24 P.R.
Volume 24 — Puerto Rico Reports
244 opinions
- 24 P.R. 1Betancourt v. Anguiano (1916)
<p>PARTNERSHIP-CAPACITY TO SUE-MERCANTILE REGISTRY-COMPLAINT.-In Order that a mercantile partnership may have capacity to sue it must be constituted by a public instrument and the instrument must be recorded in the mercantile registry at the time the action is brought.</p> <p>Id. — Mercantile Registry — Capacity to Sue — Cause op Action. — The failure of a mercantile partnership to be recorded in the registry át the time a contract was entered into does not affect its personality ot capacity to sue but affects the cause of action to establish its rights.</p> <p>Id. — Third Person — Contract.—Article 24 of the Code of Commerce cannot be understood to mean that a person who contracts directly with an unregistered partnership may be regarded as a third person.</p> <p>Id. — Public Instrument — Mercantile Registry — Contract—Third Persons.— The provisions of articles 118, 119, and 17 of the Code of Commerce do. not imply that because a firm fails to execute and record its articles of partnership, contracts entered into with it are absolutely null and void," for although a mercantile partnership may have no legal existence, the acts and contracts of the partners as such ars binding upon them in favor of the. third persons with whom they contracted.</p> <p>Id. — Mercantile Registry — Contract—Third Persons — Action.—The question-of the invalidity of acts or contracts of unrecorded partnerships affecting third persons can only be raised in the proper declaratory action, especially in case of the assertion by a partnership of rights which are not derived' from the- articles of partnership, hut ^from ordinary contracts entered into, with persons not members of the partnership.</p>
- 24 P.R. 7People v. Pérez (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of the Law of Weights and Measures.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion. ■</p>
- 24 P.R. 12People v. Torregrosa (1916)
<p>Evidence — False Will — Presentation op False Will to Executor^t-Intent.— Tlie presentation of an alleged false will to an executor and obtaining money in consequence thereof is not equivalent to the intent of producing it or allowing it to be produced as genuine or true for some fraudulent or deceitful purpose at a trial, proceeding or inquiry, as described by section 128 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Conspiracy — Forgery—False Will — Inpormation—Intent to Defraud. — An information charging two or more persons with forging a will with intent to defraud the lawful heirs of the supposed testator may be jn'esented either for conspiracy to commit the offense as described by section 413 of the Penal Code or for the specific offense of forgery defined in the said section; but the allegation of the fiscal in the present prosecution that the acts of the ' alleged conspirators tended to defraud the heirs is not the same as an allegation that the acts were committed with intent to defraud said heirs.</p> <p>Id. — Forgery—False Will — Public Health or Morals — Public Justice.— The forging of a will is not an act of a public nature injurious to public health or morals or perversive or obstructive of justice or the due administration of the laws within the meaning of section 62 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>False Will — Disbarment.—When a notary, who is also an attorney, is charged with preparing a false will, a proceeding for disbarment may be instituted, in the discretion of this Attorney General, without waiting for the result' of the trial.</p>
- 24 P.R. 20Negroni v. Lucchetti (1916)
<p>Ganancial Property — Growing Crops — Inheritance — Ejectment.— Growing crops of an estate acquired by a married heir in the division of the estate are ganancial property and the payment of a charge against the whole estate by the, conjugal partnership out of the proceeds of such growing crops creates a claim in favor of said partnership against the estate of such married heir; but an action of ejectment does not lie to the administrator of the estate of the husband or wife against a subsequent purchaser of said estate to recover on such' claim.</p> <p>Id. — Separate* Property — Conveyance.—Property purchased by a married heir from co-heirs is ganancial property and recitals in the deed of purchase acquiesced in .by the other spouse would not change its ganancial character; for the authorities are clear that declarations made by such spouse at that time are not proof of the separate character of the property.</p> <p>Id. — Separate Property — Conveyance.—Whether the act of a husband in consenting to conveyances by his wife is a ratification of the act of the wife or whether he is estopped thereby from1 setting up any title, the result is the same and he is bound by such consent. If the property appears in the name of the wife and the husband consents to its conveyance by her, the conveyance is effective whether she is or is not the sole owner.</p> <p>Id. — Separate Property — Administrator.—There is no theory of law by which the administrator of two separate estates can weld these two representations so 'as to become the representative of the conjugal partnership.</p>
- 24 P.R. 24Belaval v. Todd (1916)
<p>Municipal Employee — Superintendent of Hospital. — A superintendent of a municipal hospital appointed by the mayor is an employee within the meaning of section 32 of the Municipalities Act.</p> <p>Id. — Removal of Employee — Notice and Hearing. — The words “for just cause” used in section 32 of the Municipalities Act limit the power of a mayor to remove arbitrarily the employees appointed by him and suggest the necessity of a proceeding involving previous notice to and a hearing of the employee to be removed.</p> <p>Id. — Modern Democracy — Administrative Officers. — The tendency of modern democracies' is to insure more and more the intelligent intervention of the people in public affairs and at the same time to create an administrative machine composed of honest, -active and competent men who may have no fear of removal so long as they faithfully discharge the duties of the office to which they have been appointed or elected.</p> <p>Id.- — Municipal Oouncil. — Under section 25, paragraph 15, of the Municipalities Act, the power to create offices clearly rests in the municipal councils and, as a logical consequence, the power to abolish them.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Abolition of Office. — When a person is appointed to an office created by a municipal council, such person is entitled to discharge the duties thereof in accordance with the law as long as the office exists; but if the office is abolished, the appointment is ipso facto revoked and the appointee has no claim against the municipality.</p> <p>Id. — Term ¡of Office — Term of Mayor.- — Municipal employees of Porto Bieo appointed under section 32 of the Municipalities Act do not cease automatically in the discharge of their duties at the end of the term of the mayor who appointed them, -but continue in office so long as the same exists and they faithfully discharge the duties thereof.</p> <p>Mayor — Re-election—Substitution.—The fact that the same person is re-eleeted to the office of mayor does not imply that it is the same mayor; but when this occurs it is not necessary to make a formal substitution of one person for another in the action.</p>
- 24 P.R. 42Monclova v. Board of Pharmacy (1916)
<p>Pharmacy — Examination—High-School Diploma — Enrolment.—Section 7 of tlie Act of March 8, 1906, providing for tlie creation of a board of j>harmaey, as amended by Act No. 42 of March 10, 1910, prescribes that all applicants for examination in pharmacy shall present, in order to be enrolled, diplomas or documents showing that they have successfully passed examinations embracing all the scientific and literary subjects of the course at some high school of the Island or at some reputed similar or analogous institution of the United States or elsewhere, satisfactory to the board.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Ultra Vires Act — IIigh-school Diploma — Eating.—The Board of Pharmacy exceeds its authority in admitting to examination an applicant who has not presented the diploma or document referred to in section 7 of the Act, and acts correctly in refusing to rate the examinations taken by a petitioner who has not complied with the said requisite, even though he has paid the matriculation fee.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—Intent of Legislators — Conditional Enrolment. — It was the intention of the legislators to require candidates for licenses as pharmacists to have certain knowledge before beginning the studies provided for in section 6 of the Act and that such knowledge should be acquired prior to,' and not simultaneously with, that referred to in the said section; therefore conditional enrolment cannot be permitted.</p>
- 24 P.R. 45Wys v. Fornaris (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion:</p>
- 24 P.R. 49Tettamauzi v. Zeno (1916)
