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State v. Nichols
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT
LEE NICHOLS
(AC 46989)
Alvord, Suarez and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree and risk of injury to
a child, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that
the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying his postverdict
motion for a new trial, in which he claimed that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. Held:
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of the crimes with which he was
charged and that his abuse of the minor victim, an infant, occurred within
the applicable statute of limitations (§ 54-193 (c)), as the jury reasonably
could have credited the testimony of a witness who had watched the defendant cause the victim to hit his head on a granite countertop, drag the victim
on a rug and slam him several times on a floor.
The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying the defendant’s
motion for a new trial to the extent that the court’s statement that it could
not reject the jury’s findings and substitute its own view of the evidence
applied the legal standard used to adjudicate sufficiency of the evidence
claims, as the proper inquiry in adjudicating a motion for a new trial required
the court to determine if there was a substantial question regarding the
reliability of the verdict and to make its own credibility determinations, and
the court’s summary statement that it agreed with the jury’s findings based
on the evidence did not alter this court’s conclusion that the trial court
applied an incorrect legal standard; accordingly, the trial court’s denial of
the motion for a new trial was reversed and the case was remanded to the
trial judge who presided over the trial to make his own assessment of the
jury’s credibility determinations.
Argued May 19—officially released August 19, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child and
one count of the crime of assault in the first degree,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Hartford and tried to the jury before K. Doyle, J.; verdict
of guilty; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s
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State v. Nichols
motions for a judgment of acquittal, in arrest of the
judgment and for a new trial, and rendered judgment in
accordance with the verdict, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Corinne A. Burlingham, with whom were Michael
S. Taylor and Brendon P. Levesque, for the appellant
(defendant).
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L.
Walcott, state’s attorney, and Michael W. Riley, senior
assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ALVORD, J. The defendant, Robert Lee Nichols,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of one count of assault in the first
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3)
and two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation
of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied
his motion for a judgment of acquittal because there
was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty
on all counts, and (2) denied his motion for a new
trial because the jury’s verdict was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. We disagree with the defendant’s first claim. However, we are persuaded that the
court applied an incorrect legal standard in adjudicating
the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we
reverse the court’s denial of the motion for a new trial
and remand the case to the trial court, K. Doyle, J., for
a new determination on that motion. The judgment is
affirmed with respect to the defendant’s claim that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to our
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State v. Nichols
disposition of the defendant’s claims. The defendant
and his wife (collectively, Nichols) were pastors of a
small congregation and operated a day care out of their
house. The minor victim1 was born in October, 2012.
The victim’s parents, R and D, attended services at the
defendant’s congregation and enrolled the victim in the
defendant’s day care. The Nichols and H,2 another person who attended services at the defendant’s congregation and who lived with the Nichols, were the only
people who worked at the day care. The Nichols also
watched the victim outside of the regular day care
hours.
During August, 2013, R and D fell ill, which led to
the victim, who was approximately nine or ten months
old at the time, having an extended stay of about ten
days (extended stay) at the Nichols’ house.3 At the
beginning of the victim’s extended stay, the defendant
1
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the
victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained.
See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106,
136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
2
R, D and H were raised in a religion that viewed women as subservient
to men. R and H believed they had to submit to the authority of their
husbands and pastors.
3
D and R provided inconsistent testimony about why the Nichols watched
the victim during the extended stay. D testified that the Nichols wanted to
keep the victim in order to teach him how to be more obedient, whereas
R testified that the Nichols were concerned that the victim would catch the
illness if they took him home.
Initially, R testified that the Nichols watched the victim in August, 2013.
Although R and D testified that the stay could have been in July, 2013, and
H initially testified that she did not remember the exact dates of the extended
stay and that it might have been in the fall of 2013, H later testified that
the stay began on August 10, 2013, because she had a photo with that date
and recalled that the photo was taken the first day of the extended stay.
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State v. Nichols
placed the victim, several times, in a sink filled with
cold water and ice cubes. The defendant used the sink
faucet sprayer to spray water over the victim’s head,
causing the victim to flail and gasp for air.4 On one of
these occasions, the victim flailed, fell backward, and
hit his head on a granite countertop.
