherwise, in order to fully effectuate a quitclaim of
property, the party who receives the quitclaim deed
should have the capacity to independently assume the
outstanding mortgage on the property. That party is
subject to a lender qualifying them for said mortgage.
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The plaintiff as a [mortgagor] made a convincing argument that his vested interest in preserving his credit
was a defense that precluded his strict compliance with
the deadline to quitclaim the property. He, however,
continued to pay for household bills associated with
the marital property for a protracted period of time.
‘‘The court finds the plaintiff’s testimony credible that
the defendant was unable to meet the conditions for an
independent mortgage. This is supported by the parties’
actions when they refinanced the property in August
of 2013, with them both signing the documents to execute the refinance. Additionally, there was no evidence
or testimony to support the defendant’s preparedness
to independently assume the mortgage.
‘‘The plaintiff continued to pay the primary household
expenses such as the mortgage, real estate taxes, sewer,
gas, and electric bills through 2019, two years post the
ordered quitclaim date of February, 2017. While the
defendant also paid some expenses towards the household bills prior to the property being quitclaimed to
her, the court finds that the plaintiff significantly and
substantially met his required obligations, over and
above any limited payments that the defendant may
have made. A quitclaim deed was executed on September 16, 2019 . . . and, according to testimony of the
defendant, recorded on June 29, 2020. The date of the
quitclaim is the recognized date of final execution of
the pertinent court order.
‘‘The defendant sold the property on June 8, 2021
. . . with all the net proceeds going to her in the amount
of $125,561.
‘‘The court finds that, in light of the parties’ actions
that modified the court orders, the significant payments
of court-ordered expenses made by the plaintiff, the
defendant’s sale of the marital home in 2021 receiving
net proceeds of $125,561, the court denies both the
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defendant’s motion for contempt and request for reimbursement therein.’’ The court ordered the plaintiff to
satisfy his outstanding alimony obligation by paying the
defendant $6226 within forty-five days and denied the
motion for contempt ‘‘as it relates to the real property
and the quitclaim deed . . . and the request for any
and all reimbursement . . . .’’
The following legal principles and standard of review
govern the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff was in
contempt of the orders entered pursuant to the judgment of dissolution when he failed to comply with his
obligation to pay alimony and failed to quitclaim his
interest in the marital home.
‘‘Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders
of a court which has power to punish for such an
offense. . . . [C]ivil contempt is committed when a
person violates an order of court which requires that
person in specific and definite language to do or refrain
from doing an act or series of acts. . . . In part because
the contempt remedy is particularly harsh . . . such
punishment should not rest upon implication or conjecture, [and] the language [of the court order] declaring
. . . rights should be clear, or imposing burdens
[should be] specific and unequivocal, so that the parties
may not be misled thereby. . . .
‘‘To constitute contempt, it is not enough that a party
has merely violated a court order; the violation must
be wilful. . . . It is the burden of the party seeking an
order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the
alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful
noncompliance with that directive. . . . The question
of whether the underlying order is clear and unambiguous is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. . . .
[I]f we conclude that the underlying court order was
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sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in
issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt,
which includes a review of the trial court’s determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by
a good faith dispute or misunderstanding. . . . Under
the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will
make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of
such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the
trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably
could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Trent
v. Trent, 226 Conn. App. 791, 797–98,
321 A.3d 454
(2024).
‘‘We review the court’s factual findings in the context
of a motion for contempt to determine whether they are
clearly erroneous. A factual finding is clearly erroneous
when it is not supported by any evidence in the record
or when there is evidence to support it, but the
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Kirwan v. Kirwan, 187 Conn. App.
375, 393–94,
202 A.3d 458 (2019).
A
Before we may consider the merits of the defendant’s
claim, in which she challenges the denial of her motion
for contempt, it is necessary that we resolve a jurisdictional issue raised by the plaintiff in his appellate brief.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the present claim
is moot because, as of the time of this appeal, he has
paid the defendant the $6226 alimony arrearage as
ordered by the court and the marital home has been
sold and he ‘‘no longer has any interest in it . . . .’’
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‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to
resolve. . . . It is a [well settled] general rule that the
existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of
appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the
determination of which no practical relief can follow.
. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the
time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency
of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an
appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot. . . . [A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may
not be waived . . . [or jurisdiction] conferred by the
parties, explicitly or implicitly. . . . [T]he question of
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .
and, once raised, either by a party or by the court itself,
the question must be answered before the court may
decide the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brookstone Homes, LLC v. Merco Holdings, LLC, 208
Conn. App. 789, 798–99,
266 A.3d 921 (2021).
For several reasons, we are not persuaded that the
payment of the alimony arrearage by the plaintiff and
the sale of the marital home support the conclusion
that there is no practical relief that we may afford the
defendant in connection with this claim. First, we
observe that the defendant argues in connection with
this claim that she was entitled to more than the $6226
in alimony awarded to her by the court. In this regard,
the defendant argues that, because the plaintiff did not
make any monthly payments in the amount of $600
between February, 2013, and February, 2015, she was
entitled to an award of all of the alimony that should
have been paid to her, $14,400, plus an award of 10
percent in statutory interest on that amount of $15,100,
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for a total award of $29,500. Second, with respect to
the order requiring the plaintiff to quitclaim his interest
in the marital home to her, the defendant argues that the
court erroneously concluded that the plaintiff complied
with this order on September 16, 2019, when he executed a quitclaim deed. The defendant argues that the
plaintiff did not comply with his obligation to quitclaim
his interest in the marital home until at least June 29,
2020, when the deed was recorded, and that the court
failed to require him to pay for household expenses
until that later date. Finally, in connection with her
motion for contempt, the defendant sought, but was
not awarded, attorney’s fees. If this court were to grant
her relief in connection with either subpart of this claim,
the defendant may be able to recover not only an additional alimony payment or an additional payment for
household expenses, but an award of attorney’s fees.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that
this portion of the appeal should be dismissed on the
ground that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over this claim. Having resolved the threshold jurisdictional issue raised by the plaintiff, we now reach the
merits of the defendant’s claim that the court abused
its discretion in denying her motion for contempt.
B
With respect to the portion of the claim that pertains
to alimony, the defendant argues that, despite the fact
that, at the time of the dissolution judgment, the court
ordered the plaintiff to pay her $600 per week in alimony
between February, 2013, and February, 2015, the plaintiff failed to make any such alimony payments to her
during that period of time. The defendant argues that
it would be improper for the plaintiff to satisfy his
alimony obligation by relying on amounts that he overpaid to meet household expenses because the order to
pay alimony did not include an offset provision and
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‘‘[he] never filed a motion for modification and/or never
otherwise informed the court or the defendant that
he was intending to satisfy his alimony obligation by
making overpayments of his household expense obligations. Significantly, per the judgment, neither the term
of the two years nor the amount of $600 was modifiable.
His alleged overpayments should arguably be considered gifts.’’ The defendant, apparently acknowledging
that the evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff
made some alimony payments to her, in amounts less
than $600 beginning in February, 2013, nonetheless
argues that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s unilateral decision to pay
his alimony obligation in a manner of his choosing without the defendant’s consent usurped her right to control
the manner in which she would receive and allocate
and/or spend her alimony funds.’’ The defendant also
argues that there was no evidence to suggest that the
plaintiff lacked the ability to comply with his alimony
obligation.
The defendant also argues that the court improperly
found that the plaintiff had ‘‘labeled’’ some of the payments that he made to her as ‘‘alimony.’’ According to
the defendant, ‘‘[t]here is nothing in the exhibits that
state that the payments were labeled as alimony payments. None of the columns [in these exhibits] even
use the word alimony.’’ Alternatively, the defendant
argues that ‘‘[a]ny reference to alimony payments . . .
[was] self-serving and the court abused its discretion in
crediting the plaintiff with any such alimony payments.’’
Finally, the defendant argues that, even if the court
properly found that she and the plaintiff ‘‘were complicit
in the manner in which they dealt with each other postdivorce, as evidenced by them agreeing to refinance
the marital home in 2013, this is hardly a basis for
crediting the plaintiff with over $8000 in alimony payments as [it] did.’’
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First, we address the defendant’s challenge to the
court’s finding that the plaintiff paid her $8174 in alimony and its finding that the plaintiff characterized any
of the payments that he made to her as ‘‘alimony.’’
