Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

24 Pa. 44

McCormick v. Robb

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Decided July 1, 1854

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · decided 1854-07-01

<p>1. In an action for breach of promise of marriage, the promise of defendant being laid to have been made before the 22d September, it was proved that the defendant, on the 20th September, called on the defendant to excuse his intended absence from his home, and also proved that the defendant subsequently, the date not being specified, admitted that he had promised to marry the plaintiff — but that the contract was broken — and further that on the 1st of October he had again said the contract was broken; it was admissible for the plaintiff to prove that she had invited the witness to the wedding to take place on 22d September, as the jury might have properly inferred that the promise was previous to the time designated by the plaintiff for the wedding.</p> <p>2. The declarations of the son of the plaintiff, as to the reasons for his mother breaking up housekeeping, were'not admissible on part of the defendant as evidence of the general design of the family in breaking up housekeeping. Such general design was not material in the case; and, if it were, it could not be shown by hearsay.</p> <p>3. It was for the jury to decide whether the plaintiff-was willing and ready and offered to marry the defendant.</p> <p>4. After the defendant declared the contract at an end, it was not requisite for the plaintiff to make a formal offer to marry the defendant before bringing suit.</p>

Decided 1854-07-01

¶1The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Knox, J.

¶2This was an action of trespass on the case by Sarah M. Robb against William McCormick, for breach of marriage promise. The plaintiff recovered $1500 damages.

¶3The first bill of exceptions was to the admission of testimony that the plaintiff had invited the witness to her wedding with the defendant, which was to take place at the plaintiff’s house, on the 22d day of September, 1853. This evidence was offered to prove mutuality of promise and readiness on the part of the plaintiff to comply with the contract. It was objected to, on the ground that there was no proof of a promise on behalf of the defendant antecedent to the date of the alleged invitation. This objection was not well taken. There was evidence of the defendant’s admission that he had promised to marry the plaintiff, and although the time of the contract was not mentioned, the jury might well infer that *47it was previous to tbe 22d of September, 1853. Tbe objection to tbe reception of the evidence was special; but had it been general it would not have availed tbe defendant, as tbe evidence was competent for tbe purpose for which it was offered.

¶4Tbe declarations of the son as to tbe reasons why his mother broke up housekeeping, were clearly incompetent. They were offered, as it is said, in the bill of exceptions, “ for the purpose of showing by members of the family the general design of the family in breaking up housekeeping.” The general design of the family had nothing to do with the question, and if it had, such general design could not be shown by hearsay.

¶5It is unnecessary to examine the errors assigned upon the charge in detail. It was for the jury to determine “ whether the plaintiff was willing and ready, and offered to marry the defendant, or not;” and so the Court told them. After the defendant declared the contract at an end, the plaintiff was not required to make a formal offer to perform on her part before bringing suit.

¶6We see no reason for interfering with this judgment.

¶7Judgment affirmed.

/24/pa/44 · .json · Public domain