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Hornish v. Suffield
MARYANNE HORNISH ET AL. v. TOWN OF SUFFIELD
(AC 47147)
Alvord, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiffs appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment dismissing their
administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Department
of Agriculture, which had affirmed a disposal order, issued by an animal
control officer for the defendant town, to euthanize the plaintiffs’ dog. The
plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 22-358 (c))
authorizing the euthanizing of the dog was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority to the town in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. Held:
The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that § 22-358 (c) violated the
separation of powers doctrine because, pursuant to Bottone v. Westport
(209 Conn. 652), the separation of powers doctrine does not pertain to
delegations of powers from the state legislature to a municipality, and it
was clear under the statute (§ 22-331) governing the appointment of municipal animal control officers that the legislature has delegated the enforcement
of dog bite statutes to municipalities pursuant to § 22-331 (b), and the animal
control officer who issued the disposal order regarding the plaintiffs’ dog
was an employee of the town.
The plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the department’s
hearing officer violated their procedural rights under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (§ 4-166 et seq.) and deprived them of a fair hearing.
Argued April 14—officially released July 29, 2025
Procedural History
Administrative appeal from the final decision of the
defendant Department of Agriculture affirming a disposal order issued by an animal control officer for the
named defendant regarding the plaintiffs’ dog, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
Britain and tried to the court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn, judge
trial referee; judgment dismissing the appeal, from
which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Amy E. Markim, with whom was Timothy P. Jensen,
for the appellants (plaintiffs).
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Hornish v. Suffield
Derek E. Donnelly, with whom, on the brief, was Eric
Duey, for the appellee (named defendant).
Gail Shane, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (defendant Department of Agriculture).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs, Maryanne Hornish and
Neil Hornish, appeal from the judgment of the Superior
Court dismissing their administrative appeal from the
final decision of the defendant Department of Agriculture (department).1 The final decision affirmed a disposal order, issued by an animal control officer for the
defendant town of Suffield (town), to euthanize the
plaintiffs’ dog pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to
2019) § 22-358, as amended by Public Acts 2019, No.
19-197, § 1.2 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that (1) § 22-
358 (c) is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, and (2) procedural irregularities deprived them
of a fair hearing. We affirm the judgment of the Superior
Court dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal.
The following facts, as set forth by the department’s
final decision maker, Bruce A. Sherman, are relevant
to this appeal. The dog came to live with the plaintiffs,
his owners, in June, 2019. On November 6, 2019, an
incident occurred inside the plaintiffs’ home in Suffield.
A friend of the plaintiffs’ family, Janet D’Aleo, accompanied by her home health aide, Elizabeth Nicholls, was
visiting with Agnes Wosko, who is Maryanne Hornish’s
1
In their original complaint, filed on February 4, 2021, the plaintiffs named
the town of Suffield as the sole defendant. On December 23, 2021, the
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added the department as a party
defendant.
2
Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 22-358 in this
opinion are to the 2019 revision of the statute, as amended by Public Acts
2019, No. 19-197, § 1.
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Hornish v. Suffield
mother and lived with the plaintiffs. During the visit,
the plaintiffs’ dog, who was unprovoked, attacked and
bit D’Aleo numerous times, resulting in her death. The
plaintiffs were not home at the time the attack began,
but Maryanne Hornish returned home at some point
during the incident. Later that same day, the town’s
animal control officer, Ryan Selig, issued a quarantine
order with respect to the dog. On November 14, 2019,
Selig issued a disposal order pursuant to § 22-358 (c).
On November 18, 2019, Maryanne Hornish filed an
appeal and request for a hearing with the department.
A notice of hearing was provided to the parties, stating,
inter alia, that the hearing would be conducted in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act
(UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., and the department’s rules of practice, as set forth in §§ 22-7-8 through
22-7-38 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. Following a request filed by the Estate of Janet
D’Aleo (estate), the hearing officer, Carole W. Briggs,
granted the estate intervenor status.
