Volume 24 — Federal Cases

This was an action to recover upwards of $2,000, being so much paid by the plaintiff for freight, shipping charges, duty, charges of importation, appraisement, land carriage to Boston, law and other expenses, on certain goods shipped at St. John’s in New Brunswick, in December, 1813, for account of the defendant, in the schooner George, and consigned to the plaintiff to forward to the defendant, residing in Philadelphia.

This action was brought by the United States, in the name of [Hopeful Toler] their consul at Ponce, in Porto Rico, to recover a penalty of $500, of the defendant [John White], master of the brig Cadmus, of Ken-nebunk-port, for not depositing his register with the said consul, on’ his arrival at Ponce, agreeably to the requirement of the statute of February 2S, 1803, § 2.

Assumpsit on a bill-of exchange drawn on 17th of March, 1827, in Alabama, -by Stone, Ellis & Co., at sixty days’ sight, on the defendants, for $3.000, payable to Moses Sewall or order, and by him indorsed to the plaintiffs. The declaration averred a presentment for acceptance, and- an acceptance and-subsequent non-payment.

A.t law. ■ The Tombeckbee Bank of Mobile held the drafts on a -house in that city, duly accepted, but protested for non-payment, and settled with an endorser, receiving the principal and interest only, and reserving one of the bills as the ground of an action on which to recover the damages on all the bills, — amount of damages at ten per cent., $2,500. This action was brought to recover these damages. The declaration was in usual form on a bill of exchange against drawers.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.]</p> <p>This case was instituted in the district court on the 18th of June 1852. The libel-lants (now appellants), were Jacob Tome and Edward Bhinehart, lumber-merchants • of Port Deposit, trading under the name of • Tome & Bhinehart, agents -and consignees of William Hartley, of the state of Pennsylvania, and the said William Hartley. The libel was against four cribs of. lumber, and the contents thereof, in Harford county, in the state of Maryland, and against Albert Davis of the same county, in a cause of spolia- tion. and damage, civil and maritime.</p> <p>The libellants alleged that on the 17th of April 1852, they, the said Tome & Bhinehart, as agents and consignees as aforesaid, were possessed of two rafts of lumber containing twenty cribs or platforms, and in all 100,000 feet of lumber, which was at that "time anchored in the Susquehanna river, near Heck-ertown, in Cecil county, within the district aforesaid, and within the flux and reflux of tide, and the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court That on that day, the . said lumber, so safely anchored, was carried down the river, about five miles, by the wind and current, in a freshet, to the opposite side of said river, near the shore of one Stephen I. Thompson, of Harford county; and on the 20th of May, the libellants Tome & Bhine-hart, sent vessels and hands down the river to the said lumber, with a view to have the same put on board the vessels, to carry them to Baltimore and the District of Columbia, •to Smith, Barnett & Co., and others, to whom the libellants had sold the same. That by their said hands and agents, they had succeeded in putting all of. the lumber alongside of the vessels, preparatory to putting it aboard, when the said Albert Davis, with his servants and agents, came from his shore in a boat, armed with a gun, and threatened to shoot and otherwise violently to disturb and injure the libellants’ agents and servants, if they resisted, and finally against ■ their will, cut away violently from the said lumber, four cribs' or platforms thereof, by severing the ropes which bound them to the other lumber and the said vessels, and carried them to the shore of the -said Albert Davis, and he has since had the said lumber drawn and piled on his farm lying in the said county, and fronting on the said river, next above the farm of the said Thompson. That after the said Albeit Davis had taken away the lumber (worth about $200), he pretended that he was entitled to salvage for saving the two rafts, and demanded therefor $150, and also endeavored, by tbe like violence, to prevent the rest of the said lumber from being put on board the said vessels, under the said pretence. That the said claim for salvage, was a mere pretence to cover and excuse the said spoliation and trespass; for the said two rafts having been anchored as aforesaid, were cast loose by the rise of the river, and carried down, by the current and wind, to the shallow water opposite to the shore of the said Thompson, where the anchor again performed its office; and all the said lumber was perfectly safe and free from all kind of dangerpexcept that incident to lumber afloat as it was at Heckertown; and if the libellants had been present, they would have prevented any person .from in- ■ terfering therewith. That all -of it- was • staunch and tight (no rope or fastening hav- . ing been broken or disturbed), and would .have -so ■ continued, but that the.said Albert Davis- (not- with a view to save it, but with a view to draw it to his own shore, and there' -possess himself of it, in order to extort money for delivering it-up) boarded the rafts and cut the fastenings, -whereby about fourteen cribs went ashore, and three of them were carried down. the river as far as Swan creek, so as to expose the. libellants to risk and expense; which said cribs the said Davis made no effort to recover or secure. And the other cribs so cut away from their fastenings, went ashore on the-said Thompson’s .land, .and so remained, In a situation . more exposed than they were while attached . to the anchor as aforesaid. That if is the usual manner of preserving rafts of lumber in the Susquehanna river, within the flux and reflux of tide, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court, to anchor the same until they are drawn or piled up on land; and the said Thompson's shore is only about five miles below Heckertown; and the said lumber thus secured by the anchor. was just as safe and required no further interference with than at Heckertown; and was actually put at greater risk, and was in no manner saved or secured by anything done by the said Davis. That the li-bellants, Tome & Rhinehart, having been for many years engaged in the lumber trade, and ■ having frequently before had lumber carried by wind and freshet to some point below Port Deposit in the said river, had always been in the habit of making liberal allowances to such persons, as gave themselves any trouble about their lumber; although they always preferred that they should not Interfere with it, as lumber was always put at more risk by unskilful handling; and with that view the libellant Tome, about the 30th of April (on his return from New York, where he was at the time of the freshet), on hearing that Davis had been upon the lumber, called upon him, but not finding him at home, left word with his sister, informing her that the libellants were the owners of the lumber, as agents as aforesaid, and offering to pay any’reasonable sum for such trouble, as the said Davis or his hands -might have been put to in doing what they might have conceived necessary for the benefit of the said lumber. That they never received any demand from the said Davis, but before the 20th day of May aforesaid, they sent a letter to said Thompson, making a similar offer for any person concerned, which letter they believed and charged the said Thompson showed to Davis; and on the said 20th day of May, the libellants sent the vessels and hands for the lumber, in the manner above mentioned, never suspecting for a moment that there would De the .least difficulty, -as the said Davis well knew that they were .the owners of the. lumber, -and were willing and able to pay whatever was reasonable for his services.</p> <p>And they averred, -that by reason of the said spoliation by the said Davis, and the threats and violence he used in -endeavor* ing to prevent the rest of the lumber from being put on board the vessels, the said vessels and hands, as well as the other servants and agents of the libellants; were delayed at a heavy expense. The libellants were not able to fulfil their. contract -with the said Smith, Barnett & Co., in Baltimore, and with others in the District of Columbia, and so in both ways had been subjected to a loss, in the shape of damages, of at least $150. That the libellant Tome, notwithstanding the bad conduct of the said Davis and his bad faith respecting the said lumber, and notwithstanding the libellants had been injured instead of being benefited by his interference therewith, yet, for the purpose of obtaining the said lumber without the expense of litigation, offered and tendered to him $25 for his trouble, if he would give up the said four cribs, which he declined to do. That the said Davis never had taken any steps to obtain salvage, and never made any demand therefor, until after he had taken away the four cribs, when he demanded $150. That the said four cribs of lumber had been drawn and piled on the farm of the said Albert Davis, in Harford county within the district aforesaid, and were now there, though the libellants had been informed and believed, and so charged, that the said Davis had been using and consuming the same as if it were his own; so that the whole thereof might, not be there, but they were advised that for any deficiency he would be responsible to them. That all of the said lumber was worth between nine hundred and one thousand dollars; and if the said Davis had fixed upon any reasonable demand for salvage, the said libellants would either have paid the same, however improperly demanded, or left sufficient of the said lumber to meet the said demand; but that the whole of the proceedings on the part of the said Albert Davis were designed, by taking the law into his own hands, and subjecting the libellants to heavy and unusual and unnecessary expenses, to extort money from them. ■ Whereby and by the said act of spoliation, the libel-lants said they had been injured, besides the value of the said four cribs of lumber, in the sum of $150, as aforesaid.</p> <p>Prayer for restoration of the lumber, and compensation in damages.</p> <p>Albert Davis, in his answer, stated that he had no knowledge of what lumber the libel-lants had anchored in the Susquehanna river near Heckertown, on the 17th of April, 1852, and left them to their proof thereof. That he did not know, of his own knowledge, whose lumber had broken away in the Susquehanna river, and came down the bay on the 18th of April, but it was true, as alleged by the libellants, that they sent vessels down, about the 20th of May, to carry the same away. That early in the morning of the 18th of April last, when a very heavy easterly storm was raging, .he discovered one raft of lumber drifting down.the bay, and along and near the shore, which his servants secured and tied to the adjoining shore of Stephen L Thompson; that said lumber had no anchor attached to it, and when secured by his servants, was in great danger of being scattered by the violence of the storm, and broken up on the shores of Swan creek, into which the storm was sweeping With great force. That about eleven o’clock of the same day, he saw another raft drifting down the bay; that he boarded the same, and found that it was dragging its anchor; that it was fast breaking up, but he secured the fastenings, so that it only parted in two parts; one part, consisting of five cribs, he secured on his own shore, and the other part, he secured with the anchor, a short distance from shore. That having thus secured this lumber, he went in two or three days afterwards, to Havre de Grace, and put up public notices in several places in that town, giving notice that he had secured and saved this iumber, and requesting the owners to apply to him for the same. That some two weeks after this notice was set up, he learned that libel-lants claimed the lumber, and about the 20th of May, a vessel came down to carry it away, but without the knowledge of respondent, and without having tendered him any compensation for his services in saving it That on being told that the agents of the libellants, had taken the lumber from the shore, and were about to put it on board of their vessel, he immediately went out to them and forbade their doing so, without first proving it to be the lumber of the libellants, and paying respondent his salvage for securing the same. That they refused to pay anything, and persisted in their efforts to carry away said lumber, when the respondent cut loose four cribs, and carried them back to the shore, and told the libellants' agents, that he would return the same upon the payment of a reasonable salvage, which he thought would amount to $150. That respondent had his gun in the boat with him, but he never threatened to shoot or injure any one; but the master of the vessel had a gun, and threatened frequently to shoot respondent. That he placed those four cribs of lumber on his. shore, where they remained safely, untouched by any one, until taken by the marshal under the process issued in this case; and the balance of said lumber was taken away by the libellants. That the whole lumber secured by him was worth about $1000, and he deemed himself clearly entitled to $150 for salvage, and demanded that sum. That the salvage was not claimed as a mere pretence and excuse, but he was justly entitled to the same, as the lumber, when secured by him, was in great danger of being scattered and broken up. and if the wind had shifted to the north or northwest, it would have been carried down the bay and probably lost; and his sole object in boarding the said raft, was to secure the same, and save the lumber for the owners.. That the last-mentioned raft had come loose in several of its fastenings, which he secured, and he denied that he cut loose any fastenings, or in any other manner did anything to separate the same. That it was true, that one of the libellants called in April last, at the respondent’s house, and not finding him at home, informed his sister that the libellants were the owners of' the lumber, but he had no knowledge of any offer made to his sister by said libellants to pay any reasonable sum to respondent for his services. That he was never Bhown any letter by said Thompson, containing any offer of the said libellants, and when they came to take away said lumber, no offer was made to pay respondent for his trouble in securing the same; that said Tome subsequently offered him $25, which he refused;-deeming it entirely inadequate to compensate him for his services; that as soon as the agents of the libellants came to claim the lumber, respondent made his claim for salvage to the amount above mentioned. That he caused the said four cribs of lumber to be piled up in a place of safety on the shore; that no part of the same was used by him or his servants or any other person to his knowledge; and that the loss, if any, which might have accrued to the libellants by reason of respondent’s refusal to deliver them the four cribs of lumber, might have been avoided by their paying him his reasonable demand for salvage.</p> <p>The notice referred to in the above answer, was as follows:</p> <p>. “Notice. — On the 18th of April, was taken adrift, a number of platforms of lumber. Apply to Albert Davis.’’</p> <p>On the 10th of December, 1852, the district court (Glenn, J.) passed a decree for the sale of thelumber, directing that the defendant, Davis, should be paid out of the proceeds the sum of $150 for salvage; each party to pay his own costs. From this decree, the libel-lants took an appeal.</p> <p>In addition to the evidence offered in the court below, the depositions of several witnesses were read at the hearing of the appeal, the substance of which, is fully detailed in the opinion of the court. •</p>

<p>[In the matter of Francis Tomes and another, bankrupts.]</p>

This was an action, commenced in June, 18©, to recover back an excess of duties alleged to have been paid to the defendant [Henan J. Redfield], as collector of the port of New York, under protest, on sundry importations of merchandise from Europe.

[This was a bill by Thomas Tomlinson against Charles Hewett to recover damages for the sufferings occasioned by breach of duty on the part of the respondent.]

The steamboat plied, as a freight and passenger boat, between New York and Peeks-kill, on the North river. The libelant [Aaron Tompkins] is a trader at the latter place. On the 20th of March, 1849. he loaded on board the boat goods and merchandise to be transported to Peekskill. The goods were never delivered to the libelant. No bill of lading was executed, or other express contract entered into, upon the subject.

<p>[This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain the defendants [George Gage and George C. Gage] from infringing two letters patent for “improvements in rotary knitting machines,” one granted to Daniel Tainter, November 30, 1852 [No. 9,435], and assigned to complainant, and the other granted to Clark Tompkins and John Johnson, September 18, 1855 [No. 13,586], reissued May 15, 1860 [No. 963], and assigned to complainant. The claims of these several patents were as follows:</p> <p>[Patent to Daniel Tainter: “I do not claim the combining one or more draft rollers and a take-up roller or drum in one frame, which, when put in rotation, shall carry them simultaneously around with it, so as to draw forward and wind up a rope or cord, or like manufacture, formed of strands twisted together; nor do I claim the application of a take-up roller or mechanism, as used on either a common warp or flat-braid knitting machine. What I claim as my invention is to so combine a draft and take-up roller, and mechanism for revolving it, with a rotary series or set of needles and other mechanism-of the above-mentioned peculiar kind for knitting, that such draft roller shall rotate simultaneously or with the same velocity with such series of needles, so as to prevent the longitudinal rows of stitches from being produced in helical lines, and the evil consequences resulting-to the fabric- therefrom. 1 also claim the arrangement of the draft and take-up mechanism, in connection with the knitting mechanism, supported by two separate frames, A, T, and also their connection with the mechanism for producing .an equal and simultaneous rotation of these frames, A, T, all substantially as described, whereby there shall not only be no connection between the frames, A, T, to extend /through the fabric, but no projection from the frame, A, to come in contact with the presser, stitch wheels and cam bar, or their respective supports, during the simultaneous and equal rotations of both or either of the said frames, A, T.”</p> <p>[Original patent to Tompkins and Johnson: “We claim: First. The manner in which we cause the frame which carries the take-up mechanism to revolve in the same direction, and with the same velocity, as the needle cylinder, as specified and for the purpose set forth. Second. Combining the web-shaping plates S and C with the take-up mechanism, «substantially as described, for the purpose specified.”</p> <p>[Reissue to Tompkins and Johnson: “We claim the apparatus for revolving the take-up machinery in unison with the needle cylinder,, as herein specified, substantially in the manner and for the purpose set forth. We also claim revolving the shaping plates S and C by a positive motion with and at the same velocity as the take-up motion, substantially as described and for the purpose specified.”] 2</p>

<p>Case No. 14,089.</p> <p>Fisheries — Shipment Dobing Voyage — Appob-TIONMENT OF LAY.</p> <p>Where, after a part of a whaling voyage had been performed, a mariner shipped in a foreign port, for the residue of the voyage, at a lay of one-ninetieth, and performed his contract, and returned in the vessel to her home port: .Held, that he was entitled to one-ninetieth of all the oil, and other products of the voyage, taken during his time of service.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,090.</p> <p>Copy bight — Plat—Extrt upon Title Page-Date.</p> <p>This case has been litigated in most of the large cities, from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi valley, -and has now been de-, cided upon its merits in the United States circuit court for the district of Massachusetts, by Mr. District Judge Lowell, Mr. .Cir-. cuit Judge Shepley concurring. The style of the case in that court was Orlando Tompkins v. Arthur McKee Rankin et al. According to a brief report of the decision which we. find in the Boston Advertiser, the bill set forth, among other things, that in 1873 Adolph D’Ennery and Eugene Cormon were the authors of the play in the French language; that they agreed to convey to N. Hart Jackson the right to produce the play in the United States and to translate and adapt the play to the American stage, and joint authors of the translation, and Jackson to be sole author of any adaptation that might be made of the play; that Jackson adapted the play to the American stage, and it has been performed in New York and had become popular; that the right to this play was assigned to the plaintiffs, Shook and Palmer; that on February 1, 1875, the translation was copyrighted, and the plaintiff, Tompkins, the manager of the Boston The-atre, purchased the right of exclusive representation in the city of Boston; that the defendant, Rankin, who was a dramatic artist, and actor, was formerly engaged at Union Square Theatre in New York at the time of the original production of the play, and became then familiar with it; that Rankin and the other defendants, who were proprietors of the Howard Athenaeum, had combined together to reproduce the drama in violation of the plaintiffs’ right. The plaintiffs asked that the defendants might be enjoined from publishing or performing the play, and from advertising such performance. The defendants in their answer denied that the plaintiffs had any valid copyright, in that they had not complied with the conditions of the copyright act. They further said that the play was translated into English by John Oxen-ford of England, and was acted in London; that in August, 1875, Rankin purchased the Oxenford translation of Henry Neville in London, which translation was prior in point of time to that of Jackson; that Rankin had the lawful right to produce the play; that Jack-, son’s version was not identical with this, and that It is the translation of Oxenford, and not of Jackson, that it is proposed to produce at the Howard'. Upon the title page of the Jackson translation the notice of the copyright is as follows: "“Entered according to the act of congress in the .office of the librarian of congress, by N. Hart Jackson, as author aforesaid, and the copyright thereof duly assigned to Sheridan Shook and Albert M. Palmer as proprietors thereof. 1875.”</p>

Action of trespass and ejectment The parties agreed to the following statement of facts: Gideon Tompkins, on the, 31st day of December, A. D. 1836, made and executed his last will and testament, thereby disposing of all his estate, both real and personal, and after-wards died. The said will at a court of probate holden in Little Compton on the -- day of-, A. D. 1S37, was duly proved, approved, and ordered to be recorded.

<p>Case No. 14,092.</p> <p>Collision — Sail and Steam Vessel —Lights — Lookout — Mistaken Movement— Acr of Congress.</p> <p>1. The enactment by congress (Rev. St. § 4234) that every sail-vessel shall, on the approach of any steam-vessel during the night time, show a lighted torch upon that point or quarter to which such steam-vessel shall be-approaching, does not apply in every case in which a steamer and a sailing vessel may pass near to each other.</p> <p>2. Where the proximate cause of the collision of a steamer with a schooner was a mistaken movement of the steamer after the schooner's green light had been sighted, the steamer was condemned as responsible for the whole damage sustained by the schooner, though no torchlight had been shown by her. the lookout from each vessel having been insufficient.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in The Margaret, Case No. 9,-069.1</p> <p>TONA WAND A. The. See Case No. 14,109.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,093.</p> <p>Customs Duties — General Designation- — Specific Name — Staech—Sago.</p> <p>1. The designation of an article by a specific name in a statute, as exempt from duty, excludes it from the operation of general words imposing duties in the same act which would otherwise include it, and make it subject to duty; therefore, the clause in section 2504, Rev. St., which imposes a duty on starch made from potatoes, corn, rice, or “any other .material," does not affect sago, although it is starch, because the same is specifically exempted from duty by a clause in section 2505, Rev. St.</p> <p>2. Production and manufacture of sago, derived from different plants, distinguished by the difference in appearance of granules under the microscope.</p>

[In the matter of Tonkin and Trewartha, bankrupts.] On an issue made before the register, Hovey K. Clarke, Esq., in the matter of the proof of claim of Franklin Moore, George Foote, and George F. Bagley, constituting the firm of Moore, Foot & Co., against the said bankrupts’ estate, and adjourned into court for trial. Moore ■ & Foot also presented a claim against the said bankrupts’’ estate for proof.

<p>Case No. 14,095.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Exemption—Joint Estate.</p> <p>1. The bankrupt is entitled to an exemption although his wife owns a house.</p> <p>2. A partner cannot have an exemption set off to him out of the joint estate.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Boothroyd, Case No. 1,052: Re Melvin, Id. 0,400; Re Corbett, id. 3,220.]</p> <p>TONS OF.</p> <p>[Note. Cases cited under this title will be found arranged in alphabetical order under the ouantity or number of tons; e. g. “Tons of Coal. See Two Hundred and Thirteen Tons of Coal.”]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,096.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Enforcement op Resolution op Composition — Judgment.</p> <p>The provisions of the bankrupt act [of 1874 (18 Stat. 178)]. as to the enforcement by the court of the provisions of any composition, cannot be invoked to compel a creditor to accept a composition heretofore proposed and accepted, and to enjoin the creditor from taking steps to collect his claim, where the creditor has been permitted to take a judgment by default for the full amount of his claim, the bankruptcy proceedings not being Bet up as-a defence, in an action in a court of the state in which an order of arrest has been granted upon allegation of fraud. The bankruptcy court cannot be asked to interfere to give effect to a resolution of composition, where it would not interfere to give effect to a discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Hinsdale, Case No. 6,520.]</p>

[This was an action by Tooker & Tubbats against Thompson and others.] The defendants objected to certain depositions: (1) Because it does not appear that the depositions were taken one hundred miles from the place of trial. (2) It does not appear where the depositions were taken. (3) It does not appear that the person who took the depositions was appointed by the court to take depositions.

This was an action by Daniel H. Tooley, administrator of the estate of John Tooley, deceased, against the Railway Passenger Assurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, on two accident policies of insurance for $3,000 each, issued by the defendant to the deceased.

<p>Case No. 14,099.</p> <p>Railroad Company — Guaranty op Payment on Negotiable Security — Legal Effect of — Consideration Required — Pleading — When Admissions are Estoppels.</p> <p>1. An indorsement of guaranty of payment upon a negotiable bond of a railroad company, having coupons attached and made before the security is delivered, as an evidence of indebtedness, is supported by the same consideration as that which upholds the original contract.</p> <p>2. If such guaranty be general, it is negotiable, together with the instrument on which it is indorsed.</p> <p>3. A consideration for the guaranty is required, where the instrument is made after the inception of the principal contract as security for indebtedness.</p> <p>4. Whore a railroad company has under general statute, though not by charter, authority to guarantee the payment of the bonds of another such company, in an action upon the guaranty it is not necessary to set forth in the declaration such authority for making the indorsement.</p> <p>[Cited in Smith v. Tallapoosa County, Case No. 13,113.]</p> <p>5. A statute authorized the indorsement by one railroad company of a guaranty of the bonds of another, and provided that “no such aid shall be furnished * * * or arrangement perfected until a meeting of the stockholders of each of said companies shall have been called by the directors thereof at, * * * and the stockholders, or at least two-thirds of the stock of such company represented at such meeting, in person or by proxy, and voting thereat, shall have assented thereto;” held, that it was sufficient in an action by a bondholder against the guarantor to aver in the declaration “that the guaranty was duly signed by the defendant through its president, who was authorized so to execute the same, and was afterwards.” to-wit: on the same day. “duly ratified and confirmed by the stockholders of said company.”</p> <p>6. The principle of law is, that where one of the parties is a corporation and contracts as such, although it has no power except those specifically granted or necessary to carry into effect the powers expressly granted, yet the presumption of law in regard to such contracts is always in favor of their validity until the contrary is shown. But this presumption only arises in cases where it appears that it had power to contract under its charter or the laws of the state</p> <p>7. The true test of the sufficiency of a pleading is, whether the allegations in the declaration can be traversed bv plea, for a traverse must be taken on a matter of fact, not of law. But where there is a mixed question of law and fact, there may be a traverse, for that is the only mode by which the facts are to be settled.</p> <p>8. It is a principle of universal application that admissions, whetner of law or fact, which have been acted on by others, are conclusive against the party making them in all cases between him and the party whose conduct he has in-, flueneed, and that a man shall not be permitted to repudiate his own representations. A corporation, quite as much as an individual, is held to a careful adherence to truth in its dealings with mankind, and cannot by its representations or silence involve others in onerous engagements, and then defeat the calculations and claims its own conduct has superinduced.</p> <p>NOTE. See Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 5 Sneed, 48, where almost the identical expressions are used on estoppel. The opinion in that case was delivered by McKinney, J.. who was one of the ablest jurists that ever sat on the Tennessee supreme bench, and, it would not be too much to say. had few or no superior's in the Southwestern states.</p>

[This was a motion for a provisional injunction, to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 32.370] granted to George C. Howard, May 21st, 1861, for a machine .for perforating paper. The bill alleged that Howard, after the issuing of the patent, assigned to the plaintiffs [Toppan, Carpenter & Co.] the exclusive right under it, for one year. It was not stated in the bill when the year began to run, nor was the date of the assignment stated.

<p>Case No. 14,101.</p> <p>Pii.ots — Disabled Vessei, — Extra Allowance.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,103.</p> <p>Arbitration — Hearing—Aiisence op Witness-Surprise — Setting Aside Award.</p> <p>1. A court will uet aside an award of arbitrators for misconduct, or where they have decided contrary to law.</p> <p>[Cited in Lewis v. Chicago, S. F. & C. Ry. Co., 49 Feb.' 710.J</p> <p>[Cited in Anderson v. Imhoff. 34 Neb. 343, 51 N. W. 856; Graham v. Woodal (Ala.) 5 South. 688.J</p> <p>2. Where, on the hearing, the defendants are surprised by evidence, and, from the unexpected absence of a witness, they are unable to explain the evidence — on this being shown, the arbitrators should have given time to produce the absent witness.</p> <p>3. And having refused this, the testimony being important, it is ground for setting aside the award.</p>

In admiralty. This action is brought on a charter of the ship by the owners to the li-belant [Rafael E. Torices] in July, 1857, for a voyage to China, and thence back to Havana, with a load of coolies, not less than 884 in number, for which the libelant was to pay freight, $67.50 apiece to the ship, and a further sum to the master.

This was an ejectment [by the lessee of David Torrey against Beardsly] to recover a parcel of land lying in Wayne county. The plaintiff’s title, the evidence, and the grounds of objection to the recovery, are fully stated in the charge.

<p>Case No. 14,105.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — Bond—Costs—Statutes.</p> <p>A suit was brought in a state court, in August, 1875, and proceedings for its removal into this court were taken, under subdivision 3 of section 639 of the Revised Statutes. The bond given was such a bond as is provided for by section 639, and not such a bond as is provided for by section 3 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 4701. It contained no provision for costs. Held, that the suit was not properly removed.</p> <p>[Cited in Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. & S. W. It. Co., Case No. 4,605; Webber v. Bishop, 13 Fed. 49; Deford v. Mehaffy, Id. 491; Harris v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 18 Fed. 833; Sheldrick v. Cockcroft. 27 Fed. 579; Austin v. Gagau, 39 Fed. 628; Kentucky v. Louisville Bridge Co., 42 Fed. 242.]</p> <p>[Gited in Bates v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 39 Ohio St. 167; Stone v. Sargent, 129 Mass. 512.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,106.</p> <p>Collision' — Effect of Swearing to Pleadings— Conflicting Testimony — Fault.</p> <p>This was an action brought by [Richard Totten], the owner of the sloop Delaware, for damage occasioned by a collision with the steamboat Pluto, near the Battery. It appeared that the steamboat was bound from the North to the East river, with a raft in tow, and the sloop was bound from the East river to Jersey City; the wind blowing from the east, and the tide running ebb. The testimony offered by the respective parties failed to sustain the allegations of the libel and answer, but contradicted them in material points.</p>

This is a suit instituted by Toucey to recover the amount of certain bank notes issued by the Wabash Valley Bank and protested for non-payment at the place where the bank was located. The defendant is charged as the sole stockholder in the bank, and the declaration alleges that no such bank or banking house Is in existence at the place, — Jasper, Dubois county, Indiana,— where the notes purport to be issued and aré made payable.

On habeas corpus. In the matter of H. P. Toueliman, on habeas corpus, to the sergeant of the city of Richmond, brings the body of the prisoner into court and makes return that the prisoner is held in his custody as jailer, etc., under an indictment found by the grand jury of the hustings court, charging him with unlawfully selling and offering to sell goods, wares, and merchandise by card, sample, and other representation, without a license, according to law, so to do; and…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania. [This was a libel by Mary Helmsley against Coggins, master of the Towanda. to recover damages to her resulting from the death of her husband in a collision between the Towanda and the H. P. Blaisdell. From a decree of the district court in favor of libel-lant (case unreported), respondent appealed.]

[This was a libel in rem by Hamilton E. Towle against the Great Eastern for salvage.] Tne following diagrams were used on the trial, for the purpose of explaining the nature of the injury to the ship, and the character of the services, performed by the libel-lant: (a) The rudder shaft just below the point of fracture. (e) The nut which was at one time attempted to be unscrewed. (c) The ribbed frustum of cone.

[In the matter of Richard, Maty, and S. R. Town, bankrupts.] In this case the register certified that the assignee’s final report exhibits a balance of one thousand nine hundred and ninety dollars for distribution, and that the debts proved, with interest to March 5, 1869, the date of commencement of proceedings, amounted to one thousand seven hundred and fifty-one dollars and twelve cents, leaving a balance of two hundred and thirty-eight dollars and eighty-eight cents,…

<p>Case No. 14,112a.</p> <p>Makitime Lieks — Pkiokitibb—Pkocbeds.</p>

This suit is brought by the complainant [George Town], a citizen of the state of New York, to obtain a conveyance from the defendants [William De Havén and wife and others], of a certain tract of land situate in Marion county, Oregon, and being parts of sections 29 and 30, in township 5 south, range 2 west, Wallamet meridian, containing six hundred and forty acres of the value of more than five thousand dollars.

This was a hill in equity, brought by the complainants [William B. Towne and another], as assignees of Christopher J. Horn and Benjamin F. Howe, insolvents under the statute of Massachusetts.

<p>[In the matter of William E. Townsend, a bankrupt.)</p>

Judgments against the bankrupt [O. H.. Yiergutz] were rendered in the state court, and levies made thereunder by the sheriff, before the proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced. The sheriff has made sales under the levies, and the proceeds are in his hands.

On a motion for a discharge from imprisonment on a ca. sa. Peter Townsend was indebted to the United States, to the amount of sixty thousand dollars. He was imprisoned on a ca. sa,, and petitioned the secretary of the treasury for a discharge from imprisonment, under the act of congress. The discharge was granted, but there was a condition that the debtor should assign over his property to the United States, and pay costs •which had arisen in obtaining judgment.

<p>Case No. 14,120.</p> <p>Homestead — Antecedent Liens— Saw-Mills— Lien for Logs Furnished —Mortgage — Parties — Practice in Equity — Taking Account.</p> <p>1. A homestead exemption established by law cannot affect antecedent liens, and cannot be set up in derogation thereof.</p> <p>2. An act of the legislature of Georgia gave to' persons employed in any steam saw-mill, or who furnished it with saw logs or with anything necessary to carry on the work of the mill, a lien of the highest dignity for the wages of the employes, or for the saw logs and other necessaries furnished. Held, that it was not within the power ot the legislature to make such lien paramount to that of prior judgments and mortgages, or other older liens.</p> <p>3. An act of the legislature of Georgia, passed in 1842, established the lien mentioned in headnote 2, in favor of the emnloyés of .steam sawmills. and those furnishing the mills with logs and other necessaries. On December 13,1857, an act was passed which repealed the law, so far as it related to all saw-mills upon the several mouths of the Altamaha Tiver. and declared that the term, “months of the Altamaha river.” should include all the mills within ten miles of Darien, in straight line. Held, that a mill which was not strictly on out1 of the mouths of the Altamaha. but was embraced within the net-work of channels extending along the coast and connecting with the main channel of the Altamaha, and was within ten miles of Darien, by a right line, was fully within the terms of the repealing act.</p> <p>4. A sale made on the foreclosure of a lien for logs furnished a saw-mill, where there was a prior mortgage, conveyed only the equity of redemption, subject to the mortgage.</p> <p>5. When one of two joint mortgagors conveyed absolutely to the other his equity of redemption, held, that he was not a necessary party to a bill to foreclose. But his right to redeem, in case the mortgaged property did not satisfy the mortgage debt, would not be foreclosed by the decree.</p> <p>6. Without being a party he would be bound, by an account taken, to ascertain the sum due on the mortgage, unless he could show collusion.</p> <p>7. Courts of equity are always unwilling to turn a complainant out of court on an objection, for want of proper parties, made at the final hearing. •If they deem it necessary that a new party be made, they will generally allow the cause to stand over for that purpose.</p> <p>8. A mortgage lien was paramount to a claim for homestead in the mortgaged premises. Held, that the wife of the mortgagor was not a necessary party to a bill to foreclose. The right to homestead was to be considered in the light of a subsequent incumbrance.</p> <p>9. The wife is only interested to see that the mortgage shall not absorb more than it ought, to the detriment of the homestead, and the husband, being primarily liable on the mortgage note, is the only necessary party to be present at the taking of the account. Such account will be binding on persons only collaterally liable, unless collusion is shown.</p>

This was a libel for wages by the first mate of the brig Mina. Owing to alleged disobedience of orders, whereby part of the vessel’s tackle was lost, the captain claimed to defalk from the wages due to the mate the cost of a hawser, etc. The mate referred the question involved, with the concurrence of the captain, to the decision of the British consul at the port of Philadelphia. The consul investigated and decided the dispute.

<p>[This was an action by Toy William against J. L. Hallett to recover for the nonperformance of a contract.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,124.</p> <p>Baxkkuptcy — Discharge—Opposition—Fiduciary Debt.</p> <p>On a specification in opposition to a discharge, setting forth that a debt due by bankrupts, was created while they were acting in a fiduciary character. held, that the fact was no ground for withholding discharge.</p>

In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction to restrain the infringement of a patent. The plaintiff [Samuel R. Tracy] was grantee of the exclusive right for Yates county.

<p>Case No. 14,128.</p> <p>Judgment — Lien—Effect or Revival— Priorities.</p> <p>1. If a judgment become dormant its lien is lost, as against a mortgage executed by the judgment creditor, during the continuance of the judgment lien.</p> <p>[Cited in Flagg v. Flagg, 58 N. W. Ill; McCormick v. Wheeler, 36 Ill. 124.]</p> <p>2; A revival of the judgment cannot affect prior liens.</p> <p>3. But such revival gives a lien on the land of the defendant, not included in the mortgage, and which has on it no prior liens.</p>

<p>[This was a suit to enforce the payment of a judgment by Frederick Tracy and James ! Irwin against Joseph Walker, Thomas W. Ouland, William C. Hedges, and others.]</p>

Assumpsit [by Frederick A. Tracy and others against Joshua B. Wood] for negligence in losing 764% doubloons, entrusted to the defendant to be carried from New York to Boston, as a gratuitous bailee.

