Volume 234 — United States Reports

Held: after stating that the Commission had found this road to be a common carrier both of logs and of lumber, and not a plant facility, but had denied it the right to receive either a division or allowance for the log traffic and only an allowance for the lumber traffic of the proprietary mill, while permitting it to receive a division out of the joint rate for both log and' lumber traffic of non-proprietary companies,…

The facts, which involve the rights and liabilities of a contractor and his surety under a contract with the Government, are stated in the opinion. After the annulment of the contract by reason of the contractor’s default it became the duty of the Government to complete the work at reasonable cost and to diminish as far as possible the loss which it had suffered and for which it proposed to hold the defendants liable. .

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion. By operation of law, the Carmack Amendment was written into the live-stock contract under which the shipment in this case was made, and that amendment repealed § 196, Ky. Const., as to such shipment. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Adams Exp. Co. v. Walker, 119 Kentucky, 121; C., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 613; C., M. & St. P. Ry.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts, which 'involve the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts over suits for personal injuries sustained on a vessel in port while being loaded by á stevedore, and questions of negligence of the stevedore, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Admiralty has not jurisdiction; locality is not the sole test of jurisdiction; the tort is not of a.maritime nature; the master did not fail to furnish a safe place to labor; failure to use pins was not the proximate cause; there was no evidence to show that the master failed to use reasonable care.</p> <p>In support of these contentions, see Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389; Alaska Mining Co. v. Whelan, 168 U. S. 86; Amer. Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 144 Fed. Rep. 605; Black Book of Admiralty (Twiss); Bacon’s Abridg. Actions, Local and Transitory; British African Co. v. The Compania, App. Cas. (1893) 602; 2 Brown’s Admiralty (1 Amer. ed.), 94-95; Benedict’s Admiralty (4th ed.), 39, 46, 47; The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361; 2 Bailey’s Personal Injuries, §§ 2885 and 2993; Brown v. People's Gas Light Co., 81 Vermont, 477; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; Campbell v. Hackfeld, 125 Fed. Rep. 696; Cleveland &c. R. R. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316; 9 Columbia Law Rev. 1; Cleveland v. R. R. Co., 73 Fed. Rep. 970; DeLovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 399; Gilbert’s Practice (3d ed.), 84, 85; 16 Harv. Law Rev. 210; 18 Id. 299; 25 Id. 381; Hussey v. Coger, 112 N. Y. 614; Hogan v. Henderson, 125 N. Y. 774; Kelly v. Norcross, 121 Massachusetts, 508; Kelly v. New Haven Stmb. Co., 74 Connecticut, 343; Kelly v. Jutte Co., 104 Fed. Rep. 955; Leathers v. Blessing, 106 U. S. 626; The Morris Max, 137 U. S. 1; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Smith L. Cases (11th ed.), 591; Malloy de Jure, Bk. II, Ch. III, § XVI; Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191; Martin v. Railroad Co., 166 U. S. 399; McKenna v. Fiske, 1 How. 240; McDonnell v. Oceanic Nav. Co., 143 Fed. Rep. 480; The Noranmore, 113 Fed. Rep. 367; The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158; Phila. &c. R. R. v. Phila. &c. Co., 23 How. 209; The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20; The Pickands, 42 Fed. Rep. 239; The Picqua, 97 Fed. Rep. 649; Queen v. Judge, 1 Q. B. (1892) 273; The Queen, 40 Fed. Rep. 694; Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63; Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 386; Skinner’s Case, 6 State Trials, 712; Stevens v. Sandwich, 1 Pet. Ad. Dec. 233; The Strabo, 90 Fed. Rep. 110; Tilly v. Rockingham, 74 N. H. 316; Westinghouse v. Callaghan, 155 Fed. Rep. 397.</p> <p>Admiralty has jurisdiction in the cases at bar, for the following reasons:</p> <p>The admiralty courts having properly assumed jurisdiction when the libel was brought against both the ship and the stevedore company, should retain jurisdiction to determine the liability of the • stevedore company, even though the libel be subsequently dismissed as to the ship.</p> <p>Jurisdiction once assumed by the Federal court because jurisdictional amount is alleged in good faith to be involved, is not lost because it subsequently develops by the evidence that less than the jurisdictional amount is actually involved.