Volume 239 — United States Reports

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion. submitted: This court has jurisdiction. The search warrants were Void and the searches and seizures made thereunder were in violation of the Constitution. The trial court should have ordered the return of the papers unlawfully seized and should not have admitted them in evidence.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Alien Immigration Act and the power of the Commissioner of Immigration to exclude aliens on the ground of likelihood of their becoming a public charge, are stated in the opinion. Alien immigrants are entitled to -due process of law under the Fifth Amendment, and under § 25 of the Immigration Law, and generally under our treaties with foreign countries.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals in bankruptcy proceedings from the Circuit Court of Appeals under § 4 of the Act of January 28, 1915, are stated in the opinion. The jurisdiction of this court, conferred by § 241, Jud. Code (as construéd in Houghton v. Burden, 228 U. S. 161, 165), has not been divested by the Amending Act of January 28, 1915.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, ta review a judgment of the state court in a case involving the rights and duties of a county officer, are stated in the opinion.

<p>A court is not precluded from construing a document because its construction is affected by facts and circumstances not Open to dispute. Whatever may be the rule as to legislatures and statutes this court may determine from the knowledge of its members whether the court below has acted as this court intended it should upon a mandate recently entered.</p> <p>Cases come to this court from Arizona in the usual form, and this court has no jurisdiction on appeal from' a judgment of the Supreme Court of that State even though entered on the mandate of this ■court in a case originally coming here from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona.</p> <p>As the judgment entered by the Supreme Court of the State in this case is not inconsistent with the opinion of this court there is no reason for disturbing it.</p> <p>This court will not consider provisions in a judgment of the state court entered on the mandate of this court as to matters non-federal.</p>

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States in cases involving constitutional questions, are stated in the opinion.

Truax v. Raich 239 US 33 (1915) was a United States Supreme Court case concerning U.S. labor laws, the right to work, immigration law, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Railroad Right-of-Way Act of March 3, 1875, are stated in the opinion. A railway company which complies, with the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, acquires a title in fee simple, and not merely an easement or right of way. New Mexico v. U. S. Trust Co., 172 U. S. 171; Nor. Pac. R. R. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 195 U. S. 540, 570; Oregon Short Line v. Stalker, 95 Pac. Rep. 56; Nor.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States in cases arising under the patent laws, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the duty of this court in the case of a frivolous appeal in a case under the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review a judgment of the state court on writ of error under § 237, Jud, Code, and the disposition of such writ when frivolous under Rule 6, par. 5, are stated in the opinion. cited: Behrens v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 192 Fed. Rep. 582; Cent.

The facts, which involve the validity of an award by commissioners for land taken for the Ashokan reservoir in New York, are stated in the opinion. The Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding this case within Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403. There is absolutely no evidence that the market value of the property taken had been increased by reason of availability and adaptability for reservoir purposes.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of the Nelson Act of 1889 and an allotment ’to a Chippewa Indian in the White Earth Indian Reservation in Minnesota, are stated in the opinion.</p>

. . The facts, which involve the construction of the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 and the liability of a realty corporation to pay the tax imposed thereby, are stated in the opinion.

The facts which involve the construction of § 32 of the Criminal Code and the validity , of an indictment thereunder and the extent of the jurisdiction, of this court under the Criminal Appeals Act, are stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the validity of a mortgage lien on the property of the bankrupt, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve contracts affecting realty afterwards becoming community property and the liability of the community thereon, are stated in the opinion. The contract of which specific performance is prayed was unenforceable, because it involved a conveyance of the title to real estate situated in Porto Rico belonging to a conjugal partnership, and only one member of that conjugal partnership had entered into the contract.

The facts, which involve the construction of § 3744, Rev. Stat., and the liability of a contractor on a contract with the Government for transportation of coal, are stated in the opinion. Revised Stat., § 3774, is no bar to suit by the Government on executory parol contracts. The statute does not render the contract illegal but only unenforceable. It affects not the validity of the contract but the remedy thereon.

