Volume 235 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

In two separate actions that were consolidated for trial, which involved allegations of fraud in connection with private investments, B, the plaintiff in the first action and the named defendant in the second action, and M, a defendant in the second action, appealed from the trial court's judgments for the named defendant et al. in the first action and F Co., the plaintiff in the second action. After the actions had been consolidated, the parties represented to the trial court in several joint case management proposals that the actions would be tried to a jury and filed jury claims in the separate actions they brought. F Co. thereafter filed motions to erase both of the consolidated actions from the jury docket, arguing, inter alia, that B's jury claim was untimely under the applicable statute (§ 52-215). The trial court granted F Co.'s motions to erase, reasoning that the jury claims in both actions were untimely, that the parties had not provided written consent to a jury trial under § 52-215, and that a jury claim could be withdrawn at any time in the absence of prejudice to the opposing party. B and M claimed that the trial court improperly removed the actions from the jury docket and proceeded with a bench trial. Held: This court reversed the judgments of the trial court and remanded the actions for a jury trial, as § 52-215 permits a case to be entered at any time on the jury docket upon the parties' written consent, and the trial court, in granting F Co.'s motions to erase, improperly focused on the timing of the parties' jury claims, which was not pertinent to whether they provided written consent by virtue of their jury claims. This court determined that B's filing of a jury claim in the action he brought, along with the F Co.'s filing of a certificate of closed pleadings in that action, which also indicated that the matter would be tried to a jury, constituted written consent by both parties to enter the consolidated actions on the jury docket in accordance with § 52-215, and F Co. further expressed its consent to having the two actions tried together to a jury when it thereafter filed its own jury claim in the action it brought. The trial court erred in granting F Co.'s motions to erase and in concluding that F Co. retained the right to unilaterally withdraw its consent to a jury trial once the action it brought was properly placed on the jury docket, as nothing in § 52-215 authorized such a unilateral change and, with it, the 0 Conn. App. 865 ,0 3 Barr v. MFI Management, Inc. unilateral denial of an opponent's right to a jury trial, and the placement of a case on the jury list upon the written consent of all parties fixed each party's right to a jury trial and prevented the court from erasing the case from the jury docket except by agreement of all parties. Argued February 10—officially released September 9, 2025

The defendants appealed from the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff on his claims of fraud and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) in connection with a loan agreement between the parties. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in finding that the three year statutes of limitations governing the plaintiff's claims had been tolled by their fraudulent concealment pursuant to statute (§ 52-595). Held: The trial court correctly determined that § 52-595 tolled the statutes of limitations governing the plaintiff's fraud and CUTPA claims, as sufficient evidence supported the court's finding that the defendants intentionally concealed from the plaintiff the facts necessary to establish his claims and, due to the defendants' conduct in repeatedly and falsely representing to the plaintiff that he would be repaid, the plaintiff did not become aware of his causes of action until almost two years after the defendant H had knowingly misappropriated the loaned funds. The trial court's punitive damages award pursuant to statute (§ 42-110g (a)) on the CUTPA claim did not constitute an abuse of its discretion, as the court reasonably could have concluded that the defendants' conduct in knowingly misappropriating the loaned funds and repeatedly engaging in deceptive acts to conceal the fraud and delay the plaintiff from pursing legal action warranted the amount of the award. Argued May 19—officially released September 9, 2025

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis- solved, appealed from the trial court's judgment denying his motion to modify custody of the parties' minor children and to allow him visitation. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that joint legal custody and visitation was not in the best interests of the chil- dren. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for modification of custody and visitation, as the trial court considered many factors in determining whether modification of custody and visitation was in the children's best interests and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, which was not present in this case, this court presumed that the trial court properly weighed all the evidence before it. The trial court properly articulated its basis for concluding that modification of custody and visitation was not in the children's best interests pursuant to the statute (§ 46b-56), as the court stated that it had considered all of the statutory factors set out in § 46b-56 (c) and it was not required to consider any particular factors or to assign weight to the factors that it considered. The trial court did not impermissibly delegate its judicial authority to the plaintiff by giving her discretion to decide the nature and scope of the defendant's visitation rights, as the court's initial custody order in the dissolu- tion judgment granted the plaintiff sole legal custody of the children and did not grant the defendant any visitation rights, and the fact that the court left open the possibility of visits at the discretion of the plaintiff did not transform the court's decision-making into impermissible delegation. In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of Judges Prescott, Moll and Westbrook. Thereafter, Judge Pellegrino was added to the panel in place of Judge Prescott, who did not participate in the decision of the case. Judge Pellegrino has read the briefs and appendices and listened to a recording of oral argument prior to participating in this deci- sion. This court declined to review the defendant's inadequately briefed claim that the trial court failed to apply § 46b-56 (g) when it denied his motion for modification. Argued February 14—officially released September 9, 2025