In its memorandum of decision, the court referred to
exhibits 1 and 6 introduced into evidence by the plaintiff. Exhibit 1 includes an itemized list, apparently created by the plaintiff, of ‘‘payments’’ made by him to the
defendant’s bank account, between February, 2013, and
May, 2018, totaling $8174.84. The exhibit also includes
a record of amounts paid by the plaintiff to the defendant for ‘‘water and sewer’’ and ‘‘real estate taxes.’’ The
plaintiff testified that exhibit 1 reflects payments that
he made to the defendant. Exhibit 6 is titled ‘‘John
Rettman Alimony Payments Transferred From His . . .
Bank . . . Account . . . Directly To Maura Rettman’s
. . . Bank Account . . . .’’ Similar to the information
contained in exhibit 1, exhibit 6, also generated by the
plaintiff, contains an itemized list of payments made
by him, totaling $8174.84, between February, 2013, and
May, 2018. The plaintiff testified that exhibit 6 reflects
alimony that he paid to the defendant. The plaintiff
agreed with the court that these exhibits did not reflect
$600 payments between the period of February, 2013,
and February, 2015, but rather a series of multiple payments in lesser amounts that were made beginning in
February, 2013, until May, 2018, totaling $8174.84.
Exhibit 6 also contains the following notation: ‘‘Claimed
alimony amount total is $14,400. Less the amount paid
into [the defendant’s] accounts of $8174.84 equals a
balance of $6225.16. The plaintiff is now retired and
living on a fixed income and cannot afford $600 a month
or it will bankrupt him.’’ This evidence, which the court
expressly found to be credible, supports the court’s
reference to payments labeled by the plaintiff as ‘‘alimony’’ and its finding that the plaintiff had paid the
defendant $8174 in alimony as of the time of the hearing
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on the motion for contempt. Accordingly, the defendant
has failed to demonstrate that the court’s findings with
respect to these matters were clearly erroneous.
Second, we address the defendant’s contention that
the court improperly found that the plaintiff’s failure
to pay her alimony in accordance with the court’s 2013
clear and unambiguous alimony order was not wilful.
Many of the defendant’s arguments, however, overlook
the reasoning in the court’s memorandum of decision.
The court found that the plaintiff did not make payments as were required by the court’s order, resulting
in a deficit in alimony payments of $6226. The court
did not excuse the plaintiff’s failure to make such payments on the ground that the plaintiff had overpaid
household expenses, nor did the court find that the
plaintiff was excused from paying his alimony obligation because he lacked the financial means to do so.
Indeed, although the court denied the motion for contempt, it nonetheless entered a remedial order requiring
the plaintiff to pay the defendant $6226.
In concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to pay alimony was not wilful, the court relied on its finding, the
correctness of which the defendant does not challenge
in any meaningful way in this appeal, that from the time
of the parties’ dissolution, the parties had ‘‘practiced a
financial arrangement that was complicit and blurred
the lines between the court orders and compliance with
those court orders.’’ For example, the parties jointly
refinanced the marital home in August, 2013, the parties
consented to their family members living in the marital
home at various times, and the plaintiff continued to
pay household expenses into 2019, well past the time
at which he was obligated to quitclaim his interest in
the property to the defendant.9
9
Although the court’s findings with respect to the parties’ mutual lack of
strict compliance with the court’s financial orders supports its conclusion
that the plaintiff did not wilfully fail to comply with his alimony obligation, we
emphasize that such a pattern of noncompliance by the parties is disfavored.
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The defendant essentially urges us to conclude that,
because the court’s alimony order was clear and unambiguous and the plaintiff did not comply with it, the
court necessarily erred in finding the noncompliance to
not be wilful. This logic is faulty. ‘‘Motions for contempt
implicate the court’s inherent equitable authority to
effectuate and vindicate its judgments.’’ Brody v. Brody,
153 Conn. App. 625, 635,
103 A.3d 981, cert. denied,
315
Conn. 910,
105 A.3d 901 (2014). ‘‘Whether to find a party
in contempt is ultimately a matter within the trial court’s
discretion.’’ Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 532,
710 A.2d 757 (1998). Simply because the plaintiff did
not comply with the order, it did not necessarily mean,
in light of the totality of the circumstances, that the
court could not exercise its discretion and find that the
plaintiff’s conduct was not wilful. Instead, we conclude
that the court reasonably declined to impose the harsh
penalty of contempt in favor of requiring the plaintiff
to pay the defendant an amount equaling the unpaid
portion of his alimony obligation.10
C
We next address the portion of the defendant’s claim
that relates to the plaintiff’s obligation to quitclaim his
‘‘[T]his court and our Supreme Court previously have determined that a
party’s decision to use self-help instead of judicial resources to modify an
obligation under a judgment in a family matter could be a basis for granting
a motion for contempt against that party . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lynch v. Lynch, 153 Conn. App. 208, 240,