<p>Notice of Appeal — Service of Notice — Filing of Notice. — Section 296 of the Code of Oivil Procedure of Porto Rico, whieh follows sections 940 and 3574 of the amended codes of California and Idaho respectively and not the old ' Practice Act of California, provides only for the filing of the notice of appeal in the office of the secretary and the delivery of a similar notice to the adverse party or his attorney and does not require that the notice of appeal shall be filed with the secretary before serving a copy on the adverse party.</p> <p>Id. — Service bt Mail — Affidavit of Service. — An affidavit of service of a notice of appeal by mail should contain all the requisites required by section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.'</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Residence of Parties. — An affidavit of service of notice of appeal by mail is fatally defective when it does not state the residence of the parties . or that the person who made the service and the person on whom the service was made reside or have their offices at different places or that there is a regular mail service between the said places.</p>
- 24 P.R. 56People v. Maymón (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a Prosecution for Violation of a Municipal Ordinance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 58People v. Santos (1916)
<p>Libel — Distribution op Libellous Handbill — Complaint—Identification of Complaining Witness. — In this ease a complaint was filed charging the defendant with having published and circulated a handbill containing the following: “We understand with respect to the wages that the contract is being violated and that the foremen and overseers are trying to come to an understanding with you; that from now on the highest daily wage will be seventy-five cents and that this is due to the fact that Iglesias sold himself, etc., etc. What raseals these foremen and overseers are! Instead of telling you that they can no longer rob you of fifty or sixty dollars a week, as they did formerly, they try to make you believe that the contract is prejudicial to you — all to the end of preventing you from organizing.” On appeal it was held that according to sections 2431 of the Penal Code and 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the complaint was insufficient because it did not contain any allegation showing that the complaining witnesses, who were not identified, were the persons alluded to in the handbill; and it was also held that the defects in the complaint were not cured by the evidence.</p>
- 24 P.R. 61Ninlliat v. Suriñac (1916)
<p>Sale with Eight to Bepurchase — Record of Consummation — Third Person.— When a deed of sale with right to repurchase recorded in the registry gives the vendor two different periods in which to repurchase, the second being at the option of the vendor, at the expiration of the first period the vendee may require the registrar to enter the corresponding marginal note of consummation upon the record; and in order that the second period may he effective against a third person a new instrument must he executed and recorded in the registry of property.</p> <p>Id. — Incompatible Eights. — According to section 1172 of the Civil Code, an obligation is extinguished by a later one when they are incompatible in every respect; consequently the right to acquire real property by repurchase is extinguished by the actual and effective purchase of the same because the two rights are incompatible.</p> <p>Id. — Rescission of Sale — Fraud—Injury—Cause of Action. — When it is alleged in a complaint in an action to rescind the sale of a certain lot and -buildings made by a marshal at public auction to the defendant as representative of his minor children that the defendant knew that the said property belonged to the plaintiff and maliciously procured the levy and sale thereof with the object of defrauding and wrongfully depriving him of the ownership of the same, the said complaint sets up a cause of action for it alleges an injury for which the plaintiff is entitled to reparation.</p> <p>Id. — Third Person — Capacity.—A person who purchases a thing knowing that his vendor is noj; the owner thereof has not the character of a third- person when the thing-had been lawfully acquired previously by another person; nor are the minor children of a vendee, who purchased the property for them knowing that it did not belong to the vendor, third persons, because the personality of the said vendee as such cannot be separated from that of the representative of Ms children.</p> <p>Id. — Good Faith — Record oe Title. — A person who knows of an act or contract by which another person has alienated the ownership of a thing and, therefore, knows of his own knowledge that it belongs to another person, does not aet in good faith when he purchases the same or acquires it by any other kind of contract from the former owner with full knowledge that he is not the present owner and, availing himself of what may perhaps be the carelessness of the first purchaser in not having his title recorded, hastens to have his own title recorded in the registry so that under article 17 of the Mortgage Law the owner cannot record his title.</p>
- 24 P.R. 71Iturrino v. Iturrino (1916)
<p>Vacation. — A vacation lias been defined as all the time between the end oí one term and the beginning of another and also as the interval between judicial proceedings; the rest of the court; the time during which the court, holds no session.</p> <p>Chambers. — In its popular signification the word "chambers’’ means the private-office; the office of a judge or other place where motions are heard and orders, made, or where during the vacation period the judge disposes of matters out. of court which do not require a hearing before a judge or judges in open court.</p> <p>Administration — Temporary Administrator — General Powers oe Court — -Vacation. — By express statutory provision (section 26 of the Special Legal Proceedings Act) the district courts of Porto Rico have no authority to consider petitions for judicial administration during vacation; nevertheless, in urgent cases, under the general powers given them by section 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1905, they may appoint temporary administrators during vacation and should follow as elosely as possible the rules prescribed by the statute for the appointment of permanent administrators.</p> <p>Id. — Surviving Spouse — Heir.—Section 31 of the Act relating to special legal proceedings provides that when there is no surviving spouse the heir having the largest interest in the inheritance should- he appointed administrator of the estate.</p> <p>Id. — Temporary Administrator — Suggestion—Personal Property — Capacity and Honesty op Heir. — A mere suggestion.in an unverified petition for the appointment of a temporary administrator that the estate contains personal property which may he concealed or removed is not sufficient ground for a judge of a district court, in the absence of proof of the incapacity and dishonesty of the person having the greatest interest in the estate, to disregard said person absolutely and prevent him from preserving and managing said property until it may he duly distributed and delivered to its lawful owners.</p> <p>Id. — Question Sub Judice — Authentic Acknowledgment — Natural Child— Capacity.- — When the question of whether the document in which the acknowledgment of a natural child appears is or is not such as law and jurisprudence require in order to show that said acknowledgment was made in an authentic manner is still sub judice, the alleged acknowledged natural child has no -capacity to petition as heir for the judicial administration of the estate of his alleged natural father, according to the Special Legal Proceedings- Act.</p>
- 24 P.R. 80Echavarría v. Registrar of Aguadilla (1916)
<p>Administrative Appeal — Acquiescence—Curable Defect. — When one of the grounds of appeal is an objection to the defects assigned in a former decision not subject to objection because acquiesced in, the supreme court should limit itself to considering and deciding whether said defects have been cured by the interested party.</p> <p>Id. — Partition—Approval—Batification—Becord op Title. — When a registrar refuses to reeord a partition on the ground that it has not been approved by the court or ratified by an heir who has attained his majority since the date on which the partition was made, the only means of correcting the defect is by presenting proof of the approval of the court or of the ratification by the heir. , .</p> <p>Id. — Defects—Becord op Title. — A registrar should not assign defects in a second decision which he ‘did not point out in the first decision, for he is required to state all the legal grounds for his refusal in a single decision. The assignment of some grounds and the failure to assign others denote that only those assigned influenced the registrar in refusing to admit' the instrument to reeord.</p> <p>Id. — Cancellation op Transfers — Defects—Examination of Becords. — When in his first decision the registrar has assigned as a defect the failure to cancel certain transfers which he deems in force and documentary evidence is presented to him later tending to prove the cancellation, before refusing a second time to make the reeord he should examine the records in the registry and state whether or not the cancellations had been made and, consequently, whether the defect assigned by him has ceased to exist.</p> <p>Id. — Defensor—Defect.—The failure to show the character of a defensor of a minor in the registry is a curable defect.</p>