</p> <p>Where the requisite diversity of citizenship exists at the commencement of a suit, no subsequent change in the situation of the parties ousts the jurisdiction of the Federal court.</p> <p>Where Federal and non-Federal questions are involved in the same suit, and jurisdiction has properly attached for the purpose of determining the Federal question, it is proper for the Federal court to decide the local question only and omit to decide the Federal question. Campbell v. Hackfeld, 125 Fed. Rep. 696, can be distinguished.</p> <p>The sole test of admiralty jurisdiction over torts is the locality of the person or thing injured at the time of the impact with the intentional or negligent force.</p> <p>There is a distinction between admiralty jurisdiction of the United States and that of England.</p> <p>Locality is the sole test.</p> <p>The constitutional extent of admiralty jurisdiction is involved in this case.</p> <p>The tort in this cáse was essentially maritime in its nature.</p> <p>On the evidence the master failed in his duty to provide a safe place.</p> <p>The gang boss was a vice-principal, as was also the foreman.</p> <p>The evidence was sufficient as to the proximate cause of the accident and as to lack of safety of place of work.</p> <p>In support of these contentions, see Barry v. Edmonds, 116 U. S. 550; The Blackheath, 95 U. S. 361; Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; Clark v. Mathewson, 12 Pet. 164; Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499; Campbell v. Hackfeld, 125 Fed. Rep. 696; Cleveland R. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316; The Coningsby, 202 Fed. Rep. 814; Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 222 U. S. 222; C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 229 U. S. 317; The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 110; The Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655; The Clan Graham, 153 Fed. Rep. 977; DeLovio v. Boit, 2 Gallison, 398; Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 72; The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443; The Gilbert Knapp, 37 Fed. Rep. 209; The George T. Kemp, Fed. Cas. No. 5341; Gaynor v. Klander-Weldon Co., 174 Fed. Rep. 477; Grand Trunk R. R. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1; The Iriquois, 194 U. S. 240; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S. 626; Morgan’s Heirs v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290; Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537; Moorewood v. Enequist, 23 How. 493; Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191; Miller’s Case, Fed. Cas. No. 300; Manchester v. Massa, 139 U. S. 240; The Mattie May, 47 Fed. Rep. 69; Mullan v. P. & S. Mail S. S. Co., 78 Pa. St. 25; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344; Omaha Horse R. R. Co. v. Cable Tramway, 32 Fed. Rep. 727; O’Brien v. Buffalo Furnace Co., 183 N. Y. 317; The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 36; Peters v. George, 154 Fed. Rep. 634; Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135; Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U. S. 669; Schunk v. Moline M. & S. Co., 147 U. S. 500; Smithers v. Smith, 204 U. S. 632; Siler v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175; Simmons v. S. S. Jefferson, 215 U. S. 130; The Segurranca, 58 Fed. Rep. 908; The Senator, 21 Fed. Rep. 191; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257; Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumner, 1; The Troy, 208 U. S. 321; Tex. & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Howell, 224 U. S. 577; United States v. Bailsford, 5 Wheat. 184; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76; United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290; United States v. Wilson, 28 Fed. Cases, No. 718; United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; United States v. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 255; Warring v. Clark, 5 How. 441, 464; Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the effect of fraudulent inducement to make commercial paper and the rights of comakers to be relieved of liability in such case, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the Removal Acts and also the construction of the provisions of § 6 of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 as amended in 1910 relating to removal of causes arising under the latter act, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States under § 24, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.