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the plain- tiff's application for relief from abuse and issuing a civil order of protection pursuant to statute (§ 46b-15). The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly issued a civil order of protection. Held: The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, as the plaintiff produced evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case, includ- ing testimony of the guardian ad litem for the parties' child. This court could not conclude that the trial court incorrectly applied the law or otherwise abused its discretion in issuing the protective order, as it was unclear from the record on which statutory basis the trial court relied in issuing the protective order, the defendant left unchallenged on appeal two statutory grounds to support the issuance of the protective order, the defendant failed to request an articulation from the trial court, and the defendant rooted his claim on appeal on a superseded revision of § 46b-15 and case law citing to that revision. Argued June 3—officially released September 16, 2025

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of sexual assault and risk of injury to a child, appealed after the habeas court denied his petition for certification to appeal from its judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly construed the allegations in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, resulting in a deprivation of his right to due process. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal, as he failed to demonstrate that his underlying claim of error was debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the question was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further, and, accordingly, this court concluded that the petitioner failed to invoke this court's jurisdiction, and the appeal was dismissed. The habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as, despite the petitioner's claim to the contrary, the court properly construed the allegations of the petition to the petitioner's benefit, in light of the petitioner's legal burden and the specific relief sought by him, and, even if the petitioner could demonstrate that the court erred in its interpretation of the allegations in the petition, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that it resulted in a specific due process violation as was alleged. Argued March 17—officially released September 16, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second degree, and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed. Following the second day of trial, the defendant did not appear in court, and the court completed the trial and sentenced the defendant in absentia. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support certain of his convictions. Held: The jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was sufficient evidence that the defendant's abuse of the victim occurred after the victim turned thirteen years old, as required to sustain his convictions of sexual assault in the second degree and risk of injury to a child. The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his constitu- tional rights to due process and to counsel by denying his midtrial requests for a continuance failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as the defendant failed to show that the alleged constitutional violations existed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's requests for a midtrial continuance, as the court considered the status of the case, made reasonable efforts to accommodate the defendant, and marked off two days of trial testimony to allow the defendant to prepare. The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to advise the defendant of the consequences of failing to appear and in trying and sentencing him in absentia, as the defendant's conduct constituted a waiver of his right to be present at both his trial and sentencing, and the defendant failed to make a showing that this case presented circumstances extraordinary enough to merit this court's exercise of its supervisory authority. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial when the defendant failed to appear for the third day of trial, as the court properly concluded that the defendant had waived his right to be present when he failed to appear through no fault of the state, and the court provided a curative instruction to the jury, directing it not to draw any inferences adverse to the defendant as a result of his absence. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved constitutional claim that the trial court's denial of defense counsel's motion for a mistrial deprived the defendant of his due process rights under the federal constitu- tion, as, pursuant to the first prong of Golding, the record was inadequate for review. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court committed plain error by not sua sponte discharging defense counsel and declaring a mistrial as the record was inadequate for review of that claim. This court dismissed as moot the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly relied on the rape shield statute to prevent him from cross- examining the victim about a false allegation of sexual misconduct she allegedly had made, as the defendant failed to challenge all independent bases for the trial court's ruling. Argued June 4—officially released September 16, 2025

The defendant property owners appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the plaintiff bank's application for execution of ejectment and from the court's denial of their motion for judgment on the plaintiff's claim for money damages under the mortgage note. This court, in a prior appeal, affirmed the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure, and, thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for order to set new law days. Prior to the running of the law days, the court denied the defendants' motion to open the judgment and extend the law days. On appeal, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's applica- tion for execution of ejectment on the ground that their objection thereto was moot. Held: This court rejected the plaintiff's challenge to this court's subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, as the law day set by the trial court was rendered ineffective by the automatic appellate stay that arose after the denial of the plaintiff's motion to open and, therefore, title to the property had not passed irrevocably to the plaintiff and the appeal was not moot. The trial court abused its discretion in relying on the scheduled law day to conclude that the defendants' objection to the application for execution of ejectment was moot, as the court's denial of the defendants' motion to open gave rise to an automatic appellate stay, which rendered the scheduled law day ineffective, and therefore title had not yet vested in the plaintiff. This court declined to review the merits of the defendants' claim that the trial court improperly denied their motion for judgment on the plaintiff's claim for money damages under the mortgage note, the defendants having failed to provide this court with an adequate record for review. Argued June 2—officially released September 16, 2025