- 24 P.R. 87Gregory v. Treasurer of Porto Rico (1916)
<p>Partnership — General Partnership — Limited Partnership — Liability oe Partners. — The liability of silent partners for the debts and losses of the partnership is limited to ' their contributions thereto or the amount they bound themselves to contribute; and the liability of the active partners, both in a general and in a limited partnership, is personal and solidary to the extent of all their property.</p> <p>Id. — Limited Partnership — Liability oe Partners — Taxes.—In a limited partnership a general partner risks not only his contribution to the partnership but all the property he possesses; a silent partner risks only his contribution to the partnership. That is the distinctive feature of a limited partnership and it has not been changed or modified as to the payment of taxes by section 292 of the Political Code.</p> <p>Id. — Taxes—Intent oe Legislator — Code oe Commerce — Silent Partner— General Partner. — The object of section 292 of the Political Code is to determine what persons shall pay the taxes levied upon a partnership, individualizing the partnership, so to speak; and as the names of the silent ■partners of a commercial partnership cannot be included in the firm name, it was not the purpose of the Legislature in referring to partners in general to make the silent partners equally liable with the general partners for the payment of taxes, thus eliminating the distinction whieh the Code of Commerce establishes between them.</p> <p>Id. — Taxation.—It is an old and familiar rule of the English courts applicable to all kinds of taxes and particularly to special taxes, that the State must express its intention of levying a tax in clear and unmistakable language.</p> <p>Id. — Repeal.—Article 148 of the Code of Commerce was not repealed by section 292 of the Political Code, for the provisions of both may be harmonized. Repeals by implication do not ordinarily merit the sanction of the courts.</p>
- 24 P.R. 92Ledesma v. Registrar of Arecibo (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision» of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of an Explanatory Instrument.</p> <p>'.Che facts are stated, in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 96Municipality of Ponce v. Solís (1916)
<p>Nuisance — Complaint—Cause of Action. — The mere allegation in a complaint that the facts recited therein show a public nuisance is not the setting out of facts sufficient to constitute a eause of action for sueh public nuisance.</p> <p>Id. — Hurt, Inconvenience or Damage.' — A public nuisance must produce a hurt, inconvenience or damage similar to, if not greater than, a private nuisance, as it generally extends to a greater number of persons.</p> <p>Id. — Municipal Ordinance- — Repairs to Building. — The mere violation of a municipal ordinance by making additions or repairs to a building in excess bf the permit granted by the municipality does not constitute a publie nuisance.</p> <p>Injunction — Repairs to Building — Permit.—An injunction may be granted to enjoin additions or repairs to a building when the permit granted by the sanitary or municipal authorities is abused or exceeded.</p> <p>Id. — Repairs to Building — Damage—Bad Faith — Municipal Ordinance — Sanitary Regulations. — An injunction will not be granted when the work of construction, repairs or additions to a building in excess of the permit given by the municipal or sanitary authorities is not harmful or made in bad faith, or the house itself violates some municipal ordinance or sanitary regulation.</p> <p>Good Path — Presumption.—Good faith is not only presumed but, in the absence of proof to the contrary, must be regarded as certain.</p>
- 24 P.R. 100Cruz v. Santiago (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Filiation and for Support.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 106Casiano v. Lucchetti (1916)
<p>Natural Child — Acknowledgment — Holographic Will — -Authentic Act — - French Law. — The French Civil Code does not regard a holographic will as a solemn and authentic act by which a father expresses his intention to give-his child a status, but requires the father to appear before some public functionary and execute the act when the child was not acknowledged at the-time of its birth.</p> <p>Id. — Foreign Code — Evidence.—In order that a foreign code may be considered at a trial it must be offered in evidence pursuant to the Law of Evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Authentic Act — Holographic Will — Protooolization—Locus Begit Ac-tum- — French Law. — An act which is not authentic under the laws of a-foreign country cannot become so under the principle of loeus regit aetum by being carried to the protocol of a notary in Porto Bico by some other person; and inasmuch as in France a holographic will need only be published by the judge of the place where it was made, its protooolization in Porto Bico does not make it authentic. .</p> <p>Id. — Foreign Besidence — Locus Begit Actum — French Law — Holographic-Will — Protooolization—Defect in F'orm. — The Freneh Civil Code contemplates the right of its citizens residing temporarily in foreign countries where the intervention of a public official in the making of a will is unnecessary to its validity to do the equivalent thing in such countries; but unless the will is made according to the formalities of the foreign country the principle of loeus regit actum does not apply and the protocolization of a will does not make it an authentic document. ,</p> <p>Id.- — Legitimation-—Acknowledgment—International Law. — It is a familiar principle of private international law that a child legitimated in the country of its father will be considered legitimate elsewhere; and if an acknowledged natural child is legitimated in this manner in a particular country, it will receive due recognition in another jurisdiction.</p> <p>Id. — Filiation—Holographic Will — Voluntary Act. — In an action of filiation in which the status of natural child is sought to be conferred in a holographic-will, the act of the father, even when voluntary, must be determined by the law of the country to which he belongs and which he is presumed to know.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment—Holographic Will- — Public Order. — If a French citizen domiciled in France makes a holographic will acknowledging children had by him while temporarily residing in Porto Bico, there can be no question of public order. Spanish legislation adopted the law of nationality in family matters for its own citizens and there is no reason of public order for subjecting a Frenchman, although perhaps domiciled in Porto Rico, to any law but that of his own country.</p>
- 24 P.R. 120People v. Trujillo (1916)
<p>Perjury — Variance—Evidence.—A defendant charged with perjury under section 117 of the Penal Code cannot be convicted upon proof tending merely to show the offense defined in section 122; but when the evidence is susceptible of being construed to include either of the two classes of perjury, conviction under either section will be sustained.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions to Jury — Objection.—Where perjury is charged under section 117 of the. Penal Code and the lower court instructs the jury as though the offense also came under section 122, but no objection is made or exception taken, the supreme court will not take the error into consideration.</p> <p>Id. — Knowledge of Falsity — Complaint.—It is not always easy to distinguish between swearing falsely knowing that the statement is false and swearing without knowing that the statement is true; therefore the complaint should be made to include both allegations in two different counts.</p>
- 24 P.R. 122People v. García (1916)
<p>Adultery — Witness—Accomplice.—While it is true that section 270 of the Penal Code provides that to constitute the crime of adultery the participation of a man and a woman is necessary and that both commit the offense-although only one may be married, section 239 of.the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to a case in which the woman with whom the accused is charged with committing adultery and who was not included in the eharge-testifies, nor does it prevent an accomplice from voluntarily testifying at the trial. The object of section 239 is that a co-defendant may be compelled to testify when the charge against him has been dismissed.</p> <p>Id. — Witness — Leading Questions — Sexual B-elations— Discretion op Court. — The allowing of leading questions to be put to a witness is purely discretionary with the court and its discretion should not be questioned unless manifest abuse in the exercise thereof is shown. Generally, leading-questions are allowed for the purpose of showing a woman’s sexual relations with a man, especially when she is of tender age.</p> <p>Id. — Medical Expert — Corroboration.—Objection to the testimony of a medical expert regarding the deflowering of a young woman tending to corroborate the carnal act testified to by her, was properly overruled.</p> <p>Id. — Sufficient Corroboration — Medical Expert — Statements by Defendant. — According to section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the testimony of an accomplice in a prosecution for adultery is sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of a medical expert regarding her recent deflowering, the testimony of a witness regarding the statement made to him by the defendant that he had carried off the said girl and the testimony of another witness that he knew that the defendant had taken her to a house in the town where he saw her.</p>