Held: the findings of the land officers in such a proceeding, although not open to collateral attack, are not conclusive against the Government when it sues to cancel the resulting patent upon the ground that it was obtained by means of false and fraudulent proofs. United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233 ; McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 504 , 509, and cases cited.

The facts, which, involve the jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of a state court within § 237, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion. The sole issue in the case is not merely an issue of fact;. nor is the Federal question frivolous. The judgment of the lower, court does not rest upon á question of general law, broad enough to sustain it, so that the decision of the Federal question is unnecessary.

Held: that defendant having asked for the instruction that the case could not be maintained under the Federal act, was bound thereby, and, therefore, was denied no right under the Federal law by the action of the state court, and the writ of error must be dismissed.

Held: with respect to cases other than capital, in Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 , 121. But this does not settle the question of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Islands where an appeal is taken. In the acts referred to, the right of the Government, as well as of the defendant, to appeal from the judgment in a criminal case was recognized.

The facts, which involve a review of the legislation, state and Federal, in regard to the construction of the Lake Washington Waterway to Puget Sound, and the extent of the responsibility of the Federal Government therefor, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the procedure and practice in an original case between two States of the Union and the rules to be applied in regard to the filing of ,a supplemental answer, are stated in the opinion.

Held: under the circumstances of ' this case, not to have been the payment of a stakeholder seeking to discharge his duty but of a person espousing the cause of one claimant against the other and thereby subjecting himself to the legal consequences arising from his action. This court cannot review on its merits a case which it must dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Federal courts of cases to recover damages against a railway company for refusing to accept interstate shipments without action first taken theréon by the Interstate Commerce Commission, are stated in the opinion. The Circuit Court did not have power to determine the issues and grant the relief prayed for under the facts disclosed by the record. The trial court should have instructed a verdict for the plaintiff in error.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the state court and also the power of a State to regulate the business beyond its borders of a foreign corporation licensed to do business therein, are stated in the opinio'n.

The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission establishing rates on citrus fruits and vegetables from points of production in Florida to exterior points of consumption, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the courts of a State rendered after statehood in cases transferred from the territorial court, are stated in the opinion.

Held: applying the principle, that a warranty deed made by Long Jim at a time when he did not have the power of alienation “was in the very teeth of the policy of the law, and could not operate as a conveyance, either by its primary force or by way of estoppel” after he had received a patent for the land.

Held: “The motion for a new trial was not *207 the first door open for the question to enter, and in our later decisions we have ruled that a question of such gravity must be raised as soon as orderly procedure will allow.

The facts, which, involve the constitutionality of antitrust provisions of the constitution and laws of Kentucky, are stated in the opinion. The construction placed on the anti-trust statutes by the instructions of the lower court violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The anti-trust statutes as construed are void for indefiniteness. See act of May 20, 1890," §§ 3915 and 3917, Ky. Stat.; § 198, Kentucky Const.; Ky. Stat., p. 145; acts of March 21, 1906, p. 429 (Ky.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of Virginia providing for method of payment of employés of certain industries, are stated in the opinion. The Virginia act is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, nor is it a valid exercise of police power. The act is not constitutional; it does not embrace all of a class. The act is class legislation even though it should be held . to be a police regulation.

The facts, which involve the liability of the Government under the Fifth Amendment for the rental value of property used by it, are stated in the opinion. The plaintiff had no such title to the engine as would enable it to contract for its use. There was no intention to make a contract for the use of said engine, nor conduct of the parties from which such contract might be implied.

The facts, which involve the construction of a contract for Government work and the rights and obligations of the Government and the contractor thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