Held: in Fisher v. Baker, 203 U. S. 174 , — where an attempt was made to review an order in a proceeding in habeas carpus by writ of error, — that, inasmuch as the final order in such cases in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States' can only be reviewed by appeal, the same rule governs procedure to review a final order of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, and the writ of error was accordingly '…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the right of a railroad company to forfeit a mileage book, and the construction of the rules under which such a book was issued in this case, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>In the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina no reference is made to the schedules, applicable in this case, governing the sale and issuance of mileage books and mileage exchange tickets, in force in pursuance of the Act to Regulate Commerce. The effect of this act on the ordinary rules of common law apparently was not considered.</p> <p>It is not entirely clear on what ground or grounds the South Carolina court rested its opinion. It seems to hold that the book and the ticket should not have been forfeited because the husband, the original purchaser of the mileage book, in presenting them for his wife without fraud, was not violating the provision as to forfeiture, since the book and ticket were presented by the original purchaser.</p> <p>The court also seems to hold that the acts of the various agents in exchanging the coupons for the exchange tickets were such acts as to waive the provision as to forfeiture. The provision of the tariff was clearly applicable in this case, and the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in violation of its terms was clearly erroneous.</p> <p>In support of the contentions of plaintiff in error, see Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56; B. & O. R. R. v. Hamburger, 155 Fed. Rep. 849; B. & O. S. W. R. R. v. Evans, 82 N. E. Rep. 773; Bitterman v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 207 U. S. 205; B. & M. R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97; Chi. & Alton R. R. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 156; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Henderson Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 441; Kans. City R. R. v. Albers, 223 U. S. 573; Kans. City S. R. R. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639; Marche v. Central R. R., 21 I. C. C. 195; M., K. & T. R. R. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; Newton Gum Co. v. C., B. & Q. R. R., 162 C. C. A. 341; N. Y. Cent. R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S. 500; Penna. R. R. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Burckett, 229 U. S. 603; Southern Ry. v. Harrison, 119. Alabama, 539; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Tex. & Pac. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Co., 204 U. S. 426; United States v. Miller, 223 U. S. 599.</p>

Held: in this case, to be an unconstitutional exercise of power under the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. 160 Kentucky, 16, reversed.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District Court of the offense of shipping intoxicating liquor in interstate and foreign commerce in violation of, and the construction of § 240, Criminal Code, áre stated in the opinion.

Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121 (1915), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a plaintiff can satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction by seeking non-monetary relief if the value of that relief satisfies the requirement. For instance, an injunction estimated to cost $75,000 would satisfy the requirement.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under • the contract clause and the construction of a taxing statute of New Jersey and the validity of a tax levied thereunder, are stated in the opinion. The contract of exemption from taxation was not a bounty conferred on any particular company, nor an agreement made merely in view of presumptive benefits to the people.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review under § 237, Jud. Code, judgments of the state court where there are non-Federal grounds sufficient to sustain it irrespective of the Federal question involved, are stated in the opinion. The decision of the state court is contrary to and violates the provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20; Cummings v. Merchants’ National Bank, 101 U. S. 153.

The facts, which involve the validity of an order of deportation of a Chinese person from Manila and the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands sustaining the same, are stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 241, Judicial Code, to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the finality of such judgment under § 128, Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>submitted.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT;</p> <p>The facts, which involve the propriety of issuing an interlocutory injunction in a suit for infringement- of patents for acetylene gas apparatus, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>error to the supreme court op the state op OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the inheritance of an allotment to a Creek Indian, are stated in the opinion.</p>

Bill in equity to restrain the Public Service Commission' for the first district of the State of New York from declaring certain contracts for the construction of portions of the rapid subway system of the City of New York void and forfeited for violation of certain provisions inserted in the contracts in pursuance of § 14 of the Labor Law (so-called) of the State. Laws 1909, ch. 36, Consol. Laws, ch. 31. It reads as follows: “Section 14.

. The facts, which involve the constitutionality of § 14 of the Labor Law of New York, are stated in the opinion. submitted: The conviction of plaintiff in error was erroneous because it was based upon a violation of § 14, c. 36, Laws of 1909 of New York, known as the Labor Law, which is void, as in conflict with § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; also because it abridges the privileges and immunities of plaintiff in error, a citizen of the United States, and of his alien…

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment for personal injuries based on the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the liability of the United States for injuries to, and demurrage on, a vessel under charter to the Government, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of Maryland and a tax levy thereunder on property in Baltimore for improving the paving of streets in -that city, are stated in the opinion. A legislature cannot bind parties interested by a recital of facts, or prescribed conclusive rules of -evidence, for either of these would be only an indirect method of disposing of controversies. Cooley, Const. Law, 46.