100 A.3d 968 (2014),
cert. denied, 315 Conn. 923,
108 A.3d 1124, cert. denied,
577 U.S. 839,
136
S. Ct. 68,
193 L. Ed. 2d 66 (2015). ‘‘A party to a court proceeding must obey
the court’s orders unless and until they are modified or rescinded, and may
not engage in ‘self-help’ by disobeying a court order to achieve the party’s
desired end.’’ O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 97,
161 A.3d 1236 (2017).
If the plaintiff was unsure of what the court’s order required of him, it was
incumbent upon him to seek clarification from the court.
10
In light of our conclusion that the court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the plaintiff did not wilfully violate the alimony order in light
of the parties’ conduct following the entry of the financial orders, we are
not persuaded by the defendant’s claim that the court’s remedial order did
not sufficiently compensate her for the plaintiff’s failure to pay all of his
alimony obligation in a timely manner.
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Rettman v. Rettman
interest in the marital home to the defendant.11 The
defendant argues that the court improperly denied her
motion for contempt on the ground that the plaintiff
failed to quitclaim his interest in the marital home to
her by February 5, 2017, an obligation that, in her view,
is clearly and unambiguously set forth in the court’s
financial orders. The defendant argues that the court
erroneously concluded that the effective date of the
plaintiff’s transfer of his interest in the marital home
to her occurred on September 16, 2019, the undisputed
date on which he signed the quitclaim deed. According
to the defendant, on that date the quitclaim deed had
neither been delivered to her nor accepted by her. The
defendant argues that ‘‘the earliest effective date’’ of
the transfer of the plaintiff’s interest in the home was
on June 29, 2020, the undisputed date on which he
recorded the deed on the land records. Alternatively,
the defendant argues that the transfer of the marital
home to her by way of the quitclaim deed ‘‘was never
actually effective’’ because she did not accept the terms
set forth in the deed, some of which required her to
release the plaintiff from any financial obligations
related to the marital home, and she filed an objection
to the deed after she was in possession of it.
The defendant argues that the court improperly
agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that he was not
required to transfer his interest in the marital home
until such time as the defendant was in a financial
position to refinance it, thereby removing the plaintiff’s
name from the mortgage on the home. The defendant
asserts that, even if the plaintiff acted under a good
faith belief, his failure to comply with the court’s order
did not preclude a finding of contempt. The defendant
posits that she was prejudiced because ‘‘[t]he plaintiff,
11
A quitclaim deed is ‘‘an ordinary and primary instrument of conveyance
and conveys to the grantee whatever interest the grantor has in the property.’’
Hoyt v. Ketcham, 54 Conn. 60, 62,
5 A. 606 (1886).
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Rettman v. Rettman
by refusing to quitclaim the deed to [her] until she
was financially able to refinance the home essentially
usurped her ability to put the home up for sale which,
when sold, would have removed the plaintiff’s name
from the mortgage.’’ Moreover, the defendant argues
that, by failing to find the plaintiff in contempt, the court
erroneously ‘‘modified and/or augmented the [parties’
dissolution] agreement when it essentially decided that
the agreement meant to say that the plaintiff did not
have to quitclaim the marital property to the defendant
until she was in a financial position to refinance it.’’
In denying the motion for contempt, the court concluded that the order with respect to the plaintiff’s
obligation to quitclaim his interest in the marital home
to the defendant was not clear and unambiguous
because it did not specify whether compliance with
the order occurred upon execution of the deed, the
recording of the deed, or some other occurrence. Thus,
the court determined that, for purposes of determining
whether the plaintiff was in contempt of the dissolution
order, the date on which the plaintiff executed the deed
was ‘‘not significantly distinguishable’’ from the date
on which it had been recorded on the land records.
Having also found that ‘‘the defendant was unable to
meet the conditions for an independent mortgage,’’ the
court was persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that
his failure to act with respect to the quitclaim deed
within four years was the result of the defendant’s
inability to assume sole responsibility of the mortgage
on the marital home, and, therefore, was not wilful.