<p>Case No. 14,131.</p> <p>Collision — Schooners Meeting — Mutual Fault —Inscrutable Fault — Apportionment.</p> <p>1. Two schooners, the Barney and the Bronson, came in collision in Lake Huron. They had been sailing, the Barney, west by north half north, on her port tack, and the Bronson southeast by east half east, on her starboard tack. Each claimed that she was close-hauled, and that the other had the wind free. The helm of the Barney was starboarded and the helm of the Bronson ported, when a collision was seen to be inevitable. The evidence as to the direction of the wind was conflicting. and without preponderance in favor of one side or the other, and it was agreed, by both parties that the case must be determined by the 12th 'article of the act of 1864 [13 Stat. 60], as being one of vessels crossing: Held, that under that article the Barney must prove satisfactorily, in order to recover full indemnity, that she was close-hauled and that the Bronson was free, and that she had failed to do this;</p> <p>2. It being impossible on the pleadings and proofs to determine the direction of the wind.-or which vessel was close-hauled, the case, might be properly considered as one of mutual fault or of inscrutable fault;</p> <p>3. In either case, the damages must be divided;</p> <p>4. The case was. more properly, one of vessels meeting instead of crossing, and should be determined under the 11th article instead of the 12th;</p> <p>5. Both vessels should have ported, and as neither ported until the collision was inevitable, both vessels were in fault, and the damages must be divided.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by James F. Trader and others against A. L. Messinore and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 20,410, granted to William Blessing December 13, 1859.]

The bankrupt, having offered a composition of twenty per cent to his creditors, now informs the court by petition that Charles' F. Roberts claims a considerable sum as due to him, which the bankrupt wholly denies. He has placed the name and residence of Roberts on his list, but with a statement that he disputes the whole elaim.

[This was a suit brought by Charles Traf-ton in the state court of'Placer county to recover for trespass upon a placer gold mining claim, and seeking an injunction restraining the working of the same by defendant, P. T. Nougues.

Writ of error upon a judgment rendered in the district court of the district of Maine. The original action was assumpsit for money had and received, and was commenced in September, 1841. The material facts as they appeared on the record, in the bill of exceptions, were as follows: Mark Trafton was the postmaster of the city of Bangor, and in January, 1837, gave a bond, with sureties, for the faithful performance of the duties of his office.

This was a claim by the libellants [William Trainer and James Crawshaw] for wages, under circumstances somewhat peculiar. The vessel was originally built for a canal boat, but was now employed as a museum, for the exhibition of various ar-tides for public amusement at the places to which she went, along the shores of the bays and rivers in the United States.

<p>Case No. 14,137.</p> <p>Collision — At Sea — Schooner and Pilot Boat —Free Wind — Vessel Lying to.</p> <p>1. Where a schooner, heading south southwest with the wind Dortbwest, saw a pilot boat «.bout a mile and a half off and about two points on her port bow, and the pilot boat, which was lying to, under a reefed mainsail and a’ jib with one bonnet out, and with her helm lashed to starboard, was heading about north, and making about a mile an hour, luffing up so as ,to cause her sails to shake and then falling off, and the schooner kept on without changing her course, although this luffing up and falling off of the pilot boat was seen several times, until the pilot boat, when about eighty yards off, took another luff across the bows of the schooner, which then, but too late, starboard-ed her helm, held, that, under the twelfth article of the act of April 29, 1864 (13 Stat. 60), it was the duty of the schooner to keep out of the way of. the pilot boat, because the latter, though having the wind on her port side, was close hauled.</p> <p>2. The schooner was in fault in not sooner changing her course.</p> <p>3. The pilot boat was bound, under article 18, to keep her course, but she kept no course at all. It ivas her duty, when the schooner was seen ap-proaehing, to have unlashed her helm and kept steady on a course.</p> <p>4.The damages must be apportioned between the two vessels.</p> <p>[Cited in The Haverton, 31 Fed. 5G7.]</p> <p>[For hearing on exceptions to commissioner’s report, see Case No. 14,138.]</p>

<p>• [This ■was a libel to recover damages caused by a collision between the A. T. Stewart and the Transit The court decreed the damages to be divided, with a reference to ascertain the amount Case No. 14,137. The cause is now heard on exceptions to the commissioner’s report]</p>

This was a libel by Albert R. Bass, to recover the value of a quantity of coal, furnished by him to the Transit, a steamboat ■owned in New York, but chartered to a person residing out of that state.

<p>Case No. 14,140.</p> <p>Bankrcptct —Discharge—Who mat Oppose — Persons in Interest.</p> <p>Where a claim is contingent and unliquidated, so as not to be capable of being proved as a debt, it is sufficient to entitle the creditor to look to the disposition of the estate of the bankrupt, and places such creditor amongst “other persons in interest” besides creditors (who have proved their debts) authorized by the fourth section of the bankrupt act [of 1841 (5 Stat. 443)] to show cause against the discharge of the bankrupt.</p>

Attachment for wages, Friday 21st December, 1827. stated this to be a claim for wages up to the time when they were discharged from the Dido, which had been wrecked in the Delaware, the libel-lants having remained on board five days after she grounded, and assisted in saving the spars, rigging and part of the cargo, and further stated that the respondent [John Welsh] refused to pay wages for the said five days, which the libellants insisted on as just and proper.

This was an action to recover the freight due for the carriage of a parcel of hides, from Maldonado to Philadelphia, shipped at that port, and deliverable as per bills of lading to A. Curcier of Philadelphia, or to his assigns, he or they paying freight. The declaration contains two sets of counts.. One upon a special promise made by the defendant to Sir.

This was an action brought by the owners of the ship Ann, to recover the freight due for certain goods belonging to Mr. Coucier, and delivered upon the promise of the defendant to pay the freight.

This was a bill by Spencer Trask against Constantine Maguire, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Company, Thomas Allen, and others, for an injunction to restrain the state collector from selling certain engines, etc., seized to satisfy the tax. The court refused to interfere, and an appeal, which is yet pending, was taken to the supreme court of the United States. No opinion was written, but' the following memorandum of the conclusions of the court was made at the time.

<p>Case No. 14,147.</p> <p>Pilots — Half Pilotage — Navigating Hell Gate,</p> <p>Under the Hell Gate pilotage act of the state of New York (Sess. Laws 1847, p. 85, and 1865, p. 197), when a vessel in the port of New York has entered upon a voyage, which will carry her through Hell Gate, she is bound to employ the first pilot who tenders his services to pilot her through Hell Gate, or, in case of refusal, to pay him half pilotage; and she is none the less liable to pay the half pilotage, if, for any reason, the voyage through Hell Gate is not completed.</p> <p>[Cited in The Kalmar, Case No. 7,601; The Glaramara, 10 Fed. 680.]</p>

[This was a libel by Benjamin J. H. Trask against Antonia Pelletier and Henry J. Over-mann.] Motion to set aside a warrant of arrest. The libel prayed for a warrant of arrest, with a clause therein that, if the defendants be not found, then their goods and chattels, and also their credits and effects in the hands of the American Exchange Bank, be attached. The marshal’s return was: “Defendants not found.

<p>Case No. 14,150.</p> <p>Account — Necessary Averments — Accounting— Balance Due.</p> <p>1. On a general demurrer to a count in an action of account, the question is, whether the count is sufficient in substance, without regal'd to form, but sufficient must be alleged in some form to constitute a cause of action.</p> <p>2. In the action of account there are two judgments — one, that the defendant account with the plaintiff; the other, after the accounting, for the balance found due.</p> <p>3. The declaration must show the privity by which the plaintiff is entitled to an account, and, also, proceedings under or pursuant to it, raising a balance in his favor, to be recovered.</p> <p>4. Counts held bad, for want of such averments.</p>

This was an action on the case for an infringement of a patent granted to Edward Treadwell on the 18th of May, 1826, for an improvement in the art of manufacturing biscuit and sugar bread. The schedule describes the whole instrument, viz. the circular knives, dotters, cleavers, the holes and the niches for connecting the cakes and clearing away the loose dough, as in the former patent.

<p>Case No. 14,155.</p> <p>Practice in Equity — Process—Appearance—Irregular Decree — Pleading—Special Interrogatories — Rules.</p> <p>1. The process on the defendant in chancery must be served twenty days before the defendant is bound to appear. And a rule for answer, where the process has not been so served, is irregular.</p> <p>2. A decree pro confesso, for want of an answer, under such a rule, is also irregular. And if a final decree'be entered, in virtue of the above proceedings, the court, on motion, will set the whole aside.</p> <p>3. Under the 40th rule, the defendant - is not bound to answer, unless special interrogatories be put in the bill. Such a bill is clearly demurrable.</p>

Appeal [by F. C. Treadwell, Jr., and Henry McCollum] from the decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant them a patent for their invention of improvements in preparing dough for crackers, and award-: ing priority' of invention to Joseph Fox.

[Appeal from the district court of the* United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel for damages for personal injury by Charles Treadwell against Harry Joseph. Prom a decree of the district court in favor of defendant (ease unreported), li-bellant appealed.]

[This was a bill in equity by Daniel Tread-well against Robert P. Parrott, filed to restrain the defendant from infringing letters patent [No. 18,927] for “improvement in the manufacture of cannon,” granted to complainant December 11, 1855, and reissued February 4, 1862 [No. 1,272], The claims of the original and reissued patents, together with a description of the invention of the patentee, and of the prior devices, will be found in the opinion of the court.] 2

In this case, the libel, filed on the ISth day of April, in substance alleged that the master of the schooner, on the 24th of March last, signed a bill of lading for 250 tons of coal, shipped by E. A. Packer & Co., at Philadelphia, to be delivered to J. E. Howard, or his assigns, at Boston, on payment of freight; and that on the arrival of the vessel here, Howard sold the cargo, and indorsed the bill of lading thereof, to the libel-lant, who thereupon notified the master…

At the second general meeting of creditors objection was made to the allowance of compensation to the committee of credit-tors, and the decision of the question was adjourned into court for the decision of the judge.

This was a motion on the part of the defendant [Jacob E. Dodge] in a possessory action to be allowed to take possession of the vessel upon a stipulation for value.

Action for replevin [by Jonathan F. Treat against Miles S. Staples] for a vessel, &c., seized by the defendant, a deputy-collector of internal revenue, as the property of one Kidley, for non-payment of taxes assessed upon her. The case was heard by the court upon an agreed statement of facts, the material parts of which are stated in the opinion.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] This was a libel [by Thomas Trecartin against the ship Roehambeau, John E. Donnell, claimant] in a cause of subtraction of wages, civil and maritime, and the case'came before the court on appeal from a decree of the district court for this district.

Bill in equity [by James Trecothick against Jonathan L. Austin and others], to which the defendant, Jonathan L. Austin, put in distinct demurrers to different parts of the bill. To understand the points made at the bar, it is necessary to state some of the leading facts of the bill.

This was a libel for work and materials furnished [by John Evans Tree and John Eastburn, trading as Tree & Eastburn, sail-makers, against the brig Indiana, Wells, master], the libellants being sail-makers in Philadelphia. It appeared that the Indiana was built at Egg Harbor, in New Jersey, and there enrolled in 1839, as belonging to citizens of that state.

<p>Case No. 14,166.</p> <p>Insurance— Life — Application — Repuesenta-tions — “Sickness. ”</p> <p>1. The application for a policy on the life of the husband in favor of the wife was in flip singular number, but was signed by both. Held, that it was a joint agreement by both parties.</p> <p>2. The application, whicn was for the issue Of a new. in exchange for the old, policy, covenanted that all the statements in the original application were true when made, and should be the basis of the contract. The policy provided that it was issued in consideration of the representations in the application, upon the faith of which it was issued; also, that it was issued and accepted upon the express condition and agreement that, if any of the statements in the application were in any respect untrue, the policy should .be void. Held, that any false statement, whether material to the risk or not, avoids the policy. A jury has no right to say that it will not regard them because they are not material.</p> <p>3. When the insured, who was a German, answered to one of the interrogatories in the application “never sick,” which 'was written by the person who took the application, it was for the jury to decide, in view of conflicting testimony, and his important knowledge of English, whether the answer was false.</p> <p>4. If the sickness alleged by the company had been subsequently explained to the medical examiner upon its demand for a re-examination, in order to secure a. reinstatement of the policy, and was by him regarded as too trivial to mention, the jury has a right to infer that it was not so serious as to make the statement of the insured a fatal mistake.</p> <p>5. A party may not, in general, contradict the evidence of his own witness, unless such evidence was a surprise.</p> <p>6. It is not every affectation of the head from the sun that constitutes “sickness,” within the proper significance of that term. The burden of proof is on the defendant alleging such sickness.</p> <p>7. A jury may not consider the hardship 6f the case in determining the liability of the company.</p>

The bankrupts were a copartnership, carrying on business under the firm name of the Middleboro Shovel Company.

The Tremont National Bank held certain promissory notes of third persons, indorsed by the bankrupts [George & Battey], which fell due after the adjudication of bankruptcy and before the appointment of the assignee. During this period, and before the maturity of the several notes, the bankrupts, at the request of the bank through its attorney, signed a waiver of demand and notice, which accordingly were not duly made.

<p>Case No. 14,170.</p> <p>"W ITNESS — COMPETENCT — INTEREST — SEAMEN — Wages — Vessel about to Pkoceeb to Sea —Shipping Articles — Fees.</p> <p>1. In a suit in rem for seamen’s wages, the .master is a competent witness for the libellant, though he may have executed a bill of sale of the vessel to the claimant.</p> <p>[Cited in Patten v. Darling. Case No. 10.812.]</p> <p>2. The testimony of the master in such a case is. in the absence of the shipping articles, sufficient of itself to establish the time of each seaman’s service, and the amount of wages due.</p> <p>3. Under the 6th section of the act of July 20. 1790 (1 Stat. 133). in order that admiralty process may issue within ten days after the arrival of the vessel, it is sufficient to show a reasonable ground of belief that the vessel is about to proceed to sea within the ten days.</p> <p>4. The clerk’s report, in matters referred to him, should.state facts and conclusions, and not detail the evidence at length.</p> <p>5. A neglect, at the trial, to object to the competency of evidence, is a waiver of the right to object to the same evidence on a subsequent reference to the clerk.</p> <p>6. The right of a- seaman to his wages depends on the service, and not on the shipping articles, and he is not obliged to call for them in order to establish his claim to wages, though be may do so.</p> <p>7. If the state court compensates services similar to those performed by a marshal, although not performed there by a like officer, the marshal is entitled to the same compensation.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Three Hundred Barrels of Alcohol. Case No. 16,509. Re Lowenstein, Id. 8,572.]</p> <p>8. The same fees are allowed to officers in this court, as in the supreme court of the state, without regard to the source of the power of the state court — whether customary or statutory.</p> <p>9. This court allows a reasonable compensation to its officers for services not enumerated in the fee-bill.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.] label on a memorandum' of charter-party.

Detinue [by Francis B. Trigg against James S. Conway]. contended on the motion for a new trial: (1) That the damages were excessive. There had been no demand for the negro boy before the institution of the suit, and the suit was the only demand which he admitted to be sufficient to maintain the action, and a sufficient demand to entitle the plaintiff to damages after the suit.

Detinue in the circuit court, before the Hon. PETER V. DANIEL, associate justice of the supreme court, the Hon. DANIEL RINGO, district judge, not sitting, having been of counsel m the.case. This was an action of detinue brought by Francis B. Trigg against • James S. Conway [Case No. 14,172], subsequent to which time both parties died, and their deaths respectively were suggested and proved.

[These were several proceedings in bankruptcy, entitled respectively: In re W. J. Trim; Ex parte E. W. Marshall. Agent; In re Purcell; Ex parte T. D. Wagner; and E. M. Bowman against T. D. Wagner and others.)

<p>Case No. 14,175.</p> <p>Admiralty — Surplus and Remnants — Stevedore —Coopering Cargo — Master’s Wages and Disbursements — Mortgagee —Bankruptcy — Gold Contract.</p> <p>1.Surplus and remnants of a ship, were claimed by an assignee in bankruptcy. Petitions were also filed on behalf of a stevedore, who had discharged the cargo of the ship on her last voyage, and on previous voyages; of a cooper who had put the last cargo in landing order previous to its delivery; also by the master of the vessel for his wages and for disbursements; and by a watchman for watching the vessel in port, both before and after her seizure by the marshal under the process. Held, that the claims of the stevedore and cooper for services rendered, in reference to the cargo on the last voyage only, and of the master for wages and disbursements during the last voyage only, should be paid out of the surplus.</p> <p>[Cited in Porter v. The Sea Witch, Case No. 11,280; The Wexford, 7 Fed. 684; The Lillie Laurie. 50 Fed. 221; The Seguranca, 58 Fed. 909.]</p> <p>2. The expenses of watching the vessel in port, previous to her seizure by the marshal, might also be paid out of it. but not the expenses of watching her after such seizure.</p> <p>[Cited in The Champion, Case No. 2,584; The Erinagh, 7 Fed. 234; The Seguranca, 58 Fed. 909.]</p> <p>3. A mortgagee of the ship under a mortgage given to secure “one thousand pounds sterling, lawful money of Great Britain,” petitioned also to be paid out of the surplus, the amount due him “in gold coin of the United States.” The as-signee in bankruptcy claimed, that the amount should be paid in currency. Held, that inasmuch as the questions of law involved had been decided by the district court for the Southern district of New York, arising between the same parties, on similar mortgages on two other ships, from which decision no appeal had been taken by the assignee, this court, without passing on the questions of law involved, would consider that that decision was acquiesced in by the assignee, unless it was appealed from, and would make a similar order. But if an appeal was taken from that decision, a decision in this matter would be withheld, until the determination of the questions of law by the appellate court.</p>

Upon the venire de novo issued under the mandate, of the supreme court, in this case (see 1 Pet. [2G U. S.] 25), the plaintiffs had given notice to the bank (the defendant,) to produce at the trial the letter-books of the bank, from its institution down to tbe year 1S25. to be used in evidence. objected that the notice was still too general. It does not show that there are any such letters. It is merely to enable the plaintiffs to find possible evidence.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>This was an action [by C. C. Tripp against F. S. Spring] for the possession of a parcel of land within the city of San Francisco. The case was tried at the July term of the court, before Mr. Justice Field, without a jury, by stipulation of the parties.</p>

<p>This was a libel in rem for seamen’s wages. The libellants alleged that they shipped at Havana, on a voyage “to Cronstadt, in Russia, and thence to a port of discharge in the United States,” at stipulated wages. The ■claimants (the owners of the ship) alleged, that the agreement was only for a voyage to ■Cronstadt, and had been altered without their knowledge or consent, on the home voyage of the ship. The shipping articles, as produced, corresponded with the allegatipns of the libel-lants; and the claimants offered to prove, by parol, that the words following “Russia” were inserted after the articles were signed, and whilst the vessel was on her return voyage, and that the agreement with the libel-lants was to terminate at Russia. The libel-' lants objected to the proof as incompetent, but the court ordered it to be read de bene esse, reserving, till the final hearing, the ■question of its admissibility.</p>

The vessel having been sold under a decree and the proceeds paid into court, a question arose as to the proper distribution of the proceeds, they being insufficient to satisfy all the demands preferred against them. Various libels had been filed against the vessel, and thirteen attachments had been issued and served upon her or her proceeds, and petitions were also brought in by other parties setting up claims to the fund in court.

<p>[This was a suit brought against the vessel Triumph, Artis, claimant, for an alleged salvage service.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,184.</p> <p>Towage — Damages—Speed.</p> <p>Where a lighter loaded was towed by a tug from the North into the East river without slacking speed upon coming round against the ebb tide, and capsized and sunk, held, that the tug was in fault for not observing the effect of her speed upon coming up againsi the tide, and slacking when necessary to save the lighter.</p>

This was an action [by Abraham Troost] against [Hiram Barney] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an alleged excess of duties paid, under protest, on an importation of gunny cloth from Calcutta, in September, 1862. •

<p>Case No. 14,186.</p> <p>Prize — Who mat Seize — Practice—Communicat- ' ing with Enemy — Unreasonable Regulations — Costs.’</p> <p>1. It is competent for any person to take possession of property seizable as prize when found within the jurisdiction of che court.</p> <p>2. The vessel and cargo were seized in Hampton Roads, near Portress Monroe, by Major General Butler, of the army, and sent to New York, and there libelled as prize. Reid, that the arrest was legal, and the suit regularly instituted.</p> <p>3. Claimants of property seized as prize, who complain of irregularities, delay, and acts of negligence on the part of the captors, must proceed • according to rule 23 of the standing' prize rules— that is, by libel and monition, and not by special .motion — to. discharge the arrest.</p> <p>4. Vessel and cargo, libelled for having been fraudulently employed by the master in unlawfully communicating with the enemy, released.</p> <p>• 5. There is no public or municipal law which inhibits a neutral vessel, on a lawful voyage from Washington city to Halifax, from sailing at night on the Potomac river.</p> <p>6. The questions as to what are considered, in prize law, contraband letters or dispatches, when carried to an enemy, and as to what personal intercourse with the enemy is allowed by the prize • law, discussed</p> <p>7. The seizure having been made on probable grounds of suspicion, the vessel and cargo were restored without costs or damages against the captors.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,188.</p> <p>Baxkudptcy — Composition.</p> <p>The court may give effect to composition proceedings in cases of voluntary bankruptcy, although the bankrupt has by his own acts and conduct deprived himself of the right to obtain a discharge.</p>

Action of assumpsit on a policy of insurance. Insurance was effected on three-sixteenths of the bark Hellespont, in the City-Insurance Company, for the sum of forty-one hundred and twenty-five dollars, for the period of one year from the 23d of December, 1857. The claim is for a total loss on the 3d of April following.

Assumpsit for not transporting certain merchandize from Providence to New York, in a packet sloop belonging to the defendant [John Wood].

The questions for decision arise upon exceptions by John I. Donaldson, trustee, to the petition of Luther S. Trowbridge, administrator of the estate of Hubbard Trow-bridge, deceased, praying for an order requiring the trustee to admit a claim presented by the petitioner, to participation in the distribution of the proceeds of the estate.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.) This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, against the steamboat Troy, to recover for materials-supplied to and work done upon that vessel, in July, 1857. The Troy was engaged in running upon the Hudson river, between the port of Troy and the port of New York, touching at intermediate places, exclusively within the state of New York.

<p>Case No. 14,193.</p> <p>Prize — Illegal Trade — Violation of Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, attempted to be used in trade by their owner for •the benefit of the enemy, and arrested in the act of violating the blockade.</p>

At law. On motion to stay execution and proceedings on fi. fa. until the determination of the appeal proceedings in New York. Suit by the president and directors of Troy City Bank, a corporation of the state of New York, against John C. Laúman, John O. .Rockafellow, and James Moore, Jr., of state of Pennsylvania, on a judgment obtained in the superior court of Buffalo, N. Y., on which appeal proceedings had been taken to the court of appeals of that state.

The plaintiffs were a corporation, created July 20th, 1835, under the act of the legislature of the state ot New-Tork relative to in-corporations for manufacturing purposes, passed March 22d, 1811, and the acts continuing and amending the same, for the purpose of manufacturing, at Troy, N. T., nail-rods, cut-nails, hoop-iron, spikes, &c. On the 2d of December, 1836, they became, by assignment from one Henry Burden, the owners of letters patent granted to said Burden on the…

This was a bill in equity, praying for an. injunction and an account. It was filed July 10, 1848. The answer was sworn to March 1, 1S49.

This case, reported in [Cases Nos. 14,195 and 14.196], now came before the court on a motion by the defendants for instructions to the clerk as to the principles which should govern him in the taxation of the costs awarded to the plaintiffs. The question as to the solicitor’s fees for depositions arose in regard to oral testimony taken by the master, on the accounting before him.

2 [Motion for -apportionment of costs. The bill in this ease was filed July 10, 1848. A motion was made, on the bill, for a preliminary injunction, and was resisted, on affidavits, and denied. An answer was filed in March, 1849, to which a general replication was put in. The proofs for final hearing were taken in June, 1849. The case was heard thereon, before NELSON, Circuit Justice, in August, 1849.

<p>Case No. 14,199.</p> <p>Partnership — Death op One — Bill of Revivor —Patents—Damages for Infringement-Profits.</p> <p>L A suit in equity was brought against three persons doing business as copartners, and, as such, carrying on a manufactory, to restrain them from using a machine for which the plaintiff held letters patent, and to compel the defendants to account for and pay to the plaintiff the profits realized by the defendants from the use of said machine at said manufactory. The plaintiff had a ■ decree for such injunction and account. The accounting was had, the master’s report thereon was filed, reporting an amount of profits as due to ' the plaintiff, exceptions thereto were filed and argued, the opinion of the court on such exceptions was filed, but no final decree had been entered. Then one of the defendants died, leaving a will appointing an executor. Tne plaintiff then filed a bill of revb-or, praying the revival of the suit against the executor. Held, that the profits reported constituted a debt due by the copartnership to the plaintiff;</p> <p>2. The suit did not abate by the death of ■one of the copar-uers;</p> <p>3. It not being alleged that the surviving co-partners were insolvent, or that the- copartnership -.assets were not sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's ■demand, the bill of revivor must be dismissed.</p> <p>4. No suit ar la-v or in equity can, in this country, be sustained against the representatives •of a deceased copartr.eí, or to charge his estate for the copartnership debts, if the surviving partners are' solvent and the assets of the firm are •sufficient. •</p> <p>5. Cases in England, holding apparently a contrary doctrine, noticed.</p>

This was an application by the assignee of the bankrupt for a reargument or rehearing on the report of a referee, sustaining claims of Cooper, Vail & Co., of New York, against the bankrupt, to the amount of $67,-000, and the exceptions to that report filer! by the assignee, and by the First National Bank of Troy, a creditor of the bankrupt.

<p>In bankruptcy. Petition in review.</p>

In this case, the firm of Cooper, Vail & Co. proved against the estate of the bankrupts, in the district court, a claim amounting to $67,252.22, for a balance due on account of advances made by them to the bankrupts, on consignment of manufactured goods. This claim was contested by the as-signee and by an objecting creditor. On a reference to ascertain its validity, the referee reported in favor of it.

<p>This case came before the court upon the joint exceptions of Shepard Tapen, assignee in bankruptcy of the Troy Woolen Company, and the First National Bank of Troy, a creditor of said bankrupt, which exceptions were filed to the report of Worthington Frothing-ham, Esq., to whom, upon the petition of the said bank, it had been referred, to take the proofs and accounts touching the claim of Cooper, Vail & Co., against said bankrupt, and to hear and determine the legality and amount of such claim, and report his conclusions to the court. The referee, after stating and reporting the facts found by him, reported that on the 28th day of October, 1869, the bankrupt was indebted to Cooper, Vail & Co. in the sum of sixty-seven thousand and twenty-nine dollars and eighty-one cents; and on the 30th day of June, 1870, in the sum of two hundred and twenty-two dollars and forty-one cents, and also that under an agreement referred to in said report, made on the 14th day of September, 1869, and the sales and transactions by virtue thereof, Cooper, Vail & Co. became, on the 10th day of September, 1870, indebted to the creditors of the bankrupt in the sum of nineteen thousand and eighty-four dollars and forty-three cents. To this report twenty-one exceptions were filed by the assignee and the First National Bank of Troy; and a hearing was had upon the report and exceptions, and the testimony, exhibits, books of account and other evidence returned by the referee. The claimants, Cooper, Vail & Gu.. filed no exceptions to the report. The amount of the claim of Cooper, Vail & Co. was not disputed, but the •question in the case was whether they were creditors of the Troy Woolen Company, or were solely creditors of Knowlson & Morgan; the dispute arising from the failure of both Knowlson & Morgan and Cooper, Vail & Co. to keep distinct in their various transactions out of which this indebtedness arose, the difference between the Troy Woolen Company, of which Knowlson & Morgan individually ■ were the sole stockholders, trustees and officers, and the commercial co-partnership of Knowlson & Morgan. An immense mass of evidence was introduced on this question. The evidence established, in the opinion of the judge, that the corporation,, the Troy Woolen Company, received the benefit of the advances made by Cooper. Vail & Co., and that Cooper, Vail & Co. did not intend, in making these advances, to rely exclusively on the credit of the commercial firm of Knowlson & Morgan. Previous to the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy the Troy Woolen Company had been for some time under the management of a committee of its creditors, and Cooper, Yail & Co. had acted as their agents in the sale of its products in the city of New York, having agreed that “they would receive productions of the Troy Woolen Company, and treat and handle the same as a special and independent account, and in settlement for sales would turn over the cash or the notes received, with their endorsement,” and it was under this agreement that they became indebted in the sum of nineteen thousand and eighty-four dollars and forty-three cents, above stated, to the creditors of the bankrupt (the Troy Woolen Company), for which sum actions were then pending in the state court by the committee of the creditors, and in the United States court by the assignee in bankruptcy of the Troy Woolen Company.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,204.</p> <p>Seamen— Wages — Pilot — Custom on Hudson Riveb — Repbesentations bt Libellant.</p> <p>1. Whether, unu :r the established usage among steamboats plying upon the Hudson river, the mere hiring of a pilot at monthly wages, effected prior to the commencement of the season of navigation, carries with it aD implied engagement that the employment shall continue throughout the entire season, — query?</p> <p>2. Whether such engagement could be implied where the hiring was effected after the season was partly over, — doubted.</p> <p>3. Where, in the case of a contract for services in which no definite term of service is expressed, there is proof that the party claiming to have been hired as pilot represented the engagement was terminable at his option, this affords a strong presumption that it was terminable, also, at the option of the other party.</p>

<p>[This was an action by S. J. Truman and Henry C. Hyde, assignees, against R. L. Hardin.]</p>

The principal facts appeared as follows; [C. A.] Weed, the defendant, was president of the corporation plaintiff, and by an alleged agreement he procured a loan to the company by one Adams of $10,-000, for which he became personally responsible, and for which he alleged an agreement that he was to receive $1,000 for commission. A note of the company was given him, payable to his order, for $10.000. and also certain collaterals, consisting of bonds and stock.

<p>Case No. 14,206.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Lien on Vessel — Laches.</p> <p>The vessel «vas sold under sentence of the court of admiralty at Providence at the suit of others of the crew. These libellants had notice of the proceedings, but did not apply for their wages. Their lien on the vessel is at an end.</p> <p>[Cited in The Utility, Case No. 16,806; Packard v. The Louisa, Id. 10,652; Herbert v. The Amanda F. Myrick, Id. 6.395; Wall v. The Royal Saxon. Id. 17,093; Pierce v. The Alberto, Id. 11,142.]</p>

Action for violating a patent right of the plaintiff, for a machine for making combs. After reading the pleadings, the defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the ground, that the declaration does not lay the act complained of, to be against the form of the statute, but merely claims damages at common law. 1 Com. Dig. 329; 1 Chit. PI. 357; 2 East, 341; Wils. 599; Fessenden, Forms, 209; 3 Woodeson, 214; 4 Burrows, 2387; 5 Johns. 175; 1 Saund. 135, pt. 4; 4 Burrows, 2333, 2351.

This was an appeal, pro forma, from the district court [for the district of Pennsylvania]. It was a libel, in the nature of an information, against the brig, for a violation of the act of congress of the 22d of March, 1794, prohibiting the slave trade from the United States to foreign countries.

In equity. Catherine Biddle brought an action at law in this court against Peter Tscheider et al. for use and occupation.

<p>Case No. 14,211.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade — Spoliation' op Papers — Refusal to Answer — Contraband Cargo.</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p> <p>2. Spoliation of papers by the master.</p> <p>3. Refusal of the master to answer interrogatories as to the destination of the vessel.</p> <p>4. Part of the cargo contraband of war.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,212.</p> <p>United States Marshals — Appointment of Auctioneer to Conduct Judicial Sale —Usage—Costs.</p> <p>1. The marshal is not authorized to appoint an auctioneer to conduct a judicial sale, at the expense of the government or of a private party, without the consent of the party for whose benefit the services are performed.</p> <p>2. Any custom or usage to that effect rests only on the direct consent of the party using the process of sale</p> <p>3. An auctioneer cannot have costs or disbursements taxed ’n his favor by the court, in invitum, against the libellants or claimants personally, or against the res, nor. can the auctioneer’s charges be taxed to the marshal as a part of his disbursements.</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity filed to restrain the defendant, William Bramhill, from infringing letters patent No. 13,145,' for “improvements in packing for stuffing boxes,” etc., granted to plaintiff, Joseph H. Tuck, June 25, 1855. The nature of the invention, the claim of the patent, and the facts of the •case are fully set forth in the opinion of the court.] 2</p>

In pursuance to an order of the honorable court made in the chambers at Austin, on the 22d day of June, 1878, referring to me, one of the registers of said district, the petition of P. N. Tucker, bankrupt, aforesaid, praying that an allowance of five hundred dollars in money be paid to him out of the funds belonging to said bankrupt estate in the hand of P. B. Bryan, assignee, which he claims as an exemption, under the provisions of section 5045, Rev. St. ü.

<p>Case No. 14,217.</p> <p>Injunction — Dissolution—Reinstatement.</p> <p>1. Where an injunction has been dissolved on the coming in of the answer denying the equity of the bill, and testimony has afterwards been taken and published tending to show the right of the complainant to relief, the injunction, on application. may be reinstated.</p> <p>2. The granting or dissolving an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the chancellor, and on the justice and equity of each particular case.</p> <p>[Cited in Commerford v. Thompson, 1 Fed. 424.]</p> <p>NOTE. In April, 1844, this cause came on for final hearing on the equity side of the circuit court, before the Hon. Peter V. Daniel, associate justice of the supreme court, and the Hon. Benjamin Johnson, district judge, and the injunction was by decree made perpetual.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,216.</p> <p>Patents — Preliminary Injunction — Former Suit — New Article — New Process — Reissue.</p> <p>1. Upon a motion for a preliminary injunction, the defendants showed that, in a prior suit against the manufacturers who had supplied them with the infringing articles, the complainant had obtained an interlocutory decree: Held, not a sufficient reason for withholding the injunction.</p> <p>2. Such infringing articles could not be released from the monopoly of the patent until a final decree, in the former suit, had been rendered, and satisfied.</p> <p>3. Where an original patent describes a new article made by a new process, the reissue may be in two parts, one for the process, and one for the article of manufacture</p> <p>[For hearing on a motion tor an attachment on account of breach of an injunction, see 5 Fed. 808.]</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see note to Tucker v. Tucker Manuf’g Co., Case No. 14,227.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Enoch Tucker and others against Charles S. Fowler and others ahd their assignees Joseph H. Bradley and Charles F. Frary.]

<p>[This was an action by Richard Tucker and Henry Tucker against George P. Kane, collector, tc recover Cor duties paid under protest.]</p>

This was an action against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an alleged excess of duties and a penalty. A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs [Robert A. Tucker and Alpheus Lightbourne], subject to the opinion of the court.

<p>Case No. 14,223.</p> <p>Salvage — Lien—Customs Duties.</p>

This suit was brought by the plaintiffs [R. & H. B. Tucker], merchants, of Baltimore, against the defendants [Oelrichs, Lurman, and Schumaeker] as owners of Belt’s wharf and the warehouses thereon, to recover for the injury alleged to have been done to a lot of coffee belonging to the plaintiffs, by storing it in the same warehouse with a quantity of Peruvian guano. It appeared, upon the trial, that the coffee was imported by Messrs.