Held: under an act of Congress permitting parties to submit the justice of th.eir claims against the United States for work done in the District of Columbia to the adjudication of a competent court, that equitable jurisdiction was thereby conferred upon the Court of Claims, sufficiently, at least, to order the. reformation of a written contract between the claimant and the District, and to award a money judgment on the…

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of tax assessments on property of express companies in South Dakota, are stated in the opinion. The State Board of Assessment had the right to consider among other things the income of the plaintiff in the State, so far as they could ascertain it, and the contracts of plaintiff with the railway companies, in fixing a valuation upon its property or system within the State, for the purpose of taxation.

The facts, which involve the. constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment and other provisions of the Federal Constitution of the Drainage District Law of Nebraska, and of a tax levied thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP MISSOURI.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Drainage District Act of Missouri, and of a tax levied thereunder, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The state court erred in adjudging that § 5538, Rev. Stat. Missouri, 1909, does not contemplate taking private property for public use without the compensation required by “due process of law” provided for by the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>What may be done under this section construed in connection with all the Missouri drainage laws is the constitutional test to be applied, and plaintiffs in error are neither estopped nor barred from challenging this law. Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 191; Agens v. Mayor, 37 N. J. L. 416, 420; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269; No. Pac. Ry. v. Pierce, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 286; Little River District v. St. L., M. & S. E. R. R., 236 Missouri, 94; Rev. Stat. Missouri, 1909; §§ 5496-5499, 5511-5519, 5538; Charles v. Marion, 98 Fed. Rep. 166; Moss v. Whitzel, 108 Fed. Rep. 579, 582; Chicago &c. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104; Cooley, Const. Lim. *356; 2 Story, Const., § 1956 (Cooley’s ed.); Squaw Creek District 1 v. Turney, 235 Missouri, 80; Violett v. Alexandria, 92 Virginia, 561; Ohlmann v. Clarkson Mill Co., 222 Missouri, 62; Gist v. Rackliffe-Gibson Co., 225 Missouri, 116; Ross v. Supervisors, 128 Iowa, 436.</p> <p>The avowed purpose and only possible legal purpose pf § 5538 is a public one and involves the taking of private property for public use. Morrison v. Morey, 146 Missouri, 561-563, 584; Mound City Land Co. v. Miller, 170 Missouri, 249; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Missouri, 496; St. Louis v. Oeters, 36 Missouri, 456; Kansas City v. Ridenour, 84 Missouri, 258; St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 Missouri, 537; St. Louis v. Rankin, 96 Missouri, 497; Independence v. Gates, 110 Missouri, 374; Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Missouri, 172.</p> <p>“Due process of law” requires compensation for private property taken for public use. Long Island Water Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 695; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Missouri, 541; Albright v. Fisher, 164 Missouri, 68; St. Louis v. Theatre Co., 202 Missouri, 699; Chicago &c. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 241; Norwood v. Raker, 172 U. S. 269; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561.</p> <p>If the drainage plan should fail, there can then be no compensation of the character contemplated by due process of law. Cases supra and Killy v. Cranor, 51 Missouri, 542; 14 Cyc. 1059; Lipes v. Hand, 104 Indiana, 503; Kansas City v. O’Connor, 82 Mo. App. 655; Chicago v. Blair, 149 Illinois, 310; Insurance Co. v. Prest, 71 Fed. Rep. 817; Pettit v. Duke, 10 Utah, 311; Owensboro v. Sweeny (Ky.), 111 S. W. Rep. 364; Stevens v. Port Huron, 149 Michigan, 536; Kalamazoo v. Crawford (Mich.), 117 N. W. Rep. 572; Washington Ice Co. v. Chicago, 147 Illinois, 327; Kansas City v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 230 Missouri, 369; Hutt v. Chicago, 132 Illinois, 352; Waukegan v. Burnett, 234 Illinois, 460; Chicago v. Kemp, 240 Illinois, 56; Lindblad v. Normal, 224 Illinois, 362; Holdom v. Chicago, 169 Illinois, 109; State v. Elizabeth, 40 N. J. L. 274; Guaranty Co. v. Chicago, 162 Illinois, 505; Re Park Ave. Sewers, 169 Pa. St. 433; Edwards v. Chicago, 140 Illinois, 440; Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R., 36 Connecticut, 255; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 80 Pa. St. 505; Re Market St., 49 California, 546; Hanscom v. Omaha, 11 Nebraska, 37; Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 34 Oh. St. 551; Hartford v. West, 45 Connecticut, 462; Cooley on Taxation, 416, c. 20, par. 1; Id. 2d ed. 606, par. 1; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146; Agens v. Mayor, 37 N. J. L. 416; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Loan Ass’n v, Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Missouri, 36; 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp., 4th ed., p. 934, par. 761; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 703; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 589; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Barber Asphalt Co. v. French, 158 Missouri, 534, 561; S. C., 181 U. S. 324; Parson v. Columbia, 170 U. S. 54; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Missouri, 409; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Missouri, 541.</p> <p>The state court erred in adjudging that the enforcement of § 5538 will not take plaintiffs’ property for public use without compensation — that is to say, without “due process of law.”</p> <p>Even if the drainage plan should succeed, still no compensation can result so far as concerns the large area of plaintiffs’ lands necessarily condemned for public use, and which same area is assessed with this tax. Squaw Creek Drainage District v. Turney, 235 Missouri, 80; Hanscom v. Omaha, 11 Nebraska, 37; Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 34 Oh. St. 551; Hartford v. West. M. D.; 45 Connecticut, 462; Re Park Ave. Sewers, 169 Pa. St. 433; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Missouri, 409.</p> <p>The Missouri Supreme Court erred in adjudging that said § 5538 is not retrospective so as to violate “due process of law.” State ex rel. v. Haben, 22 Wisconsin, 660; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 50; Pawlett v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 332; Charles River Bridge Case, 11 Pet. 603; Walla Walla v. Water Co., 172 U. S. 9; Bailey v. Railroad Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 389; 44 Am. Dec. 593; Edwards v. Kearzy, 96 U. S. 595; Muhlker v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 197 U. S. 544; St. Louis v. Clemens, 52 Missouri, 144; Haeussler v. Greer, 78 Missouri, 188; Fisher v. Patton, 134 Missouri, 53; In re Pell, 171 N. Y. 48; Pittman v. Adams, 44 Missouri, 570; Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518; Leete v. State Bank, 115 Missouri, 200; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202; Norris v. Bayea, 13 N. Y. 273; Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 395; Ryder v. Hulse, 24 N. Y. 372; Sperry v. Haslam, 57 Georgia, 412; Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Massachusetts, 336; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Fisk v. Police &c., 116 U. S. 131; State v. Police &c., 111 U. S. 716; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5; Gordon v. App. Tax Court, 3 How. 343.</p> <p>The state court erred in adjudging that § 5538 does not violate § 10, of Article 1 of the Federal Constitution prohibiting a State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. See cases supra, and Mulholland v. Smith, 141 Missouri, 1; Kaukauma Co. v. Green Bay Co., 142 U. S. 254; Wilson v; Black Bird Co., 2 Pet. 245; Armstrong v. Athens County, 16 Pet. 281; Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; Eureka Lake Co. v. Yuba County, 116 U. S. 410; McGrew v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 230 Missouri, 496; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371.</p>

