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State v. Benson
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD BENSON
(AC 47503)
Seeley, Wilson and Lavine, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered in accordance with his pleas of guilty to, inter alia, the crimes of possession of
narcotics with intent to sell, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, and
failure to appear in the first degree. He claimed, inter alia, that the court
violated his right to self-representation under the sixth amendment to the
United States constitution by failing to canvass him pursuant to the rule of
practice (§ 44-3) after he clearly and unequivocally asserted that he wanted
to represent himself. Held:
The defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation by failing to canvass him pursuant to
Practice Book § 44-3 failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213
Conn. 233), as the defendant’s isolated statement, when viewed in context
and considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the request,
was not a clear and unequivocal invocation of his right to self-representation,
obligating the court to conduct a canvass.
Argued June 5—officially released October 7, 2025
Procedural History
Informations, in the first and second cases, charging
the defendant with violation of probation, and information in the third case, charging the defendant with the
crime of possession of a controlled substance, and
information in the fourth case, charging the defendant
with two counts each of the crimes of carrying a pistol
without a permit, illegal possession of a weapon in a
motor vehicle, and criminal possession of a firearm,
and one count each of the crimes of possession of a
controlled substance and possession of a controlled
substance with intent to sell, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical
area number twenty-three, where the court, Zagaja, J.,
denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw; thereafter, the state filed a substitute information in the
fourth case charging the defendant with the crimes
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State v. Benson
of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, criminal
possession of a pistol or revolver, and failure to appear
in the first degree; subsequently, the defendant was
presented to the court, Iannotti, J., on pleas of guilty
to the charges of possession of narcotics with intent
to sell, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, and
failure to appear in the first degree and admissions of
violations of probation; judgments of guilty in accordance with the pleas and admissions; thereafter, the
state entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining
charges; subsequently, the court, Iannotti, J., denied
the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and
admissions, and the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Robert L. O’Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on
the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel,
for the appellant (defendant).
Rajan M. Doering, certified legal intern, with whom
were Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney,
and, on the brief, John P. Doyle, state’s attorney, and
Sarah Jones, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
SEELEY, J. The defendant, Richard Benson, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered following
his entry of guilty pleas pursuant to the Alford doctrine,1
of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation
of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a) (1) (A), criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-217c, and failure to appear in the first
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-172. On
appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the court
violated his right to self-representation under the sixth
1
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37,
91 S. Ct. 160,
27 L. Ed. 2d
162 (1970).
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State v. Benson
amendment to the United States constitution by failing
to canvass him after he clearly and unequivocally
asserted that he wanted to represent himself.2 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
The record reveals the following relevant procedural
history. On May 20, 2021, the defendant was arraigned
on various charges in four separate criminal docket
numbers in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three. Two of the matters,
Docket Nos. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S and CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S,
involved charges of violation of probation in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-32, the third matter, Docket
No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S, involved a charge of possession of
a controlled substance in violation of General Statutes
§ 21a-279 (a) (1) (A), and the fourth matter, Docket No.
CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S, involved charges of possession of a
controlled substance in violation of § 21a-279 (a) (1)
(A), possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21-278 (b) (1) (A), and two
counts each of the charges of carrying a pistol without
a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35, illegal
possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation
of General Statutes § 29-38, and criminal possession of
a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217.
The defendant hired Attorney Stephen Lebedevitch
to represent him in connection with all four criminal
matters. Lebedevitch first appeared in court on the
defendant’s behalf at a pretrial hearing on July 7, 2021.
At subsequent pretrial hearings, the defendant
expressed dissatisfaction with Lebedevitch’s representation of him. At a hearing on August 3, 2022, the defendant told the court that he wanted a different attorney
2
The defendant also claims that, because he made a clear and unequivocal
request to represent himself, the court was required to canvass him and its
failure to do so constituted structural error requiring reversal of the judgment. In light of our determination that the defendant did not make a clear
and unequivocal request to represent himself, we do not address this claim.
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State v. Benson
and that he needed time to obtain new counsel. Lebedevitch, however, continued to appear on the defendant’s behalf.
On April 18, 2023, the defendant was arraigned on a
charge of threatening in the first degree in connection
with an incident that was unrelated to the matters in
which Lebedevitch was representing him, also in the
judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three. The court appointed the Office of the
Public Defender to represent the defendant for this
matter. Attorney Keith Zackowitz, of the public defender’s office, subsequently appeared on the defendant’s
behalf regarding this charge. Lebedevitch continued to
appear as the defendant’s retained counsel for the other
matters.