Convicted, following a bench trial, of the crime of robbery in the second degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly failed to conduct an independent inquiry into his competence to understand the proceedings and to assist his counsel in his defense. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a compe- tency hearing, as the court's observations of the defendant did not lead it to believe that his conduct rose to the level of substantial evidence of mental impairment and, thus, the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing violated his due process right to a fair trial failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233). The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction, as the trial court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to steal the victim's car and represented to the victim that he had a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument, which he put to the back of the victim's head and threatened to use if the victim did not comply with his order to get on the ground. The trial court did not, as the defendant claimed, clearly and conclusively deny him his constitutional right to represent himself during a pretrial hearing, the court having instead continued the hearing to resolve its concern about his competence, and the defendant thereafter waived his right to self- representation when, after his counsel withdrew, he acquiesced to being represented by a different attorney and did not reassert his request to represent himself, and the defendant's contention that the court's alleged error was structural, thereby requiring the reversal of his conviction, did not contradict this court's conclusion that he waived his right to repre- sent himself. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it properly determined that defense counsel opened the door to the admission of hearsay testimony from a police officer regarding an out-of-court statement by the victim describing the robbery suspects, as defense counsel's implication on cross- examination of the officer that the police did not have an adequate descrip- tion of the robber could have left the court, as the fact finder, with the false impression that the police did not have a more specific description of the robber, and the officer's testimony served to remove any unfair prejudice that might have otherwise ensued from defense counsel's inquiry. Argued March 13—officially released September 16, 2025

The plaintiff, a former Waterbury police officer who suffered a work-related injury, appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing in part and deny- ing in part his administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Retirement Board of the City of Waterbury, which had denied his application for a disability pension, and from the court's judgment dismissing his breach of contract claim with respect to the board and denying that claim with respect to the defendant city. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court committed plain error by failing to consider and analyze an allegedly applicable statute (§ 31-71f) regarding certain information an employer must provide to employees, which the parties did not raise in their arguments before the court. Held: This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim regarding the trial court's failure to consider § 31-71f, as the plaintiff failed to adequately brief it. The trial court did not improperly deny the plaintiff's administrative appeal from the board's denial of his application for disability retirement and pen- sion benefits, the court having properly determined that the plaintiff did not have a ''work-related disability'' as defined under the city's ordinances (§§ 35.035 and 35.073), as there was substantial evidence that the city intended to and did offer the plaintiff a qualifying job pursuant to § 35.035 that he could perform. The board properly did not award any retroactive payments under § 35.073 of the city's ordinances, as it determined that the plaintiff was not eligible for disability benefits. The plaintiff's claim that § 35.035 of the city's ordinances required the city to offer him a job with a base pay rate of at least 75 percent of his total compensation as a police officer, not his base pay rate, was unsupported by the language of the ordinance. The trial court properly dismissed the administrative appeal with respect to the city, as the plaintiff provided no legal authority to support bringing an administrative appeal against the city, which was not involved in rendering the administrative decision. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly denied his breach of contract claim with respect to the city, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the city violated any ordinance with respect to disability pension benefits and, therefore, failed to establish a breach of the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the plaintiff's former union. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's breach of contract claim with respect to the board, as the board was not a proper party to the claim because it was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. Argued April 21—officially released September 16, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defen- dant's motion to dismiss her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff's complaint sought damages for the defendant's alleged actions undertaken in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that she lacked standing to maintain her cause of action because she had commenced the action during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding and her claim became the property of the bankruptcy estate. Held: The trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain her action against the defendant, as most of the challenged conduct in support of the plaintiff's alleged violations of CUTPA occurred after the filing of the bankruptcy petition and was not sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past, and, accordingly, the claim did not become property of the bankruptcy estate as a matter of law. Argued November 21, 2024—officially released September 23, 2025