<p>Case No. 14,226.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Wholesale Dealers— “Place of Business.”</p> <p>1. The selling agents of a manufacturing company, who sell all the company’s goods at their' place of business or that of their sub-agents, on behalf of the company, by samples only, the goods being delivered to purchasers direct from the company’s factory, and the proceeds, if received by the agents, paid over to the company, are not liable to a special tax on such sales as wholesale-dealers, under the act of June 30,1864. as amend-. ed by -the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 98).</p> <p>2. The term “place of business” in section . 9 of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 113), exempting from special tax, sales by manufacturers of their own goods, wares, and merchandise, “at their principal office or place of business,” if the. goods, wares, or merchandise, are kept there only as samples, means the principal place of business for the sale of the goods, wares, or merchandise.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,227.</p> <p>Patents — Specifications—Exact Description— Reissue —Validity — Construction — Infringement — Bronzing Iron.</p> <p>1. An exact description of an invention is requisite for three purposes. That the government may know what they have granted, and what will become public property when the patent expires. That licensees may know how to use and practise the inventioL during the term of the patent. That subsequent inventors may know what portion of the field of invention has been occupied.</p> <p>2. Persons seeking redress for the unlawful use of an invention covered by letters-patent owned by them are obliged to.allege and prove that they, or those under whom they claim, are the original and first inventors, of what is claimed in said patent: but the letters-patent in due form, introduced in evidence, afford a prims! facie presumption sufficient to support such allegation until rebutted.</p> <p>[Cited in Herring v. Nelson, Case No. 6,-424.]</p> <p>3. Where it appears, on a comparison of the two instruments by the court, that the reissue patent is for a different invention from that described in the original, then the reissue is invalid, as the state of facts shows that the commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction.</p> <p>4. Errors and imperfections in the original may be corrected in the reissue, and the patentee be allowed to redescribe his invention, within the limit of what was described, suggested, or indicated in the original patent.</p> <p>5. Whether a reissue covers no more than the invention described in the original patent, is a question of construction for tne court, aided or not, by expert evidence, as it may or may not appear that technical terms, or terms of art. in the specifications, require explanation, in order to arrive at their true meaning.</p> <p>6. Corrections may be made in a reissue specification. but not of a character to change the substantial nature of the invention.</p> <p>7. In this case the defendants, while assignees of the complainant, had acknowledged the validity of his patent.</p> <p>' 8. After reassigning the patent back to the complainant (the inventor), the respondents endeavored to reach the same results as were accomplished by the patented process, without infringing the complainant’s patent; but the court field that the attempt to avoid the charge of infringement was merely colorable, and that complainant was entitled to an account and an injunction.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Tucker v. Burditt, Case No. 14,216; Id., 5 Fed. 808: Tucker v. Corbin, Id. 810; Tucker v. Dana, 7 Fed. 213; Tucker v. Sargent, 9 Fed. 299.]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Samuel P. Tuckerman against Abraham O. Bigelow, and others. Heard on demurrer.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by the Tucker Manufacturing Company against Levi C. Boyington, praying for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a trade-mark.]

<p>Case No. 14,230.</p> <p>Seaworthiness — Burden op Proof — Loss op Cargo — Stress op Weather.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,231.</p> <p>Patents — Prior State op Akt — Claim—Novelty —Elevators.</p> <p>1. In view of the prior state of the art, the twelfth claim of the patent for improvements in hoisting-apparatus and elevators, granted Otis Tufts, Aug. 9, 1859, which is for “passing the shipping-rods, and the cord or rod that operates the friction-brake, through the car or platform, forthe object and purposes set forth,” must be construed strictly in accordance with its language, as a. claim for passing the described shipping-rods, and the described cord or rod operating the friction-brake. or their equivalents, through the car or platform, for the purposes set forth.</p> <p>; 2. The first claim of the patent for improvements in the mode of suspending and operating elevators, Ac., grafted Otis Tufts. May 28, 1861, which is for constructing an elevator, or hoisting-apparatus, with a series of two or more hoisting ropes or chains, having independent attachments, and winding simultaneously upon the hoisting-drum. for greatei safety, substantially as described, held invalid for want of novelty.</p> <p>3. The second claim of the patent of May 28, 1861. for “equalizing the strain upon the series of ropes or chains of my (Tuft’s) improved elevator or hoisting-machine by automatic adjustment, substantially as described,” held invalid for want of novelty.</p> <p>4. The patent granted Otis Tufts. Dec. 11, 1866. for improvement in means for guiding elevators, held invalid for want of novelty.</p>

<p>This was a petition for a rehearing in the case decided between these parties near the commencement of this term [Casé No. 14,-233]. The petition sets out a certificate of two counsel as to the propriety of a rehearing, but assigns no other ground, except that the petitioner feels aggrieved by the former decision, and thinks it erroneous in holding the agreement or trust between these parties named in the opinion to have been executory instead of executed.</p>

<p>This was a bill in equity founded on the following allegations. Peter Tufts of Cambridge, Mass., ■ died in 1827, leaving a small farm and house thereon, where a part of his family continue to reside till the present time. He died insolvent, and the plaintiff, his wife, being executrix under his will, sold the estate at auction for the purpose of paying the debts, September 22d, 1828. The purchasers were Cutter and Cummings, for about $3,460. It was alleged in the bill that she made an agreement with the purchasers that she might retain possession of the premises, and have a reconveyance of them on paying the sum for which they had sold and interest thereon. It was averred, also, in one part of the bill, that this agreement was made subsequent to the sale, and at the time the deed was executed, and that relying on it, she proceeded to make valuable and permanent improvements on the premises. That in January, A. D. 1831, Cummings conveyed his share in the estate to R. Perkins, and in January, 1832, Perkins conveyed to Cutter, the occupation and improvements by her still going on under the agreement. That in February, 1834, Cutter becoming embarrassed, and anxious to sell the property, she procured Charles Tufts, her step-son, to take a conveyance on the same terms which had before been agreed with Cutter. That Charles Tufts lived in the house with her, professed to be friendly, and continued to let her occupy and improve under the agreement, and to make sales of gravel and trees on her own account till 1842. the property in the meantime having risen much in value, so as to be then worth $40,000. That he then refused to fulfill the agreement, though she was ready and offered to pay the principal and interest due, and demanded a conveyance from him. That in September. 1844, Charles Tufts sold a portion of the premises to E. Wheeler, the other respondent, who was notified of the agreement before named when he purchased. The complainant prayed further, an account, by the respondent, Charles Tufts, of any rents or income, and a conveyance by him and Wheeler of the premises, setting aside his to Wheeler on her paying the original consideration and interest, as by agreement with Cutter and Cummings at first, and afterwards with Charles Tufts. She also asked an injunction against further conveyances by Charles Tufts or Wheeler while these proceedings were pending.</p> <p>The answer of Charles Tufts admits several of the matters alleged, but denies that Cutter and Cummings entered into any agreement which made the conveyance to them a trust or mortgage, or that he bought of Cutter under any such agreement with him or the complainant, though he made a verbal promise, in the close of 1831 or the first of 1832, that if she paid him his advances and interest within five years, he would convey to her. He further alleged that such only was the agreement between her and Cutter originally, except that originally it was to be done in ten years. He further denied that she had made any valuable improvements, or remained on the premises, except from kindness, or that she had paid rent or interest, though charged against her. or had ever offered to pay them within the original ten or subsequent five years. He also pleaded the revised statute of frauds to her demands, and annexed many accounts between them to show her indebtedness to him.</p> <p>The answer of Wheeler expressed his belief in the statements of his co-defendant, and denied any knowledge, when he purchased in September, 1844, that the plaintiff claimed any interest in the premises, except as tenant at. will.</p> <p>There was a supplemental bill charging the respondent Charles Tufts with instituting proceedings at law to oust the plaintiff, pending the present bill, and an answer admitting the allegation, and upon this an injunction had issued against further proceedings there till otherwise-permitted by this court. A great mass of evidence was put into the case to prove the agreement on which the plaintiff relied. and to show a trust or mortgage as between the plaintiff and Cutter and Cummings till the conveyance to Charles Tufts and since, as between the plaintiff and him. Much proof was also offered to rebut these. Such portions of the testimony on both sides as maybe pertinent will be stated hereafter in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,234.</p> <p>Prize — Carrying Enemy’s Dispatches — Procedure in Prize Cases.</p> <p>[1. An American ship, engaged, with the knowledge of. and under contract with, her owner, in carrying dispatches of a public nature, sent under the charge of a messenger from a British rninis-ter in this country, after a declaration of war, to his own government, is subject to condemnation as prize, as being engaged in the service of the enemy. In such case the cargo, if it belongs to the owner of the ship, partakes of the of-fence, and is also lawful prize.]</p> <p>.[2. Common-law principles and rules of evidence cannot be applied in a prize court. Its proceedings are totally different from those of any other court. Proofs and evidence are. of necessity. and the nature and exigencies of cases, permitted in prize courts.]</p> <p>[3. Quaere: Whether when certified copies of dispatches and documents found on board a prize, and transmitted to the state department, are sent by the secretary to the court for inspection, with a request that their contents be not made public, the court has any power, as a substitute for the documents themselves, to certify their import for use as evidence in the proceedings.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of Riley Tulley. a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,236.</p> <p>Shipping — Dissenting Pakt Ownbk — Majokitt and Minokity Rights — Stipulation.</p> <p>1. A dissenting part owner is entitled to a stipulation to secure his interest in case of a loss on a voyage undertaken against his. wishes.</p> <p>2. The court of admiralty will not order an account as a separate and independent mode of relief, but only as incident to other matter of which it has admitted cognizance.</p> <p>[Cited in Swain v. Knapp, 32 Minn. 432, 21 N. W. 416.]</p> <p>3. In the management of a vessel the opinion of the majority shall prevail, unless it forbids its employment, in which case it yields to the minority, ,who desire its employment, because the public . interest must be protected in securing employment to the vessel</p> <p>• [Cited in Lewis v. Kinney, Case No. 8,325.]</p> <p>4. The court of admiralty has an admitted jurisdiction to secure the .value of the dissentient minority's interest, in case- of disagreement among part owners in the employment of the vessel.</p> <p>0. The foreign authorities with regard to the employment and sale of a ■ vessel in case of disagreement among joint owners, collected and commented on.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,237.</p> <p>Bottomry — Under What Circumstances Bond Valid.</p> <p>A bottomry bond can be entered into by the master only under circumstances of great distress, and when lie has no other means of repairing,</p> <p>[Cited in Deland v. The Medora, Case No. 8,-287; Joy \. Allen, Id. 7,552.]</p>

<p>[This was a libel by Thomas Tunno against Benedict Preary.] ■</p>

<p>Case No. 14,238a.</p> <p>Error — De Minimis — Payment—How Pleaded.</p> <p>1. For the small excess of $1.90 de minimis non curat lex applies, and judgment will not be reversed.</p> <p>2. Payment on a judgment cannot be proved under nul tiel record, and if a party could avail himself of it, he must plead it.</p>

In the circuit court, before PETER V. DANIEL, associate justice of the supreme court, and DANIEL RINGO, district judge. Garnishment.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel against the steamship St. Lawrence (Lewis H. Meyer and Edward Stucken, claimants) to enforce a lien, under the laws of the state, for supplies furnished by the libelant, William W. Tupper.

<p>Case No. 14,242.</p> <p>Shipping — Hypothecation before Voyage Began —Residence of Owners.</p> <p>A ship cannot be hypothecated according to the maritime law, before the voyage is begun, or in places where the owners resiUe, even for those necessaries without which the vessel cannot proceed to sea</p> <p>[Cited in The Stephen Allen, Case No. 13,361; People’s Perry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. (61 U. S.) 402. Disapproved in The Richard Bus-teed, Case No. 11,764.]</p>

This was a suit brought by Turnbull & Co. for a decree for the sale of the Mount Vernon Cotton Factory property, in the city of Alexandria, to satisfy the liens upon said property. The property was sold, and the price obtained was altogether inadequate to satisfy the various liens upon it. The contest was mainly between the lienors as to the priority of their respective liens, but there were other questions upon which these rights depended.

This was a bill for an injunction to restrain the infringement of a patent for an improvement in cultivators, and for an account. Defendant filed a plea to a portion of the bill, and an answer to the residue. The plea was set down for hearing. The contents of the bill and of the plea are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1.

A number of persons, citizens of Connecticut, New York, Ohio and New Jersey, claiming undivided portions of a tract of land in the last named state, had brought ejectment against Boylan in a state court of New Jersey.

<p>Case No. 14,246.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Act Done under Process op Federal Court — Contempt—Conflicting Authority.</p> <p>1. When a person is in custody for an act done or omitted, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree of a court or judge thereof, he is entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus, no matter by what authority he íb restrained of his liberty, nor how regular and formal the proceedings against him may be.</p> <p>2. The fact that he is in custody, by virtue of the judgment of a state court, for contempt, forms no exception to this rule</p> <p>3. When poll-books, ballots and other papers relating to an election have, by virtue of the process of a court of the United States, come into its possession, where they are retained to be used as evidence in prosecutions pending in that court, they cannot be taken from its custody by the order of a state court, on the ground that the law of the state places tnem in the keeping of the inspector of election-,</p> <p>4. Both the state and federal courts have the power to require the production of ballots, poll-books and other papers relating to an election, when they are necessary and proper evidence in prosecutions for offenses of which those courts respectively have jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the state law oinces their custody with the election inspector.</p> <p>5. The court which first obtains, by its process, possession of papers and documents which are proper evidence in a prosecution pending in such court, has the right to retain them until they have been used in evidence, and no other court of concurrent jurisdiction can. without its leave, take them from its custody, or require its officers to produce them before- its grand jury.</p> <p>6. Officers of a court of the United States, who are arrested by a state court for contempt, in refusing to obey such a requirement, are entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus.</p>

Hearing upon a writ of habeas corpus. The petition in this case was preferred in behalf of Elizabeth Turner, by her next friend, Charles Henry Minoky. It alleged that Elizabeth Turner was the daughter of Elizabeth Minoky, formerly Elizabeth Turner; and that she was restrained of her liberty, and held in custody by Philemon T. Hambleton, of Saint Michael’s, Talbot county. Maryland, in violation of the constitution and laws of the United States.

Isaac Turner, a man of color, was on Monday. the 8th, brought before the district judge of the United States for this district, by habeas corpus, to the prison-keeper of the county of Cumberland.

<p>Case No. 14,249.</p> <p>Ejectment — Title—Trespasser.</p> <p>1. The general rule is, that a plaintiff in ejectment must recover upon the strength of his title; not upon the weakness of defendant’s.</p> <p>2. This is not an universal rule, and must be qualified by the case to which it is to be applied.</p> <p>3. Where a plaintiff has documentary title, aided and accompanied by possession, and the defendant is a mere trespasser, the rule is qualified in its' application. Against such defendant the plaintiff, under the decisions of the highest court in this state, is entitled to recover on prior peaceable possession alone.</p> <p>[Cited in Mickey v. Stratton, Case No. 9,-530.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,251.</p> <p>Public Lands — Treaties with Indians — Reservation of Public Lands — Pleading in Equity —Injunction to Stay Ejectment Suit.</p> <p>1. A state has no power over the public lands within its limits.</p> <p>2. When tl e state of Michigan was admitted into the Union, it assented to a compact, which inhibited the exercise of this power.</p> <p>3. A treaty is the supreme law of the land, only, when the treaty-making power can carry it into effect.</p> <p>4. A treaty which stipulates for the payment of money, undertakes to do that which the treaty-making power cannot do, therefore the treaty is not the supreme law of the land.</p> <p>5. To give it effect, the action of congress is necessary.</p> <p>6. And in this notion, the representatives and senators act on their own judgment and responsibility, and not on the judgment and responsibility of the treaty-making power.</p> <p>7. A foreign power may he presumed to know the power of appropriating money belongs to ■congress.</p> <p>8. No act of any part of the government can be held to be a law which has not all the sanctions-to make it law.</p> <p>9. A reservation of land for a specific purpose, withdraws it from general location, and from preemption rights. ■</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Garretson, 42 Fed. 25.]</p> <p>[Cited in Hamilton v. Spokane & P. Ry. Co. (Idaho) 28 Pac. 411.]</p> <p>10. Where, in a treaty, 160 acres of land was. reserved to be sold, in order to pay over the pro- , ceeds of the sale to .those entitled to them, is a ■ withdrawal of the land from general appropriation.</p> <p>11. A bill is not multifarious, where it does not unite titles which have no analogy to each other, whereby the defendant’s litigation and costs are increased. t</p> <p>12. An injunction to stay an ejectment suit, until matters of equity can be examined, will not be allowed, unless judgment in the ejectment be entered.</p> <p>[Cited in Heirs of Szymanski v. Zunts, 20 Fed. 363.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 968.]</p> <p>TURNER (BAPTIST MISSIONARY UNION, v.). See Case No. 968.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] This was an appeal from the court of admiralty, on a proceeding in. personam, instituted on the 21st of May, 1857, by Silas Beacham, the appellee [against Robert Turner]. . The district court passed a decree in favor of the libellant, and an appeal was taken to this court.

This case is an appeal from a decree rendered in favor of the libelants by the district court of the United States for the Northern district of California.

<p>At law. This cause was heard on plaintiff’s motion for new trial.</p>

' This was an ejectment, in which the plaintiff claimed title under one Boylan, whose title depended on the fact whether a certain paper of several leaves, signed on each leaf, and dated January 12th, 1852, was the will of Jonathan Meeker, a man of large fortune in New Jersey, who died in 1853. at the age of seventy-six.

[Bill in equity by Malcolm C. Turner and others against the Indianapolis, Blooming-ton & Western Railway Company and others.] Shortly after the federal courts in this circuit took possession, by receivers, of railroads in foreclosure proceedings, a policy was adopted of requiring the payment by them of what were called “back” claims for materials, labor and supplies, out of the income, find sometimes, in case of sales of the “railroad property under decree, out of the…

Under a decree of the circuit court for the Southern district of Illinois and the district of Indiana, made in the summer of 1877. and an amendment made to that decree in May, 1878. in both of these courts, the. main line of the Indianapolis, Bloomington & Western Railway Company was sold by the master in chancery of each court. The road extends from Indianapolis, in the state of Indiana, to Pekin on the Illinois river, in the state of Illinois.

<p>Case No. 14,260.</p> <p>Railroads — Judgment against Receiver — Appeal Bond.</p> <p>1. A receiver of a railroad appointed in foreclosure proceedings is the agent of the bondholders and the trustees, and a judgment rendered against him by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon the interests of the bondholders.</p> <p>2. A receiver is liable for damage to engines rented by him, arising from omission to make necessary repairs.</p> <p>3. Where a party by appealing ties up a fund in court, the bond should provide for payment of interest during the pendency of the appeal.</p> <p>[See Calhoun v. St. Louis & S. E. Ry. Co., 14 Fed. 11.]</p>

The jury brought in a verdict of guilty. On a trial of this case the following bill of exceptions was presented and signed by J. Hartley Crawford,.judge of the criminal court, viz.: On the trial of this cause the United States, to maintain the issue on their part, joined, gave evidence by one A. H. Crogier that on Sunday, the 25th day of April, 1860, in the afternoon, he was with some acquaintance in the bar-room of the National Hotel in the city of Washington talking and…

Petition to restore the record of a judgment heretofore rendered in this court in favor of the petitioner against the defendant, praying a summons, and that the case pro-; ceed in the manner provided by the statute of the state of Illinois, approved April 9,1872' (2 Gross, 317), commonly called the “Burnt Records Act”

This was an action brought [by Silas W. Turner] to recover money paid to Robert Williams, Jr., as collector of the Third district of Ohio, upon a second assessment made against plaintiff as a distiller.

In equity. This was a special demurrer to bill in equity; charging the defendant [David Cam-merrfer] with the infringement of three letters patent relating to beer coolers. The charge of the bill recited the grant of the patents and the title, and made proferí of the patents, but contained no description of the several inventions.

<p>Case No. 14,267.</p> <p>Patents — Evidence or Infringement.</p> <p>Where, upon the taking of proof to establish 'complainant’s prima facie case, it has been shown that defendant, during the time between the granting of the patent and the filing of the bill, bad on hand a considerable number of each of the parts constituting the elements of complainant's patented combination, it is proper that the defendant and other witnesses should be compelled to state whether he had used any of the parts in the construction of articles substantially like the patented article, and to answer all other questions tending to show the subsequent use of any of the parts.</p> <p>[Cited in Maynard v. Pawling. 3 Fed. 713; Roberts v. Walley. 14 Fed. 168; Schneider v. Pountney, 21 Fed. 404.]</p> <p>[For subsequent proceedings, see Cases Nos. 14,268 and 14,269.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,268.</p> <p>Practice in Equity — Election—Patents—Bill Quia Timet — Suit foe Account.</p> <p>1. A motion, that the complainant in two suits against the same defendants, for the infringement of the same letters patent, be compelled to elect which he will prosecute, and that the other suit be discontinued, denied.</p> <p>2. Whether a patentee, learning that unauthorized parties are engaged in manufacturing some of the parts or elements of the patented combination, and are entering into contracts for the subsequent delivery of the completed article, is entitled to file his bill, in the nature of a bill quia timet, for an injunction to restrain such parties against apprehended violation of his patent rights: and afterward, when he aseertaius that the infringement has become complete, by the use of all the constituents of the combination, commence a new suit for an account and damages in consequence of the said infringement, quaere.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by George B. Turrell against Edward Spaeth, and by same plaintiff against Washington I. Snyder. for an injunction to restrain the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 7.151, granted May 30, 1876; the original letters patent No. 28.495 having been granted to J. Lovatt May 29, 1800. For prior reports, see Cases Nos. 14.267 and 14,26S.]

This was an action on the case by Samuel H. Turrill and Charles Wormley, tried by the court (DAVIS, Circuit Justice, and DRUMMOND, District Judge) without a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 15,0S7), granted September 9, 1850, to Joseph D. Cawood for an “improvement in repairing railroad bars,” of which patent the plaintiffs were the assignees.

These were five bills filed by Samuel H. Turrill, as' assignee of the Cawood patent [against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, the Michigan Southern & Northern Indiana Railroad Company, the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, and the Pittsburg, Pt. Wayne & Chicago Railway Company], for an accounting, and damages for an alleged infringement of the patent.

These were five bills in equity against the Illinois Central and four other railroads [the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Itailroad Company, the Michigan Southern & Northern Indiana Railroad Company, the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, and the Pittsburg, Pt.

This action was originally commenced in one of the state courts of Nebraska, by [George X Turton] the plaintiff, a citizen of that state, against the defendant, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, caused by the negligence of the defendant in operating its road. Answer in denial filed in the state court.

<p>Case No. 14,274.</p> <p>Shipping — Carriers—Bill of Lading — Error in —Liability of Officers.</p> <p>1. If through the negligence of the mate of a vessel, in taking account of cargo, a loss to the owner has necessarily resulted, he may be responsible therefor.</p> <p>[Cited in The T. F. Whiton, Case No. 13,849.]</p> <p>2. But if a mate by mistake, give drayage receipts for a greater quantity of merchandize than has been received, and a bill of lading is given for the amount of such receipts, the master is not bound to deliver to the shipper more than was actually received.</p> <p>[Cited in Robinson v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 9 Fed. 139.]</p> <p>3. If the master, having it in his power to prove the error in the bill of lading, voluntarily and without notice to the mate, pay to the consignee, who is acting only for the shipper, the difference between the amount delivered to him, and that stated in the bill of lading, the mate is not liable therefor.</p> <p>See Sutton v. Kettell [Case No. 13,647].</p>

<p>Case No. 14,275.</p> <p>Equity — Fraud in Sale — Bill to Rescind— Covenant not to Sue.</p> <p>1. Besides the points settled in Smith v. Bab-cock [Case No. 13,009], the additional ones adjudged here were, that if a party himself, in the bill to rescind a contract for fraud in the sale, one ground of which is falsehood as to the quantity of timber on a township, makes an examination of the land before the purchase, but does not go into details, and confides for those in the false statements of the person negotiating with him, and of his agents, that party is not precluded from a rescinding of the sale for fraud, however he might be for a mistake.</p> <p>[Cited in Converse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich. 123;</p> <p>Crislip v. Cain. 19 W. Va. 474.]</p> <p>2.' His right to rescind is in such case strengthened. if there was falsehood as to other material matters in the trade, not offered to be examined; nor is he barred from his remedy against some of the men in interest, (who received his money and notes,) by an agreement in the nature of a covenant not to sue some, on certain conditions, which have been complied with.</p> <p>[See Babcock v. Terry, Case No. 702.]</p> <p>3.- A covenant not to sue one joint obligor is no bar to a suit against other obligors.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,275a.</p> <p>New Trial.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,275b.</p> <p>Assumpsit — Moket Paid under Duress— Carriers.</p> <p>1. The case of Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange, 915. which decides, that where money is extorted by duress of goods, assumpsit will lie for it. has not been overruled by the courts of New York, and is followed in England.</p> <p>2. The general rule is. that ah action for money had and received lies, whenever money has been received by the defendant, which, ex aequo et bono, belongs to the plaintiff.</p> <p>3. The cases examined, aB to recovering back money paid on compulsion.</p> <p>4. Where A., a common carrier, agreed with B. to convey goods, at a specified rate for freight, and then refused, at the place of destination, to deliver the goods, except on payment of freight at a higher rate, and B., in order to obtain possession of the goods, paid to A. the sum demanded, held, that the payment was not voluntary, and that the excess beyond the agreed freight might be recovered back.</p> <p>[Cited in Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 216; ' Swift v. U* S., Ill U. S. 29, 4 Sup. Ct. 247.]</p> <p>[Cited in Adams v. Schiffer. 11 Colo. 15, 17 Pac. 29; Simmons"v. Trumbo. 9 W. Va. 367; West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Sweetzer, 25 W. Va. 452; White Pine Co. Bank v. Sadler (Nev.) 6 Pac. 944.]</p> <p>NOTE. The case was subsequently tried, on issues of fact, before HALL, District Judge, and a jury, when a verdict was found for the plaintiffs, the court ruling, as to the law. in accordance with this opinion. For a motion before NELSON, Circuit Justice, made by the defendants. for a new trial, see [Case No. 14,275a],</p>

[This was a libel in personam by Ebenezer B. Tuttle to compel the payment of demur-rage by the Albany & Rensselaer Iron & Steel Company, as consignee, for the detention of a canal boat.]

<p>[This waé a proceeding in bankruptcy by C. D. Tuttle against D. W. Truax, as as-signee.]</p>

This was an action to forfeit the wines above named for undervaluation. The wines were imported into New York from Cadiz, in Spain, where they were manufactured by the firm of Lacave & Eehecopar, and were called “Crown Sherry,” except a small portion of Burgundy port in one invoice.

<p>Case No. 14,280.</p> <p>Shipping — Deliveut op Cakgo — Breakage fkom Inherent Defect — Tender op Freight.</p> <p>Stone-ware pipes were shipped pn a vessel, under a bill of lading, excepting dangers of the seas and navigation, bu> containing no exception of loss by breakage They were in good order when received, were stowed properly and handled carefully in loading and discharging, but some of .them came to pieces while being discharged, from .the development of cracke existing when the pipes were put on board, or caused while on board by the perils of the sea, the ship having met with bad weather.' The consignee tendered the freight .on the sound pipes delivered, which was refused, and freight was demanded on the whole, at the rate per ton specified in the bill of lading, and a libel was filed against the goods, to recover-the ■freight . Held, that,-as the goods were ■ properly .stowed with reference to their character and-their apparent condition, the vessel was not’ liable for the breakage, arid was entitled to retain all the goods till the full freight was paid.</p>

This was a motion for a new trial on the ground of alleged misdirection by the court to the jury. [Case tried Dec. 3Ó, 1867.] * The case was .a libel of information on a 'seizure for fraudulent undervaluation in the invoice of twenty-eight casks of wine, imported in the ship Emma, from Rotterdam [shipped at Rotterdam October 24, 1864, and invoiced at Markhammer September 26, 1864]. 2 No entry or invoice was put in evidence.

<p>Case No. 14,282.</p> <p>Forfeiture — Internal Revenue — Informer’s Right — Opening a Decree.</p> <p>1. Where a proceeding was commenced to forfeit property under the internal revenue laws, and the claimant consented to its condemnation, the value of certain portions being paid into court and those portions released, and a decree of forfeiture against the whole was entered, and that decree was set aside by the court, on application of the claimant, and he came in t.o defend, but. at a subsequent date, a decree of forfeiture was again enteied, under which the property in custody was sold, and its proceeds, together with the amount previously paid in. were held for distribution, and the informer claimed to be entitled to share according to tile provisions of the law existing at the time he gave the information: Held, that, under the revenue laws, the right of the informer becomes vested only when the money representing the forfeited property is paid over and is ready for distribution. Until then his right is liable to be divested by the act of the government.</p> <p>2. Section 9 of the act of Jiily 13, 1866 [14 Stat. 101]. as tc the time when the informer’s right becomes vested, is merely declaratory of the law.</p> <p>3. The court had the right-to set aside the first decree, without the informer's consent.</p> <p>[Cited in Wheaton v. U. S.. Case No. 17,487.]</p> <p>4. The money paid into court was never ready for distribution until the second decree of forfeiture.</p> <p>5. The amount of the informer's share must be determined by the law as it stood at the time of the final decree of forfeiture, and not as it stood at the time of the first decree.</p>

<p>This action was for salvage service, performed in picking up cotton bales floating in New York harbor.</p>

[Appeal from the district, court of the United States for . the Southern district of New York.] [This was a libel by George Twibell and others against the steam tug Keystone for damages occasioned by collision. The district court decreed for the respondents, and the libelants appeal.]

<p>Case No. 14,286.</p> <p>•Mortgages — Equity or Redemption — Personal Liability op Purchaser.</p> <p>When the payment of an oustanding incum-brance. created by the grantor of the equity of redemption, constitutes part of the purchase money,' the law implies an undertaking by the purchaser to pay it, and the mortgagee may recover in assumpsit</p> <p>[Cited in Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 27 Fed. 591; Middaugh v. Bachelder, 33 Fed. 707: Kilpatrick v. Haley, 13 C. C. A. 480, 66 Fed. 137.]</p>

[On certificate from the district court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.] Libel for mariners’ wages and salvage, cer tified from the district court on account of the interest of the district judge, pursuant to the statutes of May 8. 1792, c. 36, § 11 [1 Stat. 278], and of March 3, 1821, c. 51 [3 Stat. 643].

<p>Case No. 14,289.</p> <p>Forfeiture — Co/sting Vessel — Illegal Trade— License — Sale to Foreigner.</p> <p>If a coasting vessel be engaged in an illegal traffic, it is a good cause of forfeiture, within the 32d section of the coasting act, Feb. 18, 1793, e.</p> <p>8 [1 Stat. 316]. If a vessel licensed for the fisheries take on board goods with intent to transport them on an illicit voyage, it is a sufficient “trade other than that for which she is licensed” within the same section. A licensed vessel, transferred in whole or in part tc a foreigner, is forfeited under the thirty-second section of the same act, notwithstanding upon such transfer, by the fifth section of the same act, the license is no longer in force. Under the thirty-second section, the cargo found on board at the time of seizure is forfeited, and not merely the cargo on board at the time of committing the offence.</p> <p>[Cited, but not followed, in U. S. v. Open. Boat. Case No. 15.968. Cited in The Nymph, . Id. 10,388; The Henry, Id. 6,373; The Willie G., Id. 17,762.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,291.</p> <p>Prize — Locality op Capture — Combined Action of Land and Naval Forces— Enemy Property.</p> <p>1. It is no legal ground of objection to the jurisdiction of the court in a prize ease that the arrest was made out of its territorial authority.</p> <p>2. The court has jurisdiction, under the law of nations and by municipal law, when the subject-matter of the suit is prize of war, without regard to the locality of the arrest or cause of action; and it is unimportant to the question of prize or no prize whether the capturing land and sea forces act in conjunction or separately.</p> <p>3. Whore a combined action exists between vessel-of-war and land forces in making a capture, it is usually cast upon the latter to prove that their co-operation was direct and positive, to authorize their sharing in the prize, and they are not ordinarily recognized as joint captors unless it is proved on their part that the capture was produced by their active interference.</p> <p>4. The prize court has cognizance of all captures in an enemy country made in creeks, havens, and rivers, when made by a naval force solely, or in co-operation with land forces.</p> <p>5. The property in this case, consisting of cotton. rosin, staves, and planks, having been captured by the naval forces of the United States during the year, in the attack on Newbern. N. C., and being enemy property, employed at the time by the enemy in aid of hostilities against the United States, by being used in building fortifications, was condemned as prize of war.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,292.</p> <p>Prize — Restoration to Owner — Costs of Storage.</p> <p>In this case, after the decree of this court condemning the property seized as prize [Case No. 14,291) had been reversed by the circuit court on appeal [case unreported], and the property had been restored to the claimant, a warehouseman presented his bill of charges for services in regard to the property, rendered under the official employment of the officers of the court. The court-allowed the bill, the amount being a charge upon, and payable out of, the fund for defraying the expenses of suits in which the United States is a party or interested, under section 14 of the act of June 30. 1864 (13 Stat 311).</p>

<p>The case is so fully stated and discussed by the district judge that his opinion is given in full.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,294.</p> <p>Costs — Admiralty—Final Decrees.</p> <p>Where six libellants joined in one libel, and severally had decrees for their respective shares in a whaling voyage, from four of which appeals were taken, and from the other two no appeal lay: Held, that the two libellants who had obtained final decrees should recover all the costs which they had advanced, or for which they were liable.</p> <p>[Cited in The Antelope, Case No. 484.]</p> <p>[Cited in Story v. Russel. 157 Mass. 156.]</p>

Libel for freight and demurrage under a charter-party, by which the brig John Airies ■was let to hire to J. Van Praag & Co., of Boston, for a voyage to Surinam and back to Boston. At the trial it was admitted that the balance due for freight was $922.85, and the dispute was, -whether any and what sum was due for demurrage.

In admiralty. Libel in rem by the owners of the brig W. H. Parks against her cargo of molasses to recover 81,848.70 freight, for bringing it from Cardenas to Portland under a charter-party, stipulating “for a full cargo of molasses under and on deck.” The cargo was delivered on board, and 45 casks of the molasses stowed on deck.

<p>In- admiralty.</p>

This was a libel to recover freight and de-murrage. The libellant, Stephen Brown, was the owner of a canal-boat, and agreed to go with her to Port Johnson and get a cargo of-coal and take it to East Chester, Conn. The boat went to Port Johnson, and after waiting two days for coal, was loaded and came to New York, where she arrived on the 23d of December.

The canal-boat John C. Churchill, loaded ■with coal, sank in the Kill von Kull; and the master, without consultation with the owners of the cargo, agreed with the libel-lant to give him sixty per cent, of the. value of the cargo for the raising and -recovery of it. The owners of the cargo disputed the claim as exorbitant, and the salvor libelled the cargo so recovered.