At a hearing on May 10, 2023, the defendant again
expressed his dissatisfaction with Lebedevitch and told
the court that he needed more time to obtain a different
attorney. On June 16, 2023, Lebedevitch filed a motion
to withdraw his appearance, representing that the attorney-client relationship had broken down irretrievably.
In that motion, Lebedevitch asserted, inter alia, that the
defendant had failed to return his calls to speak about
an upcoming violation of probation hearing. The court,
Iannotti, J., held a hearing on June 22, 2023, to address
Lebedevitch’s motion,3 but the defendant failed to
appear in court. The defendant’s bond was forfeited
and his rearrest was ordered.4 The court deferred ruling
on Lebedevitch’s motion.
The court, Zagaja, J., addressed Lebedevitch’s motion
at a proceeding on August 22, 2023, which had been
3
At the hearing, Zackowitz indicated that he also had filed a motion to
withdraw his appearance.
4
On July 14, 2023, the defendant was arraigned for violating the conditions
of his release by failing to appear at the June 22, 2023 hearing, and the state
indicated that the defendant also had cut off a GPS bracelet that he had
been ordered to wear as a condition of his release.
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State v. Benson
scheduled with respect to the merits of the defendant’s
violation of probation charges. At the start of the hearing, the defendant stated that Lebedevitch was not his
attorney and that he had been fired. The defendant
stated, among other things: ‘‘He’s not representing me
on this matter. He’s not my attorney. He’s not representing me on no matters. He was fired. He filed a motion
to withdraw on the 22nd. Before that, he filed a motion
to withdraw, he was fired. He’s not my attorney. He’s
not . . . He’s not . . . He’s not fighting on no cases.
He’s been lying to me the whole way through. This is
not my attorney. This is not my attorney at all. I’m not
moving forward with . . . nothing with this man name
on it. He’s not my attorney.’’ The defendant also indicated that he had retained a different attorney to represent him who ‘‘should be walking in here any second.’’
The court attempted to continue with the proceeding,
but the defendant continuously interjected and repeatedly stated: ‘‘He’s not my attorney.’’5
As a result of the defendant’s disruptive behavior,
the court ordered the defendant to be removed from
the courtroom. In the defendant’s absence, the court
denied Lebedevitch’s motion to withdraw his appearance. The court recalled that meaningful discussions
previously had taken place between Lebedevitch and
the defendant, and it believed that the defendant was
‘‘simply trying to not proceed with the violation of probation hearing,’’ as reflected by his failure to appear at
the June 22, 2023 hearing, his ‘‘boisterous’’ behavior in
court, and his failure to cooperate with his transportation to court that morning. The court recessed to provide Lebedevitch and Zackowitz with an opportunity
to speak to the defendant about whether he wanted to
return to the courtroom and participate in the proceeding without being disruptive.
5
At the hearing, the defendant stated, ‘‘He’s not my attorney’’ or ‘‘This is
not my attorney’’ a total of forty-seven times.
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State v. Benson
When court reconvened, the defendant, along with
Lebedevitch, Zackowitz, and the prosecutor, returned
to the courtroom and appeared before a different judge.
The court, Iannotti, J., stated its understanding that the
parties had reached a plea agreement. The prosecutor
confirmed that they had, explaining that the state had
made an offer involving a total effective sentence of
fifteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after
eight years, followed by five years of probation, in
exchange for the defendant’s admission to the violations of probation and his guilty pleas under Docket No.
CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S to charges of possession of narcotics
with intent to sell, criminal possession of a pistol or
revolver, and failure to appear in the first degree.6 The
prosecutor stated that the state would enter a nolle
prosequi as to all other remaining charges at sentencing.
The defendant, addressing the court directly, pleaded
guilty to the charges pursuant to the Alford doctrine
and admitted to the two violations of probation. The
court conducted a canvass, during which the court told
the defendant, inter alia, that he could not withdraw
his pleas once they were accepted by the court as long
as the court sentenced him in accordance with the plea
agreement. The court stated: ‘‘I’m being really up front
here and clear with you. Once I accept this plea, there’s
no turning back. You can’t come back here in a couple
of weeks and start yelling I’m taking my pleas back, I
want my hearing. . . . [T]hat’s over.’’ The defendant
responded that he understood. Upon completing the
canvass, the court found that the guilty pleas had been
knowingly and voluntarily made, with the effective
assistance of counsel.
6
On that same day, the state filed a substitute information in the case
involving Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S charging the defendant with possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of § 21a-277 (a) (1) (A),
criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of § 53a-217c, and
failure to appear in the first degree in violation of § 53a-172.