The plaintiffs, victims of criminal computer hacking by the defendant L, appealed from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of L's parent, the defendant J. The plaintiffs claimed that the court improperly granted summary judgment because J had voluntarily assumed a duty of care to them to monitor and supervise L's Internet usage at J's home or, in the alternative, J owed a general duty of care arising from her affirmative conduct, and J failed to prevent L, an adult, from hacking into the plaintiffs' social media accounts to obtain and post on the Internet photographs of them in the nude. Held: The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for J on the plaintiffs' claims sounding in negligence, in which they alleged that J had voluntarily assumed a duty of care to them, as this court could not conclude that a reasonable person in J's position could foresee that the mere act of providing a computer or Internet service to an adult child would result in the kind of harm the plaintiffs alleged, and, although J had made gratuitous, unsolicited email statements to the police representing what she had done and was intending to do to prevent future hacking attempts by L, there was no genuine issue of material fact that J did not learn that L had stolen the plaintiffs' photographs and posted them online until after that conduct had ceased. Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, public policy considerations, under the circumstances at issue, did not compel the conclusion that J's actions gave rise to a duty of care to the plaintiffs, as the parties' normal expectations weighed against establishing such a duty, any benefit that might accrue from recognizing a public policy of encouraging parents to monitor their adult children's Internet use could not be counterbalanced by the practical difficulties inherent in taking on such a task, the recognition of such a legal duty would increase litigation, and the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions informed this court's determination that it could not conclude that J had taken on a policy of supervising L that was analogous to that of employers who undertake to supervise their employees. The plaintiffs' claim that J owed them and other similarly situated victims a general duty of care on the basis of her assurances to the police that she would supervise L's computer related activities was unavailing, as this court was not convinced that J, in voluntarily undertaking to monitor L's activities, increased the risk of harm to the plaintiffs, who provided no evidentiary basis for their assertion that, subsequent to her statements to the police, J knew that L would be tempted to engage in further misconduct or that no one else would assume the responsibility for preventing his misconduct, and the fact that the General Assembly has not expressed, by way of statute, a public policy interest supporting the imposition of third-party liability against those who provide Internet access to others weighed against creating a common-law duty of care in such circumstances. Argued January 13—officially released September 23, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgments denying his applica- tion to vacate an arbitration award and granting the defendants' application to confirm that same award, which had been issued in connection with an employment dispute. The award was issued in favor of the defendant W Co., the plaintiff's former employer, and the defendant B, a member of W Co.'s board of managers. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly failed to vacate the award because the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the arbitration submission and acted in manifest disregard of the law in awarding attorney's fees and costs to the defendants. Held: The plaintiff's failure to include the trial court docket number of the defen- dants' application to confirm the arbitration award on his appeal form did not render his appeal moot, as the defendants provided no authority indicat- ing that a party's failure to list all of the trial court docket numbers on an appeal form in accordance with the rule of practice (§ 61-7 (a) (1)) deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and the appeal form filed by the plaintiff provided notice to the defendants that the plaintiff was challeng- ing the propriety of both the judgment denying his application to vacate the award and the judgment granting the defendants' application to confirm the award. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly failed to vacate the arbitration award because the arbitrator both exceeded the scope of the arbitration submission and acted in manifest disregard of the law in awarding attorney's fees and costs to the defendants, as the plain language of the arbitration clause in the plaintiff's employment agreement provided that the prevailing party was entitled to receive an award of attor- ney's fees and costs in addition to all other damages to which such party was entitled, the alleged ambiguity in the arbitration clause regarding the arbitrator's ability to award attorney's fees undermined any claim that the award fell outside of the scope of the submission, the court expressly found that the defendants were the prevailing party in the arbitration, and the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a manifest disregard of the law by the arbitra- tor with respect to the award of attorney's fees and costs. The arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law by denying the plaintiff's counterclaim alleging breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, as the arbitrator set forth the proper legal principles governing the duty of good faith and fair dealing and made detailed findings with respect to the conduct of both the plaintiff and W Co. based on his review and credibility assessment of the documentary and testimonial evidence presented at the arbitration proceeding. The plaintiff failed to establish that the trial court improperly denied his application to vacate the arbitration award or improperly granted the defen- dant's application to confirm the award because the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law by misapplying the after-acquired evidence doctrine with respect to evidence that W Co. knew the plaintiff had provided consulting services to a third party in violation of his employment agreement prior to the termination of his employment, as the plaintiff failed to overcome the high burden of showing that the governing law on waiver was well- defined, explicit and clearly applicable in situations in which both the after- acquired evidence doctrine and a reservation of rights clause were impli- cated, that an obvious error existed that was capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator, or that the arbitrator appreciated, yet ignored, a clearly governing legal prin- ciple. Argued February 11—officially released September 23, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing his adminis- trative appeal from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. In his decision, the commissioner suspended the plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license following his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and required, pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b (i)), as a condition for the restoration of his license, that the plaintiff install an ignition interlock device in a motor vehicle he owned or operated. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly dismissed his administrative appeal for lack of standing because he had established that he was an indigent driver who did not own a motor vehicle, could not afford a motor vehicle, and had no access to a motor vehicle in which to install an ignition interlock device, and, therefore, there was a possibility that his legally protected interest in a motor vehicle operator's license would be adversely and unequally affected by the ignition interlock device requirement in violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States and Connecti- cut constitutions. Held: The trial court properly determined that the plaintiff did not have standing to assert his constitutional claim, as the plaintiff failed to establish that he was a member of the group of individuals that he asserted § 14-227b (i) was enacted to discriminate against, namely, indigent drivers who do not own a motor vehicle, who cannot afford a motor vehicle, and who do not have access to a motor vehicle in which to install an ignition interlock device, as is required by § 14-227b (i). (One judge dissenting) Argued March 26—officially released September 23, 2025