Held: in this case, not be to a preferential transfer by the conditional vendee under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. When not otherwise provided, the rights, remedies and powers of the trustee in bankruptcy are determined with reference to the conditions existing when the petition is filed.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of certain provisions of . the statute of Arizona creating the Corporation Commission of that State and of an order made by such Commission, are stated in the opinion. The lower court had jurisdiction. The case presented to the lower court made necessary the issuance of an interlocutory injunction.

Held: prior to the decision in this case, *284 that a judgment in a proceeding under § 395 of the Mortgage Law, to establish title was not res judicata as between the party instituting the- proceeding and a party opposing it, and having also held that § 395 had not been repealed either directly or by implication, held that such prior decisions had stood so long unchallenged as to have become a rule of property and should…

Held: brought the case directly within the control of Laws \ and 2, title 9, Partida 4, expressly confining the right to-complain of adultery by one of the parties to a marriage to the injured party.

Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), is a United States Supreme Court case that upheld Section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1907, which dictated that all American women who voluntarily married a foreign alien renounced their American citizenship. While the statute has since been repealed, this case remains significant because of its precedent that Congress can designate acts which serve as implied voluntary renunciation of one's American citizenship.

The facts, which involve the rights of telegraph companies under, and the construction of, the Post Road Act of 1866, are stated in the opinion. On the date of the filing of the petition of June 1, 1905, this plaintiff was occupying the streets of the Town of Essex without any right whatever, either under thé laws of the Commonwealth or of the United States.