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State v. Benson
In September, 2023, the defendant, in a self-represented capacity, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas and admissions on the grounds that he had been
denied the effective assistance of counsel and furthermore that they were entered involuntarily and under
duress. In October, 2023, the self-represented defendant
filed an amended motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
and admissions in which he detailed the manner in
which the assistance provided by Lebedevitch allegedly
had been ineffective.
The defendant’s sentencing was scheduled for October 24, 2023. When the hearing began, the defendant
stated that his pleas had been coerced and were involuntary. The defendant also repeatedly stated, as he had
at the hearing on August 22, 2023, that Lebedevitch
was not his attorney. The defendant added: ‘‘I spoke to
Taylor Crillo . . . . Taylor Crillo was supposed to
come down here and file an appearance. You’re not my
attorney.’’
The court, Iannotti, J., began to address the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and admissions when the defendant stated: ‘‘Your Honor, I would
like to represent these guilty pleas and waive the
appearance of my attorney and have stand-by counsel.’’
The court did not address the defendant’s statement
but, rather, continued to summarize the proceedings
from August 22, 2023, related to the defendant’s pleas.
Lebedevitch stated that he was not adopting the defendant’s self-represented motion to withdraw and, in
response to a question from the court,7 indicated that
he did not believe that the court’s plea canvass was
flawed. The court, after stating that it had thoroughly
reviewed its canvass, denied the defendant’s motion to
withdraw.
7
When the court addressed Lebedevitch, the defendant told the court:
‘‘Your Honor, I waived the appearance. . . . I waived the appearance.’’
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State v. Benson
The defendant subsequently stated: ‘‘Wait. Whoa,
whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. I waived the appearance to
have this man present . . . for this motion to withdraw. . . . I contacted attorney—’’ The court interjected: ‘‘I’m denying that. Sir, I’m denying that. He is
your sentencing lawyer.’’ Additional discussion took
place regarding the defendant’s pleas and the prior
denial of Lebedevitch’s motion to withdraw his appearance. The following colloquy then ensued:
‘‘The Defendant: Can you please give me a continuance for my lawyer to file a[n] appearance? . . . I
obtained . . . I spoke to my attorney. My attorney was
supposed to be here. Can you please just get this . . .
this is not my attorney to represent me. He was fired
beforehand . . . .
‘‘The Court: Sir, you’ve had virtually—
‘‘The Defendant: I have every right to fire him,
Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: With all due respect, sir, you have—
‘‘The Defendant: Please . . . .
‘‘The Court: [Y]ou have virtually had years, years for
some other lawyer to come into the case.
‘‘The Defendant: Silverstein was on trial . . . when
I came [in] August he said he had a trial . . . . I stated
to Lebedevitch when he came downstairs, could you
please get me a continuance so my lawyer can come
here. A month continuance.
‘‘The Court: . . . I’m not gonna grant a continuance.’’
The court attempted to proceed with sentencing as
the defendant continued to interject about his issues
with Lebedevitch8 and the claimed involuntariness of
8
The defendant also raised concerns with Zackowitz’ representation, however, Zackowitz was not present at the sentencing hearing. Daniel Lage, a
different attorney from the public defender’s office, appeared in place of
Zackowitz.
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State v. Benson
his pleas. The court eventually sentenced the defendant
in accordance with the plea agreement that he had
reached with the state.9 This appeal10 followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly failed to canvass him pursuant to Practice
Book § 44-311 after he clearly and unequivocally asserted
his right to self-representation at the October 24, 2023
sentencing hearing when he stated: ‘‘Your Honor, I
would like to represent these guilty pleas and waive
the appearance of my attorney and have standby counsel.’’ In response, the state argues, inter alia, that the
defendant did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his
right to self-representation and, therefore, the court had
no obligation to canvass him.12 We agree with the state.
9
After the defendant was sentenced, he repeatedly called Lebedevitch a
‘‘liar’’ and stated that Lebedevitch had ‘‘sold [him] out.’’ The court described
the setting as ‘‘chaos.’’ The defendant also kicked Lebedevitch in the leg on
his way out of the courtroom.
10
The defendant’s appeal form lists only Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S and
states that the defendant is appealing from his judgment of conviction under
§§ 21a-277 (a) (1) (A), 53a-217c, and 53a-172.
