Kaplan v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We have here, then, the situation of a defendant who, while on probation, was specifically ordered by the court to appear before the grand jury and disclose the source of his heroin purchases and who refused in the presence of the court to follow such orders. Completely regardless of the subsequent contempt proceedings, this was of itself sufficient justification for revoking probation. Here was a specific order of the court to do a certain thing — disclose information needed in a grand jury’s investigation of illegal traffic in narcotics. In effect, it could be considered as an additional condition of probation, even though it was not included in the original written conditions. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3651 , among other things, provides: ‘The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may change the period of probation.’ No claim of constitutional privilege was or could have been maintained. To hold that such a specific refusal to follow the court’s order was not a violation of probation could lead to rather bizarre results in that every contingency would need be anticipated and might have the effect of limiting the use of probation. Campbell v. Aderhold, D.C.N.D.Ga., 1929, 36 F.2d 366, 367 .””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Qualls · United States v. Longknife

2. ““Probation is thus conferred as a privilege, and cannot be demanded as a right. It is a matter of favor, not of contract. There is no requirement that it must be granted on a specified showing. The defendant stands convicted; he faces punishment and cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain. To accomplish the purpose of the statute, an exceptional degree of flexibility in administration is essential. It is necessary to individualize each case, to give that careful, humane and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each offender which would be possible only in the exercise of a broad discretion. The provisions of the Act are adapted to this end. It authorizes courts of original jurisdiction, when satisfied ‘that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public, as well as the defendant, will be subserved,’ to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and ‘to place the defendant upon probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem best.’ “There is no suggestion in the statute that the scope of the discretion conferred for the purpose of making the grant is narrowed in providing for its modification or revocation. The authority for the latter purpose immediately follows that given for the former, and is in terms equally broad. ‘The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may change the period of probation.’ There are no limiting requirements as to the formulation of charges, notice of charges, or ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Trueblood Longknife v. United States

3. ““It is only where a sentence is void or otherwise subject to collateral attack that Section 2255 affords a remedy, and a motion under that Section cannot function as an appeal. Taylor v. United States, 4 Cir., 177 F.2d 194 ; Dennis v. United States, 4 Cir., 177 F.2d 195 ; United States v. Jonikas, 7 Cir., 197 F.2d 675 , 676; United States v. Rutkin, 3 Cir., 212 F.2d 641 , 643; Pelley v. United States, 7 Cir., 214 F.2d 597 , 598. The questions raised by Shobe’s motions were questions reviewable only on appeal.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dean v. United States