Volume 25 — Federal Cases

The attorney for the United States, on the 3d day of this term, having made a motion for the caption and examination of the said Burr, etc. 2

[At law. On examination of Aaron Burr for commitment. Aaron Burr was arrested by Maj. Perkins on the Tombigbee river in what is now Washington county, Ala., February 20. 1807. He was conducted to Ft. Stoddard; detained a prisoner there about two weeks, and then started for Washington City on horseback, attended by a guard of nine men; under the command of Maj. Perkins.

[At law. Motion to commit Aaron Burr on a charge of high treason in levying war against the United States. Tending the hearing by the grand jury of charges against Burr for high treason, Mr. Hay, Dist. Atty., gave notice in .open court of his intention to submit a motion to commit Burr on the charge of high treason. On the previous examination (Case No. 14,G92a), he said there was no evidence of an overt act, and he was committed for a misdemeanor only.

[At law. On examination of Aaron Burr for commitment for high treason in levying war against the United States.] [Mr. Hay, Dist.

[At law. Motion for a subpoena duces te-cum directed to the president of the United States.] [Tuesday, June 9, 1S07. The grand jury were adjourned to the following Thursday.] Mr. Burr then addressed the court. There was a proposition which he wished to submit to them. In the president’s communication to congress, he speaks of a letter and other papers which he had received from Mr. Wilkinson, under date of 21st of October.

[At law. The questions herein arose upon the proposition of the attorney for the United States to send before the grand jury, then in session considering the charges against Aaron Burr, a certain letter in cipher. addressed to Dr. Bollman under a fictitious name, and alleged to be in the handwriting of Mr. Willie, Burr’s secretary.

[At law. Motion for attachment against General Wilkinson ’‘for a contempt in obstructing the administration of the justice of the court.”] Mr. Burr’s counsel called James Knox and Chandler Lindsley, (two of the witnesses of the United States,) whose affidavits had been drawn and were intended as the ground of the motion for the attachment.

[At law. On challenge of jurors for cause on the trial of Aaron Burr. The examination of the jurors summoned and the running comments of counsel and court will be found reported in the main case, No. 14,093.] Mr. Martin addressed the court at length on the qualifications of jurors. He insisted that the constitutional guaranty that every criminal shall be tried by an “impartial jury,” required that the jurors should be perfectly indifferent and free from prejudice.

[At law. Trial of indictment of Aaron Burr for treason in levying war against the United States.] Mr. Hay proceeded to the examination of the evidence on the part of the United States. General William Eaton was sworn, when Mr. Burr objected to this order of examining the witnesses.

The court was opened at half past twelve o’clock, when Col. Aaron Burr appeared, with his counsel, Edmund Randolph, John Wick-ham, Benjamin Botts and John Baker. [Luther Martin also appeared as counsel at a later stage of the trial.] The clerk having called the names'of the gentlemen who had been summoned on the grand jury, Mr. Burr’s counsel demanded a sight of the panel, which was shown to them.

[At law. Trial of Aaron Burr for a misdemeanor, in beginning, setting on foot, and providing the means of, a military expedition against the dominions or territory of the king of Spain.] At the meeting of the court on Wednesday;, the 2d of September, 1807, Mr. Hay stated that according to his understanding of the opinion of the court delivered in the trial for treason [Case No. 14,693], the evidence of the transactions on Blennerhassett’s Island did not come up to the…

[At law. On motion for commitment of Aaron Burr and Harman Blennerhassett to another district for trial for treason.] Immediately after the return of the verdict, on the indictment for a misdemeanor [Case No. 14.694], Mr. Hay announced that it was his intention “to move for the commitment of Aaron Burr to that place for trial where the military expedition is said to have been completed:” and that he should combine in the same motion Israel Smith and Harman Blen-nerhassett.…

[W. 31. Corry moved for a new trial upon the following grounds, which were also urged to the court and jury at the trial: [The verdict, except on the second count, is unsustained by the evidence. The punishment for the offence mentioned in that count cannot exceed 6 months imprisonment, and a fine.

<p>Case No. 14,696.</p> <p>Judgment—Payment by Cbeditok or Pmoit In-cumbrance—Rents and Profits—Lien.</p> <p>1. Where, on the filing of a bill to remove an incumbrance on land, so that it may be sold under the plaintiff’s judgment, a receiver is appointed of the rents and profits of the land, they are, in equity, subject to the lien and claim of the judgment, the same as the land itself.</p> <p>2. Where the parties to such a suit settle it, the plaintiff getting rid of the incumbrance by paying to its holder a certain sum, and the land being thus left subject only to his judgment, the result is, in legal effect, the same, as it respects the lien of the judgment, as if a decree were to be made in the suit that, on payment of the sum, the prior incumbrance should be discharged.</p> <p>3. On the payment of such sum by the plaintiff, under a decree, the land and the rents and profits would be applicable to the plaintiff’s judg-meut; and, the incumbrance being disposed of by settlement, the land and the rents and profits that have accrued become subject to the judgment.</p> <p>4. Nor does the fact that the land is then sold under the judgment, and satisfaction entered of the judgment, that being done in pursuance of an agreement with the defendant in the judgment, affect the right of the plaintiff to those rents and profits. They are, in equity, immediately applicable to the judgment when the right under the incumbrance is disposed of; and the agreement to enter the satisfaction after selling the land and applying the proceeds, will be construed, upon a fair interpretation, to intend that the rents and profits which have accrued and are in (he hands of the receiver shall also be applied on the judgment.</p>

This was an indictment for conspiracy against one David Bush to prevent him from giving his support in favor of the election of one Robert Smalls as a member of congress,… Held: “As to the question of the jurisdiction of this court throughout the entire state of South Carolina, we decide, for the purposes of this trial, in favor of the jurisdiction. This is in accordance with the uniform practice of the court, without objection from any quarter, for nearly half a century.

[This was an information against A. P. Butler and others charging them with a violation of Rev.- St. 5 .JÓOS, which provides for the punishment of conspiracies to injure Or intimidate citizens of the United States in the exercise of their civil rights. Heard on motion to quash the information.]

<p>Case No. 14,703.</p> <p>Liability op Assistant Treasurer op the United States for Monet Lost—Commission on Sale op Stamps.</p> <p>1. While B. was assistant treasurer of the United States at New York, certain moneys, in his hands as such officer, were lost by clerks. The United States brought suit on his official bond, to recover the amount. After the commencement of the suit. B. made a claim to the proper department of the government, for an allowance on the sales of stamps by him as such assistant treasurer, sufficient to make the amount of 5 per cent, on the amount of the sales, including the sum which he had allowed to the persons ro whom he had sold the stamps, under the 170th section of the act of .Tune 30th, 1864 (13 Stat. 297). The government disallowed the claim, holding that, under the 6th and 22d sections of the act of August 6th, 1846 (9 Stat. 65). he was not entitled to anything for such sales above the sum which he had allowed to others, as above stated. The allowance so claimed was more than the amount of money lost: and the bondsmen claimed that it should be made by the government. If it was made, nothing was due on the bond: Held, that B. and his bondsmen were liable on their bond for the money lost.</p> <p>2. The provisions of the 22d section of the act of August 6, 1846, were inconsistent with those of the 170th section of the act of June 30, 1864, and the later one must prevail.</p> <p>3. B.. therefore, was entitled to the allowance which he claimed; it made no difference that the claim for the allowance was not made till after this suit was brought; and the defendants were entitled to judgment.</p> <p>[Subsequently a motion, on affidavits made by the district attorney of the United States, for leave to put in further evidence tending to show, error in the statement of accounts of the treasury department, on which the case had been submitted to the court, was denied. Case No. 14,704.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,702.</p> <p>Internad Revenue—Assessor’s List—Tax Due —Prima Facie Case.</p>

After the decision made by the court in this case, which is reported in the 7th volume of these Reports [supra], the district attorney of the United States made a motion, on affidavits, for leave to put in further evidence, tending to show a mistake of fact in the treasury statement on which the case had been submitted to the court.

This was an action of debt, brought to recover the sum of eleven thousand six hundred and twenty-two dollars and sixty cents, which it was alleged Mr. M’Call in his lifetime had received from the United States for their use, and which was still due and unpaid by his representatives. To this action the defendants (Thomas Cadwalader.

[Jane Byers], required that the United States should strictly prove that it was a genuine note of the bank; and cited 2 Starkie, Ev. (Am. Ed.) 829, in the note, which refers to the case of State v. Tillery, 1 Nott & McC. 9. and Russ. Crimes (Am. Ed.) 1032.

[This was an indictment against Richard B. Caldwell for bribing an officer of the United States government. Tbe prisoner pleads to the jurisdiction of the court. Heard on demurrer to the plea.]

This- was an indictment for a misdemeanor committed in Northumberland county, in which a subpoena had issued, on the part of the defendant, to summon Samuel M’Clay, Esq., and John M’Pherson. Esq., associate judges of the county courts of Northumber-land, to appear in the circuit court as witnesses on the 4th of May. The subpcena was served on Mr. M’Clay on the 28th of April, and on Mr. M’Pherson the next day.

[Indictment against James Thompson Cal-lender for a seditious libel against the president of the United States.] The matter set out in the indictment as libellous was as follows: “The reign of Mr. Adams has been one continued tempest of malignant passions.

The defendants [Thomas C. Callicott and John S. Allen] were the former collector of internal revenue for the Third district of New York, and his deputy. The indictment against them was founded upon the thirtieth section of the act of March 2, 1867 [14 Stat. 484], and the forty-second section of the act of July 13, 1866 [14 Stat. 162]. They were indicted jointly with others against whom the government discontinued.

<p>Claim [by Henry Cambuston] for eleven leagues of land in Butte county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,713.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants—Capacity op Foreigners to Receive—Repeal op Laws—Adthority op Governors — Presumptions from Official Acts.</p> <p>[1. The law of Mexico of 1824, which permitted and invited foreigners to settle on the vacant lands of the republic, was repealed by the law of December 29, 1836, which provided ‘‘that foreigners cannot acquire real estate in the republic, unless they have been naturalized and married to a Mexican woman, and have otherwise complied with the laws relating to such acquisition. The acquisitions of colonists will be subject to special laws of colonization.” But if it be assumed that the act of 1836 did not repeal the law of 1824. such repeal was effected by the 12th article of the law of 1842, which provides that “foreigners cannot acquire royal or public lands, in all departments of the republic, without contracting for them with the government, which passes this right as representing the domain of the Mexican nation.” Therefore, after the latter act, no unnaturalized foreigner had capacity to receive a grant of land without the express license of the supreme government.]</p> <p>[2. The rule that public acts of public officers shall, in absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to have been done in the exercise of a legitimate authority, applies with but little force to grants of land made by the Mexican govern- or of California, within a few weeks before the territory passed from his hands, and during the heat and conflict of the struggle in which his power was overthrown, especially where the evidence that the formalities required by law were observed is imperfect and unsatisfactory, and rests wholly in parol, where it does not appear that any preliminary inquiries were made as to the point on which he-is supposed to have exceeded his authority, and where his situation and the mode in which he exercised his authority in other cases about the same time suggests a suspicion of carelessness and recklessness in the exercise of his powers.]</p> <p>[3. Where a grant was made by the governor of California, just before the territory was wrested from his hands, to one who was commonly supposed to be a French citizen, and in whose behalf the French minister to Mexico had made strong representations to that government a short time before, and it was not stated in the grant either that he had been naturalized or that he had obtained a license from the supreme government to take the lands, held, that the mere fact of the making of the grant did not, under the circumstances, raise any presumption that he hail been naturalized or that he had received such license, and the burden was on him to show affirmatively the existence of one of these faets in order to establish his right to receive the grant. U. S. v. Reading, 18 How. (59 U. S.) 9, distinguished.]</p> <p>[Cited in Bouldin v. Phelps, 30 Fed. 569.]</p> <p>[4. The Mexican governors of California had no authority to remove the disabilities of foreigners in respect to holding lands under the-laws of 1836 and 1842; and an attempt to make a grant to a foreigner by executing the necessary papers could not, therefore, operate as an enfranchisement. which would render the grant effectual.]</p>

This was a writ of entry, on the plaintiffs’ own seisin, wherein they demanded of the defendants seisin and possession of certain premises, situated in Portland, Maine, described in the writ. It appeared, from the agreed statement of facts, that on the 24th of October, 1839, the present defendants attached certain real estate, of which the demanded premises composed a part, on a writ against James C. Churchill and Caleb S. Carter.

<p>Case No. 14,718.</p> <p>Appeal—Final Decree—War—Prohibition* op Commercial Intercourse—Seizure of Gold Coin.</p> <p>[1. Certain merchandise, together with some gold coin, was seized during a period of insurrection and libeled for condemnation, as about to be transported into the enemy’s country. A decree was entered by which the merchandise was condemned and ordered to be sold. The court, in delivering its opinion, stated that the gold could not be condemned, and the decree directed that it should be deposited in the registry, to await further orders. Over two years later, on the petition of a claimant, the gold was ordered to be paid over to him. Held, that the original decree was not final in respect to the gold, and that, consequently, an appeal from the subsequent order might be taken, notwithstanding the fact that more than two years had elapsed since the date of the former decree.]</p> <p>[2. The act of July 13, 1861. providing for the forfeiture of all “goods and chattels, wares and merchandise” coming from, or proceeding to, the insurrectionary districts, includes gold coin.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,719.</p> <p>Elective Fkajjchise — Constitutional Amendment—NeGKOES—iNTEIiFEKENCE WITH VOTERS.</p> <p>1. The amendment to the constitution of the United States, securing to all persons born here all the rights of citizenship, is now in full force and valid as a part of the constitution, and includes the African race.</p> <p>2. The right of suffrage is included in the guaranty of the constitutional amendment.</p> <p>3. Section 4 of the act of congress of May 31, 1870 [16 Stat. 141], prohibits and punishes all interference in the exercise of the right of voting, by threats, intimidation, or violence, which hinders or prevents the free exercise of the right.</p> <p>4. The acts and conduct of the defendant, Lewis Canter, as proved, are within the scope and operation of said section 4.</p> <p>5. Individual views, adverse to the policy of the extension of the right of suffrage as provided for in the constitutional amendments, should have no influence with the jury, as the act of congress, under which the indictment is framed, is a valid act, passed in pursuance of the constitution, and obligatory upon every citizen.</p>

A writ of mandamus nisi, was obtained by Mr. Roger C. Weightman, one of the candidates for the office of mayor of Washington at the late election, held on the first Monday in June, 1822, against Mr. Thomas Carbery, who had been returned as duly elected; and against the commissioners of election; commanding the said Thomas Carbery immediately to cease and forbear to hold, claim, or execute, the place, or office of mayor, and to admit the said Roger C. Weightman into the said…

Indictment against William R. Card for passing counterfeit notes of the United States. He had been convicted and sentenced to prison. Morrill Goddard and Charles W. Horton each petitioned the court to certify to the governor and council of Maine that he was entitled to the reward allowed prosecutors and informers under section 11, c. 121, of the Revised Statutes of that state.

<p>Case No. 14,721.</p> <p>Forfeiture —Seizure — Bond for Value — Ap-praisement.</p> <p>Where property under bonds for duties is seized in a warehouse, the bond for value under the 89th section of the act of 1799 [1 Stat. 695] should represent its full market value, duties included.</p> <p>[For subsequent proceedings in the case of forfeiture^ see Case No. 14,722.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,722.</p> <p>Forfeiture—Entry op Goods—Fraudulent Appliance—Colored Sugars—Good Faith.</p> <p>1. The term “entry.” as used in section 1 of the act of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. 738], must be understood to include the series of acts done-by the importer at the custom-house necessary to the introduction of his merchandise into the United States, in compliance with the forms of law.</p> <p>2. If in the performance of these acts, and as a means of making the entry, the importer is guilty of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance, or uses any false or fraudulent document, he comes within the law.</p> <p>3. Whether the agent who makes the entry had knowledge of the fraud is immaterial. The guilty knowledge of the owner is sufficient.</p> <p>4. Where charcoal had been mixed with sugar above No. 12. Dutch standard in color, for the purpose of reducing its grade, and making it appear to be below No. 12 Dutch standard in color, and the importer failed to disclose that fact to the customhouse authorities, held, that the color of the sugar was not thereby altered. It was merely disguised, and the concealment and suppression of that fact by the importer at the time of taking his oath and making his entry, and the oath taken by him, constituted “a false and fraudulent practice and appliance” within the meaning of the law: and this notwithstanding that the law does not require that the color of the sugar be stated in the invoice or entry.</p> <p>5. Whether the collector was deceived by the attempted fraud, is immaterial.</p> <p>6. The belief on the part of the importer that he might lawfully put charcoal into his sugar, and thus alter its grade, and enable himself to lawfully enter it as of a lower grade, and that he might lawfully withhold from the custom-house authorities knowledge of the facts, will be no protection to him.</p>

This was a bill in equity filed by complainants to recover from defendant Carlisle a portion of a certain judgment fund to which the United States set up equitable rights by virtue of certain agreements between the postmaster general and Carlisle.

[In error to the district court of the United ■States for the district of Maine. [This was an action by the United States against William Carlton.]

<p>Case No. 14,727.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Ownership of Illicit Distillery—Bond—Records—How Proven.</p> <p>1. Where the statute does not require a copy of a bond to be made and preserved, or the bond to be recorded or otherwise chronicled in a book or other place, the testimony of the proper officer that no bond has been given, as required by law, is to be taken as evidence of the fact without the production of the records of his office, which would not be admissible as evidence.</p> <p>2. Whoever aids in the act of illegal distilling is to be held responsible under the law without regard to ownership of the still or its product. •</p> <p>UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER. See Case No. 15,121.</p>

<p>[This was a claim by H. W. Carpentier for the rancho San Ramon in Contra Costa county. 1</p>

This suit was brought to quiet the title to four fifty-vara lots, situated within the city of San Francisco, upon two of which stands the United States Marine Hospital. In June, 1851, commissioners for the con-struetion of public buildings in San Francisco, appointed by the secretary of the treasury, selected a place on what is known as “Rincon Point” in the city, as a suitable, site for a marine hospital.

Robert E. Carr was indicted and tried, at the November term, 1S72, of the circuit court for the Southern district of Georgia, for the willful murder of Hannon A. Jordan. The ease was this: Both the prisoner and the deceased were soldiers in the 3d artillery, United States army, and were stationed at Fort Pulaski, on Cockspur Island, near the mouth of the Savannah river, in Georgia. On the 13th of July, 1872, the prisoner was the sergeant of the guard at the fort.

Indictment, under the act of congress of 1790 (1 Stat. 112), for stealing. [Michael Car-rigo], contended that he had a right to a peremptory challenge. He contended that the prisoner was charged with felony; and by the law of Virginia (Rev. Code, 110) “no person charged with murder or felony shall be admitted to a peremptory challenge of more than twenty,” which implies the right peremptorily to challenge that number.

<p>[Claim by Joaquin Carillo to a certain tract of land.]</p>

A special session of the circuit court of the United States for the district commenced at Norfolk, October 27, 1823. pursuant to public notice, for the trial of Manuel Cartacho upon a charge of piracy; Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL presiding, Hon. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, associate judge.

Claim [by Joaquin Carrillo] for three leagues of land [the rancho Llano de Santa Rosa] in Sonoma county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

moved in arrest of judgment, and contended that the indictments did not show any offence at common law. That it was only an attempt to defraud by false pretences, which is only a statute offence. That no person has been actually defrauded, and that an unsuccessful attempt to defraud a person is not an offence at common law. If the attempt had been punishable at common law, there would have been no necessity for the statute of false pretences. They cited 1 Chit. Cr.

[In error to the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.] This was an action, brought in the district court, by the United States, on a recognizance taken by a commissioner appointed by the circuit court, on the arrest and examination of a person charged with perjury, conditioned for the appearance of the accused before the commissioner on a future day, to-which the proceeding was adjourned, for his further examination.

<p>Case No. 14,743.</p> <p>PRINCIPAL AMD SURETY —MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT—Release of Surety.</p> <p>A surety is released from his obligations under a contract guaranteed by him where any modification is made in that contract without his consent, even though it be by mutual agreement hetween the principals, and in a particular not deemed essential by either of them.</p>

<p>Cáse No. 14,744.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Twice in- Jeopakdt—Acquittal BEFORE COURT-MaR-HAL.</p> <p>An acquittal before a court-martial cannot he pleaded in defence of an indictment in a court of law; even though the offence charged in either case be substantially the same.</p>

Indictment for an endeavor to commit a revolt on board of the ship Amethysi, on the high seas, against Act 1835, e. 40. § 2.' Plea, the general issue. At the trial it appeared in evidence, that the Amethyst was an American ship, registered in New Bedford. She sailed from thence on a whaling voyage in the Pacific in August, 1836, under the command of Capt. AVarren Howland.

<p>Case No. 14,749.</p> <p>Mexican' Land Grant—Survey.</p> <p>[Where a survey based on a Mexican grant appears to be incorrect, it will be rejected, and a new one ordered.].</p> <p>. [For the opinion confirming the grant in this case, see Case No. 14.731.]</p>

The principal controversy in this case is as to the location of the dividing line between the ranchos of Mariano Castro and Jose Pena. It appears from the expediente that in February, 1841, Jose Pena presented a petition to the governor, alleging that from the year 1837 he had solicited the Rincon de San Francisquito, but that, by various proceedings, which he details, a part of it, and also an augmento he had solicited, had been conceded to other parties.

<p>Claim [by Joaquin Y. Castro, administrator of Francisco Maria Castro, deceased] for about four leagues of Rind in Contra Costa county [the Rancho San Pablo], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.</p>

Claim [by Rufina Castro and others] for two leagues of land in Santa Clara county [the Rancho Solis], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

This was an appeal [by the United States] from a decree of the district court of California, approving the survey of a confirmed claim under a Mexican grant [to Guadalupe Castro.]

This was an appeal from a decree of the district court of [the United States for] the Northern district of New York, awarding restitution of a vessel captured as a slaver, and libelled by the United States.

<p>[These were indictments against Charles W. H. Cathcart and against Catherine Par-menter. Heard on a demurrer, and on a motion to quash.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,758.</p> <p>Contempt—Refusal to Testify before Grand Jury.</p> <p>It is a contempt of court in a witness to refuse to answer proper questions before the grand jury, for which he may he fined, and required to give security for his good behavior.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Anonymous, 21 Fed. 770.]</p>

The petitioners, Richard Wallaeli and others, by their counsel, J. M. Carlisle and Henry May, pray, that a writ of quo warranto be awarded, and directed to Nathaniel P. Causin, commanding him to be and appear before the court to exhibit the right and authority under and by virtue of which he exercises the powers, functions, and authority of judge of the orphans’ court.

<p>•This was an action of debt against the master ot the schooner Two Brothers, to recover a penalty of $500 under the fifty-seventh section of the impost law, the goods on beard not agreeing with the report or manifest delivered by the defendant at the customhouse, inasmuch as 25 bags of coffee, not reported, were found by the inspectors concealed in the vessel, some days after the master had declared that the whole cargo was discharged.</p> <p>The disagreement was clearly proved at the trial, under such circumstances as excluded every idea that it arose from accident or mistake. But Mr. Condy, the counsel for the defendant, contended that, as the goods had never been landed until they were seized and sent to the custom house by the inspectors, the penalty, by virtue of the proviso to the section of the act of congress on which the suit was founded, could not be inflicted.</p> <p>After a general answer from Mr. Dallas, the jury gave a verdict for the United States, subject to the opinion of the court on the point of law.</p>

Claim [by Antonio Cazares] for two leagues of land in Marin county [the Rancho Cañada de Pogolome], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.]</p>

Action to recover five per centum of the net earnings of the Central Pacific Railroad Company from July 15, 1869. The case was tried by the c-ourt, without a jury, upon stipulation of the parties.

On the trial of this cause before BETTS, District Judge, and a jury, Mr. Hoffman, district attorney, offered to read in evidence printed acts of parliament, 5 & 0 Wm.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was a motion to dismiss an appeal from a decree of the district court on an information in the admiralty for the reason that the term of the district court at which the decree was entered had not ended when the term of the circuit court, at which the appeal was entered, was begun.

<p>[This was an action for forfeiture of a certain piece of land claimed by V. Spreekens.]</p>

Claim [by Cruz Cervantes] for [the rancho of San Joaquin or Rosa Morada] a tract of-land within boundaries supposed to contain two sitios of ganado mayor, granted to ap-pellee ou the first of April, 1836, by Nicolas Gutierrez, superior political chief, ad interim, of California. The claim was confirmed by the board of land commissioners. The United States appealed.

The claim in this case was originally confirmed on uncontradicted testimony, which seemed to establish beyond doubt the occupation and possession of the land, by permission of the Mexican authorities, since the year 1837. [See Case No. 14.770.] The cause having been opened for further proofs as to the boundaries and extent of the land occupied by [Pedro] Chaboya. additional testimony was taken.

<p>Case No. 14,770.</p> <p>Mexican Land Gbant — Loso and Continuóos Occupation—Validitt.</p> <p>[For a subsequent proceeding iu this litigation, see Case No. 14,769.]</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against La Fayette Chaffee. Heard on motion in arrest of judgment.]</p>

This was a suit by the United States, in which a large amount was claimed for unpaid duties on whisky manufactured by defendants [Highland D. Chaffee and others] at Tippecanoe, in Ohio, which it was alleged was sold by them in fraud of the internal revenue laws. A great mass of testimony was introduced, and the case occupied the court and jury for upward of five weeks. The charge of the court was necessarily of great length, and would occupy too much space for a full report.

[This was an action of debt by the United, States against Highland D. Chaffee and others for the penalty for the illegal manufacture of whisky. See Case No. 14,772. There was a verdict in favor of the United States for $253.-200. Case unreported. The case is now heard upon motion for new trial.]

The defendants were distillers at Tippecanoe, Miami county, Ohio, and the firm was composed of H. D. Chaffee, since deceased. Rue P. Hutchins, and Sidney L. Chaffee.

[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Information of forfeiture and seizure on land of one chain cable, for having been unladen and delivered from the ship Marathon, at the port of Boston, without a permit, against the collection act of 1799. c. 128. § 50.

This was a suit brought by the United States to recover a penalty of fifty dollars against the defendant, for an alleged violation of the act of congress of- March 3, 1825, entitled “An act regulating the post-office establishment.” It was submitted to the decision of the court on the following agreed statement of facts: “That the defendant was a mail carrier from Machias, through Eastport, to Calais, and that on the day specified, his driver took from Eastport certain…

<p>Case No. 14,778.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Evidence—Handwriting—Other Writings—Comparisons—Expert Testimony.</p> <p>1. Ou the trial of an indictment for depositing scurrilous postal cards in the mail, the cards put in evidence displayed characteristic instances of misspelling, and it was held to be competent to-prove other writings of the defendant’s, containing identical errors in spelling, for the purpose of connecting the defendant with the cards which formed the -abject of the charge.</p> <p>2. It was, also, held to be incompetent to test the knowledge of an expert in handwriting, by placing before him irrelevant papers, for the mere purpose of contradicting his testimony as to the handwriting thereof.</p> <p>[Cited in Springer v. Hall, 83 Mo. 698.]</p> <p>3. It was, also, held, to be competent for the-jury to compare the handwriting of documents properly in evidence, and proved to have been written by the defendant, with the handwriting of the cards in dispute, for the purpose of ascertaining the origin of the cards.</p> <p>4. It was, also, held, that, standard specimens-of the defendant’s handwriting being in evidence, an expert might point out to the jury features in the writing of ,uch specimens, identical with those displayed by the cards in question.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,781.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Failure to Take Out License—To Affix Stamps—Indictable Offences.</p> <p>A failure to take out a license or a neglect to affix stamps as ■ equired by the internal revenue law, are indictable offences.</p>

Claim [by Claude Chana] for four leagues of land in Yuba county [the Rancho Nemshas], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

2 [The following preliminary remarks are explanatory of the case. [The constitution of the United States confers on congress the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations.” Article 1, § 8. “The Federalist” (No. 42) says this power belongs with equal propriety to the general government; and is a still greater improvement on the articles of confederation.

<p>Case No. 14,783.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Confession—Promise of Favor.</p> <p>A confession made by a prisoner against himself on a hearing before a committing magistrate, although previously cautioned by a magistrate not to criminate himself, held to be inadmissible because it appeared that forty-two hours before he had made a confession to one of the magistrate’s officers under the influence of false promises.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,784.</p> <p>Pehjcrít — Bankrupt Schedule — Indictment — Items of Schedule. .</p> <p>1. In an indictment for perjury under the bankrupt law. in not giving a true and full account of the property of the' petitioner, the items on the schedule need not be stated in the indictment.</p> <p>2. The allegation that the property was omitted. with intent to defraud A. B. and the other creditors, is sufficient.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. French, 57 Fed. 389.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,785.</p> <p>Public Lands—Sioux Scrip Location—Occupied Land—Contest—Patent Pending—Preemption — State Location.</p> <p>1. In the location of Sioux half-breed scrip, the rules and regulations of the United States land-office require that in all cases where not located by the party to whom the scrip issued in person, the application to locate must be accompanied with a power of attorney from said party authorizing the same.</p> <p>TCited in Chapman v..Polack. 58 Cal. 555. 5 Pac. 232: Lee v. Justice Mining Co., 29 Pae. 1024. 2 Colo. App. 112.]</p> <p>2. While a contest between a purchaser from the state, on a state selection, and a claimant under Sioux half-breed scrip location, arising under the provisions of the act of congress of July 23. 1866. is pending and undetermined before the register and receiver of the United States land-office, no patent can properly issue.</p> <p>3. The act of congress under which the Sioux half-breed scrip was issued does not permit •it to be located on land occupied by another: and the land in this case being occupied by the holder of a state title, with valuable improvements thereon, was not subject to location by said scrip.</p> <p>TCited in Chapman v. Polack, 70 Cal. 492. 11 Pac. 767; Polack v. Gurnee. 66 Cal. 267, 5 Pac. 229. 610.]</p> <p>4. At the time the slate agent applied to select th.e land in question. January 15, 1868. there being no pre-emption or other valid claim thereto. the state selection was good as one made on surveyed lands.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,787.</p> <p>Customs Derres—Protest—Action to Recoveh Balance.</p> <p>1. Act June 60. 1864. § 14, Rev. St. 8 29H1 [13 Stat. 209], making the decision of the collector of customs of the port where merchandise is entered final and conclusive as to the rate and amount of duties on such merchandise unless the importer pays the amount claimed, and duly protests, appeals, and brings suit for its recovery, applies not only in eases where such collector errs in judgment as to the proper rate and amount of such duties, but also where there are infor-malities and irregularities on the part of the customs officers respecting the appraisal of such merchandise, such as would enable the importer to recover his money back if he had duly protested. appealed, and brought suit therefor.</p> <p>2. In this ease it appeared that the collector did not designate jn the invoice the requisite number of sample bales for examination, nor did the appraisers make proper examination of the merchandise in question, and the said merchandise was in fact erroneously classified to the prejudice of the importer; but the appraiser made a certificate of appraisal in due form, and the collector made final liquidation of the duties on the basis of the appraiser’s report, and the importer, having already paid the estimated duties, refused to pay the balance demanded. Held, that in a suit by the government against the importer to recover such balance, the importer could take advantage of none of' the above facts in Jiis defence.</p> <p>[Upon a writ of error the circuit court affirmed the judgment. 9 Fed. 882.]</p>

<p>[This was an action on a collector’s bond by the United States against Harry Chase and others.]</p>

<p>This cáse came before the court upon a motion for the distribution of a fund in the registry, arising from a fine imposed upon the defendant [Frederic Chassell]. The proceeding against the defendant was an indictment found against him for carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer, without haring paid the special tax. reuuired by law. Upon that indictment he was tried and convicted, and a fine was imposed by the court, which was paid, and constituted the fund in question. One-half of this fund was now claimed by Brewster Wood, as informer. In support of his claim, Wood produced a certificate of the district attorney, to the effect that he was the person who first informed of the cause, matter, and thing, whereby the arrest and conviction of the defendant were procured. To this he added his own oath, showing that he first informed the district attorney of the facts upon which the prosecution was based, and also that he had no knowledge or information that any claim was made by any other person to have first informed of such matter and thing. On the part of the government, there was produced the written admission of Wood, that he obtained the information which he imparted to the district attorney, while in the discharge of his official duty as assistant assessor .of the Third collection district of the state of New York.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,790.</p> <p>Statutes — Repeal by Implication — Assistant Treasurer’s Bond—Liabilities op Sureties.</p> <p>1. Where a statute revising another act embraces the entire subject-matter of the prior act, with additional provisions, it must be regarded as a substitute for, and as repealing such prior act.</p> <p>2. The act of congress of June 30, 1804. to provide internal revenue, etc. (13 Stat. 294-297), embraces the entire subject-matter of section 2 of the act of December 23. 1862 (12 Stat. 632), and Repeals the latter section.</p> <p>3. The liabilities of sureties are strietissimi ju-ris, and cannot be extended beyond the reasonably necessary import of the language of the bond.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. i. Adams, 24 Fed. 333.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in City of Harrisonville v. Poiter. 76 Me. 359. Cited in Milwaukee Co. y. Ehlers 45 Wis. 293.]</p> <p>4. Subsequent to the passage of the act of congress of .Tune 30. 1864. to provide internal revenue, etc. (13 Stat. 223]. the assistant-treasurer of the United States and treasurer of the branch mini at San Francisco, gave an official bond in pursuanci of sections 6 and 7 of the act of August 6, 1846. to provide for the reorganization of the rreasiny. etc. (9 Stat. 60), and conditioned in the language of said sections: also referring to the aci of May 23. 1850. providing for a bullion fund (9 Stat. 436], but not containing the conditions prescribed for stamp agents’ honds by section 170 of said act of .Tune 30. 1864, and not making any reference to said act or duties: which bond was accepted by the secretary of the treasury: Held, that the sureties on said bond, given as assistant-treasurer and treasurer of the branch mint, are not liable for any default cf their principal occurring in the performance of the duties of stamp agent, in pursuance of the provisions of said section 170 <>f said act of .Tune 30, 1864.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,789a.</p> <p>Indians—Criminal Jurisdiction Over—How Far Indian Tribes Independent.</p> <p>1. Congreso has the constitutional power to pass laws punishing Indians for crimes and of-fences committed against the United States.</p> <p>2. Indian tribes are not so far independent natious as to lie exempt from this kind of legislation.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,792.</p> <p>Shipping Prohibited Articles on Steamboats— Gunpowder—Who Liable.</p> <p>1. Act August 30, 1852 [10 Stat. 61], which prohibits the shipment of gunpowder and other ignitible articles on board of steamboats, punishes by fine or imprisonment, for putting up such articles for shipment, except they be put up and marked as required, or for shipping the same.</p> <p>2. An individual who has not put up the articles, is not liable for shipping the same, if the articles have not been actually shipped on board of the vessel</p>

[These were actions for forfeiture of certain cigars late in the possession of Edward Bolin.] Heard upon motion for order to pay the whole fund in the registry of the court in each of the causes (including the fees, costs, charges and expenses of the officers of the court) to the local collector of internal revenue.