- 24 P.R. 125Bou v. Colorado (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Recovery of Rent.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 130Infanzón v. Registrar of Guayama (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 133Sabat v. Valera (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Intervention and for Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 136People v. Morales (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in a Prosecution for Violation of the Internal Revenue Law.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 140Finlay v. Fabián (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 149Alvarez v. Quilichini (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Cancellation of Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 156People v. Reyes (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Malicious Mischief.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 159Rivera v. Rivera (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Partition.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 163Serrano v. Succession of Santos (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in Injunction Proceedings to Recover Possession of Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 172Ex parte Sotomayor (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in Proceedings for Approval of Partition of Inheritance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 187Latorre v. Registrar of Mayagüez (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Deed of Partition.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 189People v. Padilla (1916)
<p>OFFENSE AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE — WARRANT OF ARREST-PROBABLE CAUSE-Arrest. — When in a prosecution for violation of section 148 of the Penal Code — that is, for having maliciously and without probable eause procured the issuance and execution of a warrant of arrest against the prosecuting witness — it is not shown that the warrant was properly executed because the prosecuting witness was not arrested, there is not sufficient ground to support a judgment of conviction.</p>
- 24 P.R. 195People v. Cortés (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Eape.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 209People v. Martínez (1916)
<p>Rape — Information.—Every information charging rape must allege that the victim is not the wife of the accused, for this is an essential element of the offense.</p>
- 24 P.R. 210People v. Lange (1916)
<p>Attempt to Commit Murder — Aggravated Assault — Information.—An information alleging that the accused wilfully, criminally and with malice aforethought attacked a certain person with a firearm and fired three shots at him with the intent then and there to commit murder, alleges facts constituting the crime of attempted murder as well as aggravated assault.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Eirearm—Deadly Weapon. — In order to charge the crime of aggravated, assault it is not necessary to specify in an information for attempted murder when the weapon employed is a firearm that it was charged with powder and hall; nor is it necessary to allege that the weapon was a deadly one if from the context of the information both facts clearly appear.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Identification—ITnprgjudicial Error. — The testimony of a fiscal regarding the examination made by him of an automobile in connection with the crime may be admitted in evidence subject to the identification of the same by other evidence during the trial; and if said evidence is presented the error which the court may have committed in admitting said testimony, including some hearsay evidence, would be corrected and not prejudicial.</p>
- 24 P.R. 215People v. Garzot (1916)
<p>Municipal ORDINANCE — Evidenoe.—When an ordinance is an essential element of proof and is unconstitutional or unlawful, it is incompetent for the purpose of obtaining a conviction.</p> <p>Id — Judicial Notice — Burden of Proof. — Municipal courts and district courts’ in- the trial of eases de novo should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances; and when the defendant alleges that the ordinances are not law because they have not been duly approved, the burden is upon him to prove the same.</p> <p>Id. — License Tax — Show or Exhibition — Theatre — Cinematograph — Be-peaIi. — The power or authority of a municipality to impose a license tax upon public shows or exhibitions, such as theatres or cinematographs, conferred by the Act of 1906, was not revoked by Act No. 134 of 1913 (License Tax Act) providing for commercial and industrial licenses, for such intention is not revealed. Implied repeals are not favored. The municipal ordinance • of Naguabo of May 28, 1914, and said Act No. 134 can be harmonized.</p> <p>Id. — Theatre—License Tax — Public Amusements. — Theatres and public shows are not included in the tariff of license taxes following section 74 of. the Municipal Act of'1906; therefore, prior to the enactment of Act No. 134. of 1913 no tax was imposed upon the business of managing theatres or public shows, and licenses could only be imposed on public amusements or shows under paragraph 7 of section 70 of the Act of 1906. The management of a theatre and the furnishing of public amusements and shows are different.</p> <p>Id. — Double Tax — Discretion oe Legislature. — The mere fact that a tax is double does not affect its validity unless it operates in an unequal manner on the same class or classes of the community. The question of whether there should be a double tax is generally a matter for the discretion of the Legislature; therefore the ordinance of the municipality of Naguabo of May 28, 1914, is not void because it may impose a double tax.</p> <p>Id. — Public Amusements — License Tax — Presumption.—When the municipality of Naguabo passed its ordinance of December 3, 1914, its intention was to impose a fine of ten dollars on public-amusement concerns which failed to pay the license tax and a fine of five dollars on those whieh failed to pay the other taxes enumerated. It is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair to separate public amusements and shows from other businesses subject to the payment of license taxes. The reasonableness of ordinances is presumed.</p>
- 24 P.R. 223People v. Escanella (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Carrying Arms.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 224Méndez v. Martínez (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action for Acknowledgment of Natural Children.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 240Isabella Grove, Inc. v. Registrar of San Juan (1916)
<p>Corporation — Purchase of Eeal Property — Mortgage — Engaging in Business.- — The mere fact that an unregistered foreign corporation acquires and holds real property and mortgages the same to secure the payment of a part of the purchase price -does not amount to engaging in business in this Island within the meaning of the Act of March 9, 1911. Sections 37 to 40 of said Act refer to corporations actually engaged in business in Porto Rico in the ordinary acceptation of the term.</p> <p>14. — Name op Corporation — Engaging in Business. — A conclusion of law regarding the business of a corporation cannot be reached by reason of its . name.</p> <p>Id. — Engaging in Business. — It is the province of courts and not of registrars of property to determine whether or not a foreign corporation is engaged in business in Porto Rico.</p> <p>Id. — Eights op Corporation.- — When a foreign corporation is not expressly forbidden by legislative enactment to make contracts or own lands, it possesses all the rights pertaining to an individual, like any other corporation not restricted by its own charter.</p> <p>Id. — Invalid Contract — "Voidable Contract. — A contract which meets the requirements of section 1228 of the Civil Code is not void, although if it is unlawful it may be rescinded at the instance of an interested person.</p>
- 24 P.R. 245Porto Rican Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Registrar of Caguas (1916)
<p>Corporation — Purchase of Real Property — Engaging in Business. — The acquisition and ownership of real property by an unregistered foreign corporation is not equivalent to engaging in business within the meaning of the Act of March 9, 1911.</p>
- 24 P.R. 246People v. Villaveitía (1916)
<p>Libel —■ Identification of Complainant — Complaint. — A complaint for libel made in a municipal court by the sanitary officer of the municipality, as such' officer, and signed by him both as complainant and as local health officer, which charges that defendant, as author of the libelous matter, caused the same to be published with the intention of “defaming the sanitary officer” of such municipality and of “impugning his honesty and integrity as such public official, exposing him to public odium and ridicule,” sufficiently identifies complainant as the person referred to in the libelous publication.</p>