<p>In eminent domain proceedings, an award of one dollar for property taken for an easement does not deprive the owner of his property without due process of law if the state court recognized the right to recover for any substantial damage, but found as matter of fact that no damage whatever had been shown.</p>

JERSEY. The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the act of July 31, 1912, prohibiting the importation of pictorial representations of prize fights, are stated in the opinion. The act of July 31, 1912, c. 263, §§ 1, 2, and 3, is unconstitutional and void because in violation of Amendments IX and X to the Constitution of the United States.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in an action for injuries sustained by a passenger against a carrier, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Hours of Service Act, are stated in the opinion. Violation of the Hours of Service Act is not negligence perse destroying defenses of assumed risk and contributory negligence regardless of whether or not it was the proximate cause. St. Louis &c. Ry. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265; Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall, on p. 537. A party charging negligence as a ground of action must prove it.

Held: in view of the warning given on granting-the-extension, not to absolve claimant from the extra expenses specified in the contract in ease such extension were allowed. *345 A Government contractor in this case held not to be entitled to extra compensation by reason of advanced prices in labor and material due to outbreak of war, it appearing that the increased expense was not due to any breach on the part of the…

EEEOE TO THE SUPEEME COÜET OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA. The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Safety Appliance Act in cases for injuries under the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Employers’ Liability Act and the validity of a verdict of the state court in a suit for death of an employé, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This is a suit, brought in 1911, to recover lands in the City of Seattle, County of King, State of Washington and to quiet title. (See R. & B. Code, Washington, § 785.) The plaintiff claimed title as heir, and grantee of other heirs, of Lars Torgerson Grotnes who died intestate in the County of King, Territory of Washington, in March, 1865. The defendant, the County of King, succeeded the County of King of the Territory which had control of the property pursuant to a decree of escheat which was passed' by the Probate Court in May, 1869. " The legislature of the Territory had provided that in case of the death of an intestate leaving no. kindred his estate should escheat to the county in which it was situated. Washington Laws,' 1862-3, p. 262. Demurrer was filed to the amended complaint on the grounds (among others) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that the action had not been commenced within the time limited by law. The demurrer was sustained and judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 203 Fed. Rep. 894.</p> <p>After alleging title in fee in Lars Torgerson Grotnes, and the fact that he had acquired the land under the name of John Thompson (having changed his nafne to conceal his identity) through certain mesne conveyances from a grantee of the United States, the amerided complaint set forth in detail the proceedings in the Probate Court, which may be summarized as follows: That on March 26, 1865, the Probate Court, upon an informal request of H. L. Yesler and J. Williamson, assumed to appoint Daniel Bagley administrator of the estate of John Thompson, deceased, the order reciting that the decedent had died in the county, intestate, leaving property subject to administration; that after certain intermediate proceedings the administrator presented his petition on February 12,1869, stating that no heirs at law had been- found after diligent search, and praying that the administrator might be discharged and that after due notice the estate might be turned over to the county or such further order made as might be meet; and that on May 26, 1869, after publication of notice' for four weeks in a local newspaper, a final decree of distribution was entered whieh recited the proceedings and continued as follows:</p> <p>"That said decedent died intestate in the County of King, Washington Territory,. on the — day of March, A. D. 1865, leaving no heirs surviving him;</p> <p>"There being no heirs of said decedent, that the entire estate escheat to the County of King, in Washington Territory.</p> <p>“Now on this 26th day of May, A. D. 1869, on motion of said Daniel Bagléy, administrator of said estate, and no exceptions or objections being filed or made by any person interested in the said estate or otherwise;</p> <p>“It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed: that all the acts and proceedings of said administrator, as reported by this Court and as appearing upon the records thereof, be and the same are hereby approved and confirmed; and that after deducting said estimated expenses of closing the administration, the residue of said estate of John Thompson, deceased, not heretofore distributed, hereinafter particularly described, and now remaining in the hands of said administrator, and any other property not .now known or discovered which may belong to the said estate, or in which the said estate may have any interest, be and the same is hereby distributed as follows, to-wit: The entire estate -to the County of King, in Washington Territory. ,</p> <p>“The following is a particular description of the said ■residue of said estate referred to in this decree, and of which distribution is ordered, adjudged and decreed, to-wit:</p> <p>“1st. Cash, to-wit: $343.83 gold coin.</p> <p>“2nd. And real estate, to-wit: One hundred and sixty acres of land on Duwamish River, in King County, W. T., more particularly described in a certain deed from Joseph Williamson and William Greenfield to John Thompson, dated January 19th, A. D. 1865, and recorded in Volume 1 of the records of King County, W. T., on pages 458, 459 and 460.</p> <p>“Third. A lease of said land to John Martin, dated March 5th, 1866, on which the entire rent reserved remains due and unpaid.</p> <p>“Dated May 26th, 1869.”</p> <p>It was alleged that this decree was null and void, that the Probate Court was wholly without jurisdiction to pass upon the title to the land described or to declare it es-cheated; that all claims to the land.by defendant, and all its acts relating thereto, had been under this, assailed decree, and that the defendant had no instrument or judgment purporting to evidence any title in it; that neither the defendant nor any other authority had'instituted any suit or proceeding before any tribunal for the purpose of having an escheat declared or its claim of title confirmed. The acts of the county in relation to the land were set forth, the tracts’involved being described as the ‘King County Farm,’ ‘King County Hospital Grounds,’ ‘King County Addition to the City of Seattle,’ and ‘King County 2nd Addition to the City of Seattle.’ The plaintiff did not seek to recover the lands which had been appropriated for railroad rights of way or highways, or that portion which had been sold to innocent purchasers, and it was also conceded that the county might retain the buildings and tangible betterments which it had placed upon the land, as stated.</p> <p>At the outset, after alleging that the plaintiff was a subject of the King of Norway and that the matter in dispute exceeded in value the sum of $300,000, the amended complaint set forth that the controversy involved the construction of Amendments V and XIY of the Constitution of the United States, and of §§ 1851, 1907 and 1924 of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the Territory of Washington.</p> <p>It was further stated that the heirs of the decedent had no knowledge of his whereabouts or déath until three years prior tb the beginning of. the action, and that the heirs, and particularly the plaintiff, had been diligent since receiving this information in. searching for the proofs of the decedent’s identity and of their relationship.</p> <p>No estoppel or laches were shown.</p> <p>The county never acquired title by escheat.</p> <p>The Territory was not a sovereign.</p> <p>The organic law conveyed no property rights of United States to the Territory.</p> <p>The territorial escheat act trenched upon the primary disposal of the soil by the United States and the act did not fit its title.</p> <p>There was never any office found.</p> <p>The territorial probate court proceedings were void; the organic law did not giye jurisdiction to the Probate •Court.</p> <p>The organic law forbade interference with the primary disposal of the soil.'</p> <p>The territorial probate act did not cover escheats.</p> <p>The probate proceedings were informal and insufficient.</p> <p>The probate proceedings were not due process of law.</p> <p>The statute of limitations does not apply.</p> <p>The county took the property for public use without making compensation.</p> <p>The county’s possession was ultra vires.</p> <p>The county’s possession recognized the title of the heirs.</p> <p>The county had no claim of right nor color of title.</p>