This was a suit to recover duty upon the alleged weight of a quantity of wool imported by the defendants • [Pierre Cboteau and others].

<p>Case No. 14,796.</p> <p>Indians — Power op Congress to Regulate Intercourse among — Reservation Included within State Limits—Federal Criminal Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. Under the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, congress have power to prohibit all intercourse with them, except under a license.</p> <p>[Cited in Oliver v. Liverpool & L. Ins. Co., 100 Mass. 537; Territory v. Guyot (Mont.) 22 Pac. 134.]</p> <p>2. This power is the same as the power to regulate commerce among foreign nations, under which embargo, laws have been enacted, and also laws of non-inter.course.</p> <p>3. Under the treaty-making power, certain political relations have been established between the United States and the Indian tribes.</p> <p>4. The laws regulating intercourse with the Indians, were intended to operate on communities, somewhat remote from a white population.</p> <p>5. The exception in the act of 1802 [2 Stat. 139] refers to Indian tribes at that time surrounded by white settlements, as the remnant oi tribes in Connecticut. Massachusetts, and other states.</p> <p>6. The power of congress to regulate commerce with the Indians does not necessarily cease on their being included within the limits of a state.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Seveloff. Case No. 1(5,252; U. S. v. Bridteman. 7 Fed. 897.]</p> <p>TCited in State v. McKenney (Nev.) 2 Pac. 172.]</p> <p>7. The federal relations should be withdrawn from the Indians within a state, by the concurrent acts of th" federal and state governments.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. 7. Ward, Case No. 16,639.]</p> <p>8. But if no such acts take place, and the Indians occupy a territory of very limited extent, surrounded by a white population, which necessarily have daily intercourse with the Indians, and it becomes impracticable to enforce the law, the federal jurisdiction must cease.</p> <p>[Cited íd U. S. v. Sa-Coo-Da-Cot, Case No. 16,212; Ex parte Sloan, Id. 32.944; U. S. v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 624; Bush v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 107 U. S. 115, 1 Sup. Ct. 630J</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Doxtater, 47 Wis. 292.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,790.</p> <p>Banks— Idlegai, Deposit—Action to Recover —Drafts— Government Agents—Evidence.</p> <p>1. No bank, under the suh-treasury law, can become a depository of the public money.</p> <p>2. The law prohibits such a deposit, and inflicts a severe penalty on the public officer who makes it.</p> <p>3. But a state bank may engage with the secretary of the treasury to transmit a draft to New Orleans or elsewhere.</p> <p>4. This does not render a deposit necessary.</p> <p>5. The same draft received by the bank may be transmitted, or having the specie at the place, the bank may draw on it and pay the treasury at New Orleans.</p> <p>6. This accommodates both parties, without expense.</p> <p>7. Where the money of the government is improperly placed in a bank, the illegality of the transaction is no bar to a recovery.</p> <p>8.- The agents of the government do not bind the government, when their powers are transcended.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Sooy, 39 N. J. Law, 149.]</p> <p>9. The money, in such a case, would be received wrongfully, and without any authority from the assent of the government.</p> <p>10. It could be.recovered by the government, if not on the contract, on the general counts.</p> <p>11. And in such a case the writing would be evidence to charge the bank.</p> <p>[There was a judgment in this case in favor of the defendant, which was affirmed in error by the supreme court. 21 How. (62 U. S.) 356.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,797.</p> <p>Shipping— Penal Action — Employing Sea.men-Without Signed Articles—Mexican Voyages—Statutes.</p> <p>The 14th section of the act of June 7th. 1872 (17 Stat. 2651, provides, that, “if any master, mate, or other officer of a ship, knowingly receives. or accepts to be entered on board of any merchant ship, any seaman who has been engaged or supplied contrary to the provisions of this act. the ship on board' of which such seaman shall be found shall, for every such seaman,-’ be liable to a penalty not exceeding $209. The 13th section of the same act provides, that every agreement with a seaman shall be signed by him in the presence of a shipping commissioner, and be acknowledged and certified under the band and official seal of such commissioner. The 12th section of the same act provides, that the master of every ship bound from a port in the United States to a foreign port, shall make an agreement with every seaman of his crew, in a form prescribed by that section. By the act of January 15th. 1873 (17 Stat. 4101. it is-provided, that the 12th section of the said act of 1872 shall not apply to masters of vessels when engaged in trade with Mexico. The 1st section of the act of July 20th, 1790 (1 Stat. 131), provides, that the master of any vessel bound from a port in the United States to a foreign port, shall make an agreement in writing or in print, with every seaman on board, declaring the voyage or term of time for which such seaman shall be shipped. Held, that the said act of 1873 had no effect to modify the provisions of the said 13th section of the act of 1872. and that, notwithstanding the said act of 1872. the master of a vessel making a voyage from New York to a port in Mexico was required, under the said act of 1790. to make the agreement therein required, and was also required to see that such agreement was signed, acknowledged, and certified before a shipping commissioner, in the manner prescribed by the said 13th section of the said act of 1872, and that such vessel was liable to the penalty provided by the said 14th section of the said act of 1872. if her master received a seaman on board who had been engaged otherwise than under an agreement so signed, acknowledged and certified:</p>

<p>Case No. 14,798.</p> <p>Indictment — Description— Certainty — Smuggling.</p> <p>1. Section 4 of the act of July 18th, 1866 (14 Stat. 179). reproduced in section 3082 of the Revised Statutes, provides, that, “if any person shall fraudulently or knowingly import or bring into the United States, or assist in so doing, any merchandise, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment or sale of such merchandise. after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law,” “the offender shall be fined.” &c. An indictment founded on this section described the merchandise as “certain goods, wares and merchandise, to wit, a large quantity of silk goods, to wit, six cases containing silk goods, of the value of $30.000. a more particular description of which is to the jurors unknown,” and stated that the goods were dutiable goods introduced into the port of New York from France: Heli, that the indictment was not open to the objection, that the goods were not sufficiently identified, and the description of them not sufficient to enable the defendant to prepare his defence.</p> <p>2. It is not necessary to describe property in an indictment with such particularity as will obviate all necessity for proof outside the record to support a plea of once in jeopardy.</p> <p>3. A reasonable amount of detail in describing property is all that is necessary in an indictment. and, if more detail is required, a bill of particulars may be demanded.</p> <p>4. An indictment under the said section need not set out the offence committed in the original importation, with the same particularity of time, place and circumstances that would be required in an indictment for the original offence.</p> <p>5. Whether the said section applies to any other case than that of smuggled goods, quere.</p> <p>6. The indictment having alleged that the illegality in the original importation of the goods was. that they had been “smuggled and clandestinely introduced into the United States,” the charge must be confined to such illegality.</p> <p>• 7. The averment that the goods were smuggled and clandestinely introduced into the port of New York from the republic of France is -a sufficient averment to enable the court to say fhat the original importation was illegal, within the meaning of the statute.</p> <p>8. The meaning of the word “smuggle,” defined.</p> <p>9. When technical words are used in an indictment. they must be taken to be intended to have their technical meaning.</p> <p>10. In an indictment under the sáid 4th section of the act of 1866, it is not a sufficient designation of the illegality of the original importation. to say, merely, that the goods had been imported and brought into the United States contrary to law.</p> <p>[For an action of debt against same defendants, see Case No. 14,799.]</p>

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.</p> <p>[This was an action for a penalty by the United States against Horace B. Claflin and others.</p> <p>[For an indictment against the same defendants. see Case No. 14.798.]</p> <p>The opinion of the district court (BLATCH-FORD. District Judge,) was as follows;</p> <p>“It is quite clear that the 2d section of the act of March 3, 1823 (3 Stat. 7S1), must be regarded as having been repealed by section 5596 of the Revised Statutes, (even if it had not been previously repealed.) on the ground that some portion of that act is embraced in the Revised Statutes, the provisions of the 1st section of that act being embraced in section 3099 of the Revised Statutes, and the provisions of the 2d section of that act not being embraced in any section of the Revised Statutes. The effect of such repeal is to destroy the right of the plaintiffs to recover under said 2d section in respect of any acts done after the enactment of the Revised Statutes. Therefore, counts 7, 9, 11 and 13 of declaration No. 2 are bad.</p> <p>“By section 5597 of the Revised Statutes, it is provided, that the repeal of the several acts embraced in the Revised Statutes shall not affect any right accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil cause before the said repeal, but all rights and liabilities under the said acts shall continue, and may be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal had not been made; and, by section 5598, it is provided, that, all offences committed, and all penalties or forfeitures incurred under any statute, embraced in the Revised Statutes, prior to said repeal, may be prosecuted and punished in the same manner and with the same effect as if said repeal had not been made. Thereupon, the question arises, whether the 2d section of the act of 1823, on which the counts for double the value of the imported goods are founded in these cases, was in force at the time of the enactment of the Revised Statutes, or whether it had been superseded and virtually repealed by the enactment of the 4th and other sections of the act of July 18, 1866. (14 Stat. 179). It was decided by the supreme court in Stockwell v. U. S.. 13 Wall. [80 U. S.] 531, that the penalty of double the value of the imported goods, imposed by the 2d section of the act of 1823, was not repealed by the 4th or any other section of the act of 1866. This decision was made at the December term, 1871. Yet, the 2d section of the act of 1823 is not found in the Revised Statutes, and, as lias been shown, must be regarded as having been repealed by section 5596 of the Revised Statutes, even if it were not previously repealed. What is the effect of the omission to include it in the Revised Statutes? Section 5595 of the Revised Statutes declares, that the revision embraces the general and permanent statutes which were in force on December 1st, 1873. as revised and consolidated by the commissioners; and section 5596 declares. that all parts of acts passed prior to December 1st, 1873, which are not contained in the Revised Statutes, have been repealed or superseded by subsequent acts, or were not general and permanent in their nature, and that all acts passed prior to December 1st. 1873, no part of' which is embraced in the Revised Statutes, shall not be affected or changed by the enactment of the Revised Statutes. As was pointed out by the circuit court for this district in Re Stupp [Case No. 13.563], the purport of the foregoing provision of section 5590 is, that, if any portion of a particular act is embraced in any section of the Revised Statutes, the parts of the same act which are not contained in the revision liave been repealed or superseded by subsequent acts, or were not general and permanent in their nature, but that, if there be an entire permanent and general statute which was in force on the 1st of December, 1873. and no part of it is to be found in the Revised Statutes, it is to be regarded as still in force. As a portion of the act of 1823 Is embraced in section 3099 of the Revised Statutes, and as the provisions of the 2d section of that act are not contained in the Revised Statutes, and as those provisions were general and permanent in their nature, it follows, that congress has declared by section 5596, that the provisions of the 2d section of the act of 1823 were repealed or superseded by a subsequent act. This declaration was made by congress after the decision iu StOckwell v. ü. S. [supra] was made, aud iu view of that decision; because, the only subsequent provisions of law by which the 2d section of the act of 1S23 could have been, or were claimed to have been, repealed or superseded, were rhe provisions of the 4th section of the act of 1806, in connection with the provision of the 43d section of that act. repealing all parts of acts conflicting with or supplied by the act of 180(>, and the provisions of the 4th section of the act of 1800 are found embodied in section 3U82 of the Revised Statutes, and. in the marginal note to that section, the case of Stockwell v. U. S.. 13 Wall. [80 U. S.] 331, is referred to.</p> <p>“The force of the legislative declaration contained iu section 3300 of the Revised Statutes, iu respect to this subject, has been recognized bj- the supreme court in two cases. Iu Murdock v. City of Memphis. 20 Wall. [87 l.'. S.] 390, 017. the question arose as to whether any part of the 23th section of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. S3), remained in force after the enactment • if the 2d section of the act of February 5. L807 (14 Stat 380). or whether the later section had taken the place of the prior one. there being no express repeal of the prior one. Other provisions of the act of 1789 are incorporated in the Revised Statutes, but the 25th section of that act is not incorporated in them, and the 2d section of the act of 1807 is incor-IMirated in them. The court came to the conclusion that the 25th section of the act of 1789 was technically repealed, and that the 2d section of the act of 1S07 had taken its place, although the act of 1807 had no repealing clause, nor any express words of repeal. The opinion of the court then proceeds: -This view is strongly supported by the consideration. that the revision of the laws of congress, passed at the last session, based upon the idea that no change in the existing law should be made, lias incorporated with the Revised Statutes nothing but the 2d section of the act of 1807. Whatever might have been our abstract views of the effect of the act of 1807. we are, as to all the future cases, bound by the law as found in the Revised Statutes, by the express language of congress on that subject; and, it would lie labor lost to consider any other view of the question.'</p> <p>“In the case of Sinythe v. Fiske. 23 Wall. [90 T.*. S.] 374. the supreme court, iu construing certain sections of tariff acts passed iu 1842 [5 Stat. 3481. 1840 [9 Stat. 421. and 1804 [13 Stat. 202], refers to the manner in which those sections, as reproduced in the Revised Statutes, are worded, and says that such wording is ‘a legislative declaration that such was the state of the law on the 1st of December. 1873.’ that is. prior to the enactment of the Revised Statutes, and ‘is necessarily a construction of the last clause of the 8th section of the act of 1804. iu accordance with that, which we have given to it.’ and that ‘it was the declared purpose of congress to collate all the statutes as they were at that date, and not to make any change in their provisions.’</p> <p>"In accordance with these views it must be held, that the omission to enact in the Revised Statutes the 2d section of the act of 1S23, while another portion of that act is enacted iu the Revised Statutes, is a legislative declaration by congress, that, on the 1st of December, 1S73, and prior to the enactment of the Revised Statutes, the 2d section of the act of 1823 was not in force, but had been repealed or superseded. It could have been repealed or superseded only by the act of 1800; aud it must be held that congress has declared, by statute, that, notwithstanding the decision of the supreme court in Stock-well v. U. S. [supra], the 2d section of the act of 182:? was superseded by the act of 1800. aud was not in force after the act of 1800 was enacted.</p> <p>“The authority of congress to declare, by statute, the existing state of statutory law. has been recognized and upheld by the supreme court. In Bailey v. Clark, 21 Wall. [S8 U. S.] 284, the question .arose as to the meaning of the words ‘capital employed’ by banks or bankers, in the 110th section of the internal revenue act of .Tune 30th, 1804 [13 Stat. 277], as amended by section 9 of the act of July 13. 1800 (14 Stat. 130). as applicable to questions of taxation which arose in ISO!) and 1870. Congress, by section ;?7 of the act of June 0, 1S72 (17 Stat. 230). enacted that the words ‘capital employed,’ in such 110th section, ‘shall not include money borrowed or received from day to day, in the usual course of business, from any person not a partner of, or interested in. the said bank, association or Arm.' In reference to this enactment, the court says: ‘This enactment was evidently intended to remove any doubt previously existing as to the meaning of the statute, and declare its true construction and meaning. Had it been intended to apply only to cases subsequently arising, it would undoubtedly have so provided in terms.’</p> <p>“The question thus presented, as to whether causes of action falling within the terms of the 2d section of the act of 1823, and which arose prior to the enactment of the Revised Statutes, on the 22d of June, 1874 [IS Stat. ISO], can be prosecuted on or after the latter date, has been heretofore ruled by me in favor of such prosecution, on the ground that the supreme court had held that the act of I860 did not repeal the 2d section of the act of 1823. But the views above presented as to the effect of section 5596 of the Revised Statutes, iu the particulars referred to. were not as fully considered as they now liave been. It follows, that all the odd numbered counts, in both of the declarations, must be held bud.</p> <p>"As to the even numbered counts, all those in suit Xo. 1. and counts 2. 4, and 0 in suit Xo. 2. are founded on section 4 of the act of 1SG6, while counts 8, 10, 12 and 14 in suit No. 2 are founded on section 30S2 of the Revised Statutes. These sections are substantially identical. It was decided by the supreme court, in Stockwell v. U. S., that the 4th section of the act of ISUfi was designed to punish as a crime that which before had subjected an offender to only civil liability or quasi civil liability. Besides the forfeiture of the offending merchandise, the only penalty imposed is, that the offender shall be tined in a sum not exceeding $5,000. nor less than $50. or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both. This tine is manifestly a fine not to be recovered by a civil action, but to be imposed after a conviction on a trial for a crime, as a punishment for which the court limy, in its discretion. inflict imprisonment, either with or without the imposition of a fine. No such imprisonment can be inflicted as the result of a civil action.</p> <p>“Moreover, this is an action of debt, and, in each of the even numbered counts, the plaintiffs claim the sum of $5.000 as a debt. But the statute does not imitóse a penalty or tine of $5.000, or of any other definite sum, or of any sum which can be reduced ro a certainty otherwise than by the discretion of the court in fixing such sum after a verdict on a trial. There can be no verdict for any definite sum. Debt lies only when a sum certain is due to the plaintiff, or a sum which can be reduced to a certainty, so as to form the basis of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a sum certain.</p> <p>“It follows, that all the even numbered counts are bad. The demurrers are sustained."</p>

This was an indictment [against Eben H. Clark] under the twenty-first section of the act of March 3. 1825 (3 Story's Laws. 1991), for embezzling a letter containing a bank note. .

<p>Case No. 14,800.</p> <p>Witness— Interest—Owner op Stolen Goods— Release op Interest in Fine.</p> <p>Upon indictment for larceny under the act of congress [of 1790 (1 Stat. 112)], the owner of the goods stolen is a competent witness after having released to the United States his half of the fine.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. McCann. Case No. 15,655; U. S. v. Brown. Id. 14,657; U. S. v. Tolson, Id. 16.530.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,804.</p> <p>Perjury —⅛EAElXG before Distkic i' Judge— Statute.</p> <p>1. Whether perjury, committed on a hearing on a criminal complaint before the district judge, be within the act of April 30th. 1790. c. 9. § 18 [1 Stat. 11(5].</p> <p>[Cited in U. S v Nunnemaeher. Case No. 15,-903: Ex jiarte Perkins. 29 Fed. 909. Explained in Todd v. U. S.. 15 Sup. Ct. 891.’]</p> <p>[2. Cited in Boston & P. R. R. v. Midland R. R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 355, to the point that, when a statute uses words whose meaning is well ascertained by the existing jurisprudence, they shall be understood in that meaning, unless the context displaces such construction, and clearly sets up another meaning.]</p>

The defendant [Edward Clark] was indicted under section 3995. Rev. St., for knowingly and wilfully obstructing and retarding the passage of the mail and .of the carriage carrying the same.

Indictment [against Hugh Clark] for a misdemeanor under the bankrupt act. After a verdict of guilty, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment.

<p>Case No. 14,807.</p> <p>United States—Pkiohitt—Assignments—Insol-vency — Notice — Principal and Surety—Assumpsit.</p> <p>1. An assignment under the act of congress of 1797 TI Stat. r>121. to entitle the United States to their priority, must be an assignment of all the debtor’s property; that is. the assignment must lie a general one as opposed to a partial assignment, or an assignment professedly of a part only of the debtor's property.</p> <p>[.Cited in U. S. v. Langton, Case No. 15.Ó00: Allen v. U. S.. 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 209.]</p> <p>[Cited in King v. McGilliard. 70 Ind. 31; Mussc.v v. Noyes. 20 Vt. 474.]</p> <p>2. Where there is an omission of an article of property in an assignment which purports to lie general, hut which does not show that the intention ■ was that the assignment should be a partial as opposed to a general one. it does not take the case out -A the act.</p> <p>[Cited in Winner v. Hoyt. 00 Wis. 247, 28 N. W. 390.1</p> <p>3. If the assignment docs not on its face ax>pear to lie general, the onus prolwndi is on the United Stares.</p> <p>4.The-priority of the United States does uot attach by the mere concealment of their debtor while insolvent. The "legal bankruptcy" mentioned in the act applies only to cases of legal insolvency, where by operation of law the debt- or's property is taken out of his hands to be distributed by others.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Wilkinson. Case No. 1(U>95.1</p> <p>An assignee is not liable under the act until notice of the debt due the United States. But the notice need not be given by the United States, nor is a judgment or suit against him necessary in order to charge him with notice. Tile notice must be such as is required in ordinary casis of trustees, and enough to put a prudent man on inquiry.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Eggleston. Caso No. 15.027.1</p> <p><>. Where the debtor, at the time of making the assignment, informed the assignee that he was surety on a bond to the United States, and that lie believed the bond was broken, it was held sufficient notice to the assignee.</p> <p>7. The hand on which he was such surety was a paymaster's bond, conditioned that the latter should well and truly account for and pay over all monies received by him as such paymaster. Held, that the- deot of the paymaster to the United States wiu, created by the advances made to him, and not at the time of striking a balance of account against him on the treasury books: and that the surety became a debtor ns soon ns the paymaster failed to account according to law.</p> <p>8. And it was />. Id. that it was not necessary that the debt.cf the surety should be ascertained by a judgment against him in order to make the assignee chargeable with its payment: but that the latter might in the action against, himself liave the benefit of any reduction to which the surety was entitled.</p> <p>9. Where the United States are entitled to a priority, they can bring an action of assumpsit against the assignee for monies received by him under the assignment.</p> <p>10. The article omitted in the assignment was a debt from the assignee to the debtor of the United Slates, growing out of a previous partnership between them. After the making of the assignment the assignee gave the debtor his bond for the debt. Held, that if the bond was given for monies of the debtor in the as-signee’s hands at the making of the assignment, the amount might lie recovered in assumpsit, but not if it grew .nit. of unsettled partnership concerns.</p> <p>11.'Where assumpsit is brought against an as-signee. and ho has funds which cannot he reached h.v the action, it seems that he is not entitled to a deduction for his expenses incurred in the preservation of the property, and the execution of his trust.</p> <p>12. Where a part of the assigned property had been sold at auction under the direction of the assignee, it was held enough prima facie to show that lie had received the price for which it was sold.</p>

This was an indictment under the statute of 1812, e. 14, § 17 (2 Stat. 673), charging the prisoner with having enticed and procured a soldier by the name of Hayden to desert. It appeared that early in November last.

<p>On motion to quash the indicnnent against Gus. Clarke.</p>

<p>[This was an action by the United States against Lorenzo N. Clarke. James Pitcher, and Charles P. Bertrand. Heard on a demurrer to pleas.]</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] The original action was debt on a bond for duties on goods imported in the Mercury, Birt master, from London, in the common form. The bond was dated on the 5th of September, 1826.

The indictment in this ease was presented at the April term, 1871, and is founded upon section 22 of the act of congress of May 31, 1870… Held: etc., John Edwards-was duly elected in the Third congressional district to represent the state of Arkansas, in the Forty-Second congress- of the United States.” The indictment then alleges that the said certificate was false and fraudulent, and that, “in truth and fact, it did not appear. at the time it was made, by and upon said…

This was an action on a custom-house bond-Xo. 1294, dated 30th June, 1841, conditioned for the payment of $793, on the 30th December, 1841, that sum being part of the duties charged on an invoice of molasses, imported by the defendants [Clement and Newman] from Cuba into Philadelphia.

On the 4th of February, 1850. the schooner J. B. Lindsey, Captain S. S. Riggs, came into the port of St. Thomas, West Indies, with signals of distress, and on landing, the captain and two men,… Held: admissible in criminal cases in Crawford v. State, 2 Yerg. 60; but the practice has-since been regretted and characterized as dangerous, and a disposition expressed to restrict it. Norris v. State, 3 Humph. 333. Commented on. McCaul’s Case, Kennedy’s Case, and Overbee’s Case.

The defendant was tried upon two indictments; one for stealing bank notes from the Bank of the United States, and the other for embezzling bank notes, the property of that bank. All the counts in the first indictment-charge that the defendant was. at the time the offence was said to have been committed. a person employed as a servant in the Bank of the United. States.

<p>Case No. 14,820.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Preliminary Examination—Evidence-Resisting Fugitive Slave I,aw.</p> <p>[1. On preliminary examination, prima facie evidence of guilt 1- sufficient to hold to bail, until the offence way be examined by a grand jury.]</p> <p>[2. Where a fugitive slave is arrested and lawfully restrained of his liberty under the provisions of the act of Sept. 18, 1850. all interference by third parties by word or act. for the purpose of favoring his escape, and tending to that result, is a violation of the act. rendering the offender amenable to its penalties.]</p> <p>[This was an indictment against Ira H. Cobb. Moses Summers, James Davis, Stephen Porter, William L. Salmon, Harrison Alien, William Thompson, and Prince Jackson, for aiding in the escape of a fugitive from labor.]</p>

An information was filed in the circuit court of the United States for the district of North Carolina, against Robert Cochran, late colleet- or for the port of Wilmington in that state, and J. E. and J. W., his sureties, to recover from the sureties the sum of $10,000, that being the penalty of Cochran’s official bond.

Indictment [against Thaddeus Coffin] for maliciously, and without justifiable cause, forcing a seaman of the ship Fabius on shore in a foreign port, to wit. at the Sandwich Islands, contrary to the crimes act of 1825, c. 276, § 10 [3 Story's Laws, 1999 ; 4 Stat. 115]. Plea, general issue, not guilty.

Debt on the official bond of the defendant, Pearson Cogswell, late marshal of New Hampshire. The defendant prayed oyer of the condition of the bond, which latter was as follows:—“The condition of the above-written obligation is such, that, whereas the above-bounden Pearson Cogswell is appointed marshal of the United States, within and for the district of New Hampshire, for the term- of four years, from and after the fifteenth day of March, eighteen hundred and thirty-two.

<p>Case No. 14,827.</p> <p>Esternal Revenue—Violation op Laws—Fraudulent Cigar Returns.</p>

It has been the practice of the marshal of this district to select the jury, both as to the individuals who were to serve on it and the part of the district from which they were to come, at his own pleasure. In other words, it was completely in the power of the marshal to return at any time just such a jury as would answer the purposes of government, or of any of the officers of government having an interest in the cause to be tried.

Indictment for an assault with a pistol, upon one Fuller, a seaman. The evidence was somewhat contradictory, but the main-facts appeared to be as follows;—Upon a late voyage of the ship, under the command of the defendant.

<p>Case KTo. 14,831.</p> <p>Internal Re vence—License—Jcggt.eky--Sjí*U{IT-ual Mediums.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,832.</p> <p>Conspiracy to Destroy Vessel—Evidence—Acts Done—Destruction op Vessel—Witnesses —Guilt—Reasonable Doubt.</p> <p>1. The 23d section of the act of congress of the 3d of March. 1825 [4 Stat. 122], which punishes a conspiracy to destroy a vessel or cargo, with the intent to defraud the underwriters is constitutional.</p> <p>2. The object of the act is. to protect commerce. and the protection to underwriters is incidental.</p> <p>3. The act applies to our internal as well as to our foreign commerce.</p> <p>4. Tile mischief is as great in the one case as in the other.</p> <p>5. And the opportunities to commit the offense, are much greater in our internal, than in our foreign commerce.</p> <p>6. This congress has as full power to do, for the protection of commerce among the several states, as for the protection of commerce with foreign nations.</p> <p>7. After prima facie evidence has been given of a conspiracy, the statements of those implicated. though not included in the indictment, is evidence.</p> <p>[Cited in Cuyler v. McCartney, 40 X. Y. 244.]</p> <p>8. This is. on the principle, that where a combination of individuals has been formed, to commit an unlawful act. they have assumed an individuality in doing the wrong, and the conduct of each one in doing or promoting the act. is chargeable on the whole.</p> <p>[Cited in People v. Marble. 38 Mich. 130: Spies v. People. 122 Ill. 230, 12 X. E. 07(1. and 17 X. E. 808.]</p> <p>9. The burning of the vessel is not necessary to complete the offense.</p> <p>10. Any combination of two or more persons to destroy the vessel or cargo, consummates the offense under the law, though neither the vessel nor the cargo is mjured.</p> <p>11. The act strikes at the incipient stages of the crime.</p> <p>12. In its object it is preventive, by punishing the design to do the act.</p> <p>13. Circumstantial evidence may be as satisfactory to a jury as positive. Sometimes it may equal positive proof.</p> <p>14. The destruction of the vessel by the defendants. or by any one of them, identified with the defendants ns conspirators, would be conclusive against them.</p> <p>[Cited in People v. Richards. 07 Cal. 415, 7 Pac. 830.]</p> <p>15. The burning of the vessel is not punishable under the act of congress, but it operates as evidence. ngamst the defendants.</p> <p>16. The testimony to show the unlawful combination does not end at the destruction of the boat.</p> <p>17. After, as well as before that event, the acts of the confederates may be examined to show their guilt.</p> <p>18. Theit entire acts, in relation to the subject matter of the indictment, which conduce to show a guilty purpose, may be proved.</p> <p>19. The jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses</p> <p>, 20. The manner in which a witness testified, the opportunity he had of knowing the facts he swears to. and his whole deportment in making his statements, will necessarily have an effect with the jury, in giving or withholding their confidence in his statements.</p> <p>21. In coming to a conclusion of guilty or not. guilty, the jury will weigh the evidence and exercise their best and most deliberate judgment.</p> <p>22. They will not convict unless their minds: are clearly convinced of the guilt of the accused..</p> <p>23. But if so convinced, they will not be deterred from a conviction of the defendants, in-whole or in part, as the evidence may require, from the consequences which may follow.</p> <p>24. TVe have, in this trial, only to look at the-facts and the law. With consequences we have-nothing to do.</p> <p>25. But if the jury are not satisfied of the-guilt of the defendants, beyond reasonable-doubts. an acquittal should follow.</p>

<p>This was an action commenced on the 10th of May, 1852, to recover from the defendant [James Collier] a balance alleged to be due from him to the United States on his official bond as collector for the district of Upper California. He acted as such collector from the 3d of April. 1849, until the 14th of January, 1851. The defendant tiled a plea of the general issue, and a notice that he elaim-ecl against the plaintiffs various specified credits, which exceeded their demand, and had been presented by him to the accounting officers of the treasury and disallowed; and .he claimed that he was entitled to have a balance certified in his favor upon the whole accounting. At the trial, before Betts,’J., in April. 1S54. the jury found a special verdict, and the case now came before the court on a case ma4e, which contained the evidence given on the trial, and the special verdict, and various exceptions taken on the trial to rulings of the court.</p>

<p>This was an application for a provisional injunction against [Edward K. Collins] William Brown and others, creditors of the New York and Liverpool United States Mail Steamship Company, who had obtained judgments upon their demands against that company, in the courts of the state of New York, and had issued executions thereon to the sheriff of the city and county of New York, to restrain and prevent the sale, under such executions, of the mail steamers Atlantic and Baltic, upon which vessels it was claimed that the United States had liens, under certain deeds of trust or chattel mortgages, for moneys advanced towards building and completing those vessels.</p>

Indictment [against David Collins] for not supporting a bastard child, under the act of Maryland of 1781 (chapter 13). The mother was received as a competent witness, although she was to be relieved from the charge of maintaining the child, by convicting the defendant. objected to the cross-examination as to her connection with others. THE COURT limited the inquiry to a period not more than twelve months nor less than six before the birth of the child.