The administrative hearing, during which the plaintiffs were self-represented, was held on June 2 and 4,
2020. The parties introduced documentary evidence and
presented testimony. On October 20, 2020, the hearing
officer issued a proposed final decision, recommending
the affirmance of Selig’s disposal order. After reviewing
the record and considering the plaintiffs’ exceptions to
the proposed final decision, the final decision maker
issued a December 21, 2020 final decision affirming
Selig’s order. The final decision incorporated the proposed final decision and included responsive language
to the plaintiffs’ exceptions.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior
Court. The plaintiffs claimed that § 22-358 (c) is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The
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Hornish v. Suffield
plaintiffs further claimed that they were deprived of a
fair hearing. The parties filed briefs and appeared before
the court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn, judge trial referee. On
November 13, 2023, the court issued its memorandum
of decision in which it concluded that the statute was
constitutional and rejected the plaintiffs’ remaining
challenges to the final decision. Accordingly, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ administrative
appeal. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be
set forth as necessary.
I
The plaintiffs’ first claim on appeal is that § 22-358
(c) ‘‘violates the separation of powers provisions of
the Connecticut constitution because it impermissibly
delegates a legislative function to the executive branch
without declaring a clear legislative policy, adequate
standards, or intelligible principles to guide the animal
control officer’s decision.’’ See Conn. Const., art. II. The
town and the department respond that the statute is
constitutional and also raise as an alternative ground
for affirmance that the plaintiffs’ claim fails on the basis
that a legislative delegation of power to a municipality
does not raise separation of powers concerns.3 We agree
with the town and the department’s alternative ground
for affirmance.
We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘[A]lthough
we have noted that [a]n agency’s factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable
3
The Superior Court noted the town and the department’s alternative
argument but addressed the plaintiffs’ delegation argument directly, concluding that it was meritless. ‘‘It is well established that, [w]here the trial court
reaches a correct decision but on [alternative] grounds, this court has repeatedly sustained the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist to support it.
. . . [W]e . . . may affirm the court’s judgment on a dispositive [alternative] ground for which there is support in the trial court record.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Virgulak,
233 Conn. App. 329, 339 n.6, A.3d (2025).
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Hornish v. Suffield
weight by the courts . . . we have maintained that
[c]ases that present pure questions of law . . . invoke
a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved
in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency
has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse
of its discretion. . . . The plaintiff’s constitutional
claims are therefore entitled to plenary review.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller
v. Dept. of Agriculture, 168 Conn. App. 255, 266,
145
A.3d 393, cert. denied,
323 Conn. 936,
151 A.3d 386
(2016).
The statute at issue in the present case provides in
relevant part: ‘‘The commissioner, the Chief Animal
Control Officer, any animal control officer, any municipal animal control officer or any regional animal control
officer may make any order concerning the restraint or
disposal of any biting dog . . . as the commissioner
or such officer deems necessary. . . . Any person
aggrieved by an order of any municipal animal control
officer, the Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal
control officer or any regional animal control officer
may request a hearing before the commissioner within
fourteen days of the issuance of such order. Any order
issued pursuant to this section that requires the
restraint of an animal shall be effective upon its issuance and shall remain in effect during any appeal of
such order to the commissioner. After such hearing,
the commissioner may affirm, modify or revoke such
order as the commissioner deems proper. . . .’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 22-358 (c), as amended
by Public Acts 2019, No. 19-197, § 1.
The following legal principles regarding the separation of powers also are relevant. ‘‘The [c]onstitution of
this state provides for the separation of the governmental functions into three basic departments, legislative,
executive and judicial, and it is inherent in this separation, since the law-making function is vested exclusively
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Hornish v. Suffield
in the legislative department, that the [l]egislature cannot delegate the law-making power to any other department or agency. In the establishment of three distinct
departments of government, the [c]onstitution, by necessary implication, prescribes those limitations and
imposes those duties which are essential to the independence of each and to the performance by each of the
powers of which it is made the depositary.’’ State v.
Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 627,
13 A.2d 586 (1940); see
also Casey v. Lamont, 338 Conn. 479, 503,
258 A.3d
647 (2021).