11
Practice Book § 44-3 provides: ‘‘A defendant shall be permitted to waive
the right to counsel and shall be permitted to represent himself or herself
at any stage of the proceedings, either prior to or following the appointment
of counsel. A waiver will be accepted only after the judicial authority makes
a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant:
‘‘(1) Has been clearly advised of the right to the assistance of counsel,
including the right to the assignment of counsel when so entitled;
‘‘(2) Possesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent oneself;
‘‘(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range
of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad
understanding of the case; and
‘‘(4) Has been made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’’
12
The state also argues that the defendant’s claim is unpreserved and that
the record is inadequate for review under the first prong of State v. Golding,
213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,
317 Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Specifically, the state argues
that the defendant’s claim is unpreserved because the defendant ‘‘did not
adequately alert the trial court to his invocation of his right to self-representation or that the trial court was required to conduct a canvass,’’ and the
record is inadequate for review under Golding because ‘‘the record in this
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State v. Benson
The defendant seeks review of his unpreserved claim
under the doctrine set forth in State v. Golding, 213
Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by
In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015).
‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of
constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all
of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is
adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, 345
Conn. 258, 267,
284 A.3d 280 (2022). The record is adequate to review the claim, and it is of constitutional
magnitude as it implicates the defendant’s constitutionally protected right to self-representation. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the defendant cannot
case is, at best, ambiguous as to what the defendant was requesting at his
sentencing proceeding.’’ We are not persuaded. The state’s argument appears
to conflate the issues of preservation and adequacy of the record for review
with the extent to which the defendant has established the merits of his
claim that he made a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself.
Because a review of the transcripts fully establishes what happened before
the trial court, thus setting the factual predicate for the defendant’s claim
on appeal, we proceed to address the merits of the defendant’s claim. See,
e.g., State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 780,
91 A.3d 862 (2014) (‘‘[t]he record
in this case is perfectly adequate for review in that the transcript of the
sentencing proceeding tells us verbatim what happened in the trial court’’).
In addition, the state raises alternative arguments that, even if we agree
with the defendant that he made a clear and unequivocal request to represent
himself, (1) the trial court was not required to conduct a canvass because
the defendant forfeited his right to proceed in a self-represented capacity
based on his disruptive behavior, and (2) the defendant suffered no harm
by the lack of a canvass. In light of our conclusion that the defendant did
not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation, we
need not address the state’s alternative arguments.
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State v. Benson
prevail under Golding because he has failed to demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation exists.
The following legal principles guide our analysis of
the defendant’s claim. ‘‘The sixth amendment to the
United States constitution provides in relevant part: In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense. The sixth amendment right to counsel is made
applicable to state prosecutions through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. . . . In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807,
95 S. Ct. 2525,
45
L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court
concluded that the sixth amendment [also] embodies
a right to self-representation and that a defendant in a
state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed
without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently
elects to do so. . . . In short, forcing a lawyer upon
an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to
defend himself if he truly wants to do so. . . .
‘‘It is well established that [t]he right to counsel and
the right to self-representation present mutually exclusive alternatives. A criminal defendant has a constitutionally protected interest in each, but since the two
rights cannot be exercised simultaneously, a defendant
must choose between them. When the right to have
competent counsel ceases as the result of a sufficient
waiver, the right of self-representation begins. . . . Put
another way, a defendant properly exercises his right
to self-representation by knowingly and intelligently
waiving his right to representation by counsel.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ghant, 212 Conn.
App. 662, 676–77,
276 A.3d 1004, cert. denied,
345 Conn.
901,
282 A.3d 465 (2022); see also, e.g., State v. Braswell,
318 Conn. 815, 827–28,
123 A.3d 835 (2015); State v.
Paschal, 207 Conn. App. 328, 332–33,
262 A.3d 893, cert.
denied, 340 Conn. 902,
263 A.3d 387 (2021), cert. denied,
U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 1395,
212 L. Ed. 2d 341 (2022).
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State v. Benson
‘‘State and federal courts consistently have discussed
the right to self-representation in terms of invoking or
asserting it . . . and have concluded that there can be
no infringement of the right to self-representation in
the absence of a defendant’s proper assertion of that
right. . . . The threshold requirement that the defendant clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to proceed [as a self-represented party] is one of many safeguards of the fundamental right to counsel. . . .
Accordingly, [t]he constitutional right of self-representation depends . . . upon its invocation by the defendant in a clear and unequivocal manner. . . . In the
absence of a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right
to self-representation, a trial court has no independent
obligation to inquire into the defendant’s interest in
representing himself . . . . [Instead] recognition of
the right becomes a matter entrusted to the exercise
of discretion by the trial court. . . . Conversely, once
there has been an unequivocal request for self-representation, a court must undertake an inquiry [pursuant to
Practice Book § 44-3; see footnote 11 of this opinion];
on the record, to inform the defendant of the risks of
self-representation and to permit him to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. . . .