This was an indictment against [Walter Collins] the master of a vessel of the United States, under the act of March 3, 1835 (4 Stat. 776), for inflicting on one of the crew a cruel and unusual punishment. The case opened by the district attorney was that the defendant had inflicted the punishment of flogging, abolished by the act of September, 1850 (9 Stat. 515).

<p>Case No. 14,837.</p> <p>Jury — Selection op Grand Jury — Following State Practice—Selection by Commissioners —Incriminating Testimony—Opficers.</p> <p>1. The act of congress of July 20, 1840 (5 Stat.. 394). prescribing how jurors in courts of the United States shall be designated, does not require a minute adherence to the state practice on that subject by the United States courts.</p> <p>[Cited in Brewer v. Jacobs, 22 Fed. 234; U. S. v. Richardson, 28 Fed. 69.]</p> <p>2. It is not necessary, under said act, for the United States courts to employ state officers to perform for them any part of the duty of designating jurors. They may and should impose that duty entirely on their own officers.</p> <p>3. The law of Georgia required that the names of jurors should he taken from the book of the receiver of tax returns; held, that this requirement was not binding on the courts of the United States. Those courts were only required to take care that their jurors had the same qualifications as jurcrs in the state courts.</p> <p>4. A rule of the United States court for the Southern district of Georgia, which prescribed that the names 02 five hundred persons, having the qualifications of jurors under the state law. should be selected from the body of the district by the marshal and clerk and three United States commissioners, to be designated by the court, and that the names of grand and petit jurors should be drawn from such list by the marshal and clerk, by lot, is in substantial accord with the law of Georgia prescribing how jurors shall be selected, and is a compliance with the act of congress on the subject.</p> <p>5. Where a charge of misconduct is made against an officer, whether amounting to an indictable offense, or only to his discredit as such officer, which might furnish grounds for his removal or impeachment, he is not bound to be a witness against himself.</p> <p>6. An inquisitorial examination, under oath, of a party charged with an offense or misconduct, would infringe the spirit if not the letter of the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and would be repugnant to the principles of personal liberty embodied in the common law.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Hammond, Case Xo. 15,-294.]</p> <p>7. One of the officers appointed to select the names of ñve hundred persons from whom jurors were to be drawn, applied to a reputable citizen of a distan* county for the names of proper persons residing in his vicinity to be placed upon the list. The names furnished, in compliance with this request, were submitted to the board of officers whose duty it was to make out the list of five hundred names, and some of the names so furnished were put upon the list: Held, that this was a substantial compliance with the rule which required the selection of the names to be made by the board of officers.</p> <p>8. A public officer cannot, by subsequent declarations, invalidate his own official act.</p>

The lamentable accident wherein the steamboat Henry Clay was destroyed on the banks of the Hudson river, and about eighty-five lives… Held: in those eases, that, although the states might have jurisdiction over certain crimes, yet, that congress might also exercise the same power in cases within their jurisdiction. In relation to the matter now- before the court, lie submitted tliat it was not important whether it was exclusively under the authority of congress or not.

This was an action of debt, brought upon an embargo bond, in the district court, to .June, 3811; and the declaration demanded twenty thousand dollars, which the defendant was alleged to owe and detain.

The indictment [against Charles Columbus]: was in these words: -‘District of Columbia..

Four men, three being citizens of South Carolina and one of Georgia, were tried by-a military commission convened at Charleston. by orders from the headquarters of the department of South Carolina, dated Dec. 26, 1S65, on charges and specifications alleging. in substance, that, being actuated by hostility to the Uuited States, and with intent to oppose the military forces of the United States, oil Oct. 8, 1865. at Brown's Ferry, S. C., whilst martial law was in force by…

<p>Indictment under Rev. St. § 5209, relative to embezzlement by national bank officers, clerks, etc. On motion to quash an indictment.</p>

The defendant [Jerome B. Conklin] was indicted under the seventh and eighth sections of the act of congress, approved July 8, 1870, for retaining a greater compensation for his services as claim agent than was allowed by law. He had obtained a father’s pension for an old man named Porter, amounting with the back pay to some six hundred and sixty dollars; from this amount he retained $330. or one half. The indictment was found in October, 1872.

Indictment for keeping a gaming-table, to game with dice, at a booth, on the race-field, contrary to an act of assembly of Maryland.

<p>Case No. 14,848.</p> <p>Officers—Extra. Compensation—Collectors op Cdstoms—Disbursements.</p> <p>1. The act of August 23, 1842, § 2 (5 Stat. 580). provides thxt no officer whose salary is fixed shall receive any additional compensation, “unless the same shall be authorized by law, and the appropriation therefor explicitly set forth that it is for such additional pay, extra allow-'anee, or compensation.” The act of March 3, 1849 (9 Stat. 367), makes an appropriation for superintendents’ commissions on disbursements for light-house purposes, and repealed' the following proviso in a previous act of the same year: “Provided that no part of the sum hereby appropriated shall be paid to any person who receives a salary as an officer of the customs, and from and after the first day of July, 1849, the said disbursements shall be made by the collectors of the customs without compensation.” Held, that the repeal of this proviso- neither repeals the second section of the act of 1842, nor satisfies its requirements by an explicit appropriation to pay an extra compensation for an extra service. The effect of such repeal is merely to restore the power of appointing others than collectors to make che disbursements, and, if collectors shall be appointed, leaves their rights to' commissions to depend on the law as elsewhere found.</p> <p>2. For disbursements made not as superintendent for a certain district, but under special orders from the secretary of the treasury for the whole lighthouse service, the act of 1849 makes no provision.</p> <p>3. If the repeal of the proviso enabled collectors to participate in said commissions, the act of 1822, § 18 [3 Stat. 696), limits their extra compensation to $400 a year.</p> <p>4. The acts of September 30, 1850 (9 Stat. 5331, March 3. 1851 (9 Stat. 608), and August 1, 1852 (10 Stat. 86), deprive every collector whose compensation exceeds $2,500 of all participation in these commissions, though they are required to render the service of superintendents of lights, or disbursing agents, in procuring supplies for them.</p> <p>[Reversed by the supreme court, where the cause was taken by writ of error. 21 How. (62 U. S.) 463.)</p>

<p>[Suit by the United States against .Tames S.Conway.)</p> <p>Motion to quash a venditioni exponas.</p>

This was a question addressed to the court, respecting the priority of two executions, interfering with each other. A case was stated, which was shortly this. John Travis and others having obtained judgment in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, against F. and I. West, laid a fi. fa. on their household goods, and about twenty-eight days afterwards, assigned the judgment bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, to the defendants in this cause.

<p>Case No. 14,851.</p> <p>Appeal— Record—Issues of Fact—Nul Tiel Record.</p> <p>1. Where the issue in the district court is nul tiel record, and the court below adjudge, that the plaintiff has not produced the record, there can be no reversal of that judgment, unless the record, if any is produced, is contained in the record brought up on the writ of error to the circuit court.</p> <p>2. The issue of nul tiel record is an issue of fact, and as such, no writ of error lies from the judgment of the district court, on that fact, to the circuit court, under the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 22 [1 Stat. 84].</p>

This was an indictment, containing four counts, founded on United States statute, March 2d, 1799, c. 22, § 71 (1 Stat. 678). The defendants were charged with “forcibly resisting, preventing, and impeding,” custom-house officers and their assistants, in the execution of their duty.

Demurrer to bill to establish priority. The facts in this case as set up by the bill were, that the defendant bank was duly organized under the national banking laws, and was also designated as a depositary of money and funds of the United States. It became insolvent and suspended, with liabilities largely exceeding its assets. A receiver [Augustus H. Burley] was appointed and entered upon the discharge of his duties.

[This was an action of debt by the United States against Jay Cooke, William J. More-head, H. D. Cooke, H. C. Fahnestock, Edward Dodge, and Pitt Cooke, comprising the Arm of Jay Cooke & Co., for money had and received by the defendants to and for the use of the United States, which money was received upon the occasion of their delivery to the plaintiff of certain treasury notes, believed by plaintiff to be valid, whereas they were afterwards discovered to be counterfeit.]

<p>Case No. 14,855.</p> <p>Payment—Mistake—Forged Signature— Laches.</p> <p>Where an officer of the United States paid a draft upon a forged signature, and more than six years afterwards suit was brought m recover the same from the banker, who had innocently collected the same: Held, the action not to be sustained.</p> <p>[Cited in The Iunocenta, Case No. 7,050.]</p> <p>UNITED STATES (COOKE v.). See Case-No. 3,178.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,857.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Offences aoainst United States —Fedekal Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Whether the circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction over common law offences against the United States?</p> <p>[Cited in Henfield’s Case. Case- No. 6,360; Bains v. The James & Catherine. Id. 756; Allen v. Blunt, Id. 217; Ü. S. v. New Bed-ford Bridge. Id. 15.867: Re Metzger, Id. 9,-511. Cited in brief in McElrath v. McIntosh, Id. 8.781.]</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Gaunt (Or.) 9 Pae. 58; U. S. v. Marshall. 6 Mackey, 35.]</p>

This was an indictment, found at the May term, 1813, for shipping on board of a vessel, called the Moronda, fifty barrels of rye flour, with intent to transport the same to Halifax, during the war, contrary to the second section of the act of 6th of July, 1812, c. 129 [2 Stat. 779]. In the course of the trial, William R. Lee, Jr. who was called as á witness on the part of the government, declined taking the oath usually administered to witnesses, but offeied to affirm.

[This was an. indictment against Natlian Coons, charging him with the crime of com mittiug perjury in falsely swearing to a dei. osition.]

Claim [by John B. R.- Cooper] for four leagues of land in Sonoma county [the Rancho El Molino], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

The defendant [Wesley Cooper] was indicted for distilling under the act of July 13, 1806 [14 Stat. 98], ' testified that he was an assistant assessor of internal revenue in Union county, Tennessee, and as such in August, 1868, was instructed to ascertain who was the party liable to be assessed, and for hdw much, for carrying on a certain distillery near to the house of Albert Mitchell, and which had been seized by Deputy Collector J. M. Sawyers, about the 1st of March…

An indictment was found against James Cooper, charging him with abstracting and embezzling certain letters, taken by him out of a mail bag; he being a mail carrier. Plea, not guilty. The prisoner is a boy, fifteen years old.

The libellous matter complained of was as follows: “Nor do I see any impropriety in making this request of Mr. Adams. At that time he had just entered into office. He was hardly id the infancy of political mistake. Even those who doubted his capacity thought well, of his intentions. Nor were we- yet saddled with the expense of a permanent navy, or threatened, under his auspices, with the existence of a standing army.

At law. This was a petition of Daniel Breed for a writ of habeas corpus for the discharge of the fugitive [William Copeland].

.. Indictment [against William G. Cornell] for the murder of one William Kane in Fort Adams in Newport Harbor, alleged to be a place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. At the trial of the cause, the prisoner having pleaded not guilty, it appeared in evidence, that the prisoner was placed on post at 8 o’clock in the evening of the 4th day of July, 1819, and remained on post until relieved by a guard at 10 p. m. .of the same night.

[This was an indictment against William G. Cornell, for the murder of William Kane. At the trial there was a verdict of guilty of murder. Case No. 14,867. Heard on motion for a new trial.] * This motion for a new trial was made at the last November term, at Providence, and was continued over to this term for argument. It contained the following causes for a new trial: First.

<p>Case No. 14,869.</p> <p>Pikacy — Slave Traob — Jurisdiction — Nolle Prosequi.</p> <p>[1. Under Act May 15, 1820, §§ 4, 5, declaring certain acts by the master and crew of a vessel, relative to negroes, piracy, and giving jurisdiction of the offense to the federal courts of the state in which the offender is "brought” or "found,” the mere landing in a state of negroes with intent to sell them as slaves is not piracy, which would be an offence committed within that state, and therefore triable there (under Const, art. 3, § 2, declaring that the trial of crimes shall be in the state where the crimes were committed; but, when not committed within any state, the trial shall be where congress directs); but it is part of such offense that the crew landed on a foreign shore, and there seized free negroes with intent to make them slaves, and confined them in the vessel, from which they were landed.]</p> <p>[2. Leave to enter nolle prosequi in a piracy ease pending in a federal court will not be granted, the - motion of the United States attorney therefor not being made in the exercise of his discretion, or for the purpose of abandoning a prosecution, for any of the causes which suggest that course, but having been made at the direction of the attorney general of the United States, with the sanction of the president. for the purpose of overcoming the judgment of the court in which the case is pending, that it, and not the federal court of another state, has jurisdiction of the case.]</p> <p>[Cited in Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 457.]</p>

[Suit by the United States against R. O. Corwin and others to recover a shortage in the account of Henry Harvey, a sub-Indian agent, upon whose bond the defendants were sureties.]

<p>Case No. 14,871.</p> <p>Principal and Surett—Government Contract —Discharge op Sdreties—Change op Contract.</p> <p>1. The sureties upon a bond, wherein the principals have obligated themselves to the United States to open a ship canal three hundred feet in width and twenty feet in depth, and keep it open the same width and depth for four and a half years from the time of the acceptance of the work by the secretary of war, are discharged from all liability on the same if the principals do not perform their agreement' for opening the channel according to its terms, and the government accepts the work with a channel only eighteen feet in depth instead of twenty, as required by the contract. '</p> <p>2. A surety is not bound beyond the terms of his contract, and his liability can not be extended or enlarged by implication, and any change in terms, unless expressly assented to by him, releases him from his legal responsibility.</p> <p>[Cited in U S. v. Case, Case No. 14.743.]</p>

This was an indictment against [George Cot-üngham] a clerk in the post office at Albany, New-York, under the 21st section of the act of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 107), for opening a letter and stealing money therefrom. The punishment fixed by law for the offence was imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than twenty-one years.

Indictment for gaming, contrary to the act of Virginia. A capias had issued upon the indictment, as the first process. moved to quash it, as being illegal and oppressive. But THE COURT overruled the motion.

<p>Case No. 14,874.</p> <p>Insolvency—Proof—Claims op United States —Soit to Enforce Priority—Parties.</p> <p>[1. A bill by the United States to enforce a preference out of the estate of its insolvent debt- or, who has made an assignment, cannot be maintained against one of its debtors, without making his assignee party.]</p> <p>[2. The assigning m of firm property and the property of one only of the partners does not establish insolvency of the firm, which will entitle the United States, a creditor of the firm, to maintain a bill to enforce the priority given it by Act March 2, 1799, § 65, in the estate of an insolvent debtor.]</p>

Indictment for keeping a disorderly house. contended that a disorderly house is only indictable at common law as a common nuisance, and that actual disorder must be proved. Coulter had a license to keep a tavern; he is only prohibited by statute from selling on Sundays; from dealing with slaves, &e. A bawdy-house is indictable as a common nuisance, and yet it is not necessary to prove that any one person has been disturbed by it.

In this case motion was made by respondent at this term to quash the alternative writ which had been issued requiring respondent to levy and cause to be collected a special tax for the payment of the relator's judgment. It seems that upon representation made by the respondent that there was money in the county treasury for the purpose, the court at the last term by mandamus ordered a warrant issued for the amount, but said warrant when presented was not paid.

[This was a suit by the United States against Firmin Cousinery and others to recover the difference between an estimated and a liquidated duty.]

<p>Case No. 14,879.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant—Survey—Location wt thin Exterior Boundaries—Right of Election.</p> <p>[When, in locat’ng a given quantity of land granted to a claimant within exterior boundaries containing a much larger quantity, the survey is made on instructions by the government, without any consultation with the claimant, or allowance to him of an opportunity to make an election as to the land to be surveyed, the survey should be set aside:]</p>

Demurrer to indictment for conspiracy to defraud the United States. The indictment, in substance, charges; 1.

The prisoner [J. W. Craig] was indicted for counterfeiting sundry notes of different denominations, purporting to be notes of the Bank of the United States; and for having in. his possession other blank notes, in the similitude of the notes of that bank, with intent. &c. The following points of evidence were ruled: by the court: 1.

Motion in arrest of judgment Indictment tinder section 44 of the bankrupt act of March 2, 1867, charging the defendant [John Crane] with attempting to account for a certain part of his property by fictitious losses, and for secreting certain of his property after the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy. The following causes were assigned: First.

[This was an indictment against Joel W. Crane, charging him with knowingly and willfully receiving and secreting stolen mail.]

<p>This' was an indictment against [Lewis Crawford and others] certain seamen composing a part of the crew of the American ship called “The Clifford Wayne,” which sailed on a whaling voyage to the South Atlantic Ocean from the port of New Bedford in Massachusetts. The offence charged, was for endeavoring to make a mutiny and revolt on board of said ship on the high seas on said voyage. The vessel, after being at sea for nine months, returned to the port of New Bedford with a part of the disobedient crew, and the remainder, being the prisoners, had been taken out at Buenos Ayres, and sent home in a ship of war to the United States. The prisoners, on being arraigned, severally pleaded not guilty. Upon the trial before the learned district judge, on the evidence of the master and officers of the vessel, they were convicted.</p> <p>now moved to arrest the judgment on the following grounds:</p> <p>1. That no proof on the trial had been adduced in support of the averment in the indictment, that the Southern district of New York in the Second circuit was the district and circuit in which the defendants were first brought _ and apprehended; that such fact was necessary to give the court jurisdiction. The learned counsel referred to the act of congress of March 3, 1825, § 14,—Gard. Dig. p. 754 [4 Stat. 118]; and he contended that the averment of that fact ought to have been proved on the trial; U. S. y. Tillotson [Case No. 16,524]; 1 Kent, Comm. 344; Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dali. [3 U. S.] 382; Starkie, Cr. Pi. 278, 279; 3 Starkie, Ev. 1552, note; Doug. 665; 5 E. C. L. 180; 12 East, 452; 1 Brod. & B. 538; 1 Esp. 302; 5 Wheat. [18 U. S.] 14,15, Append.; Pet. Cond. R. 587; 1 Chit PL 319, 320; Peake, 119; Gres. Eq. Ev. 172; Halst. Ev. 169; 2 Bibb, 4, 26; Starkie, Cr. PI. p. 13, note 6; East, P. C. 469; 2 How. State Tr. 200; Cromp. Jur. Cts. 4, 61; Rose. Cr. Ev. 84, 85:</p> <p>2. That the constitution of the United States (article 9, § 8) gave congress the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations, and the old confederation gave congress the power of appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; but there was nothing in either of those instruments to punish misdemeanors, and the prisoners in this case having been indicted under the act of March 3d, 1835, § 2 [4 Stat. 776], were accused only of committing a misdemeanor. The indictment therefore ought to be quashed. The Exchange, 7 Cranch' [11 U. S.] 116; 1 Kent, Comm. 355, 333; [U. S. v. Wiltberger] 5 Wheat. [18 U. S.] 97, 105.</p> <p>3. That no proof on the trial had been adduced in support of the averment contained in the indictment, that the offence was committed on board of an American vessel. That as the United States had not jurisdiction of of-fences committed on board foreign ships, such averment in the indictment became necessary, and being necessary it should' have been proved. U. S. v. Robins [Case No. 16.175]; 1 Chit. Pi. 320; Gres. Eq. Ev. 172; 1 Story’s Laws, 268 [1 Stat 287]; 2 Phil. Ins. 37; Ohl v. Eagle Ins. Co. [Case No. 10,472]; Rose. Cr. Ev. 3; Tayloe v. Riggs, 1 Pet [26 U. S.] 596; 1 Starkie, Ev. 437; 1 Chit Cr. Law, 566, 567; Rose. Cr. Ev. 221; Catlett v. Pacific Ins. Co. [Case No. 2,517]; 2 Ld. Raym. 15, 35; Russ. Crimes, 14, 95.</p> <p>4. That the names of the grand jurors who found the indictment did not appear in the indictment. That such omission was fatal, inasmuch as the courts of the United States in the absence of their own rules were bound by the practice of the king’s bench in England. 1 Kent, Comm. 341, 342; Precedents of Indictments in the Crown Circuit Companion, 4 Dallas’ Rep., title “Indictmeiit;” [Robinson v. Campbell] 3 Wheat. [16 U. S.] 212; [Elmendorfv. Taylor] 10 Wheat. [23 U. S.] 159; Hall, P. C. 167; [Case No.' 14,692a].</p> <p>5. That the indictment ought to have averred, and proof ought to have been adduced on the trial in support of that averment, that the prisoners were citizens of the United States. For the want of such averment and proof, the indictment is bad; 2 Story’s Laws U. S. 1302 [4 Stat. 809]; Rose. Cr. Ev. 23, 221, 228; [Tay-loe v. Riggs] 1 Pet. [26 U. S.] 596; 1 Starkie, Ev. 437; 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 566, 567; 17 Mass. 258.</p> <p>6. That the shipping articles between the master and the prisoners ought to have been introduced on the trial to show that the voyage or term of time for which the crew shipped had not expired at the time of the alleged mutiny. Gord. Dig. arts. 14, 70; [U. S. v. Gooding] 12 Wheat. [25 U. S.] 471; Rose. Cr. Ev. 2, 3, 228; 15 East, 244; 7 Barn. & C. 625; 3 Barn. & C. 665; Rose. Cr. Ev. 31.</p> <p>7. For multifariousness in the’ several counts of the indictment. Cowp. 675.</p> <p>relied on the following points:</p> <p>1. That the prisoners having been indicted and tried in the Southern district of New York, the court would presume after verdict that this district and circuit was the one in which the prisoners were first apprehended and brought.</p> <p>2. That congress had passed laws repeatedly to punish misdemeanors, and he denied the right of the judges at the assizes to disregard the acts of congress.</p> <p>3. That the presumption of law was that the offence was committed on board of an American vessel, and as the prisoners had not called for the proof of the character of the vessel, the court might presume that the offence was committed as charged in the indictment.</p> <p>4. That the state court practice was to omit the names of the grand jurors in the indictment, that this ought to be the rule in the present case. (BY THE COURT. We do not admit that the state courts’ practice is to govern where it conflicts with the practice of the court of king’s bench' in England.)</p> <p>See Rule 7, Sup. Ct. U. S.</p> <p>5th. That it was not necessary that the prisoners should have been citizens of the United States, inasmuch as had they enlisted on board of an American vessel they would be bound by the laws of the United States.</p> <p>6th. That inasmuch as the prisoners had not set up in their defence, that the voyage was not ended, the court would presume that the prisoners were not entitled to their discharge.</p> <p>7th. That the several counts were not multifarious.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,890a.</p> <p>Indictment—Allegation op Time—Conclusión.</p> <p>1. Indictment is quashable in which the time is alleged “on or about” such a day.</p> <p>2. It is also quashable for failing to conclude “against the peace and dignity of the United States.”</p>

[This was a hearing upon return to writ of habeas corpus issued against George Crook, a brigadier general of the army of the United States, at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca tribe of Indians.]

This was an indictment [against Allen Crosby, Sherod Childers, and others] for conspiracy contrary to the provisions of sections 5, 6, and 7 of the act of congress of May 31st, 1870, to enforce the… Held: nor that he was a candidate for election, or that said Rainey voted or intended to vote for him.

<p>Case No. 14,895.</p> <p>Larceny from Mail — Evidence — Inculpating Circumstances—Proof of Character.</p> <p>1.On the trial of an indictment for abstracting a letter or package from the mail, the most satisfactory evidence that it had been in the mail is that of the person who deposited it in the post-office; and of its loss, that of the person to whom it was addressed, to the effect that it was never received by him.</p> <p>2. In the absence of any direct testimony connecting the defendant with the violation of the mail, collateral circumstances tending to his in-culpation are admissible in evidence to the jury.</p> <p>3. Evidence having been introduced showing that a letter had been mailed at Carlisle, in the state of Pennsylvania, addressed to parties in Ohio, inclosing a draft or bill, the prosecution, for the purpose of proving that the draft or bill had been in the defendant’s possession, and to raise the presumption that he had stolen it from the mail, offered in evidence a letter purporting to have been written and signed by Martin Smith, transmitting the draft or bill to a banker in Marietta, Ohio, to be cashed, and proposed to prove by a witness that said letter was in the handwriting of the defendant; and the witness stated that it was his impression and belief that the handwriting of the letter, including the signature of Martin Smith, was the proper handwriting of the defendant: but having sworn that he had seen the defendant write but once, and had no other means of knowing his handwriting, the court instructed the jury that the proof of the handwriting was not sufficient, and would not justify a verdict 0‡ guilty.</p> <p>4. Proof of the previous good character of the defendant, and that without compulsion he sought an investigation of the charge is not only admissible. but should have weight with the jury if the evidence implicating him creates a reasonable doubt of his guilt.</p> <p>UNITED STATES (CROWELL v.). See Case No. 3,447.'</p>

The first count of the indictment was for a common assault and battery on “one negro Hilly.” The second count charged the' defendant [George Cross] with an assault upon one negro Hilly, “in a public road and highway in the county aforesaid,” and cruelly beating her, “to the great damage of the said Hilly and to the terror and disturbance and annoyance of the good citizens of the United States then and there passing and repassing on and near the said public road and highway,…

This was an indictment under the enforcement act of May 31, 1870, against [William .1.

[This is a libei on information for the forfeiture of the vessel and tackle under the act of 1799, on the charge of some 45,000 cigars having been landed without permit.

This is an action -of debt upon a bond given by the defendants [Edward F. Cullerton and others] conditioned for the faithful performance by defendant Cullerton of his duties in the office of internal revenue gauger for the First collection district-of this state, to which he had been duly appointed. The bond bears date the 23d day of December, 1874. Ten breaches of this bond are assigned in the declaration ;■ [1.

<p>Case No. 14,900.</p> <p>'Mail Robbery — Indictment—Evidence—Trial.</p> <p>[This was an indictment against Henry Cummings, charging him with robbing the mail.] The indictment being read to the prisoner, he plead “not guilty.” This case was set down for the previous term, but a continuance was granted, the defendant alleging that he was not prepared to go to trial, owing to the absence of important witnesses.</p>

In the case of the United States against Henry Cummings, indicted for mail robbery, which had been certified to the United States circuit court to get the opinion of his honor, Judge Grier, in reference to the motion in arrest of judgment, Judge Shaler remarked that the judge of the circuit court had decided that after a conviction the case could not be properly certified from the one court to the other.

The court was occupied principally in the transaction of civil business. The grand jury foimd a true bill against Henry Cummings, for mail robbery. Our readers will recollect that this man was tried on the above charge, convicted, and subsequently granted a new trial at the last term of the court in this city. He now stands indicted a second time. The trial will commence on Wednesday. The case of Henry Cummings, indicted for robbing the United States mail, was taken up.

[This was an action by the United States against Cumpton. and Coleman, his surety, upon the official bond of Cumpton as post master.]

Indictments [against Winslow Curtis, alias Sylvester Colston] for the murder of Edward Selfridge, on the high seas, on the 28th of August, 1826. Plea, not guilty. After a verdict of guilty, Jarvis & Dunlap, for the prisoner, moved in arrest of judgment, and also for a new trial, because no copy of the indictment was furnished two days before the prisoner’s arraignment and pleading, according to the statutes of 1790, c. 9, § 29.

<p>Case No. 14,906.</p> <p>Internal Revende — Distiller — Special Tax— Repeal of Statutes.</p> <p>Section 23 of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 153). punishing a distiller who shall carry on business without payment of a special tax, is not repealed by section 5 of the act of March 31, 1868 (15 Stat. 59), which punishes more severely every distiller who shall defraud or attempt to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits distilled by him, although the minimum punishment under the former law is regulated by the amount of spirits unlawfully distilled.</p>

Debt on judgment. The parties agreed to a statement of facts, as follows: This is an action of debt, founded upon a judgment rendered by the circuit court, for the district of New Hampshire, on Stli of October, A. D. 1829, in favor of the plaintiffs, against Willis Barnabee, John N. Sherburne, and John Abbot—for the sum of $918.53 debt, and $27.06 cost The said judgment was rendered upon a bond, given for the security of duties upon goods imported.

Bill In equity, by the United States, against Samuel Cushman, administrator of John Abbott. The parties agreed to the following statement of facts: On 25th February, 1828, Willis Barnabee, with J. N. Sherburne and John Abbott as sureties, made their joint and several bond to the United States, in the sum of $2,400, conditioned to pay certain duties on or before the 25th August, 1829, due on goods imported by the said Barnabee.

This was an action of debt on the official bond of Charles W. Cutter as navy agent. Cutter having absconded was not served; but service was made on several of his sureties, who appeared and pleaded the general issue, with leave to give any special matter in evidence. It appeared on the trial that Cutter was duly appointed navy agent for the United States naval station at Portsmouth, on the seventeenth day of April, 1850.

This was an indictment under the third section of the act of March 3, 1835, (4 Stat 776,) against [Charles B. Cutler] the master of the whaling bark Dolphin, for beating one of his crew. It appeared that the man had been disobedient and in a quarrel with the boat-steer-er, under whose command he was at the time, the man had wounded him severely in the head. And that the defendant had caused the man to be seized up, and inflicted on him six blows with a piece of ratlin stuff.

This was an action of debt on an official bond, given by N. Lyde (the intestate) for the faithful performance of his duties as purser in the navy. The parties agreed to a special statement of facts, as follows: ‘‘It is agreed that the defendant’s intestate was a purser in the navy of the United States, and that the bond mentioned- in the plaintiff’s writ was given by the said Lyde for the faithful performance of his official duties as such purser.

<p>Case No. 14,913.</p> <p>Pleadixo at Law—Tkavkkse—Plica—Non kst Factum—Escrow.</p> <p>1. A breach of the condition of a penal blind is not sufficiently traversed by a plea averring that the obligors have not violated the condition to the extent charged in the declaration. It should deny any breach of the condition as charged in the declaration.</p> <p>2. A special plea of noit est factum, averring that the supposed bond sued on is a mere escrow, is bad, unless it avers that the instrument in puestion was delivered to some third person on a condition that has not been- performed. But with such an averment, the plea may lie a good special non est factum.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,916.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Wholesale Liquor Dealers —Tax—Death of Partner.</p>

In this case a rule was taken upon the United States marshal, requiring him to show cause why he should not discharge from seizure certain logs and lumber taken by him under a writ of replevin sued out of the United States court, in a suit brought by the United States against the defendant [L. N. Dantzler].

<p>Case No. 14,915.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Tobacco—Dealer—Debt for Penalty—Burden of Proof— Act July SO, 1868.</p> <p>Meld, that any person who keeps leaf tobacco for sale is a dealer, and a single sale is sufficient to fix liis character as such: that if such dealer does not keep a book and make returns of his purchases and sales, as required by the 76th section of the act of July 20. 1368 [15 Stat, 158], he becomes liable to the penalty of five hundred dollars prescribed by that section; that in an action of debt for the penalty under that section the jury cannot find a greater sum than five hundred dollars, although the act fixes the penalty at not less than that sum. The plaintiff having proved sales of leaf tobacco by the defendants, and that said defendants had not paid the special tax as dealers in leaf tobacco, and had not procured or kept a book, as required by the act, so far as was known to the assess- or of internal revenue, the burden of proof was, by such prima facie case, shifted upon the defendants to show that they had kept such book, and had made the proper returns therein; and, having failed so to do, the jury might infer that no such book was kept by them.</p>

A law of congress (Act of May 15, 1820, c. 113, §§ 4, 5 [3 Stat. 600]), designed for the suppression of the slave trade, enacts by one section, that if any citizen of the United States, being of the crew or ship’s company of any foreign vessel, engaged in the slave trade, or any other person whatever, being of fhe crew or ship’s company of any vessel, owned in whole or in part, or navigated for, or in behalf of any citizen or citizens of the United States, shall land from…

<p>[This was an indictment against Peter Darton for cutting timber on public lands.]</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against Isaac A. Davenport, for perjury.]</p>

Motion to dismiss a suit upon a marshal’s bond, on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction, the allegations in the declaration concerning the citizenship of the parties not bringing the case within the 12th section of the judiciary act [1 Stat. 79].