Other incidents occurred during the victim’s
extended stay. The defendant slapped and hit the victim,
causing the victim to have bruises on his legs. Also, the
defendant very roughly put the victim into a playpen,
making a ‘‘thud’’ sound, and placed pillows on either
side of the victim in order to force him to sit upright.
In addition, the defendant tightly swaddled the victim.
One time, the defendant tightly wrapped the victim,
took him by the legs, flipped him over, and dragged
him along a carpeted floor. While the victim was still
wrapped, the defendant hit the victim on the floor about
three to four times.5 After those incidents, the victim
had marks on his head and bruises.
After R and D recovered from their illnesses, they
attended a service at the defendant’s church. The defendant did not allow R and D to see the victim at that
time because, according to the defendant, the victim
was rebellious.6 The victim was returned to R and D
4
During trial, H testified that the victim had not been standing up when
the defendant commanded him to do so, and the defendant ‘‘was trying to
prove to me, like, he . . . said to me . . . see, look . . . if [the victim]
can’t breathe, if [the victim is] fighting for his life, [the victim] can do it.
So, that means [the victim] knows how to do it and he’s being rebellious.
And so, [the defendant] was trying to prove that [the victim] knew how to
do it, but [the victim] wasn’t because, if he was fearing for his life, he would
do it.’’
5
H testified: ‘‘I heard the thud of [the victim’s] head on the floor. . . .
[I]t was a carpeted floor, but not like a plush, thick carpet. It’s like that thin
. . . kind of carpet that’s knit very tightly. . . . And it was in the living
room where we had a lot of the day care time.’’
6
The defendant told R that the victim’s ‘‘rebellious behavior was because
of [her], because [she] was rebellious, and [she] had passed that on to
[her] son.’’
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State v. Nichols
after being with the Nichols for about ten days.7 When
the victim was returned to his parents, R and D noticed
that the victim seemed off and did not seem to be
himself.8 R saw bruises on the victim’s legs. R wanted
to take the victim to a doctor, but D did not allow
her to do that. Following the extended stay, the victim
would cry whenever R dropped him off at day care or
passed him to the defendant.
In September, 2013, R, D and the victim left the apartment in which they had been living and moved into the
defendant’s basement. D’s sister helped R and D move
out of the apartment. At the time, D’s sister did not
see any bruises or cuts on the victim, but the victim
appeared cross-eyed9 and would put his head down and
keep it down when he was on the floor.
On October 9, 2013, a pediatrician examined the victim during a routine wellness visit. During this twelve
month wellness visit, the pediatrician observed that the
7
H testified that the defendant ‘‘seemed very concerned that [R] would
see [the bruises]. And he said that [they] had to keep [the victim] until the
bruises went away so she wouldn’t see it because he was concerned . . . she
wouldn’t understand how necessary this was and she would say something
to the doctor. . . . He thought it was necessary because he was convinced
that [the victim] had a rebellious spirit and that it was Satan’s attack, and
that he had to get it out of [the victim].’’ In addition, H ‘‘was very strictly
told not to take any photos of [the victim] once [the victim] had the bruises
and his eyes were crossed.’’ During the victim’s extended stay, H did not
report the incidents to R or to the police ‘‘[b]ecause I was afraid if I went
against [the defendant], who was my pastor and the one who was my
authority, that I would be going against God, and then I would be vulnerable
to Satan attacking me. . . . I was also afraid of my life and what [the
defendant] would do to me. If he was capable of doing that to a small infant,
I was very scared to stand up to him because, if I had ever tried in the past,
it resulted in verbal yelling and screaming at me. And so, I was very afraid
to attempt speaking up about it.’’
8
R testified that the victim ‘‘was not as happy as he normally was’’ and
‘‘look[ed] more pale whenever he would vomit, which would happen periodically after he came home.’’ D testified that the victim looked ‘‘somber’’ and
‘‘malnourished. . . . [The victim’s] face color was different.’’