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals, in a bankruptcy proceeding and the marshaling of proceeds of sale of homestead property in Iowa, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of acts of. Congress relating to the right of way of the Northern Pacific Railway, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the liability of connecting carriers under a statute of South Carolina, are. stated in the opinion.

Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), was an early U.S. Supreme Court case on the constitutionality of zoning ordinances. The Court held that an ordinance of Los Angeles, California, prohibiting the manufacturing of bricks within specified limits of the city did not unconstitutionally deprive the petitioner of his property without due process of law, or deny him equal protection of the laws.

The facts, which involve the title to allotted lands conveyed by a Choctaw Indian and the construction, application and constitutionality of Acts of Congress relating to the allotment of lands to Choctaw Indians and restriction of alienation thereon, are stated in the opinion. Private property rights are protected by the Federal Constitution. The land involved herein is not alienable.

The facts, which involve the validity of the removal from the state to the Federal court of a case against joint tort feasors one of which was a railroad company not a resident, and the other an individual resident, of plaintiff’s State, are stated in the opinion. The question for determination in this case is whether the removal of the suit to the Federal court should not have been allowed.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of a statute of Nebraska relative to duties and liabilities of hotel keepers in case of fire, are stated in the opinion.

Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), was a United States Supreme Court case which held that due process protections attach only to administrative activities in which a small number of people are concerned, who are exceptionally affected by the act, in each case upon individual grounds. By contrast, rule-making or quasi-legislative activities that affect a large number of people without regard to the facts of individual cases do not implicate due process protections. It is an important case in United States administrative law.