<p>Case No. 14,923.</p> <p>District Attorney—Directions from Attorney General—Trial—Removal of Prisoner during Trial—New Trial.</p> <p>1. Whether the attorney general has power to give a direction to a district attorney, in respect to his official action in regard to an indictment found by a grand jury, and presented by such grand jury to the court, for its action thereon, quere.</p> <p>2. Such a direction, if given, is for the district attorney alone, and does not control the court</p> <p>3. Where the court refused to allow a prisoner, indicted for perjury, to read, in opposition to the motion of the district attorney to proceed with the trial of the indictment against him, a letter from the attorney general to the district attorney, directing the latter to allow the prisoner an opportunity to place himself beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and also refused to allow the prisoner to show that he had not been afforded such opportunity, and the trial was proceeded with, and the prisoner was convicted: Held, on a motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, that no error was committed.</p> <p>. 4. Where a prisoner, indicted for perjury, was put upon his trial, and was present, with his counsel, during the empanelling of the jury, and during a portion of the opening of the case to the jury by the district attorney, and was then removed from the court-room, by order of the court, to an adjoining room, with liberty of access for hia counsel, because he persisted in interrupting the district attorney, in a loud voice, although admonished by the court to refrain, and the opening by the district attorney proceeded and was concluded during the prisoner’s absence, and the prisoner was present during the rest of the trial, and was convicted: Held, on a motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, that no error was committed.</p> <p>[Cited in Gore v. State (Ark.) 12 S. W. 565. Cited in brief in Sahlinger v. People, 102 Ill. 243. Cited in Shular v. State, 105 Ind. 300, 4 N. E. 870; State v. Hope (Mo.) 13 S. W. 494.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,925.</p> <p>Witness—Mulatto Born op White Woman.</p> <p>A mulatto bom of a white woman, and not in a state- of servitude by law, is a competent witness for a white man.</p>

This action was brought by the United States against the defendant Herman W. Davis, and his sureties—Robert Pentland and James B. Stephens—in his official bond as deputy post-master at the city of Portland, to recover certain moneys alleged to have been received and wrongfully detained by said Davis, while acting as such postmaster.

<p>[This was an indictment against M. A. Davis upon the charge of keeping an illicit distillery.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,939.</p> <p>Bankruptcy—Discharge—Government Claim— Surety eor Postmasíer—Defaulter —Limitations.</p> <p>1. The surety of a postmaster is entitled to a discharge under the bankrupt law [of 1841 (5 Stat. 440)].</p> <p>[Cited in Saunders v. Com., 10 Grat. 495, 496.]</p> <p>2. In England a general statute does not embrace the king, unless specially named. And this doctrine has been adopted to a considerable extent in this country.</p> <p>[Cited in Dollar Savings Bank v. U. S., 19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 239.J</p> <p>3. The statute of limitations does not bind the government, unless it be specially named.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. The Rob Roy, Case No. 16,-179.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Re Fox’s Will, 52 N. Y. 531. Cited in Mayrhofer v. Board of Education, 89 Cal. 112, 26 Pac. 646.]</p> <p>4. In the post office act, government is bound to sue a surety of a postmaster, in two years after after the defalcation, or it is barred.</p> <p>5. A public defaulter is excluded from the benefit of the bankrupt law.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Herron, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 255.]</p> <p>6. This is personal, because he has been unfaithful in his public duties.</p> <p>7. But a surety is not excluded from the benefit of the act. And being discharged, he may plead it in bar of a suit by the government.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Throckmorton, Case No. 16,-516; U. S. v. Herron, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 255.]</p>

Indictment against the defendant [Edmund Davis] for larceny.

<p>This was an indictment [against Joshua Davis and John Hanlon] for grand larceny on the high seas, on board of the American brig Excel, belonging to the port of New York, under the act of congress of the United States, passed April 30, 1790 (section 16).</p> <p>The indictment charged, that the prisoners, on the high seas, on board of said brig, took and carried away 3 pieces of kersey-mere cloth, 14 pairs of boots, 22 silver spoons, 10 pieces of table linen, and other articles, of the value of ¡5300, the personal goods of the master of said vessel, or the owners thereof, or belonging to some person or persons to the jurors unknown. Plea, “not guilty.”'.</p> <p>The prisoners were jointly indicted and tried together.</p> <p>The district attorney called William Wendell, who testified that the brig Excel sailed from the port of New York for Savannah, in Georgia, and thence back to the port of New York. That the prisoners and another man by the name of Hobby, were seamen on board of said vessel. The goods stolen were consigned to Prince & Wylder, merchants in Savannah, Georgia. The witness further testified, that he did not know to whom the. goods belonged, but they were a part of the cargo of the vessel. He saw Hobby, who was a seaman on board the brig, with a quantity of kerseymere, and also a number of silver table spoons, on shore at Savannah, trying to sell them. On the return voyage of the vessel, Davis told witness that he had been sadly cheated by Han-lon and Hobby, that they had broken open together the forehatch of the vessel, took a parcel containing three pieces of kersey-mere, broke open a package and took out 14 pairs of boots, and from another box 22 silver spoons, a quantity of table linen, sheets and diapers, four knives, &c., and that they had only given him $10 for his share, when-it was worth 2 or 300. Witness advised Davis to tell the captain, but he answered that he was afraid that Hanlon and Hobby would kill him if he did. Davis further told Wendell that part of the goods were now on board the vessel, in a box, and stated where they were placed. Previous to the arrival of the vessel at quarantine, New York, Wendell told the captain. The secreted goods were then drawn from their hiding place, and the two men arrested on their arrival here.</p> <p>The master of the vessel for the voyage was next called as a witness, and testified that he had not been aware that any other goods than the kerseymere had been stolen, previous to Wendell’s giving him the information. A bill for this had been presented at Savannah, amounting to $98. ■ The packages from which the rest had been taken probably belonged to the country, and sufficient time had not elapsed to hear from them. He also stated, that the men were more likely to have stolen the goods while lying at Savannah than at sea. He further testified that the fact of the robbery having been committed was corroborated by the finding of a box in a house over the forehatch of the vessel, which box contained part of the stolen property, which had been brought back from Savannah to the port of New York, and was not discovered until the vessel arrived at quarantine, in New York, on her return voyage. The captain of the vessel testified that he knew nothing of the robbery by the prisoners until the witness Wendell, to whom the alleged confession wa3 made, informed him of it on the return voyage, about three days before the vessel arrived at quarantine, and that he had not until then known there was such a box on board the vessel.</p> <p>At this stage of the case the prisoner’s counsel contendM that the confession of Davis should not be considered as evidence against him. It was given under circumstances of promise which were not good in law, and cited the case of People v. Thorn,reported in 4 City • H. Ree. 81. Thorn, Livingston and Tracy, were indicted for a conspiracy to defraud the Merchants’ Bank in the city of New York out of $100,000, when the government witness testified that he believed the confession of Thorn was made under the influence of the promise of making him a state’s evidence.</p> <p>The counsel for the prisoners also took another objection,—that it did not appear to whom the goods belonged by the evidence. The district attorney stated that he had no further evidence in the cause. The counsel for the prisoners insisted that they could not be convicted, as it was necessary to prove that the goods taken belonged to some person who had a real existence, and whose name should be correctly set forth in the indictment, and cited 2 Russ. Crimes, p. 162; Archb. Cr. PI. 176. The counsel stated the indictment did not agree with the statute. The latter states that the goods taken must be personal property of another, whereas the indictment says that they belonged to some person or persons unknown, and “what evidence have we,” said the counsel, “that the goods did not belong to the prisoners themselves?” The objections to the confessions of Davis were overruled by the court. The judge stated that in case the prisoners were convicted they could move in arrest of judgment on a case made for want of sufficient proof, should they be advised so to do; but was inclined to hold in the present stage of the case that the proof and the indictment charging the prisoners with stealing goods, the property of persons unknown, was sufficient, and declined to stop the trial.</p> <p>The prisoners’ counsel then stated that they wished to call Hanlon, one of the prisoners. as a witness in the cause, and moved that the case, so far as Hanlon, one of the prisoners, was concerned, might go to the jury separate. His honor, the judge, then permitted the counsel of the prisoner to submit his case on the evidence to the jury, who returned a verdict of not guilty. Hanlon was then put upon the stand, and was asked where it was that Davis took the goods, whether it was on the high seas or in the port of Savannah. The witness stated that he could not tell, for he knew nothing about it.</p> <p>The prisoner’s counsel'then summed up to the jury, and argued that the weight of proof went to show that the robbery had been committed at the town of Savannah, in Georgia, and that therefore this court had no jurisdiction in the premises, as the act-of congress required that it should be proved the defendants had “taken and carried away the personal property of another person on the high seas,” and that therefore the prisoner must be acquitted, even had he been morally guilty of the robbery, and asked the court to charge the jury that if they believed that the goods were originally taken while the vessel was in the port of Savannah, in Georgia, that this court had not jurisdiction to try the offence, and the prisoner must be acquitted on this ground. They urged that the act of congress of 179Ó (section 16), under which the prisoner was indicted, did not confer jurisdiction upon this court for larcenies on board of vessels while' they lay within the municipal jurisdiction of any state in the United States, or within the municipal jurisdiction of a. foreign state.</p>

Indictment [against James Davis] for manslaughter of a person, whose name was unknown, against the act of 1790, c. 36, § 12 (1 Story’s Laws, 84 [1 Stat. 115, c. 9j). There were two counts, one stating the of-fence to be committed on the high seas; the other containing a special statement of all the circumstances as to locality, &c. Plea, not guilty.

Indictment for murder. The indictment was as follows, namely;— “The United States of America, District of Arkansas, ss.: In the circuit court of the United States, begun and holden within and for the district of Arkansas aforesaid, at the April term thereof, A. D. 1845.

<p>Case No. 14,934.</p> <p>Contempt — Violation of Injunction — Subsequent Decree.</p> <p>1. A contempt of court in the United States courts must arise from disobedience of or resistance to some decree or order in existence. Hence where A., on the 17th day of September, 1852, sold a certain patent while a suit was pending in relation to it, and on the 28th of September, 1852, an injunction was issued, held, that the sale was no contempt.</p> <p>2. The history of the law of contempt' in the United States courts traced and discussed.</p> <p>UNITED STATES v. DAT. See Case No. 1,581.</p>

The indictment charged that on the 19th of November, 1874, the defendant [Reuben E. De Bare] with intent to defraud the United States, wilfully and feloniously received from one Crawford a quantity of postage stamps, the said stamps having been stolen from a post-office of the United States, and the defendant, at the time he received the same, knowing them to have been stolen.

Defendants [Anthony De Grieff and others] were indicted for unlawfully conspiring together to commit an offence against the United States, which is specified in section 5443 of the Revised Statutes. [A motion made to quash the indictment was denied. Case No. 14,936.] They did not appear, and their bail was forfeited.

[This was an indictment against Anthony De Grieff and others for concealing and destroying papers relating to certain merchandise, liable to duty, for the purpose of concealing evidences of fraud against the United States.]

Survey of grant at Mission Dolores. Rejected [by the board] December 12, 1862. [Upon appeal to the district court, the decree was reversed, and the grant confirmed. Case unreported. This last decision was affirmed by the supreme court. 22 How. (63 U. S.) 293. It is now heard upon the question of the location of the grant.]

<p>Case No. 14,938.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Ambiguous Decuee oe Confirmation—Rejection of Survey.</p> <p>[In a clear case of mistake in a decree of confirmation. whereby the claimants might be given more land than they are entitled to, or have claimed, it is the duty of the court, on objections to a survey, to lay hold of any ambiguity or discrepancies in the language of the decree, which will enable it to restrict the claimant to the land actually granted, occupied, and claimed.]</p> <p>[For other of the De Haro grants, see Cases Nos. 14,939-14,941.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,939.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant — License to Occcpt — Effect.</p> <p>[On a petition for the grant of land for pasturage, the secretary reported that the land was vacant, but suggested that, as the ejidos of the neighboring pueblo had not been ‘ designated, the petitioner might “in the meantime” occupy the land under “a provisional license”; and the governor accordingly executed a document permitting the petitioners to occupy the land subject to the measurement which might be made of the ejidos of the pueblo,' and providing that they should lose their rights “to this provisional concession” if they violated the conditions thereof. Held, that such document gave the petitioners no rights to the absolute fee which should be respected by the United States.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,940.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant — Survey — Conflicting Claims—Shape of Tract.</p> <p>[See Case No. 14,941.]</p>

<p>[Objections to the official survey of the rancho of the Laguna de las Mercedes, claimed by Josefa de Haro.]</p>

This is a action for money had and received, to recover the sum of $6,141, on the following case: On the 7th of May, 1822, H. D. Watkins and Michael Doran borrowed from the defendants, the sum of $10,000, at respond-entia, upon the specie, goods, &c. laden or to be laden on board the ship Adriana, whereof Thomas Dixey was master, bound on a voyage from Philadelphia to Canton, and at and from Canton back to Philadelphia, at a premium of fourteen per cent.

This was an indictment against [Ferdi-nando Demarchi] an alien, for a murder on the high seas, committed on board of the ship Blondel. The defendant, having been convicted, now moved for an arrest of judgment, on the ground that the indictment did not allege that the Blondel was an American vessel.

<p>Case Ho. 14,945.</p> <p>Perjury—False Bankrupt Schedules—Indictment—Misnomer op Court—Oath-Authority to- Administer.</p> <p>X, Where such words of description are used in an indictment, as to have an application only to the proper person, it is sufficient, although the words of the statute be not used.</p> <p>2. On a charge of perjury by a petitioner in bankruptcy, the indictment need not set out, particularly or substantially, the petition.</p> <p>3. A general reference to it, which shall show its character and object, is sufficient.</p> <p>4. To sustain an indictment for perjury, the oath must' be administered by some one authorized.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Howard, 37 Fed. 667.]</p> <p>5. An authority to a county clerk, to swear petitioners resident in his county, does not give him power to administer an oa& to one who resides in another county.</p>

Indictment for subornation of perjury. Heard on demurrer. The indictment contained two counts.

<p>Case No. 14,946.</p> <p>Register or Court—Custody of Records.</p> <p>The register of the orphans’ court in Alexandria is entitled to the custody of the record books of wills, of the late court of hustings.</p>

Heard on demurrer to the indictment. The indictment was found on the 6th day of June, 1876, and was predicated on section 30 of the act approved March 2, 1876, entitled “An act to amend existing laws relating to internal revenue, and for other purposes.” 14 Stat. 484.

[Claim by Maria Concepcion Valencia de Rodriguez and others to the Rancho San Fran-cisquito, in Santa Clara county, granted May 1, 1839, by Juan B. Alvarado to Antonio Buelna. The claim was confirmed by the commission November 28, 1854, by the district court February 4, 1856, and appeal dismissed April 2, 1857.]

<p>Case No. 14,949.</p> <p>Recognizance—Certainty— Action Upon— United States Mail.</p> <p>1. A recognizance is sufficiently certain if it sets out an act punishable by the statute without any of the particulars.</p> <p>2. Where an action of debt was brought on a recognizance, the condition of which was, that the defendant should appear “to answer to the charge of stealing from the mail of the United States, contrary to the statute of the United States, in such case made and provided:” Held, that the felonious or criminal character of the act was charged with sufficient certainty.</p> <p>3. The mail of the United States embraces everything which may by law be transported or conveyed by post.</p>

Declaration: “That whereas the said Bronaugh M. Derringer, on the 8th day of May, in the year 1845, by his certain writing obligatory, sealed with his seal, and to the court here shown, whose date is the day and year above written, acknowledged himself jointly and severally with one Henry Derringer, Esq., to be held and firmly bound unto the said United States in the sum of $1,000, which said writing obligatory was with a condition therein written, that if the said B. M.…

This was a motion for a new trial. The prisoner [John Devlin] had been convicted on an indictment, charging him with offences against the internal revenue laws. [Case No. 14,955.]

In this case, which was one of several indictments found against the defendants [John Devlin, T. T. Levan, F. H. Tappan, and A. J. Phillips] arising out of the great frauds in distilled spirits, the defendants demurred to the indictment on the ground that the statute had not constituted the acts charged an offence. The demurrers were argued by:

' [This was an indictment against John Devlin for defrauding the government out of the tax on distilled spirits. There .were indictments against Devlin and others for falsely branding spirits. See Case No. 14,-954. The most material part of the defendant’s evidence is given in the report below.] Thursday, Jan. 30.

This was án action brought to recover the sum of $6,215 of the defendant [Nelson Dewey] as one of the sureties of George W. Gaffitt and James J. Dewey, upon a bond given by them to the United States, on the 7th day of January, 1868, as manufacturers of friction matches, etc., conditioned to pay for all revenue stamps that might be needed by them from the commissioner of internal revenue, from time to time, according to law.

Indictment [against Thomas Dickinson] for rape. This was an indictment for rape committed on the person of Sally ‘ Hall, to which the defendant pleaded not guilty, and there was a trial by jury composed of Richmond Peeler, Charles Roberts, Manuel Roderigue, John Jordolas, Jacques Gocio, Stephen Vasseau, Nathal Vasseau, Michael Petterson, John Pertua, Manuel Pertua, Pierre Mitchell, and Attica Nodall, who, after hearing evidence and arguments of counsel, retired- to consult…

<p>[This was an indictment against Daniel J. Dickinson for larceny from the United States mail.]</p> <p>The Prosecuting Attorney, for the Government.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,960.</p> <p>Internal Revenue Law—Process for Vinegar Making—Production of Alcohol.</p> <p>[The owner of a vinegar manufactory is liable under 15 St. 125, if by the process used by him he obtains alcohol from his mash so that be is saved the expense of purchasing the alcohol necessary for the making of vinegar.]</p>

The facts of the case of the United States against a distillery [owned by M. & E. Myers] at Petersburg were as follows: Section 3303 of the Revised Statutes provides that every distillery shall, from day to day, make, or cause to be made, in a book or books to be kept by him in such form as the commissioner of internal revenue may prescribe, certain specified entries recording in detail his transactions at the distillery.

<p>Case No. 14,963.</p> <p>Forfeiture — Ownership of Property— Distilling after Notice of Suspension—Forfeiture of Laxd—Complicity of Owner.</p> <p>1. The 48th section of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 240). as amended by the 9th section of the -act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. Ill), in providing for a forfeiture of “tools, implements, instruments and personal property,” is not limited to the property of the person having the fraudulent purpose mentioned in the section, or to property constituting part of the manufacturing apparatus used in the business.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Sixteen Barrels of Distilled Spirits, Case No. 16,300.]</p> <p>2. The 22d section of the act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 134), as amended by the 12th section of the act of June 6. 1872 (17 Stat. 240), in providing that a distiller who carries on business after the time stated, in a notice of suspension. as the time of suspension, shall incur the forfeitures provided for persons who carry on the business of a distiller without having given the bond required by law, being the forfeitures mentioned ■ in the 44th section of the same act (15 Stat. 142), as amended by the 12th section of the said act of June 6, 1872, means, by the words “shall incur,” "shall cause or bring on,” and is not limited to a forfeiture only of the interest of such distiller in the things which are made the subject of the forfeitures.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Loeb, 14 Fed. 688.]</p> <p>3. The said 44th section, in providing for the forfeiture of the interest in the land on which a distillery is situated, of every person who know. ingly has suffered or permitted the business of a distiller to be there carried on, or who has connived at the same, does not require that he should have knowingly suffered or permitted it to be fraudulently carried on, or that he should have connived at such fraud.</p> <p>[Cited in Dobbins’ Distillery v. U. S., 96 TJ. S. 404; Gregory v. U. S., Case No. 5,803; • U. S. v. One Copper Still, Id. 15,928.]</p> <p>4. The 5th section of the act of March 31, 1868 (15 Stat. 59), in declaring that a distiller shall forfeit the distillery and distilling apparatus used by him, means, by the words “shall forfeit,” “shall subject to forfeiture.”</p> <p>5. The 19th section of the act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 132), in providing that “the distillery,” &c., shall he forfeited, forfeits the property, irrespective of the question of its ownership.</p> <p>6. In none of those sections is any proof required of the actual complicity of the owner of the property to be forfeited, in the fraud or other thing which causes the forfeiture.</p> <p>[Cited in IT. S. v. Two Horses, Case No. 16,-578.]</p>

<p>[This was a suit to forfeit the distillery and rectifying establishment of J. C. McCoy & Co. Judgment of forfeiture entered.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,966.</p> <p>Revenue Laws—Validitt op Provisions Imposing Forfeiture.</p> <p>An act of congress.—such as section 44 of the act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 142), which declares that real property employed in a violation of a revenue law shall be forfeited therefor,—is not unconstitutional. Such an act may be sustained as a regulation of civil policy appropriate to accomplish a purpose vital to government.</p>

Informations were filed in two cases under the internal revenue laws against distillery No. twenty-eight, and certain rectifying houses and other property. Gordon B. and John W. Bingham intervened as claimants and the causes were consolidated.

<p>Case No. 14,967.</p> <p>Embargo Bond — Excuse for Nonperforming Voyage—Putting into Foreign Port —Seaworthiness.</p> <p>Want of seaworthiness, in a vessel sailing under a bond given according to the provisions of the embargo law, may or may not, according to circumstances, deprive the obligee of the excuse of prevention from performing the voyage, by the perils of the sea. If the vessel be lost before she arrive at her port of destination, or at another port in the United States, the obligors would be excused, whether she was seaworthy or not. If the vessel proceeded to a foreign port, from want of seaworthiness, it may afford strong presumption that it was not the real cause of her so doing, but that a breach of the condition was originally intended.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,968.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Indictment por Burglary — Conviction op Larceny—Retractinq Plea op Guilty.</p> <p>1. Upon an indictment for burglary, the jury may find the prisoner guilty of larceny only.</p> <p>2. Upon an indictment for larceny at common law, the court may render judgment according to the statute.</p> <p>3. The court will suffer the prisoner to retract his plea of guilty in a capital case, and to plead not guilty.</p>

This was a habeas corpus commanding the defendant, a constable, to bring before the court the body of .Tohnathan Ramaley.

[This was an indictment against Newman H. Dobbs and E. S. Elliott on a charge of illicit distilling.] Upon the trial of this cause the following proceedings were had: After the jury was placed in the box, but before they .were accepted by the defendants, defendants' attorneys proposed to challenge peremptorily John Anderson, one of the jurors in the box, which was objected to by the district attorney, who contended that, in the courts of the United States in cases other than…

This action was commenced June 23, 1865. to recover a balance of $738.68, alleged to be due from the defendant [Alexander Dodge] to the plaintiff, for duties on a cargo of salt imported from the Sandwich Islands to Portland, in the district of Oregon, in the month of June, 1864. The case was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury.

'This was an indictment [against Solomon Dodge] found under section 73 of the Act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 249), commonly called the “Internal Revenue Act.” It charged the defendant with selling liquor at retail without a license therefor, between July 12 and September 15, 1845, at Yaquinna Bay, in the district of Oregon. The plea was “Not guilty.” On the trial, it was admitted that between the dates aforesaid, or since, the defendant was not licensed to retail liquor.

This was a process of attachment against the respondent for a contempt in forcibly rescuing T. P. Shaw, a prisoner in the custody of the marshal, under an indictment for treason.

<p>Case No. 14,976.</p> <p>Civil Rights — Railwav Passengebs — Masteb and Sebvant.</p> <p>[1. A railway employé who denies to a female passenger having a first-class ticket a right to ride in the only car in the train appropriated for the accommodation of ladies alone, solely because she is a person of African descent, is guilty, under the civil rights law of March 1, 1875 (18 Stat. 335), whether he acts under the instructions of his employer or not. If he acts under the instructions of superior officers of the railway company, they also are guilty under the law.]</p> <p>[2. If there are two cars, equally fit and appropriate, in all respects, for the use of white female passengers as well as colored female passengers. then there is no offence, under the law in denying a colored female passenger entrance to one, and requiring her to ride in the other.]</p>

The indictment in this case contained three counts: (1) For forging, procuring to be forged and assisting to be forged, a note in imitation of a note of the Bank of the United States, for 20 dollars, signed by N. Biddle, president, and W. M’Ulvaine, cashier; the payee, the date, and place of date is unknown, which was in the possession of the defendant, and is now in the possession of some person unknown to the jury.

This was an indictment [against Philip Dolan] for an assault with intent to kill, committed in the navy yard at Brooklyn. The defendant now moved to quash the indictment, on the ground that the act of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat 115), on which it was founded, did not create the offence charged, and that there was no statute of the United States creating the offence

<p>Case No. 14,979.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Banks—Surplus Earnings.</p> <p>1. The undistributed surplus earnings of savings banks, added during the year to their contingent funds, are subject to taxation under the 9th section of the act of congress of July 13, 1866 [14 Stat. 138].</p> <p>2. That such a fund is held as an authorized security for depositors does not affect its liability to taxation under the act; that question depends upon the fact that it is the accumulation of surplus earnings, and not upon the purpose for which these earnings are withheld from periodical distribution.</p> <p>[On error this judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. 19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 227.]</p>

<p>Case No. 14,984.</p> <p>Internal Revende—Brewers—Entry in Books —“Fermented” and “Malt” Liqdors.</p> <p>In the act of June 6, 1872 [17 Stat. 245], the terms “malt liquor” and “fermented liquor’ are used synonymously, and the brewer is expressly required to enter ail malt liquors in his book, whether sold to other brewers or to the public.</p>

This was a motion to quash an indictment [against Simon' Donau and Christopher Flood] found for a violation of the 30th section of the act of March 2d, 1867 (14 Stat. 484), which provides, “that, if two or more persons conspire either to commit any of-fence against the laws of the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner whatever, and one or more of said parties to said conspiracy shall do any act to effect the object thereof, the parties to said…

[This was an indictment against S. P. Doss and others for obstructing a United States officer in the discharge, of his duty.]

[This was a bill in equity by Joseph L West and others against Samuel H. Doughty, praying the surrender of certain letters patent, No. 25,701, issued October 4, 1859, reissued December 27, 1859 (No. 870), and again August 1, 1870. A trial under the first issue of this patent will be found in Case No. 4,029, and under the second reissue in Case No. 4,028.]

This was an indictment under the act of congress, March, 1835, § 2 [4 Stat. 776], for. an endeavor to commit a revolt on board of the American ship Arcóle (E. A. Pitman,. master), while lying in Hampton Roads. Plea not guilty.

<p>Case No. 14,988.</p> <p>Witness—Freeborn Mulatto.</p> <p>A freeborn mulatto is a competent witness against a white person.</p>

<p>This was a joint indictment against three persons for murder upon the high seas. The prisoners were tried at New-York, before Mr. Justice NELSON and Judge BETTS, in May, 1851, and found guilty. [Edward F.] Douglass was tried separately. James Clements and Thomas Benson were tried together. Before sentence, a motion for a new trial was made before both judges, upon their minutes of the trial and the charge of the presiding judge to the jury. The indictment, in every count, charged the murder of the deceased by each of the prisoners There was no count charging either of the prisoners with only being present at the murder, aiding and abetting it. The points urged as grounds for a new trial were these: 1st. That the court erred in allowing the district attorney to exercise a qualified peremptory challenge, by excluding individual jurors from the jury until the panel should be exhausted, without making any challenge to such jurors for principal cause or to the favor; 2d, that Douglass ought to have been allowed to prove a conversation between Benson and Clements when they were alone, inculpating themselves and exculpating Douglass from all participation in the crime; 3d, that the court erred in not charging the jury that the evidence was purely circumstantial; 4th, that the court erred in not charging the jury that the evidence must exclude, to a moral certainty, every hypothesis hut that of guilt, before a conviction could be had, and that the court misdirected the jury, in. instructing them that they could convict the prisoners if the circumstantial evidence was found to he more consistent with their guilt than with their innocence; 5th, that the court erred in charging the jury that mere presence, actual or constructive, at the murder, aiding and abetting it, was sufficient to warrant a conviction under the indictment.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,990.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Copt op Indictment — List op Jury — Peremptory Challenges — Manner op Selecting Jury—Witnesses—Indictment—Repugnant Allegations.</p> <p>1. In capital cat.es, the prisoner is entitled to a copy of the indictment, and a list of the jury, mentioning the names and places of abode of such jurors, to he delivered to him two entire days before his arraignment.</p> <p>[Cited in Logan v. U. S., 12 Sup. Ct. 630.]</p> <p>2. Under the set of congress of April 30, 1790, c. 36, § 28 [1 Story’s Laws, 89; 1 Stat. 118, c. 9], the arraignment is to be regarded as the commencement of the trial; and the two entire days must be exclusive of the day of delivery of the copy of the indictment and list of jurors, and the day of the arraignment.</p> <p>3. In offences made capital by the act of congress of April 30, 1790, the-prisoner may challenge twenty jurors peremptorily; in treason, thirty-five. In indictments for capital offences, under that act, the prisoner may challenge twenty jurors peremptorily, and no more; in offences made capital since that act, he is entitled to thirty-five peremptory challenges, according to the rules of the common law.</p> <p>4. The act of congress, passed September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 29 [1 Story’s Laws, 63; 1 Stat. 88], in referring to the laws of the states in relation to juries, applies only to the mode of selecting them, and not to the number to be summoned. The circuit courts are bound to follow the laws of the respective states in which they are held, in the mode of forming the juries, and in determining upon their qualifications; but the laws of the several states do not regulate the courts of the United States in the number to be summoned; upon this subject, they are governed by the rules of the common law.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Richardson, 28 Fed. 69.]</p> <p>5. The prisoner was indicted for the murder of the captain of the brig Francis, on the high seas; the brig was an American vessel, and the prisoner one of the mariners on board; he belonged to the Malay race, and was baptized and educated in the Christian religion; the witnesses on the part of the United States were two free negroes and one free mulatto. On objection being made to the admissibility of the evidence of one of these negroes, held, that the question was to be determined by the laws of Maryland.</p> <p>6. Upon general principles, there was nothing in the case of the witness, or in his color, that would make him incompetent to give testimony in any case</p> <p>7. The result of ihe legislation of Maryland on this subject, is. that negroes and mulattoes, free or slave, are not competent witnesses in any case wherein a Christian white person is concerned; but they are competent witnesses against all other persons.</p> <p>8. The prisoner could not be regarded' as a Christian white person, and therefore the testimony was admissible against him.</p> <p>9. An indictment which states that the prison-, er, “late of the district of Maryland, mariner, on the 31st day of October, 1839, then and there, being on board a certain brig, called, &c., on the high seas, on the Atlantic Ocean, in latitude 33°, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, and within the jurisdiction of the United States, * * * did, then and there, commit,” &c., is bad for repugnancy; and no judgment will be rendered thereon.</p> <p>10. The words then and there, mean “at the time and place aforesaid,” and in this case refer as to time, to the 31st day of, October, 1839, and as to the place, to the district of Maryland; and this allegation (which is a substantive one) is repugnant to the subsequent allegation, that the offence was committed on the high seas, “out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.”</p> <p>11. The court cannot reject any material allegation in an indictment or information, which is sensible and consistent in the place where it occurs, and is not repugnant to any antecedent matter, merely on account of there occurring aft-erwards, in the same indictment or information, another allegation inconsistent with the former,- and which latter allegation cannot itself be rejected.</p>

<p>Case No. 14,990a.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Prosecution—Evidence—Handwriting—Witness.</p> <p>1. The prisoner has a right to show the spirit and temper with which the prosecution has been conducted, and if it has been brought to bear against the accused he has a right to bring it to the attention of the jury.</p> <p>2. In the examination of a witness as to the handwriting of the prisoner he must answer from his knowledge of handwriting; he must have seen the writing which the writing in question resembles, and must come to the conclusion in his own mind that he believes it to be the prisoner’s handwriting.</p> <p>3. A witness whose name is on the back of the indictment should be called by the district attorney if he is a material witness, not otherwise.</p>

<p>[Indictment for selling liquor to Indians. Heard on motion to quash.]</p>

Petition to quash execution: “District of Arkansas—set. To the Hon. Benjamin Johnson, Judge of the District Court of the United States in and for the District of Arkansas: Your petitioners, John Drennen and Elias Rector, as administrators of all and singular the goods and chattels, rights and credits of Wharton Rector, deceased, respectfully represent, that heretofore, namely, on the 12th day of October, A. D. 1844, the United States, by the consideration and judgment of the…