<p>Case No. 14,300.</p> <p>Practice in Admiralty — Discharge oe Attachment-Opposing Claimants — Retaking Property into Custody — Practice.</p> <p>1. A libel was filed against a domestic vessel on January 25th, 1879, to recover for supplies furnished to her. Process was issued to the marshal, who returned that he had attached the vessel. At the libellant’s request, no keeper was put by the marshal on board the vessel, whiéh was then undergoing repairs at City Island. No notice to appear was ever published. On Sept. 16, 1879, on motion of the libellant’s proctor, an order was made that the marshal take the vessel into his custody under the original process and put a keeper on board. The marshal did so, .and removed the vessel from City Island to a pier in the East river. H., the shipwright, who had been repairing her, appeared as a claimant, averring that when the vessel was seized by the marshal, he was in possession of the 'vessel, on which he claimed a common law lien. He gave a bond under the act of 1847, and an order was made in the usual form for the release of the vessel, and the marshal gave him a notice to the keeper on the vessel to discharge her, with which he went to the vessel. C., the master of the vessel, who was also one-sixteenth owner, was on board and so was the proctor for the libellant. A controversy arose between them which resulted in H.’s being arrested by a police officer and compelled to leave the vessel. He had shown the marshal’s notice to the keeper, but refused to leave it with him or to show it to the other parties. After his arrest the keeper left the vessel, leaving the vessel in the possession of the master. H. «then moved the court for an order directing the marshal to retake the vessel and restore her to him. The master opposed the motion, claiming that he and not the alleged claimant was in possession of the vessel when the marshal retook her under the order of Sept 16th. The libellant also opposed the motion, denying that he had had notice of the claimant’s application to bond the vessel. Pending the motion the court made an order directing the marshal to take the vessel into custody and hold her till the determination of the motion: Reid, that it is the duty of the court, on the dissolution of an attachment against, a vessel under its process, to cause the vessel to be restored to the party who was in possession at the time when she was taken under the process</p> <p>2. Where there are two different parties, each claiming to have been so in possession, the marshal ought not on the dissolution of the attachment to deliver her to either without the order of the court.</p> <p>3. In this case, the order for the release of the vessel had not been duly executed, and the court therefore had jurisdiction to order the marshal to take her into his custody again under the original process.</p> <p>4. The libellant’s default as to the bonding of the vessel should be opened, and he have leave to file objections to the right of H. to appear as a claimant.</p> <p>5. New publication of notice to all parties to appear should be had. on the return of which C., the master, would have the opportunity to appear and aver his possession at the time of seizure; and the question between him and H., could be then properly determined.</p> <p>[NOTE. An order of reference was accordingly entered. Upon exceptions to the report of the referee, the court decided that Hawkins had a possessory lien upon the vessel, which entitled him to intervene as claimant. 10 Fed. 919. On other motions for leave to file petitions to intervene, see 12 Fed. 152, and 16 Fed. 097.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,303.</p> <p>Forfeiture — Import Acts- Relanding Goods Intended for Export — Intent to Defraud.</p> <p>1. Goods on board a ship, which had been entered for exportation under the act of 2d March, 1799 (1 Stat. 692), but for which no bond had been given, as provided in the 81st section of that act, and no debenture issued, were put on board a lighter alongside the ship. They were seized as forfeited under the 81st section of the act. as having been relanded. A verdict in favor of the government having been directe d, in a suit brought to enforce the forfeiture, the claimant made a motion for a new trial: Held, that the discharge of the goods into the lighter amounted to a landing of them, within the meaning of the 82d section of the act. See Rev. St. § 3(M9.</p> <p>[Cited in Kidd v. Flagler, 54 Fed. 369.]</p> <p>2. A landing in the port of exportation, before the ship had broken ground, was within the act.</p> <p>3. The forfeiture attached, although the' bond had not-been given nor the debenture issued.</p> <p>4. Evidence that the claimant caused the goods to be relanded simply to correct a mistake which had arisen between merchants, whereby he had been led to enter for export a -different quality of goods from that intended to be exported, afforded no defense.</p> <p>5. An intent to defraud the government is not required for a forfeiture of goods relanded contrary to thir act.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,302.</p> <p>INTERNA!, REVENUE — WHOLESALE LIQUOR DEALER —Rectifier and Distiller.</p> <p>Under the 44th section of the internal revenue act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 142), the wine and distilled spirits owned by a wholesale liquor dealer, are not forfeited by reason of his not having paid the special tax. That forfeiture is applica? ble to the wines and spirits of distillers and rectifiers only.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the.United States for the Eastern district of Texas.]</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[This was a suit in bankruptcy by John Tyler, assignee of Jacob Shell and John Peter Shell, against Jackson Angevine.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,307.</p> <p>Patents — Patentable Invention —Principle— Combination — Claims—Injunction.</p> <p>1. Motion for an injunction, to prevent the infringement of an alleged patent right Held, that a machine is patentable, only when it is substantially new.</p> <p>2. An invention in mechanics consists, not in the discovery of new principles, but in new combinations of old principles.</p> <p>3. Where an inventor claims to have invented more than he has actually invented, the patent is void.</p>

[This was a bill by Henry W. Tyler, against George R. Hagerty, Amanda Moore, and Clinton Idler, for specific performance. Heard on motion of plaintiff to remand the cause to the state court.]

This case came up on a demurrer to a plea puis darrein continuance. The action was brought for the infringement of letters patent.

[This was a libel by Lindley B. Tyler, Josiab Smith, Usher Benjamin, and Henry A. Cording, owners of the sloop Jonah Smith, against the steamboat South America. Isaac Newton, claimant, for damages caused-by collision.]

■ After the decision in this case [see Case No. 14,309], on the demurrer to the plea puis darrein continuance, the defendants, under the leave then given them to plead over, put in a special plea, which the plaintiffs now moved to strike out, on the ground that it was,,, in effect, a repetition of the plea puis darrein continuance which was adjudged bad.- The defendants opposed the motion, and insisted that the plea was regular and valid because it pleaded the judgment and…

Bill as rendered Major George W. Walker, to Capt. Henry B. Tyler, Dr.: “For amount retained in your hands as paymaster of the U. S. marine corps, for double rations due the said Capt. Tyler as commandant of a detachment of marines, stationed at the navy yard, Washington, from the 1st of December, 1849, to the 30th of September, 1850: 305 days, at 4 rations per day, is 1,220 complete rations, at 20 cents per ration, is $244.00; for allowance for responsibility and safe…

Bill in equity [by Ebenezer I^ler and others against Abraham Wilkinson and others] to establish the right of the plaintiffs to a prior- • ity of use of the waters of Pawtucket river, Ac. The cause was argued at great length, by Whipple and Webster, for plaintiffs, and by Cozzens and Searle, for defendants, at the last November term, and continued for advisement to this term when the following opinion was delivered.

<p>Case No. 14,313.</p> <p>Attachment — Sale — Counties — Division of County — Effect of on Lien.</p> <p>1. An attachment being levied on land fixes a lien from the time of the levy, and a sale by the sheriff of the land, under a judgment on the attachment. has relation to the time of the levy of the attachment.</p> <p>2. Under these circumstances a division of the county which throws a part of the land in the new county, being made subsequent to the levy of the attachment and before the sale by the sheriff, will not affect the lien, or oust the jurisdiction of the court.</p>

This was a suit to foreclose mortgages on the defendant railroad. Motion by complainant [David J. Tysen, Jr.] to appoint a receiver pending litigation.

[This was an action of covenant brought by William Tyson against August Belmont upon a charter party.] The plaintiff in this case, being part owner of the American ship Probus, agreed by charter party with defendant to freight the ship for a voyage from the port of New York to Apalachicola, the vessel to he in good order, well manned and provisioned, thence to proceed to Toulon or Brest, the whole of the freighting part of the ship to be according to the custom of merchants,…

[This was a libel in admiralty by William Tyson and others against the bark Jason to recover damages for injuries occasioned to the ship Probus, with which the Jason collided.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] - This was a case of salvage [by Benjamin Tyson and others, claimants of eight hundred barrels of flour, against Matthew Prior] claimed by the libel, as due from property derelict.

[This was an appeal by William F. Tyson • from a decision of the commissioner of patents in an interference proceeding, awarding priority to Ebenezer Beard in respect to the invention of an improvement in propellers.]

By an act of the general assembly of Virginia, passed the 17th of June, 1870, four several railroad companies, whose lines stretched from Norfolk, via Petersburg and Lynchburg, to Bristol and beyond, were authorized to consolidate themselves into one company, by the name of the Atlantic, Mississippi and Ohio Railroad Company, upon such terms as the stockholders of each company in general meeting might agree upon, but with no power to compel any stockholder in any divisional…

<p>[This was a libel by James Udell to recover for supplies furnished the steamship Ohio; George Law and others, claimants.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] Libel to recover value of materials furnished the builders of a steamship.

This was a libel [against the ship Washington, Oakford. owner, and James Taylor, master] for wages.

This was a case of seizure of an ullage box of sugar. Several other articles were seized in company with it. which were condemned on default, no person appearing to claim them. For the sugar, a claim was interposed by Messrs. Dunlap & Jewett. The facts disclosed by the evidence are that the sugar was imported into New York in the brig Frances Ellen, owned by the claimants.

This was an action to recover back money claimed to have been erroneously exacted by [Thomas Murphy] the defendant, as collector of customs for the port of New York, for duties exceeding the true amount due upon certain goods imported by the plaintiff [Sigmund Ullman], The parties respectively agreed to and read a statement of facts, in which it appeared that the goods in question were imported by the Aleppo, and were entered for warehousing on the 21st of January, 1871;…

<p>Case No. 14,326.</p> <p>Prize — Damages for Goods Taken.</p> <p>Damages decreed for the amount of goods taken out of a prize captured after the treaty of peace of 1815. Costs, when allowed in prize causes.</p> <p>[Cited in Elliott v. The Leah H. Miller, Case No. 4.393a.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,327.</p> <p>J UK1SD1CTION — WITHDKA WING APPEARANCE — Bill and Petition — Pleading.</p> <p>1. The general appearance of a party to a suit in personam waives all irregularities in the service of process, and confers jurisdiction so far as the person is concerned.</p> <p>2. Such jurisdiction, when once conferred, cannot be withdrawn by the act of the party who has so appeared, without the consent of the court, or of the prosecuting party.</p> <p>3. On a petition by an assignee in bankruptcy, seeking to set aside transfers of property by the bankrupts to K., the court made an order requiring K. to show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted, which order was personally served on K., in Illinois. Thereupon a general appearance for K. by an attorney, was filed with the clerk of the court, and served on the attorney for the petitioner, and proceedings on the order to show cause stood over for the party to answer. On the adjourned day, the attorney for K. filed a withdrawal of his appearance for K., stating that the same had "been made by mistake.” Held, that the attorney had no right to withdraw such appearance without application to the court for leave to withdraw it, and that the court had jurisdiction over K. to grant the relief prayed for against him.</p> <p>4. The objection that the relief sought must be obtained by bill, instead of on petition, was one which could be waived, and must be held to have been waived, if not taken by pleading.</p> <p>^JjFor subsequent proceedings, see Case No. 14,-</p>

<p>Case No. 14,328.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Injunction on Petition before Appointment of Assignee.</p> <p>In proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy, on a jietition by creditors after an adjudication in bankruptcy, an injunction was issued restraining certain creditors from interfering with the property of the bankrupts. This injunction was served on S., one of the creditors, before an assignee was chosen. Afterwards proceedings were taken to punish S. for contempt, in violating that injunction. which resulted in an adjudication that he was guilty of contempt. He then applied to the court to vacate the injunction, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction on a petition. Held, that the court had jurisdiction to make the injunction which it issued, and that the motion must be denied.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Duncan. Case No. 4.131: Re Irving, Id. 7.073: Re Oregon Iron Works, Id. 10.562: Re Sims, Id. 12,888: Re Litch-field, 13 Fed. 866.]</p>

Libel in rem. filed to recover damages for negligence aud carelessness in towing the canal boat Van Olinda. from Newark to Pas-saic on the Passaic river. The two defences were: (1) That the masier of the canal boat assumed all risks in the tolvage; (2) that the unskillfulness of said master caused the accident.

<p>The Ulysses, a merchant ship of Boston, sailed from that port on the 25th of August, 1798. on a voyage to the Northwest coast of America, at that time regarded as a most hazardous aud difficult undertaking. Nothing material occurred till their arrival at St. Jago, where a lad going on shore and not returning in due season, was left by the captain. In the course of the voyage, between St. Jago and the Falkland' Islands, the gunner was suspected by the whole crew of having committed depredations on the bread-room; upon which he was put in irons, and, at his own request, was put ou shore at the Falkland Islands, where they soon after-wards arrived. Here, three of the crew, discovering an uneasy disposition, and a mutinous spirit, were severely beaten by the captain, who put them in irons. Off Cape Horn, John Salter, the first officer, took a lunar observation, and by his calculation they . were in longitude sixty-nine degrees and some minutes west from Greenwich. This differed materially from the captain’s calculation by the dead reckoning, and originated a quarrel between them, which was pursued with mutual violence and invective. On January 24, they were in imminent danger of running aground on Terra del Fuego, from which they escaped by the prudence of Captain Lamb. The quarrel between him and the mate was revived by this circumstance, and the next day the latter was degraded for incapacity, as was entered in the log book, and was turned before the mast. The voyage was then pursued without any remarkable occurrence, till April 30, when the crew revolted, seized the captain, put him in irons, imprisoned him in his stateroom, and transferred the command to Salter. They had previously signed a paper containing their reasons for the revolt. These were, the captain’s intemperance, which incapacitated him for the command, and had, in two instances, endangered the safety of the ship; and second, the fear, that in a moment of passion, he would leave some of them on some desert island, or on some inhospitable coast, as he had frequently threatened. The ship continued under Salter, in this revolted state, for ten days, when they arrived on the Northwest coast, where by the interposition of Captain Rowan, of the Eliza, and Captain Breck, of the Hancock, ships belonging to Boston, the crew returned to their duty, Captain Lamb was re-. instated in his command, and the officers were imprisoned. On the return of the ship to Boston, the three officers, John Salter, John Carnes. Stephen Bruce, Jun., and two seamen, John Bullock and Edmund Smith, were indicted in the circuit court of the United States, for feloniously confining the master of the Ulysses, and endeavoring to excite a revolt in the ship. The ease being of a somewhat novel character, and there being an impression that the crew,' before confining the captain, had good reason to fear that he intended to leave some of them amongst the savages on the Northwest coast, excited much interest, which was greatly enhanced by the fact that the most eminent counsel of that day were engaged on either side. The trial took place before the circuit court of the United States at the October term, 1800, before WILLIAM CUSHING, Circuit Justice of the United States, and JOHN LOWELL, District Judge. The case was conducted, on the part of the defendants, by The-ophilus Parsons and Fisher Ames. For the government, by Harrison Gray Otis, and John Davis, district attorney of the United States.</p> <p>It appeared clearly in evidence, that the defendants confined the master, and, indeed, they did not deny the fact, but set up a justification of their conduct. 2</p> <p>Fisher Ames, in opening the defence, stated, that he could with pleasure leave the cause in the hands of the jury, without attempting to influence either their hearts or understandings. He confessed the necessity of subordination among sailors, but denied that the acquittal of the defendants would weaken the authority of masters, who would be restrained by it, not from preserving discipline. but from acts of cruelty. At most, it would be but an exception from the general rule, requiring subordination. The consequence of leaving sailors to the brutal ferocity of captains, would be piracy and death; it would be more fatal to the interests of commerce, than restraining ship government within strict and definite limits. He laid it down as a principle, that when men act from honest motives, they cannot be considered as criminals; and, if the defendants were really in fear of their lives, it sufficiently justified their conduct. That fear might be ill-founded; but its reality was their justification. Self-defence is a supreme law of nature. It is written in the heart, and cannot be obliterated. If ' men make laws to restrain it, their voice will not be heard in the moment of danger, 3</p> <p>The crew complained of the want of provisions. Mr. A. remarked on the effects of hunger in a small degree. It keeps the mind in a constant state of irritation. An uninterrupted series of small vexations, which individually require no magnanimity, will, in the course of time, humble and conquer the greatest spirit. The crew complained of the want of rum, to deprive sailors of which, said Mr. A., has always been considered as depriving them of the rights of man.</p> <p>The crew accused Lamb of intemperance.4 An intemperate use of rum has various effects on different constitutions. It deprives ■ some of the powers of their body; some it ■ makes loquacious, unlocking the secret recesses of the mind; it makes some very foolish, and others ferocious, adding to their nerves, strength, and to their intellects, fire. It converted Lamb into a tiger. When he came from his cell, he resembled an Eastern despot, who delighted only in scattering fears, and in inflicting torture. He compared Lamb to a giant, whose twisted nerves, and black countenance, would appal the stoutest heart. He eulogized sailors, as the most sincere and heroic of men. Among them, the purest and most exalted friendship subsists, and almost only among them. Their whole life is on the scale of heroism, and it is only because it is common, that they are insensible of their heroic character. The character of the sailors of New England is superior to that of those of any other nation. During the war, few of them ever entered on board an English vessel of force, without soon deserving and receiving an honorable commission, 5</p> <p>This prosecution is founded on a law of congress, but I do not fear the accusation of want of attachment to the federal govemment by asserting, that the clause of the act, on which the indictment is founded, is unconstitutional. I have been accused of the wish to elevate that power on the ruins of the state. government. This I disavow. I consider the state governments the pillars, on which the federal arch stands, and the federal constitution as the key-stone of the arch: they mutually impart strength and beauty.</p> <p>The defendants are accused of endeavoring to make a revolt. To show what a revolt is, he quoted Johnson’s Dictionary, folio, on this word. It signifies a departure from one power, and going over illegally to another. But to whom did the sailors go over? If to Mr. Salter, to whom did he revolt?</p> <p>2. Is the offence, with which the defendants stand charged, felony? If so, it must be either by common law, or by the statute. ■It is not by the common law, because that code extends not to offences, committed on the high seas. If it had been meant to be felony by the statute, it would have been so expressed. I do not know, that we have a right to supply the omission of congress, even if it were their intention to declare this offence felony. Laws ought to be clear. Congress has power, by the constitution, to define and punish all piracies and felonies on the high seas. If this offence is neither piracy nor felony, congress had no jurisdiction, and therefore this clause is unconstitutional.</p> <p>3. Admitting the fact, I ask with what intention did the defendants confine Capt Lamb, and make this revolt. It is the felonious intention, which constitutes the crime. A man may kill another, but if it is by accident, or if from self-defence, and in a justifiable cause, the guilt of murder cannot attach to him. If the defendants had acted with a felonious intention, wherein, I say, the guilt of the offence consists, they would either have perpetrated murder, or run away with the property. They committed no murder. If they had run away with the property, it would have been piracy, and of this they are not accused. But from their conduct, we may infer the purity of their intention. They pursued the voyage, and traded with the natives of the country, with the express view of doing for the owners, as they would have done, had they been present. It is a correct rule, that where certain facts exist, we are to consider the probable cause of their existence. This will assist our investigation of the true cause. It is clear, they could not act without some motive, and it is equally certain, they had neither murder nor theft in their hearts. It must then have arisen from necessity, from a sense of eminent hazard of their lives, from the right of self-defence, which is imprinted in the heart, and which is superior to all law.</p> <p>4. On the subject of Capt. L.’s testimony, Mr. P. observed, that it is true, in one sense, .he neither gains nor loses by the event of this trial, and on that account is a competent witness. But, has he not a character to gain or lose, or is he a bankrupt in reputation? Has he not the strongest human feelings of resentment and revenge to gratify? Almost every active motive, which influences human conduct, impels him to color his evidence, and to effect the conviction of the defendant Besides, when a man is under the influence of strong feelings, he easily persuades himself to believe, that that is true, which is most for his interest to be true. He then noticed some omissions of important matters in L.’s evidence, exaggerations, and attempts to influence the witnesses. One of these he had supported for some time, and supplied with money.6</p> <p>5. Leaving Charles Bead at St. Jago, discovered the greatest cruelty in Capt. L. A .youth of respectable connections, without experience, committed to the care of Capt. L., who was bound both by feeling and duty, to protect him, was left at an immense distance from- his native country, among strangers, with whose language he was unacquainted, without the power of making himself known, and without the means of subsistence. The young men of New England, who engage in this hard life, are generally of respectable connections, of good education, and hope, in the course of time, to rise to respectability in their profession, and to political eminence among their fellow citizens. Of this number was young Head, left in this desolate condition, his fair and honest hopes cut off in their very birth. Had Capt. L. been a parent, what would have been his feelings; had Bead been his son, what would have been his indignation! The crew of the ship applied to Capt. L. for permission to bring Bead on board: but to this application he only returned language, the fit offspring of such a heart! He damn’d Read, and swore, that he would not send for him, if he were his brother. Can it surprise us. that this conduct inspired the crew with fear and detestation!</p> <p>6.Putting the gunner in irons on suspicion merely, was regarded as a severe punishment, even had he been really guilty, and showed Capt. L.’s temper to be ferocious, delighting in inflicting pain. Mr. P. called him a despot, being both a judge and executioner, examining without deliberation, and punishing with the utmost violence.</p> <p>Mr. Parsons defended the prisoners with the most energetic eloquence; and Mr. Otis, with equal eloquence, and with more candor, supported the prosecution. Mr. Davis, with his usual, and almost proverbial candor, recapitulated the evidence for the government. In the course of his'observations, he applied one from Hooker. “He that goes about persuading men they are not so well governed as they ought to be, will never want adherents.”</p> <p>Harrison Gray Otis closed the pleadings. In relation to the first position, taken by Mr. Parsons, he said; the crew did make a revolt; this necessarily includes the endeavor to make one. They departed from the legal authority of their commander, and went over to the dominion of their unlawful and uncontrolled will. The revolt consisted in the departure from their duty.</p> <p>2. Upon the second point, he said; felony has a popular and a technical signification. In the former, it is an offence committed with a corrupt, malignant, and evil intention. Congress undoubtedly had the right to use this expression in either sense. They were describing offences against the United States, and undoubtedly considered this offence as felonious. In this same act, they speak of theft on the high seas, but omit the term “felonious.” If a person, charged with theft on the high seas, were indicted, and the term “felonious” omitted, would not that omission be sufficient cause to quash the indictment? This whole act is a transcript of the British statute, in which this very of-fence is felony, and punished with death. Because congress meant to lessen the offence, and meliorate the punishment, could they mean to make it no offence? For if it is not felony, it is not within the powers of congress; and. being out of the reach of the common law, it cannot be punished.</p> <p>This question called forth much learning and ingenuity. The etymology of the word was investigated. It was further suggested by Mr. Otis, that congress having power to define and punish felonies on the high seas, it was to be supposed, that when legislating on this offence, they were legislating on a felony.</p> <p>Mr. Parsons. That is. because congress is legislating on an offence, it is felony. It is a pernicious doctrine.</p> <p>THE COURT thought this doctrine strained, but stopped the discussion, as belonging properly to the court. It would be ground for a motion in arrest of judgment, and ought not to be addressed to the jury.</p> <p>3. The felony consists in the very act of confining the master, and making the revolt. The law says it is an offence, and they may not make a revolt, even with the intention of pursuing the voyage. Their asserting it to be their intention to pursue the voyage, does not authorize their conduct. We grant, that fear is a sufficient justification, but not every fear. To justify this crew, - it must have been lawful for them, not only to confine the master, but, in case of resistance, to put him to death.</p> <p>4, Upon the fourth point discussed by Mr. Parsons, Mr. Otis acknowledged, that Capt. L. must be under the influence of strong passions, but perhaps, not more so than the witnesses in behalf of the defendants. They were all engaged in one common cause; they had a fellow feeling. Their interest and their reputation were engaged equally with Capt. L.’s. Capt L. had not designedly omitted any thing. If he had omitted facts, it arose from the negligence of his counsel, who had omitted to interrogate him. and not from his crafty design. His evidence had been confirmed in all its principal parts. It was not pretended, that he was not a warm man, imprudent, and perhaps a rigid disciplinarian: but it did appear, from all circumstances, that the defendants were equally warm, imprudent, and perhaps violent.</p> <p>. 5. In relation to leaving the lad at St. Jago, Mr. Otis said: The situation of Capt. L., and the circumstances of the crew, at the time amply justify bis conduct. The Ulysses had stopped at St. Jago for water. This Read knew. The water was procured, the boats were taken in, and the wind was fair: the crew were in liquor, and when they applied to Capt. Li., it was late in the evening. It was an order of the governor of St. Jago, that no boat should come on shore in the evening. Whoever infringed this law would be fired upon. Capt. L. had the charge of a valuable cargo worth $40,000. Had he. stopped till morning, he might have lost the opportunity of a fair wind, he might have been exposed to shipwreck, and thus, the hopes of a valuable voyage would have been ruined. Capt. L. acted, then, as every prudent and good man ought to act.</p> <p>G. In regard to the treatment of the gunner, the captain acted upon the suspicion of the whole crew, as well as his own. He was engaged in a long'voyage; it was necessary to preserve strict economy; and if an individual committed depredations on the provisions, he would deserve the most severe punishment. It was not to be expected, that legal forms were to be observed. There were circumstances which justified the suspicion which fell on the gunner. Perhaps Capt L. was too severe, but it was a necessary severity. Much was said on the conduct of Capt. L. at the Falkland Islands, where it was acknowledged, he was guilty of excess. It was denied, that Salter discovered incapacity, or deserved' to be degraded. It was proved, however, that he had been found sleeping on his watch. It was clear, that Salter, excited by disappointment, and revenge, had stimulated the crew to mutiny. He told them, that he knew the laws of America, and that when two-thirds of a crew agreed, they might depose their captain. Some ■ of the crew, in their evidence, confessed, that though Capt. L. was a violent man, using most intemperate language, and threatening to heave some overboard, and to leave others on some desert island, or on the N. W. coast among the natives; yet, they regarded them merely as words of passion, and never feared, that he would attempt to realize his threatenings. They signed the paper from motives of personal safety. Besides, it was urged, that, to justify their revolt, they ought to have stopped till Capt. L. should attempt to leave them on shore, or to throw them overboard.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,331.</p> <p>Collision— Master— Presumption op Absence.</p> <p>1. The master of a vessel has authority, as such, to maintain an action in his own name for damages to such vessel by collision.</p> <p>2. The owner of a foreign vessel, in such a case, is presumed to be absent till the contrary is shown.</p> <p>[Cited in The Tillie, Case No. 14.049.)</p>

<p>Case No. 14,332.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — Supplies to Vessel in Bier Home Port — State Law.</p> <p>1. The lien, given by the laws of the state of New York (Sess. Laws 1862, c. 482), for supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port is valid and enforceable in the admiralty, the vessel being of twenty tons burden and upwards, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of commerce and navigation between different states upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting them.</p> <p>2. Such a lien must prevail over the title of a purchaser of the vessel who has bought her without notice of the lien.</p> <p>3. Case of The Edith [Case No. 4,283) criti-cised.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,334.</p> <p>Colusión at Pier — Damages—Repair by WrongDoer — Right op Action by' Master for Insufficient Repair.</p> <p>1. The master of a vessel haying charge and custody of her at the time of a collision may maintain an action to recover the damages caused by the collision, it appearing that the bringing of.the aetion has been authorized and approved by all interested. The master’s right of aetion in such ease is not affected by the fact that underwriters upon the vessel have paid the cost of the repairs, which constitute a part of the demand sued for.</p> <p>2. Where .a party, while denying liability for a collision, offers to repair the damages, and that offer is accepted, and afterwards suit is brought on the ground of insufficient repair, the court will not be astute to discover unimportant particulars, in which the condition of the vessel differs when repaired from her condition before the collision.</p> <p>3. When the wrong-doer takes the injured vessel into his possession to repair the injury he has done, he will be required to show that the boat, when returned, was in substantially as good condition as before the accident. Where in such a case the boat, when returned, appears to have been repaired in an imperfect manner, and the owner had refused to accept the repairs as satisfactory. the wrong-doer will be held liable for all the additional work necessarily done upon the hoat, to put her is as good condition as she was hefore the accident.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,335.</p> <p>Seaman’s Wages — Registered Owner — Set Off.</p> <p>1. O. M. bought a schooner at Bermuda, took command of her, and brought her to New York. As she needed repairs, he obtained an advance of the necessary funds, agreeing to give a mortgage on her as security therefor. It was found that she could not be registered in the name of O. M., and he made a bill of sale of her to his brother, E. M., for the nominal consideration of five dollars, and procured E. M. to execute the mortgage. The mortgagees were told by O. M. that he had sold the vessel to his brother, and they had no notice that the sale was not a valid sale, except knowledge of the consideration stated in the bill.of sale. After the mortgage O. M., who continued to control the vessel, shipped E. M. as cook and sailed on a voyage to Cuba and back to New York, where the vessel was libelled and sold for seaman’s wages. The mortgagees intervened as claimants and objected to the payment of the claim of E. M.: Held, That, although the claim of the mortgagees to the proceeds was superior to that of E. M. as owner, the claim of E. M. as a seaman was superior to that of the mortgagees, and there was no reason why it should not be recognized and enforced.</p> <p>2. The liability of E. M. for a deficiency on the mortgage could not be set off against his claim for wages.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,336.</p> <p>Affreightment — Lien for Charter Monet — Vessel Let to United States — Prize Cargoes.</p> <p>1. The owners of a vessel let to the United States for a transport, in time of war, have no lien for their charter-money on goods the United States may put on board.</p> <p>2. In the absence of an agreement to that effect, it i6 not to be presumed that the United States intends to charge captors with the expense of sending prize cargoes to port for adjudication, in vessels belonging to, or in the service of, the United States.</p> <p>3. Prize cargoes sent in for adjudication in a transport chartered by the government, are not-chargeable with the payment of freight or any part of the charter-money, in favor of the own-’ ers of the vessel</p> <p>See The Nassau. 4 Wall. [71 U. S.] 634 .'</p>

<p>Case No. 14,337.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Brewers—Special Tax as Wholesale Dealers — Sale at Place of Manufacture.</p> <p>1. The provision, in section 59 of the internal revenue act of July 20th, 1868 (14 Stat. 150), declaring that no brewer who has paid his special tax as such, and who sells only malt liquors of his own production, at the place of manufacture, • in the original casks or packages in which they are placed for the purpose of affixing the tax stamps, shall be required to pay the special tax of a wholesale dealer, left subject to such special tax brewers selling elsewhere than at the place of manufacture; and the act of April 10th. 1869 (16 Stat. 42), did not r-ffieve brewers from taxation as wholesale dealers in respect of sales made elsewhere than at the place of manufacture.</p> <p>2. Under these acts, therefore, a brewer selling at another place than the place of manufacture, is liable to taxation as a wholesale dealer,</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court by the owners of the steamship Delaware, against the ship Underwriter, to recover salvage for contributing to the rescue of the Underwriter, which was stranded on Squam Beach, in April, 1854, laden with a cargo and passengers.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] The steamboat Katie was built by one J. •M. White, her owner, at Louisville, Kentucky, in the year 1870. After she was launched. John B. Davis performed labor and furnished materials in equipping the boat with boilers, engine, etc. His bill amounted to somewhat more than $50,000.

<p>Case No. 14,343.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Breach of Trust — Rights of As-signee-Preference.</p> <p>1. U. requested S. & Co. to invest his funds in their hands in a certain stock. They informed him that they had done so. but in fact took the shares in their own name, and soon afterwards hypothecated them to a bank, as security for a loan. They subsequently failed, and on the day of their failnre deposited with B. L. & B. certain securities with which to release the stock hy-pothecated. The bank refusing to return the stock, the securiti >s were sold, the proceeds- remaining in the possession of B. L. & B. S. & Co. having been adjudged bankrupts and an assignee appointed. U. filed a bill in equity against the assignee and B. L. & B.. to recover those pro-heeds. as representing the stock. Held, that, with respect to other creditors, S. & Co., -when they became insolvent, were merely debtors to U. for the value of the stock.</p> <p>2. No lien or trust arose in respect to the securities deposited with B. L. & B., or their proceeds, that was not revoked by the appointment of the assignee, to whom the property in them passed, free of any charge in favor of U.</p> <p>[Cited in Hosmer v. Jewett, Case No. 6,-713.]</p> <p>3. To hold the contrary would be to give U. a preference contrary to the provisions of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)].</p> <p>[See Cases Nos. 12,452 and 12,453.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,344.</p> <p>Collision is East River — Steamboats Crossing —Lights—Speed—Borden of Proof.</p> <p>1. The ferry-boat S. was coming down the East river on an ebb tide, at the rate of twelve miles an hour, at night. She discovered, off her port bow. the tug U.. which was crossing the river from Brooklyn to New York, and her pilot, blowing one whistle, ported her helm. The U. blew two whistles and starboarded, and the vessels came in collision. The U. had no green or red lights set. She had a feeble light set on a pole aft, and she had in a box in her kitchen window, under her pilot-house, a white light. Held, that the U. was in fault in not having set the lights required by the 47th section of the act of February 28, 1871 (16 Stat. 454).</p> <p>2. The burden, therefore, was on her to show that this fault could not have contributed to the collision, and that she had not shown this.</p> <p>3. The U. was also in fault in not having sooner stopped and backed.</p> <p>4. The S. was in fault in going at too great a speed, after dark, in a crowded part of the harbor.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois.] This was a libel filed by Peter Nolan, one of the crew of the tug Dole, for damages caused by the crushing of his leg at the time of a contact between the tugs Dole and Union, he claiming that it was on account ol' the negligence o.f the latter tug.

<p>Case No. 14,346.</p> <p>Practice rx Admiralty — Discharge on (Stipulation — Sale—Rights or Purchaser — Order roit Redelivery — Mistake and Fraud.</p> <p>1. Where, in a suit in rem against a vessel, after she had been discharged on á stipulation for costs and value, the latter in 84.000, the amount claimed in the libel, the libel was amended by claiming 88.000. and subsequently a decree was entered in favor of the libellant, for 87.834.75. with interest, with a provision that the stipula-tors pay into the registry the amount of the stipulation, and afterwards the district court made an order that the claimant redeliver the vessel to the marshal, but that, it being represented that she was beyond his control, he pay into the registry $10,000, part of the purchase money of the vessel on her sale by him subsequently to her discharge, and that that be taken as a sufficient compliance with the order to redeliver. held, on appeal, that the order for the redelivery of the vessel, or the payment of the $10.000 into the registry, was erroneous.</p> <p>[Cited in The Wanata, 95 U. S. 605.]</p> <p>2. The vessel, after being so discharged, returned into the hands of her owner subject to all previously existing liens or charges, the same as before her seizure, except that on account of which she was seized; and she was also subject to any subsequently accruing liens or charges in the hands of her owner, or in the hands of any person to whom she might be transferred.</p> <p>[Cited in The Thales, Case No. 13,855; The Old Concord, Id. 10.482; The William F. McRae, 23 Fed. 558.]</p> <p>3. A redelivery of the vessel would be one subject to all these existing or subsequently accruing liens, and also to the rights of any bona fide purchaser, in case of a sale of her in the meantime.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Mackey, Case No. 15,696.]</p> <p>4. In this case, the vessel had, after her discharge, been sold and passed into the hands of her purchaser; and his title was undoubted.</p> <p>5. In case of any mistake or fraud committed in entering into the stipulation, and of the improvident discharge of the vessel, it would be competent for the court to relieve the parties concerned, on an application within a reasonable time, by ordering the vessel back into the custody of the officer.</p> <p>[Cited in The White Squall, Case No. 17,570; The .Tack Jewett, Id. 7,121; The Favorite, Id. 4,698; Roberts v. The Huntsville, Id. 11.904; U. S. v. Ames, 99 U. S. 42; The Two Marys, Case No. 14.300; The H. F. Dimock. 52 Fed. 600; The Haytian Republic. 8 C. C. A. 182, 59 Fed. 478; The Haytian Republic, 154 U. S. 126, 14 Sup. Ct. 994.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,347.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Deseution—Act op Congress.</p> <p>1. Under the maritime law, there can be no desertion by a seaman, working a forfeiture of wages, unless there is an abandonment of the ship and of her service, with an intent not to return.</p> <p>[Cited in The John Martin. Case No. 7.357.]</p> <p>2. The ‘act of congress of July 20th, 1790 (1 Stat. 131), varies that qualification of the of-fence. supplies a new definition of it, prescribes the manner in which it must be proved, and fixes an inflexible punishment.</p> <p>[Cited in The John Martin, Case No. 7,357; The Elwin Ivreplin, Id. 4,427.]</p> <p>3. Under the maritime law, courts of admiralty could mollify the penalty of absence without leave, and of desertion, and could do so upon evidence mitigating the offence, or showing the repentance of the deserter, at any reasonable time after the offence.</p> <p>[Cited in The Swallow, Case No. 13,664; The , Balize. Id. 809.]</p> <p>4. The statute inflicts an absolute forfeiture of wages in both cases.</p> <p>5. The construction of the statute, considered.</p> <p>6. The mode of proot appointed by the statute must be strictly followed, in all particulars.</p> <p>fCited in Gifford v. Kollock, Case No. 5,409.)</p> <p>7. A seaman has, under the statute, forty-eight hours to return to his vessel, after having absented himself from her without leave, and does not incur a forfeiture of wages if the vessel departs from the place before the expiration of the forty-eight hours</p> <p>8. If a seaman has permission from the second mate to go on shore, and acts in confidence upon such permission, he is not absent without leave from the commanding officer, although the chief mate or master is. at the time, on board.</p> <p>9. Such permission to go ashore may be implied from the acquiescence or silence of the officers in command, or of the master on shore.</p> <p>10. Where a seaman goes ashore temporarily, intending to return immediately, and makes all reasonable efforts to do so, if the master, knowing that he is on shore, prevents his reaching the ship, and the seaman is thus left in a foreign port, he is entitled to recover full wages for the voyage.</p> <p>[Cited in Worth v. The Lioness No. 2. 3 Fed. 925.]</p> <p>11. He can also recover the value of his wearing apparel and effects left on board the ship, and taken away in her, and not restored to him.</p> <p>UNION. The (DEARBORN v.). See Case No. 3,714.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>The libel was for wages, on a voyage from New York to Liverpool and back; and the question will be, whether there was a forfeiture of wages by desertion, or the libellants leaving the ship at Liverpool. The libel alleges, that on the 11th of August, the libel-lants, by the permission of the first officer— the captain being on shore — went on shore for the purpose of getting their dinner; that they had not been on shore more than twenty minutes or half an hour, before they returned and found the ship had left the pier and was lying oft' and on in the stream: that they made signals and endeavored to get on board; but that they were refused by the ship's boat, saying thej- had orders from the captain not to take them. The answer admits the shipping of the men, and their proceeding on the voyage, doing their duty at all times until the 11th of August; and alleges, that libel-lants on that day went on shore and left the vessel, but denies that they did this by the permission or consent of the first officer, but were forbidden to go on shore, and went in •disobedience of his orders; believes they went with intention not to return, as the' cook and steward had done that morning; no dinner prepared on board until two o'clock; the ship all ready for sea — only waiting for the captain to come on board; the difficulty of getting out of port; ship obliged to leave the pier-head, and fall out into the stream, the dock-master requiring it to be done; that master, on coining on board, found the men absent, and ship lay out in stream for them at distance of from a quarter to half a mile until nearly three o’clock: denies that the men returned to pier-head whilst the ship lay off and on in the stream; denies, or believes no signals were made; no signals seen, or hailing heard; a glass used to see whether men were in sight; denies that they endeavored to get a boat, or prevail on any one to take them on board, or that orders were given by the captain not to take them on board; but alleges, that the captain gave orders to the shipping-master, who went on shore in the boat that, carried the captain on board, to bring the men on board if he could find them, and it not. to get other men; denies there was any boat that tended the ship — no necessity for one; vessel lay by the ’dock, and employed a boat but once to take captain on board. Entry made in log-book A. The answer alleges, that Jansen’s clothes were put in charge of second mate, to deliver to him, and that they were delivered to some person in New York, who brought an order for them. Brown’s clothes were of little value, and were given by second mate to their boys. Answer denies any wages due, but have been forfeited by the desertion of the vessel; alleges that Jansen is a foreigner and not a citizen; that he shipped fraudulently.</p> <p>Decree of the district court: That libel-lants recover their wages and the value of their clothes, and ease referred to the clerk to ascertain the amount; and on coming in of the report, which was confirmed, final decree entered. [Case No. 14,347.]</p> <p>Jansen for wages. $49 50</p> <p>“ clothes.... 26 00 — $75 50</p> <p>Ritan, for wages. 49 50</p> <p>clothes ... 40 50- 90 00</p> <p>Brown, for wages.. 54 50</p> <p>. “ clothes. 36 75— 91 25</p> <p>| Decree .$256 75</p> <p>' Together with costs to he taxed.</p>

<p>This was a suit, commenced by the Union Bank of Louisiana, to recover the sum of $90.000, being the amount of interest due on five hundred bonds of the consolidated debt of the city of New Orleans, under the following circumstances: The said bonds, with the coupons attached, were deposited with the auditor of public accounts, at Baton Rouge, in 1854, by the plaintiff, to secure the redemption of the circulating notes of the plaintiff, issued in conformity with the free banking laws of 1853, of the state of Louisiana; to 1» transferred and returned by the auditor to plaintiff upon its application, accompanied by a delivery to him of cancelled circulating notes to an equal amount or pro rata. On the capture of New Orleans and that part of the state in 1802. the officers of the insurrectionary government fled .to avoid falling within the federal lines, first to Ope-lousas and then to Shreveport, continuing to exercise their official functions at the places of their flight; the auditor carried with him the bonds so deposited. Under a special pass from Gen. Banks, the plaintiff did, by an agent, deliver cancelled notes to the amount of $252.600 to the rebel auditor at Shreveport, and applied for the return ot an equal amount of bonds with their coupons; the said auditor refused to deliver the same, and was prohibited by the rebel legislature from doing so. The plaintiff finding it impossible to obtain the coupons, then applied' to the mayor of New Orleans, and to the First National Bank of New Orleans, the fiscal agent of the city, with which were deposited, as required by law. certain revenues of the city, dedicated exclusively to the payment of these bonds, to pay the. interest due on them, without the production of the coupons. which was refused by them, and this suit was thereupon commenced. On the trial all the above facts were either proved or admitted.</p>

Debt on the teller’s official bond, against George P. Forrest, the teller of the plaintiffs’ bank, and Washington Bowie and Nathan Lufborough, his sureties.