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of, inter alia, violation of a protective order, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that the court erred by dismissing his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that he was not in custody while on conditional discharge pursuant to the statute (§ 52-466) governing applica- tions for writs of habeas corpus. Held: The habeas court improperly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the petitioner was in custody while on conditional discharge within the meaning of § 52-466, regardless of the conditions of discharge, because such an individual is subject to incarcera- tion without the procedural safeguards enjoyed by members of the public, and that exposure, in itself, constitutes a severe restraint on an individu- al's liberty. Argued March 18—officially released September 30, 2025

The defendant, who had been on probation in connection with his convic- tions, in two separate dockets, of violation of probation and interfering with an officer, appealed from the trial court's judgments revoking his probation and imposing a sentence of incarceration. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied his motion to dismiss, which alleged violations of his right to a speedy trial and of the 120 day guideline contained in the revocation of probation statute (§ 53a-32). Held: The trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss was not clearly erroneous, as § 53a-32 (c) does not extend the right to a speedy trial to probation revocation proceedings, and the court found that the commence- ment of the hearing was tolled in light of the defendant's voluminous motion practice and the numerous files pending before the court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in waiting to rule on the defen- dant's request to represent himself, as the court reasonably waited to canvass the defendant for a period of approximately six weeks while a competency evaluation of the defendant was pending in another jurisdiction, and the delay in the court's canvass did not prejudice the defendant, who then represented himself at all critical stages of the proceedings. The trial court's finding that the defendant violated his probation was sup- ported by sufficient evidence, including testimony by the victim, which the court found to be highly credible. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his due process rights were violated as a result of prosecutorial impropriety, specifically, that the prosecutor failed to correct certain statements by the victim during her testimony, which the defendant alleged were false or misleading, as this court's review of the victim's testimony revealed that the defendant had not demonstrated that the state presented any material, false or substantially misleading testimony that the prosecutor failed to correct, the defendant's claims relied on documents that were not in evidence at the probation revocation hearing, and there was no reasonable likelihood that any allegedly false testimony could have affected the trial court's judgment. Argued June 3—officially released September 30, 2025

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff had previously been dis- solved, appealed, challenging the financial orders in the trial court's judg- ment of dissolution. While the appeal was pending, the trial court denied the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for contempt, in which the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to pay attorney's fees that had been awarded to him in the dissolution judgment, but ordered the defendant to pay those fees. The defendant filed a motion for review of the trial court's order determining that the automatic appellate stay pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 61-11 (a)) did not apply to the award of attorney's fees. Held: This court granted the motion for review and granted the relief requested, vacating the trial court's order, as the award of attorney's fees was automati- cally stayed under Practice Book § 61-11 (a) because the award did not fall within the orders exempted from the automatic appellate stay in § 61-11 (c), namely, periodic alimony, support, custody or visitation in family matters. Considered July 23—officially released September 30, 2025

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment granting in part the peti- tioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent claimed that the court improperly determined that the petitioner's criminal trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in advising the petitioner not to testify in support of his claim of self-defense in light of the potential admissibility into evidence of certain of the petitioner's prior convictions. Held: The habeas court improperly granted in part the habeas petition, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his counsel rendered deficient perfor- mance in advising him not to testify, that advice having been within the range of reasonable professional assistance based on counsel's concern that the petitioner's testimony might potentially open the door to the admission of his prior convictions or that the trial court could permit their use as impeachment evidence. The habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of his counsel's advice, as the petitioner failed to show, in light of the strength of the state's case, that a reasonable probability existed that the trial's outcome would have been different had his counsel advised him that the admissibility of the prior convictions would have been limited had the petitioner testified, and the petitioner's testimony would have been, to some extent, cumulative of the record already established at the trial. Argued April 22—officially released September 30, 2025