- 24 P.R. 248People v. Quirós (1916)
<p>Petty Larceny — Advice or Instigation — Authors or Principals — ■ Complaint. — A complaint alleging that some of the defendants counseled, incited and suggested to other defendants the commission of a specified crime of petty larceny, they being principals or authors of the crime, charges a public offense.</p>
- 24 P.R. 249Martínez v. Nussa (1916)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action for the Execution of a Deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 251Cividanes v. Acosta (1916)
<p>Mandamus — Administrator.—This court having decided that the surviving spouse has preference over any other person to appointment as judicial administrator and that the objection made to his appointment is not sufficient to deprive him of that right, it is the duty of the lower 'Court to appoint him so that he may take charge of said office.</p> <p>Id. — Answer—Denial—Peremptory Writ. — If the answer by the respondent judge to a conditional writ of mandamus is evasive and alleges no facts constituting a denial, a peremptory writ should issue without further proceedings, in accordance with section 9 of the Mandamus Act.</p>
- 24 P.R. 257Isern v. Zequeira (1916)
<p>appeal — Transcript of Record — Dees.—In order that an appeal from a munici pal to a district court may be considered duly filed in the appellate court, not only must the transcript of the record be sent up by the secretary, but it must be entered in the books of the district court after payment by the appellant of the proper fees.</p> <p>Id. — Notice of Appeal — Stay op Judgment. — The filing of a notice of appeal from a judgment of a municipal court in a civil action has the effect of staying the execution of the said judgment, but not of setting it aside; and if it is held later that the appeal was not duly prosecuted, the stay ceases and the judgment appealed from recovers its original force.</p> <p>Id. — Trials de Novo — Plaintiff and Dependant — Transcript op Record. — In trials de novo in district courts by virtue of appeals from judgments of municipal courts, there are, properly speaking, no appellants or appellees, but plaintiffs and defendants; but this doctrine applies only after the case has been duly docketed in the appellate court.</p>
- 24 P.R. 260Medina v. Registrar of Guayama (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 262González v. Vilella (1916)
<p>DeMurrer — Misjoinder oe Causes — Prayer—Allegations.—When two remedies are prayed for in the complaint, the second in case the first is not granted, and the allegations of the complaint refer to one only, a demurrer on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action will not be sustained.</p> <p>Contract — Consideration—Fraud—Cause oe Action. — A complaint alleging that the consideration of a contract was fictitious and simulated in order to defraud the plaintiff sets up a cause of action for its rescission.</p> <p>Transfer oe Property — Fraud—Third Person. — The allegation that one of the defendants is attempting to secure possession of the only property owned by the other defendant and transfer it to an innocent third person is sufficient to show that the property is not subject to the claim of the plaintiff.</p> <p>Promissory Note — Evidence.—After examining the evidence in this case it was held that the lower court did not err in holding that the promissory note under consideration was simulated and fraudulent for lack of consideration.</p> <p>Appeal — Judgment—Grounds oe Judgment — Error.—An appeal is not taken from the grounds of the judgment, but from the judgment itself; and when the judgment is supported by the facts and the law, an error which the trial judge may have committed by citing statutes not applicable to the case is unimportant.</p>
- 24 P.R. 271Martínez v. Trujillo (1916)
<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Ponce in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 278Maldonado v. Ramos (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the- opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 281Cubille v. De la Cruz (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 282Rivera v. Negrón (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 284Neumann v. Trujillo (1916)
<p>•Complaint — Cause op Action. — The allegations of a complaint determine the cause of action arising therefrom and not the name given to it by the parties.</p> <p>Id. — Prayer.—While as a rule the prayer of the complaint is not of great importance, still it may sometimes serve to show the purpose or end pursued by the plaintiff.</p> <p>Nullity op Sale — Community Property — Consent op Spouse — Ejectment.— When an action is brought to annul the sale of certain joint interests made to the defendant by the wife of the father of the plaintiff because it involves the sale of ganancial property without the consent of the husband, and to recover of the defendant restitution to the succession, of which the plaintiff is a member, of the possession of said joint interests and also a certain sum of money to be paid to the plaintiff as joint owner in the share of his father in the said joint interests, the action is one of ejeetment and for annulment of title.</p> <p>Ejectment — Liquidation oe Conjugal Partnership — Cause oe Action — Community Property. — When a plaintiff suing in ejeetment bases his right upon his hereditary interest in his father’s estate without alleging that the conjugal 'partnership has been liquidated, the complaint does not state facts constituting a cause of action. The acquisition of property during the existence of the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to support an action of ejeetment because the surplus belonging in equal shares to the two spouses cannot be determined until the common property has been liquidated.</p>
- 24 P.R. 288Wantzelius v. Corrada (1916)
<p>Damages — Contract—Merchants—Resale.—In this case a contract for the purchase and sale of coffee to be delivered in December, 1914, was entered into by the parties, both of whom were merchants. 'The contract was not complied with and damages were claimed, consisting of the difference between the purchase price and the higher price at which the coffee was contracted to be resold. The defendants pleaded that they were liable only for such damages as could ordinarily be foreseen. Held: That pursuant to section 1074 of the Civil Code, both parties being merchants, the defendants could have foreseen that the plaintiffs had purchased for the purpose of reselling; therefore the judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed.</p>
- 24 P.R. 290Trucharte v. Figueroa (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for an Injunction to Recover the Possession of Real Property.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 292Monclova v. Rexach (1916)
<p>Appeals from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action to Annul Possessory Title Proceedings and their Record in the Registry.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 294People v. Mayagüez Fruit Packing Co. (1916)
<p>Corporation — Private Corporation — Annual Report — Directors—Contempt.— When a corporation is charged with neglecting or failing to file in the office of the Secretary of Porto Rico the report referred to in section 25 of the Private Corporations Act of 1911, as amended in 1913, the names of its directors should he inserted in the information; for, in the event' of conviction, the court should know the names of its officers in order to compel them to file the report under penalty of being adjudged in contempt.</p> <p>Id. — Preliminary Proceedings — Information.'—There is no statutory provision that an information charging a corporation with failure to comply with the requirements of the law shall show that the preliminary proceedings prescribed by sections 453 to 458 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been complied with. An information is sufficient when it charges clearly the commission of a punishable offense.</p> <p>Id. — District Attorney — Attorney General. — As the district attorneys are the assistants of the Attorney General and the law provides only that the said official shall cause an action to be commenced against the corporation without requiring that he shall prosecute the action, the district attorneys may institute the same.</p> <p>Id.- — Criminal Action — Civil or Administrative Action. — -When a corporation is charged with the violation of a duty imposed upon it by law, such as the failure to file its report, which is punishable by fine upon conviction, the action is of a criminal and not of a civil or administrative character. Id. — Directors—Legal Representatives. — As the directors of a corporation are its legal representatives, an information filed against a corporation is directed against the persons who legally represent it.</p>
- 24 P.R. 299People v. Juncos Central Co. (1916)