This was a libel in rem by Alexander Tre-gent, owner of the tug Gem, for towage and salvage services, on the nights of June 17th and 18th. 1873. On the 17th of June the barge took on a cargo of 250 cords of slabs at Belle river, on Lake St. Clair, in the province of Ontario, for transportation to Sandwich, on Detroit river, in the same province, for one John Holgate. She had no sails or other means of propulsion of her own, and no small boat.

This was a libel in rem brought by John H. Eakin against the barge Union Express, a Canadian vessel, for moneys advanced by him to procure and pay for necessaries supplied to the barge, partly at Detroit, in this state and district, and partly at Windsor, in the province of Ontario, the home port of the vessel. (1) Money advanced for the purchase of supplies constitutes a lien upon the vessel, equally with the supplies and repairs furnished directly to the vessel.

<p>At law. Hearing upon an agreed statement of facts.</p>

These causes are here by appeal from the decrees of the district court for the Eastern district of Missouri. The respondents were the owners of the steamer Stonewall, which, in proceeding on a voyage from St. Louis to New Orleans, was destroyed by fire on the 27th day of October. 1869. The libellants had insured against fire goods on board of the boat, embraced in bills of lading which excepted unavoidable dangers of the river and fire.

<p>Case No. 14,367.</p> <p>Debt — Penal Statute — Cokpobations—Indjvi dUAL LIABILITY — RbPOKT OF OFFICERS — CONSTITUTIONAL Law — Statutes.</p> <p>1. Debt will lie upon a penal statute; it lies whenever the obligation is to pay a sum certain, or which may be readily rendered certain, whether the liability arises on simple contract, legal liability, specialty, record or statute.</p> <p>2. When the charter of a corporation provides that where its officers shall neglect to make and publish certain reports required, they shall be individual^ liable for all corporation debts contracted while they arc officers or stockholders; and when, while they were such, they were guilty of such neglect, and in the mean time the corporation became indebted to the plaintiff by note, —held, that he might maintain an action of debt therefor against such delinquent officers.</p> <p>3. Where the charter of a corporation required its officers annualh. between the 1st and 20th of January, -to maké and publish a certain report. —held, that a company incorporated in May, 1867, was bound to make and publish such report in the following January.</p> <p>4. Declaratory laws, as such, are unconstitutional. They may operate as future rules on subsequent transactions; but. as constructions of prior laws, they are utterly void. The state legislature has no t ower to construe a statute previously enacted — such construction, as to acts done, is solely for the judiciary.</p> <p>5. When two statutes of different dates are repugnant, the latter repeals the former to the extent of such repugnancy.</p> <p>6. Actions on statutes in their nature penal, pending at the time of the repeal of such statutes, cannot be further prosecuted after such repeal.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Eastman v. Clackamas Co., 32 Fed. 33.]</p> <p>[Cited in Mitchell v. Hotchkiss, 48 Conn. 21; Kleekner v. Turk (Neb.) 63 N. W. 473.]</p> <p>NOTE. By Act Cong. Feb. 25. 1871 (1C Stat. 432), it is provided, “that the repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated ns still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability.’’</p>

This was a bill in equity filed to restrain the defendants [John D. Lounsbury and others] from infringing letters patent for an “improvement in the machines for forming the web of cloth, of wool, hair, or other suitable substance without spinning or weaving,” granted to John Arnold July 15. 1829.

<p>Case No. 14,369.</p> <p>Patents — Equivalents— Patented Machines — Use of.</p> <p>1. The machine of the complainants for making cartridges consisted of a mandrel, die and bunter, the shell being held between the die and mandrel, and advanced against the stationary bunter, which thereby formed a flange. The defendants’ machine was substantially the same, except that it was operated by the bunter advancing on the die, which is kept stationary: Held, that the defendants* infringed the complainants patent.</p> <p>2. A patentee, without describing equivalents, is entitled to be protected against the use. by others, of devices which are the equivalents of those described in his patent.</p> <p>3. A purchaser from a patentee may repair and perfect the machines purchased, and use the same, but he may not n«¡e machines embracing the patented inventions, which are not the identical machines purchased.</p> <p>[Cited in Young v. Foerster, 37 Fed. 204.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Exceptions were hied to the master’s report, but the court affirmed the finding of profits as assessed at $40,307.2(5. and'rendered a decree for the complainants. 7 Fed. 344. Subsequently the complainants moved to recommit the case to the master for.a further statement of profits, to bring the account down to the. time of the final injunction and decree. The petition was denied. 8 Fed. 446. Both parties appealed to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was reversed, with costs to the United States Cartridge Company on both appeals, and the cause remanded to this court with directions to dismiss the bill, with costs. 112 U. S. 624, 5 Sup. Ct. 475.]</p>

Injunction bill The facts appear in the opinion, and in the case of the same plaintiff against Ferris [Case No. 14,371].

<p>Case No. 14,371.</p> <p>Pubi.ic Lands — Title op Government — Waters —Appropriation—Adverse Use — Presumptive Grant — Irrigation Rights — Reasonable Use —Statutes.</p> <p>1.The government of the United States has a perfect title to the public land and an absolute and unqualified right of disposal. Neither state nor territorial legislation can, in any manner, modify, or affect the right which the government lias to the primary disposal of the public land.</p> <p>2. A stream of running water is part and parcel of the land through which it flows, inseparably annexed to the soil, and the use of it as an incident to the soil passes to the patentee of the land.</p> <p>[Cited in Ison v. Nelson Min. Co., 47 Fed. 201.]</p> <p>3. The government as proprietor of land through which a stream flows has the same property and right in the stream that any other proprietor would have.</p> <p>4. The appropriation of water flowing through the public land confers no right on the appropriator, either against the government or its grantee, in the absence of congressional legislation qualifying the effect of the government patent. And this is so although the customs, law's and decisions of the courts of the state wherein the land lies, recognize and enforce rights acquired by prior appropriation in controversies between occupants of the public lands without title from the government.</p> <p>5. So long as the title to land, through which a stream of water flows, remains in the United States there can be no use, or enjoyment of the waters of the stream, which will avail the person so using, as a foundation for title by prescription against the grantee of the government. In order that such use may ripen into a prescriptive title, it must continue for the full period required by the statute of limitations after the title to the land has passed from the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in Wimer v. Simmons (Or.) 39 Pac. 11.]</p> <p>6. If a proprietor below on a stream has, by reason of an adverse use by a proprietor above, presumptively granted to the upper proprietor, a right to use the water of the stream in a particular manner, such grant affects only the property owned by the proprietor below at the time the presumptive grant must have had its origin, and he may afterwards purchase other lands on the stream and will hold the latter unaffected by such presumed grant.</p> <p>7. The act of congress of July 26, 1866 (14 Stat. 253), is prospective in its operation, and does not in any manner qualify or limit the effect of a patent issued before its passage.</p> <p>[Cited in Beaver Brook Reservoir & Canal Co. v. St. Yrain Reservoir & Fish Co. (Colo. App.) 40 Pac. 1069.]</p> <p>8. If, when the act was passed, the defendant had acquired such a right, by priority of possession, as the act contemplates, that right is confirmed in him. as against one claiming, as riparian proprietor merely, through a patent subsequently issued, and when no right had vested in the patentee before the act became a law'.</p> <p>9. The use of water by a riparian proprietor does not become adverse until it amounts to an actionable invasion of another's right.</p> <p>10. A riparian proprietor may lawfully divert the water of a stream, for the purpose of irrigating his land, to a reasonable extent. But in no case may he do this so as to destroy or render useless, or materially affect the application of the water by other riparian proprietors.</p> <p>11. Water for irrigation is not a natural want in the same sense that water for quenching thirst is, which a riparian proprietor may satisfy without regard to the rights and needs of proprietors below.</p> <p>12. Every proprietor of land by or through which a stream of water naturally flows, may make a reasonable use of the water for any useful purpose. What is a reasonable use depends upon the circumstances of each case.</p> <p>[Cited in Mason v. Hoyle. 56 Conn. 272, 14 Atl. 786; Jones v. Adams (Nev.) 6 Pac. 445.]</p> <p>13. Elements which may enter into the inquiry of reasonable use stated.</p> <p>14. It seems that a riparian proprietor is only entitled to take the water from the stream on his own land, and must return the surplus to the stream before it leaves his land. At all events, the fact that a proprietor took the water at some distance above, and returned the surplus at some distance below, his land, would have an important bearing upon the question of reasonable use.</p>

This was a suit in equity to enforce the specific performance of a contract for a policy of reinsurance. The material facts and parts of the answer bearing on the case are set out in the opinion of the court.

Bill in equity, filed in March, 1877, by the Union Mutual Life Insurance Company against the defendant, its general agent for the states of Pennsylvania and Maryland, averring that, by the terms of a written contract annexed to the bill, the company had a right to discharge the defendant upon thirty days’ notice, which right it had duly exercised; that the defendant had received,' as the company’s agent, large sums of money for premiums, of which there remained a balance due…

These were ten bills in equity filed by the Union National Bank of Chicago, and nine other national banks, against the city of Chicago, and the city collector, to restrain the collection of the city tax upon the capital stock of the respective corporations for the years 1867 and 1870.

At the May term of this court the plaintiff recovered judgment against the Missouri & Iowa Construction Company for the sum of 823,914.28. Upon this judgment an execution was returned unsatisfied. Demand was made upon the officers of the corporation to disclose and turn out property. These officers failed and refused to turn out property or show any from which satisfaction could he obtained.

The petitioner alleged that he was a creditor of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation created by an act of congress, and haying its domicile and usual place of business at Boston, in this district; that the petitioner was the owner of eight bonds of the company payable to bearer for one thousand dollars each, commonly known as income bonds, which were not secured by mortgage, and would be due on the 1st day of September next; that the defendant corporation was…

In equity — on final hearing. The case made by complainant, in its bill, is substantially this: That in the month of November, 1863, the Union Pacific Railroad Company, having been incorporated and organized, and being about to commence the construction of its road, and having already commenced surveys in Nebraska, at or in the vicinity of Omaha, for the purpose of ascertaining the best point for the location of its eastern terminus, and the most practicable route thence…

On motion to continue the temporary injunction, heretofore allowed. The bill in this suit is filed to restrain the defendant, who is the county treasurer of Lincoln county, in the state of Nebraska, from proceeding to collect taxes upon the property of the complainant, assessed and levied under the revenue law of the state (Act 1S69, p. 179).

Bill for an injunction to restrain the sale of three locomotives, seized by the county treasurer- to pay certain taxes assessed against the coinp'ainant, amounting to about $20,000. In 1870, owing to the inaccurate return of the complainant of the number of miles of its road lying in Lincoln county, and west to the state line, the assessment made was upon seventy-two miles less of road than the actual amount.

This is a bill by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, as a large property owner and tax-payer in the county of Lincoln, in behalf of itself and other tax-payers similarly situated. to restrain the proposed issue of $30,-000 of the bonds of the county, to borrow money to aid in erecting public buildings therein.

<p>Case No. 14,381.</p> <p>'Taxation — Public Lands — Grant to Railroad —Tax Sales.</p> <p>That the United States still retains a pecuniary interest in the lands granted to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, as well as the legal title to such lands, and that the contingent right of offering these lands to actual settlers at the minimum price asked for its lands by the government forbid the state to embarrass these rights by a sale for taxes, and that such lands are not liable to be taxed by the state.</p>

<p>This is a suit brought by complainant to restrain the several county treasurers, in which the lands granted by the United States, in aid of the construction of its railroad, by the acts of congress July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864 (12 Stat. 489; 18 Stat. 356), are situated, from advertising and selling the same in satisfaction of state, county, and school taxes, levied thereon for the year 1S72. and becoming due. and delinquent May 1, 1873. The bill alleges in substance the incorporation of the company, its acceptance of the acts of incorporation, the fixing the eastern terminus, the approval of the route, and the construction and operation of the road to its western terminus, and the examination and acceptance by commissioners appointed by the president; that, thereafter, suggestions having been made that the road was not built in full compliance with the law, under authority of a joint resolution of congress of April 10. 1869, the secretary of the interior appointed a commission consisting of five eminent citizens of the United States, to examine and report whether the road was completed in all respects as required by law; that said commission made such examination, and on the 30th of October, 1869, reported that a further expenditure ■ of $1,586,100 would be necessary for that purpose, and that thereupon the secretary of the interior suspended the issue of patents to granted lands; that the whole of said work has not been accepted by the government as completed; and that the company is the owner of the lands derived from the grant contained in the acts of congress aforesaid, situated in the several counties and described in the several schedules to the bilk having never disposed of the same by way of mortgages. The bill also alleges the assessment and levy, by the proper authorities, of state, county, school and other taxes in the respective counties, in amount $104.180.-51, and that the several treasurers of the several counties are proceeding; under warrants issued for that purpose, to advertise and sell said lands in satisfaction of said taxes (as well as by seizure of the cars, locomotives, and trains of complainant); that such sale and seizure will result in a multiplicity of suits and irreparable injury, for which no adequate legal remedy exists; and that the value of the lands situated in each county exceeds the sum of $500. No question is made upon the regularity of the proceedings in assessing, levying, or enforcing the tax. The bill further alleges that all lands situated within the ten miles limit have been selected and listed and certified to the company by the commissioner of the general land office, and the land office fees required upon the entry thereof, paid by the company; but that the cost of surveying the same has not been paid; that the lands situated outside the ten miles limit have neither been selected nor certified to, nor the land office or surveying fees paid by the company; that the amount of such taxes so sought to be collected, which are levied for state purposes, and will be paid to the state, if collected, is $17,-711.17. It is thereupon claimed that, under the provisions of section 3, Act July 1, 1862, and section 21, Act July 2, 1864, the lands are not subject to state taxation, and injunction is invoked to restrain the treasurers from proceeding to collect. A temporary injunction being granted, at the November (1873) term [Case No. 14.3S1] the case was heard upon general demurrer and the demurrer overruled.</p> <p>The answer, filed January 5, 1874, admits most of the allegations of the bill, but denies that the secretary of the interior has suspended the issue of all patents, and alleges the issue of patents to certain of the lands in controversy; alleges the making of a mortgage by the company of said lands, in 1867, claiming that such mortgage is a disposal thereof, within the meaning of section 3, act of July 1. 1862; denies that land office and surveying fees have not been paid as alleged in the bill; denies that the road was not accepted, as completed, by the United States in 1869. and insists that the question of exemption of said lands from taxation is not common, and the.same in respect to each and all the said defendants as alleged in the bill, and that the bill is therefore multifarious. The answer also alleges that the lands in controversy had been surveyed in 1869; that since 1865 the complainant has exercised ownership over the same by advertising and offering the same for sale, and that they are treated by the government as private property. Replication being filed and proofs taken, the case now comes on for final hearing. As to the status of the lands, the evidence taken by the defendant shows (nor is it denied by the complainant) that, at the date of the assessment and levy of the tax in question, the lands in controversy had been surveyed, appraised, offered for sale, and mortgaged. It also appears from the proofs that of the lands situated within the ten miles limit, every alternate odd section to which the company claimed to be entitled had been patented previous to the assessment and levy of the tax; and that the residue of the grants within like limits was un-patented. and that the costs of surveying had not been paid on any lands situated within the ten miles limit, whether patented or unpatented, because not required by the interior department. In respect to the lands situated between the ten and twenty miles limits, it appears from the proofs that they had all been 'selected, listed, certified, and the land office fees and cost of surveying paid, and every alternate odd section of those claimed by the company patented — the resi■due being unpatented. Upon tbe report of the committee of “eminent citizens” under the joint resolution of April 10th, 1869, that $1,586,000 be required for supplying deficiencies in the road, Mr. Cox, the secretary of the interior, November 3d, 1869, to indemnify the government, ordered that only one-half the lands to which the company would otherwise be entitled should be patented, and the patents for the rest be suspended until further directions from the department. He directed patents to issue beginning at Omaha and working westward for the odd numbered sections 1, 5, 9, etc., and that patents for sections 3, 7, etc., be not issued until further orders. In February, 1871, a patent issued to the company under this order for about 640,000 acres of land, the department refusing to issue a patent for the other half. In February, 1874, Mr. Delano, then secretary of the interior, refused to rescind the order of his predecessor, and so patents for one-half <ef the company’s land are still withheld as security for the completion of its road, and matters reported deficient or not up to the required standard.</p>

This is a bill in equity to restrain the county authorities of Merrick county from issuing certain bonds voted to the Midland Pacific Railway Company.

This suit is brought to restrain the collection of the state, county, and school taxes levied in Iowa for the year 1875 on that portion of the property of the Union Pacific Railroad Company commonly known as its “Missouri River Bridge.” The city assessor of the city of Council Bluffs, in the year 1875, assuming that that portion of the Union Pacific Railroad extending over the Missouri river into the state of Iowa constituted a portion of a railway bridge across said river,…

Ejectment for one hundred and sixty acres of land. No questions arise on the pleadings. The plaintiff introduced a patent for the land in dispute, dated February 23, 1871, made under the act incorporating the plaintiff, July 1, 1862 (12' Stat. 489), and rested.

In equity. Pinal hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 17,184] for an “improvement in machines for making paper bags.’’ reissued to Morgan, Whitney, and Priest, March 6, 1860 [No. 920], as assignees of the original patent granted Benjamin P. Rice.

Suit brought [against Benjamin S. Binney] upon letters patent [No. 30,191], for “improvement in paper-bag machinery,” granted to Horatio G. Armstrong, October 2, 1860, and assigned to complainants; and also letters patent [No. 38.452], for “improvement in paper-bag machines.” granted to complainants as assignees of Simon E. Pettee, May 5, 1863. The above engraving represents a plan view of the Armstrong machine.

<p>Case No. 14,388.</p> <p>Patents — Interference— Res J cdicata — Priority — Estoppei..</p> <p>1. After decision bv the patent office of an interference between an applicant for a patent and the grantee of a patent theretofore issued, granting a patent lo the applicant ns the prior inventor, suit was brought in the circuit court by his assignee of the patent to have the interfering patent declared void. Held, that the decision of the patent office in the interference was not conclusive upon the question of priority of invention.</p> <p>[Cited in Pentlarge v. Beeston. Case No. 10.-963, Wire Book Sewing Mach. Co. v. Stevenson. 11 Fed. 155. Followed in Whipple v. Min°r. 15 Fed. 117: Gloucester Isinglass & Glue Co. v. Brooks. 19 Fed. 427: Hubei v. Tucker, 24 Fed. 702; Illingworth v. Atha, 42 Fed. 144.1</p> <p>2. The defendants were not, by the statement of the date of his invention made to the patent office by the patentee, their assignor, estopped to show that his invention was in fact made at an earlier date.</p> <p>ICited in Lockwood v. Cleaveland, 6 Fed. 725.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by the Union Paper-Bag Machine Company against George L. Newell and George H. Mallary, brought on letters patent No. 49.951, granted to Benjamin S. Binney. Heard on motion to dissolve an injunction.]

<p>In equity.</p> <p>[Motion for preliminary injunction. Suit brought [against George L. Newell and George H. Mallary] on letters patent [No. 49.951] granted Benjamin S. Binney. as-signee of E. W. Goodale. September 12, 1805, for "machine for making paper bags,” and afterward assigned to complainants.] 2</p>

Final hearing on pleadings and proof. Suit was brought on the patent [No. 17,184] granted Benj. F. Rice, April 28,1857, and re-issued to Morgan, Whitney & Priest, March 6,1860 [No. 920], and afterwards assigned to the Union Paper-Bag Company for the extended term. This company conveyed to Chatfield & Woods the exclusive right to use machines in certain western states, Ohio among them. The suit was brought for infringement of the second and fourth claim of th^ patent.

<p>Case No. 14,392.</p> <p>Patents — Prior Experiments — Specifications— Paper Bag Machine.</p> <p>1. The firsr claim of the letters patent granted to William Goodale. July 12th. 1859, for improvements m machinery for making paper bags, and extended foi 7 years from July 12th, 1873,* namely: “Making the cutter which cuts the paper from the roh or piece, of the form herein described, thst. on cutting off the paper, it also cuts it into the required form to fold into a bag, without furthei cutting,” is valid.</p> <p>2. Knowledge of prior experiments by another, will not defeat the claim of the patentee to an invention, if i* appears that, after those experiments were abandoned, he first perfected and adapted the iuvention to actual use.</p> <p>3. The patentee has the right to take up the improvement at- the point where it was left by his predecessor and if. by the exercise of his own inventive skill, he is successful in first perfecting and reducing to practice the invention which his predecessor undertook to make, he is entitled to the merit of such improvement, as an original inventor.</p> <p>[Cited in Whittlesey v. Ames, 13 Fed. 899.]</p> <p>4. Declarations of a patentee and former owner of a patent, undertaking to restrict the invention within a narrower coriipass than that stated in his specification, will not be allowed to vary tlie construction which would otherwise be given to the patent.</p> <p>5. The invention of Goodale was not simply a knife which would cut without waste, or which would produce the exact form of blank described in the specification, but was a machine having a cutter of five planes, which, by a transverse cut across a roll oí paper in the flat sheet, cut the paper rato the required form to fold into a paper bag without further cutting out, the form of the blank being substantially the form given in the specification.</p> <p>6. A machine having a knife of the irregular form of the Goodale cutter, which cuts the paper into the required form to fold into a bag, without further cutting out, is an infringement of the first claim of the Goodale patent, although such knife has an additional parallel blade, at each end of it.</p> <p>7. Nor does the removal of the central cutting portion of such knife about a bag’s length in advance of the side cutters, cause the machine to be no infringement, the cutters which remove side pieces of paDnr from the roll remaining the same.</p> <p>. 8. It required invention to make a knife which would cut from a roll of paper in the flat sheet, by one cut, a blank which could be folded into a bag without further cutting out.</p> <p>[The above decision was confirmed in Case No. 14.393 For another case involving this patent, see Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S. 120.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,398.</p> <p>Patents — Prior Experiments — Machine for Making Paper Bags.</p> <p>1. The decision in Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Pultz & Walkley Co. [Case No. 14,392], sustaining the validity of the first claim of the letters patent granted to William Goodale, July 12th, 1859, for improvements in machinery for making paper bags, confirmed.</p> <p>2. An inoperative and abandoned model, containing a three-cutter knife, existed and was known to the patentee, but he was the first to demonstrate that such a knife would, in an organized machine, cut a blank from a roll of paper in the fiat sheet, by a transverse cut, so that the blank, when cut off, would be of the form ready to be folded into a bag. Having done so, he had a right to claim the knife separately.</p>

Bill in equity [by the Union Paper-Collar Company against Emerson Leland] for an injunction to restrain alleged infringement of reissue letters-patent [No. 5,259] dated Jan. ■24, 18TB, 2 for paper collars and cuffs, granted W. E. Lockwood; and for an account.

<p>3 [Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [against Isaac Van Deusen and others] upon the following letters patent, all assigned to complainants: 1. Letters patent [No. 11,376] for “improvement in shirt-collars,” granted' to Walter Hunt, July 25, 1854; assigned to William E. Lockwood, and reissued to him in four divisions (A, B, C, and D), which were dated as follows:, Division B, November 29, 1864, No. 1,828; division C, February 7, 1865, No. 1,867; divisions A and D, April 4, 1865. Nos. 1.926 and 1,927. No. 1,927 was subsequently surrendered, and reissued July 10, 1866, in two divisions, A and B, Nos. 2,306 and 2,307. 2. Letters patent [No. 23,771] for “improvements in collars,” granted to William E. Lockwood, April 26, 1859, and reissued June 6, 1855, in two divisions, Nos. 1,980 and 1,981. 3. Letters patent [No. 38,-664] for an “improvement in paper shirt-collars,” granted to Andrew A. Evans, May 26, 1863, and reissued July 10, 1866, to James A. Woodbury, assignee, No. 2,309. 4. Letters patent for “improvement in shirt-collars,” granted to Solomon S. Gray, June 23-, 1863, and reissued March 29, 1864, No. 1,646. 5. Letters patent for an “improvement in paper cuffs or wristbands,” granted to James A. Woodbury, as assignee of Andrew A. Evans, July 31, 1866, No. 56,737. The bill alleged the infringement of reissues Nos. 1,828, 1,867, 1,-926, 2,306, 1,980,1,981, 2,309. 1,646, and patent No. 56,737; but, upon the hearing, all claim was abandoned as to reissues 1,867, 1,926, and 2,306.] 3.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by the Union Paper Collar Company against Henry .1. White, to restrain the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 5.109, granted October 22, 1872, and assigned to complainants.]

Trespass on the case for the alleged infringement of certain letters-patent [Ño. 37,-548]. The plaintiff corporation was a citizen of this district, and the defendants [Francis O. Mathiesson and others) of New Jersey, the former having a place of business at Charlestown, tbe latter a residence in Jersey City, but service of the writ was made on the first-named defendant at Boston, in this district, under process returnable to this court.

The decree in this case was as follows: — It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the letters-patent [No. 37,548], dated January 27, 1863, granted to the complainant as assignee of Gustavus A. Jasper, for an improvement in purifying and cleansing sugar, is a good and valid patent; that said Jasper was the original and first inventor of the improvements therein described and claimed; that the defendant [Francis O. Mathiesson] has infringed upen the said patent and the…

[This was an action on the case tried by Judges CLIFFORD and LOWELL and a jury, for the infringement of letters patent [No. 37,548], for “improvement in purifying and cleansing sugar,” granted to the plaintiffs as assignees of Gustavus A. Jasper, January 27, 1883.

<p>Case 3STo.‘14,400.</p> <p>Salvage — Surrender oe. Control — Superfluous Services — Speculative Danger— Salvage Services.</p> <p>1. In a case of salvage, it is immaterial whether the master of the vessel requiring assistance formally surrenders the vessel into the hands of the salvors or not, if it appear that he called for assistance, and that neither he nor his crew actively participated in the salvage service. Their presence, merely, cannot be permitted to detract from the meritorious character of the services performed by the salvors.</p> <p>2. The aid rendered to a burning vessél by tow-boats whose services were not actually required to rescue the vessel from her perilous situation, will be regarded as superfluous. And the court, in estimating the value of the' towboats employed in the salvage service, will look to the evidence to ascertain how many were really necessary for the accomplishment. of the object in view, and treat all others as supernumeraries, which being in sight of the burning vessel, rendered assistance not actually required.</p> <p>3. While such assistance is not to be deprecated by the court, it cannot be received as a reason for increasing the estimate of the property put at risk, and thereby enhancing the claim of the owners for salvage compensation.</p> <p>4. A tow-boat company cannot be treated as a salvor, but as the owner of property (their towboats), whicu is put at risk in the salvage service, are to be compensated like all other owners of vessels under similar circumstances.</p> <p>5. Salvage is nor always a mere compensation for work and labor. Various considerations: the interests of commei ce and navigation, the lives of the seamen, render it proper to estimate a salvage reward upon a more enlarged and liberal scale.</p> <p>0. The ingredients of salvage are: First. Enterprise in the salvors m going out in tempestuous weather to assist a vessel in distress, risking their own lives to save their fellow creatures, and to rescue the pioperty of their fellow citizens. Secondly 9 he degree of danger and distress from which the property is rescued, whether it was in imminent peril and almost certainly lost, if not ar the .ime rescued and preserved. Lastly.' The value of the property saved. Where all these circumstances concur, a large and liberal reward ought to be given: but whore none, or scarcely any take n'.ace. the compensation can hardly be denominated a salvage compensation. It is littie more than a mere remuneration pro opera et labore. Sii John Nicholl, in the case of The Clifton. 3 Hagg Adm. 117. ></p> <p>7. Mere speculative danger will not be sufficient to entitle a person to salvage: but the danger need not be such that escape from it by other means was impossi. le. It cannot be necessary that the loss should be inevitably certain; but it is Decessary that the danger should be real and imminent. Talbot v. Seeman. 1 Cranch [5 U. S.] 1.</p> <p>8. It is rr.re that w.e find combined in a single .case all the ingredients of a salvage service; but ■we must not, therefore, .ose sight of those which .prominently appear, from the evidence, to command our approval or elicit our commendation.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,401.</p> <p>Courts — Conflict of Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. It is the settled rule of law that the court which first takes cognizance of the controversy is entitled to retain jurisdiction to the end of the litigation, and to take possession and control of . the subject-matter of the litigation, to the exclusion of ¿11 interference from other courts of ' co-ordinate jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Applied in Gaylord v. Ft. Wayne, M. & C. R. Co.. Case No. 5,284. Cited in Oyrens v. Ohio Cent. R. Co.. 20 Fed. 13; Judd v. Bankers’ & Merchants’ Tel. Co., 31 Fed. 183: Reinaeh t. Atlantic & G. w. R. Co., 58 Fed. 44; Wadley v. Blount, 65 Fed. 674; Wheeler v. Waiton & Whann Co., Id. 722; Colieiv v. Solomon. 66 Fed. 415; Hatch v. Bancroft-Thompson Co.. 67 Fed. 809.]</p> <p>[Cited in Smith v. Ford. 80 Iowa. 620. 45 N. W. 1031; Id., 2 N. W. 159; State v. Ross (Mo. Sup.) 23 S. W. 202; Re Schuyler’s Steam Towboat Co., 136 N. X. 176. 32 N. E. 623; Texas Trunk Ry. Co. v. Lewis (Tex.) 16 S. W. 648.]</p> <p>. 2. This rule does not require that the court first taking jurisdiction of the case shall also first take possession of the property; and prior seizure from another court does not give priority of jurisdiction.</p> <p>3. The power of the court over its judgments, to set aside, modify or annul, is unlimited during the term at which they were rendered.</p> <p>.4. Where a demurrer to a bill is sustained and bill dismissed, the court may. during the term, set aside its dismissal and restore the case without losing its jurisdiction, and a state court cannot, by taking jurisdiction during this interval, oust or supersede the jurisdiction of this court. The case stands precisely as though no order of dismissal had been made.</p> <p>[Cited in Adams v. Mercantile Trust Co., 15 C. C. A. 1, 66 Fed. 620.]</p> <p>5. The cases where courts have refused to set aside their judgment and proceed with the case, in order to protect their parties acting in good faith, are cases of equitable discretion, not of right, and do not contravene the rule.</p>

This was an application by the complainant, the trustee in a ra.lway mortgage, for the ap]x>intment of a receiver. The material facts appear in the opinion of MILLER, Circuit Justice. The arguments were heard, at chambers, in Keokuk. May 31 and June 1, 1877.

The plaintiff is the trustee in a railway mortgage executed by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain, and Southern Railway Company (the only defendant in the… Held: or as agents or attorneys in fact represented the holders of, every bond subscribing the several applications to the trustee, with the single exception of Mr. D. G. Bacon, and of ten bonds once owned by the complainant, and since sold. The bill prays: 1. That complainant may be put inte possession of the property. 2.