<p>Indictment [against Alexander Drew] for the murder of Charles L. Clark on the high seas on board of the American ship John Jay, of which Drew was master, and Clark was second mate. Plea, general Issue.</p> <p>At the trial the principal facts were not contested. But the defence set up was the insanity of the prisoner at the time of committing the homicide. It appeared, that for a considerable time before the fatal act, Drew had been in the habit of indulging himself in very gross and almost continual drunkenness; that about five days before it took place, he ordered all the liquor on board to be thrown overboard, which was accordingly done. He soon afterwards began to betray great restlessness, uneasiness, fretfulness and irritability; expressed his fear that the crew intended to murder him; and complained of persons, who were unseen, talking to him, and urging him to kill Clark; and his dread of so doing. He could not sleep, but was in almost constant motion during the day and night. The night before the act, he was more restless than usual, seemed to* be in great fear, and said, that whenever he laid down there were persons threatening to kill him, if he did not kill the mate, &c. &c. In short, he exhibited all the marked symptoms of the disease brought on by intemperance, called delirium tremens.</p> <p>Upon the closing of the evidence, the court asked Blake, the district attorney, if he expected to change the posture of the case. He admitted, that unless upon the facts, the court were of opinion, that this insanity, brought on by the antecedent drunkenness, constituted no defence for the act, he could not expect success in the prosecution. See 1 Hale, P. C. 29, 36; 1 Russ. P. C. 11; 19 State Tr. 946; 3 Paris & Troutt. 140; Has-lam, Ins. 50; Coates, 34; Arms. 372; Coop. Med. Jur. 10; Am. Insan. 67.</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against John T. Driscoll for embezzling and destroying letters.]</p>

<p>This was an information to enforce the for feiture of certain hides seized for an alleged violation of the revenue laws of the United States.</p> <p>The claimants [Pickman & Silsbee], in 1862, imported from Buenos Ayres, by the barque Emma Cushing, a cargo of four thousand two hundred and sixty-one hides, and entered them at the custom house upon an invoice from E. H. Polmar & Co., their Buenos Ayres correspondents. This invoice was' made out in the paper currency of Buenos Ayres, and contained the consular certificate for reducing the amount to American currency. They had also received from their correspondents another invoice made out in gold doubloons. The government maintained that the goods should have been entered upon this last invoice, and that, because they were not so entered, the government was defrauded of duties.</p> <p>The information alleged: ' 1st. That the hides were invoiced at less than their actual cost, with intent to avoid a part of their proper duty. 2d. That the invoice was made up with intent, by a false valuation, to evade the revenue. 3d. That the invoice was falsely made up with intent to evade the revenue in this: that it represented the hides as bought in paper money, whereas they were in fact bought in gold; that it was well known that by this mode of stating the purchase, as in paper -and not in gold, the hides would pay less than their proper duties on entry here, and that this invoice was made up in paper with the intent that this result should follow. The claimants pleaded the general issue.</p> <p>Upon the trial of the cause, the government showed that Mr. B. H. Silsbee, one of the claimants, upon the arrival of the vessel which brought these hides, entered them at the custom house in Boston, and produced on their entry an invoice from the shipper, E. H. Folmar, of Buenos Ayres, stating the price in the paper money of Buenos Ayres, and representing the hides as costing in this currency $345,278 78; that attached to the invoice was a certificate of the United States consul at Buenos Ayres, that twenty-seven paper dollars were equal to one Spanish dollar; and that, upon his entry, the importer had stated the cost of the hides in federal money, in accordance with the rate given in this certificate, at $12,788 07. It was also proved that, shortly after this entry, difficulties arose with reference to importations from Buenos Ayres, which led to an examination of Mr. Silsbee by the appraisers, and that upon this examination he produced another invoice of these hides, made out in specie, and repre-seating their cost as $14,376 75, accompanied by a letter from Folmar, in which he spoke of this as “the real invoice,” and stated that there was “an advantage in having the invoice for the custom house made out in paper, the consular certificate placing the currency at $27 per Spanish dollar, whereas estimating as worth $16 (fuertes) we would calculate it at about $25 to the hard dollar;” but also saying that our custom house regulation required the invoice to be made out in the paper money; and that this letter and the specie invoice were in the possession of the importer before the arrival and entry of the hides in Boston.</p> <p>It was also shown in evidence that Buenos .Ayres is a province of the Argentine confederacy; that there is in that province paper money issued by the government of the province known as moneda corriente, which is a legal tender for all government dues; is employed in the payment of all the ordinary expenses of daily life, and in the purchase of Mestiza wool for exportation; that it is not received in any other province of the confederation; and that dry and salted hides for export, tallow, and Cordova wool, are always bought and paid for in doubloons.</p> <p>The claimants on this state of facts contended, as matter of law, that they .were obliged by the statute of the United States, requiring all invoices of goods subject to ad valorem duty imported into the United States from any foreign country to be made out in the currency or currencies of the place or country whence they were imported, to have the cost of their hides expressed on their invoice in paper money, even though the purchase was actually made in doubloons. They also contended that the statement of the cost of the hides in the invoice in another currency than that actually employed in their purchase, if the reduction from the one currency into the other be truly made, even though such a reduction would probably effect their entry at less than their actual value, and was made with this intent and for this purpose, was not a violation of the laws of the United States. But on these points the court ruled otherwise, as appears in the instructions to the jury given below; and the claimants then offered evidence tending to show that the United States consul at Buenos Ayres had insisted on having the invoices of all goods exported from Buenos Ayres to the United States made out in • paper money, and refused to certify to invoices in which the price was expressed in specie; that the merchants in Buenos Ayres believed the law to require that the invoices should be made out in paper money, and understood the consul to insist upon this being done; and that this was the reason why Fol-mar made up his invoice in this way; and, in support of this view, they relied much on Folmar’s own statement in his deposition, taken in the case, and on a passage in his letter to the claimants, inclosing the specie invoice of these hides, in which he said: “Hides in this market are generally bought in gold, but the custom house regulations of the United States requiring all invoices from Buenos Ayres to be made out in paper currency, we always accompany each shipment with a certified invoice reduced to paper, corresponding in value to the cost of the merchandise in hard money.” It was admitted that the amount of paper money stated in the invoice as the cost of the hides was the exact equivalent of the doubloons actually paid for these hides at the market rate of doubloons to paper on that day.</p> <p>The government introduced evidence tending to show that the consul had never refused to certify to specie invoices of exports from Buenos Ayres; that no such certificates had ever been required at the custom house; and that, prior to the entry of these goods, no entry had ever been made of an invoice of dry ox and cow hides from Buenos Ayres, in which the cost was stated and the transaction represented in paper alone, and the actual coin used in payment wholly suppressed.</p>

This was a motion to put off the trial on the affidavit of William Duane.

[This was an action on the ease for a libel on the plaintiff in the case of Hollingsworth v. Duane, in the Aurora, a newspaper published by William Duane, the defendant. A motion to postpone the trial was denied. Case No. 6,614. The trial then proceeded, the main question being as to whether the defendant was a citizen of the United States or an alien.

<p>Case No. 14,999.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Indictment — Indorsement of Prosecutor’s Name.</p> <p>When a presentment for a misdemeanor is found by the grand jury without the name of a prosecutor, the court will order an indictment to be sent up without the indorsement of a prosecutor, upon the suggestion of the attorney of the United States.</p>

The United States, by her attorney for the district of Minnesota, who acts under the direction of the attorney general, brings this bill in chancery in the circuit court for that district, for an injunction against the defendants.

<p>Case No. 15,002.</p> <p>Dower—Provision in Will in Lieu of Dower— Election—Renunciation—W hen to be Made.</p> <p>1. Dower is a clear legal right, and can not be divested except upon full knowledge of the widow’s rights.</p> <p>2. If she accept what by the will is given in lieu of dower, not knowing the extent of the estate, she may renounce under the will, and claim, after the lapse of years. And in' some cases, where it shall be necessary, she may bring a suit to ascertain the true condition of the estate, to enable her to make a proper election.</p> <p>[Cited in Cribben v. Cribben, 136 III. 609, 27 N. E. 71; Valentine v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 79 Wis. 585, 48 N. W. 856.]</p> <p>3. The statute of Illinois, declaring “that any provision in the will bars dower,” must have a reasonable construction.</p> <p>4. To bar dower, the amount must be such as to afford a reasonable presumption that it was given in lieu of dower.</p> <p>5. Unless the will shall be express on the subject, a small amount of personal property, the estate being large, not sufficient.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Warren v. Warren, 148 IU. 647, 36 N. E. 611.]</p> <p>[The value of the widow’s dower was agreed upon and amicably settled. See Case No. 15,-003 for a settlement of the priorities of the various creditors, including the United States.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,003.</p> <p>Judgment—Lien on Real Estate—Partnership —Appropriation op Assets to Pat Individual Debts — United States — Prioritt op Claim— Judicial Sale.</p> <p>1. The judgments at law and charges in chancery of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Illinois, institute a lien throughout the state, on the real estate of the party against whom they are rendered. This doctrine treated as the law of this court until the supreme court shall establish a different rule.</p> <p>2. A person who, at a judicial sale, purchases a tract of land as the property of the party against whom the judgment is obtained, and pays the purchase money to the plaintiff, can not as a general thing, call on him for re-payment.</p> <p>3. A sale of real estate of D had taken place under a decree of this court. O became the purchaser of a piece of land and paid the purchase money to the plaintiffs, but discovering that D had no title to the land, made application to the court to have the purchase money reimbursed out of moneys of the plaintiffs in court. Held, that in the absence of fraud and unfair dealing, this could not be done, but that being a judicial rule, O must take the consequences of a defect or failure of title; and that the remedy was in equity against D or his legal representatives.</p> <p>[Cited in Brunner v. Brenan, 49 Ind. 100.]</p> <p>4. If one partner withdraws funds from the partnership and pays the taxes on his private estate, the creditors of the partnership do not, in general, thereby acquire a lien on the land. The estate of the partner is still his own private property, and in case of his death, passes to his heirs or devisees, subject to that debt as to others; and if his executors make a similar appropriation of the partnership funds, the rule is the same.</p> <p>5. Where it was alleged that A & B were partners, and after A’s death his executors appropriate partnership property to the payment of taxes on his estate, and in expenses of administration, he being at the time of his death insolvent and indebted to the United States, in judgments and otherwise, which judgments were a lien on the real estate of A, the lien of the United States and their priority of payment were not thereby affected, but they could enforce their judgments notwithstanding the acts of the executors.</p> <p>6. Where the partnership property is not sufficient to pay the debts of the firm, the priority of the United States does not reach the undivided interest of one of the partners in the partnership effects, if he is indebted to the United States, but when it has become his separate, individual property, the rule would be different. The true test is, whether the property belong to the partnership or the individual.</p> <p>7. The creditors of a partnership applied to the state court by bill, to declare the partnership and decree the payment of the partnership debts out of assets in the hands of the administrator of one of the partners who had died insolvent, indebted to the United States. The administrator denied the partnership and took an objection based on the debts of the United States and their priority. The state court decreed in accordance with the prayer of the bill. The United States were not parties and did not appear in the state court. Held, that the proceedings in the state court did not impair the rights of the United States, and that they were not bound by them, but that notwithstanding the decree in the state court, the priority of .the government attached and that whenever the proceeds of any real estate, or any personal estate came into the hands of the administrator, he became a trustee for the United States, and they must first be paid.</p> <p>8. The acts of congress giving the United States a priority of payment supersede all state laws upon the subject of the distribution of those' estates that come within their provisions. The law makes no exception in favor of a particular class of creditors, and the priority of the United States does not yield to the claims of any creditors, however high .may be the dignity of their debts.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Drennan, Case No. 14,992.]</p> <p>9. In June, 1841, the United States reversed judgments in this court against D, subsequently in 1841 and 1842 other creditors obtained judgments in a state court against him. These last judgments were liens only on the real estate of D, situate in the county where the judgments were rendered. In 1846 the United States obtained a decree in this court directing all of D’s real property in the state, to be sold to pay an indebtedness to the United States independent of the judgments of 1841. D died in 1844, his whole property not being sufficient to pay the debts due the government. Under the decree of 1846, various sales took place of real estate out of the county in which the other creditors had their judgments, and there was a fund in court arising from these sales sufficient to pay the judgments of the other creditors. The United States having made out executions on the judgments of 1841 and levied them on lands situate in the county where the other creditors held their judgments, these creditors made application to this court to compel the United States to go on lands out of that county to satisfy their judgments, or for the proceeds of the lands sold, out of that county. Held, that however it might be in the case of private individuals, the United States having an older lien, made perfect by a levy, were entitled to return it and sell the property to satisfy the judgments of 1841, and that the other creditors had no claim upon the proceeds in court.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in U. S. v. Lewis, Case No. 15,595.]</p> <p>10. It is a rule well recognized and understood, that where a party has a lien for a debt on two funds, and another party has a lien on one of the funds only, a court of equity will oblige the party who has the double fund to resort in the first instance, for payment, to that fund upon which the other party has no lien. But this is never done when it trenches on the rights or operates to the prejudice of the party entitled to the double fund.</p> <p>11. But this rule does not affect, under the circumstances of this case the priority of the United States, neither is that priority affected by the suit settled in New York, that lands consisting of different parcels, subject to a general incum-brance, are, in equity, to be charged in the inverse order of the alienation of the several funds.</p> <p>12. The case of Schryver v. Teller, 9 Paige, 173, examined and distinguished from this.</p> <p>13. It has been uniformly held in all the cases that the priority of the United States does not disturb any specific lien, nor the forfeited lien of a judgment, that is, it does not supersede a mortgage on land, nor a judgment made perfect by the issue of an execution and a levy on real estate. But in the case of a general lien it is not so clear.</p> <p>14. The laws of the United States giving a priority to tbe government, are of general application in the cases therein stated, and if a debt- or is to be excepted out of the general rule, it devolves upon the party alleging the exception to show it.</p>

<p>Case Mo. 16,004.</p> <p>Bah, — Fobfeituke of Recognizance — Relief fbom—Surety.</p> <p>1. Act of congress of 28th February, 1838 [5 Stat. 321], authorizing the courts of the United States to relieve bail in certain cases, construed.</p> <p>2. The courts in England had such power, independent of acts of parliament conferring it, which were held by the judges to be simply in affirmance of the common law.</p> <p>3. The reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall, in U. S. v. Feely [Case No. 15,082], although delivered many years before the passage of the act of congress, sustains the power of the court to grant relief, as well after as before judgment.</p> <p>4. A recognizance is a matter of record, and when forfeited, it is in the nature of a judgment of record, and when judgment is given the whole is to be taken as one record.</p> <p>5. In the courts of the United States, the recognizance is estreated and sued in the same forum, and the court having power over the proceedings from the beginning may grant relief, even after judgment and execution in the hands of the marshal.</p>

<p>Mr. Butterfield, for the United States.</p> <p>Mr. McClure, for defendants.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,006.</p> <p>Appeal—Right to Open and Close—Evidence —Bill op Exceptions.</p> <p>1. Allowing a party to open and close is not the subject of a bill of exceptions.</p> <p>2. The state laws of evidence are rules of decision in trials at the common law in the United States courts.</p> <p>3. Where the rulings of the court on letters or papers are made the subject of exception, they must be inserted in the bill of exceptions, or the presumption will be that the rulings were correct.</p> <p>[Cited in Merchants’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baring, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 162.]</p>

<p>[These were separate indictments against John L. Durkee and C. E. Band for the crime of piracy. Defendants moved the court to consolidate the two cases, under Act Eeb. 26, 1853.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,009.</p> <p>Larceny—Requisites—Intent to Appropriate— Piracy.</p> <p>1. The essential requisite^ of larceny is the liicri causa. Held, if the prisoner took and carried away the muskets with intent to appronriate any of them to his own use, or permanently to deprive the owner of them, such taking is larceny.</p> <p>[Cited in dissenting opinion in People v. Raschke, 73 Cal: 385, 15 Pac. 16: State v. Slingerland, 19 Nev. 135, 7 Pac. 283.]</p> <p>2. If the taking was with the sole intent to prevent the use of them upon himself or his associates, it is not larceny.</p> <p>[Cited in Gooch v. State, 60 Ark. 5, 28 S. W. 511.]</p>

[This was an indictment against Daniel G. Dustin and others, charging them with a conspiracy, to defraud the government in evading the payment of taxes upon distilled spirits. Heard on motion to quash.]

<p>Case No. 15,010.</p> <p>Witness—Recognizance por Appearance— Traveling Expenses.</p> <p>1. It is the duty of the district attorney, in criminal prosecutions by the government, where he has any doubt whether witnesses will attend, to have them properly recognized.</p> <p>2. If a witness subpoenaed by the government, has means to travel, it is not necessary for the officer to tender his traveling expenses; and the court will attach a witness who, on that ground, neglects to attend.</p> <p>[Cited in Norris v. Hassler, 23 Fed. 582.]</p> <p>3. The officer summoning witnesses should see that those who have no means to travel, are provided with necessary funds.</p>

[This was an indictment against Daniel G. Dustin and others, charging them with a conspiracy to defraud the government, in evading the payment of taxes upon distilled spirits. Heard on demurrer. See Case No. 15,-011.]

Suit upon a distiller’s bond given to the United States under the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 163).

<p>This was a libel for forfeiture of a rectifying establishment at Amboy, Ill., for neglecting to keep a book as required by the 26th section of the act of July 13,1866. The claimant’s counsel admitted that it was clearly proven to the jury that the book kept did not show all the spirits received and purchased, and sold or delivered; and Hon. Geo. C. Bates, on behalf of the defense, asked the court to charge the jury as follows; That if the jury believed from the evidence adduced that no rules and regulations for the keeping of a rectifier’s book were ever prescribed, and furnished to the claimant by the commissioner of internal revenue as are provided for in section 26 of the act of July 13, 1866, they must find for the claimant, even though the books were not kept in accordance with the statute. That if the jury believed from the evidence adduced that the claimant has actually paid the excise tax of $2 per gallon “on every proof gallon so purchased or received by him, or sold or delivered” into the office of collector of that district, so that the United States has- not been injured or defrauded in its revenue by the irregular entries in his book, that then they must find for the claimant, as they must be satisfied that his intent and purpose was, by irregular books, to defraud the revenue.</p>

On the 25th of January, 1833, suit was brought in this court by the United States against the representatives of Edward W. Duval [Ellen Duval, and William Duval], to recover eleven thousand five hundred and thirty-eight dollars and fifty-four cents, for that sum of money alleged to have been received by him in his life time, and to be still due and unpaid. To this suit the defendants pleaded the general issue.

<p>Case No. 15,017.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Warehouse Bond—Reduction in Rate—Sale—Action for Deficiency.</p> <p>1. On the 1st of December, 1866, a warehouse bond was given to the'United States, for the payment of the duties then existing, or to be thereafter enacted, on certain brandy. The condition of the bond was, that the obligors should, after the expiration of one year, and before the expiration of three years, from the date of the bond, withdraw the brandy and pay to the collector the amount of the penalty of the bond, or the true amount, when ascertained, of duties imposed by law on the brandy, and an additional sum equal te ten per centum of the said duties. From a date prior to December 1, 1869, until January 1, 1871, the duty on brandy was $3 per proof gallon. By the twenty-first section of the act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat. 262, 263), which went into effect January 1, 1871, the duty was reduced to $2 per proof gallon. The twenty-sixth section of the same act provided, that all imported goods which might be in bonded warehouses on January 1. 1871, should be subject to no other duty, upon the entry thereof for consumption, than if the same were imported after that day. After January 1, 1871, the brandy was sold at auction by the United States for non-payment of duties, and a suit was brought on the bond to recover the amount of duties due beyond the proceeds of the sale. Held, that the proper rate of duty on the brandy was the rate imposed by law at the expiration of three years from the date of the bond, namely, on the 1st of December, 1869, which was $3 per proof gallon, and an additional duty equal to ten per centum thereof.</p> <p>2. Whether the twenty-sixth section of the act .of July 14, 1870. applied to goods which are, by statute, regarded as abandoned to the government, for having remained in warehouse three years without the payment of the duties and charges thereon, quiere.</p>

<p>Action [by United States against R. P. Earhart, administrator, and others] on bond of superintendent of Indian affairs.</p>

<p>relied on the fifth amendment to the constitution.</p> <p>relied on and cited 1 Bish. Or. Proc. 604, 611; Com. v. Waterborough, 5 Mass. 257; Adams v. Woods, 2 Crunch [6 U. S.] 336; Ex parte Marquand [Case No. 9,100]; Walsh v. U. S. [Id. 17,116]; Levy v. Burley [Id. 8,300]; Parsons v. Hunter [Id. 10,778]; U. S. v. Mann [Id. 15,717]; Territory v. Lockwood, 3 Wall. [70 U. S.] 236; U. S. v. Shephard [Case No. 16,273]; U. S. v. Waller [Id. 16,634]; 1 Stat. 119, § 32; 13 Stat. 305, § 179; 14 Stat. 145, § 179.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,020.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Indictment—Action op Debt.</p> <p>1. Under the internal revenue laws, when the punishment prescribed is a pecuniary penalty or fine only, and the act fixes the exact amount of it, the action of debt will lie to recover it.</p> <p>2. Where the punishment provided is a fine •only, and the amount of it is not fixed, but left to the discretion of the court, the prosecution for it must be by indictment.</p> <p>3. In all cases in which the law provides that imprisonment either may or must be any part of the punishment, the prosecution must be by indictment.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.] This was an appeal from a decree of the-district court, adjudging against the propeller-Echo a penalty of $500 for a violation of the-acts of congress of July 7, 1838 (5 Stat 304), and August 30,1852 (10 Stat 75).

Indictment [against John Eddy] under the twenty-second section of the act of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 109).

Indictment [against L. C. Edwards] under section S9 of the act of July 20, 1868 (16 Stat. 162), which enacts “that all cigars which shall be removed from any manufactory or place where cigars are made, without the same being packed in boxes as required by this act, or without the proper stamp thereon denoting the tax, or without burning into each box with a branding iron the number of the cigars contained therein, and the name of the manufacturer, and the number of the…

<p>Case No. 16,028.</p> <p>Evidence — Treasury Transcript — Original Items—Receiver op Public Monets— Commissions—Salary.</p> <p>JL. A transcript from the treasury which contains sums charged in gross, as balances, is not evidence, as to such balances.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Case, 49 Fed. 271.]</p> <p>2. The original items on which the accounting officers acted must be stated.</p> <p>[Distinguished m U. S. v. Harrill, Case No. 15,310.]</p> <p>3. A receiver of public moneys is entitled to his commissions or moneys received, though he resigns or is removed from office at the termination of the first six months of the last year, covered by his appointment.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. McCarty, Case No. 15,-657.]</p> <p>4. This allowance cannot be graduated and paid quarterly, as an annual salary.</p> <p>[Cited in. U. S. v. McCarty, Case No. 15,-637.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,027.</p> <p>Evidence—'Tbeasurt Transcripts—Priority op United States—Administrators—Assets —Charges upon Estate—Expenses.</p> <p>1. The transcript of the books and proceedings of the treasury department, provided for in section 886 of the Revised Statutes, in relation to the accounts of persons accountable for public money, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, so far as the same are authorized by law.</p> <p>2. Nothing is assets in the hands of an administrator, applicable to the payment of a demand against the estate, within the meaning of section 1103 of the Oregon Civil Code, but money— something which is a legal tender.</p> <p>3. Semble, that under section 1140 of the Oregon Civil Code, even money in the hands of an administrator is not assets applicable to the payment of a claim, until its payment has been directed by the county court.</p> <p>4. A debt due an estate from the administrator thereof, and returned on the inventory as solvent, is presumed to have been collected, and is, therefore, assets in his hands, applicable to the payment of a debt due from the deceased to the United States.</p> <p>5. The priority given to the United States by section 3466 of the Revised Statutes in the case of insolvent debtors, is not a lien upon the property of the insolvente in the hands of the assignee or administrator, but only a right to a priority of payment out of the proceeds of such property after notice of the claim.</p> <p>6. Taxes and funeral charges are not “debts due from the deceased,” within the meaning of section 3466, supra, but charges imposed thereon by the law of the state, which the administrator is bound to discharge before satisfying any claim of the United States as creditor of the deceased.</p> <p>7. Expenses of last illness are a “debt due from the deceased,” and under section 3466. supra, a debt due the United States is to be preferred to them, but if duly paid by the administrator without notice of the claim of the United States, the priority of the latter is lost.</p> <p>8. The priority of the United States only extends to the net proceeds of the property of the deceased, and therefore the necessary expenses of the administration are first to be paid; but this does not include the costs and expenses of defending an action like this, where the claim was prima facie just, and ought to have been allowed.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,028.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Forfeiture — Di%tilled Spirits — Removal from Inspected Packages—Rectification.</p> <p>[The provisions of Acts 1866, c. 184, § 43, providing for the forfeiture of spirits, removed from the original packages in which they were inspected and gauged, into other packages, for purposes of rectification, redistillation, or change of proof, unless they are again inspected, gauged and properly branded, does not apply to spirits •merely poured from the original packages into an open vat for rectification.]</p>

[This was an action for the forfeiture of eight cases of lamps imported from Prance in June, 1838, per the ship Louis Phillip, and consigned to Augustine Draconi.] Forfeiture of goods for undervaluation.

This was a case where a quantity of rectified spirits was seized while being transported from the rectifying establishment of W.. O. Tyler, West street, New York, to Brook--lyn. The evidence on the part of the government showed that the spirits were rectified; that they were made of a barrel of new spirits and the remainder rectified spirits which were properly branded.

<p>Case No. 15,033.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Distiller — Neglect to Make Entry and Return—Penalty—Forfeiture—W itness—Evidence.</p> <p>1.The penalty for a violation of the thirty-first section of the act of July 13, 3866 (14 Stat. 157), in the neglect, on the part of a distiller, to make entry and return, as required by that section, is not merely the penalty imposed by-that section, but' also the forfeiture of spirits, &c., provided for by the twenty-fifth section of the act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 483).</p> <p>2. Where, on the cross-examination of a witness, collateral facts are called out from himr tending to create distrust of his integrity, fidelity, or truth, it is competent for the adverse-party to ask of the witness an explanation which, may show the consistency of such facts with his integrity, fidelity, and truth, although circumstances may thus be proved which are foreign, to the principal issue, and which, but for such previous • cross-examination, would not be permitted to be proved.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Quantity of Tobacco, Case-No. 16,106.]</p> <p>3. Where some, though slight, evidence is given on the part of the United States tending to show a failure to make the true and exact entries and returns required by the said thirty-first section, the burthen is cast upon the claimant to show a compliance with the statute.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Quantity of Tobacco, Case No. 16,106.]</p> <p>4. Where property is seized as forfeited for a violation of the internal revenue law, and is bonded, and returned to the claimant, it becomes subject to forfeiture for causes subsequently arising; but the fact of a condemnation for such subsequent forfeiture cannot affect the question of its liability to condemnation in the suit in which it was so bonded.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,032.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Forfeiture—Undervaluation.</p> <p>This was a case brought to forfeit the goods for alleged undervaluation. The goods were manufactured at Piermont, near Paris, by T. A. Sollier, and by him shipped to this country, one Invoice in December, 1861, and one in January, 1862. He stated the value in the invoices at 11 francs a pair. On appraisal at the customhouse their value was raised to 15 francs a pair. A reappraisement was demanded, and the reappraisers valued them at 10 francs. Thereupon the goods were seized as forfeited for the undervaluation. The claimant gave testimony by witnesses examined on commission, that the goods though shipped in December and January, were actually manufactured by him in September previous, and that the invoice stated their value correctly at that time, while the appraisers had taken their value at the time of shipment.</p>

[This was an information of forfeiture against 18 pipes of distilled spirits, claimed by T. R. Rix, charging the violation of sections 41 and 43 of the act of congress of March 2, 1799, “regulating the collection of ■duties on imports anc] tonnage.”]

<p>Case No. 15,035.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Whisket — Forfeiture-— Failure to Pat Tax—Rectifier—Books.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,038.</p> <p>'Internal Revenue—Tobacco—False Return— False Brands—Innocent Purchaser.</p> <p>1. In an information, claiming a forfeiture of tobacco, in two distinct charges, based on two provisions of the internal revenue laws, the district attorney may claim a judgment on either or both, as the evidence may justify, and the court will not require him to gleet on which he will rely.</p> <p>2. Tobacco, as an article subject to taxation, is included in section 9 of the act of July, 1866 [14 Stat. 101], and may be forfeited for fraud perpetrated by the manufacturer, even in the possession of a purchaser, without knowledge of the fraud.</p> <p>3. This is a stringent but necessary provision in the internal revenue system.</p> <p>4. The title of the government to the property infected with fraud, vests from the time of its •commission, and the taint of fraud inheres in it, even in the possession of an innocent purchaser.</p> <p>5. If false brands were placed upon the caddies, by a revenue officer, indicating that the legal taxes had been paid, when in fact they had not been paid, without any complicity in the fraud by the claimant, it would not be a ground of forfeiture, and if the jury find a forfeiture,, it must be for the original fraud of the manufacturer in failing to return, or making false returns of the quantity manufactured.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] Between the 24th December, 1829, and 2d' January, 1830, entries were made at the custom-house, in New York, by the claimant,, of a shipment of about 300 hogsheads and. casks of sugar, for the benefit of drawback, thereon, as allowed by law upon the exportation of sugar refined in the United. States, and made out of foreign sugar.

This was a motion for a new trial. A libel of information was filed to forfeit the goods for undervaluation, under the 66th section of the act of March 2,1799. The case was tried before a jury, who rendered a verdict condemning the goods.

<p>Case No. 15,040.</p> <p>Army Officer — Extra Services — Disbursements.</p> <p>An army officer, ordered to take charge of and superintend the works on certain fortifications, claimed credits for extra services under the army regulations for 1821, 2y2 per centum of the amount disbursed by him. Held, on a suit by the government upon his account for alleged balances due, that the proviso of the 3d section of the act of congress of 1835, c. 30 (4 Stat. 771), did not apply to the ease, and that he was entitled to such credits.</p>

The relators, who are the legal representatives of Peter and Robert Goelet, recovered in September, 1879, a judgment in this court against the city of Elizabeth for overdue interest on its municipal bonds, and execution thereon was returned nulla bona. [Case unreported.] A rule then issued from this court to defendant to show cause why writs of mandamus should not be granted, one directed to the city council, commanding a tax to be levied and collected for the amount due on…

This was an indictment of [negro Ellick] a slave, for an assault and battery upon Henry Shortle, a white man. The jury found him guilty, and assessed the fine at 523.

An information in the nature of debt was filed by the attorney of the United States against the defendant [George P. Elliot] as owner and master of the American bar-quentinqi Annie E. Elliot, of Boston, to recover penalties for a breach of Rev. St. §| 4569 and 4570, alleging, in the first count, that on the 3d day of May, 1874, said vessel was bound on a voyage from Boston “around the Cape of Good Hope,” to wit, to Batavia, to Java, and that the defendant, as owner,…

Indictment [against Jedediah Elliot] for taking a false oath under the pension act of 1st of May, 1820, c. 51 [3 Story’s Laws, 1778; 3 Stat. 569; c. 53]. Plea, not guilty. At the trial a verdict was found against the defendant. made two points of law on a motion in arrest of judgment: (1) That the act did not make the offence perjury in its technical sense, though it affixed to it the same punishment.

[This was a presentment against William R. Elliott, charged with shooting W. Z. Kendall. Heard on motion to discharge.] On motion of Mr. P. R. Fendall the prisoner was brought into court, and was assisted by Mr. Jones in asking for his discharge on the presentment made by the grand jury. The district attorney resisted the motion.