9
D’s sister testified that the victim did not appear cross-eyed on prior visits.
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State v. Nichols
victim had experienced abnormal head growth. At the
victim’s nine month wellness visit, his head had normal
measurements; there had been an abrupt and abnormal
acceleration in the victim’s head growth in the three
month interval between the two wellness visits. As a
result, the pediatrician ordered an ultrasound for the
victim. The ultrasound was done on October 14, 2013,
and the victim was sent home following the procedure.
Upon receiving the radiology results, which showed
fluid in the victim’s head, the pediatrician notified
authorities of suspected child abuse and called R and
D to schedule an MRI scan for the victim. R and D
decided against scheduling an MRI.10 However, the victim was transported to a hospital by ambulance that
night, where he later underwent an MRI scan.
R gave two statements to Detective Kerri Rosa of
the Manchester Police Department during the victim’s
hospitalization.11 D was present each time R was interviewed by Rosa, and R was not allowed to meet with
Rosa outside the presence of D. In addition, the defendant coached R before her meeting with Rosa. R provided one written statement on October 15, 2013, in
which she stated that she ‘‘[did] not know of anything
that could have caused a serious injury to [the victim].’’
On October 16, 2013, R gave a second statement to
Rosa. In that statement, she provided examples of how
the victim may have been injured, such as by a wave
10
The defendant advised R and D to ensure that their insurance would
cover the MRI. R and D contacted the insurance company, which told them
a referral was required. The pediatrician would not provide a referral, so
R and D did not schedule the MRI. R testified that ‘‘[t]he way it was communicated at [the victim’s] well visit was . . . it was all precautionary anyways.’’
R further testified that she did not believe that the victim’s condition was
serious at the time. She then left for work that night. D testified that, at
that time, the defendant told R and D that they should pray over the victim,
that the fluid would dissipate, and that their insurance might not cover the
procedure.
11
D also gave a statement to the police.
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State v. Nichols
hitting the victim while they were in Florida, and an
incident in which the victim hit his head after R fell
backward when taking the victim out of a car. Although
the defendant was not present when R gave her statements to Rosa, the defendant had prompted R to
respond to the detective’s questions with those examples.12
H also gave a statement to Rosa on October 15, 2013.
H had spoken to and was instructed by the defendant
before she gave the statement.13 In that statement, she
recounted that she did not notice any abnormal behavior by or injuries to the victim and that she did not see
the victim act in a way to make her believe that he had
been abused.
The victim’s MRI results showed that he had subdural
hematomas around his brain and blood in another layer
of tissues near his brain. On October 17, 2013, the victim
underwent surgery to relieve pressure on his brain.
The treatment providers conducted a six month long
12
The defendant gave statements to Rosa on October 15 and 16, 2013. In
his October 16 statement, the defendant recalled that he ‘‘was bathing [the
victim] in [his] kitchen sink, and [he] went to rinse [the victim] off with the
water and [the victim] jerked backward, striking the back of his head on
the granite kitchen countertop that surrounds the sink.’’ The defendant also
noted that ‘‘[R] recalled two different situations. One . . . was when we
were all vacationing together in Florida. [R] said her and [D] had brought
[the victim] to the beach, and a wave hit him. And the other incident happened when she was getting him out of the car. [R] explained that . . .
within the last couple weeks, she was getting him out of the car, and she
lost her balance and stumbled backward. [R] said [the victim] struck his
forehead on the car’s doorframe and grab bar area.’’
13
H testified that the defendant had told her that ‘‘[Rosa] was, essentially,
like, I believe he called [Rosa] Satan multiple times. Or she was of Satan.
Or working on Satan’s behalf. She was, like, evil.’’ H also testified that, after
she provided her statement to Rosa, the defendant told her that ‘‘people
are never going to understand the ways of God or understand disciplining
children. They’re not going to understand that this is a spiritual attack
of Satan. They’re not going to understand the ways of God or how you
discipline children.’’