<p>Case No. 14,404.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Com pressing Cotton — Storage —Board of Sailous — Monet Advanced — Mortgage.</p> <p>1. The bark Alexander McNeil, owned by a citizen of New York travelling in a foreign country, was libelled by various claimants for expenses incurred by her master and her consignee in the port of Savannah. Schuchardt and Sons, of New York, intervened in all of these suits, and claimed the proceeds of the vessel’s condemnation by virtue of a mortgage of 830,000 they held against her. Held, that the claims for the compressing of cotton and for its storage upon the vessel were not in the nature of maritime service, and could not be enforced by a suit in rem.</p> <p>2. The liens for wharfage and dockage, and for the board, as well as for the wages, of the marines employed on the vessel, were the subjects of a maritime lien, the subsistence of the marines being held to be. if not synonymous with wages, at'least the complement of wages, and as such entitled to protection.</p> <p>3. A loan lawfully made to supply wants or necessities of the vessel and upon her credit alone is enforceable by a suit in rem, even though after the advancement of the money the master squanders it. the lender not being responsible for any abuse or misappropriation of the fund.</p> <p>4. The mortgagees are entitled to the surplus remaining in the registry, after the puyment of all the costs arising out of the subject-matter of the several libels filed, and after all the claims superior in dignity have been paid and discharged.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,405.</p> <p>Patents — Assignment—“Invention ” — Impuove-M ENTS.</p> <p>1. The word “invention” used in a contract for the assignment of a patent therein recited, and to which it refers, includes only the invention described in the patent to be assigned, and reissues and extensions thereof; it cannot be held to cover other improvements in the same art. although the patent to be assigned would be worthless without them.</p> <p>2. The question of license under particular circumstances, considered.</p> <p>[For other oases involving these patents, see note to Case No. 14,406.]</p>

[Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent [Nos. 93,157, 102,748, and 113,612] for “improvements in the electro-deposition of nickel,” granted to Isaac Adams, Jr., August 3, 1869, May 10, 1870, and April 11, 1871. The difficulties attending the previous processes by which the electro-deposition of nickel had been attempted, are stated in the opinion.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by the United Nickel Company against George ■ J. Harris and Edward Weston.J</p>

<p>[This was a bill by the United Nickel Company against N. S. Keith for an injunction to restrain the infringement of certain patents.]</p>

[These were suits by the United Nickel Company against the Manhattan Brass Company and others, and by same plaintiff against William H. Jackson and others. Heard on motions for preliminary injunctions.]

In consequence of the extreme indisposition of the Honorable David L. Barnes, district judge of Rhode Island district, an application was made by the district attorney to STORY. Circuit Justice, for an order in the nature of a certiorari, to remove the suits and proceedings pending in the distinct court into the circuit court at this term, pursuant to the act of March 2, 1809) c. 94 [2 Story’s Laws, 1121; 2 Stat. 534, c. 27].

The relators were arrested by the sheriff of Barren county, Ky., in May, 1877.

<p>[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Virginia.]</p> <p>At law.</p>

This was an indictment for passing certain pieces of counterfeit coin in the similitude of the current coin of the United States. The prisoner having been brought into court for trial, his counsel moved the court to quash the indictment on the ground that the offence charged was not within the jurisdiction of the court. The authority upon which reliance was chiefly placed in support of the motion, was Fox v. State of Ohio, 5 How. [46 U. S.] 410.

[This was a prosecution by the United States against James E. Abbott for a penalty for the omission to affix a proper revenue stamp to a package sold by defendant. Heard on demurrer to the indictment.]

<p>Case No. 14,417.</p> <p>Officers — New Appointment — Sureties — Old Defalcation — Collector of Internal Revenue — List of Assessments.</p> <p>1. Under the well established doctrine that where an officer becomes his own successor, he, as such successor, is to be governed by the same rules as if another person had been appointed, it is held that in the absence of formal receipts, the fact that the government funds were turned over so as to make the officer and his sureties under the new appointment liable, is to be inferred from what his accounts show were in his hands at the commencement of the new term, and the moneys of the second term, in which new sureties are interested, cannot be taken to pay off an old debt or defalcation with which they had no concern.</p> <p>2. A collector of internal revenue should be credited with so much of the list of assessments transferred to his successor as the commissioner found he could not collect with due diligence, within the meaning of section 34 of the act of 1866 [14 Stat. 158], and he is at liberty to show that by due diligence he could not collect the same before the expiration of his term of office, or that, as to some of the items, the day prior to which they ought to be collected had not ar.rived. the action of the commissioner on his accounts not being final. — Ed. Int. Rev. Rec.</p>

This was a bill in equity, brought by the United States against Daniel T. Aborn, the sole acting executor of Samuel Aborn deceased, against the sureties of the same executor on his probate bond, against the heirs and devisees of the testator, and against Edward Carrington, to whom Daniel T. Aborn had assigned, and conveyed all his estate. The bill charged that Daniel T. Aborn was insolvent, and had wasted the personal estate of the testator.

[This was a libel filed in the name of the United States against the schooner Active and cargo to procure their condemnation as prize of war.]

This action was brought under the act of congress of 1825, to recover a penalty for a violation of the post-office laws.

This was a motion in arrest of judgment. The prisoner [John B. Addatte] was indicted under various statutes relating to counterfeiting the currency of the United States. The evidence given on the trial ivas such as to make a conviction impossible under any statute, except the 12th section of the act of June 30th, 1864 (13 Stat. 222). The case was given -to the jury, on a count in the indictment founded on that section, and the prisoner was convicted.

[This was an indictment against Simon Adler and Furst for failing to deface and obliterate from casks or packages of distilled spirits, at the time of emptying, marks, brands, or stamps required by law to be thereon.] |

<p>Case No. 14,426.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Federal Jurisdiction — Ixdiax Country.</p> <p>1. The circuit and district courts of the United States can take cognizance of civil and criminal matters only so far as the power so to do is conferred upon them by statutes of the United States.</p> <p>2. The jurisdiction of these courts, so far as it results from the terms of their creation, or is necessarily implied in their constitution, is restricted to che territorial limits within which they are placed.</p> <p>[Cited in Ex parte Kang-gi-shun-ca, 109 U. S. 560, 3 Sup. .Ct. 396.]</p> <p>3. Acts of congress of the 30th of March. 1802 [2 Stat. 139]. and of the 30th of June, 1834 [4 Stat. 729], to regulate intercourse with the Indian tribes and preserve peace on the frontiers; the act of 3d of March, 1825 [4 Stat. 115], relating to crimes against the United States: the act of 15th June, 1836 [5 Stat. 50], admitting Arkansas into the Union, and the act of March 3d, 1837 [5 Stat. 176], amendatory of the judicial system of the United States, commented on and explained.</p> <p>4. Courts of the United States are of limited, though not of inferior, jurisdiction: and hence tbeir jurisdiction must, in every instance, be apparent on the face of the pleadings.</p> <p>5. The circuit court of this district, in the absence of any statute attaching the Indian country west of Arkansas thereto, has no jurisdiction over such Indian country, and cannot punish an offence committed therein.</p> <p>[Cited in U S. v. Starr, Case No. 1G.379; U. S. v. Ivy, Id. 15,451.]</p>

Silas P. Alden, of Fairhaven, master of the whaling bark Bi’uce. was tried upon an indictment, under the United States statute of March 3d, 1835. § 3 [4 Stat. 776], for imprisoning. “from malice, hatred and revenge, and without justifiable cause,” Barzillai McFaden, one of the seamen. It appeared that Mc-Faden, a young man from Maine, who had worked a short time as waiter in one of the Boston hotels, shipped on board the Bruce as a green hand.

<p>Case No. 14,429.</p> <p>Prize — Owner — Residence within Insurrec-tionary States — Loyalty.</p> <p>1. After seizure, by the surveyor or collector of a port of the United States, a libel is filed to declare the forfeiture.</p> <p>2. A claimant, who is an inhabitant of an in-surrectionary state, takes his status from such state.</p> <p>3. Whether his capital be great or small, it contributes to swell the means of resistance, and is liable to confiscation.</p> <p>4. Even his loyalty will not protect him, because, being an integral part of a state in rebellion, he is treated as a public enemy.</p> <p>5. New Orleans (the residence of claimant) having elected members of congress, the government of the state of Louisiana being yet under the control of the insurgents, the position of the claimant is not changed.</p> <p>6. The persons “exercising the functions of government” there, not having disclaimed the acts of the insurgents, or suppressed the insurrection, the laws of the United States have not yet been fully vindicated.</p> <p>7. A vessel owned, in whole or in part, by a resident of New Orleans, found in any other port of the United States, is subject to condemnation.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,430.</p> <p>Inteknal Revenue — Succession Tax — Legatee.</p> <p>1. By the will of H., his executors were directed to apply the income of a legacy to the use of his cousin, F., and on the death of F. to pay the legacy, which amounted to $10,000, to such person as F. might appoint. The legacy was taxed, as though payable instanter to F., the sum of $300, under subdivision 3, § 111, Act July 1st, 1862 [12 Stat. 485]. F. died, and appointed the defendant, A., a stranger in blood to H. and to F., as the person to receive the legacy, and A. received the same. More than six years after-wards suit was brought by the United States, in personam, against A., to recover $600, claimed to be due to the United States from him as a tax on the legacy. Held, that sections 111, 112, Act 1862, so far as they impose a tax in per-sonam, impose it only on the executor or trustee and not on the legatee or cestui que trust.</p> <p>2. As it is not provided that a suit shall lie against the legatee in personam, to recover the tax, but that proceedings in the nature of proceedings in rem shall be brought to enforce and realize the lien on the property of the deceased, judgment must be entered for the defendant.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Trucks’ Adm’r, 27 Fed. 542.]</p>

This was an indictment containing seven counts, — -four under section 42 of the act of July 13, 1866 [14 Stat. 163], charging the defendants [John S. Allen and Biehard 0. En-right] with executing, and procuring to be executed, certain fraudulent bonds for the withdrawal of whiskey from warehouse, and three counts under section 30 of the act of March 2, 1S67 [14 Stat. 484], charging them with conspiracy to defraud the revenue.

<p>Case No. 14,433.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Indictment—Certainty.</p> <p>[An indictment against several defendants, which charges that on a certain day they, being seamen of an American vessel named, “with force and arms, did then and there- feloniously make a revolt on board the said ship, contrary,” etc., fails to charge with sufficient certainty an offence under the act of congress of 1835 (4 Stat. 775), providing that if any one or more of the crew of an American vessel shall, with force, or by fraud, threats, or other intimidations, usurp the. command of such ship from the master, or deprive him of his authority and command, or resist or prevent him in tjie free exercise thereof, or transfer such authority and command to any other person, the person so offending, and his aiders or abettors, shall be deemed guiity of a revolt or mutiny, and shall be fined and imprisoned according to the nature and aggravation of the offence.]</p>

[This was a claim by José Maria Alvisu (or Alviso) for the rancho of Milpitas, one square league in Santa Clara county, granted September 28,1835, by José Castro to José Maria Alvisu. Claim filed March 30, 1852. Confirmed .by the commission March 14, 1853, and on appeal by the district court March 3, 1856. Case unreported. It is now heard upon objections to confirmation of survey.]

Claim [by Manuel Alvisu] for three leagues of land in Santa Clara county [the Rancho Quito], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

<p>Claim [by José Maria Amador] for four leagues of land in Alameda county [part of the Rancho San Ramon], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States,</p>

<p>Case No. 14,438.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Rectifiers and Wholesale Liquor Dealers — Entries in Rooks — Who mat Make — Omissions.</p> <p>1. The entries required to be made by section 3318 of the Revised Statutes of the United States by rectifiers and wholesale liquor dealers in the government books may be made by the clerks of the dealers.</p> <p>2. The dealers in that case are charged with the duty of seeing that the entries are properly made, and if by their want of care the entries are omitted, they are liable for such neglect.</p> <p>3. To render the party liable under this section for neglect, it must appear that the entries were omitted through carelessness or design, and not by pure accident.</p> <p>4. The same rules applied to the making of notices of rectification.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United Slates for the district of Missouri.] On the 13th day of July, 1861, congress passed an act, entitled, “An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes,” the 5th section of which is as follows: “Sec. 5.

<p>[This was a bill in equity brought by the United States against Oakes A. Ames and Oliver M. Second, executors of Oákes Ames, deceased, and Peter Butler.]</p>

This was an action of trespass on the case, brought by the United States against the defendant [David Ames] for flowing land of theirs, situated in Springfield, over which jurisdiction had been ceded to them by the state of Massachusetts. The writ was sued out, April 26, 1843. The general issue was pleaded, and a special bar of an award, which was averred to have been made under a submission between the United States and the defendants, September 24, 1841.

<p>Case Ho. 14,443.</p> <p>Insolvenct — Priority of United States— Sureties.</p> <p>Where there is a general assignment of a debt- or’s property, for the benefit of creditors, and the priority of the United States attaches, they having various debts due by bonds, with different sureties, all payments made by the assignees are to be applied pro rata to all the debts of the United States; and the latter are not at liberty to apply the payments in any other manner, without the consent of all the parties in interest.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in U. S. v. Uewis, Case No. 15,-595.]</p>

It appeared by the testimony in this case, that on the morning of the 8th July, 1823, between 3 and 4 o’clock in the morning, the Great Southern Mail was stopped and robbed by three men, [John] Aminhisor, Moore, and Ward.

The slave Amy, the property of Samuel W. Hairston, of Patrick county, Virginia, was indicted for stealing a letter from the mail at Union Furnace post-office in that county, under section 22 of the… Held: and the post-office establishment located. Nor will it do to say that these are all cases of fair purchase on the part of the government.

This was an action of debt, on a joint and several bond, executed by Jesse Hoyt and Thaddeus Phelps to the United States, in the penal sum of $200,000, dated December 14, 1839, which, after reciting that Hoyt had been appointed collector of the port of New-York, and had, on the 22d of March, 1S3S. given a bond to the United States, with six sureties, -in the penalty of $150,000, conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties, and also had, on the 30th of November,…

<p>[This was an action at law by the United States against Thomas Anderson.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,448.</p> <p>Indictment — Place of Committing Offence — Out of Jurisdiction of Ant State— Allegations — Assault.</p> <p>An indictment purporting to be founded on section 5346 of the Revised Statutes, charging .the commission of an assault with a dangerous weapon, on board-a vessel belonging in whole or in part to a citizen of the United States, alleged the assault to have taken place “in the harbor of Guantanamo, in the island of Cuba,” but did not allege that that place was out of the jurisdiction of any state of the United States. Beld, upon the authority of U. S. v. Jackelow, 1 Black [66 U. S.) 484, that the indictment was bad, for want of such allegation/</p> <p>[Cited in Com. v. Clancy, 154 Mass. 133, 27 N. E. 1001.)</p>

The defendant [Alexander McKim Andrews] was indicted under the second section of an act of congress, passed the 10th of May, 1800 [2 Stat. 70], which is in these words; “It shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States, or other person residing therein, to serve on board any vessel of the United States, employed or made use of in the transportation or carrying of slaves from one foreign country or place to another; and any such citizen or other person, voluntarily…

The defendant [James Anderson] was brought in by the marshal at the suit of the United States, upon a ca. sa. for debt; and applied for the benefit of the prison bounds, and tendered a bond with sufficient sureties.

This was a libel filed by the district attorney of the United States, to enforce a forfeiture, under the acts of congress passed in relation to passenger vessels.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] The libel in this case was filed in the district court, on the 27th of December 1853, against the barque Anna, a foreign vessel, belonging to the port of Bremen. It claimed a forefeiture of the vessel, for a violation of the acts of congress relating to the transportation of passengers to the United States from foreign countries.

The defendant [Susan B. Anthony], a female, was indicted for a violation of the 19th section of the act of May 31st, 1870 (16 Stat. 144), which provides, “that if, at any election for representative * * in the congress of the United States, any person shall knowingly * * vote without having a lawful right to vote, * * every such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime, and shall, for such crime, be liable to prosecution in any court of the United States of competent…

<p>Case No. 14,461.</p> <p>Forfeiture — Shipping—Illegal Registrt— Innocent Purchaser.</p> <p>The ship Anthony Mangin had been registered as an American vessel, when she belonged in part to a foreigner. She was afterwards sold for a valuatle consideration to a person ignorant of the fraud whien had been committed, and was afterwards libelled as forfeited to the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S v. The Laurel, Case No. 15,-569.]</p>

This was an indictment, under section 3290 of the Revised Statutes, and charged a removal of a certain quantity of “distilled spirits,” on which the tax had not been paid, to a place other than the distillery warehouse. The defendant [James Anthony] demurred to the indictment, on the ground that it did not charge any offence.

<p>Case No. 14,463.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Insufficient Returns — Extra Assessments.</p> <p>[Rev. St. § 3887. provides for returns by cigar manufacturers. Id. §§ 3371, 3396. authorize the commissioner of internal revenue, on information that cigars have been made without payment of the tax due thereon, to make an assessment for the tax omitted to be paid. A cigar manufacturer reported the amount of cigars made, showing the use of 38 pounds of leaf tobacco for every 1,000 cigars manufactured. The reports of other manufacturers showed an average use of about 24 pounds of leaf tobacco for every 1,000 cigars made. Held, in an action to recover an extra assessment made under such circumstances, that where the manufacturer offered evidence that his cigars were of a larger size than usual, and required a greater number, of pounds of leaf tobacco to the 1,000 cigars, it was for the jury to determine whether such evidence rebutted the presumption which the returns of other manufacturers raised against defendant.]</p>

Trespass quare clausum fregit. The parties agreed to a statement of facts, the substance of which is as follows; A certain block of brick buildings, situate on CustomHouse street, in Boston, was… Held: that a use for six years was sufficient to found the presumption of dedication. Trustees of Rughby Charity v. Mer-ryweather, 11 East, 376, note; Jarvis v. Dean, 3 Bing. 447; Rex v. Barr, 4 Camp. 16.

Archer in his life time became bound as “surety” to the United States for the payment by Mifflin and another, as “principals” of certain joint and several bonds. Suits were brought jointly against all the obligors and judgment so obtained on them; but before satisfaction was procured the principals became insolvent and the surety died. The present suits, bills in equity, were brought after the surety’s death to recover the amount of the judgments outof his estate.

<p>Case No. 14,464a.</p> <p>Prize— Residence of Owner — Ship’s Papers— At what Time Belligerent Rights Commence —Actual Hostilities — Rights of Lotal Mortgagee — Recording of Mortgage.</p> <p>[1. The uncontradicted testimony of the owner of a captured vessel that he lives in Virginia, together with a showing that he had, in a mortgage of the vesse», stated that he was of that state, is sufficient to show that he was a citizen thereof at thé time of the capture of the vessel.]</p> <p>[2. The existence of a state of war such as would justify the capture of a vessel belonging to a resident of Virginia, dated from the beginning of hostilities, the closing of the federal courts, and the opposition 1;o the execution of the laws of the Union by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, such as justified the exercise of belligerent rights by the government, and not from the passage or adoption of the ordinance of secession of Virginia j</p> <p>[3. The interest of a loyal citizen in a vessel, based on a mortgage made to him by the owner before the outbreak of hostilities, and regularly recorded under the act of congress, and indorsed on the certificate of enrollment, should not be condemned because the interest of the mortgagor, a citizen of Virginia, is subject to condemnation.]</p>

The libel is in the common technical form. The vessel and cargo are proceeded against as “belonging to the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or to persons being subjects thereof, and as such, or otherwise, liable to confiscation and condemnation,” &c. It is conceded, and if it were not, it appears by the papers found on board, and exhibited by the captors, that both vessel and cargo are bona fide the property of •citizens of the United States;…

[This was a claim by Dolores Risego Ar-mijo and others, heirs of José Francisco Ar-mijo, for the rancho Las Tolenas, three square leagues in Solano county, granted March 10, 1840, by Juan B. Alvarado to José Francisco Armijo. Claim filed February 0, 1852. Rejected by the commission August 8, ¡1854. Confirmed by the district court on appeal at the June term, 1857. Case No. 530. Confirmation affirmed by the supreme court on1 appeal by the United States. Case unreported.

<p>Case No. 14,466a.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Federal Courts— Libel or Forfeiture.</p> <p>[1. The jurisdiction of the federal courts in admiralty includes cases of seizure and forfeiture on tide waters without as well as within the United States noi is that jurisdiction intercepted by the existence of a foreign territorial authority over the place where the seizure was made. No legal exception can be taken by an American citizen to this fact, even if it might be a subject of reclamation by such foreign government.]</p> <p>[2. In libels of forfeiture in rem, it is sufficient to describe the offense and the method of its commission in the words of the statute creating it. It is not essential to aver the manner or agency by which the property was arrested, unless it be in prize cases.]</p>

The prisoner [James H. Armstrong] was indicted for the murder of William Thompson, by wilfully and maliciously striking him on the head with a hatchet, while on the high seas, on board a vessel of the United States called the bark Kelly, of which wound Thompson afterwards died on shore within the United States.

The defendant [Christopher Armstrong] was tried upon several indictments framed under the two last clauses of the first section of the act of congress of 3d March, 1823 (3 Stat. 771), entitled “An act for the punishment of frauds committed on the government of the United States.” Each indictment contained two counts.

This was an action of debt on a bond for the payment of duties. The defendants pleaded as follows: “Rhode Island District ss. — Circuit Court, November Term, 1812.

Indictment against the defendants [James Ashton and others] for an endeavor to commit a revolt on board the ship Merrimack, of Boston, on the high seas. Plea, not guilty. At the trial it appeared, that the ship sailed from Boston on Saturday, 23d of August, 1834, on a voyage to Rio Janeiro, under the command of Capt. Eldridge.

[Error to tbe district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] This was an action of indebitatus assump-sit, for money had and received by the defendants [Astley and Brooks], to the use of the United States, brought in the district court.

2 [The defendant was put upon trial for obtaining the fishing bounty for the schooner Waldemar, of Provincetown, by making a false declaration in an oath, required by law, before the collector of Barnstable.

<p>[This was an action at law by the United States against William C. Atwill on a recognizance.]</p>

Indictment for disturbing the religious worship of a society of Methodists, under the 4th section of the act “for the effectual suppression of vice,” &c., passed 26th December, 1792 (Old Rev. Code, p. 287; New Rev. Code, p. 276); by which if any person shall maliciously disturb any congregation, assembled in any place of religious worship, he may be put under restraint during religious worship by any justice present, who may cause the offender to find two securities for his…

<p>Case No. 14,477.</p> <p>Slave Trade — Evidence—Judicial Notice.</p> <p>[1. A vessel was purchased and fitted out ostensibly for a short whaling voyage, but her outfit, admitted to be nearly complete, was entirely inadequate for such a voyage; her meat being deficient in quantity, and a large part of it tainted. No adequate preparations had been made forshipping such experienced officers and crew as were indispensable for a whaling voyage. The whaling business had ceased to be generally profitable, and her pretended voyage would have exposed a whaler, but not a slaver, to capture by Confederate cruibers. She had an immense quantity of salt, and -an excess of rice, corn, beans, and firewood, for a whaling voyage, with an unusual quantity of water, partly in oil casks, all suitable for a slaver. Held, that she was fitted out with the intent to employ her in the slave trade, within the meaning of Act March 22.- 1794, § 2 (1 Stat. 349), and Act April 20, 1818 (3 Stat. 450). and must, with her tackle and lading, be declared forfeited to the United States.]</p> <p>[2. Where a libed in rem against a pretended whaling vessel by the United States charges that she is being fitted out with the intent to employ her in the slave trade, a court of admiralty will take judicial .notice of the fact that the projected voyage would have exposed a whaler, but not a slaver, to capture by Confederate cruisers.]</p> <p>[See The Augusta, Case No. 647.]</p>

Assumpsit to recover of [ Arthur‘W. Austin] the defendant $13,990.60, alleged to be due from him as collector of the port of Boston and Charlestown, on the settlement of his accounts with the treasury department. The defendant Dleaded the general issue, and claimed a set-off.

<p>Case No. 14,478.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Prosecution for Violations — Failure to Make Entry in Books.</p> <p>It is no defence for a dealer in leaf tobacco, to a charge of violating the provision of section 76 of the act of Julv, 1868 [15 Stat. 158], in not making proper entries in the book, form 77, that his bookkeeper had neglected to make the entries. The principal is criminally responsible. Held to await action of grand jury.</p>

<p>This was an information in the nature of a quo warranto, brought on the relation of John Bigler, to oust the defendant [John M. Avery] from the office of assessor of internal revenue for the Fourth district of California. It was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and the facts as stated in the findings are as follows: I. That' in the month of February, 1803, the defendant was duly appointed assessor of internal revenue for the Fourth district of California, and thereupon, being first duly qualified therefor, did enter upon such office, and perform the duties and receive the emoluments thereof, continuously,' until October 20, 1866. II. That on September 19, 1866, in the recess of the senate, John Bigler was duly commissioned by the president assessor of internal revenue for the district aforesaid, “for the time being, and until the end of next session of the senate of the United States, and no longer.” III. That on October 20, 1866, said Bigler, having first taken the oath of office prescribed by law, did demand of the said defendant the surrender of the books and papers pertaining and belonging to the office aforesaid, then in the possession and control of said defendant, who then refused to surrender or deliver the same to said Bigler; and at the date of filing the information herein. still so refused. IV. That from and after October 20, 1866, and at and after the filing of the information herein, the defendant claimed to be the legal incumbent of the office aforesaid, by virtue of his appointment and qualification aforesaid, and that during the periods last aforesaid, did act as assessor of internal revenue of the district aforesaid, and deny that said Bigler, by virtue of the commission granted to him as aforesaid, or otherwise, had or acquired any right to enter upon such office, or exercise the powers or perform the duties thereof. V. That during the session of the senate next following the issuing of the commission to Bigler as aforesaid. the president nominated said Bigler for the office aforesaid, but the senate refused to consent to such nomination, and rejected the same; and that afterwards, during the session of the senate last aforesaid, the president nominated T. J. Blakeny for the office aforesaid, to which nomination the senate then consented, and thereupon said Blakeny was duly commissioned as assessor for the district aforesaid. YI. That on March 9, 1867, W. C. Felch was duly appointed assistant assessor for a portion of the district aforesaid; and that at the date of such appointment, said Blakeny was absent from the state of California, and had not then entered upon the office aforesaid, and therefore said Felch was authorized by law to act as assessor of the district for the time being. VII. That on March 14, 1S67. and while said Felch was acting as assessor as aforesaid, he demanded of the defendant the possession of said office and the books and papers pertaining thereunto; and the defendant then surrendered and delivered the same to said Felch, as required.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,483.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,482.</p> <p>COUNTERFEITING — RESEMBLANCE TO GENUINE — Ordinary Caution.</p> <p>1. In order to make counterfeiting an offence, within the act of congress (Act 1825, c. 65, § 20 [4 Stat. 121]), it is not necessary for the prosecution to shot! that the prisoner made the base in exact resemblance of the true coin.</p> <p>2. The words “similitude” and “resemblance,” as used in that statute, must he construed to mean, not an exact copy, but such a one as might deceive an ordinary observer.</p> <p>3. If the spurious article had not a resemblance strong enough to deceive persons exercising ordinary caution, then the passing was not a public crime.</p>

Mr. Henry Hitchcock presented the following: And now comes William Orton, and moves the court to vacate the order granting a subpoena duces tecum for him to appear in said court, and bring with him the papers and books therein mentioned,- for the reason that the order granting such subpoena was improvidently made.

[This was an action by the United States against Orville E. Babcock.] On the trial, one Everest, a witness. on the part of the government, and a confessed conspirator, testified that he had procured, at the instance of Joyce, from the United.

The testimony in the case being closed, the defendant’s counsel moved that the court instruct the jury that, there being no evidence, or no sufficient evidence to convict the defendant [Orville E. Babcock], it was their duty to return a verdict of not guilty. This motion was argued by Messrs. Porter and Storrs, for defendant, and by Messrs.

<p>Case Wo. 14,487.</p> <p>CONSPIRACY — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — DECLARATIONS OP CONSPIRATORS — TESTIMONY or Accomplices.</p> <p>1. What is necessary in order to constitute a conspiracy; essentia] to prove some one of the overt acts as charged. Guilty knowledge and participation necessary, but same may be proved by circumstantial evidence.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Howell. 56 Fed. 32; U. S. v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. 702.]</p> <p>2. Necessity of showing motive, where the evidence is circumstantial.</p> <p>3.The testimony of Everest and Magill, as to the mailing, at the instance of Joyce, of an envelope to the defendant containing a $500 bill, and the subsequent withdrawing of it from the letter-box, and the returning of it to Joyce, analyzed, and its effect stated.</p> <p>4. The dispatches, correspondence, and testimony of the president, with regard to the app'oint-emnt of a successor tc Collector Ford, grouped for the convenience of the jury, and the questions arising thereon stated.</p> <p>5. The dispatches and correspondence which took place at the time of Joyce’s trip to California, grouped, and the respective theories of the prosecution and defence with reference thereto stated.</p> <p>6. The dispatches and testimony relating to the contemplated visit of inspection by Brooks and Hogue to the St. Louis distilleries; and also those in regard to the projected transfer of revenue officers, grouped for the convenience of the jury.</p> <p>7. After the indictment of McDonald, one of the conspirators, letters were sent to him by the defendant through Major Grimes. ' Neither the prosecution nor the defendant produced the letters. or proved their contents. Beld, that the jury were not at liberty to conjecture what their contents were, but were to receive the fact as a circumstance that the defendant and this conspirator were in correspondence with each other about some matter undisclosed, and might consider the time when the correspondence took place, and the manner in which it occurred.</p> <p>8. The acts and declarations of conspirators are not, of themselves, evidence to connect a third person with the conspiracy; but, if such third person is shown "to have been a member of the conspiracy, then telegraphic dispatches of fellow conspirators, among themselves or to others, sent for the purpose of promoting the objects of the conspiracy, become evidence against him.</p> <p>9. The credit to be given to the testimony of the accomplices stated.</p> <p>10. Some rules laid down for the guidance of the jury in determining the credibility of witnesses.</p> <p>11. The effect to be given to evidence of good character of the defendant stated.</p> <p>12. In cases where the evidence tending to show guilt is wholly circumstantial, the following rules are laid down: 1. The hypothesis of delinquency or guilt of the offence charged in the indictment should flow naturally from the'facts proved, and be consistent with them all. 2. The evidence must be such ns to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of his guilt of the of-fence imputed to him: or. in other words, the facts proved must all be consistent with and point to bis gudf only, but they must be inconsistent with h's innocence. People v. Bennett, 49 N. T. 144. If the evidence can be reconciled either with the theory of innocence or of guilt, 1 lie law requires the jury to give the accused the benefit of the doubt, and to adopt the former. Tlie burden of proof does not shift in criminal cases: it is on the prosecution throughout to establish the defendant's guilt by the evidence, and, in criminal cases, the defendant, not being permitted to testify, cannot be called upon to explain or produce any proof, until the prosecution, by tlie evidence it actually produces, establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.</p> <p>13. The law clothes a person accused of crime with a presumption of innocence, which attends and protects bint until it is overcome by testimony which proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt — “beyond a reasonable doubt” — which means that tne evidence of his guilt, as charged, must be clear, positive and abiding, fully satisfying the minds and consciences of the jury. It is not sufficient, in a criminal case, to justify a verdict of guilty, that there may be strong suspicions. or ever, strong probabilities, of guilt, nor, as in civil eases. <t preponderance of evidence in favor of the truth of the charge against the defendant: but. what the law requires, is proof, by legal and credible evidence, of such a nature that, when it is all considered by the jury, giving to it its natural effect, they feel, when they have weighed and considered it all, a clear, undoubting and entirely satisfactory conviction of the defendant's guilt.</p> <p>[Cited in brief m State v. Shaeffer. 89 Mo. 274, I S. TV. 293.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,488.</p> <p>Perjury — Extra-Judicial Oaths — Usage—Ministerial Oppiceb — Indictment— Falsity— Motive.</p> <p>1. Where a clerk of a circuit court administers an oath as to the travel of a witness, which is not required by law, nor by a rule of court, it is not false swearing, under the act of congress.</p> <p>[Cited in Com. v. Kimball, 103 Mass. 476.]</p> <p>2. The oath must be required by law, or by usage, sanctioned by the court, or the department of the government, to make it perjury.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Howard, 37 Fed. 667.)</p> <p>3. The act of congress applies to oaths made in behalf of claims against one of the departments of the government.</p> <p>4. A ministerial officer can not institute a usage, which shall bring a case within the law.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Evans, 2 Fed. 152.]</p> <p>5. A voluntary or extra-judicial oath is not perjury.</p> <p>6. The indictment should charge that the oath was false, and known to be so by the witness.</p> <p>[Cited in Downey v. Dillon, 52 Ind. 449.]</p> <p>7. Also, the motive must be stated in the indictment to be corrupt, or words equivalent.</p> <p>[Cited in Downey v. Dillon, 52 Ind. 449.]</p>

This was an information of debt filed by the district attorney to recover a penalt.v against the defendants for resisting a revenue officer. There were two counts in the information, one founded on the act of February 18, 1793 c. 8, § 31 [1 Stat. 316], for a penalty of 500 dollars; and the other on the act of March 3, 1S23, c. 58, § 3, for a penalty of four hundred dollars. The verdict was for the plaintiffs.

This was an indictment against the defendant for an obstruction of one Nehemiah Jones, an inspector of the customs, in the duties of his office.

<p>Case No. 14,491.</p> <p>United States — Claim against Decedent’s Estate — State Probate Law — Priority— Limitation — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>1. A state regulation that the estates of deceased persons shall be settled in the probate court, which shall appoint commissioners to adjust the claims against the estate, and prescribe the time within such claims must be presented, and if not presented, shall be barred, is not obligatory on the federal government, in the collection of its debts.</p> <p>[See Backus v. The Marengo, Case No. 713.]</p> <p>2. The amount claimed has been adjusted by the accounting department of the government, and must be collected under its own laws.</p> <p>3. It has a priority of daim, and cannot, therefore. do any injustice to general creditors by enforcing its claim. A law of a state, which gives eighteen months before suit can be brought against executors, does not apply to a demand by the federal government.</p> <p>4. If the act could be so construed, it would be in conflict with acts of congress, and would consequently be inoperative.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 14,492.</p> <p>Qci Tam Action — Special Agent — Entrt op Satisfaction — Motion to Set Aside.</p> <p>C., as special agent of the post-office department, prosecuted an action given by statute, as well for himself as for the United States, to final judgment, against T., the avails of which, as to costs, would belong to him alone, and, as to damages, to him and the United States, in equal parts. The bond of T. and B., running to the United States alone, was taken in satisfaction of such, judgment. A large part of the sum due on the bond was paid, and, out of it, the costs of the suit, belonging to C., were paid, and the balance was divided between him and the United States. Suit was then brought by the United States, on the bond, to recover the balance due on it, and judgment was obtained. Satisfaction of such judgment was entered, without payment made, by the law officers of the United States, by direction of the post-office department. C. moved to set aside the entry of satisfaction. BeZeZ, that the motion must be denied.</p> <p>[See Bacon t. Stark, Case No. 715.]</p>

Proceeding by mandamus to compel the officers of the town of Amboy, Lee county, in this state, to audit and report to the proper officers of the county of Lee certain judgments recovered in this court by Bolles & Co., against the town of Amboy.

Criminal information [against Berry Bag-well] for carrying on the business of a distiller without having given bond as required by law. There was a second count for retailing which was abandoned.

<p>Case No. 14,495.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Powers of Congress — Federal Territorial Jurisdiction — Indian Country within State — Murder.</p> <p>1. The powers of the federal government are limited.</p> <p>2. It possesses no powers but such as have been delegated.</p> <p>3. Congress have power to regulate commerce among the Indian tribes, which affords a wide scope for legislation.</p> <p>4. Under a similar power, as regards foreign nations, congress have passed non-intercourse, embargo, and other acts which are admitted to be constitutional.</p> <p>5. Congress have a right to select the means, which have a direct relation to the object, in the regulation of commerce with the. Indians.</p> <p>6. Such are the provisions of the intercourse law of 1802 [2 Stat. 139],</p> <p>7. But congress cannot under this investure of power exercise a general jurisdiction, over an Indian territory'within a state.</p> <p>rCited in XT. S. v. Ward. Case No. 16.639.]</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Doxtater, 47 Was. 292, 2 N. W. 447.]</p> <p>8. In a territory of the United States where congress possesses the legislative power, there can be no objection to the power.</p> <p>9. Congress cannot punish for an offence, within the Indian territory, in a state, which has no relation to the Indians, and which cannot affect their commerce..</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Ward, Case No. 16,639.]</p> <p>10. The act. of 1817 [3 Stat..383], which assumes to exercise a general jurisdiction over Indian countries, within a state, is unconstitutional, and of no effect.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Sa-coo-da-cot, Case No. 16.-212. Disapproved in U. S. v. Partello, 48 Fed. 674.]</p> <p>[Disapproved in State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 358, 55 N. W. 555.]</p> <p>11. The crime of murder charged against a white man for killing another white man, in the Cherokee country, within the state of Tennessee, cannot be punished in the courts of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Sa-coo-da-cot, Case No. 16,-212; Ex parte Sloan, Id. 12,944.]</p>

[Bill in equity by the United States against George M. Bain, Jr., and others.] The bill complains of the defendant’s dock in front of Randolph street, in Gosport, as an obstruction of a highway, and prays for an appropriate restraining order. Before the year 1792 the site of the town of Gosport (now a part of the city of Portsmouth) was a common belonging to the state of Virginia.