<p>These three actions were brought by the United States against the sureties on the official bond of Beverly 0. Sanders, executed by him as collector of customs in the port of .San Francisco. Sanders was appointed such ■collector by the president, on the 13th of November, 1852. The appointment was made to fill a vacancy occurring during a recess of the senate. On the 16th of January, 1853, during the ensuing session of the senate, Sanders was appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, collector for four years from that date, and he accepted the appointment. On the 6th of December following his first appointment, he executed with Argenti and the defendants [Alfred J.] Ellis, [John] Parrott and [Samuel J.] Hensley, as sureties, the bond upon which these actions are brought—each of the sureties limiting his individual responsibility to the sum of ?50,000. The pleadings were identical in each case. The questions for determination arose Upon demurrer to the answers to the first and second counts of the amended ■complaint.</p> <p>The first count averred that Sanders was collector from November 13, 1852, to January 16, 1853, inclusive, and assigned as breach of the bond the unlawful detention by him, and the conversion to his own use of public money^ received by him in his official capacity during this period. The second count differed from the first in averring that Sanders was collector of the customs from the 13th of November, 1S52, to the 3d of March, 1853, inclusive; and in assigning as breaches of the bond the detention and conversion of public moneys received during that period. There were several special answers to both of these • counts, upon which two questions were presented for determination: First, whether the bond in suit bound the sureties for the acts of the collector prior to its date; and second, whether it bound them for his acts after his acceptance of his new appointment, January 16, 1853.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,048.</p> <p>Citizenship op Indians—Disintegrated Tribes —Right to Vote.</p> <p>[Indians born in the United States, of a tribe which has ceased to maintain its tribal integrity, and who are subject to taxation under the laws of the state in which they reside, are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution, and are therefore, under its terms, citizens of the United States, and of the state of their residence, and possess the right to vote in national elections.]</p> <p>[Cited in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 120, 5 Sup. Ct. 48, 55.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,049.</p> <p>Prize—Residence ix Exemy Couxtry—Exemy Flag—Neutral Owxership—Further Proof —Examixatiox ix-Preparatorio.</p> <p>1. A person residing in the enemy country long enough tc acquire a domicil there, is subjected to all the disabilities of an enemy, so far as it relates to his property.</p> <p>2. A vessel sailing under the flag of the enemy, is considered as eremy property, and is liable to confiscation jure belli.</p> <p>3. Upon the breaking out of war between the United States ana the republic of Mexico, the province or department of Yucatan, belonging to Mexico, having assumed a flag of her own, and having manifested a determination to remain neutral, a special order was issued by the president of the United States, exempting her citizens from the operation of the laws of war. Under sucb circumstances no citizen or resident of Yucatan, could with impunity violate her neutrality by assuming, for the purposes of trade, the flag of the enemv.</p> <p>4. It is a princiole of the law of prize, as recognized by the supreme court of the United States (The Nereide, 9 Cranch [13 U. S.] 388), that the two maxims of “free ships, free goods,’’ and “enemy ships, enemy goods,” are not necessarily connected. The primitive law, independently of international compact, rests on the simple principle, that war gives a right to capture the goods of an enemy, but gives no right to capture the goods of a friend. The neutral flag constitutes no protection to an enemy’s property, and the belligerent flag communicates no hostile character to neutral property.</p> <p>5. From the foregoing principle, it follows, that a distinction may be drawn between the vessel sailing under the flag of the enemy and her cargo belonging to a neutral; but if it appear-that the neutral has by his residence in the enemy country, acquired a domicil there, his property will be considered as enemy property.</p> <p>6. The court will refuse an application for further proof, where the claim and test affidavit of the claimant are utterly at variance with his answers to the standing interrogatories.</p> <p>7. The greatest solemnity is attached to examinations in preparatorio. The standing interrogatories are of a searching character, and well calculated to elicit truth and detect fraud; and the reasons must be cogent indeed, that would induce the court to deviate from the established practice, and permit a claimant by further proof, to contradict his own declarations, made under the solemnity of an oath, touching a fact so important as domicil or national character.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,051.</p> <p>Embezzlement prom Mail—Evidence—Witnesses —Character.</p> <p>1. On a charge for stealing letters out of the mail by a post master or other person, it is important to have as witnesses the post masters through whose offices the letters passed or were distributed.</p> <p>2. When such witnesses are not called, although there may be proof of the mailing of the letters, and that they were never received, it is not sufficient for the conviction of any post master on the route.</p> <p>3. If a witness swear positively as to the commission of the offence under improbable circumstances, whose character is bad, it will have little weight with the jury.</p> <p>4. And this is especially so where the accused shows a good character. Under doubtful circumstances of guilt, good character will lead to an acquittal of the defendant.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,053.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant—Inchoate Title—Judicial Possession.</p> <p>An inchoate title, followed by juridical possession, presents an equity which the United States are bound to respect.</p> <p>[The United States objected to the official survey of this grant, but the survey was approved by the court in Case No. 15,064.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,054.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Identification of Boundaries—Error in Decree op Confirmation.</p> <p>[1. In view of the well-known looseness and inaccuracy with which business was transacted in California under the Mexican government, the fact, that a decree of concession made by a Mexican governor referred to a certain tree as a live oak, when in fact the only tree reasonably answering the other calls of the description was a white oak, is not sufficient ground for overthrowing a survey based upon such white oak; especially when there is other evidence identifying it as the one referred to in the act of possession.]</p> <p>[2. In a decree of confirmation an apparent error, arising out of the obscurity of the act of possession, and which consists in assuming that the line taken as the base of the survey runs towards the property of a person mentioned, and may interfere therewith, should not be allowed to control a clear and definite call for that line, as of a given course and direction.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,056.</p> <p>Income Tax—Interest on Corporation Bonds— Alien Ownership—Penaltt.</p> <p>1. Interest on bonds of a corporation held by non-resident aliens is not taxable by the United •States, under section 122 of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 284), as amended by section 9 of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 138).</p> <p>2. Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Slack [Case No. '9,527a], dissented from.</p> <p>3. Only one penalty is recoverable for all failures to make returns for taxation, under said •statute, prior to the commencement of a suit.</p> <p>[Cited in Ex parte Snow, 120 U. S. 286, 7 Sup. Ct. 562.]</p> <p>[The judgment of the circuit court was reversed in error by the supreme court. 106 U. S. 327, 1 Sup. Ct. 223. At a later day a petition for rehearing was denied. 107 U. S. 1, 2 Sup. Ct. 83.]</p>

<p>Claim [by the heirs of Jose Joaquin Estu-dillo] for one league of land in Alameda county [known as the “Rancho San Leandro”],, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.</p>

In this case a libel of information was filed by the district attorney of the United States against the barque Ethan Allen, charging that the master of the vessel took on board at Sydney, Australia, thirty-five more passengers than is “the proportion to the space occupied by them, and appropriated for their use on board said vessel, and unoccupied by stores or other goods, not being the personal baggage of such passengers,” as provided in section 1 of the act of congress,…

In admiralty. 1.The proof shows beyond doubt that this .vessel was the rebel privateer Retribution, and was liable to seizure and forfeiture for some, or all of the causes set forth in the libel; and having been so liable,- these claimants must show that they have acquired such a title as purges the forfeiture, and gives them the absolute ownership, and the burden of proof is upon them.

<p>Case No. 15,061.</p> <p>Counterfeiting—Witnesses—Detectives.</p>

Jonah Thompson being indebted'to the United States as surety on sundry bonds of Samuel Thompson, given in the years 1825 and 1826, became an insolvent on the 7th May, 1827, and was released by the secretary of the treasury on the 13th December, 1832. See United States v. Thompson [Case No. 16,-487]. On the 25th May, 1827, Jonah and George Thompson, then, and for some time before, trading together, executed an assignment of their joint and several property.

Demurrer to an indictment. The defendant, James H. Fairchilds, was indicted for having wrongfully withheld from one Penrose, a pensioner of the United States, a portion of a sum which the defendant, acting as agent for Penrose, had collected from the pension office, as being a pension to which Penrose was entitled.

<p>Case No. 15,066.</p> <p>•Customs Duties — Discharge oe Goods — Manifest—Post Entry.</p> <p>Discharge of cargo into lighters not an unloading under the statute. After such discharge, by general order, consignee should be allowed to make a post entry of goods not on the manifest.</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] This was an action of debt brought in the district court against the defendant [Eobert Fairclough], master of the Placidia, a foreign vessel, to recover the penalty of $500, under the fifty-seventh section of the duty law (1 Story’s Laws, 624 [1 Stat. 671]), for an alleged disagreement between the cargo on board and that reported in the manifest; there being found concealed on board…

<p>The defendant was arrested on an indictment charging him with a criminal offence under the customs act of 1799, and gave bail for his appearance, but afterwards made default, and his sureties paid the amount of the bond into court The petitioner alleged himself to be the person who first informed the collector of the crime committed by the defendant, and prayed that a moiety of the money in the registry might be paid out to him.</p> <p>submitted the case without argument, excepting a citation of Ex parte Marquand [Case No. 9,100], and a statement of the practice which has followed that decision.</p>

This case involved the important question to the government in the way of revenue, whether loan and trust companies were subject to the tax imposed by the act of congress of June, 1864 [13 Stat. 223], and as amended by the subsequent act of March, 1865 [Id. 469], which provides that banks shall pay a license, &c.; that every person, firm, or company, and every incorporated or other bank having a place of business where credits are opened by the deposit or collection of money…

<p>This was an indictment against the defendant [Charles W. Famham], under the twelfth section of the act of July 7, 1838, entitled “An act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam” (5 Stat. 304), for manslaughter, in causing the death of several persons, who lost their lives by the explosion of the boiler of the steamboat Reindeer, while she was landing passengers at Bristol dock, on the Hudson river. The defendant was the captain of the steamboat. The substance of the indictment, and the facts put in evidence to sustain it, on the trial, which took place before BETTS, District Judge, sufficiently appear from the charge of the court.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,072.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Concealment op Goods—Resisting Seizube.</p> <p>1. What constitutes a concealment of goods within the 69th section of the collection act of March 2. 1799, c. 128 [1 Story’s Laws, 632; 1 Stat. 678, c. 22.]?</p> <p>2. If an officer of the customs seizes goods, a party, who resists the seizure, is not guilty of concealment within the statute, merely by such act of resistance; although the goods are taken away, and wholly removed from the custody of the officer in consequence thereof.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,073.</p> <p>Internal Revenue-Destruction op Spirits bt Fire — Taxes Thereon — When Tax on Distilled Spirits Attaches.</p> <p>1. The fact that distilled spirits placed in a distillery warehouse were destroyed by fire, because of the absence of the government storekeeper from the warehouse, does not release the bondsmen from liability for the amount of the taxes which were due on the spirits. • The government cannot be made a loser by a neglect of duty by an officei.</p> <p>2. The liability of a distiller for the tax on distilled spirits attaches so soon as the spirits are produced, and if he places them in a warehouse, giving bond for the payment of the tax on their removal and within one year from the date of the bond, and the warehouse and spirits are destroyed without any negligence on nis part, this does not release him from liability for payment of the tax.</p> <p>3. A destruction by fire is a “removal” within the meaning of the statute and the bond.</p>

The indictment charged, that the defendant [Abraham Faw], being coroner of the county- of Alexandria, and having, upon view of the dead body of one Curran, taken an inquest, stating that, while opposing the lawful orders of a justice of the peace, the said!

Heard on demurrer to the indictment. The indictment in this case was based on the last clause of section 3177, Rev. St. U. S. The entire section reads as follows: “Any collector, deputy collector or inspect- or may enter in the day time any building or place where any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced or kept within his district, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects.

Indictment for misdemeanor in office of justice of the peace in taking the personal recognizance of Harry Allen, in the sum of one hundred dollars, charged with theft of goods to the amount of sixty dollars, and receiving one hundred dollars in cash in lieu of bail of security. contended that the justice acted judicially, and that it was an error in judgment for which he is not liable to answer criminally, and that he lias a right to take the money; and cited Cro.

<p>Case No. 15,082.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Recognizance—Failure to Appear—Forfeiture—Power of Court to Suspend.</p> <p>Where an individual is charged with the commission of a criminal offence, and enters into a recognizance, conditioned to appear at a given day, and undergo his trial, which recognizance is forfeited by the failure of the party to appear and submit himself to the law; but the accused appears at the succeeding term of the-court, the court in which the recognizance is filed has full power to suspend (or discharge?) it, for good cause shown by the accused, why he did not comply with the condition of the recognizance; the object of such a recognizance being, not to enrich the treasury, but to combine-the administration of criminal justice with the convenience of a person accused of a criminal offence, but not proved to be guilty.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Duncan, Case No. 15,004.]</p> <p>[Cited in Caldwell v. Com., 14 Grat. 705; State v. Hoeftner, 124 Mo. 48S, 28 S. W. 7.]</p>

The indictment in this case was predicated on section 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which declares: “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of said parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not less than one thousand dollars and not more than…

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [Tliis was an action for forfeiture of fifty barrels of distilled spirits, Alois Feigelstoek claimant. The judgment of the district court was in favor of the claimant. Case unreported. The case is now heard upon writ of error sued out by the United States.]

This was an indictment under sections 167 and 169 of the act of June 30, 1864, c. 173 (13 Stat. 296, 297), as amended by act of March 3, I860, c. 78, § 1.(13 Stat. 482), and by act of July 13, 1866, c. 184, § 9 (14 Stat. 144).

This was a bill in equity, filed by the United States against George A. Gardiner in his lifetime, and the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company. A subpoena and an injunction were served upon the trust company, as the depository of certain moneys sought to be recovered by the plaintiffs in this suit, the ground of the suit being that those moneys had been fraudulently obtained by Gardiner, under the Mexican claims commission.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.] In this case a libel of information was filed in the district court, for the forfeiture of fifteen hogsheads of brandy, for undervaluation. The case was tried in the district court, by the court without a jury [case unreported], under an agreement between the parties that the court should determine the law and render a verdict and judgment.

<p>Case No. 15,091.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Removal of Spirits—Entry in Books—How and by Whom to be Made.</p> <p>1. The requisition of the 26th section of the internal revenue act of 1866 [14 Stat. 154], that there shall be entered daily the number of proof gallons purchased or received, of whom purchased or received, and the number of proof gallons sold or delivered, is complied with as to entries made before the act of 1868 [15 Stat. 125], if the entries, although made in a continuous manner without anything to designate to what the figures refer, are a true statement of such transactions.</p> <p>2. The provision of the statute that requires the wholesale dealer and rectifier to make these entries daily does not demand that they should make them with their own hand. The duty may be delegated to a clerk, but the dealers and rectifiers are responsible if the proper entries are not made.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was a libel of information founded on the sixty-eighth section of the collection act of 1799 (1 Stat. 677). The district court decreed a forfeiture [case unreported], and the claimants appealed.

<p>Case No. 16,093.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Removal op Spirits—False Bonds—Mixture—Forfeiture.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,094.</p> <p>Customs Duties —Forfeiture — How Fees Paid out of Proceeds.</p>

Trial of an information. This was an information filed against fifty-six barrels of whiskey, and certain stills and other vessels, for a violation of section 68-of the internal revenue act of 1864 [13 Stat. 248]. The information contained two counts.

<p>Case No. 15,097.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Forfeiture—Claim of Railroad for Freightage.</p> <p>The case of the United States against Fifty-Three Bales of Rags, decided by the United States district court for Massachusetts, was an information under Rev. St. § 3082, against certain bales of rags as having been clandestinely imported and brought from Montreal into some part of the state of New York without having been entered at the custom house and without payment of duties. The jury found most of the goods to be liable to forfeiture, and they were condemned and sold. The Boston & Lowell Railroad Company, from whose custody the goods were taken by the marshal, petitioned for the payment of $47.30 from the proceeds of the sale. This was claimed to be freight due for the transportation of the goods to Boston by the petitioners and connecting roads, all of whom were entirely innocent of the fraud on the government.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,098.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Undervaluation — Sugars — False Grade—False Entrt—Smuggling —Innocent Purchaser.</p> <p>1. The consignee of goods, wares, or merchandise subject to duty, imported into the United States at an alleged fraudulent undervaluation, who has no knowledge of such fraud, and who, in good faith, makes advances to the consignor, and incurs expenses in the storage and management of the property, occupies the position of a bona fide purchaser, and his title will be protected.</p> <p>2. A bona fide purchaser of such property, before the United States has elected whether to proceed for a forfeiture or sue for the value of the property, will hold the same as against the government claiming a forfeiture for fraud in the importation.</p> <p>3.’ The fraudulent entry of goods at less than their actual value subjects them to forfeiture under section 1 of the act of congress of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. 737], but that section, to constitute such a fraudulent entry as will subject the goods to forfeiture, requires that the entry should have been knowingly made on a false invoice.</p> <p>4. Where the LniteS States claim the forfeiture of sugars, on the ground that they were entered as of a grade which subjected them to a duty of three cents per pound, when they were of a grade subjecting them to five cents per pound, it must appear, by the evidence, that the importer had knowledge of the false grade, and that a fraud was intended; and, if this guilty knowledge and intent are negatived by the evidence, there is no ground for a judgment of forfeiture.</p> <p>5. The entry of property at a custom-house, at a false valuation, does not subject it to forfeiture under section 4 of the act of July, 1866 [Í4 Stat. 179], “to prevent smuggling, and other purposes;” the scope and intent of said section being to prevent the' clandestine introduction of property into the United States, to evade the payment of duties, known as smuggling, in the accepted sense of that term; and does not apply to a false entry at a custom-house.</p> <p>[See Case No. 16,418].</p>

<p>Motion to quash an indictment.</p> <p>This was an indictment against John B. Finlay, for rendering false returns of manufactures of woolen goods. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,102.</p> <p>Embezzlement from Mail—Indictment—Article: of Value.</p> <p>1. Where an indictment charges the carrier-of the mail with stealing a letter out of it, it is-sufficient.</p> <p>2. If the letter contain an article of value, it must be so averred in the indictment, to subject the defendant to the incurred penalty.</p> <p>3. But as it is an offence to steal a letter which, contains no article of value, it is not necessary to aver that it contained no such article.</p>

The action was brought to recover from the assignees of [Peter] Blight, a bankrupt, the amount of a protested bill of exchange endorsed by Blight, with damages, &c. as settled at the treasury. The bill was purchased by the cashier of the Bank of the United States, for the secretary of the treasury, and paid for by a warrant on the bank. It was protested, and notice given on the 11th of April, 1800.

<p>Case- No. 15,104.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Bankers and Brokers—Tax .. .on Sales.</p> <p>[The provision in Act March 3,1865, extending the definition of “brokers” given in Act June 30, 1864, § 79, subd. 9, which requires a license fee to be paid by brokers, so as to make it apply to persons negotiating sales of stocks or securities, whether “for themselves or others,” does not apply to section 99 of the act of 1864, imposing certain duties upon sales by brokers.]</p> <p>[The case was taken on a writ of error to the supreme court, where the judgment of this court was affirmed. 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 445.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,106.</p> <p>Counterfeiting—Possession op Forged Treasure Notes—Indictment—Copies.</p> <p>1. An indictment for possessing forged treasury notes and postal currency with intent to pass them, must profess to give, and must actually give, exact copies of them, or allege a reasonable excuse for not doing so. Quaere, whether in such a case it is sufficient to paste the forged instruments themselves on the indictment as a part of it?</p> <p>2. To charge in the indictment in such a case, that the prisoner had in possession “divers” such forged instruments, it too indefinite. The number ought to be stated.</p>

This was an indictment [against Thomas Fitton] for an alleged cruel assault and battery of the defendant’s wife. offered the wife as a witness against her husband. objected; but

<p>Case No. 15,108.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Forfeiture—Condemnation bt Default.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,109.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Cigars—Undervaluation.</p>

This was a motion for a new trial on a cas.e made by the defendant [William Broadbent], and was submitted on written points. The circumstances of the case, and the point upon which his honor’s opinion was sought, sufficiently appear in the adjudication.

This was an information against merchandise, to obtain its forfeiture on several allegations: (1) That the goods, being procured otherwise than by purchase, were not invoiced at their actual value at the time and place where procured. (2) That the invoices were undervalued.

This was an information against certain distilled spirits, seized on the 8th of January, 1867, for a violation of the internal revenue laws. At the trial, the court directed a verdict for the government [Case No. 15,114], and the claimant now moved for a new trial.

<p>Case No. 15,114.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Counterfeit Brands—Bonded Warehouse—Removal of Spirits.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,115.</p> <p>District Attorney—Percentage —Compromise.</p> <p>1. A district attorney of the United States is entitled to two per cent, on all moneys collected, or realized, in any proceeding under the revenue or internal revenue laws of the United States conducted by him.</p> <p>2. While a proceeding in rem, to forfeit distilled spirits for non-compliance with the provisions of the internal revenue laws of the United States, was pending .in the United States district court, the owners of said spirits effected a compromise of the case with the secretary of the treasury by the payment of a large sum of money, and accrued costs, the case being dismissed and the property released to the owners by order of the secretary. Upon motion of the district attorney, for a retaxation of costs in the case, to include a commission to himself of two per cent, upon the sum paid to the secretary of the treasury: held, that, under section 11 of the act of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. 741], the district attorney was entitled to receive from the United States two per cent, upon the sum paid by the terms jf the compromise for the release of the property seized in said proceeding, as well as upon the sum paid as penalties incurred upon said property.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,116.</p> <p>AdMIRALTV—JURISDICTION’—CUSTOMS DUTIES— Lies.</p> <p>1. The admiralty jurisdiction of the district court in revenue cases, extends only to seizures for forfeitures under duty laws; as conferred by section 9 of the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. 76). The payment of duties can only be enforced by proceedings on the common law side of the court.</p> <p>2. It seems where imported goods have been seized for an alleged violation of the revenue laws, and a decision has been rendered in favor of the claimant, that the United States is not deprived of its lien upon the goods for the duties unpaid.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,118.</p> <p>Violation or Customs Laws—Forfeiture and Seizure.</p> <p>[The fact that foreign distilled spirits and wines are found in considerable quantity in an upper room of a private house, stored for safekeeping, as alleged by the house owner, and not his property, justifies a seizure thereof, and places the burden upon the claimant to show that they were legally imported, and that the original packages had been inspected, marked, and branded, as required by law.]</p>

The specie in this case was seized upon water and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the district court. The court below having decreed in favor of claimant [case unreported], the United States appealed to this court. Thereupon a motion was made by claimant to dismiss the appeal.

<p>Case No. 15,119a.</p> <p>Costs — Criminal Case — When Prosecutor Liable.</p> <p>1. In ail cases of trespass on the person or property of an individual, where the prosecution is carried on at the instance of the party aggrieved, he is liable for costs, and they may be adjudged against him.</p> <p>2. The word “trespass,’’ in the Criminal Code, has a technical and definite meaning, as is descriptive of offences of a lower grade only, such as misdemeanors, and does not mean crimes of a deeper dye, such as horse stealing, or the like, in which no prosecutor is necessary.</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against Christopher Flecke, John Flecke, and Henry Hildebrand for violating certain internal revenue acts.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,121.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant—Board op Commissioners — Jurisdiction and Decrees — Purchasers — Decree of Confirmation—Attorney General —Survey.</p> <p>1. The obligation to which the United States succeeded, under the stipulations of the treaty by which California was acquired, was political in its character, and provision was made for its discharge by the act of March 3. 1851 [9 Stat. 631]. By this act a special tribunal was created for the settlement of claims to land in California of Spanish and Mexican origin; and the jurisdiction conferred upon the tribunal and upon the courts empowered to review its decisions was, in its nature, exclusive.</p> <p>2. Final decrees, touching the validity of such claims, rendered by these tribunals, are conclusive and final between claimants and the United States. Such decrees are not open to review in any court.</p> <p>[Cited in Manning v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 9 • Fed. 734.]</p> <p>3. The frauds for which judgments are impeachable in courts of equity are collateral acts, extrinsic to the merits. They are acts by which the successful party has prevented his adversary from presenting the merits of his casé, or by which the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon. Collusion between the parties to obtain a decision injurious to a third person; the purloining of an adversary’s testimony; the service of process in such a manner as to defeat its purpose: false representations that the parties are really before the court; are examples of such frauds as render the judgment impeachable. But, where the matter involved has been once tried, or so put in issue that it might have been tried, the judgment rendered is the highest evidence that the alleged fraud did not exist, and estops the parties from asserting the contrary. The judgment settled the matter otherwise; it became res judicata.</p> <p>[Cited in Manning v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 9 Fed. 734: Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co.. 106 U. S. 454, 1 Sup. Ct. 395; U. S. v. White, 17 Fed. 562; TJ. S. v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 Fed. 280.]</p> <p>[Cited in Friese v. Hummel, 26 Or. 145. 37 Pae. 458; Morrill v. Morrill, 20 Or. 96, 25 Pac. 365.J</p> <p>4. Purchasers of lands under final decrees of confirmation cannot be disturbed upon charges of fraud in the prosecution of the claims confirmed and a vague allegation of notice of such fraud. Such purchasers have a right to rest in confidence upoD the decrees.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in U. S. v. San Pedro & Canon Del Agua Co. (N. M.) 17 Pac. 339.]</p> <p>5. After the decision of the commissioners, the control of proceedings, whether to prosecute an appeal or to dismiss the same, rested exclusively with the attorney-general; and the propriety or legality of his action in any case was not the subject of review by any tribunal, and it could only be revoked by the appellate court upon his own application. In coming to a determination on the subject, he was not restricted to an examination of the transcript transmitted to him; he could look mto the archives of the former government, the reports of officers previously appointed to examine into the subject of land titles in the state, the records of the land department at Washington, and any correspondence existing between Mexico and the United States respecting the title.</p> <p>6. Where the United States enters the court as a litigant, it waives its exemption from legal proceedings, and stands upon the same footing with private individuals; and, therefore, if on a consideration of all the circumstances of a given case, it be inequitable to grant the relief prayed against a citizen, such relief will be refused by a court of equity, though the United States be the suitor.</p> <p>[Approved in Manning v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 9 Fed. 734. Cited in U. S. v. White. 17 Fed. 564. 565: U. S. v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 Fed. 287; on appeal. 125 U. S. 304, 8 Sup. Ct. 867. Disapproved in U. S. v. Rose, 24 Fed. 196. Cited in ü. S. v. Wal-lamet V. & C. M. WT. R. Co., 42 Fed. 357, 44 Fed. 240. Distinguished in U. S. v. Adams, 54 Fed. 115.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in U. S. v. San Pedro & Canon Del Agua Co., 17 Pac. 339.]</p> <p>7. In the absence of an act of congress, the power 'of the attorney general to institute proceedings to vacate these decrees of confirmation is doubtful</p> <p>8. Whether the issue of a previous grant of eleven leagues to a claimant disqualifies him from receiving a second grant, is a question of law, and any error in its decision could be corrected only on appeal.</p> <p>. 9. The subject of surveys of confirmed claims is under the control of the land department, and its action is not subject to the supervision of the courts, however erroneous.</p> <p>[Cited in Leitensdorfer v. Campbell, Case No. 8,225; Manning v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 9 Fed. 733; ü. S. v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 21 Fed. 22: U. S. r. San Jacinto Tin Co., 23 Fed. 282; U. S. v. Hancock, 30 Fed. 853; Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 699, 9 Sup. Ct. 206.]</p> <p>[Cited in Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 12 Pac. 742.]</p> <p>10. If the bill showed that the decree had been procured by fraud of the grossest character, the court would still be without jurisdiction, for it has no authority to pass upon the propriety of the decree; i. e., to decide upon the validity of the claim, nor to demand the cause to any other forum where that question may be determined. Per Hoffman, J.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. San Jacinto Tin Co.. 23 Fed. 294: U. S. v. Hancock, 30 Fed. 860; U. S. v. Oregon C. M. R. Co., 41 Fed. 501.]</p> <p>[11. Cited in Pratt v. California Min. Co., 24 Fed. 878, to the point that it is an inherent principle of courts of equity to refuse to interpose in behalf of stale demands, since from the lapse of time and' the nature of flie case it is probable justice cannot be done.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,132.</p> <p>Evidence—Chain of Evidence—Conversations —Slave Tbade—New Trial— Circuit Courts.</p> <p>1. Facts which, if standing alone, would be irrelevant, are admissible in evidence, upon the statement of counsel, that they constitute a part of a chain of evidence, which, as a whole, would be relevant.</p> <p>2. The court may direct at what part of such proposed chain of evidence the counsel shall begin.</p> <p>3. It is no ground for a new trial, that incompetent evidence vas admitted without objection.</p> <p>4. It seems, that where there is evidence tending to show that several persons are combined together in carrying on an unlawful enterprise, such as the slave trade, the conversations of some of them, in relation thereto, in the absence of others, may be given in evidence against such others.</p> <p>5. Where a witness, in his direct examination, had testified that a certain person was reputed to be a man of large property, counsel were permitted, in cross-examination, to ask in what such property was reputed to consist.</p> <p>6. A new trial will not be granted, merely because counsel have been indulged in too great latitude in arguing, as to the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.</p> <p>7. Whether circuit courts of the United States may he holden by the two judges in the same district, at the same time, in different rooms,— quaere.</p> <p>(The prisoner, after some remarks had been, made by his counsel, was sentenced to five years’' imprisonment in the common jail, and to pay a fine of $2,000.] 2</p>

This was in indictment under section 3279 of the Revised Statutes, charging the defendant [John Flynn] with working in a distillery on which no sign was placed and kept, as provided by that section. A motion was made by the defendant to quash the indictment, upon the ground that no punishment was provided for the act charged.

It is provided by the act of congress of the 15th day of March, 1864 (13 Stat. 29), that “if any person shall sell * * * or dispose of any spirituous liquors to any Indian, under the charge of any Indian superintendent, or Indian agent appointed by the United States,” he shall be punished, etc., as provided by the act.

<p>[This was a claim by the executors of J. L. Folsom to the Rancho Rio De Los Americanos. The grant was confirmed by the board. Appeal taken by the government; but not prosecuted. Subsequently a motion was made that the survey made in conformity with the decision of the board be brought into court and confirmed. Case No. 15,127.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,126.</p> <p>Mexican- Land Grant—Concldsiveness op Location.</p> <p>[Where the decree of the board of commissioners, of the district court, or of the supreme court, locating a grant, is specific and plain, and it has long been accepted as finally and definitely locating the land, and large interests have been acquired on the faith of this finality, the location ought not to be disturbed, except in the case of manifest error, and on clear proof of the incorrectness of the location, and not on the mere ground that, if the question were new, the court might have located the land differently. |</p>

<p>Case No. 15,127.</p> <p>California Land Grants—Jurisdiction op District Court—Final Decrees—Confirmation op Surveys.</p> <p>[1. It seems that the decision of the supreme court in U. S. v Fossat, 21 How. [62 U. S.] 145, should not be construed as determining that none of the decrees heretofore rendered by the boards of land commissioners and the district courts are not final decrees because they do not embody and confirm an exact survey of the claims, or as deciding that final decrees, defining with precision the boundaries of the land, must be entered. The decision must, however, be understood as determining that, in all cases where a decree of comfirmation has been entered, and a survey under it has been made, on which a patent is about to issue, which survey is objected to as erroneous, it is the duty of the court to direct the survey to be returned to it, that it may hear and determine the questions of location and boundary which may be raised.]</p> <p>[2. Quaere, as to what parties may be heard to object to the survey.]</p> <p>[3. Settlers claiming under the United States must make their objections through the district attorney, and cannot be heard as separate parties. See U. S. v. Bidwell, Case No. 14,592.]</p> <p>[For subsequent hearing upon the new survey ordered to be made, see Case No. 15,125. At a still later date the survey of 1857 was finally approved. Id. 15,126.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,128.</p> <p>Post Ovstob — Obscene Matter—“Notice” — Indictment.</p> <p>1. In an indict nent under section 3893 of the Revised Statutes, charging the defendant with depositing in the mail an obscene pamphlet, and also with depositing in the mail a notice giving information how an article designed for the prevention of conception can be obtained, it is not necessary or proper that the indictment should give a definite or detailed description of the pamphlet.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Grimm, 45 Fed. 500.]</p> <p>2. Sufficient information as to the particular article about which evidence is to be given can be obtained by an order for a bill of particulars, and for the exhibition to the defendant of the article itself.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Bennett, Case No. 14,571.]</p> <p>3. A notice in the form of a letter enclosed in a sealed envelope, if it gives the prohibited information, is within the scope of the statute.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Gaylord, 17 Fed. 443; U. S. v. Huggett, 40 Fed. 637.]</p> <p>4. A written slip of paper, without address or signature, giving the prohibited information, is a “notice,” within the meaning of the statute, although not volunteered, but sent in reply to a letter asking for the information.</p>

This was an indictment for revolt. It appeared that the ship Farewell sailed from Philadelphia on the 25th December, 1844.' When below Chester, the pilot being still on-board, the crew, most of whom were intoxicated, became very disorderly and wholly out of the master’s control, and, when the officers' attempted to seize the liquor in their possession, a portion of them, among whom [Thomas] Forbes was very prominent, refused to do duty.