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State v. Nichols
assessment of the victim. Subdural hematomas are commonly caused by trauma but can result from rare medical causes. The treatment providers believed it was
more likely than not that the injuries were the result
of abusive head trauma because the injuries were unexplained.14
Because of the victim’s injuries, R and D lost custody
of the victim. The victim was placed in foster care by
the Department of Children and Families while R and
D continued living in the Nichols’ house. R, however,
eventually left the defendant’s church, moved out of
the Nichols’ house, and separated from her husband.
The victim was returned ‘‘full-time [to her] care’’ in
June, 2014. H left the Nichols’ house in December, 2016.
In June, 2018, H told R about what had happened to
the victim. H then gave a statement to the police, in
which she described the defendant’s assault on the victim.15 On June 4, 2018, R provided her third statement
to the police.16 In the 2018 statement, R described how
she and D had fallen ill in August, 2013, the Nichols
took the victim, and she and D were not allowed to see
the victim for about ten days. D also gave a statement
to the police in 2018.
14
Nina Livingston, a pediatrician specializing in child abuse, testified that
the treatment providers ‘‘originally, during [their] evaluation, said that [the
injuries] were suspicious for physical abuse. . . . [They] could not find a
medical reason for these collections [of blood in the victim’s brain]. And
there were many things, including this head growth chart, that pointed to
some event occurring between nine and twelve months of age.’’ In addition,
she opined that the injury had taken place more than one week before the
victim was treated at the hospital.
15
H testified that her 2018 statement was different from her 2013 statement
‘‘[b]ecause, in 2013, I was so afraid of disobeying [the defendant]. And he
told me what to say, and I felt that I had to obey him because he was the
man of God. He was my authority. And I was too scared to tell the truth.
And I just said exactly what he told me to say.’’
16
R testified that she gave that statement because ‘‘[t]he case was being
revisited. [H] had come forward and [R] felt at that time [that she] was free
to speak for [herself].’’
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State v. Nichols
Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged
by way of a substitute long form information with one
count of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-
59 (a) (3) and two counts of risk of injury to a child in
violation of § 53-21 (a) (1). A jury trial was held in
June, 2023.
When the state rested its case, defense counsel orally
moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that
there was ‘‘not enough evidence that would reasonably
permit a finding of guilty on all the charges.’’ Specifically, although defense counsel did not dispute that
someone had injured the victim, he argued that there
was insufficient evidence identifying the defendant as
the perpetrator. In addition, defense counsel moved for
a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the state had
not commenced this case within the five year statute
of limitations; see part I of this opinion; arguing that
there was conflicting evidence from H regarding the
start date of the victim’s extended stay.17 The trial court
denied the motion, concluding that there was sufficient
evidence ‘‘to find the defendant guilty and to avoid the
statute of limitations claim.’’
The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. On
June 30, 2023, the defendant filed three motions. The
defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal on
all counts on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to permit a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction
because the prosecution did not commence within the
statute of limitations. The defendant filed a motion for
a new trial on all counts on the ground that the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. Following argument, the trial court denied all three motions in an oral
decision. On August 16, 2023, the court sentenced the
17
See footnote 3 of this opinion.
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State v. Nichols
defendant to a total effective term of twenty years of
incarceration, execution suspended after ten years, followed by five years of probation. This appeal followed.
Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he
argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that he committed the alleged conduct or, in the alternative, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that
the conduct occurred within the statute of limitations
because ‘‘the only evidence of the defendant’s involvement in the injuries sustained by [the victim] came from
a single, highly incredulous witness—[H].’’ We are not
persuaded.
We begin with the well settled standard governing
our review of the defendant’s claim that his conviction
was predicated on insufficient evidence. ‘‘In reviewing
a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two part
test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably
could have concluded that the cumulative force of the
evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
. . . . This court cannot substitute its own judgment
for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict. . . .
‘‘While the jury must find every element proven
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic
and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need
not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is
reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a
basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted
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State v. Nichols
to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether
the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the
defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
‘‘On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether
there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports
the jury’s verdict of guilty. . . .