The facts, which involve the validity of tariffs of rates filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission by carriers and of charges made by such carriers, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of § 5 of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, and the validity of a judgment for damages for injuries of a railroad employé, are stated in the opinion. Section 5 of the Employers’ Liability Act is inapplicable in this case because plaintiff was not an employé of defendant. Nor does that section invalidate a release, resultant to a joint tort feasor from the acceptance of relief benefits under a relief contract.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of the various statutes relating to seamen’s wages and garnishment of the same, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment of non-suit in a suit for death of a railroad employé under the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 and the practice of this court in regard to cases which have, become moot, and the effect of the legal consequence of war, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity, under the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the action of a Police Jury in Louisiana establishing a drainage district and including property therein not benefited by the drainage system, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality, under the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also the validity under the state laws and Constitution, of the Smoke Abatement Ordinance of the City of Des Moines, Iowa, are stated in the opinion. submitted: Injunction lies to restrain enforcement of invalid municipal ordinances, the execution of which injuriously affects private rights!

The facts, which involve the validity of the refusal of the state court to remove an action to the Federal Court and of its judgment in an action brought under the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of- a judgment of the. courts of the Territory of Hawaii in an action affecting title to a tract of land in that Territory, are stated in the opinion.

Held: not applicable to the statute, in this case ■which simply changes the tribunal to hear the case and takes away no substantive rights. • Congress in its plenary control of Indians has power to pass the act *507 of June 25, 1910, vesting in the Secretary of the Interior the determination of heirs of allottee Indians dying within the trust period; the act evinces a change of policy on the part of Congress, and its…

The facts, which involve the-determination in a bankruptcy proceeding of conflicting rights of pledgees of the same goods represented by warehouse receipts therefor, and the construction and application of provisions of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Acts of Louisiána, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of statutes of the United States and military regulations in regard to conduct of military hospitals, and the right of an enlisted man to extra pay for services in connection-with a military hospital, áre stated in thé opinion.

Held: one member dissenting, that the patents passed the title not only to the lots, as shown on the plat, but also tó all islands lying between them and the thread of the stream. The judgment was accordingly reversed and a new trial ordered to determine whether the plaintiffs had lost title to the island through adverse possession. 14 Idaho, 598 .

The facts, which involve the validity of a verdict and judgment under the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Plaintiff in error was not engaged,in doing business in Tennessee. Therefore, the decision of the court below is ■ without support in law, and operates to deprive the company of its property without due process of law. There is no evidence to support the judgment and no basis for the conclusion that the company did business in Tennessee as contemplated by the Act.

<p>This court follows the conclusions, reached by the Special Master and affirmed by both courts below, that transactions purporting to be purchases of accounts receivable from the bankrupt were really loans with the accounts transferred as collateral security.</p>

The facts, which, involve the validity of a verdict and judgment in an action for injuries under the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion. The court erred in refusing to arrest the evidence from the jury and to direct a verdict in favor of defendant, at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, aud the court erred in refusing to'direct a verdict for defendant, at the close of all the evidence.

. The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended in 1906, prohibiting discrimination in regard to facilities and privileges of transportation and the validity of contracts made prior to the Hepburn Amendment and the rights of parties thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the responsibility of a carrier for goods under the applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Carmack Amendment thereto, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of a verdict and judgment in an action for injuries under the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in cases founded on a tort of an officer of the United States, are stated in the opinion. The Court of Claims has jurisdiction over a claim ex delicto, founded upon the Constitution of the United States. Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222; United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445.

The facts, which involve the construction of various statutes of the United States relating to pay of retired naval officers while on active service, are stated in the opinion. The act of March 4,1913, 37 Stat. 891, should be interpreted according to the usual meaning of its words. By the usual meaning of its words the appellant comes within its provisions and has a valid claim against the United States.

Held: in construing the Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1911, that the compensation thereby provided in the cases covered by its terms was intended to be exclusive of every other remedy and that all causes of action theretofore existing and not saved by its provisos were done away with, the Federal court should accept that construction.

The facts, which involve the method of determining the amount in controversy in order to give jurisdiction to the District Court, are stated in the opinion.

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Hampshire.</p>

<p>In error to the Superior Court of the State of New Hampshire.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.</p>

<p>On a certificate from and writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Superior Court of the State of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.</p>

<p>In error to and appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>