These suits wefe brought by the United States in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of ■Minnesota against the appellees to set aside certain conveyances under and through which the appellees claimed title to lands, particularly described, in the White Earth Indian Reservation in Minnesota.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from the Circuit Court of Appeals in certain classes of bankruptcy matters, are stated in the opinion. This court has jurisdiction of the cause of the appellants.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the Locomotive Headlight Law of Georgia, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The act known as the Georgia Headlight Law is violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589; Baxendale v. Railway Co., 5 C. R. (N. S.) 336; Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70; Bonnett v. Vallier, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 492; Bracewell Coal Co. v. People, 147 Illinois, 66; C. H. & D. R. Co. v. Bowling Green, 41 L. R. A. (Ohio) 422; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Connersville, 37 L. R. A. (Ind.) 175; Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Co., 59 L. R. A. (Ohio) 775; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223; Elliott on Railroads, 2d ed., § 668; Id., Vol. 2, Note, p. 24; Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tennessee, 421; Health Department v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 41; Houston & Tex. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 329; Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 59; Int. Com. Comm. v. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 52; Int. Com. Comm. v. Chicago G. West. Ry., 209 U. S. 108; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 547; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; Nat. Phonograph Co. v. Sehlegel, 128 Fed. Rep. 733; Ritchie v. People, 154 Illinois, 98, 29 L. R. A. 79; Shelbyville v. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 146 Indiana, 66; United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262, 271; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 105; Wisconsin v. Kreutzberg, 58 L. R. A. 748, 751.</p> <p>The act violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 U. S. 79; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223; Gulf Col. & S. Fe R'y Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Harding v. People, 43 N. E. Rep. 624; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45; Los Angeles v. Hollywood Cemetery, 57 Pac. Rep. 153; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.</p> <p>The act is unenforcible and void under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution and because Congress by its legislation has preempted and occupied the field of regulation of the same subject-matter.</p> <p>The act interferes with and places a burden upon interstate commerce. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218, 223; Atl. Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334; Bowman v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 209; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259; Un. Pac. Ry. v. Chic., R. I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U. S. 564; Rev. Stat., § 5258; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1.</p> <p>Congress by its legislation has preempted and occupied the field of regulation of the same subject-matter, to the exclusion of state legislation. See acts of March 2, 1893, known as the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531; March 2, 1903, amending Safety Appliance Act, 32 Stat. 943; May 27, 1908, authorizing investigations for safety of railway operation, 35 Stat. 324, c. 200; April 14, 1910, supplemental of the Safety Appliance Act, 36 Stat. 298, c. 160; May 6, 1910, reports of accidents, 36 Stat. 350, c. 208; May 30,1908, as to ash pans, 35 Stat. 476; February 17, 1911, see also the statutes relating to boilers and appurtenances, and to the hours of service. See also the Employers’ Liability Act, and the act of March 4,1911, as to investigations, 36 Stat. c. 285, § 1, p. 1397, and the Act. to Regulate Commerce, § 1; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Block Signal Board’s Final Report to Int. Com. Comm., June 29, 1912, pp. 14-15; Chic., B. & Q. R’y v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513; Chic., St. P., M. & O. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519; Chic., R. I. & Pac. R’y v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426; Chic., R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 466; Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55; Interstate Commerce Commission’s Rules, promulgated March 13, 1911; Twenty-fourth Ann. Rep. to Congress, December 21, 1910, pp. 44—47, and pp. 173-189; Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1; Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 632; N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248; Nor. Pac. R’y v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20; Southern R’y Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424; Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid & Beam, 222 U. S. 444; B. & O. R. Co. v. Indiana Railroad Commission, 196 Fed. Rep. 690, 699.</p> <p>The brief contains a summary of the Headlight Laws in sixteen States.</p> <p>Statutes of States of the character of the one under consideration, being designed for the protection of the property and lives <of the people, are not unconstitutional because they may in a manner affect interstate commerce, nor do they violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution because an expense may be incurred in obeying their regulations, N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 622; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Briston, 151 U. S. 567; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501; Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524; Chic., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251; Chic., M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; Mo. Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; N. C. & St. L. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96.</p> <p>The act does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it excepts from its operations tram, mill, and lumber roads. This would seem to be a wise and reasonable classification. Chic., R. I. & Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas, 219 U. S. 453; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, supra; People v. New York &c., 56 Hun, 409; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. State, 121 S. W. Rep. 930 (Ark.); Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Railroad Com’rs, 90 N. E. Rep. 1011.</p> <p>The contention that the act exempts from its operations railroads operated by receivers is not tenable. The act does not by its terms exempt receivers of railroads. A court would order its officer to comply with the terms of the statute and equip the locomotives with the headlights required.