<p>Case No. 16,130.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Production op Books and Papers—Authority op Supervisor —Contempt.</p> <p>. [1. A supervisor of internal revenue entered the house of a banking firm in Huntsville, Ala., and demanded to see their books and papers. The members of the firm, doubting his right to such inspection, asked time to first consult counsel. This was refused, and. on their failure to at once produce their books, the supervisor served them with a summons requiring them to appear before him at his "office at Huntsville” instanter on the same day. He had no regular office in that city, and no place was specified in the summons. The firm then consulted their counsel, who, though somewhat in doubt, advised them to permit the inspection. They then sought the supervisor to apprise him of their consent, but were unable to find him, and he left the town on the samé night. Bold, that the firm were not unreasonable in asking a; short time to consult attorneys, that a compliance with the summons according to its terms was manifestly impossible, that the supervisor acted with undue haste, and that the members of the firm were not punishable as for a contempt for what they had done.]</p> <p>[2. By the forty-ninth section of the act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 144), a supervisor of internal revenue who attempts to proceed against delinquents in the matter of making the annual returns required to be furnished to the assistant assessor, must proceed in manner and form precisely as the assistant assessor is required to proceed by the ninth section of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 101), and not otherwise.]</p>

This was a libel of information filed on behalf of the United States, claiming a condemnation and forfeiture of the steamboat Forrester, her tackle, apparel and furniture, to the government for an alleged violation of the revenue laws. The Forrester had been duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, while she was owned by E. B. Ward, a citizen of the United States.

<p>Case No. 15,133.</p> <p>Collectors op Customs—Embezzlement—Treasury Transcript—Refusal to Pay Over —Offer to Compromise.</p> <p>1. To sustain an indictment tinder the sixteenth section of the subtreasury law, the proof must be clear that the defendant has violated some specific provision of the act.</p> <p>2. A duly certified transcript from the treasury is made evidence and declared to be, prima facie evidence of embezzlement; but where the items of such evidence have been estimated and made up from hearsay, they are not admissible.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Case, 49 Fed. 271.)</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Swan (N. M.) 34 Pac. 534.)</p> <p>3. Where the expenditures of the collector’s office are greater than its receipts, to convict, the evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt, that he has used the money or refused to pay it over, in violation of the law.</p> <p>[Cited in Goodrich v. Hooper. 97 Mass. 6.)</p> <p>4. An offer to make a deposit of fourteen thousand dollars, to secure the government, for any balance that might be found against him, is nothing more than a proposed compromise, to avoid the prosecution, and cannot be received as evidence of indebtment to any specific amount.</p>

<p>[This was a proceeding for the forfeiture of 46 casks of California grape brandy (G. San-guinnette, claimant), under the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864.]</p>

The United States has filed a libel of information against forty-three gallons of whisky, sundry peltries, and other goods and merchandise seized as forfeited by virtue of the twentieth section of the act of congress approved June 30, 1834 [4 Stat. 732], as amended by the act passed February 13, 1862 [12 Stat. 338], which, it is claimed, is now in force over the territory where this seizure was made. There are three special counts in the •libel.

<p>Case No. 15,137.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant—“More or Less”— ■ Boundaries.</p> <p>The genuineness of the grant in this case not disputed. The ruling in Estudillo’s Case [Case No. 15,058], that the words "poco mas ó menos” are operative for such fractional parts of a league as may be in excess of the quantity named in the grant, re-affirmed. Tho southern boundary of the land granted to Justo Larios declared to be the main Sierra, and not the low hills or lomas bajas.</p>

<p>This was an application by the district attorneyfor a continuance, in order to produce further testimony.</p>

[This was a claim by Charles Fossat for one league of land in Santa Clara county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States. Affirmed by the district court for one league, “more or less.” Case No. 15,-137. Upon appeal, the supreme court limited the grant to one league within the designated east, west, and south boundaries, the north boundary to be determined by survey. Case remanded. 20 How. (61 U. S.) 413.

<p>Case No. 15,140.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants—Locatios or Boundaries — Obscure Descriptions — Location op Quantity in Exterior Boundaries.</p> <p>[This was a claim by Charles Fossatt for the Rancho Los Capitaneillos. The claim was confirmed by the district court for one league “more or less.” Case No. 15,137. Upon appeal, the supreme court limited the grant to one league to be taken within the boundaries designated in the grant. Case remanded. 20 How. (61 U. S.) 413. A continuance was allowed the United States in order to take further testimony in relation to the location of the boundaries. Case No. 15,138. Subsequently the district court passed upon the location of three of the boundaries, the fourth (the northern) to be determined by quantity. Id.'15,139. An appeal from the decree was determined to have been brought prematurely, the decree not being final. 21 How. (62 U. S.) 446. A survey having been made, the case is now heard for a final determination of the boundaries and locations.]</p>

Replevin brought by the United States against the defendant for a quantity of logs which, it is alleged, were cut on the Oneida reservation, near Green Bay, in the state of Wisconsin.

<p>Case No. 15,142.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Brewer—Failure to Keep Books—Penalties—How Enforced.</p> <p>1. To an information against a brewer filed under the 48th. 49th, 51st and 53d sections of the act of July 13, 1866 [14 Stat. 164r-166], it is not a sufficient answer that the neglect to keep the prescribed books and accounts was through ignorance or carelessness, and that there was no wrongful or criminal intent.</p> <p>2. The object of the law is to protect the government in the collection of the tax. The penalty is for the omission, and the very nature of this business demanded that the brewer should know his duty in the premises.</p> <p>3. Nor is it a sufficient answer or excuse that he misconstrued the law, and drew erroneous inferences as to his rights.</p> <p>4. Where the law prescribes as punishment for an offense both a money penalty and imprisonment, it is not true that the penalty can only be enforced by indictment. The government can maintain an action of debt for the money penalty.</p> <p>5. The words “shall be liable to,” &c., are permissive, and not compulsory; they mark the extreme limit of the penalty, and leave it discretionary whether the whole penalty shall be imposed.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,143.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Reasonable Doubt—What is— Embezzlement from Mail.</p> <p>1. The jury are :o weigh the evidence in every case, and where there is a conflict in a criminal case which creates reasonable douht, they will acquit the accused.</p> <p>2. These doubts should not arise from our sympathies or hopes, but from a deliberate consideration of the evidence.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,144.</p> <p>Customs Duties—False Invoice — Forfeitures.</p> <p>Suit by the United States against four cases of cutlery, Edward Leon and Theodore Myers, claimants and defendants, trading as Edward Leon & Co. The amount of the invoice was £127. 13s. 9d.; the valuation of the custom-house appraisers, £191. 17s. 7d.,—differ-ence, or supposed undervaluation, £64. 3s. lOd.</p> <p>Various witnesses were examined, and a variety of opinions expressed, as to the value of the goods. The weight of testimony, however, converged to one point, namely, that on manufactured articles, of which labor constituted the principal value, and this fluctuating in price from ten to fifteen, and sometimes twenty per cent., and the articles, when manufactured, being frequently sold by small dealers at reduced prices to raise money, it was possible that the goods in question might have been bought at invoice prices, and more than probable that they were so.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,145.</p> <p>False Invoices—Forfeiture— Boxa Fide Purchaser—Rev. St. §§ 13, 2864.</p> <p>1. The act of March 3. 1863, c. 76, § 1 (12 Stat. 738), provided that in case of the knowingly entering goods by means of a false invoice, etc., the goods or the value thereof should be forfeited. In embodying this statute in the Revised Statutes (section 2864). the words "or the value thereof” were omitted, and the act of 1863 was repealed. By the act of 1875, c. 80 (18 Stat. 319), passed February 18, 1875, section 2864 was amended by restoring the words “or the value thereof.” After the passage of the Revised Statutes, but before the passage of the amending act of 1875, certain goods were knowingly entered by means of false invoices:</p> <p>2. Held that, under the statute in force at the time of the entry, the forfeiture of the goods wan absolute, and that it was not a case of a forfeiture of the goods or of their value at the election of the United States, and therefore a transfer for value to a bona fide purchaser or pledgee before suit brought gave no title as against the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Auffmardt, 19 Fed. 901.]</p> <p>3. That, if the act of 1875 was a repeal by implication of Rev. St. § 2864, the right of the United Slates was not thereby defeated, although the act of 1875 contained no saving clause as to forfeitures already incurred, because that act is subject to the provisions of Rev. St. § 13, which provides that “the repeal of any statute shall not Lave the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture or liability under such statute unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide.”</p>

<p>Case No. 15,146.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Fraudulent Entry — Ownership op Goods.</p> <p>1. Upon the question whether goods were fraudulently entered, the court ought to be liberal in the admission of evidence which has a bearing, even in a remote degree, upon the point to be made out.</p> <p>2. But circumstances which are offered to show the fraud, should he of a character fairly and reasonably tending to make it out. If irrelevant, or relating to a' matter immaterial to the point of inquiry, they are not admissible.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. One Hundred and Forty-Six Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty Clapboards, Case No. 15,935.]</p> <p>3. Goods were entered by one of the claimants, and the oath taken by him on entry, was the one prescribed by the act of congress to be taken in cases where the goods have been actually purchased. Afterwards, the goods were proceeded against under section 14 of the act of July 14, 1832 [4 Stat. 593]. on the ground that the packages were made up with intent to evade and defraud the revenue. Evidence that the claimants were not owners of the goods at the time of entry, but only consignees, and that the real owners were the manufacturers of the goods, who resided • abroad, was held irrelevant anil inadmissible.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,147.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Failure to Stamp — Forfeiture.</p>

At the commencement oí the proceedings the district attorney asked for the books of the claimants [G. S. Matteson, of New Orleans, and E. R. Goodell, of Springfield, Ill.], for the production of which the court passed an order on the 4th of January. Col. Broadhead said that the notice of the production of the books was served on his partner, Mr. Sharp, and that he found it a few days ago amongst his papers.

<p>Case No. 15,150.</p> <p>Bonds—Penal Actios—Principal and Surety— Division op District.</p> <p>1. Proceedings by libel were instituted upon a seizure of goods, and a bond given for their appraised value on the delivery of the goods to the claimant. Afterwards the libel was by amendment changed to an information, and the goods were condemned. On an application for an attachment against the obligors in the bond, it was held, that although the case was not regularly within the 89th section of the collection law, yet a compliance with the stipulations in the bond might be enforced by attachment against the obligors.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Three Hundred Barrels of Whisky, Case No. 16,510; Todd v. The Tulchen, 2 Fed. 603.]</p> <p>2. And the court held, that it made no difference that the obligors were only sureties, and had not themselves received the goods.</p> <p>3. If the claimant is not a party to the bond, all the obligors are to be deemed principals.</p> <p>4. The bond was taken in the district court of New-York, and under the statute dividing the •district the proceedings were transferred to the district court of the Northern district, and by a subsequent statute to this court, where the condemnation took place. The condition of the bond was to pay the appraised value of the goods into the district court, if they should be condemned in that court: Held, that a condemnation in this court had the same effect to forfeit the bond.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Hosmer. 1 Mackey (12 D. C.) 298.]</p>

On the 17th September, 1830, the attorney of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania, filed an information against thirteen eases of pins, and one case of needles, imported into the port of Philadelphia, on the 4th August, 1830, from Liverpool in England, on board of the ship Alleghany.

<p>Case No. 15,153.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Forfeiture — Pleading— Construction of Statute—Evidence— Personal Property.</p> <p>1. The 96th section of the internal revenue act of July 20, 1808 (15 Stat. 164), is to be construed to mean, that where the statute has attached no punishment to the doing or omitting of acts required or forbidden, such act or omission, when knowingly or wilfully committed, shall be punished by the infliction of the penalty and forfeiture provided by that section.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. One Thousand Four Hundred and Twelve Gallons Distilled Spirits, Case No. 15,960.]</p> <p>2. Proof that tubs were so placed in a distillery that they could be used contrary to the internal revenue acts, is not sufficient to warrant the court in finding that they have been so used.</p> <p>3. Where, in accordance with the practice in this district, in forfeiture cases, an information had been filed containing numerous counts, and the district attorney had before the trial filed a specification of the counts on which he intended to rely, but on the trial evidence was offered which it was claimed established an offence not embraced in the specification: Eeld, that the omission to include it in the specification was fatal.</p> <p>4. Distilled spirits found on the premises on which the business of distilling is carried on. being the product of such business, are not “personal property used in the business” within the meaning of the 19th section of the act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 133).</p>

<p>Case No. 15,155.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Penal Action— Original. Packages—New Trial—Verdict.</p> <p>1. The verdict of a jury is presumed to be correct and should be sustained, if the evidence by any fair construction will warrant such finding.</p> <p>2. Goods are sold "in the original and unbroken package” within the meaning of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 144), although the pack.age is opened for inspection, if closed again before delivery without the contents being changed-</p> <p>3. When the verdict of a jury is directly contrary to the evidence and the law applicable-thereto, it is the imperative duty of the court to set it aside: and it makes no difference in this, respect that the actiou is brought to recover a penalty given by statute.</p> <p>4. What is called “the justice of the case” on. a motion for a new trial is not affected by the fact that a moiety of the penalty recovered will go to the person who gave information of the violation of the law, whereby such penalty was-incurred.</p>

[This was a proceeding for the forfeiture of 4,175 cigars because of an alleged violation of the internal revenue laws.]

Indictment against two persons [John J. Fox and another] alleged that they carried on the business of a distiller on the first day of September, 1866, and on divers other days tip to and until the tenth day of December of- the same year, without having paid the special tax as required by law; they and each of them then and there distilling and manufacturing spirits to a very large amount, to wit, to the amount and number of one thousand gallons of proof spirit.

<p>Case No. 15,157.</p> <p>Larceny from Mail— Letter—Bank Note—Indictment.</p> <p>1. Evidence that the prisoner uttered as genuine, what purported on its face to be a bank-note, is competent proof that it was a bank-note, though it is not otherwise shown such a bank existed.</p> <p>(Cited in State v. Brown, 4 R. I. 535.]</p> <p>2. A letter, containing money, deposited in the mail, for the pulpóse of ascertaining whether its contents were stolen on a particular route, and actually sent on a post route, is a letter intended to be sent by post within the meaning of the post-office act (4 Stat. 102).</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Riypp. 30 Fed. 822. Distinguished in U. S. v Matthews, 35 Fed. 805. Cited in U. S. v. Wight. 38 Fed. 100: U. S. v. Bethea. 44 Fed. 803; U. S. v. Grimm, 50 Fed. 531.]</p> <p>3. The description of the termini, between which the letter was intended to be sent by post, cannot be rejected as surplusage, but must be proved as laid.</p> <p>[Distinguished in U. S. v. Okie. Case No. 15.-916. Cited in TI. S. v. Thomas. Id. 16,473: Walster v. U. S., 42 Fed. 893.]</p> <p>4. It is necessary, in an indictment for larceny from a letter under the 21st section of the act, to lay the property stolen on some person other than the prisoner.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Laws, Case No. 15,579.].</p>

[This was a libel of forfeiture against the brig Francis F. Johnson for alleged violation i of the laws relating to the slave trade.]

<p>Case No. 15,158.</p> <p>Prize — Prohibited Trade — Treasury Regulations—Effect of.</p> <p>1. Under the act of congress of July 13, 1861, § 5 [12 Stat. 257], goods forming the cargo of a vessel proceeding to a point in the insurrec-tionary states are liable to forfeiture only while in transitu. And the vessel only while the contraband cargo is on board.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Stevenson, Case No. 16,-396.]</p> <p>2. But under the regulations made by the secretary of the treasury by authority of the acts of July 13, 1861 [12 Stat. 257], May 20, 1862-[12 Stat. 404], and July 2, 1864 [13 Stat. 375], a vessel engaging in trade with the insurrectionary districts is liable to forfeiture even after the termination of the prohibited voyage and the discharge of the contraband cargo.</p> <p>3. The imposing of such forfeiture is within the power to make regulations conferred on the secretary of the treasury by the acts of congress. Congress has the constitutional right to confer such power, though quasi legislative, on the executive</p> <p>4. Even if it be necessary for congress itself to exercise such power, it may be considered to have ratified and adopted such regulations by the act of July 2, 1864, § 3.</p> <p>5. Therefore, where a vessel had been engaged in prohibited trade, but, before the libel was filed, had completed her voyage and discharged her cargo, a forfeiture was decreed by virtue of the regulations established by the secretary of the treasury.</p>

In bankruptcy. This was an indictment found under the following clause of the bankrupt law; “If any debtor,” etc., “shall within three months before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, under the false color and pretense of carrying on business, and dealing in the ordinary course of trade, obtain on credit from any person any goods and chattels, with intent to defraud,” etc., “he shall be deemed guilty of-a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof in any court of…

<p>Case No. 15,161.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Reliquidation — Limitation.</p> <p>1. After the collector has liquidated the duty on imported goods, and the duty nas been paid and the goods delivered to the importer, no part of the same nor any samples being retained by the collector, he has no power to make a reliquidation upon a subsequent report of an appraiser who never saw the goods.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. McDowell, 21 Fed. 564; U. S. v. Doherty, 27 Fed. 733.]</p> <p>2. The year, within which, under Act 1874, c. 391, § 21 [18 Stat. 190], the collector can re-liquidate the duty, runs from the time of the presentation to the collector of the “entry” by the importer, and not from the time of the first liquidation of the duty.</p>

Indictment against the defendant [William D. Freeman] for the murder of one David Whitehead, on the high seas, on board of the' brig Floyd, of which the defendant was master, and Whitehead a seaman, and one of the crew, on the 28th of April, 1827. The indictment laid the charge in two counts. The first stated, that the prisoner made an assault upon Whitehead, and threw him overboard, and he was drowned.

This was an action of assumpsit for a balance appearing due on the books of the treasury, from the defendant to the United States, for money advanced to him as an officer in the marine corps, to be used in the Florida war, whither he was detached in 1836. There was an agreement by the counsel for the parties as to the facts, which were, in substance, •as follows: That [William H.j Freeman received a draft from the paymaster of the ■corps, on the Commonwealth Bank in.

The claim was for ten square leagues of land granted to Juan B. Alvarado, and confirmed by the board of land commissioners. The United States appealed.

Information against the defendant [Jonathan French] for a misdemeanor, in loading merchandize in a sleigh, ■ with intent to export the same to Canada, contrary to Act .Tan. 9, 1809, c. 72 § 1; 9 Laws [Weight-man's Ed.] 185 [2 Stat. 506], At a former term the defendant had been arrested, and had recognised in court with sureties for his appearance to answer to the information. moved for a habeas corpus to the sheriff and gaoler of Grafton county, to bring up the body of the…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] [The government brought a suit to condemn premises for violation of the internal revenue law. The court below, at the close of the evidence for the government, directed a verdict in favor of the claimant [Frederick Frerichs], and refused to give a certificate of probable cause. [Case unreported.] The government appealed.] 3

Information by the United States, claiming ; a forfeiture of tools and machinery used in the manufacture of friction matches, in vio- ■ lation of the internal revenue laws. The claimant alleged, that the articles seized were ' fixtures and not liable to seizure under the acts of congress as personal property. j

This was an indictment [against Daniel Frink] similar to the one stated in the preceding case. [U. S. v. Phelps, Case No. 16,041.] Peleg Palmer, of Stonington, a witness in support of the indictment was summoned last September, and his fees tendered. He now refused to attend. The district attorney moved for a delay of the cause in order to afford time for a capias.

<p>Case No. 15,168.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Fermented Liquors—Dealers—Storage—Penalty—Act July 20, 1868.</p> <p>[Decided by FRASER, District Judge. Cited in 11 Int. Rev. Rec. 5, to the point as stated above; opinion not now accessible.]</p>

The defendant [William E. Frost] .was indicted for making a false return of his income for the year 1866, under the following state of facts: The defendant was a partner of William E. Hall (who was also indicted) and had returned as income for that year $10.075. The books of the firm showed that there had been entered as the profits of the business for that year $31,-295.70, and to the* credit of the defendant one-half of that sum. $15.647.85.

Catharine Fuers was indicted for carrying on the business of brewing, etc., without keeping the books required by law; selling beer in casks without stamps, and without cancelling stamps.

This was an application on the part of the defendant [William Fullerton] to postpone tlie trial of the indictment in this case, until such time as the associate justice of the supreme court assigned to the Second circuit, could sit in the circuit court with the dis-triet judge who was now holding it. on the ground that difficult and important questions of law would arise on the trial, so that, if a division of opinion should occur between the judges, the point or points…

In this case, which was an indictment for a misdemeanor, after testimony had been given, at the trial, on the part of both the prosecution and the defence, and the evidence was closed, the counsel for the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury to acquit the defendant [William Fullerton], the ground of the request being that the evidence was such as not to warrant a conviction.

<p>Case No. 15,177.</p> <p>Informers—Their Rights—Share in Proceeds.</p> <p>1. The information must be given to some government official who has the power and duty to act thereupon, and if several causes exist information of any one of them is sufficient.</p> <p>2. The information must be a plain statement in writing of some one substantial cause, matter, or thing, whereby a fine, penalty or forfeiture shall have been incurred. And it should be sworn to, if required by the officer.</p> <p>3. A party claiming to share in the judgment must be the first informer, and his information must be substantially true, and capable of proof.</p> <p>4. Whether, under any circumstances, a special agent of the revenue is entitled to claim as an informer,—quiere.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Simons, 7 Fed. 714.]</p> <p>5. The claim of an informer can only date from the time when he actually gave the proper formal information—not when he ascertained the facts.</p> <p>6. The share of the informer must be taken from the net, not the gross, proceeds.</p>

The defendant was a distiller in the spring of 1868. In accordance with instructions from the commissioner of internal revenue, two officers of the government visited his distillery on each of ten successive days, measured his tubs, and calculated how much spirits he should have made on the theory now Incorporated into the act of July 20, 1868 [15 Stat. 125], that forty-five gallons of the meal and water combined represented one bushel of grain.

<p>Case No. 15,179.</p> <p>CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—REBELLION AND SECESSION op States—Belligerent Rights—Prize—Enemy Property — Enrollment as Evidence — ' Breach op Blockade.</p> <p>[1. Where states have assumed to secede from the Union, and the government has raised large armies, which are engaged in actual war in endeavoring to put down the rebellion, and the functions of the United States courts are entirely suspended in the rebellious territory, the government of the United States is entitled, by the constitution and by international law, to exercise belligerent rights, as determined by the rules applicable in cases of prize and blockade.]</p> <p>[A The fact that a vessel Is enrolled in a port of a rebellious state is not conclusive that such port is the domicile of her owner, so as to make her enemy property; and it is competent to show that the owner is, in fact, a resident of another port in a loyal state, and thus avoid condemnation.]</p> <p>[3. The domicile of the owner at the time of the capture of the vessel determines whether she is of a hostile character or not.]</p> <p>[4. Where a foreign vesel, laden with railroad iron consigned to a port in a loyal state, was driven ashore on the coast of Virginia and wrecked, and thereafter a wrecking vessel was sent in good faith to rescue the cargo, and bring it to the port of destination, held that, upon the capture of the latter vessel while taking on cargo from the wreck, there was no ground for condemnation for attempted breach of blockade, although it was the intent to land the rescued property temporarily on the shore, until it could be conveyed to the loyal states.]</p>

This was a libel ot information, filed by the district attorney of the United States, to enforce the payment of a penalty of $1.009 by the master of the brig Baltic, for an alleged violation of the act of 1790 (chapter 35. § 16), which enacts:—“That within twenty-four hours after the arrival of any ship or vessel, from any port or place, at any port of the United States established by law, at which an officer of the customs resides, or within any harbor, inlet, or creek…

<p>Case No. 15,180.</p> <p>Indictment—Gaming.</p> <p>An indictment will not lie under the Virginia act, for suffering gaming in the defendant’s house; because the act has given an action of debt to the informer.</p>

[This was a claim by James D. Galbraith to the Rancho Bolsa de Tómales, five square leagues, in Marin county, granted June 12, 1846, by Pio Pico to Juan N. Padilla; claim filed April 29, 1852, confirmed by commission April 11, 1S54, by the district court December 1, 1854-. Case unreported. Decree reversed by the supreme court, and cause remanded for further proofs. 22 How. (63 U. S.) 89. The case is now heard upon further proofs taken.]

<p>[This was a claim by Juan C. Galindo, based upon an alleged grant from a priest of the mission of Santa Clara, for two leagues of land lying in Santa Clara county, Cal.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,185,</p> <p>Indictment—Assault with Dangerous Weapon.</p> <p>The twenty-second section of the crimes act of March 3. 1S25 (7 Bior. & D. Laws. 401 [4 Stat. 115]i. providing for the punishment of assaults with dangerous weapons, contemplates a misdemeanor and not a felony; and in an indictment under the act for such an offence, it is not necessary to charge that the assault was committed feloniously, or with intent to perpetrate a felony.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,186.</p> <p>Practice—Final Decree—Reexamination.</p> <p>1. When the minutes of the former United States district court for the Southern district of California, showed that the judge delivered an opinion overruling exceptions and confirming a survey of a Mexican grant, but no decree appeared to have been made or written opinion filed. Held, that no final decree had been made and that the cause was still pending.</p> <p>2. Held, further, that it was the duty of this court, which had succeeded to the jurisdiction of the late Southern district court, to enter a decree in the cause; but that on a showing, such as would justify an order for a new trial, or rehearing, or leave to file a bill of review, the cause might be re-examined.</p> <p>UNITED STATES (GARCIA v.). See Case No. 5.215.</p>

It appears by the fourteenth and fifteenth articles of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,, the United States discharged Mexico from all claims of whatever amount, which citizens of the United States had against the republic of Mexico, and which arose prior to the date of the treaty; and they undertook to make satisfaction of the same, to any amount not exceeding three and one quarter millions of dollars.

[This was an indictment against William Gardner for alleged violation of the revenue laws. Heard on motion to quash the array of jurors.]

Indictment for an endeavour to make a revolt on board the ship Ganges, in Boston har-bour. founded on the crimes act of 1790, c. 9 (36), § 12 [1 Stat. 115; 1 Story’s Laws, 85]. Plea, not guilty. At the trial it appeared, that the seamen had signed the shipping articles, and the ship was all ready for sea. and that the master directed the pilot to get the vessel under weigli for sea for the voyage.

<p>Case No. 15,189.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Bond—Married Woman— Lex Loci Contractus.</p> <p>1. The defendant Garlinghouse, a warned woman, as principal, and the defendants Monger- and Gulick. as sureties, executed, on the 9th of March. 1866. at Canandaigua, in the state of New York, a bond, conditioned according to the requirements of the internal revenue laws of the United States relating to bonded warehouses. To the declaration, which was in debt upon this bond, alleging breaches of the condition, the defendants severally pleaded that at the time of the making of the bond, the defendant was. and still .continued to be. the wife of one Leman B. Garlinghouse. To the plea of the sureties the United States replied, that at the time of the delivery of the bond, the defendant G. was engaged in the business of a distiller at Canandai- , gua, on her separate account, and separate and apart from her said husband, and that she gave the bond in the proper carrying on of said business. To the plea of the defendant G. the United States replied, in addition to the allegations just stated, that for the successful prosecution of her separate business it was necessary for the defendant G. to have a bonded warehouse, under the laws of the United States: that she applied therefor: and that she executed the bond according to the requirements of those laws. The defendants demurred to these pleas, and issue was joined on these demurrers, field, that a bond, voluntarily given to the United States to secure the performance of any corporate act. or the discharge of any public, official, or private duty, is valid and binding, if the United States, in their political and corporate capacity, have a legal pecuniary interest in the performance of the condition of such bond, although the bond is not expressly required or authorized by any act of congress.</p> <p>2. The capacity of a party to contract depending on the law of the place where the contract is made, the validity of the bond in question, so far as it depended on the capacity of the defendant G. to make it. was to be governed by the law of the state of New York. and. under that law, was valid and binding upon her.</p> <p>3. Under the laws of this state, G. was authorized to carry on the business of a distiller on her own account, and for her own benefit: and. the acts of congress having required that in order to make the warehouse of the defendant G. a legal bonded warehouse, under the laws of the United States, she should execute such a bond with sureties as was here in question, she acquired, by the very virtue of the acts themselves (even if she did not possess it without reference to them) legal capacity to bind herself by such a bond as she had made hero, and the bond was valid under those laws by necessary implication.</p>

[This was an indictment against Samuel Gassaway for house-breaking.] This is an indictment, for breaking into a storehouse and stealing goods, under tbe act of Maryland of July, 1729, c. 4, § 3,2 and is as follows: ’‘The jurors of tbe United States, for tbe county aforesaid, on their oath present that Samuel Gassaway, late of tbe county aforesaid, a slave, on the 26th day of Nov.. 1842. with force and arms, at the county aforesaid, into a certain storehouse of one James…

<p>This was an action under the 50th section of the act of congress of March 2, 1799, which provides that no goods brought in any vessel from any foreign place may be unladen within, the United States but between the rising and the setting of the sun, except by special license of the collector, &c„ nor at any time without a permit; and the landing thereof under any other circumstances is prohibited under a penalty of $400 against the person in command of the vessel at tiie time, and every other person knowingly concerned or aiding therein, and certain disabilities therein mentioned against such persons. The United States sued for the above penalty, alleging the landing of the goods [from the packet ship Oxford, from Liverpool, defendant being then in command of said ship] i in question without a permit. The defendant pleaded specially that since the landing of said goods he had been indicted by the United States in the circuit court of this district, under the act of 1842, for smuggling and •clandestinely introducing said goods into the United States without paying or accounting •for the duties due thereon according to law, and that he pleaded guilty to such indictment. and was by said court sentenced to pay a fine of two thousand dollars and be imprisoned thirty days; that he paid such fine and bore such imprisonment; and that the acts for which he was so indicted and committed and sentenced are the same acts for which this action is brought to recover the above named penalty. To this plea the United States demurred. The defendant joined in demurrer. The cause came on for argument before the Honorable S. R. BETTS, United States District Judge, on the 28th day of October, 1845.</p> <p>with whom was F. A. Marbury, relied on the following points:</p> <p>I. The facts set forth in the second plea, and which are admitted by the demurrer, constitute no valid bar to the action of the plaintiffs. (1) The unlading and delivery of goods without a permit from the collector (section 50, Act March 2, 1799) is an of-fence entirely distinct from the fraudulent introduction of goods into the United States (section 19, Act Aug. 30, 1842), for which the defendant has been indicted and punished as set forth in his plea. The former offence may be committed in respect to free goods; the latter only concerns such as are dutiable. A party might unlawfully unlade goods, and thus incur the penalties of the law of 1799. without that fraudulent intent which would be necessary to conviction under the law of 1842. The punishment attending the violation of the former differs from that prescribed in the latter. (2) The two statutes are at most only cumulative. The former is not repealed by the latter, neither being incompatible with the existence and operation of the other.</p> <p>n. There is no merger. The ancient feudal doctrine of the merger of a private wrong in a felony is not applicable to the civil polity of this country, and has never been adopted in our system of jurisprudence. Plummer v. Webb [Case Ho. 11,234], But, if this doctrine were recognized by our courts, it could not affect this case, as the law of 1799 was devised for the protection of a public right, and the infringement of >'ts provisions is therefore a public wrong. Nor is the violation of the law of 1842 made felony; it is, on the contrary, expressly declared to be a misdemeanor.</p> <p>Though there are no eases in point which I have been able tc find, yet, upon general principles, the defendant is not liable to this second action for another offence in the same act for which he has already been punished at the suit of the same party (the United States). The rights of the United States against the defendant have been satisfied, and his liability discharged, by a compliance with the former sentence of the court. In a suit for money, if a judgment were obtained for the same cause, and paid, the fact pleaded would be a good bar to a subsequent action for the same cause, however the action (as in this case) might differ in form. In criminal law the maxim is familiar, that “no man shall oe tv'ee put in jeopardy for the same offence.” Moreover, it cannot 'be supposed to have been the intention of congress that the two acts should be enforced in the same case, for one and the same offence. They could hardly have intended to cumulate penal consequences in this manner. On the contrary:</p> <p>I. The statutes were intended for different cases, and the act of 1799 was intended to apply to those cases in which the landing was only in violation of that statute,-but without any fraud or fraudulent intent upon the revenue of the United States. Whenever the fraud or fraudulent intent made a part of the offence, the act of 1842 applied, but the act of 1799 did not; and, on the other hand, when the landiug was without such fraudulent intent upon the revenue, this act (of 1799) was violated, and the remedy provided by it was the legitimate remedy.</p> <p>The counsel for defence admitted the position of the plaintiff, that the latter did not repeal the former statute, and also that the doctrine of the merger of the civil remedy in the felony was not a part of -the common law of this country, it having had its origin in England, in the necessity of the case, where the entire property of any one convicted of felony was forfeited and confiscated, and the civil remedy of the individual lost. But the case at bar does not depend upon either of these positions. Neither this nor the former suit was for damages sustained. The case at bar is more nearly analogous to the doctrine of merger as applied to a lesser offence, where the acts constituting it go to make up a greater. He cited the cases of robbery, assault with intent to rob, and assault and battery. In every robbery there is an assault with intent to rob, and usually an assault and battery, and one guilty of the first is literally guilty of the one or both of the others; and yet it will not be contended that, in a case where all these concur, the offender, having been punished for robbery, is liable for an assault with intent to rob, or that, having suffered for the latter, he could properly be proceeded against for an assault and battery. The lesser would be merged in the greater offence, and. having suffered for the latter, he would not be liable for the former. On the other hand, if indicted for assault and battery, and on the trial the evidence should show death caused by the assault and battery, so that the accused was guilty of murder, the less would doubtless be merged in the greater offence, and on this appearing on the trial the proceedings under the indictment would be dismissed. The two remedies in the case at bar are in behalf of the same plaintiffs. Both are for the commonwealth. The offences complained of are against the rights of the same parties, and concur in the same act, and neither is for damages. The goods were landed without a permit (the offence forbidden in the act of 1799), and with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States (the offence prohibited in che act of 1842). In one suit he has been punished for the act with the intent. In this it is sought to punish (more mildly) fyr the act alone, without the wrong intent,—the mere lauding, independently of any intent to defraud the revenue.</p> <p>n. On general principles there can be only one punishment for the same act,—one satisfaction for one debt. The United States having enforced one remedy, their claim against defendant is satisfied,—extinguished. He has fulfilled the law by bearing the sentence thereof. The demand of the United States having been paid, they have no further claim on defendant for the single act which forms the foundation of both their claims. This doctrine is analogous to that of satisfaction of a debt or liability by payment in a civil suit, —a former conviction in criminal law. In this case the first suit was criminal in its form, but this is a civil action. The law in either ease,1 being complied with, is satisfied.</p> <p>On either of the above grounds the plea is good, and this action cannot be maintained.</p>

This cause was an action at law against [Bessie Elgee Gaussen,] the executor of one of the sureties on the bond of Thomas Barrett, late collector of customs. It was heard upon a motion of plaintiff’s counsel to strike out two of the answers of defendant as insufficient in law. [In this case there had been a judgment in the circuit court in favor of defendant. Case unreported. This judgment was reversed by the supreme court, and a new trial granted. TO Wall. (86 U. S.) 198.