Convicted of various crimes in connection with a motor vehicle accident involving a pedestrian, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that his conviction of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and assault in the second degree, arising from a single occurrence, violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution. Held: The defendant could not prevail on his claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and assault in the second degree, as the state adduced ample evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that the state had proven beyond a reason- able doubt that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle that struck the victim, that the defendant's intoxication caused the victim's injuries, and that the victim suffered serious physical injuries. The defendant's conviction of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle and assault in the second degree did not violate double jeopardy because the defendant failed to establish a clear legislative intent to treat the relevant statutes (§§ 53a-60 (a) (3) and 53a-60d) as one offense for double jeopardy purposes pursuant to Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299), as the statute and the information on each charge at issue required proof of elements that the statute and the information on the other charge did not, neither statute refers to the other, each statute sets a different penalty, and the statutes have distinct purposes, and the fact that the same evidence was used to establish that the defendant committed each crime was irrele- vant. The trial court's supplemental instruction to the jury in response to a note it received regarding whether ''serious physical injury'' to the victim must be long-term did not mislead the jurors, as the court answered the jury's question and that answer was correct in law, the court did not state that permanence was not a factor that the jury could consider in determining whether the victim sustained a serious physical injury, and the court referred the jury to its original instructions, a copy of which was in the jury's posses- sion, and those instructions provided the correct definition of ''serious physi- cal injury.'' Argued April 15—officially released October 7, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment denying its application to vacate, correct and/or modify a certain arbitration award and granting the defendant's motion for order confirming the arbitration award. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied its application and granted the defendant's motion because the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law and violated public policy. Held: The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, as the trial court properly resolved the issues raised in this appeal, and this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a proper statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues. Argued May 21—officially released October 7, 2025

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment rendered in accor- dance with his pleas of guilty to, inter alia, the crimes of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, and failure to appear in the first degree. He claimed, inter alia, that the court violated his right to self-representation under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution by failing to canvass him pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 44-3) after he clearly and unequivocally asserted that he wanted to represent himself. Held: The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his constitu- tional right to self-representation by failing to canvass him pursuant to Practice Book § 44-3 failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as the defendant's isolated statement, when viewed in context and considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the request, was not a clear and unequivocal invocation of his right to self-representation, obligating the court to conduct a canvass. Argued June 5—officially released October 7, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment limiting his recovery of costs pursuant to statute (§ 31-72) to statutory, taxable costs. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly concluded that costs recoverable under § 31-72 are limited to statutory, taxable costs rather than all reasonable and necessary costs. Held: Pursuant to the binding precedent of this court in Miller v. Guimaraes (78 Conn. App. 760) and Arnone v. Enfield (79 Conn. App. 501), this court concluded that costs recoverable under § 31-72 are limited to statutory, taxable costs. Argued January 9—officially released October 7, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of assault in the first degree, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner, whose trial counsel had been permitted by the trial court to withdraw upon an oral motion made during a hearing at which the petitioner failed to appear, claimed, inter alia, that the habeas court erred in determining that the proceeding during which his counsel had withdrawn was not a critical stage of the prosecution and, thus, despite his absence, his rights to due process had not been violated. Held: The habeas court properly determined that the proceeding during which the trial court granted the motion to withdraw by the petitioner's criminal trial counsel was not a critical stage of the petitioner's prosecution, as, although the proceeding had originally been scheduled to address a pending plea offer from the state, the petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing changed the nature of the hearing, and the proceeding had no effect on the petitioner's ability to later accept or reject a plea offer from the state. Argued March 19—officially released October 7, 2025

Convicted, following a jury trial, of attempt to commit murder and other crimes, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court violated his right to jury unanimity by discharging the jury after accepting its verdict but before disclosing to the parties that one of the jurors had made an ex parte comment to the court in the deliberation room that she felt ''a little guilty about the attempted murder charge.'' Held: The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his right to jury unanimity failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as the juror's comment was simply a statement about how she felt about the verdict that could not reasonably be construed as an equivocation or expression of reservation about it and did not indicate that she or any other juror had not agreed to the verdict, and, because this court could not infer that the juror intended her comment to inform the trial court that the jury's verdict was not unanimous, that court's failure to disclose the comment to the parties before discharging the jury did not amount to a constitu- tional violation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by conducting a limited inquiry during a posttrial hearing about the juror's comment and denying the defen- dant's request to inquire into why she made that comment, as the court's actions did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial but, rather, satisfied the preliminary inquiry into possible juror misconduct required under State v. Brown (235 Conn. 502), the juror having affirmed her verdict and the court, on the basis of the juror's testimony, having determined that there was no indication that the jury's verdict lacked unanimity or that juror misconduct had occurred, and further questioning of the juror would have constituted improper inquiry into the mental processes by which the verdict was determined. (One judge concurring and one judge dissenting in separate opinions) Argued February 10—officially released October 7, 2025 In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained.