</p> <p>The statute does not interfere with the right of the railroad company to contract. New York & New England R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 567; McGehee on Due Process of Law, 345.</p> <p>It is not a-taking of property without due process of law, in contemplation of this provision of the Constitution, because the railroad, in order to comply with the statute, would have to discard the headlights used by it, which it considers are good headlights, and to replace the same with the headlights required under the act. All property is held subject to the police regulations of the State. Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; Bacon v. B. & M. R. Co., 76 Atl. Rep. 128 (Vt.); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512.</p> <p>The legislature may prescribe in detail the kind of light which should be used, and may also designate the size of the reflector as well as the number of watts that should be used. The intensity of an electric light is measured by the watt, and the reflector increases the breadth and intensity of the light, as was well known to the legislature. Chesapeake &c. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 238; Freund on Police Power, § 34; Atchison &c. R. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 102.</p> <p>This statute is in the interest of the public and its wisdom cannot be questioned by the courts. The public policy of the Government is to be found in its statutes and when the law-making power speaks upon a particular subject over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such cases is what the statute enacts. Logan v. Postal Tel. Co., 157 Fed. Rep. 570, 587; United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 340; Chi., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 569.</p> <p>The subject has not been acted upon m any way by Congress or by the Interstate Commerce Commission, directly or indirectly. The act does not in any way conflict with ány act of Congress'or any rule or regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in the absence of such conflict the Federal courts will not declare the act invalid as interfering with interstate commerce. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612, 623; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 148.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the Interstate1 Commerce Commission relative to switching charges within, the yard limits of San Francisco, California, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF ERRORS AND, APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the power of a State, or a 'municipality acting under its authority, to establish rates of transportation on ferries plying between one of its ports and a port of another State, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>A State cannot prescribe rates to be charged by a person or corporation operating an interstate ferry not in connection with a railroad, because a ferry across an interstate stream is an instrument of interstate commerce; the transportation of passengers, vehicles, horses and cattle from one State to another; is interstate commerce; prescribing rates for such transportation is a direct regulation of interstate commerce; and the power to regulate directly commerce among the States can be exercised only by authority of Congress. Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204; Covington Elevated R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 224.</p> <p>A ferry operated in connection with a railroad and carrying passengers who arrive at the ferry by rail, and also passengers who arrive at the ferry otherwise, is not subject to regulation as to its rates by authority of a State. N. Y. Central Case, 74 N. J. Law, 367; 76 N. J. Law, 664; 80 N. J. Law, 305; and see International Transit Co. v. Sault Ste. Marie, 194 Fed. Rep. 522; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 620; Gloucester Ferry Case, 114 U. S. 196.</p> <p>States have indeed exercised control in some instances over commerce.by means of interstate ferries and bridges since the Federal Constitution was adopted, and there are expressions in a few opinions of this court that have been supposed to recognize the authority of the States to do so (see Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Bl. 603; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365), but there is no decision of this court to that effect. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, does not support this, although sometimes cited to that effect,' and see St. Clair County v. Interstate Transfer Co., 192 U. S. 454; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204; N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248; Wabash Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557.</p> <p>Nearly every important instrument of interstate commerce was created by authority of the States; but that fact does not justify or support the conclusion that commerce carried ori by those instruments may be directly regulated by the States. Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra, at p. 219; New York v. New Jersey Nav. Co., 106 N. Y. 28.</p> <p>The States may make and enforce regulations that indirectly and in minor particulars affect interstate commerce until Congress takes action, after that, as to all matters covered by congressional action, state regulations must give way. Gloucester Ferry Case, supra, at p. 214; Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 398-412.</p> <p>For cases in New Jersey in which the authority of the State to prescribe rates to be charged by owners of interstate ferries has been considered, see State v. Freeholders of Hudson, 23 N. J. Law, 206, aff’d, 24 N. J. Law, 718; New York Central Case, 74 N. J. Law, 367; 76 N. J. Law, 664, 679; 227 U. S. 248.</p> <p>The history of the commerce clause of the Constitution confirms the opinion that it was intended to transfer the power to regulate directly foreign commerce and commerce among the States of all kinds and by every means, from the States to the National Government. See, letters by Madison to Cabell (1829), and to Davis (1832); Letters and Writings of Madison, vol. iv, pp. 14 and 247; Curtis’ Const. Hist. U. S., vol. 1, p. 231, note; Elliot’s Debates, vol. 1, p. 115, ed. 1876; Webster’s Works, vol. vi, p. 9, 8th ed. 1854; 9 Wheat, at p. 226, and 12 Wheat, at p. 445.</p> <p>If the power to regulate foreign commerce was transferred to Congress by the Constitution, it cannot be denied that power to regulate interstate commerce was also transferred at the same time. Story’s Constitution, § 1065; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 57; West Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1. Rev. Stat., § 2792, evidently relates to ferries between points in Canada and Mexico and the United States, but § 4426 applies to all ferryboats, and see § 4400; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488.</p>