<p>Corporation — Appearance :— Appeal —• Jurisdiction — Submission. — When an action is brought against a corporation in a municipal court and it appeals to the district court, its appearance in the district court, unless it be special for the purpose of challenging its jurisdiction, constitutes submission, even though it was not summoned in due form by the former court. A motion to dismiss the information should be made prior to appearance and the burden is on the defendant to show that the municipal court had not acquired jurisdiction.</p> <p>Public Health and Safety — Information—Water Supply. — One of the essen-tia] averments of an information charging a violation of section 332 of the Penal Code is to state that water is drawn from a specified body of water for the supply of some city, village or municipality.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Demurrer—Ambiguity.—In this case the information charges that the defendant polluted “the water of the Bio Grande de Gurabo which was destined to the use of the inhabitants of the said municipality.” Heldt That although only the words “said municipality” are employed, inasmuch as the name immediately preceding said words in grammatical order is “Gurabo” and the sanitary inspector of Gurabo made the complaint, in the absence of a demurrer on the ground of ambiguity the question of whether the words “said municipality” refer to Juncos, which is also mentioned in the complaint, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Pollution of Water — Evidence—Agent.—When a corporation engaged in the manufacture of cane sugar is charged with' having polluted the water of a river destined for the supply of the inhabitants of a municipality, rendering the same unfit for public consumption by throwing filth, refuse and molasses therein, the admissions of an engineer, who is an agent of the corporation, within the scope of his employment are not objectionable.</p> <p>Municipality — Judicial Notice. — The courts of Porto Bieo will take judicial notice of the different municipalities of the Island referred to in a complaint.</p>
- 24 P.R. 303Cruz v. Santiago (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Dominion Title Proceedings.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 306Alers v. American Railroad (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 310Fernández v. Torres (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Intervention in Ownership.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 312Rivera v. D. E. Cintrón, Ltd. (1916)
<p>Damages — Attachment—Third Person — Malice—-Probable Cause. — When a plaintiff attaches real property recorded in the registry as belonging to a person other than his defendant, it is not necessary to prove malico or lack of probable cause in an action for damages brought by said person.</p>
- 24 P.R. 314Blasini v. Colón (1916)
<p>Survey — Plan—Procedure—Ejectment..—When it is not the purpose of the petitioner to obtain the formal establishment by the judge of a boundary line upon the ground after survey in accordance with the provisions of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure, Title XV, "Surveys and Demarcations,’r but that a survey and plan of the property be made, pursuant to section 286 of tlae Code of Civil Procedure of 1904, as a iweliminary step to bringing an action of ejectment, any resort by the trial judge to the old Spanish practice in order to supplement the procedure prescribed by said section 286 is entirely unnecessary and the refusal of the court to include in its order the provisions of the old law of civil procedure is not reversible error.</p> <p>Id. — "View oe Premises — Discretion oe Court. — Under the faets in this ease the refusal of the trial judge to view the premises before issuing the order for the survey and plan was not an abuse of discretion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 318Arce v. Bianchi Green & Co. (1916)
<p>Partnership — Liquidation—Action Against Partnership. — When it does not appear from the transcript of the record that the defendant partnership raised in the court below the question of whether, "being in liquidation, only the liquidator should "be sued, but that, on the other hand, all the circumstances show that the case was tried in the belief that it was an action against the partnership in liquidation and the judgment was rendered under such impression, no modification of the judgment will be made on that ground.</p> <p>Id. — Dissolution of Partnership — Third Person. — Although the articles of dissolution of a partnership are not recorded in the registry they are evidence against the world of the fact and date of its dissolution, but this fact cannot affect third persons who have done business with the said partnership after the dissolution and without knowledge thereof.</p>
- 24 P.R. 325Carrera v. New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co. (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages and Injunction- — New Trial.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 329People v. Figuerella (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Violation of the Pharmacy Act.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 331Aponte v. Verdiales (1916)
<p>Common Property — Partition—Jurisdiction—Conflict of Bights. — When it appears from the pleadings and the evidence that three different persons are entitled to the ownership of a single rural property; that the part desired by each of said persons is well known; that their individual interests in the property have never been actually determined or the boundaries thereof fixed, and that two of the said persons are fully agreed that their actual, fixed, and concrete rights should be determined, but have been unable to reach an understanding with the other, the court should decide the conflict thus arisen and not delay final action on the ground that it is impossible to determine precisely the nature or character of the action brought.</p>
- 24 P.R. 336Nazario v. Atlas Assurance Co. (1916)
<p>Pleading — Answer—Verification—Attorney's Knowledge of Pacts. — According to section 118 oí the Code of Civil Procedure, the verification óf an answer by. the attorney is clearly defective when he avers only that the facts alleged therein are true of his own knowledge except as to those matters alleged upon information and belief, which he also believes to be true, without specifying in the answer itself or in the verification what facts he knows in one way and what in the other.</p> <p>Id. — Answer.—Verification—Third Person — Verification by Attorney. — It is deduced from- section 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure that an answer may be verified by a person having knowledge of the facts, although he may be neither the defendant nor a party to the suit, When the defendant is unable to verify it for lack of knowledge of the facts; but the affidavit should state the reason why the defendant did not make the verification. If neither the party nor the person having knowledge of the facts can make the affidavit and the answer is verified by the attorney, it is his duty to state such fact in the .affidavit in order to give it legal effect.</p> <p>Id.- — Id.—Verification by Agents — Parties.—-Pursuant to the last paragraph of section 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the authorized agents of a company who are such when the answer is filed may verify the same in. case the agent who represented said company at the time the contract was entered into is unable to do so, for the fact that they are such authorized agents of the defendant makes them parties to the action.</p>
- 24 P.R. 344Díaz v. People (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in Habeas Corpus Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 347Bartholomew v. Allen (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an. Action to Enforce the Execution of a Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 350Huelva v. Clivillés (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action to Annul Partition and Recover Inheritance.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 357People v. Coto (1916)
<p>Muncipal Ordinance — Municipalities.—A municipality cannot prohibit what is authorized nor authorize what is prohibited by the legislature; but, following the line of conduct drawn by the legislature, it may forbid the commission of acts of the same character as those prohibited by it.</p> <p>Id. — Carrying Arms — Police Regulations — Public Order. — The ordinance of the municipality of Caguas prohibiting the carrying of razors and cigar-makers’ knives, approved March 16, 1915, does not conflict with the Act of the Legislative Assembly of Porto Eico of March 9, 3905, but is simply an addition within the fundamental idea which inspired the act, intended to meet local requirements, by virtue of the powers conferred on the municipality by the said Legislative Assembly in section 25 of the Municipal Act of 1906 for the adoption of police regulations in relation to public order.</p> <p>Id. — Carrying Arms — Class Privilege. — The fact that the . ordinance of the municipality of Caguas provides that the prohibition shall not apply to barbers and cigarmakers who carry the said arms during working hours, is not a distinction constituting a class privilege; for the object of the ordinance is to prohibit the carrying of arms for purposes of offense or defense and not to prevent barbers or cigarmakers from carrying their razors and knives, the tools of their trade, during working hours.</p>