‘‘Furthermore, we are mindful that [w]e do not sit as
a [seventh] juror who may cast a vote against the verdict
based upon our feeling that some doubt of guilt is shown
by the cold printed record.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Douglas C., 195
Conn. App. 728, 735–36,
227 A.3d 532 (2020), aff’d,
345
Conn. 421,
285 A.3d 1067 (2022).
Next, we set forth the relevant statutory language.
Section 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a]
person is guilty of assault in the first degree when . . .
(3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a risk of death to another person, and
thereby causes serious physical injury to another person . . . .’’ Section 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part
that ‘‘[a]ny person who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes
or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to
be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of
such child is endangered, the health of such child is
likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely
to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the
health or morals of any such child . . . shall be guilty
of . . . a class C felony for a violation of subdivision
(1) . . . .’’ In addition, with the exception of certain
crimes identified in General Statutes § 54-193 (a), ‘‘[n]o
person may be prosecuted for any offense . . . for
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State v. Nichols
which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in
excess of one year, except within five years next after
the offense has been committed.’’18 General Statutes
§ 54-193 (c).
The defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence claim
is premised on his contention that the jury could not
reasonably have relied on the testimony of the sole
eyewitness, H. Specifically, the defendant argues that
‘‘[n]o reasonable fact finder could have relied on [H’s]
claims’’ because H ‘‘is an admitted liar who has proven
[that she would] lie to law enforcement and when under
penalty of perjury’’; ‘‘[H’s] testimony that she was sexually assaulted by the defendant was contrary to objective contemporaneous records from [H]’’;19 and ‘‘H has
several demonstrated motives for lying, which are to
exact revenge against the defendant and personally
profit in the process.’’20 The defendant also argues, on
the ground that H’s testimony was unreliable, that the
evidence was insufficient because it failed to establish
that the crimes occurred within the statute of limitations.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the jury
reasonably could have found that the victim had been
injured by the defendant during his extended stay with
the defendant in his home in the days following August
10, 2013. From H’s testimony, in conjunction with evidence that the victim had acted differently after his
18
Detective Claire Hearn testified that a judge had signed the arrest warrant for the defendant on August 10, 2018. The state was required to prove
that the defendant’s crimes occurred on or after August 10, 2013.
19
The defendant points to evidence that H had a sexual relationship with
the defendant and his wife. He argues that H, despite claiming that she had
been sexually abused by the defendant, told another pastor that she liked
having sex with the defendant ‘‘in the moment’’ and grew to have feelings
for the defendant.
20
The defendant argues that H was retaliating against the defendant for
a $22,000 debt she had incurred, which she blamed the defendant for, and
capitalizing on her story by appearing in podcasts and writing a book.
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State v. Nichols
extended stay and sustained life-threatening head injuries requiring surgery in October, 2013, the jury was
permitted to infer that the defendant had wilfully caused
serious physical injuries to the victim. See, e.g., State
v. Franklin, 162 Conn. App. 78, 89,
129 A.3d 770 (2015)
(‘‘[t]he credited testimony of even a single witness may
be sufficient to sustain a defendant’s conviction’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 321 Conn.
905,
138 A.3d 281 (2016).
The jury could have reasonably found the following
facts on the basis of H’s testimony. In the days after
August 10, 2013, the victim had an extended stay at the
Nichols’ house. During the extended stay, H saw the
defendant place the victim in an ice bath in the kitchen
sink and spray the victim with cold water, causing the
victim to flail and hit his head on a granite countertop.
At that time, the defendant stated that he believed the
victim was being ‘‘rebellious’’ because the victim was
not following his commands. Also during the extended
stay, as H testified, the defendant, ‘‘wrapped [the victim]
very tightly and took [the victim] by his legs and flipped
him over and dragged him. So, he had a rug burn on
his head, and [the defendant] slammed him on the floor
like three or four times with, like, a loud thud sound.’’
Following these incidents, the victim had marks on
his head and bruises on his legs, which the defendant
concealed from R by keeping the victim for about
ten days.