‘‘Although a clear and unequivocal request is required,
there is no standard form it must take. [A] defendant
does not need to recite some talismanic formula hoping
to open the eyes and ears of the court to [that] request.
Insofar as the desire to proceed [as a self-represented
party] is concerned, [a defendant] must do no more
than state his request, either orally or in writing, unambiguously to the court so that no reasonable person
can say that the request was not made. . . . Moreover,
it is generally incumbent upon the courts to elicit that
elevated degree of clarity through a detailed inquiry.
That is, the triggering statement in a defendant’s attempt
to waive his right to counsel need not be punctilious;
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State v. Benson
rather, the dialogue between the court and the defendant must result in a clear and unequivocal statement. . . .
‘‘Finally, in conducting our review, we are cognizant
that the context of [a] reference to self-representation
is important in determining whether the reference itself
was a clear invocation of the right to self-representation. . . . The inquiry is fact intensive and should be
based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the request . . . which may include, inter alia, whether
the request was for hybrid representation . . . or
merely for the appointment of standby or advisory counsel . . . the trial court’s response to a request . . .
whether a defendant has consistently vacillated in his
request . . . and whether a request is the result of an
emotional outburst . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pires, 310 Conn. 222,
231–32, 77 A.3d 87 (2013).
‘‘We ordinarily review for abuse of discretion a trial
court’s determination, made after a canvass pursuant
to [Practice Book] § 44-3, that a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. . . .
In cases like the present one, however, where the defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to
exercise that discretion by canvassing him after he
clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to represent
himself . . . whether the defendant’s request was clear
and unequivocal presents a mixed question of law and
fact, over which . . . our review is plenary.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1, 13–14,
44 A.3d 794 (2012); see also
State v. Flanagan, 293 Conn. 406, 419–21 and 420–21
n.10, 978 A.2d 64 (2009).
In the present case, we conclude that the defendant’s
isolated statement, when viewed in context and considering ‘‘the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
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State v. Benson
request’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v.
Pires, supra, 310 Conn. 232; see also State v.
Jordan,
supra,
305 Conn. 15; was not a clear and unequivocal
request invoking his right to self-representation. Rather,
the record demonstrates that, at the start of the October
24, 2023 hearing, just prior to the defendant’s statement
that he would ‘‘like to represent these guilty pleas and
waive the appearance of [his] attorney and have stand-by counsel,’’ the defendant indicated that he had spoken
to a different attorney who ‘‘was supposed to come
down here and file an appearance.’’ In addition, after
the defendant’s purported request to represent himself,
the defendant stated that his new attorney ‘‘was supposed to be here’’ and explicitly asked the court for a
continuance in order for his new attorney to appear on
his behalf.
Indeed, the record demonstrates that, beyond the one
isolated statement by the defendant at the October 24,
2023 hearing, on which he relies in support of the present claim, the defendant had displayed a pattern of
conduct, at and before that proceeding, in which he
had been focused on firing Lebedevitch and replacing
him with a different, privately retained attorney, including at the August 22, 2023 hearing when he repeatedly
stated that Lebedevitch was not his attorney and
explained that he had retained a different attorney to
represent him who ‘‘should be walking in here any second.’’ See State v. Pires, supra, 310 Conn. 240 (considering defendant’s ‘‘pattern of activity’’ over course of several pretrial proceedings, which demonstrated that,
beyond one isolated comment by defense counsel that
defendant told her that he wanted to represent himself,
defendant’s energies ‘‘had been exclusively devoted to
trying to ‘fire’ [defense counsel] and have her replaced
with different court-appointed counsel’’ (emphasis
omitted)); see also State v. Carter, 200 Conn. 607, 611,
513 A.2d 47 (1986) (defendant’s repeated complaints
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State v. Benson
about public defender’s performance and requests for
appointment of special public defender, and his statements that ‘‘ ‘I am misrepresented and now I have to
represent myself’ ’’ and ‘‘ ‘I’ll have to represent myself,’ ’’
did not constitute clear and unequivocal request when
‘‘couched in terms of his request for a different public
defender’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Further, the court’s failure to acknowledge the defendant’s comment about his apparent desire to represent
himself and rule definitively on that matter also supports the conclusion that the defendant’s comment was
not clear and unequivocal. See State v. Pires, supra,
310 Conn. 242 (‘‘[t]he trial court’s response is one factor
that we consider in determining whether the defendant’s request was clear and unequivocal’’). Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances and the context of the defendant’s isolated statement, we conclude
that the court was not required to canvass the defendant
pursuant to Practice Book § 44-3 because he did not
clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self-representation. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails
under Golding’s third prong.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
