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Milot v. Milot
RAYMOND J. MILOT v. CHRISTINE M. MILOT
(AC 47073)
Alvord, Moll and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment resolving several
postdissolution motions concerning custody and visitation. The defendant
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly delegated its judicial authority
over visitation to the plaintiff. Held:
The trial court’s order authorizing the plaintiff to exercise his discretion
over the defendant’s visitation with the parties’ minor children was an
improper delegation of judicial authority, as, pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s decision in R. H. v. M. H. (350 Conn. 446), it placed the trial court’s
decision-making authority in the hands of a party to the litigation.
The trial court abused its discretion in precluding the defendant from communicating with her youngest child’s health-care providers or therapists, as
the court failed to make a finding, pursuant to statute (§ 46b-56 (g)), that
the defendant should be denied access for good cause shown.
Argued May 28—officially released August 19, 2025
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury and tried to the court, Eschuk, J.;
judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain
other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation
agreement; thereafter, the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion
to modify custody and visitation and denied the defendant’s motions to modify custody, and the defendant
appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Mark A. Shiffrin, for the appellant (defendant).
Rebecca Mayo Goodrich, for the appellee (plaintiff).
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Milot v. Milot
Opinion
PER CURIAM. In this postjudgment dissolution matter, the defendant, Christine M. Milot, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court resolving several motions,
including the motion filed by the plaintiff, Raymond J.
Milot, to modify custody and visitation. On appeal, the
defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly
delegated its judicial authority over visitation to the
plaintiff and (2) abused its discretion in ordering that
the defendant was not permitted to contact the health-care providers or therapists of the parties’ youngest
child without finding good cause in support of the order.
We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claims on
appeal. The parties’ marriage was dissolved in June,
2019. At the time of the dissolution, the parties had
three minor children. The judgment of dissolution incorporated by reference the parties’ separation agreement,
which incorporated by reference a final parenting plan
executed on June 20, 2019 (parenting plan). Pursuant
to the parenting plan, the parties had joint legal and
shared physical custody of the children, with the older
two children primarily residing with the plaintiff and
the youngest child primarily residing with the defendant. Only the parties’ youngest child currently remains
a minor.
Shortly after the dissolution, in the fall of 2019, the
parties agreed that the youngest child would live with
the plaintiff. In September, 2020, within the context of
a matter pending in juvenile court, the parties agreed
that an order vesting in the plaintiff temporary custody
of the youngest child would be sustained until further
order of the court. In June, 2022, the juvenile court
issued an order providing that sole physical custody
and guardianship of the youngest child shall be vested
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Milot v. Milot
in the plaintiff under an order of protective supervision,
which was to expire on September 3, 2022. The juvenile
court orders provided a comprehensive plan to extend
beyond the expiration of the period of protective supervision. The orders addressed, inter alia, the responsibilities of the custodial parent and the defendant’s relationship with the youngest child, including that any inperson contact by the defendant with the youngest child
must be supervised clinically or by a third-party professional. The juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction
following the expiration of the protective supervision
and expressly provided that the orders would be subject
to modification by the family court.
In February, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify custody and visitation in the dissolution action.
Therein, he requested that the orders contained within
the June, 2022 decision of the juvenile court be adopted
in the present file. A hearing was held on the motion for
modification, among other motions,1 before the court,
Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee, on October
18 and 19, 2023. Both parties testified.
On October 19, 2023, the court issued a ruling on
the motions, in which it found that ‘‘[t]here have been
substantial changes affecting the parenting of the minor
children in this case since the last parenting orders
entered by this court, as well as the orders of the juvenile court. Among those changes are the juvenile court’s
removal of the defendant as the custodial parent and
guardian of [the youngest child]; the defendant’s relocation of primary residence to North Canaan; the children’s adamant refusal to spend time with the defendant
or attend therapy with the defendant; and the substantial improvement of the children’s behaviors and
demeanors since living full-time with the plaintiff and
seeing little of the defendant.’’
1
The defendant had filed two postjudgment motions seeking, inter alia,
modification of custody.