The facts, which involve the right of the State, or a municipality acting under its authority, to establish ordinances regulating maintenance of ferries between its ports and one of a foreign government and the construction of the treaty of 1909 with Great Britain, are stated in the opinion. The ordinance is not invalid as in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. A ferry is in respect to the landing and not on the water.

Houston East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), also known as the Shreveport Rate Case, was a decision of the United States Supreme Court expanding the power of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States. Justice Hughes's majority opinion stated that the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce also allowed it to regulate purely intrastate commerce in cases where control of the former was not possible without control of the latter. Because the Supreme Court consolidated several related appeals, they are sometimes collectively known as the "Shreveport Rate Cases" although the Supreme Court issued only one ruling.

CERTIFICATE frIom.the circuit court of appeals for the SIXTH CIRCUIT. The facts, which involve the construction of § 3a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States under § 57, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of a patent of the United States for a tract of land issued under a homestead entry, are stated in the opinion. The evidence having all been taken, before a special master, the rule that appellate courts wiR give great weight to findings of trial courts on questions of fact does not apply. After Landis had made his homestead filing, he had a right to make an agreement to sell the land and then commute his entry and purchase the land.

Held: that a summons in an action of foreclosure served by publication and mailing and otherwise in strict compliance with the state statute, did not deprive a defendant of his property without due process of law because his name was misspelled Albert Guilfuss assignee in the various papers instead of correctly, Albert B. Geilfuss assignee. 118 Minnesota, 117, affirmed.

David Rohrer, for many years prior to November 5, 1909, owned and operated a' distillery in Montgomery County, Ohio. On that day he was adjudicated a bankrupt, and the appellants were appointed his trustees.

Held: in a series of recent cases (Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 ; C., B. & Q. Railway v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513 ; Chicago, St. P. &c. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U. S. 519 ; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469 ; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639 ; Missouri, Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657 ; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.

This is a direct appeal from, a final decree of the District Court, rendered April 20, 1912, granting to appellees (who were complainants below,-and will be so designated), a permanent injunction against appellants (defendants below), in accordance with the prayer of the amended bill of complaint.

5)-: “The damages'in mandamus proceedings comprehended by Section 723 of the Code (Gen’l. Stat. 1909, Sec. 6319) are the injuries sustained as the natural and probable- consequences of the wrongful refusal to comply and the expense reasonably and necessarily incurred in compelling compliance with the alternative writ, including reasonable attorneys’ fees in this court and in the Supreme *469 Court of the United States.” And in addition the view of the court below is aptly…

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the' long and short-haul provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce as.amended by the; act of June 18, 1910, and the validity of an order made in pursuance thereof by the Interstate Commerce Commission, are stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE UNITED STATES COMMERCE COURT,</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that a survey was made and approved. In this case, held, that the report of the Surveyor General ánd the subsequent proceedings and survey by the Surveyor General of Arizona amounted to a survey and finding, that the lands were non-mineral and that title thereto vested in the holder of the float grant selecting the lands and passed out of the United States.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of the State of South Carolina in regard to negligent non-delivery of telegraph messages, are stated in the opinion. The statute is unconstitutional, as to interstate messages at least, under the commerce clause, where there has been no breach of duty by the telegraph company within the State. In this case there was no breach in South Carolina.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OP APPEALS OP THE STATE OP GEORGIA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the liability of a railroad company to a member of the family of an employé traveling on a free pass issued by the company under the free pass provision of the Hepburn Act, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity and sufficiency of service of process upon a foreign corporation and the determination of whether such corporation was doing business within the State, are stated in the opinion. For cases involving questions of service of process upon foreign corporations as controlled by the Constitution of the United States, see Ky. Stats., § 571 (1909); Commonwealth v. Hogan & Co., 25 Ky.

The facts, which involve the sufficiency of service of process upon a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Kentucky and also the constitutionality of the anti-trust act of Kentucky, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that defendant had not been deprived of Federal rights because the state court had refused to allow him to file an amended pleading and relitigate a question already decided by setting up alleged violations of Tederal rights.

The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of certain provisions of the laws of Tennessee in regard to the descent of real property, are stated in the opinion.