- 24 P.R. 360Martínez v. Bryan (1916)
<p>Intervention — Unlawful Detainer — Execution — Certiorari. — When an action of unlawful detainer is terminated by the execution of final judgment the court commits no error of procedure in refusing to consider a motion to set aside the execution of said judgment made by a person not a party to the action.</p>
- 24 P.R. 363Tomei v. Arkadia Sugar Co. (1916)
<p>Appe.al from the District Court of Humacao iu an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 366Filardi v. Barreda (1916)
<p>Damages — Evidence.-—When in determining the amount of damages the court relies upon the testimony of the plaintiff, the defendant having offered no evidence against the amount or to impeach the truth of said testimony, the finding of the court will be sustained.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—Items.—Judgment having been rendered against the defendant for a fixed sum of money as damages 'without enumerating the items composing the same, the sum as a whole and not the items should be objected to in order to determine whether the said amount is excessive.</p> <p>Id. — Negligence—Evidence.—If the evidence is contradictory on the question of negligence and the trial court decides the conflict in favor of the plaintiff, its findings will not be disturbed unless passion, prejudice, bias, or manifest error be shown.</p>
- 24 P.R. 371People v. Vilá (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Adulteration of Milk.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 374González v. Lebrón (1916)
<p>Venue — Performance op Contract — Purchase and Sale — Action in Perso-nam — Jurisdiction.—When the action is not for the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, or for injuries to real property (sec. 75 of the Code of Civil Procedure), hut its object is to enforce the specific performance of a contract of purchase and sale of a rural property, such action is personal (in personam) and must be brought in the district where the defendants, or some of them, reside, in accordance with section 81 of the said Code of Civil Procedure.</p>
- 24 P.R. 376González v. Virella (1916)
<p>Appeal from- the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 383People v. López (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Hiimacao in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 384Berio v. American Railroad (1916)
<p>Opinion op Court — Transcript op Record — Appeal.'—The opinion of the trial judge is not such an essential part of the record that its omission from the transcript could be made a ground for the dismissal of the appeal, although the better practice is to include it for the guidance of the court'. The appeal is taken from the judgment and not from the opinion.</p> <p>Id. — Statement op Case — Omission—Evidence.—A party is not prejudiced by the omission from the opinion of facts which the judge considers it unnecessary to state, for what really concerns the par-ties is that the facts of the ease, as they actually came before the trial court for consideration, appear in the statement of the case.</p> <p>Damases — Shipment op Merchandise — Delivery to Agent — Bill op Lading.— When mercandise shipped by railroad is delivered to an agent of the consignee 'duly authorized to receive it, such delivery is the same as if made to the consignee himself, although the waybill, or bill of lading, is not presented, and no action will lie against the carrier for damages caused by the loss of the merchandise after its receipt by the agent.</p>
- 24 P.R. 389López v. Registrar of San Juan (1916)
<p>Lease — Conjugal Partnership — Community Property — Record of Title — Presumption — Curable Defect. — Although a property may he recorded in the registry in the name of the husband, if he admits that it belongs to the conjugal partnership by having his wife join him as lessor, he must prove in some way that he was married to her at the time he acquired the property so as to show that the said wife and not the succession of a former wife waa the party interested in tlie contract; for there is no presumption that a person now married to a certain wife had the same wife at a former date. However, the lack of such proof constitutes only a curable defect.</p> <p>Id. — Power op Attorney — Record op Title — Ownership—Express Power.— Even when section 159 of the Civil Code is cited in the power of attorney and it is stated that the husband and attorney in fact may do whatever he please with the community property to be managed by him and execute the necessary deeds without the joinder of the wife, as she expressly consents thereto, the said power of attorney does not authorize the husband to make a contract of lease of two rural properties for a term of four years, to be recorded in the registry of property; for, pursuant to the provisions of sections 159, 1328 and 1615 of the Civil Code, such a contract would require express authority inasmuch as it is an act of strict ownership.</p>
- 24 P.R. 396Rivera v. Registrar of Caguas (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of tlie Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Possessory Title.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 400Alvarez v. Registrar of San Juan (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Lis Pendens Notice.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 403Cortés v. Crehore (1916)
<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Ponce in an Action of Ejectment and for Mesne Profits.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 410People v. López (1916)
<p>Seduction — Promise of Marriage — Breach op Promise. — In a prosecution for-seduction under promise of marriage the court is not in error in refusing; to strike out the testimony of the complaining witness to the effect that-when she requested the defendant to keep his promise to her he married another person within three days. The marriage apparently completed the-breach of the promise made to the complainant.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence—Pregnancy of Complainant — Error.—There is no prejudicial error in permitting a witness to testify that the complainant told him seven months after the occurrence that she was pregnant provided her condition was shown by other evidence; for although it is not an essential fact,, it is evidence tending to corroborate the testimony of the complainant regarding her dishonor.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—-Essential Elements — Corroboration.—There are two elements equally-essential to the crime of seduction — the seduction and the promise of marriage. Therefore, there must be evidence tending to corroborate both elements.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Instructions—Corroboration.—An instruction to the jury that the-admissions of the accused that he had seduced the victim is sufficient corroborating proof of her testimony regarding the seduction and the promise-of marriage, is erroneous.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence—Corroboration-—Instructions—Weight op Evidence. — The-fact that the defendant contracted marriage with another woman after he had been requested to fulfil his promise; his long and continued relations-with the complainant; his confession that he had married another woman to-avoid compulsory marriage with the complainant, and the fact that he gave-the victim a ring, are. all elements of proof tending to corroborate the testimony of the complainant regarding the promise of marriage, and. the court should give the jury an opportunity to pass upon the weight of sueh evidence-</p> <p>Instructions — Objection or Exception — Appeal.-—Even when no specific objection is made or exception taken to the charge to the jury, if the error committed by the court is fundamental it may be reviewed on appeal.</p>
- 24 P.R. 413Esterás v. Esterás (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Annulment of Designation of Heirs.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 418Fajardo Sugar Growers' Ass'n v. Registrar of Humacao (1916)
<p>Corporation — Trustees or Receivers — Record of Title — Curable Defect.— When the trustees or receivers of a corporation acquire the ownership of certain joint interests in rural properties, the record made in their names in the registry should be understood as made in the name of the corporation; therefore failure to express in the title-deed the proportional part acquired by eaeh receiver or trustee does not constitute a curable defect.</p>
- 24 P.R. 420People v. Cuevas (1916)
<p>Falsification of Public and Judicial Documents — Altering Record, Map, Book, Paper, or Proceeding — Surety Bond. — Altering a surety bond signed before a notary public for the purposes of a criminal action before said bond has been filed or received for filing by the secretary of the court does not constitute a violation of sections 112 and 113 of the Penal Code, for it is neither a record, map, book, document, or proceeding of any court.</p>