In Bottone v. Westport, 209 Conn. 652, 664,
553 A.2d
576 (1989), however, our Supreme Court explained:
‘‘The separation of powers doctrine . . . does not pertain to delegations from the state legislature to a municipality. A municipality cannot be considered ‘any other
department or agency’ in the context of that phrase in
Stoddard; a municipality is not one of the three departments enumerated in the constitution’s separation of
powers provision. Accordingly, a nondelegation doctrine founded upon the separation of powers doctrine
does not pertain by jurisprudential necessity to the delegation of power from the state legislature to a municipality.’’ (Footnote omitted.) The court went on to state
that ‘‘the rule limiting the delegation of legislative power
between coequal branches of state government is not
the appropriate rule to govern the delegation of legislative power from the state to a municipality.’’ Id., 667;
see also Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk,
245 Conn. 551, 566,
715 A.2d 46 (1998).
In the present case, the plaintiffs have framed their
constitutional challenge as one claiming a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine. Our Supreme Court
held in Bottone that the separation of powers doctrine
does not pertain to delegations from the state legislature
to a municipality. Bottone v. Westport, supra,209 Conn.
664. Because the present case involves a delegation to
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Hornish v. Suffield
a municipality, the plaintiffs’ claim is foreclosed by our
Supreme Court’s holding in Bottone.4
In their reply brief, the plaintiffs argue that ‘‘Bottone
does not stand for the proposition that [§] 22-358 (c),
which delegates authority to the [department] (which,
in turn, sometimes but not always utilizes municipal
animal control officers to carry out its actions), constitutes a delegation to a municipality to which Bottone,
and not Stoddard, applies.’’ We disagree. Pursuant to
General Statutes § 22-331, municipal animal control officers are appointed by the municipality’s chief of police
or other appointing authority. It is clear under this statute that the legislature has delegated the enforcement
of dog bite statutes to municipalities. Indeed, the plain
language of § 22-331 provides that municipal animal
control officers are appointed ‘‘to administer and
enforce the laws relating to dogs and other domestic
animals.’’ General Statutes § 22-331 (b).5 In the present
case, the record reveals that Selig, the animal control
officer who issued the disposal order, was an employee
of the town. Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs’ claim
rooted in the separation of powers doctrine.
II
The plaintiffs’ second claim on appeal is that procedural irregularities deprived them of a fair hearing. Specifically, they argue that (1) the town did not rule out
4
The plaintiffs have waived any claim that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague under a traditional due process analysis by their failure to brief any
such claim. Likewise, the plaintiffs do not claim that, under the analysis in
Bottone, the delegation to the municipality was unconstitutional because it
did not provide ‘‘reasonable notice of what conduct may be authorized or
prohibited . . . .’’ Bottone v. Westport, supra,209 Conn. 675. ‘‘[W]e are not
required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court
through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bohonnon Law
Firm, LLC v. Baxter, 131 Conn. App. 371, 383,
27 A.3d 384, cert. denied,
303 Conn. 902,
31 A.3d 1177 (2011).
5
General Statutes § 22-331 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he chief . . .
of police in each other city or town having a police department . . . shall
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Hornish v. Suffield
that the dog was provoked, (2) the estate improperly
was allowed to participate ‘‘as if it were a full party,’’ (3)
the town did not present an expert witness on D’Aleo’s
cause of death, and (4) the hearing officer improperly
relied on the testimony of Shawn St. John, a detective
with the Suffield Police Department, as to the home
health aide’s account of the incident. We conclude that
the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their procedural claims.
We first set forth our well established standard of
review of administrative agency rulings. ‘‘Judicial review
of an administrative decision is a creature of statute
. . . and [General Statutes § 4-183 (j)] permits modification or reversal of an agency’s decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because
the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are: (1) [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority
of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4)
affected by other error or law; (5) clearly erroneous in
view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. . . .
‘‘Under the UAPA, the scope of our review of an
administrative agency’s decision is very restricted. . . .
[R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires
a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the
agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . . Neither [the appellate] court nor the trial court may retry
the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or
questions of fact. . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all the evidence, whether the agency,
appoint a municipal animal control officer . . . to administer and enforce
the laws relating to dogs and other domestic animals. . . .’’
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Hornish v. Suffield
in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . . We have stated
that not all procedural irregularities require a reviewing
court to set aside an administrative decision . . . . The
complaining party has the burden of demonstrating that
its substantial rights were prejudiced by the error. . . .
It is fundamental that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the [agency], on the facts before [it], acted
contrary to law and in abuse of [its] discretion . . . .’’