The respondent Commissioner of Correction appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment granting in part the petition- er's petition for a writ of habeas corpus after concluding that the petitioner's sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel had been vio- lated due to an undisclosed, actual conflict of interest on the part of his criminal defense counsel, G. The respondent claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that the petitioner had established that G was burdened by an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his repre- sentation of the petitioner. Held: The habeas court's finding that G simultaneously represented both the peti- tioner at the time of the petitioner's criminal trial and S, a witness who testified on behalf of the state at the petitioner's criminal trial, was clearly erroneous, as it was undisputed that another attorney filed an appearance in place of G in S's criminal case before the commencement of the petitioner's criminal trial, and, thereafter, G did not file any appearances on behalf of S at any time prior to the conclusion of the petitioner's trial or his sentencing, nor was there any documentary or testimonial evidence in the record that G provided legal representation to S in any court proceeding or otherwise at the time of the petitioner's criminal trial. The habeas court's finding that G represented S at a hearing six weeks prior to the start of the petitioner's criminal trial was clearly erroneous, as the relevant court files, considered in tandem with the unequivocal statements that S's defense counsel had filed an appearance in the unrelated criminal case, which were included in conflicting transcripts from that hearing, con- vinced this court that a mistake had been made regarding G's alleged repre- sentation of S at the hearing in question. The habeas court improperly concluded that G's representation of S and the petitioner for four months prior to the start of the petitioner's criminal trial created a conflict of interest with respect to G's representation of the petitioner in his criminal trial, as this court, having considered the facts of this case under the multifactored analysis set forth in State v. Davis (344 Conn. 122), concluded that there was no evidence that G's simultaneous representation of S and the petitioner in the early stages of the petitioner's criminal trial and S's unrelated criminal case was anything other than tran- sient and insubstantial. Even if this court were to conclude that a conflict of interest existed, the petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the conflict of interest adversely affected G's representation of the petitioner, as G's failure to use S's prior convictions and pending cases to attack his credibility at trial actually demonstrated that G was acting in the petitioner's best interest with respect to S, who was the only witness to corroborate the petitioner's account of what transpired the night of the murder. The habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner's sixth amend- ment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated by G's failure to notify the petitioner in writing of his prior representation of S pursuant to rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as a party must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his attorney's perfor- mance, and proof that an attorney violated rule 1.7 was not sufficient to establish a violation of a client's sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Argued May 23, 2024—officially released October 14, 2025

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant on his complaint alleging, inter alia, a prescriptive easement over the defendant's property pursuant to statute (§ 47-37). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that his use of the defendant's property was not open and visible and continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years. Held: The trial court's finding that the plaintiff's use of the defendant's property was not open and visible was not clearly erroneous, as the plaintiff presented no evidence that he maintained the area where he crossed the defendant's property and he left no physical conditions to put the prior owner or the defendant on notice of his use, and the prior owner of the defendant's property had no knowledge of the plaintiff's use of the alleged easement until the plaintiff informed him of the use upon the sale of the property to the defendant. The trial court's finding that the plaintiff's use of the defendant's property was not continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years was not clearly erroneous, as the court discredited the plaintiff's testimony that he biannu- ally crossed the defendant's property to reach the rear of his property for yardwork, and there was ample support in the record for the court's finding that the plaintiff used the defendant's property only sporadically and inter- mittently. The trial court properly determined that the plaintiff failed to establish the boundaries of the alleged prescriptive easement with reasonable certainty, as the plaintiff presented only his own testimony and several exhibits, which the court found to be inadequate. Argued September 4—officially released October 14, 2025

The defendant, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of murder, felony murder and capital felony, appealed from the trial court's dismissal of his motion for sentence modification. The defendant claimed that the court erred in determining that his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release was a mandatory minimum sentence that the court was precluded from modifying pursuant to statute (§ 53a-39 (d)). Held: The trial court correctly determined that § 53a-39 (d) precluded the modifica- tion of the defendant's sentence, as a definite sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release required to be imposed pursuant to the capital felony statute (§ 53a-35a (1) (A)) operated as a mandatory minimum sentence, despite the absence of the phrases ''mandatory minimum'' or ''may not be suspended or reduced,'' and § 53a-39 (a) did not offer any express terms or criteria that would have allowed the court to modify that sentence. The trial court improperly dismissed the defendant's motion for sentence modification on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the limitation set forth in § 53a-39 (d) operated to limit the court's authority to modify the defendant's sentence but did not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and, accordingly, the court should have denied the motion. Argued September 3—officially released October 14, 2025

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed from the trial court's judgment granting the defendant's motion for modification of custody and awarding the parties' joint legal custody of their minor child and the defendant primary physical custody of the child. The plaintiff challenged, inter alia, the propriety of the court's custody order. Held: This court dismissed the appeal as moot, as there was no practical relief this court could afford the plaintiff because, during the pendency of the appeal, the challenged custody order had been superseded by a subsequent court order addressing the custody of the parties' child. Argued September 3—officially released October 14, 2025