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Milot v. Milot
The court found that the parties’ relationship is contentious and they are unable to make joint decisions
regarding the needs of the children. The court found
that the original agreement providing for split custody
of the children ‘‘did not work when it was first agreed
upon and has not worked at any time since.’’ The court
found that the children were ‘‘under tremendous stress’’
following the dissolution of the parties’ marriage and
that the youngest child demonstrated that stress by
acting out dangerously, prompting the parties to agree
in the fall of 2019, for the youngest child to live with
the plaintiff. The court found: ‘‘To alleviate their stress,
the children chose to align themselves with the plaintiff
and see as little as possible of the defendant. By doing
so, they minimize their exposure to parental conflict.
Both children are doing well emotionally and physically
with the status quo and little or no contact with the
defendant. . . . Both children have made it known
emphatically that they do not wish to spend time with
the defendant or attend therapy with the defendant.’’
The court awarded the plaintiff sole legal and physical
custody of the parties’ youngest child. The court further
ordered that ‘‘[v]isits between the children and the
defendant shall be at the sole [discretion] of the plaintiff
with all arrangements approved by the plaintiff,’’ and
that the plaintiff ‘‘shall not impose any limitations upon
the children restricting or discouraging them from initiating communications with [the defendant].’’ The
court ordered that ‘‘[t]he defendant is barred from communicating with the children’s health-care providers or
therapist.’’2 This appeal followed.
2
The court also ordered: ‘‘The plaintiff shall write a paragraph to the
defendant twice per week for each minor child (a minimum of four paragraphs per week) informing the defendant of the children’s health, education,
activities, interests, aspirations, achievements, disappointments and general
welfare. Any electronic method of communication that the defendant is
likely to actually receive may be used. . . . The defendant and her extended
family are entitled to attend all practices, performances and graduations of
the children. If there are a restricted number of tickets, the tickets shall be
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Milot v. Milot
I
The defendant’s first claim on appeal is that the court
improperly delegated its judicial authority when it
ordered that ‘‘[v]isits between the children and the
defendant shall be at the sole [discretion] of the plaintiff
with all arrangements approved by the plaintiff.’’ We
agree that the trial court improperly delegated its judicial authority to the plaintiff.
We begin with our standard of review and relevant
legal principles. Whether the trial court improperly delegated its judicial authority is a legal question over which
we exercise plenary review. Zilkha v. Zilkha, 180 Conn.
App. 143, 170,
183 A.3d 64, cert. denied,
328 Conn. 937,
183 A.3d 1175 (2018). ‘‘It is well settled . . . that [n]o
court in this state can delegate its judicial authority to
any person serving the court in a nonjudicial function.
The court may seek the advice and heed the recommendation contained in the reports of persons engaged by
the court to assist it, but in no event may such a nonjudicial entity bind the judicial authority to [issue] any order
or [to render a] judgment so advised or recommended.
. . . A court improperly delegates its judicial authority
to [a nonjudicial entity] when that person is given
authority to issue orders that affect the parties or the
children. Such orders are part of a judicial function
that can be done only by one clothed with judicial
authority. . . .
‘‘The trial court’s authority to issue orders pertaining
to the custody and visitation of minor children is prescribed by statute. [General Statutes §] 46b-56 (a) provides in relevant part that the court may make or modify
apportioned equally between the parties. The defendant and her family shall
not approach the children at any of those events unless the children initiate
the contact. . . . There shall be no contact of the children allowed by either
parent with John Goodwin. The children shall continue to reside in the town
of New Milford unless the parties agree in writing to a relocation of their
primary residence, or a court order allows relocation of their primary residence outside New Milford. . . . The provisions of Practice Book § 25-26
(g) are imposed in this case.’’
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Milot v. Milot
any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children if it has
jurisdiction . . . . Section 46b-56 (a) thus authorizes
the trial court alone to make or modify any proper
order regarding custody and visitation of a minor child.
Subsection (b) of § 46b-56 provides in relevant part that
a trial court, in crafting such orders, shall consider the
rights and responsibilities of both parents . . . and the
court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best
interests of the child and provide the child with the
active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests. . . . Section 46b-56 (c) requires the trial court, when making
or modifying an order as provided in subsections (a)
and (b), to consider the best interests of the child and
enumerates seventeen factors the court may consider.