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Miller v. Dept. of Agriculture, supra,
168 Conn. App. 265–66.
The Superior Court, in considering the plaintiffs’
appeal, first found that ‘‘substantial evidence existed
for the animal control officer and the [department’s
final decision maker] to find that the dog was a danger
and subject to the order at issue.’’ Specifically, the court
referenced the dog’s history of biting and that he had
bit D’Aleo and caused her death. The court referenced
Detective St. John’s testimony that he ‘‘spoke with Beth
Sanchez, who had cared for the dog . . . for approximately two years, and, during that time, the dog was
involved in three instances of aggression or bite events.
Two had been reported to the Norwich police, while the
third had not. Through a photo confirmation, Sanchez
confirmed to . . . Selig that the dog she had cared for
was the [plaintiffs’] dog . . . .’’
The court then turned to the plaintiffs’ procedural
challenges, stating: ‘‘First, while admitting that hearsay
proof is permissible in an administrative appeal hearing,
[the plaintiffs] stated that the evidence must be reliable.
They contend that [Detective] St. John’s testimony was
unreliable. The example given to the court was that
[Detective] St. John gave different testimony regarding
the incident in a deposition taken by the . . . estate
after the plaintiffs’ hearing. The final review of the [hearing officer], however, had not been issued at the time
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Hornish v. Suffield
when the deposition text became available. There was
no reason why the plaintiffs could not have submitted
the deposition to the town’s hearing officer for [her]
review. The plaintiffs argue that the doctor’s report
came to the attention of the plaintiffs immediately before
the hearing. Further, the doctor himself did not testify.
On the other hand, our Supreme Court has held that a
hearing officer may make use of evidence as it exists
in the record and may choose as [she] wants to make
use of the evidence of record. . . . There was sufficient
time after the municipal hearing for the plaintiffs to
reply. The plaintiffs contend that [the hearing officer]
did not discuss any provocation of the dog. But the
text of the ruling . . . shows that the provocation was
discussed. The plaintiffs contend that the . . . estate
was allowed to participate in the hearing and dominated
the hearing. The record shows, however, that the estate
participated modestly at the hearing. The plaintiffs also
question the [hearing officer’s] use of [Wosko’s] oral
statement . . . . [Wosko] later wrote a written statement, but the hearing officer used the first oral statement. This was [her] prerogative in reviewing the evidence. The court observed that the plaintiffs chose to
appear at the hearing as self-represented [parties].
Some of the alleged mistakes that they point to were
caused by their voluntary decision to appear as self-represented [parties]. Our Appellate Court has recently
declared that, while the trial court should be solicitous
of self-represented parties, the trial court must also
refrain from interfering with the rights of other parties,
such as the municipality here.’’ (Citation omitted.) Having rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, the court dismissed
the appeal.
On the basis of our examination of the record and
the briefs, and our consideration of the arguments of the
parties, we conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prevail
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Hornish v. Suffield
on their procedural claims.6 See Direct Energy Services,
LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, 347 Conn.
101, 154,
296 A.3d 795 (2023). First, the plaintiffs’ claim
that the ‘‘town did not rule out’’ that the dog was provoked is belied by the record. The final decision maker
considered the plaintiffs’ exception to the proposed
final decision on the issue of provocation and stated,
from his review of the record, that he agreed with the
hearing officer’s determination that the dog was not
provoked. This determination finds support in the
record in the testimony of Selig and Detective St. John.
We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ contention otherwise. Second, the plaintiffs challenge the extent of the
participation permitted by the estate, arguing that the
estate improperly was permitted to cross-examine witnesses without limit. We agree with the Superior Court’s
determination that the ‘‘estate participated modestly at
the hearing,’’ and we conclude that the plaintiffs have
not demonstrated any disruption of the proceedings
related to the estate’s participation.
6
To the extent the plaintiffs seek to raise any claims that the hearing
officer’s procedures violated due process under the federal constitution,
such claims are abandoned due to inadequate briefing. Specifically, the
plaintiffs fail to ‘‘apply the traditional three part balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335,
96 S. Ct. 893,
47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976),
to determine what safeguards the federal constitution requires to satisfy
procedural due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Turn of River
Fire Dept., Inc. v. Stamford, 159 Conn. App. 708, 712 n.2,
123 A.3d 909
(2015). ‘‘It is well established that [w]e are not required to review issues
that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate
brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order
to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . .
[When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives
only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation
of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id.; see also Frauenglass & Associates, LLC v. Enagbare, 149 Conn.
App. 103, 110–11,
88 A.3d 1246 (federal due process claim was inadequately
briefed where defendant failed to mention applicable balancing test, let
alone include analysis of Mathews test as applied to facts of defendant’s
case), cert. denied, 314 Conn. 927,
101 A.3d 273 (2014). Accordingly, we deem
any procedural due process claim abandoned due to inadequate briefing
and decline to review it.
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Hornish v. Suffield
Third, the plaintiffs claim that the town should have
introduced expert testimony relative to D’Aleo’s cause
of death. Section 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant part that an expert witness
‘‘may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
concerning scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge, if the testimony will assist the trier of fact
in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact
in issue.’’ In the present case, the final decision maker
made clear that autopsy evidence was unnecessary in
order for him ‘‘to reasonably conclude, on this record,
that the bite or bites inflicted by [the dog] were very
serious and that [the dog] is a risk to public safety
. . . .’’ The ample evidence before the final decision
maker concerning the dog bites that immediately preceded D’Aleo’s death leads us to conclude that expert
opinion as to the cause of her death was unnecessary.
See Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Precision Mechanical
Services, Inc., 122 Conn. App. 448, 455,
998 A.2d 1228
(‘‘[A]lthough expert testimony may be admissible in
many instances, it is required only when the question
involved goes beyond the field of the ordinary knowledge and experience of the trier of fact. . . . The trier
of fact need not close its eyes to matters of common
knowledge solely because the evidence includes no
expert testimony on those matters. . . . Rather, [the
finder of fact is] not expected to lay aside matters of
common knowledge or [its] own observation and experience of the affairs of life, but, on the contrary, to apply
them to the evidence or facts in hand, to the end that
their action may be intelligent and their conclusions
correct.’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 926,
5 A.3d 487 (2010). Fourth, the plaintiffs claim that the
hearing officer improperly relied on Detective St. John’s
testimony as to what the home health aide said about
the incident, arguing that it constituted unreliable hearsay. ‘‘In administrative proceedings under the UAPA,
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Hornish v. Suffield
evidence is not inadmissible solely because it constitutes hearsay. . . . Additionally, a party to an administrative proceeding under the UAPA is not required to
call any particular witness.’’ (Citations omitted.) Miller
v. Dept. of Agriculture, supra,168 Conn. App. 267. The
plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the hearing officer
erred in relying on Detective St. John’s testimony.7
Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed
to satisfy their burden of showing that the hearing officer violated their procedural rights under the UAPA.
The judgment is affirmed.
7
The plaintiffs raise two additional contentions that warrant little discussion. First, in two brief paragraphs of their principal appellate brief, the
plaintiffs suggest that the hearing officer erred in crediting the testimony
of Detective St. John regarding the contents of an audio call from D’Aleo’s
emergency call button. The plaintiffs claim that the hearing officer instead
should have credited Neil Hornish’s testimony regarding the audio call. We
reject this claim because it is well established that ‘‘[t]he credibility of
witnesses and the determination of factual issues are matters within the
province of the administrative agency.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cohen v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection, 215 Conn. App. 767,
830, 285 A.3d 760, cert. denied,
345 Conn. 968,
285 A.3d 1126 (2022), and
cert. denied, 345 Conn. 969,
285 A.3d 737 (2022); see also Goldstar Medical
Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 830,
955 A.2d 15
(2008) (‘‘[i]t is well established that it is the exclusive province of the trier
of fact to make determinations of credibility, crediting some, all, or none
of a given witness’ testimony’’).
Second, the plaintiffs claim that ‘‘[t]he town and the estate were allowed
to unfairly combine resources against the [self-represented] plaintiffs to
create a biased record that ultimately led to a decision that was improper
and substantially prejudicial to the plaintiffs.’’ In support of their claim, the
plaintiffs repeat the various procedural challenges previously discussed in
this opinion. Because we reject the plaintiffs’ procedural challenges, we
likewise reject their contention that the alleged errors resulted in substantial
prejudice to the plaintiffs.