Held: in this case, not to be a law impairing the obligation of a contract. The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of direct appeals from the District Court under § 247, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion. Mr. William A. Ketcham and Mr. A. S. Worthington for appellant. Mr. C. C. Shirley, with whom Mr. W. H. H. Miller, Mr. S. D. Miller and Mr. W. H.. Thompson were on the brief, for appellees.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to entertain an- original suit against the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, and the determination of whether the suit is one against the United States, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of provisions of the statutes of Kentucky of 1906, permitting combinations or pools of tobacco and other farm products, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OP APPEALS OP THE STATE OP KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640 (1914), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that when someone joins an ecclesiastical order, subject to individual state law, their income from copyright may be dedicated to that order's common fund as much as any other income or form of property. This does not violate any part of the Constitution if the member may withdraw from the order at any time.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York enforcing the liability of a stockholder of an insolvent Minnesota corporation, are stated in the opinion. The order of assessment does not purport to decide defendant’s liability, but only the amount of probable debts and assets and the extent to which it was necessary on the basis of all debts to resort to the liability of stockholders.

<p>PETITION POE EEHEAEING.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

FOR t THE NINTH CIRCUIT. The facts, which involve the construction and validity of patents for land issued to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company under the Land Grant Act of July 27,1866, and the effect of provisions in the patents as to the effect of subsequent discovery of minerals, are stated in the opinion.

Held: in this case, to apply to a case commenced after adjudication of bankruptcy to enjoin the trustee from prosecuting a suit in ejectment, in the courts of the State where the land is situated. Such a ease is not within the exception or in aid of the bankruptcy proceeding. 206 Fed. Rep. 4 ; 207 Fed. Rep. 543 , affirmed.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction and application of the provisions of the Safety Appliance Acts and of the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The Safety Appliance Act did not require a draw-bar thirty-one and one-half inches high. A switch-engine is not a freight car. The words “all cars” in § 2 are not applicable to height of draw-bars. The effect of the act of 1893, and the effect of the amendment of 1903 were misconceived by the Circuit Court of Appeals.</p> <p>The defendant in error assumed the risk: such was the common-law rule and that doctrine was not abolished by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.</p> <p>In support of these contentions, see American R. R. Co. v. Birch, 224 U. S. .544; Baker v. Kansas City áte., 129 Pac. Rep. 1151; Bowers,v. Southern Ry. Co., 73 S. E. Rep. 679; Burns v. Delaware Tel. Co., 7 N. J. L. 745; California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362; Central Vt. Ry. Co. v. Bethune, 206 Fed. Rep. 868; Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64; Cleveland ácc. Ry.,v. Bassert, 87 N. E. Rep. 158; Creswill v. Grand Lodge, 225 U. S. 246; Eau Claire Bank v. Jackman, 204 U. S. 522; Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 6; Freeman v. Powell, 114 S. W. Rep. 1033; Gila Valley Ry. Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S.- 94; Gulf &c. Ry. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173; Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U. Sr 538; III. Cent. R. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 IT. S. 514; Johnson v. Railroad Co., 196 IT. S. 1; Kan. City .Sou. Ry. Co. v. Albers Com. Co., 223 U. S. 573; Kizer v. Texarkana Ry. Co., 179 IT. S. 199; Louis. & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Lankford, 209 Fed. Rep. 321; McCormick v. Market Bank, 165 U. S. 538; Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 IT. S. 59; Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 H. S. 1; Neil v. Idaho, 125 Pac. Rep. 331; Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 98; Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12; Pennell v. Phila. & R. Ry. Co., 231 U. S. 675; Rector v. City Deposit Bank Co., 200 U. S. 405; St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 IT. S. 281; St. L., I. M. <& S. R. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 275; St. L., S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156; San Jose Land Co. v. San Jose Ranch Co., 189 IT. S. 177; Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co., 220 U. S. 590; Seaboard Air Line v. Duvall, 225 IT. S. 477; Seaboard Air Line v. Moore, 228 IT. S. 433; Southern Ry. Co. v. Gadd, 207 Fed. Rep. 277; Sioafford v. Templeton, 185 IT. S. 487; Tex. & Pac. Ry.- Co. v. Archibald, 170 IT. S. 665; Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sioearingen, 196 IT. S. 51; Un. Pac. R. R. Co. v. O’Brien, 161 IT. S. 451; Un. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Fuller, 202 Fed. Rep. 45; Worthington v. Elmer, 207 Fed. Rep. 306.</p>

The facts, which involve the application of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and the jurisdiction of this court to review a judgment of the state court, under § 237, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.

<p>In error to the Supreme' Court of the State of Tennessee.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State- of Nebraska.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii.</p>

<p>In error- to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>