Habeas corpus to Commodore [WilliamJ Bainbridge to bring up the body of Robert Treadwell, an infant, of the age of twenty years, and about eleven months. Held: not by virtue of his original engagement, strictly speaking, but by the sentence of a competent tribunal, in consequence of the crime that he committed. If his original contract with his country was an invalid one, he ought to have pleaded the disability which rendered it such, at the time he was arraigned.

The defendant in this ease [Garniss E. Baker] was convicted of an offence under the national banking act. After the verdict, a motion was made to set it aside on the ground, among others, that one of the jurors was deaf and did not and could not hear the evidence, and that the defendant was ignorant. at the time the jury were sworn and empanelled, of the deafness of the juror.

[This was an action at law by the United States against Richard Baker, Jr., to recover the value of certain sugar claimed to be forfeited.]

<p>Case No. 14,501.</p> <p>Crimes on High Seas — Jurisdiction—District where First Brought — Robbery — Piracy — Confederate Privateer — Belligerent Rights —Recognition.</p> <p>1. Semble, that, under the fourteenth section of the act of March 3d, 1825, 14 Stat. 118,) which provides that the trial of all offences which shall be committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere, out of the limits of any state or district, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may be first brought, an offender captured on the high seas by a public armed vessel of the' United States, and ordered to New York for trial, and put on board of a vessel destined for Hampton Roads, and taken to Hampton Roads, and there transferred to another vessel by which he is taken to New York, where he is arrested for the offence, is not to be regarded as having been brought into the district in which Hampton Roads is situated.</p> <p>2. That provision of the fourteenth section is in the alternative, and, under it, an offender may be tried either in the district into which he is first brought, or in the district in which he is apprehended, under lawful authority, for trial for the offence.</p> <p>3. The third section of the act of May 15th, 1820, (3 Stat. 600,) in regard to robbery on the high seas, applies to all persons, whether citizens or foreigners.</p> <p>4. The ninth section of the act of April 30th, 1790, (1 Stat. 114,) in regard to piracy or robbery on the high seas, applies only to citizens and not to foreigners.</p> <p>5. A nation at war may commission private armed vessels to carry on war against its enemy on the high seas, and the commission will afford protection, even in the judicial tribunals of the enemy, against a charge of the crime of robbery or piracy.</p> <p>6. Such a commission would be a good de-fence against an indictment under the third section of the act of 1820.</p> <p>7. The ninth section of the act of 1790 changes that rule, as it respects citizens of the United States who take service under a commission to a private armed vessel from the enemy of their country.</p> <p>8. The term “robbery.” as used in the third section of the act of 1820, means, the felonious taking of the goods or property of another, of any value, from his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear.</p> <p>9. A felonious taking means a taking with a wrongful intent to appropriate the goods of another.</p> <p>10. The taking, to be within said third section, need not be a taking which, if upon the high seas, would amount to piracy according to the law of nations.</p> <p>11. Piracy according to the law of nations, defined.</p> <p>12. Until the legislative and executive departments of the United States government recognize the existence of a new foreign government, the courts of the United States cannot do so; and the same doctrine anplies to the erection of a new government within the limits and against the authority of the government of the United States.</p> <p>• 13. The courts must look to the acts of those departments ns evidence on the question of such recognition.</p>

This was an indictment against [Samuel] Baker for an assault and battery upon W. Howard, who entered Baker’s house with the officer who had an execution against the goods of Baker, at the suit of Barry. Howard accompanied the officer at the request of the plaintiff, and as his agent to show the goods to the officer

<p>Claim [by the heirs of Edward A. Bale] for four leagues of land [the Rancho Carne Humana] in Napa county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.</p>

The offence is charged in the information in the following words: “One James Z. Ballard, late of Detroit aforesaid, did knowingly by means of a certain false representation effect an entry into the United States of certain merchandise, to wit, one brown horse, by payment of less than the amount of duty legally due thereon.” .

<p>Case Wo. 14,507.</p> <p>Limitation of Actions — Criminal Prosecutions —Second Indictment — Perjort.</p> <p>1. The thirty-second section of the act of congress of April 30, 1790 [1 Stat. 119], applies to offences created after, as well as before, the act.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Six Fermenting.Tubs. Case No. 16,296.]</p> <p>2. The indictment, or information, must be found within the limitation of the statute.</p> <p>3. An indictment within the two years, on which a nolle prosequi was entered, cannot save • the statute.</p> <p>4. A second indictment has no connection with the first</p> <p>5. In no sense can the second be considered as an amendment of the first.</p>

These were indictments numbered from 1 to 54, inclusive, for breaches of the revenue laws of the United States.

<p>Case No. 14,610.</p> <p>Grants — Railroad Concession — Right op Wat over Government Lands — Contract — License — Revocation—Equitable Estoppel.</p> <p>1.Under the act of March 3, 1819 [3 Stat. 520], authorizing the secretary of war to sell “such military sites belonging to the United States as may have been found or become useless for military purposes.” and the act of 28th April, 1828 [4 Stat. 264], authorizing the president to “sell forts, arsenals, dockyards, lighthouses, or any property held by the United Stares for like purposes,” the secretary of war had authority to execute the agreement it made with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company on the 5th November, 1838, conceding to the company “authority to construct their railroad along and over their property” at Harper’s Perry, Virginia.</p> <p>2. The grant by congress to the president, of a right to dispose of the full title in fee in real property, implies the grant of all minor powers, and these powers may be exercised by the secretary of war as agent of the president.</p> <p>3. Where, under a contract perpetual in its purport, a license to use property for specific purposes is not specially restricted, and is coupled with an interest which was necessary to the possession and enjoyment of the rights acquired under the permission, the license is not revocable as long as the interest exists; and though the fee simple remains in the grantor, the right to use is paramount to the fee, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies against the grantor.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Hillsdale College v. Rideout, 82 Mich. 95. 46 N. W. 373.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,511.</p> <p>Income Tax — Liability op City — Loan in Aid op Railroad.</p> <p>[1. Where a railroad company agrees to pay the interest on bonds issued by a city for the purpose of raising funds for a loan to tne company, and makes a mortgage to the city to secure performance of its agreement, the bonds so issued binding the city alone, the interest paid by the company belongs to the city, and is not subject to the 5 per cent, income tax imposed by the internal revenue act.]</p> <p>[2. The income of a corporation is not liable to the 5 per cent, tax provided by the internal revenue act of 1864.]</p> <p>[3. The federal government has no power to tax agencies employed by a municipal corporation in the exercise of its legitimate powers.]</p> <p>[4. An advance of money by a city to aid in the construction of a railroad to that city is the exercise of a legitimate municipal power.]</p>

<p>[Contempt proceedings by the United States ex rel. Leonard C. Hyde, assignee, against Edward W. Bancroft and Michael Steiner, for violation of an injunction.]</p>

On the first day of this term, the president and directors of the Marine Insurance Company obtained a rule on the president and directors of the Bank of Alexandria, to show cause on the sixth day of this term why a mandamus should not issue commanding the president and directors of the Bank of Alexandria to admit the president and directors of the insurance company to subscribe for twenty-five of the unsubscribed shares of the augmented capital stock of the bank. showed, for…

Motion to quash sales of real estate on execution, determined before the Hon. BENJAMIN JOHNSON,- District Judge, holding the circuit court; the Hon. PETER V. DANIEL, absent.

<p>Indictment for an endeavour to make a revolt on board the brig Aptborp, at Nantasket Roads in Boston harbour. Plea, “Not guilty.”</p> <p>At the trial it appeared, that George Barker was the mate of the ship, and the other defendants were of the crew. They had signed the shipping articles in Charleston, South Carolina, for a voyage “to two or.three ports of discharge and lading in Europe, and back to a final port of discharge in the United States.” Michael C. Bowden was master for the voyage. The vessel went to her ports in Europe, took in a cargo of salt at St. Ubes, and came back to Boston as her port of, destination. Before her arrival the owners in Boston had directed a letter to the master, ordering him not to come into Boston har-bour, but to proceed to Alexandria in the District of Columbia, and there land his cargo. The letter was dated several days before the arrival of the brig, and 'was delivered to a pilot, who delivered it to the master, while the brig was at sea, three miles out beyond the Boston light-house. The master was at this time quite ill, having spit blood; and he concluded' to go into Nantasket Roads and procure, with the consent of the owners, a new master for the voyage to Alexandria. He accordingly anchored the brig in Nantas-ket Roads, went on shore, and with the consent of the owners he was discharged, and a new master appointed. He came on board with the new master, explained to the mate and crew the situation of the brig and his orders, and showed them, that, by their shipping paper, they were bound to go the voyage to Alexandria, as the voyage was to the final port of discharge. The mate at first expressed himself doubtingly whether to go or not, but finally refused; and the crew, notwithstanding every solicitation, refused to go the voyage. No actual orders were given to go to sea, although the brig was then ready, and the new master had all his clothes and papers and trunk on board. There was no actual proof, that the mate acted in concert with the crew, or that the latter acted by a previous combination. Some of them pleaded ill health, and were discharged; and new hands were shipped in their stead. The others separated themselves and remained together, until they were removed on shore under a warrant, and when brought before a magistrate they all refused to go on board again, though he explained to them their obligations. A new crew was then shipped, and the brig went to Alexandria with her cargo.</p> <p>argued, that there was no crime in the transaction, there being no intention to do wrong, and the of-fence resulting from an incorrect understanding of the law as to what was meant by a “final port of discharge.” They knew that the vessel was bound from St. Ubes to Boston, which port they entered, and supposed that port must be the end of the voyage, and it appeared, that one man, shipping for Boston only, without signing the papers, was here discharged. Mr. Parker contended also, that there was no offence, because there was no disobedience of an actual command, it appearing from the evidence, that the question was put to them hypothetically, as, if you are ordered, &-c.., by the new captain, will you obey? The answer was in the negative; but as no such command was given, there was no disobedience. The government had proved no combination among the men to resist a lawful command, It- appearing that each man, separately questioned, answered for himself, declining to proceed on the new voyage, but obedient to all orders, and uniformly civil in his replies. It appeared, that two men were here discharged, being unwell, and that some of the others had families, and all friends, in this neighbourhood. If discharged at Alexandria, they would be at the expense of returning to this port.</p> <p>cited 1 W. Bl. 392; 1 Strange, 144; showing, that the actual fact of a conspiracy was not necessary to be proved to constitute a conspiracy, which might be inferred from circumstances. He argued, that a similar determination, expressed by all the men, and persisted in by them, amounted to a conspiracy, which was of an illegal character and came within the statute. That the crew had no right to infer, that Boston would be the final port of discharge, from the fact, that the vessel cleared at her last port for Boston, but that the owners possessed the right to order a vessel to any port whatever; that from the insertion of the words final port of discharge, the men must have considered it not only possible, but exceedingly probable,' that the vessel would proceed to some other port. That the men did not refuse to go the voyage so much as to obey the new master, and that the form of an order was unnecessary after a positive refusal to obey such order if given. From the nature of the circumstances there must have been a combination among the men, which was also evident from the result.</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was an action by the Unitsd States upon a certain bill qf exchange against Jacob Barker. Theie was a judgment in the district court in favor of the United States.]

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,519.</p> <p>Bills or Excfiange — Time fob Presentment — Protest and Notice.</p> <p>[1. A bill of exchange, payable at sight, must be presented within a reasonable time. Due diligence must be used, but there is no necessity for such dispatch in forwarding a. bill for acceptance as in giving noti'ce of dishonor; and in the case of a foreign bill it is not necessary to send it by the first vessel that sails for the country where the drawee resides.]</p> <p>[2. In determining whether a bill purchased by the government has been forwarded by it for acceptance, and whether notices of dishonor have been transmitted by it in proper time, some allowance may be made for the situation of the • capital, and some indulgence extended to the useful and proper forms, if not to the supercilious ceremonies of public officers.]</p> <p>[3. In giving notice of dishonor due diligence must not only have been used, but must be affirmatively shown to have been used.]</p> <p>[4. It is now settled that after the facts of time, distance of the parties, course of the post, etc., are found by the jury, it is the province of the court to determine whether due diligence has been used in giving notice of dishonor.]</p> <p>[5. Where there was a delay of nine days between the protest of a bill for nonacceptance and the first attempt to transmit notice thereof from England to America, held, that such delay ought to have been explained, and, in the- absence of an explanation, was fatal.]</p> <p>[C. If there is a regular post between two countries, which is the proper channel for transmitting notice of dishonor, it' must be proved not only that notice was put in that course of transmission. but that it was done in time for the next practicable post. Mere belief of a witness that this was done is not sufficient evidence thereof.]</p> <p>[7. A notice through the post office is only effectual where there is a regular post. Where it is known to have ceased, or where it is notoriously interrupted by reason of war or otherwise, the post is not the proper legal medium for transmitting notice. The fact of the existence of war between the two countries does not obviate the necessity for at least making an attempt to give notice by means of a licensed vessel, etc., or by transmission through another country with which both belligerents are at peace.]</p> <p>[8. Whenever the holder of a bill becomes aware of its dishonor, he is bound to transmit notice thereof, even though the protest has not yet been received by him. If the protest is received. it is proper to forward it, but notice may be given without it.]</p> <p>[9. Where a protest for nonacceplance and a protest for nonpayment were both received at the same time, held, that transmission of notice of the nonpayment alone was not sufficient. A protest for nonpayment can never supply the place of a protest for nonacceptance, where the bill has been presented.]</p> <p>[10. Where notices of dishonor of a bill of exchange were in the hands of the secretary of the treasury on the 7th. and he wrote a letter, inclosing the notices, on the 8th. which could only be placed in the mail of the 9th. held, that this was sufficient, in view of the delays incident to governmental business, but that transmission by the mail of the 10th would have been too late.]</p> <p>[11. Where notices of dishonor are transmitted through agents, the time for giving notice cannot be extended by giving an additional day ! to each agent. The notice must be transmitted within the time allowed to the principal.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 14,519.]</p>

The jury were sworn to try four actions, on four different bills of exchange, drawn in New lork, on Liverpool and London, by Jacob Barker, indorsed by the defer .lant’s intestate, [A. Barker,] and purchased in New York by the treasurer of the United States for the use of the United States. Two of the bills were dated the 30th of July, 1814, one for £8,040. 6s. ’5d. sterling, and the other for £10,000 sterling.

<p>Case No. 14,522.</p> <p>Voters — Right to Register — Conviction of CoUNTERFE ITING — lNDICTM E NT.</p> <p>1. The law's of the state of New York do not deprive of the right of suffrage a person who has been convicted in a court of the United States of the offence of uttering a counterfeited security of the United States, such offence being created by section 5431. Rev. St. U. S.</p> <p>2. An indictment will not lie. in a United States court in New York, against a person for having fraudulently registered at a registry of voters in New York, for an election for representatives in congress, when he was disqualified as a voter by reason of having been convicted of a felony, where the conviction set forth is for having committed the offence created by section 5431. Rev. St. U. S., of uttering a counterfeited security of the United States.</p>

Indictment for stealing a horse, the property of Col. Thomas Lee. It was objected, on the trial, that the property was not in Thomas Lee, but belonged to the estate of Calvin Washington, deceased. But it being proved that Thomas Lee had the possession and management of that estate,

This was an action brought agáinst the defendant [Harvey Barnes] to recover the value of certain sugars imported by him, on the alleged ground that he had made the entry by means of false papers, and thereby had forfeited the value of the goods to the United States. On a trial before a jury a verdict was found in favor of the United States. The defendant made a motion for a new trial.

<p>Case No. 14,524.</p> <p>Federal Courts — Criminal Jurisdiction — Foh-oerv — Bond—Precincts of Custom House.</p> <p>1. The federal courts cannot resort to the common law as a source of criminal jurisdiction, and cannot try any offences except such as are in some form prohibited by the constitution or by act of congress.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 205.]</p> <p>2. The crime of forgery, denounced in the first and second causes of the 1st section of the act ■of March 3d. 1823 (3 Stat. 771). is confined to instruments designed to obtain money from the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Lawrence, Case No. 15.572; U. S. v. Albert. 45 Fed. 556; U. S. v. Moore, 60 Fed. 739.]</p> <p>3. An indictment for uttering, within the precincts of the custom oouse in the city of New York, a false and fraudulent bond purporting to be given to the United States under the 61st section of the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 245), relating to the exportation of distilled spirits, cannot be sustained under the said 1st section of the act of March 3d, 1823.</p> <p>4. Nor can an indictment for forging such bond within such precincts, be sustained under the 3d section of the act of March 3d, 1825 (4 Stat. 115). That act is confined to offences committed in places, the sites whereof had been ceded to, and were undt'r the jurisdiction of, the United States, at the time of its enactment. The case of U. S. v. Paul, 6 Pet. [31 U. S.] 141, cited and applied.</p> <p>[Cited in Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug. (Mich.)</p>

<p>Case No. 14,525.</p> <p>Obstructing Carriage of Mail — Lien on Houses —United States.</p> <p>1. The United States government cannot be sued.</p> <p>2. The lien of a private citizen against horses for their liverage cannot be enforced in a manner to stop the passage of the United States mail in a stage-coach drawn by the horses.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. "Wilder. Case No. 16.694; U. S. v Sears, 55 Fed. 270.]</p> <p>[Cited in Briggs Lightboats, 11 Allen, 182.]</p>

Indictment [against Hugh A. Barr] for having counterfeit coin in possession, knowing the same to be false. Motion in arrest of judgment.

<p>Case No. 14,526.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Liquor—Sale without License — Intent to Defraud.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,529.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Treasury Regulations.</p> <p>1. A ■ regulation of the treasury department, made in pursuance of an act of congress, becomes a part of the law. and is of the same force as if incorporated in the body of the act itself.</p> <p>2. Under the internal revenue laws of July 13, I860. § 94 [14 Stat. 128]. and March 3. 1865, § 61 [13 Stat. 472], when oil is transported from one district to another, under a transportation bond, the duty is assessed and paid on any deficiency or reduction of the number of gallons received at the warehouse, from the number of gallons as stated in the bond at the place of shipment, less the per centum for leakage allowed by the treasury department. And this is so, although there has been an absolute loss by solar heat, or the action of the elements.</p> <p>3. The law has provided a rule regulating the allowance for leakage, from which, however great the hardship, it is not the province of the courts to depart.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,528.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Tobacco Manufacturer’s Bond — Surety—Laches.</p> <p>1. It is no defence to an action by the government, upon a bond given by a tobacco manufacturer, to recover an amount of duties, that the government seized the manufacturer’s goods as forfeited, instead of distraining upon them for the tax.</p> <p>2. Laches is not to be imputed to the government in such a case.</p>

Indictment for assault and battery on George Coryell. [Samuel Bartle], asked the witness, Preston, whether he had heard Coryell use threats to break up and injure Bartle, or any prior quarrel, in order to discredit the witness Coryell, and to mitigate the fine, which, by the law of Virginia, is to De assessed by the jury. objected, that it was not a justification, nor could be given in evidence in mitigation of the fine. But THE COURT permitted the question to be asked.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the United States to recover back the amount of a fishing bounty, paid to the defendants, as owners of the schooner Gleaner, for the fishing season of 1834. The Jury returned a special verdict.

<p>Indictment for stealing a handkerchief. Upon the prisoner being brought to the bar, he appeared to be a mulatto.</p>

On the 13th November, 1833, a warrant was issued by Judge HOPKINSON for the arrest of Henry Barton, charged on oath with swearing falsely, in a case where an oath was required from him, as the consignee of certain goods, wares and merchandise imported into the port of Philadelphia from a foreign place. On the 29th November, the defendant was brought up for hearing, and the following facts were given in evidence.

The prisoner was indicted under the eighth section of the act of congress, passed in 1790 (1 Gord.

<p>[This was a petition by Nathaniel Bassett, claiming the Rancho Los Coluses, for a confirmation of his claim.]</p> <p>Claim for four leagues of land in Butte county, confirmed by the board', and appealed by the United States.</p>

This was an amicable suit, brought by the United States, to recover a balance, supposed to be due to the plaintiffs from [Francis Bas-sett] the defendant, as clerk of the district and circuit courts of the United States for the Massachusetts district, upon his return, made to the secretary of the treasury, on January 1st, 1843, pursuant to the act of congress, passed May, 1842, making appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenditures of government.for the year 1842.

<p>Case No. 14,640.</p> <p>Pen Ai, Action — Declaration—Pleading Statute —Motion in Arrest of Judgment.</p> <p>1. In an action of debt on a penal statute the existence of the statute on which based, must be made in the declaration by direct allegation, as matter of fact. The mere assertion of a conclusion of law, as that by force of a statute, an action has accrued is insufficient.</p> <p>2. A motion in arrest of judgment based on the ground that a declaration was so defective allowed, and judgment arrested.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Seventy-Six Thousand One Hundred and Twenty-Five Cigars. 18 Fed. 151.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,541.</p> <p>Pleading at Law — Amendment—When Allowed —Carelessness op Counsel.</p> <p>1. The power to allow amendments of defective pleadings rests in the discretion of the court, to be exercised in view of the interests of the pub-lie and suitors, and all the circumstances of the cause.</p> <p>2. Carelessness of counsel in preparation of case and pleadings severely animadverted upon.</p>

Indictment for a capital offence, in being engaged in the transportation of slaves, contrary to the fourth section of the act of May 15,'1820 (chapter 113). Plea, not guilty. At the trial, the facts were substantially .as follows: It appeared that John Battiste sailed from New York, in July, 1834. in the brig America, a vessel belonging to the Messrs. Hathaway, Messrs. Swain, and Mr. Grinnell of New Bedford.

<p>Case No. 14,644.</p> <p>3. Where a prisoner is not indicted at the first term of the court, or the grand jury has ignored the bill, he is not entitled to be discharged.</p> <p>(See U. S. v. Johns, 4 U. S. (4 Dali.) 413.]</p>

The defendants are indicted for a conspiracy to commit offences against the United States in violation of the penal section of the bankrupt act (Rev. St. §§ 5132, 5440). The indictment contains two counts.

<p>Case No. 14,548.</p> <p>Penal Action — Bankkuptct—Intent—Chattel Moktgage.</p> <p>1. A criminal intent is not to be presumed, but must be proved.</p> <p>2. The doubt which will entitle a. defendant to an acquittal must be reasonable.!</p> <p>3. A chattel mortgage is a disposition of property out of the usual course of business of the mortgagor</p> <p>[For a hearing upon motion to quash an indictment against tht defendant and others for conspiracy. see Case No. 14,547.)</p>

This was a proceeding before Commissioner Hamlin against Gustavus L. Bean for delaying by arrest for debt one John G. Withee. a mail carrier, who had come to the post office for the mail for Belfast November 15. The testimony was closed on the 25th of November, and the commissioner rendered his opinion.

<p>Case No. 14,551.</p> <p>Contracts — Precedent Acts to be Done bt Plaintiff — Damages—Pleading.</p> <p>1. Wheie certain work was to be done by the-defendant, and certain things were to be done by the plaintiffs; tc enable the defendant to perform his contract, the declaration must show that the precedent acts were done, by the government, to enable it to sustain an action for damages on the contract.</p> <p>2. A demurrer reaches the first defect in pleading.</p> <p>Mr. O’Neal. U. S. Dist. Atty.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,551a.</p> <p>Al)M! RAT,TV — ATTACHMENT FOK CONTEMPT.</p> <p>[A court of admiralty lias full power to punish by fine the action of one of the parties in taking a vessel away from the custody of the court without permission.]</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Debt for a penalty of 400 dollars for a violation of the twenty-ninth section of the revenue collection act of 2d of March 1799, c. 12S [1 Story’s Laws, 598; 1 Stat. 648, c. 22]. Plea, nil debet. On the trial in the distrid court, a verdict was found for the defendant [Isaac Bearse.

On the IStb August, 1818, Thomas Bur-rowes, a purser in the navy, as principal, and Francis S. Beattie and Edward M’Gee as sureties, executed to the United States of America a joint and several bond for twenty-five thousand dollars.

Debt on statute, before PETER V. DANIEL, associate justice of the supreme court, and BENJAMIN JOHNSON, district judge, holding the circuit court. This was an action of debt brought against Robert Beaty, master and owner of the Arkansas No. 4, by the direction of the postmaster-general, on the information of A. Gordon. postmaster at Lewisburg, Arkansas.

Indictment for keeping a disorderly house. Mr. Burr, a police officer, proved that the traverser kept a shop with the word “Oysters” painted near the door; that he sold liquors, which were drank in his shop; that he sold liquors to persons who were neither lodgers nor boarders in the house; that he did not keep beds or stables for the accommodation of lodgers and travelers; that he had seen people drinking there, but had not seen men there so drunk as to be disorderly, and…

Information' and bill in chancery to abate the works of the Beef Slough Company, above the mouth of the Chippewa river in Wisconsin; and to prevent the running and driving of logs in said river. Defendants filed a demurrer.

The grand jury found five separate indictments against the defendant [Henry Beer-man] for larceny in stealing the goods of five different persons; the property stolen being in each ease, of the value of five dollars and upwards.

<p>In equity.</p> <p>This case was heard upon a motion to quash the indictment.</p>

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.</p> <p>[These were actions by the United States against Edward Belding and Edward Myn-derse, respectively, brought to recover the statutory penalty for the violation of the revenue law's. The judgments rendered in the court below were in favor of the defendants. Cases unreported. The causes are now before this court upon a writ of error to review its judgments.]</p>

The prisoner [Soloman Belew] was indicted for secreting and embezzling sundry letters, and stealing therefrom divers bank notes, which had come into his hands as the carrier of the mail of the United States, between Charlottesville, in Virginia, and Richmond, in the same state, and the jury found the prisoner guilty. The counsel for the prisoner then moved in arrest of judgment, oil the ground stated in the following opinion:

This was a suit on a bond dated on the 19th June, 1806, in which Maurice Rogers was the principal, and William Bell his surety.

<p>[These were informations against John B. Bellingstein.]</p>

The defendant was indicted under the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sections of the act of 1790. — 1 Story Laws, SS. 89 LI Stat. 117, 118]. — for arresting and imprisoning Louis Brandis, a minister of the king of Denmark. The indictment contained four counts: (1) Stating Mr. Brandis to be a public minister, to wit, a secretary of legation. (2) A public minister, to wit, an attache to the legatiou of the king, of Denmark.

[This was a motion in arrest of judgment by John C. Bennett, who was charged with the wrongful withholding from a pensioner of a part of a claim.]

<p>[This was an indictment against Deboigne M. Bennett.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,572.</p> <p>Counterfeiting — Indictment' — National Bank Notes — Seal of Treasury — Variance—Counts —Joinder—Trial—Production of Witness.</p> <p>1. An indictment under sections 5431 and 5434 of the Revised Statutes, in setting out counterfeit notes, did not exhibit any imprint of the seal of the treasury, while the notes put in evidence on the trial exhibited such imprint. Held, that there was no such variance as to make it improper to admit the notes in evidence.</p> <p>2. The notes were circulating notes of a national banking association, but the indictment, while setting them out at length, called them “national bank currency notes.” Eeld, not a variance.</p> <p>3. At the close of tne evidence for the prosecution the defendant requested that one M. be called as a witness for the government. He was not then called. Afterwards, and after the defendant had testified in his own behalf, M. was produced in rebuttal. Eeld, no error.</p> <p>4. The circulating notes of a national banking association are valid contracts without having the imprint of the seal of the treasury on them.</p> <p>5. The indictment is not bad for not giving a fac-simile of the seal to which it refers, or for not setting out the numbers on the notes.</p> <p>6.' The indictment properly charges in different counts different offences, under sections 5431 and 5434, for which different punishments are prescribed by those sections, the offences charged being of the same class of crimes, such joinder being permitted by section 1024.</p> <p>7. Whether the offences were “properly joined,” under section 1024, was a question to be determined on a motion to quash or to compel an election.</p> <p>8. Where the defendant is convicted of the several offences charged in said indictment, he is, in effect, convicted on separate indictments, and may be separately punished for each offence proved.</p>

[Action by the United States against Mary S. Bennett, claiming two tracts of land in Santa Clara county.] This was a motion to amend the decree of confirmation so as to conform to the decree of the board of commissioners.

<p>Case No. 14,676.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Income Tax — False Return.</p>

The defendánt [John E. Bennett] was indicted for a violation of the 5347th section of the Revised Statutes, which punishes any officer of any American vessel on the high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, who, under the conditions as to malice expressed in the section, beats, or imprisons, or inflicts cruel punishment on any of the crew of such vessel.

This was an action of assumpsit brought to recover the sum of $4.992.42 and interest, alleged to be due the United States from the defendants [Edmund L. S. Benzon and others], as and. for duties on certain goods imported by them into the port of Boston.

[This was a claim by Agustín Bernal for Santa Teresa, one square league in Santa Clara county. Granted July 11.1834, by José Figueroa to Joaquin Bernal. Claim filed January 3, 1853. Confirmed by the commission September 5, 1854. and by the district court August 11, 1858. Case No. 14.583.]

<p>[This was a claim by Barcelia Bernal for a tract of land one league square, in Santa Clara county. Rejected by the board.] •</p>

<p>Case No. 14,580.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant — Objections to Survey.</p> <p>In this case [of the United States against Agustín Bernal] the survey was rejected. The rancho, called “Santa Teresa.” lies in Santa Clara county, between San Jose and the Almadén mine, and the amount of land is about a league and a half. The objection to the survey was made by the claimants.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 14,681,</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant — Vauiditt of Grant.</p> <p>The allegations of fraud not being proved by the United States, the claim must be confirmed.</p>

Claim [by Augustin Bernal] for one league of land in Santa Clara county [the Rancho Santa Teresa], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

<p>[This was a claim by Nicolas Berreyesa for the rancho called “Milpitas.”]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,584.</p> <p>Robbing Mail — Possession and Exhibition op Dangerous Weapons.</p>

Claim [by Jose Santos Berreyesa] for four square leagues of land in Napa county [the rancho Mallacomes], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

<p>Case No. 14,587.</p> <p>Indictment — Ccstom Frauds — Offenses in Same Count — Fraudulent Means.</p> <p>1. The offenses of effecting an entry, and of aiding and assisting in effecting an entry, of goods, etc., at lesc than their true weight or measure, by meant of false samples or false representations, etc., may be charged conjunctively in the same count of an indictment.</p> <p>2. An indictment under section 3 of the act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 739), charging the defendant with effecting an entry of goods by fraudulent means, must specify what fraudulent means were used, otherwise it is bad.</p> <p>[Approved in U. S. v. Goggin, 1 Fed. 53.]</p>

This was a suit founded on an alleged mistake of the officers of the custom-house at Philadelphia.

<p>Case lío. 14,689.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of Federad Courts — Offences on the High Seas — Killing by Marine on Naval Vessel — Ordehs of Superior — Power of Naval Officers — Murder and Manslaughter — Evidence—Presumptions'.</p> <p>[1. An offence committed on a United States naval vessel, while lying in the channel of the harbor of Boston, at a considerable distance from the shore, and outside of low-water mark, is committed upon the “high seas,” and consequently is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.]</p> <p>[2. The “high seas” are in legal contemplation that portion of the waters of the sea and of the arms of the sea which lies without low-water mark.]</p> <p>[3. A naval officer in command of a ship has no authority to direct a sentry on duty aboard the vessel to run through the body any man who should abuse the sentry by words alone, however opprobrious; and if any such order should be given k would be unlawful, and could not justify or excuse a homicide committed by> the sentry under such circumstances.]</p> <p>[4. Where a prisoner charged with murder is proved to have killed the deceased, the law presumes that the act was founded in malice until the contrary appears; and the prisoner has the burden of proving that the act was done under circumstances which excuse or justify it, or abate its malignity.]</p> <p>[5. If upon slight provocation one inflicts with a deadly weapon a punishment outrageous in its nature, and beyond all proportion -to the of-fence, and death results, the law presumes that the act was inspired rather by malignity and a depraved spirit recklessly bent on mischief, than by human frailty.] •</p> <p>[6. Where a sentry on duty on board a United States naval vessel ran through the body with his bayonet one who merely used abusive language to him, held, that if the sentry intended only to strike the deceased with the back of his bayonet or to prick him slightly, and had no intention of killing him, the crime was manslaughter; but that if he meant to kill, or to do some enormous bodily harm, he was guilty of murder.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Upon certificate of division of opinion the supreme court decided that in the case above the circuit court had not jurisdiction to try the offense. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion. 3 Wheat. (16 U. S.) 336.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,590.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Action on Distillbe’s Bon» —Actual Product — Survey — Capacity Tax —Back Taxes — Sureties—Agreement.</p> <p>1. If a distiller pays tax on the actual product of the distillery, evtn though that falls short of 80 per cent, of its estimated capacity, he cannot be made liable for a larger amount.</p> <p>2. What is known as the “capacity tax,” assessed under the thirteenth section of the act of July 20. 1868 [15 Stat. 130], does not come within this principle, but is in the nature of a license for the privilege of distilling in that es-' tablishment.</p> <p>3. It is not a tax upon the product of the distillery, but a tax upon.each distillery according to its capacity,' and is therefore to be determined by its capability of producing according to the survey.</p> <p>4. Where the period of fermentation has been fixed at forty-eight hours by the officers of the government upon survey, it is not a valid objection that the distillery uses a longer time in fermentation.</p> <p>5. The survey and return having been made, the distiller has the right to appeal to the commissioner of internal revenue. If he does not do this, or if on appeal the survey is sustained, then his liability as to the capacity tax is inexorably fixed.</p> <p>6. It then becomes a part of the license under which he operates, and it only remains for him to decide whether upon the conditions thus imposed he can undertake the business of distilling.</p> <p>7. This court will not revise the survey made by the officers of the government, nor entertain objections founded upon the overestimated capacity of the distillery.</p> <p>8. When at the time of the execution of the bond there were back taxes assessed against the distillery, and afterward moneys paid to the collector without specific appropriation were applied by him in liquidation of these back taxes, these moneys were rightly applied, and in a suit upon the bond cannot be set-off against taxes subsequently accrued.</p> <p>9. It is the duty of the distiller and his sureties to see that the taxes are paid as they accrue, and if they are rot paid government has its remedy upon the bond, even though the wines produced during the time the bond was in force may have been more than sufficient to pay the taxes.</p> <p>10. The case is not analogous to suits upon collector’s and receiver’s bonds, they being public officers whose duty is to receive government moneys and pay them over to the government.</p> <p>11. Nor is it a valid objection that at the time the sureties signed the bond the distillery was, by agreement between the distiller and his creditors, under the control of the trustee, who was also a deputy collector, and who was to receive the proceeds of the wines and pay the expenses and taxes, and that he at the time agreed with the sureties- that he would see to it that they were protected.</p> <p>12. The government is not bound by any such agreement, nor is it competent for a public officer to vary or in any way change the terms of the distiller’s bonds required by law: though such an agreement or pledge may bind him individually, it is as to the government inoperative and void.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,591.</p> <p>Indictment — Joindek op Distinct Felonies — Practice — Copy op Indictment — Transmitting False Papers — Trial—Election.</p> <p>1.An indictment founded on the act of March 3, 1823 (3 Stat. 771], and charging the defendant with knowingly transmitting false papers to the-pension office, in support of applications for bounty land under section 9 of the act of March 3d, 1855 (10 Stat. 702), and containing 13S counts, each for a distinct felony, and some of which charged subornation of perjury, was objected' to, on a motion 10 quash, because of the joinder in it of distinct felonies, and also of felonies of different grades: Held, that the indictment.was warranted by the act of February 26th. 1853 (10 Stat. 162), but that the counts for subornation of perjury must be stricken out.</p> <p>2. A prisoner is not entitled to have a copy of the indictment against him furnished to him at: the expense of the government.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 173, 11 Sup. Ct. 760.]</p> <p>3. It is an offence, under the said act of March 3d, 1823, to transmit false papers, for the purpose of obtaining from the United States a bounty land warrant.</p> <p>4. Declarations and affidavits subscribed andsworn to by the signers, are “papers,” within said: act.</p> <p>5. If the papers are transmitted from Vermont to Washington Ci*y, the offence is committed in Vermont.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257, 10 Sup-Ct 1036.]</p> <p>6. On a motion by the defendant that the government elect upon which of 100 counts in an indictment it would proceed, the court refused to-interfere.</p> <p>7. It is not necessary, under the said act of March 3d, 1823, to show that the prisoner actually transmitted the papers. It is an offence to procure the papers, with a view to their transmission by another.</p> <p>8. Where a prisoner demurs to an indictment, and the demurrer is heard and overruled, and he-is then required to plead to it without having it’ read to him, and it is not read to the jury, the reading of it not being, in either case, demanded by him, such omissions to read the indictment furnish no ground for a motion in arrest of judgment.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,592.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant — Survey—Contest by Third Person.</p> <p>[1. A survey made by the surveyor general on ■the confirmation of a Mexican grant cannot be contested by a purchaser from the claimant of a tract which is within the location. as made by the surveyor general, and which would be included within any survey that could be made.]</p> <p>[2. A person alleging that any of the land included in a survey of a rancho is public land ■of the United States must urge his objection in the name of the United States, and through the -district attorney.]</p>

Indictment for selling spirituous liquors without license. Alexander Simms, the prosecutor, whose name was indorsed on the indictment, was offered by the United States, as a witness. [James BirchJ. objected that he was interested; being liable to pay the costs, according to the act of Virginia of November 13, 1792, § 25, p. 105. It is every-day’s practice in England to examine prosecutors.