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment dissolving his mar- riage to the plaintiff and granting certain other relief. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly treated certain trust assets as part of the marital estate subject to distribution pursuant to statute (§ 46b-81). Held: The trial court's finding that a spendthrift trust created by the defendant's father prior to the parties' marriage was part of the marital estate and subject to distribution pursuant to § 46b-81 was clearly erroneous, as the trust agreement provided that all trust distributions to the defendant had to be approved by a disinterested trustee, and, accordingly, the defendant had no presently enforceable right to receive his interest in the trust and the court should not have considered it an asset of the marital estate that it was authorized to divide pursuant to § 46b-81. The trial court properly determined that three trusts created by the defendant during the parties' marriage and funded with marital assets constituted divisible marital property, as, although the trusts were created as self-settled spendthrift trusts under South Dakota law, at the time the trusts were created Connecticut did not recognize the validity of self-settled trusts and, even if the trusts had satisfied the requirements of the Connecticut Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act (§ 45a-487j et seq.), enacted in 2019, they would nonetheless be void as a matter of public policy by virtue of the fact that sustaining them and excluding their assets from distribution would unfairly prejudice the plaintiff. This court, having concluded that the trial court improperly treated the assets from one of the trusts as marital property, determined that, on remand, the entirety of the mosaic of financial orders, excluding the personal property distribution order, must be refashioned, as it was uncertain whether the trial court's other financial orders would remain intact after reconsidering the property distribution orders in a manner consistent with this court's opin- ion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sole legal custody of the parties' minor children to the plaintiff, as the court's findings, which were either unchallenged or based on its credibility determinations and which were consistent with the testimony and recommendations of the guardian ad litem, supported the award of sole legal custody to the plaintiff. The trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to its order that the plaintiff have access to the former marital residence to retrieve her personal belongings, as the order was sufficiently clear and explicit and was appropriately tailored to the facts and circumstances of this case. Argued March 18—officially released October 21, 2025

The petitioner, who had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and other crimes, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying in part his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rejected his claim that his criminal trial counsel, F, rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to flee the state during trial or by leading him to believe that it was in his best interest to do so. Held: The habeas court did not err in concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that F rendered ineffective assistance with respect to his alleged advice about fleeing the state, as the court's factual findings, including its finding that F did not advise the petitioner to flee, were well supported by the evidence, which this court would not reweigh in a manner that under- mined the habeas court's conclusions. This court could not conclude that the habeas court's incorrect ruling, which precluded the petitioner from testifying as to alleged statements F made about fleeing the state, was so fundamentally unfair as to deny the petitioner his due process right to a fair trial, as, although the proffered testimony was admissible nonhearsay that was offered not for its truth but to prove the nature of F's advice and the effect it had on the petitioner, the habeas court permitted the petitioner to testify at length as to the substance of that advice, his understanding of that advice, and the actions he took in reliance thereon, even if he was not permitted to recount the exact words F used. The petitioner's contention that the habeas court improperly failed to con- sider certain evidence that supported his claim that F rendered ineffective assistance in connection with his trial performance was unavailing, as the court did not err in concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that he was prejudiced by F's cross-examination of a physician who testified for the state, which did not amount to, as the petitioner claimed, an admission that he engaged in unlawful sexual contact with the victim or that it gave the prosecutor an opportunity to graphically explain to the jury the anatomy of sexual penetration, and there was no basis to support the petitioner's claim that the victim's statement to the police, which F had offered into evidence at the criminal trial but which was not offered into evidence at the habeas trial, was so prejudicial that it impacted the jury's verdict or that the state relied heavily on it to support its case. This court declined to review the petitioner's unpreserved claims that the habeas court improperly failed to address F's statements and actions after the petitioner failed to appear in court in determining whether F rendered ineffective assistance or had a conflict of interest and that F rendered ineffective assistance at the petitioner's sentencing proceeding, as none of those claims were presented to the habeas court. (One judge concurring in part) Argued November 21, 2024—officially released October 21, 2025

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of assault in the first degree, appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court's judgment denying his habeas petition. He claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that his criminal trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance because she failed to adequately investigate certain potential witnesses. Held: This court dismissed the appeal because it concluded that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate, in accordance with the test adopted in Simms v. Warden (230 Conn. 608), that the issue of whether his trial counsel's representation was reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law was an issue that was debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve in a different manner or that was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Argued April 23—officially released October 21, 2025