None of the provisions in § 46b-56 permits the delegation by a trial court of its statutory duty to one of
the litigants before it.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R. H. v. M.
H., 350 Conn. 432, 440–41,
324 A.3d 720 (2024).
The trial court did not have the benefit of the guidance
found in our Supreme Court’s decision in R. H., which
was issued after the trial court’s decision in the present
case. In R. H. v. M. H., supra, 350 Conn. 437, the court
considered a mother’s challenge to an order that authorized the father to suspend visitation between the child
and the mother in the event that the father, after consultation with the child’s therapist, reasonably determined
that visitation was causing negative behavioral or emotional consequences for the child. Our Supreme Court
concluded that the order constituted an impermissible
delegation of judicial authority on the basis that ‘‘the
trial court’s visitation order effectively removes the
court entirely from the decision-making process and
delegates its authority to the plaintiff to suspend visitation.’’ Id., 445.
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Milot v. Milot
We conclude that the court in the present case impermissibly delegated its authority to the custodial parent
in ordering that ‘‘[v]isits between the children and the
defendant shall be at the sole [discretion] of the plaintiff
with all arrangements approved by the plaintiff.’’ This
order is akin to the order determined to be improper
in R. H. v. M. H., supra, 350 Conn. 446, because it
‘‘places the decision-making authority in the hands of
a party to the litigation.’’3 Accordingly, the court erred
in rendering this order.
II
The defendant’s second claim is that the court abused
its discretion in precluding her from communicating
with the youngest child’s health-care providers or therapists without making the statutorily required finding of
good cause. We agree in part with the defendant.
We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude
as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In
determining whether a trial court has abused its broad
discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every
reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of
its action. . . . [T]o conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion, we must find that the court either
The plaintiff argues that the challenged order does not constitute a
3
delegation of judicial authority because it was accompanied by an order
prohibiting the plaintiff from ‘‘impos[ing] any limitations upon the children
restricting or discouraging them from initiating communications with’’ the
defendant. We are not persuaded that the additional provision protecting
the child’s ability to communicate with the defendant renders the order
giving the plaintiff sole discretion over visitation permissible.
Moreover, the present case is distinguishable from Zilkha v. Zilkha, supra,
180 Conn. App. 172, a case on which the plaintiff relies. In Zilkha, the trial
court exercised its authority in deciding that the defendant ‘‘should not have
any right to custody or visitation,’’ but left open the possibility of voluntary
visits at the discretion of the children. (Emphasis omitted.) Id.
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Milot v. Milot
incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably
conclude as it did. . . . Appellate review of a trial
court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine
whether they are legally and logically correct . . . and
whether they find support in the facts that appear in
the record.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Clark v. Clark, 150 Conn. App. 551, 568,
91
A.3d 944 (2014).
Section 46b-56 (g) provides: ‘‘A parent not granted
custody of a minor child shall not be denied the right
of access to the academic, medical, hospital or other
health records of such minor child, unless otherwise
ordered by the court for good cause shown.’’
On the basis of the language of § 46b-56 (g), the defendant, as the noncustodial parent, is statutorily entitled
to have access to the youngest child’s health records,
including therapy records, ‘‘subject only to the court’s
denying [her] the right of access to the records for good
cause shown.’’ C. D. v. C. D., 218 Conn. App. 818, 847,
293 A.3d 86 (2023). The court did not make a finding
that the defendant should be denied access for good
cause shown. To the extent that the court’s decision
can be construed to prohibit the defendant from
accessing the health records of the youngest child, in
the absence of a good cause finding required by § 46b-
56 (g), the court’s order constitutes an abuse of its
discretion.
The defendant’s claim on appeal is limited to the
argument that the court abused its discretion in rendering its order in the absence of a finding of good cause.
The defendant has not argued nor demonstrated that
the court abused its discretion in precluding her from
communicating with the youngest child’s health-care
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Milot v. Milot
providers in a manner that extends beyond her exercise
of the right of access to the records.
The judgment is reversed only with respect to the
order delegating the trial court’s authority over the
defendant’s visitation rights to the plaintiff and the
order precluding the defendant from accessing the
youngest child’s health records and the case is
remanded for further proceedings solely on those issues
consistent with this opinion; the judgment is affirmed
in all other respects.