<p>This was an indictment for resisting one Johnson, an inspector of the customs, in attempting to seize two casks of merchandize and some other articles of trifling value. The casks had been brought from Vermont, and were deposited in the store of Gay, at Oambridgeport, a short distance from Boston, to which place they were destined. There appeared to have been no attempt at concealment, or opposition to search. The casks were accompanied by an invoice, on which was written a certificate or passport from the collector of the district of Vermont. This invoice was produced and shown to Johnson, and- the marks and number's in it corresponded with those on the casks. Gay informed Johnson, that the casks were to be transported to Boston, and there delivered to a person whose name and place of business he declared, and he offered that Johnson should accompany the merchandize, and ascertain at the custom-house the genuineness of the signature of the collector of Vermont. This offer Johnson refused, and insisted upon a removal of the property to the custom-house in Boston. Gay, thereupon, placed the casks in a cart, they having before been rolled out from the store by Johnson, and sent them to Boston.</p> <p>THE COURT called upon the district attorney to show, that, upon these facts, there was probable cause of seizure.</p> <p>that the mere production of the invoice or passport did not bind the officer, who had no means of knowing whether it was genuine or not. That the merchandize, being on its way from Vermont, and such as must have been imported, might reasonably be presumed to have been imported from the British colonies, and as such to be liable to seizure.</p> <p>But THE COURT were of opinion, that the facts were not such as to justify the officer in insisting upon a removal of the property to the custom-house in Boston, though it might have been reasonable, .that the property should be placed in a neighboring store, until the genuineness of the certificate could be ascertained.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] At chambers.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,195.</p> <p>Trespass—Ore Lands—Permit—Rent Receipt.</p> <p>1. A permit to enter od lands containing lead ore. may be shown in an action of trespass by the United States, not as a justification, but to show the nature and object of the entry.</p> <p>2. A final receipt by an officer of the government. authorised to act in the premises, for rent, is a full discharge, being subsequent to the trespass alleged, although the officer may never have accounted for the money received.</p>

<p>[Before United States commissioner.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,197.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Forfeitures—Distribution— Informer’s Share.</p> <p>1. The provisions of the act of March 2. 1867 {14 Stat. 546), in regard to the distribution of the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred under the provisions of the laws relating to the customs, commented on.</p> <p>[Cited in The Monte Christo, Case No. 9.720.]</p> <p>2. Those provisions apply to the proceeds of a forfeiture incurred under the 3d section of the act of August 6, 1846 (9 Stat. 54, 55).</p> <p>3. The provisions of the act of 1867, compared with those of the 89th, 90th, and 91st sections of the act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 695-697), in regard to the distribution of the proceeds of forfeitures for a breach of its provisions.</p> <p>4. The proper practice, under the act of 1867. is for the court to pay to the collector the amount recovered, less the charges allowed, and for the collector to deduct duties and charges, where proper, and to pay the residue into the treasury of the United States, to be distributed, under the direction of the secretary of the treasury, to the persons, and in the proportions, prescribed by the decree of the 'ourt.</p> <p>5. Preparatory to such decree, the court, while in possession of the fund, will determine disputes between persons claiming to share in the fund, as informers.</p> <p>[Subsequently the controversy between the parties in regard to their respective rights to the fund in court was determined. Case No. 15,198.]</p>

<p>This was a controversy between the customs’ officers and certain informers on the one hand, and the United States on the other, and also between the informers, among themselves, in regard to the distribution of a certain fund, which originally consisted of $59,-722 in gold, and $32,000 in currency, and which was paid into the registry of this court under the following circumstances: In the summer of 1867, the officers of the customs, having discovered that great frauds upon the government had been perpetrated by persons doing business in the city of New York, under the name of J. W. George & Co., by means of the withdrawal, without payment of duties, of dutiable merchandise, from their bonded warehouse, Nos. 290 and 291 West street, criminal proceedings were instituted against the offenders, in which several of them were arrested and held to bail for trial, and a civil action for duties, amounting to-$400,000, was commenced in the district court, against one of them named Henry Hart, in which suit a large amount of real estate and personal property was attached. A quantity of segars, appraised at some $25.-000, was also seized by the collector, as forfeited by reason of these frauds. Pressed' by these proceedings, the offenders commenced negotiations with the officers of the government, which terminated in an agreement, made at Washington, with the secretary of the treasury, by which it was arranged that the offenders should pay to the United States the sum of $59,722 in gold, for the duties on the segars, brandy, rum, gin and wine withdrawn by them without payment of the duty, and also $32.000 in currency, as penalties for the illegal abstraction of such bonded merchandise; and that, upon such payment, the government should discharge all the property which had been attached or seized, and release the offenders from all civil and criminal liabilities relating to the illegal transactions. Accordingly, instructions were issued to the district attomey to carry into effect this arrangement, and the offenders proceeded to make the payment agreed on. This payment, however, by arrangement with the district attorney, was-not made in the action for duties which was pending in the district court; but a new, and, in some sense, a friendly action of debt was-eommenced in this court, not for duties, but for penalties and forfeitures, amounting to the sum agreed on, namely. $59,722 in gold, and $32,000 in currency, in which action judgment was confessed on the same day, and the same was satisfied, on the payment into-the registry of this court of the sums demanded. At the same time, the property attached in the action pending in the district court was released from custody, and all the-criminal proceedings were stopped. The se-gars held under seizure by the collector were also directed to be released, on due entry and payment of the duties to the collector. There being thus $59,722 in gold, and $32,000 in currency, in the registry of this court, a controversy arose respecting the rights of the customs’ officers and the informers in this fund, it being claimed, by the officers and the informers, that no part of it was duties, but that it was all penalties and forfeitures, and, as such, distributable, one-half to the government, one-fourth to the customs’ officers, and one-fourth to the informers. [See Case No. 15.197.] A controversy also arose between the parties claiming to be the informers, in regard to their respective rights. One-half of the gold and one-half of the cur¡rency being clearly payable to the United States, was so paid, by consent, and one-half of the residue of the currency, admitted to be payable to the collec or, was paid, by consent, thus leaving in t'ie registry $20,861 in gold, and $8,000 in currency. To one-half of this $29,861 in gold the customs’ officers laid claim, and the informers claimed the other half, as well as the balance of the currency. These several claims were set forth by petitions, under which, by order of the court, testimony in behalf of ail the parties was taken by the clerk. Upon these petitions, and some 363 pages of testimony, with a mass of exhibits. the case now came before the court for its determination.</p>

before by I. N. Oardozo, Esq. a commissioner for the circuit court for the district of Minnesota. The condition of the recognizance appears in the following opinion of NELSON. District Judge, in the district court, on demurrer to the petition: This action is brought on a recognizance entered into before a commissioner of the United States circuit court, by which Hiram George, as principal. Wm.

<p>Case No. 15,200.</p> <p>Shuumno—Regulation's — Proceeding on Voyage.</p> <p>A vessel has not proceeded or departed on her voyage, within the provisions of acts of congress ' of July 13, 1861 [12 Stat. 255], and May 20, 1862 [Id. 404], and the rules and regulations of the secretary of the treasury supplementary thereto, until she is outside the limits of the harbor of her port of departure.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,204.</p> <p>Robbebt on High Seas—Piracy—Continuance —Separate Trials—Indictment—Conclusion—New Trial—Evidence.</p> <p>. 1. It is not a sufficient ground for a delay of the trial of a capital case, that the party wishes it, in order to procure papers from a foreign country, since this court cannot issue process, which will be effectual in procuring such papers.</p> <p>2. Convictions for murder may take place, where the murdered body is not found.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Matthews. Case No. 15.741a; U. S. v. Williams, Id. 115.707: St. Clair ?. U. S., 154 U. S. 152, 14 Sup. Ct. 1009.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in State v. Lamb. 28 Mo. 227.']</p> <p>3. The weight and character of circumstantial evidence.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Macomb, Case No. 15.702.]</p> <p>4. In order to affect all the officers and crew of a piratical vessel with guilt, the original voyage must have been undertaken with a piratical design, and the officers asid crew have known and acted upon such design; otherwise those only are guilty, who actively co-operate^ in the piracy.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Com. v. Nickerson. 5 Allen, 525. Cited in State v. Furne,,. 41 Kan. 115, 21 Pac. 216; State v. Soper, 16 Me. 207.]</p> <p>. 5. It would not be sufficient to affect them with guilt, if they had known, that the voyage was intended to be an illegal one, as in the slave trade, contrary to the laws of Spain.</p> <p>. 6. The simple fact of presence on board the piratical vessel, where there was no original piratical design, is not sufficient per se to affect a party with the crime.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 21 Pac. 216.]</p> <p>7. All, who are present, acting and assisting in the piracy, are to be.deemed principals.</p> <p>8. The prohibition in the constitution of the United States. "Nor shall any person be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,” means, that no person shall be tried a second time for the same offence, after a trial by a competent and regular jury, upon a good indictment, whether there be a verdict of acquittal' or conviction. Therefore, the circuit court of the United States cannot grant a new trial in a capital case, after a verdict regularly rendered upon a sufficient indictment. Davis. J., dissenting, held that the privilege, intended to be secured by the prohibition, might be waived by the prisoner.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Keen, Case No. 15,516: U. S.v. Shoemaker, Id. 16.279; U. S. v. Harding, Id. 15,301; Macy v. De Wolf, Id. 8,933; U. S. v. Holmes. Id. 15,382; U. S. v. Williams. Id. 16,707; Holmes v. Oregon & C. R. Co.. 9 Fed. 239; U. S. v. Watkinds. 6 Fed. 159: Sparf v. U. S.. 156 U. S. 175, 15 Sup. Ct. 321.]</p> <p>[Cited in Ex parte Brown. 68 Cal. 180. 8 Pac. 831; Brown v. Swineford. 44 Wis. 287: Harp v. State, 59 Ark. 113, 26 S. W. 715. Disapproved in Re Keenan. 7 Wis. 697. Cited in Kohlheimer v. State. 39 Miss. 548; Re McClaskey (Okl.1 37 Pac. 858; McDonald v. State, 79 Wis. 653. 48 N. W. 864; Mount y State, 14 Ohio. 295: State v. Davis, 31 W. Va. 393, 7 S. E. 26: State v. Horns-by, 8 Rob. (La.) 583. Disapproved in State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 241; U. S. v.' Salter, 1 Pinney, 282; Weinzorpflin v. State. 7 Blatehf. 196. Cited in brief in Williams v. State, 10 Ind. 517.]</p> <p>9. Quaere—If this prohibition extends to the state courts?</p> <p>10. A new trial may he granted in a capital ease, where the jury has been discharged from giving a verdict: for then the party has not been put in jeopardy of his life.</p> <p>[Distinguished in TT. S. v. Keen. Case No. 15,510. Cited in Holmes v. Oregon & C. R. Co.. 9 Fed. 239.]</p> <p>[Cited in Kohlheimer v. State. 39 Miss. 548: State v. Davis, 31 W. Va. 393, 7 S. E. 26; State v. Walker, 26 Ind. 353.]</p> <p>11. The prohibition in the constitution is a recognition of an old maxim of the common law, and, therefore, we are to resort to the common law to ascertain its true meaning.</p> <p>[Cited in Kohlheimer v. State. 39 Miss. 548.]</p> <p>12., There is no instance of a new trial granted by the English courts in capital cases, where the indictment was sufficient, and there has not been a mistrial.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Howard. 17 N. H. 197.]</p> <p>13. Quaere—if the courts of the United States may grant new trials in cases of misdemeanors.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Morris. Case No. 15.815; Ex parte Lange. 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 204.]</p> <p>[Cited in Henning v. State. 106 Ind. 394. 6 N. E. 803. 7 N. E. 4.]</p> <p>14. Quiere—If congress may invest the courts of the United States with the power to grant new trials in all criminal cases, capital or otherwise.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Plainer, Case No. 16,956. J</p> <p>15. A writ of error does not lie at the common law for the refusal of a court to grant a new trial.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. .Tarvis. Case No. 15.469; U. S. v. Plumer, Id. 16.056: Ex parte Lange, IS Wall. (85 U. S.) 185.1</p> <p>[Cited in Fay v. Parker. 53 N. H. 387: Welch v. County Court. 29 W. Va. 68. 1 S. E. 340.]</p> <p>16. According to the constitution of the United States, "no fact, once Tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined than according to the rules of the common law:” therefore, independent of the express prohibition of the constitution, there can be no new trial, in a capital case, after a regular trial once had upon a good indictment.</p> <p>[Cited in Fay v. Parker. 53 N. H. 387; State v. Elden. 41 Me. 169; State v. Lee. 10 R. I. 495. Cited contra in State v. McCord. 8 Kan. 232.]</p> <p>17. Whether prisoners shall be tried separately or together, rests in the discretion of the court.</p> <p>[Cited in Ballaid v. State (Fla.) 12 South. 868. Cited in brief in Com. v. James. 99 Mass. 439: Doyle v. People. 147 Ill. 395, 35 N. E. 372. Cited in Matón v. People. 15 Ill. 539.]</p> <p>18. Where the reason assigned for separate trials was, that the prisoners might use the testimony of each other in their defence: held, that this would not justify the court in the exercise of its discretion.</p> <p>19. Quiere—If the court, for the reason assigned. would have a right to grant separate trials, and thus deprive the government of the right to exclude all the confederates from being witnesses, and render them competent, when they would otherwise be incompetent.</p> <p>20. The clerk of the court, upon the arraignment of the prisoners, did not further proceed. upon their pleading not guilty, to ask them, how they would be tried, so that they did not make the usual reply, "By God and their country.'’ Held that, under the laws. of the United States, the plea of not guilty put the prisoners upon the country by a sufficient issue, without any further express words.</p> <p>[Cited in Com. v. McCormack. 126 Mass. 258; State v. Soper, 16 Me. 300; Territory v. Kee (N. M.) 25 Pac. 926.]</p> <p>21. A question cannot be put to a witness, the relevancy of which does not appear.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Real v. People. 42 X. T. 275.]</p> <p>22. Where the court instructed the jury, that certain confessions of the prisoners, reduced to writing, and not produced on the trial, ought to be disregarded by the jury, although they came out upon direct interrogatories of the cross-examining counsel for the defence, held, if there was any error in this instruction, it was favorable to the prisoners, and that the suppression of the writings afforded no presumption of law, but of fact only in the case.</p> <p>23. tf the persons, who made the confessions were not identified, but the testimony was only, that some did confess, not being named or identified. such confessions could not be applied to any particular prisoner as proof of his guilt, but might be considered by the jury, so far as they applied to the identification of the piratical vessel.</p> <p>24. The log-book is not proof per se of the facts therein stated, except in certain cases provided for by statute.</p> <p>[Cited in Paine v. Maine Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 69 Me. 571.]</p> <p>25. It was proper to admit parol evidence to establish the time of the sailing of the Panda on her voyage, and to prove the course and termination of the voyage, without proving, that the log-book was missing or lost.</p> <p>26. The rule, requiring the production of the best evidence, is applied to reject secondary evidence. which leaves that of a higher nature behind in the power of the party: but not to reject one of several eye-witnesses to the same facts, for the testimony of all is in the same degree.</p> <p>[Cited in D. S. v. Scott, 25 Fed. 471.]</p> <p>[Cited in Putnam v. Goodall. 31 X. H. 424; State v. Kilgore. 70 Mo. 547.]</p> <p>27. Where the officers, attending upon the jury, under a mistake of duty, permitted them to read the newspapers,—the officers first inspecting them, and cutting out everything, that in any manner related to' the trial,—and it appeared, that in point of fact the jury uever saw anything in any newspaper relative to the trial, and, after the charge from the court, were not allowed to see any until they had delivered their .verdict, held, that it was an irregularity in the officer, but not sufficient to justify the court in setting aside a verdict, and granting a new trial, or treating the matter as a mis-trial.</p> <p>[Cited in Henning v. State. 106 Ind. 394, 6 X. E. 808. 7 X. E. 4: Jones v. People, 6 Cal. 452: State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 757.]</p> <p>28. Nor would it be sufficient for this purpose, to show, that some of the jurors drank ardent spirits during the trial, when the prisoners’ counsel consented in open court to this indulgence to those whose health might require it. unless it was also shown, that the indulgence was grossly abused, and operated injuriously to the prisoners.</p> <p>[Cited in Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 155; .Tones v. People, 6 Cal. 452; Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 546; State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 827.]</p> <p>29. The indictment charged the piracy to have been committed ‘‘on the high seas, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.” Held, that this was a sufficient statement of the venue, without any further specification of place.</p> <p>[Cited in St Clair v. U. S„ 154 U. S. 145, 14 Sup. Ct. 1006; Kelly v. ü. S.. 27 Fed. 620.]</p> <p>30. The crimes act of 1790, c. 9, § 8 [1 Stat. 113], as well as the act of 1820, c. 113 [3 Stat. 600], applies to all murders and robberies committed on board of or upon American ships on the high seas.</p> <p>31. A conclusion of an indictment against the form of the statute (in the singular) is sufficient in all cases, where the offence is distinctly within more than one independent statute.</p> <p>32. Also a conclusion against the form of the statutes (in the plural) would be good, even if the offence were punishable by a single statute only.</p> <p>33. A sworn interpreter may take advantage of the suggestions of others, who are not sworn, with regard to the proper interpretation of testimony, stating the result to the court as his own interpretation.</p> <p>[Cited in Skaggs v. State. 108 Ind. 56, 8 N. E. 697.]</p> <p>34. Where the prisoners were placed within the bar, and within a reasonable distance from their counsel, who could constantly have free access to them, and to whom the court stated, that every delay of time for that purpose would be cheerfully given, and it was given, held, that to place the prisoners in the very front benches of the bar, by the side of their counsel, would have been an indulgence inconvenient and unnecessary, and that the court did not err, under the circumstances of ’he case, in refusing it.</p> <p>35. The court did not err in refusing to have the order of the prisoners (twelve in number) changed, before the introduction of each of the witnesses for the government, who were excluded from the court room, and after the first of these witnesses had been examined and had ret ired.</p> <p>36. The witnesses for the government were allowed, with the chart of the Mexican’s course before them, to be asked the question, whether, under the circumstances slated of the supnosed time of starting of both vessels, the Mexican and Panda would or would not be likely to meet at the point marked on the chart. Held, that this was a direct and proper question, and not leading.</p> <p>37. The praetic in this court in capital cases is for counsel to state the points of law, on which they wish instructions to the jury, at some time before the charge is given, that the court may have time to examine and consider them.</p> <p>38. It would be improper to grant a new trial, on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, proceeding from persons, who were charged as joint offenders with the prisoners, and were incompetent at the time of the trial, but have been acquitted.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Bean, 36 N. H. 128.]</p> <p>39. No bill of exceptions lies in any capital case, in the courts of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Croteau. 23 Vt. 42; State v. Ryan. 120 Mo. 88. 22 S. W. '486. 25 S. W. 354.]</p> <p>40. The only mode contemplated by the laws of the United States to revise the opinions of the judges of the circuit court in criminal cases is, when the judges are divided in opinion at the trial, and then the point of division may be certified to the supreme court for a final decision under the judicial act of 1802. c. 31. § 6 [2 Stat. 159].</p> <p>41. Xo bill of exceptions lies at common law in cases of treason and felony.</p> <p>42. Quiere—If one lies in cases of misdemeanors.</p> <p>43. If the court has the power in a capital case to allow a bill of exceptions, it is too late to present it, when no tender has been made at the trial, and after the motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment have been argued and overruled.</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against Everett H. Gilbert upon the charge of embezzlement.]</p>

The indictment contained two counts. One charging the murder to have been committed by means of a spring-gun set by the traverser for that purpose in a goose-house; the other that the murder was done by shooting. The prisoner [William Gilliam] plead not guilty. insisted that the prisoner had a right to defend his property by such means.

Indictment [against Adolphus Gitma] for hindering and assaulting a deputy marshal in the discharge of his duty at an election for a member of the house of representatives of the United States. During the progress of the argument before the jury in this case, the judge, in order to shorten the discussion, interrupted counsel with the following explanation of the law governing the case:

[This was an indictment against Archibald Given for violation of Act Hay 31, 1S70 (16 Stat. 140). There was a verdict of guilty, and the case is now heard upon motion in arrest of judgment.]

[This was an indictment against Archibald Given for violating the second section of the act of Hay 31, 1870. There was a verdict of guilty against the defendant, and the case is now heard upon motion in arrest of judgment. For the opinion of Judge Strong, delivered in the same case, see Case No. 15,210.]

The prisoners [.Henry Givings and others], fourteen in number, were indicted for a revolt on board the whale ship Hibernia, of New Bedford, while lying at Fort Louis, in the Isle of France. From the evidence it appeared. that when the ship had been about twelve months out, and was nearly full of oil, the masts were discovered to be rotten, and were fished by pieces of a spare topmast, cut up for that purpose. Port Louis was the first port the ship made, after this discovery.

This is a civil action to recover the penalty imposed for carrying on the business of a brewer, without having paid the special tax therefor required by law. The answer sets up former acquittal and general denial. By stipulation, the cause was tried alone upon the general issue on the following agreed statement of facts: ‘‘That on the first day of May, 1874.

<p>Case Wo. 15,314.</p> <p>Appeal—When to be Takex.</p> <p>1. After a final decree has been made by a district court, sitting in admiralty, and the court has adjourned without day, the decree cannot he set aside, or opened so as to allow an appeal to the circuit court,' a term whereof has intervened since the decree was made.</p> <p>[Cited in The Major Barbour. Case No. 8,984; The Lizzie Weston, Id. 8,425; Snow v. Edwards, Id. 13,145: French v. Stewart. 22 Wall. (89 U. S.) 245; Bronson v. Schul-ten, 104 U. S. 416; Allen v. Wilson. 21 Fed. 884; The Brantford City, 32 Fed. 325.]</p> <p>2. If an appeal from such a decree be not taken to the term of the circuit court, held next after the making of the decree, the right is lost.</p> <p>[Cited in The Oriental, Case No. 10,570.]</p>

<p>This was a demurrer to an indictment.</p>

This was the trial before the court and jury of the defendant upon an indictment for murder. The provost marshal of the United States army, for the district of Iowa, with headquarters at Grinnell. in that state, employed J. L. Bashore and J. M. Woodruff to arrest Samuel Bryant, Joseph Robertson, and Thornes (J. MTntire. as deserters from the service.

At chambers. This cause was heard upon a motion for-new trial, the ground for which sufficiently appears in the opinion of the court.

This was a suit upon the o.iicial bond of Cade AI. Godbold. late marshal of the United States, and ■ William E. Cleveland, one of his sureties. The bond was executed June :i, 1854. The defendants interposed the plea of the statute of limitations of six years (.Rev. St. § 780) to which plea the plaintiff demurred. cited Green v. U. S., 9 Wall. [70 U. S.] 055; U. S. v. Herron, 20 Wall. [87 U. S.] 251; Story, Const, bk. 3, p. 593; U. S. v. Union Pac.

<p>Indictment for conspiracy.</p>

The defendant [Abraham Goldbackj is a j manufacturer of lucifer matches. As a nov- ! city in his line of business, instead of putting . up his matches in a box of one compartment, ' he provides two sliding drawers in each box, i the drawers being open on top when drawn i out, each holding about forty-two matches, and I not large enough to hold by possibility as i much as, or more than, fifty; the package i holding from eighty to ninety matches.

Heard on demurrer to indictment. The indictment was based on section 5520. Held: to wit. on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.

A United States commissioner, on proper complaint and proceedings before him. required a person charged with receiving stolen property of the United States, knowing it to be stolen, to give bail in the sum of $500 to appear at the next term, and the commissioner at the same time, on another charge of like-nature, required the same person to give bail in the sum of $200 to appear at the next term,. &c.; and one bond for $700 was taken; and the principal cognizor having failed…

[This was a libel of forfeiture tiled against the ship Good Friends and cargo, charging a violation of the nonimportation act of March 1. 1809.]

Action to recover pienaity under section 3324 of the Revised Statutes, for transporting empty barrels which had theretofore contained distilled spirits, and upon which, it was claimed, were internal revenue stamps not effaced or obliterated as required by law.

[This was an action by the United States against F. H. Goodwin.] The case was referred to the decision of the court upon the following statement of facts, which was agreed upon by the parties: ‘’It is agreed, that the goods in question, before they were imported into the port of Passamaquoddy, had been imported into St. Andrews, In the province of New Brunswick, and were lying in St Andrews, and intended to be imported, or not imported into the United States, according as…

Goosely was indicted for felony, under the 16th and 17th sections of the act of congress establishing the post-office and post-roads within the United States, for robbing the mail of some bank-notes.

<p>Case No. 15,231.</p> <p>Citizenship—Shipping—Americas Vessel—Slave Tkade—Indictment—Sentence.</p> <p>1. A person born abroad, on board of an American vessel, of parents who are citizens of the United States, and who are, at the time, in the foreign country, not with the design of removing thither, but only having touched there in the course of a voyage which the father has made, as captain of the vessel, is to be regarded as a citizen of the United States.</p> <p>2. Where it appears that a vessel was built in the United States and belonged to American citizens, it is not enough, in order to show that she ceased to be an American vessel, to prove that she was taken abroad and there sold and transferred by those American citizens, but it must also be shown that she was sold and transferred to a foreigner.</p> <p>3. Where a vessel is shown to have been fitted out for the purpose of engaging in the slave trade; her master, if he had control and charge of the vessel, in procuring the cargo, in stowing it and in shipping the seamen, is to be held chargeable; as matter of law, with a knowledge of the intended service of the vessel.</p> <p>4. If such master conducts the vessel to Africa, remains in her. and starts to come back with her, she having there taken on board a cargo of slaves, such previous knowledge on the part of the master, is, on the trial of an indictment against him for engaging in the slave trade, to be taken into consideration by the jury, on the question as to the purpose for which he was found on the vessel, in Africa, when the slaves were put on board.</p> <p>' 5. To sustain an indictment, under tiic 5th section of the act of May 15. 1S20 (3 Stat. 601), for forcibly confining and detaining negroes on board of a vessel, with intent to make them slaves, it is not necessary to show that physical or manual force was exercised on board of the vessel, but it is enough if the negroes were under moral restraint and fear there, their wills being controlled by superior power exercised over their minds and bodies, it appearing that they were under restraint at the time by the persons who furnished them at the vessel’s side and transferred them to the vessel, and that they came upon the deck of the vessel in that condition; and any person who participated in such sort of detention is to be regarded as a principal in the offence.</p> <p>6. In such an indictment, it is sufficient to aver, that the defendant forcibly confined and detained the negroes, “they not having been held to service by the laws of either of the states or territories of the United States,” without otherwise averring that they were not so held to service at the time of the commission of the offence.</p> <p>T. An offence commenced to be committed on board of an American vessel lying at the time in a river which is an arm of the sea. on the coast of Africa, and continued uninterruptedly to a point in the Atlantic Ocean several miles from land, is within the jurisdiction of the United States and of a circuit court thereof.</p> <p>8. Although a trial and conviction have been had for a capital offence before a circuit court when held by both of the judges thereof, it is competent for the same court, when held by only one of the judges, to pass the sentence.</p>

This was an action of debt, brought in the district court of the United States at Richmond, upon an embargo bond, executed by Salem Woodward, William Gordon, and John M. Shepherd, which bond was in the words ami figures following, to wit: ‘‘Know all men by these presents, that we, Salem Woodward, master of the brigantine Essex of New-burypovt. and owner, William Gordon, and John M. Shepherd, are held and firmly bound unto the United States of America, in the sum of $21,000.…

<p>Case No. 15,234.</p> <p>SeLLINO blQUOK WITHOUT LICENSE.</p> <p>Under the act of Virginia prohibiting the sale of spirituous liqucs without license, all the acts of selling before conviction constitute but one offence.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,234a.</p> <p>Prize—Capture by Army and Navy—The Blockade.</p>

This was a motion for a new trial, and was argued by Mr. Carnahan, U. S. Disk Atty., for fhe government; and by Kopelin, Noon,. Hampton & Swartzwelder, for the defendant.

<p>Case No. 15,239.</p> <p>Slave Trade—Power to Prohibit—State Sovereignty— Importation op Negroes—Indictment.</p> <p>1. Congress has the constitutional power to prohibit the foreign slave trade.</p> <p>2. That power is part of the power to regulate foreign commerce. It is commercial in its character. and has the same extent and application, and the same limits, as the power to regulate foreign commerce.</p> <p>3. The several states have the general sovereign right to determine who may or who may not live within their limits, to fix the political and social status of each inhabitant, and to prescribe his rights and punish their violation within its limits</p> <p>4. This portion of state sovereignty has not been wholly surrendered to the general government. It is surrendered only to the extent and for the purposes specified by the constitution. .Is respects negrres. imported as slaves, it is surrendered only so far as to allow the prohibition of such importation, and as a means to this, the removal of negroes unlawfully imported. The power to prescribe and to protect the rights of such negroes after the importation is entirely complete and ended, and they have become mingled with the mass of the population of a state, is exclusively in the state government.</p> <p>5. It is settled, by repeated decisions of the supreme court, that the commercial power of the general government extends to and covers (exclusively of the interference of state laws,) the importation of either goods or persons, until the commercial transaction of importation is complete and ended, and no further. When the goods or persona imported pass out of the possession or control of the importer, his agents and employees, and become mingled with the mass of property or population of a state, they then become subject to the state jurisdiction and laws.</p> <p>6. The laws of the United States prohibiting the foreign slave trade, are to be construed in reference to the mischief intended to be remedied, and to the nature, extent and limits of the constitutional power of congress over this subject.</p> <p>7. The sole mischief intended to be remedied was the importation of negroes us slaves. It was not and is not, the manner in which either free negroes or slaves are regarded or treated in any state.</p> <p>, 8. These laws extend to all persons who in any manner, directly or indirectly, participate, aid or abet, in the prohibited importation. They do not extend to offences committed in a state against the rights of a negro who had been previously unlawfully imported by some other person, after he has passed out of the possession or control of the importer and become mingled with the mass of the population of a state.</p> <p>9. An indictment which only charges that the accused, within this state, did hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of, a negro or a slave, who had previously been unlawfully imported by some other persons, without alleging that the accused did participate, aid or abet, in the unlawful importation, is fatally defective.</p> <p>10. The mode ,/E procedure prescribed by the 7th section of the act of April 20. 1818. for enforcing the penalty for violating its provisions, is a qui tam action, and no other. Therefore an indictment does not lie under that section.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,241.</p> <p>Federal Courts—Criminal Jurisdiction—Murder on American Ship in Bay of Cadiz.</p> <p>Quaere, whether a United States court has jurisdiction to tiy a person who committed murder on board an American merchant ship in the Bay of Cadiz.</p>

<p>In admiralty. Libel for forfeiture.</p>