Although the defendant presented evidence to
impeach H’s credibility,21 ‘‘it is the function of the jury
to consider the evidence and [to] judge the credibility
of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Williams, 350 Conn. 363, 374,
324 A.3d 760 (2024);
see State v. A. M., 156 Conn. App. 138, 145,
111 A.3d
974 (2015) (‘‘[Q]uestions of whether to believe or to
21
See footnotes 19 and 20 of this opinion.
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State v. Nichols
disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our review.
. . . Our review of factual determinations is limited to
whether those findings are clearly erroneous. . . . We
must defer to the [finder] of fact’s assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses that is made on the basis
of its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor
and attitude.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)),
aff’d, 324 Conn. 190,
152 A.3d 49 (2016). Accordingly,
we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
II
The defendant also claims that the trial court applied
an incorrect legal standard in denying his motion to set
aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence.
We agree with the defendant.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review
applicable to the defendant’s claim. Because the defendant’s claim challenges the legal standard applied by
the trial court, it is subject to plenary review. See, e.g.,
State v. Hughes, 341 Conn. 387, 414,
267 A.3d 81 (2021)
(‘‘[i]nsofar as the defendant’s claims [challenging the
court’s ruling on the motion for new trial] bear on the
proper legal standard, they are subject to plenary
review’’).
Our analysis is guided by the following principles.
‘‘[A] challenge to the weight of the evidence is not the
same as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
A sufficiency claim dispute[s] that the state presented
sufficient evidence, if found credible by the jury, to
sustain [the defendant’s] conviction. . . . In contrast,
a weight claim does not contend that the state’s evidence . . . was insufficient, as a matter of law, to
establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . Rather, [it] asserts that the state’s case
. . . was so flimsy as to raise a substantial question
regarding the reliability of the verdict [and that there
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State v. Nichols
was a] serious danger that [the defendant] was wrongly
convicted. . . .
‘‘Given that these two types of claims raise fundamentally different issues, the inquiry appropriately undertaken by a court ruling on a sufficiency of the evidence
claim differs substantially from that of a court ruling
on a weight of the evidence claim. In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, a court considers whether
there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would
support a guilty verdict. . . . In doing so, the court
does not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast a vote
against the verdict based upon our feeling that some
doubt of guilt is shown by the cold printed record. . . .
[It] cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the
jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict. . . . Thus, a court will not reweigh the evidence or resolve questions of credibility in determining
whether the evidence was sufficient. . . .
‘‘In contrast, a court determining if the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence does precisely what
a court ruling on a sufficiency claim ought not to do.
That is, the court must do just what every juror ought
to do in arriving at a verdict. The juror must use all
his experience, his knowledge of human nature, his
knowledge of human events, past and present, his
knowledge of the motives which influence and control
human action, and test the evidence in the case
according to such knowledge and render his verdict
accordingly. . . . The trial judge in considering the verdict must do the same . . . and if, in the exercise of
all his knowledge from this source, he finds the verdict
to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in
the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly
apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or
were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or
partiality, then it is his duty to set aside that verdict
and to grant a new trial. . . . In other words, the court
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State v. Nichols
specifically is required to act as a [seventh] juror
because it must independently assess [the] credibility
[of witnesses] and determine the weight that should be
given to . . . evidence. . . .
‘‘Thus, because a court is required to independently
assess credibility and assign weight to evidence, a
weight of the evidence claim necessarily raises the issue
of which courts are competent to perform those tasks.
It is well settled that only the judge who presided over
the trial where a challenged verdict was returned is
legally competent to decide if that verdict was against
the weight of the evidence . . . . Consequently, a
judge in a later proceeding, such as a direct appeal or
a habeas corpus proceeding, is not legally competent
to decide such a claim on the basis of the cold printed
record before it. . . . The rationale behind this rule is
sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain
a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of
the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the
trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury
to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and
to determine the weight that should be given to their
evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of
the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record,
cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could
improperly have influenced the jury.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Capasso, 203 Conn. App. 333, 345–47,
248 A.3d 58, cert.
denied, 336 Conn. 939,
249 A.3d 352 (2021); see also
State v. Soto, 175 Conn. App. 739, 745–48,
168 A.3d 605,
cert. denied, 327 Conn. 970,
173 A.3d 953 (2017).
The following procedural history is relevant to our
review of the defendant’s claim. As set forth previously,
the defendant filed three postverdict motions: a motion
for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, a motion in
arrest of judgment, and a motion for a new trial on all
counts. In an oral decision, the trial court denied the
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State v. Nichols
motions, concluding that, ‘‘[i]n all three of the motions,
defense essentially are arguing that this court should
sit as a ninth juror and reject the jury’s factual findings.