The court determined that the plaintiff, who at the time
of the dissolution judgment was a mortgagor of the
marital home together with the defendant, had made
‘‘a convincing argument that his vested interest in preserving his credit was a defense that precluded his strict
compliance with the deadline to quitclaim the property.’’
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Rettman v. Rettman
As stated previously, we review de novo the court’s
legal determination that the order at issue was not clear
and unambiguous. See Trent v. Trent, supra,226 Conn.
App. 797. ‘‘As a general rule, judgments are to be construed in the same fashion as other written instruments.
. . . The determinative factor is the intention of the
court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . .
The interpretation of a judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment.
. . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly
implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The
judgment should admit of a consistent construction as
a whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v.
Perry, 156 Conn. App. 587, 593,
113 A.3d 132, cert.
denied, 317 Conn. 906,
114 A.3d 1220 (2015). ‘‘The language of a judgment must be given its ordinary meaning
unless a technical or special meaning is clearly
intended.’’ Brewer v. Gutierrez, 42 Conn. App. 421, 424,
681 A.2d 345 (1996).
The order, dated February 5, 2013, stated that ‘‘the
plaintiff shall quitclaim [the marital home] to the defendant. The defendant shall be responsible for all household bills from the date of the [quitclaim] deed.’’ The
dissolution court also ordered that the marital home
‘‘will remain joint property of the plaintiff and the defendant for four years.’’ We reach the same conclusion as
Judge Price-Boreland, that the order at issue is unclear
and ambiguous. The order reasonably could be interpreted to mean that the plaintiff and the defendant were
required to continue to jointly own the marital home for
at least four years following the date of the dissolution
judgment. Under such a construction of the order, it
would have been improper for the plaintiff to have
quitclaimed his interest in the marital home prior to
February 5, 2017, and there is no readily identifiable
deadline for the plaintiff to take any action with respect
to a quitclaim deed by any particular date thereafter.
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Rettman v. Rettman
Moreover, the orders do not specify what specific conduct constitutes compliance with the order beyond the
requirement that the plaintiff ‘‘quitclaim’’ the marital
home to the defendant. The ambiguity that arises from
the court’s use of the colloquial phrase ‘‘quitclaim’’ is
readily reflected in the parties’ arguments before this
court. The plaintiff believes that compliance occurred
upon his execution of the quitclaim deed. The defendant
argues that compliance with the order occurred, at the
earliest, once the quitclaim deed had been recorded
and, in the alternative, that the plaintiff could not have
complied with the order until the quitclaim deed was
both delivered to her and accepted by her.12
Our conclusion that the order was not clear and
unambiguous is a sufficient basis on which to uphold
the court’s denial of the motion for contempt to the
extent that it is based on the plaintiff’s alleged failure
to quitclaim the marital home to the defendant in a
timely manner. We also note that, in determining that
a wilful violation of a court order did not occur, the
court credited the evidence that the defendant was
unable to meet the conditions of an independent mortgage, as well as the plaintiff’s testimony that his alleged
noncompliance was the result of his own interest in
protecting his credit. These additional findings further
support the court’s finding that the plaintiff did not
wilfully fail to comply with his obligation to quitclaim
his interest in a timely manner. It was proper for the
court to consider the plaintiff’s rationale for his alleged
noncompliance and exercise its discretion to deny the
motion for contempt, particularly in light of the unclear
12
In light of our conclusion that the order was not clear and unambiguous,
we are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the court improperly
failed to require the plaintiff to pay household expenses until June 29, 2020,
the date on which the plaintiff recorded the quitclaim deed, rather than
September 16, 2019, the date on which the plaintiff executed the quitclaim deed.
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Rettman v. Rettman
and ambiguous order at issue. Contrary to the defendant’s arguments, the court, in denying the motion for
contempt, did not in any way augment or modify the
terms of the dissolution judgment. Instead, the court
merely declined to find the plaintiff in contempt for
failing to comply with an order that the court found to
be unclear and ambiguous. We are not persuaded that
the ruling reflects an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
The judgment denying the motion to open the judgment denying the motions to open the dissolution judgment is reversed, the judgment denying the motions to
open the dissolution judgment is vacated, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings on the defendant’s
motions to open the dissolution judgment; the judgment
denying the defendant’s motion for contempt is
affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