This indictment alleged an offence to have been committed on the high seas, and that the prisoner was first brought into the district of Massachusetts. Questions of jurisdiction arose upon the evidence. The counsel for the prisoner contended, that the offence, if any, was committed on the Mississippi river, and within the state of Louisiana; and further, that if committed beyond the limits of that state, the prisoner was not first brought into this district.

This was an indictment drawn under section 5399 of the Revised Statutes: “Every person who corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede .any witness or officer in any court of the United States in the discharge of his duty, or corruptly or by threats or force obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein, shall be punished,” &e.

<p>Case No. 14,599.</p> <p>Fraudulent Claims — Scienter—Internal Revenue — Gaugers.</p> <p>1. Making a claim against the government of the United States consists in asking or demanding payment for services. The object of the statute is to prohibit and punish the drawing of money from the treasury of the United States without having rendered legal and recognized equivalents</p> <p>2. The terms “false,” “fictitious,” and “fraudulent.” used in the statute, have no special legal signification. By the word “knowing” is meant having a certain and clear perception of the falsity of the claim made.</p> <p>3. Under the authority of the law the commissioner of internal revenue has a right to make regulations concerning gauging and in relation to gangeis, and these regulations are binding and -obligatory upon gaugers.</p> <p>4. Section 3290 of the Revised Statutes does not authorize a gauger to delegate his authority, or to have his duties performed for him; nor do the statutes or regulations anywhere authorize such a delegation or substitution.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,600.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Action on Distiller’s Bond-—Errors in Assessment — Additional Tax —Assessor’s Authority — Survey.</p> <p>1. In a suit brought by the United States-against a distiller, as principal, and his sureties, on a bond conditioned that the principal “shall,, in all respects, faithfully comply with all the provisions of lav in relation to the duties and business of distillers,” to recover the balance of the-amount of aD assessment, and the amount of a reassessment, made by the assessor upon the principal, as a tax due by him as a distiller, the sureties cannot show that there were errors in the assessment and the reassessment, whereby the-amounts thereof were made too large.</p> <p>2. The only remedy of the sureties is to pay the amount under constraint, and appeal to the commissioner of internal revenue, and, if the appeal is denied, bring a suit against the collector to recover the amount unjustly exacted.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Ü. S. v. Myers. Case No. 15,-846. Cited in Alkan v. Bean. Id. 202; Ken-sett v. Stivers, 10 Fed. 525; Snyder v. Marks, 109 U. S. 193, 3 Sup. Ct. 160.]</p> <p>[Cited in Eddy v. Township of Lee, 73 Mich. 131, 40 N. W. 796.]</p> <p>3. Such an assessment, if too small, is not rendered invalid by the fact that the assessor, under section 20 of the internal revenue act of June 30th. 1864, as amended by section 9 of the act of July 13th, 1866 (14 Stat. 103), afterwards makes an assessment of the additional tax for which the distiller is liable.</p> <p>4. Such assessment of such additional tax may be made by the assessor, solely because he determines that an error was made by him or his predecessor in the first assessment, as well as because he determines that an error was made by the distiller in his returns.</p> <p>5. The assessor derives his authority to assess such additional tax. not from the fact that an error existed, but from his determination on the question of error.</p> <p>6. A distiher is liable to pay an assessed tax, although it is not shown affirmatively by the government. in an action upon his bond, that the survey required by the 10th section of the act of July 20th. 1868 (15 Stat. 129), has been made, and a copy of it been served upon him. and although it is not shown that a demand for the payment of such tax has been made upon him.</p>

Indictment for violating section 44 of the bankrupt act. The defendants [James B. Black and others] pleaded not guilty, and upon their trial offered to testify on their own behalf, but were not allowed to so testify by the court. The verdict was guilty and they move for a new trial for error in excluding .them as witnesses.

This was an indictment against .Tames Blackburn and others, charged with conspiring and going in disguise on the highway for the purpose of depriving Frank Lucas and others, as a class of persons, and because of their being colored citizens of the United States of African descent, of the equal protection of the laws, and of the equal privileges and immunities under the laws.

Indictment for manslaughter. The .right of peremptory challenge was allowed. The mortal blow was given in Alexandria, the death happened in St. Mary’s county, in Maryland. contended that the crime was not punishable here, and cited 1 East, P. C. 361; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 31. 12. 13; Va. Law, Nov. 29, 1792, p. 104, c. 73, § 16. There is no evidence of the defect of the common law, but the recital of the statute of 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 24.

Indictment for “confining the captain of a merchant vessel, and endeavoring to make a revolt,” upon the 12th section of the act of congress entitled “An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States.” 2 Laws U. S. 93.

[This was a libel of forfeiture filed against a distillery of David Blair of Woodbridge, Middlesex county, N. J.] This distillery and ■the stills, boilers, machinery, and a quantity of distilled spirits, were seized on the 18th ■of December last, by Elston Marsh, collector of internal revepue, for violations of the tax law.

<p>These defendants [Alvah Blaisdell, John J. Eckel and John McClaren] were indicted under the forty-fifth section of the internal revenue act of July 13th, 1866, for violations of that law in connection with a distillery in Christopher street, New York. The distillery ran during August, September and October, 1867, and was seized on November 3d, 1867. After being condemned it was sold and ran ■again during April and May, 1868, when it was again seized. The indictment in this case contained eight counts, three founded upon a removal of spirits from the place where they were distilled to a place other than a bonded warehouse, (one of them during the first run. and two under the second run. of the distillery,) three for aiding and abetting in such removal, (two under the first run and one under the second,) and two for failing to keep proper books. These last, however, were not sustained by evidence and were not submitted to the jury.</p>

<p>Application for leave to file information against the defendant for omitting property from inventory of bankrupts’ estate, contrary to section 5132 of the Revised Statutes.</p>

This was a petition filed by the district attorney, in the name of the United States, for the condemnation of block 121, school section addition to Chicago, commonly called the “Bigelow Block.” The various parties claiming an interest in the land or any part of it, whether as owners of the fee, tenants, or by mortgages, judgments, liens, or otherwise, were made parties defendant, and commissioners appointed by the court, in conformity with the state statutes, who heard the…

<p>Case No. 14,612.</p> <p>Criminal Procedure — Examination before a United States Commissioner — Confessions —Officer of the United States.</p> <p>1. On an examination, before a United States commissioner, of a person charged with crime, his confession of the crime, without any proof of the corpus delicti, is sufficient to warrant his being held for trial.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Brawner, 7 Fed. 87.]</p> <p>2. A clerk, appointed by the direction and with the approbation of the secretary of the treasury, for the fractional currency counter of the treasury department, at Louisville, is an officer of the United States, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, and of the statutes of the United States in regard to officers charged with the safe keeping of the public money.</p> <p>[Subsequently, upon a removal of the cause to the district court for the district of Kentucky, the prisoner was convicted. See Case No. 14,-613.]</p>

Joseph Bloomgart was indicted and convicted of embezzlement whilst engaged as a clerk in the United States depository in this city. The conviction was had under the decision of the supreme court in the case of U. S. v. Hartwell [6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 385]. [Case No. 14,012]. The court sentenced accused to confinement in the penitentiary' at hard labor for the term of six years, and ordered him to pay a fine to the United States of $14,838.77.

This was an indictment against [James Blunt and J. T. Deweese] the defendants under the act of March 2d. 1867, found at Ashe-ville, in the Western district of North Carolina, in November, 1872, and brought to trial in October, 1874, at Statesville, before Hon. ROBERT P. DICK, District Judge. The defendant Blunt was the only party on trial. Pleas not guilty, and statute of limitations. Verdict, guilty.

<p>[This was an action at law by the United States against Robert D. Bogart.]</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against James B. Bogart.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,619.</p> <p>Parties — United States — Note.</p> <p>On a note given to an agent of the United States, for their benefit, suit may be brought in their name.</p> <p>[Cited in Bry Co. v. Brock, 44 Mich. 53, 6 N. W. 105.]</p>

Claim [by L. W. Boggs] for six hundred and forty acres in Napa county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

<p>[This was a claim by Bartholomeo Bo-jorques to the rancho of Laguna de San Antonio. Heard upon objections to survey.]</p>

moved the court to issue a bench-warrant upon a charge of treason against Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, who had been brought, by a military force, from New Orleans, and detained here under a military guard. This motion was founded upon the affidavit of General Wilkinson, made in New Orleans, and a printed copy of the president’s message to congress of the 22d of January, 1807.

[This was a motion for leave to file a bill of review by the United States in the case of the claim of James R. Bolton. The claim had been confirmed. Case unreported.] ‘5

<p>Case No. 14,625.</p> <p>Seamen — Indictment for Revolt — Intimidation —Combination—Reasonarle Measures for Protection — Master’s Authoritt.</p> <p>1. A master is prevented in the free and lawful exercise of his authority, within the meaning of the act of 1835. c. 40 [4 Stat. 775], defining the crime of revolt, if he be prevented from carrying into effect any one lawful command; and a command to continue the business of whaling is prim& facie lawful.</p> <p>2. A combination to refuse to pursue such business is not, of itself, the intimidation required as an element to constitute the crime, but it may be the means of intimidation.</p> <p>3. Such combination and intimidation may lie lawful. If, from the improper conduct of the captain, the crew have good reason to believe, and do believe, that they will be subjected to unlawful and cruel or oppressive treatment, or that a great wrong is about to be inflicted on one of their number, they have a right, to take reasonable measures for his. or their own protection.</p> <p>4. What would be reasonable measures must depend upon tbe nature and extent of the wrong, and upon the means of prevention, having regard to the importance of preserving the authority ok the master, as well as to the importance of protecting the crew.</p> <p>See U. S. v. Lunt TCase No. 15.(543]: The Mos-lem rid- 9.875): The Mary Ann fid-- 9.194]: V. S. v. (riving!, [Id. 15.212]; U. S. v. Thompson [Id. 10.492],</p>

Indictment for forging and uttering the following order: “Sir: Please let the bearer have one pair pair boots. Yours Ac.. Levin Stewart. Mr. Lang. Geo'town. December 31, 1821.” — with intent to defraud one William Lang.

[Indictments against John Bott and against John Whitehead for depositing prohibited articles in the mails. Heard on motions for new trial.]

<p>[This was an action of debt for a penalty by the United States against James Bougher. Heard on a demurrer to the declaration.]</p>

The trial of Richard N. Bowerman, late deputy collector of customs at Baltimore, on the charge of embezzlement, was commenced in that city on Wednesday, September 27, and concluded October 7 with a verdict of guilty-on the part of the jury.

The indictment states, that at a circuit court, held for the district of Pennsylvania, at Philadelphia, in said district, on the 11th of October, 1808, before the justices of that • court, a certain indictment was found by the grand jury, then and there empannelled and sworn, to inquire against one J. S. Hutton, mariner, for that, on the 20th of September, 1807, a certain schooner, named the Matilda, a vessel of the United States, was unlawfully and voluntarily employed in…

The defendants [J. A. Boyden and others] were indicted under Act March 2, 1867, | 30 (14 Stat. 484), for a conspiracy to defraud the United States of the taxes arising from and imposed by law upon certain divers proof gallons and' quantities of distilled spirits, distilled in the United States, then and there situated in certain bonded warehouses (described).

<p>It is agreed that an amicable action in this form be entered in the said court, to be of the same effect as if the process had been regularly issued, been served, and so returned by the marshal; and that the following statement of facts be submitted for the opinion and judgment of the said court, to be of the same effect as if the same had been found by special verdict.</p> <p>The defendant [James B. Boylan,] is a manufacturer of clothing in the Fourth collection district of the state of New York, and within this judicial district. On the tenth day of May, Anno Domini 1864, defendant entered into a contract with the United States to manufacture for the United States, and to deliver at certain times therein specified, to the proper officer thereof, a certain number of pairs of “cavalry pantaloons,” of materials, dimensions, and workmanship, described in said contract; and to receive therefor from the United States the price of four dollars and fifty-two cents for each pair. Under said contract, defendant did so manufacture, and deliver during the month of October, A. D. 1864, eighteen hundred pairs of such “cavalry pantaloons,” and did receive for them from fiv» United States the said price The said goods were manufactured of materials, the cash value of which, in the open market, at the said city of New York in the said month of October. A. D. 1864, was more than the price received by defendant for the said goods. But the cost of the process of manufacturing said cavalry pantaloons was more than five per cent, of the value of the pantaloons when manufactured. Defendant in his return of manufactures for the said month of October. A.' D. 1864, under the internal revenue laws, made return of the said goods. The assessor of internal revenue for said district in due form assessed upon said goods an internal revenue tax of four hundred and six dollars and eighty cents, being five per centum ad valorem upon the price received by defendant for said goods, said assessor claiming to act under the 94th section of the excise law of June 30, A. D. 1864; and returned the said assessment to the collector of internal revenue for the said collection district of New York, to be by him collected from the said defendant for the use of the United States. For the said tax of four hundred and six dollars and eighty cents so assessed and so returned for collection this action is brought. If the court shall be of the opinion that the said assessment was made in accordance with the proper construction of the provisions of said act. then it is agreed that judgment shall be entered in favor of the United States, for the sum which shall be found to be due to the United States, from defendant. But if the court shall be of the opinion that the said assessment was not made in accordance with the proper construction of the provisions of said act. then it is agreed that judgment shall be entered for the defendant.</p> <p>Section 96 of the excise law of June 30, 1864 113 Stat. 272], provides that when goods are manufactured from materials which have paid tax, and the increased value of the manufactures does hot exceed five per centum ad valorem, they shall be exempt from duty.. By section 86, and by all parallel provisions of the law, the basis of taxable value is that of actual sales, where a sale is made at the time the tax is levied. But where no sale is made at that time, as where goods are consumed by the manufacturer, or shipped to a foreign port for sale, the tax is levied on the basis of “the average of the market value of the like goods, wares, and merchandise at the time when the same became liable to duty.” The taxable value of the manufactured goods in this case is the price obtained by actual sales: that is the contract price. The value of the materials for the purposes of this law is the average of the market value of the like materials at the time of these sales; and the “increased value,” if any, is unquestionably the excess of the former over the latter. But since it is admitted that at the time when these goods “became liable to duty” — if liable at all — the materials were worth more in the market than the price received for the completed goods; the “increased value,” therefore, does not exceed five per centum “ad va-lorem,” and they are exempt. Had Mr. Boy-lan sold the materials in the market, instead of manufacturing and delivering them to the United States, he would have received more than he did receive. That is to say, by the process of manufacture he did not increase their value at all; and an increase of value by that process to the extent of more than five per centum is necessary to render the product taxable. But it is urged that “the defendant might have made a fair and even an enormous profit upon this transaction, and yet be allowed to obtain exemption.” And in what would this profit consist? In the advance in value of materials held by him between the date of the contract and the delivery of the goods. The government desires to introduce a new element into the computation —that of time, and hold the defendant liable on the ground that the goods were increased in value, not by manufacturing them, but by the length of time during which he held them. Assuming this to be true, it could not render the goods taxable. If we suppose the tax itself levied on the increased value of any manufacture, no one would doubt that the increase of value by the process of manufacture is that which is to be taxed. The manufacturer might have held the materials for ten years, or forty: or might have obtained them by inheritance or by gift; still, the taxable increased value is the added value by the process of manufacture. In this case it is admitted that no value was added by this process. What has the tax claimed to do with any additions to their value made by other causes? Any application of such a principle as is here suggested by the government is quite impracticable. For example, let a dealer sell to-day two coats, precisely alike, the one made of cloth purchased recently at one dollar, the other of similar cloth purchased a year since at two dollars; the one would be taxable, the other exempt.. Now government contractors must constantly deliver goods made thus at the same time and from similar materials, but the materials purchased at various times. Shall the liability to taxation depend on the accident of being made from one or another piece of precisely similar goods?</p> <p>It is objected that the contract price, fixed in May, cannot be compared with the value of the materials in October. But we have nothing to do with the time at which the contract was made. * Whether made in October, or May, or at any earlier time, it fixed the price, and at this price the goods were sold in October. The actual sale is the standard of the value, and nothing else can be substituted for it.</p> <p>Does the government argue that the goods were sold in May? The argument implies it; yet nothing is better settled than that .“an agreement to sell is not a sale; and therefore no mere promise to sell hereafter amounts to a present sale.” 1 Pars. Gont. D2S. No property can pass in that which does not exist; the law, therefore, holds that when goods are manufactured under contract the time of sale is the time of delivery and acceptance of the goods. In the present case, the materials used by defendant in October were his property, and had a recognized market value. He manufactured them for the government, and received for them a certain price, by “actual sales,” this price being less than the value of the materials. Were the goods increased in value more than five per-cent, by the manufacture? The counsel for the government has not attempted to lay down any other rule for determining the increased value, under section 96. than that upon which we claim exemption. No other method can be found which at once accords with legal principles and is susceptible of practical application. Shall the price of the manufactured goods be compared with the price of materials at the date of the contract? But the law fixes the time of sale, that is. of delivery, as the time at which the estimate shall be made. And shall a fact, the increase of value of goods by a certain person, be determined by figures arbitrarily agreed on months before? Or shall we assume that the contractor purchases his materials on the day on which he makes his contract? Contracts are constantly made for future delivery of goods at a price lower than the present value of the materials, in reliance on an intermediate decline. Shall all such contracts be exempted from taxation? The government, in or-ded to avoid the exemption of these goods, attempts an explanation of the' intent of section 96, as connected exclusively with section 95, which provides for the taxation of certain manufactures only on their increased value. "When the tax is levied only on the increased value of the article, and that is of slight amount, it is manifest that there will be a limit within which the taxation will be burdensome to the consumer while it is not remunerative to government,” remarks counsel for the United States, and infers that the 96th section was inserted for the purpose of meeting this case. Unfortunately for this argument, it is directly contradicted by the facts. Section 96 with its proviso, is a part of the original excise law of 1863 [12 Stat. 729], while section 95 was inserted into the law in July, 1864, after the proviso on which we rest had been for nearly a year in operation.</p> <p>Finally, it is urged that the construction placed by the government on this section “is based on the actual cost of production of the article, which is the true and substantial basis of all commercial dealings, and the only foundation on which a revenue system can safely rest.” We simply answer that by a familiar principle of political economy, the actual cost of production of an article never was, nor can be, the basis of commercial dealings; but the price determined by the relations of demand and supply. And still less can it be the foundation of a revenue system. By fixing a standard for taxation which is within the knowledge of no one but the tax-payer himself, it would open a wide door to fraud.- It would tax most heavily those who, by mistake or accident were most burdened by the manufacture— that is those least able to bear it. And it would reverse the intent of an excise on manufactures, which is everywhere declared a tax, not on cost, but on the price ob-. tained by actual sales. The increased value under section 96 is doubtless to be estimated, as the government urges, in the discretion ■of the court. But it must be estimated according to the intent of the law, and by some method at once reasonable and capable of practical application. There is but one such method possible; it is to deduct from the price received for the completed goods the market value of the materials at the time of delivery. This method alone is legal, and accords with the received principle of law— that the time of sale of goods made under contract is the time of delivery; and with the principle of the tax law — that the time of sale is the time at which values are to be estimated. This method alone is definite, affording a fixed standard, readily intelligible, and accessible in all commercial newspapers. It admits of no disguise, concealment, or fraud. This method alone is practicable. It avoids the necessity of tracking out, by the evidence of interested parties, the dates of contracts, the. actual cost of different lots of materials and other accidents of business. This method alone is just. The exemption turns upon the increased value of the goods by the process of manufacture, not their increased value by time. And to obtain this we must compare the value of the completed article with the value of its material at the same time. It is, therefore, respectfully claimed that the goods in question are exempt from taxation, and that judgment should be entered for the defendant.</p>

This was an action of debt on a bond given by William Bradbury, late postmaster at Levant, with sureties for the faithful performance of the duties of that office, dated Jan. 26. 1838.

Indictment under section 5467 for embezzling a letter having a ten-dollar note, in one count charged that the note, was a United States treasury note, the other that it was a national bank note. Rose Kelly, a colored servant woman, mailed a letter addressed to Monaskan. Lancaster county, Va., having in it a ten-dollar note, to John Kelly, her father, on the 16th or November, 1876. at the Philadelphia post-office; and had the letter registered.

■ [Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of .New Jersey.] This was an information filed in the district court, against the defendants, for assisting to unlade rum from the ship Hunter before her arrival at her port of discharge, contrary to the provisions of the 50th section of the act of congress passed 2d March, 1799 (3 Laws 183 [1 Stat. 665]).

Debt on a duty bond. [Action by the Unit,ed States against Ebenezer Breed and others.] Plea, tender. Replication, that greater duties were due than the amount tendered; rejoinder and issue thereon. The cause was tried by a jury. The latter cited U. S. v. Pennington [Case No. 10,026]; Webst. Diet. “Loaf-sugar”; Parker, Excli. 200; Id.. 208: Hardr. 1S5; 3 Price. 447; Id. 1S9, 224, 229, 234.

Debt on the marshal’s official bond. The facts agreed were that the marshal [D. C. Brent] arrested Jane Burch on a capias ad satisfaciendum at the plaintiff's suit, and voluntarily suffered her to gp out of prison for three days, after which she returned and was discharged under the insolvent act before the return day of the writ [the United States, for the use of James & Benson McCormick].

<p>Case No. 14,641.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Illegal Manufacture of Liquors — Forfeiture.</p> <p>[1. Under sections 48 and 31, Act 1S64 (13 Srat. 240), as amended by Act May 53. 1806 (54 Stat. Ill), a brewer is bound to enter in his books, from day to day, all the beer made by him, or at his brew >ry; and, if he knowingly enters a less quantity, such entry, in the absence of an explanation, subjects his brewery to forfeiture.]</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. A Quantity of Tobacco, Case No. 16.100.J</p> <p>[2. If an unstamped package of beer is found in the possession >f a brewer, and it is proven that he was aware of its existence, the law presumes, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. that he intended to defraud the revenue, and imposes a forfeiture, not only of the unstamped package, lint of ali the beer and materials of the hrewoiv.)</p>

This was an indictment for uttering and passing, as true, counterfeited coin in the resemblance or similitude of gold dollars.

<p>Case No. 14,645.</p> <p>Writ — Service of — Privilege—Compulsory Appearance.</p> <p>A citizen of Massachusetts was indicted in the federal court of Wisconsin. Under an arrangoment with the. United States attorney that he might within a prescribed time apirear, without arrest, and plead to the indictment and give bail, he came to Wisconsin for that purpose. Held, that his appearance in court was compulsory, and that during the time be vas necessarily- within the jurisdiction oi the court for such purpose, he was exempt from liability to civil process.</p> <p>[Cited in Miner .. Markham, 28 Fed. 391.]</p> <p>[Cited in Melntire v. Mclntire, r> Mackey. 348: Moletor \. Sinnen, 76 Wis. 311, 44 N. W. 1099 ]</p>

The defendant was indicted for perjury. After the court had charged the jury, it tlien being night, one of the defendant’s counsel said that the jury might bring in a “sealed verdict.” The judge presiding said that the court would not immediately adjourn. After a short interval, the jury not having returned their verdict, the judge left the court house. That night about two o’clock, the jury delivered a sealed verdict to the cleric of the court, and separated.

This was an indictment founded on the act •of congress of August 13, 1813, c. 56, for using a British pass or protection.

<p>Case No. 14,647.</p> <p>Jurisdiction op United States Courts — Court op Appeals under the Articles op Confederation— District Courts under Constitution — -Prize Cases — Suit in which State has an Interest — State Officers Obstructing Federal Process.</p> <p>[1. The court of appeals established by congress under the Articles of Confederation had full power tu re-examine and reverse or affirm the sentences of the courts of admiralty established by the different states, though founded upon the verdicts of juries. Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dali. (3 U. S.) 54, followed.]</p> <p>[2. Where the subject of litigation depends upon the question of prize or no prize, .it id completely within the cognizance of the district courts, which, under the constitution and laws of the United States, are invested with jurisdiction of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ]</p> <p>[3. The mere fact that n state claims an interest in a subject m dispute in an action between private citizens, does not, by virtue of the eleventh amendment to the constitution of the United States, deprive the federal court of jurisdiction to determine the matter and enter a decree binding upon the parties before it.]</p> <p>[4. The provision of the eleventh amendment that the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed co extend to any suit “in law or equity” commenced or prosecuted against a state by a eitizen of another state, does not apply to suits involving questions of- admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and which are brought in the federal district courts as courts of admiralty.]</p> <p>[5. A state har no constitutional power to direct its governor io employ force to resist the execution of a decree of a federal court, though such decree is deemed to have been beyond the jurisdiction of the ;ourt to make; and a militia officer, who, .under the orders of the governor, employs force to resist and prevent a United States marshal from executing process issued upon such decree, is not excused or justified therein by reason of the governor’s order, but is subject to punishment for violating the laws of the United States.]</p>

Claim [by Juana Briones] for one square league of land in Santa Clara county [the Rancho La Purísima Concepcion], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

Indictment for a forgery in altering a bank check. The indictment contains three counts.

Indictment tor smuggling. One of the witnesses, in favour of the prosecution, was objected to. on tlie ground, that he had been convicted of an assault aud battery witli intent to murder, aud had been sentenced to pay a fine, and to six months imprisonment, as appeared h.v the record produced in evidence. read the following cases: Co. Lift. 6. 13: Kel. 37. 38; 2 Wils. 18: 2 Bac. At»-. 583; 4 Bl. Comm. 217; 1 East, P. C. 407.

<p>Case No. 14,654.</p> <p>Officers — Fraudulent Transactions of Clerks —Extra Compensation — Bond—Sureties —Past Defalcations.</p> <p>1. A navy agent being a defaulter to the government. a new bond was required. Held, that the sureties on the new bond, in this case, were responsible for past defalcations of the principal, as well as for the future.</p> <p>2. Public officer.- are not responsible for a fraudulent transaction of their clerks, if it is not attributable to their own negligence.</p> <p>[Oited in Robertson v. Siehel, 127 U. S. 517, 8 Sup. Ct. 1291.]</p> <p>3. Whether public officers are entitled to extra compensation, depends cn the circumstances of each particular case. There is a distinction, however, between services rendered upon a thing of permanent character, and those required upon some sudden and unforeseen emergency. In the former case they should have extra compensation, but not in the latter.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,656.</p>

Brown, otherwise called Baker, with two others of the crew, was indicted for the murder e£ the master of the schooner Sarah Lavinia in .Tuly, 18-13, upon the high seas, by drowning. He was tried in the circuit court before Betts, District Judge, in December, 1843, and convicted and adjudged to execution. The proof was that the mate was thrown overboard by the prisoner and his associates intentionally, but there was no proof that his body was seen after his death.

This was an action brought upon the information of Leander Quivey and I. G. Cul-pepper, against the defendant [Samuel Brown], to recover penalties to the amount of $750, for selling nine sealed boxes of sardines and six bottles of hair oil, without the same being duly stamped.

On the 22d July, 1813 [3 Stat. 22], an act of congress was passed for the assessment and collection of direct taxes and internal duties, by which various collection districts were established in each state. The Eighth district of Pennsylvania comprised the connties of Northampton and Wayne. One collector was to be appointed by the president for each district, who was to be a respectable freeholder and reside within the same.

<p>[This was a claim by E. L. Brown to ■eleven leagues of land. Rejected by the hoard.]</p>

The defendant íJ. H. Brownj' was indict-. ed at the Juneterm, 1873, for beating and wounding, on the high seas, one of the crew of an American vessel, the defendant being the first officer of the vessel*. The offence was laid as having been committed in August, 1871; but the evidence was, that the real date was in August or September, 1870. At the trial, the point was reserved, whether the statute of limitations was a bar. The jury found the défendant 'guilty.

[This was an indictment against James Brown for a violation of the act of congress of March, 1825, which provides the punishment for counterfeiting gold and silver coin.]

Indictment, against the defendant [George Brown] for purchasing a soldier’s arms, against the act of March 16, 1802, c. 9, § 19. Upon the trial, the evidence was that the defendant purchased a musket from a soldier, knowing him to be such, and that the soldier claimed the arms as his own. But it also appeared, that the musket was not lawfully in the possession of the soldier, but had been stolen by him from the arsenal of the United States, at Charlestown.

<p>Case No. 14,670.</p> <p>Covenant — Penal Bond — Breach —Non-Per FORMANCE OF CONDITION — NON-PAYMENT of Penalty.</p> <p>1. Covenant will not lie upon words in an instrument inserted by way of condition or de-feasance by the performance of some collateral act.</p> <p>[Cited in Douglas v. Hennessy, 15 R. I. 279, 3 Atl. 213, 7 Atl. 3, 10 Atl. 584.]</p> <p>2. So upon a penal bond conditioned that one should account for public monies, property, &c.: lirltl, that covenant would not lie upon the condition.</p> <p>3. But covenant will lie upon the bond itself; but the breach assigned must be the non-payment of the penalty.</p> <p>[Cited in. brief in Farrar v. Christy. 24 Mo. 465.]</p> <p>[Cited in Jackson Co. v. Leonard. 16 W. Va. 486, 492.]</p> <p>4. Where covenant was brought upon the bond itself, and the breach assigned was the non-performance of the condition, it was held bad on demurrer.</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against John Brown, Paul Oberhiem, John Gassen, Thomas B. Scott, Samuel Adolph, Henry Heyman. Daniel Wagnon, and Wesley Brown. Heard on motions to quash the indictment.]</p>

Indictment for larceny. namely, C. Simms, C. Lee, E. ,T. Lee, and Mr. Hiort, contended, that as this theft was charged in the indictment to have been done feloniously, the prisoner had a right to a peremptory challenge of twenty jurors, under the act of assembly (Old Rev. Code, 109). See U. S. v. Carrigo [Case No. 14,739],

This was a certiorari to bring up the proceedings had before a justice of the peace in a case of forcible entry and detainer, upon a warrant issued under the act of Virginia of the 3d of December, 1792, p. 151, which reduces into one the several acts concerning forcible entries and detainers. The certio-rari was granted by the chief judge of this court, upon the petition and affidavit of the defendant, in vacation.

<p>[This was an action at law by the United States against George W. Bruan, executor.]</p>

A law of congress for the suppression of the slave trade (Act May 15, 1820, c. 113, § 5 [3 Stat. 601]) enacts that, if any person being of a ship’s company of any vessel owned wholly or in part by any citizen of the United States, shall aid and abet in confining any negro, &c., with intent to make such negro a slave, he shall be adjudged a pirate.

The crew of the Gen. Rondeau were tried on a charge of piracy.

This was an action of debt, on an official bond, to recover the sum of $11,535 50, alleged to be due from [M’Kean Buchanan] the defendant to the plaintiffs. It appeared that the defendant was a purser in the navy of the United States. In 1839, he was ordered to the frigate Constitution, then about to sail for the Pacific under command of Captain Turner, and being the flag-ship of Commodore Claxton.

The relator, Huidekoper, a judgment creditor of the county of Buchanan, a majority of whose county justices had refused to obey a writ of mandamus from this court, or to make any return thereof, moved for an order that the respondents, the county judges, be peremptorily commanded to return the writ, with a return thereon, and to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt.

On the following indictment: “District of Columbia, County of Washington, to wit: The jurors of the U. S.. for the county aforesaid, on their oaths present that Henry Buete, late of the county aforesaid, laborer, falsely intended to'defraud the U. S., and wickedly and maliciously contriving and intending to aggrieve and injure the heirs and legal representatives of one William Brown, deceased, on the 5th day of February, 1840, at the county aforesaid, came in his proper…

<p>Case No. 14,681.</p> <p>Internal Revende — Tax on Gross Receipts — Public Exhibition — Race Track.</p> <p>A. corporation which maintains a driving track, with stands and other conveniences for horse-racing, and annually, for several days in succession, devotes such track to horse-racing, and keeps its grounds open, for pay, to the public, and realizes money therefrom, is not liable to a tax ■on its gross receipts, under section 108 of the act ■of .Tune 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 276), as conducting a public exhibition of feats of horsemanship, or a .show which is opened to the public for pay.</p> <p>[Cited in The Viola. 59 Fed. G35; The Ceres. 61 Fed. 702.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,684.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Product of Foreign Fishing.</p> <p>Where whales are caught, and oil is manufactured, by the crew of an American vessel, the oil is not the product of “foreign fishing,” within the purview of the revenue laws of the United States, though it has since been owned, and brought into port, by persons in a foreign service.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,687.</p> <p>•Mandamus — Municipal Cobpokation — Tax Limit —Judgment Creditor.</p> <p>1. The federal courts have jurisdiction and power to issue the writ of mandamus to a municipal corporation to compel it to perform its duty, although such duty is created and enjoined by .state law alone.</p> <p>2. An agreement to levy a special tax cannot be implied from an ordinance making it the duty of the city council “to provide means to meet the payment” of a designated debt when the same may become due.</p> <p>3.A city council has no power to levy taxes not expressly authorized by its charter or the law. Hence, where by the charter of a city it is provided that no greater tax than one per centum shall be levied for any one year, and this maximum rate is actually levied, a mandamus will be refused even to a judgment-creditor to compel the city to levy a greater tax, or even to levy a specific tax to pay his judgment.</p> <p>[Cited in Britton v. Platte City, Case No. 1,-907.]</p>

Demurrer to a bill in equity, filed on behalf of the United States by the district attorney.

This was a writ of error from a judgment of the district court of Massachusetts, rendered upon an infoimation in rem, against certain goods and merchandise seized on land, by the collector of the district of Boston and Charlestown, at Boston, in said district, for an alleged breach of law.

<p>[This was an indictment against James Burns for counterfeiting coin.]</p>