This court cannot reject the jury’s findings and substitute its own view of the evidence. The jury’s verdicts
are supported by the evidence, and the jury found [H]
credible and that she lacked any motive to falsely
accuse the defendant, who, at one point, acted as her
father and spiritual leader. The jury rejected the inference raised by the defense that [H] would come forward
and lie and expose herself to being charged almost five
years after the incident. This court agrees with the jury’s
findings that were based on the evidence presented in
this matter and, therefore, denies all of the defendant’s
motions.’’
We conclude that the trial court applied the incorrect
legal standard relative to the motion for a new trial.
First, we note that nowhere in the court’s oral decision
did it expressly state the legal standard applicable to
the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Cf. In re Xavier
H., 201 Conn. App. 81, 100,
240 A.3d 1087 (when court
correctly set forth legal standard elsewhere in its memorandum of decision, imprecision in conclusory statement did not reflect application of incorrect legal standard), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 981,
241 A.3d 705 (2020),
and cert. denied, 335 Conn. 982,
241 A.3d 705 (2020).
To the contrary, the legal standard set forth by the court
at the beginning of its analysis to apply to all three
motions stated that ‘‘[t]his court cannot reject the jury’s
findings and substitute its own view of the evidence.’’
To the extent the court applied the standard used for
sufficiency of the evidence claims to the defendant’s
claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence, such an application was improper. See State
v. Capasso, supra, 203 Conn. App. 345 (‘‘[T]he inquiry
appropriately undertaken by a court ruling on a sufficiency of the evidence claim differs substantially from
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State v. Nichols
that of a court ruling on a weight of the evidence claim.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence . . . the
court does not sit as a [seventh] juror who may cast
a vote against the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)). In contrast, ‘‘[a] weight claim predicated on
a challenge to the jury’s credibility determinations . . .
requires the trial court to make its own assessment
of the jury’s credibility determinations.’’ State v. Soto,
supra,175 Conn. App. 755.
Although the trial court concluded its oral decision
by noting its ‘‘agree[ment] with the jury’s findings that
were based on the evidence presented in this matter,’’
that summary statement alone does not alter our conclusion that the court applied an incorrect legal standard. Accordingly, we must reverse the court’s determination on this issue and remand the case to the judge
who presided over the trial22 to ‘‘make [his] own assessment of the jury’s credibility determinations.’’ State v.
Soto, supra,175 Conn. App. 755.
The denial of the motion for a new trial is reversed
and the case is remanded to the trial court, K. Doyle,
J., for a determination, on the existing record, of the
motion for a new trial; the judgment is affirmed in all
other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
22
We recognize that Practice Book § 1-22 (a) provides in relevant part:
‘‘A judicial authority shall, upon motion of either party or upon its own
motion, be disqualified from acting in a matter . . . because the judgment
was reversed on appeal. . . .’’ However, considering the procedural posture
of this case and the factual determination to be made, the determination
required on remand must be made by the same trial judge. See, e.g., State
v. Phillips, 102 Conn. App. 716, 739 n.19,
927 A.2d 931 (reversing denial of
motion for new trial and remanding case to same trial judge for determination
as to whether there was racial bias on part of juror against defendant), cert.
denied, 284 Conn. 923,
933 A.2d 727 (2007); State v.
Soto, supra,175 Conn.
App. 748 (‘‘[i]t is well settled that only the judge who presided over the trial
where a challenged verdict was returned is legally competent to decide if
that verdict was against the weight of the evidence’’ (emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted)).