- 24 P.R. 423Arbona v. Torres (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for the Custody of Natural Children by Virtue of Patria Po-testas.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 435Torres v. Pons (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Ejectment and for Recovery of Profits.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 439Iturrino v. Iturrino (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action to Recover Inheritance and Annul Proceedings.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 447People v. Marcano (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Gambling.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 450People v. Cartagena (1916)
- 24 P.R. 451Torres v. Plazuela Sugar Co. (1916)
<p>Servitude — Right oe Way — Written Title. — Pursuant to sections 546 and 547 of the Civil Code, a non-apparent and discontinuous servitude of right of way can only be acquired by a written title; but if by laying railroad tracks on the land the servitude is converted into an apparent one, it is doubtful whether a written title would be necessary. In both cases a title of some sort must always be shown.</p> <p>Id. — Consideration—Consent—Ownership.—When there is no lawful consideration for a servitude of right of way and the owner of the servient tenement has received no benefit therefrom, the fact that he has consented thereto does not imply that he has forever renounced his absolute ownership.</p> <p>Id. — Denial oe Servitude — Consent.—When in an action of denial of a servitude of right of way praying that the defendant, a private corporation, be enjoined from running its trains and ordered to remove the traeks laid on the property, it appears that the plaintiff only gave his consent, the case should be governed, perhaps, by section 446 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Ib.—Public Service Corporation — Private Corporation — Equitable Es-toppel. — In this case the defendant is not a public service but a private corporation engaged in the manufacture of cane sugar and for some years has been using some land belonging to the plaintiff, constructing thereon a private railroad track for the transportation of cane to and from the said factory; and the theory of equitable estoppel having been- invoked to prove the existence of a contract, completed or inchoate, or the beginning of negotiations similar to the right of eminent domain, it was held that as the defendant corporation was not a public service corporation and as there was no compensation, the provisions of the Civil Code in force are applicable and not the rule of equitable estoppel.</p>
- 24 P.R. 456Delgado v. Trujillo (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 458People v. Veve (1916)
<p>Breach op Peace — Assault and Battery — Former Jeopardy — Double Conviction. — In the circumstances of this case the court held that, as the defendant had satisfied the sentence imposed upon him for disturbing the public peace by quarreling with another person, that fact was a bar to a second conviction for the same offense, classified by the other defendant as assault and battery in the complaint charging breach of the peace.</p>
- 24 P.R. 460People v. Soto (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Forfeiture of Bail.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 462Ensenada Estates, Inc. v. Hill (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for the Recovery of Taxes Paid Under Protest.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 513Ríos v. Richardson (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for the Refund of Taxes.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 526Rabell v. Rodríguez (1916)
<p>Injunction — Ancient Interdict — Demolition op Structure — Equity.—The ancient civil code remedy of an interdict to enjoin the construction or to obtain the demolition of a newly erected structure has been largely superseded by the ordinary proceeding for injunction, such matters now being governed by the general principles of equity.</p> <p>Id. — Estoppel.—The doetrine of estoppel is as well known to the Civil Code as to any court of equity.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Demolition op Structure — Municipal Ordinance — Sanitary Regulation. — -A neighbor who for weeks or months observes the construction of a house on an adjoining lot without any protest or objection cannot thereafter obtain an order of court for the demolition of such structures merely because the municipal or Insular Government officials permitted slight deviations from some building ordinance or health regulation.</p> <p>Servitude op Light and View — Doors, Windows, Balconies and Similar Projections — Construction op Law. — It was not the intention of the Legislature to include doors among windows, balconies and other similar projections enumerated in section 589 of the Civil Code, for if it had been it would have done so by name and not by implication.</p>
- 24 P.R. 535Cancio v. Ramírez (1916)
<p>Promissory Note — Surety—Principal Debtor — Joint and Several Debtors.— An unsatisfied judgment in favor of the holder of a promissory note and against the maker thereof is no bar to an action against other joint and several debtors under the terms of an endorsement reading as follows: “We bind ourselves jointly and severally as sureties and principal obligors of the foregoing obligation, waiving the benefit of discussion, endorsement and such laws as may be in our favor, and the creditor may grant his debtor any extension without affecting our guaranty, which shall remain in force until the total payment of the debt for which we are sureties.”</p>
- 24 P.R. 541Mulet v. Local Committee of the Unionist Party (1916)
<p>De Pacto Corporation — Committee op Political Party. — Action op Debt — Es-toppel. — The local committee of a political party, after opening an account,, purchasing supplies, making various payments and promising to pay the balance, and after appearing as such committee and demurring to a complaint in an action to recover the amount unpaid, is estopped from denying its existence and capacity for the purpose of such litigation.</p>
- 24 P.R. 548Coll v. Arzuaga (1916)
<p>Mandamus — Corporation — Examination of Books — Stockholder. •— When a stockholder who petitions for a writ of mandamus to command the president of a corporation to allow him to examine the hooks, accounts and contracts of the corporation and take such notes as he may deem advisable fails to show that he first made such request of the respondent in due form and the latter refused such permission, the writ will not be granted.</p>
- 24 P.R. 556Turner v. Municipal Council of San Juan (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action to Annul the Forfeiture of a Bond and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 563Morales v. Olivari (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 567Benedicto v. Brac (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action to Recover Fees.’</p> <p>Motion by the Appellee for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 569Bosch v. Bosch (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action to Eecover Inheritance, etc.</p> <p>Motion by the Defendant-appellee for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the decision.</p>
- 24 P.R. 571García v. Humacao Fruit Co. (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Htimacao in an Action. of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 572Torres v. Registrar of San Germán (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Deed with Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 573People v. González (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 328 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 575People v. Franquis (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Disturbance of Peace.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 577Jiménez v. Registrar of Caguas (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Deed with Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 579Fuentes v. Registrar of Caguas (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Deed with Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 581De Jesús v. Registrar of Property of San Juan (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Dominion Title Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in 'the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 585People v. Rivera (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in a Prosecution for Slander.</p> <p>'The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 587People v. Fernández (1916)
<p>Unlawful Assembly — Cook-eighting—.Cruelty to Animals. — Cock-fighting is; an unlawful act prohibited and penalized by section 5 of the Act for the-prevention of cruelty to animals; therefore when persons assemble for the purpose of pitting cock-fights and separate without committing the aet, it is an unlawful assembly within the meaning of section 362 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Spectator.—Being a mere spectator at a gathering for the purpose of pitting cock-fights is not an unlawful aet within the meaning of section 3'62 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence.—The fact that the accused were in a cock-pit when the police arrived does not show that they had assembled for the purpose of instigating, promoting or carrying on a cock-fight, or of doing any aet as assistant, umpire or principal, or aiding or engaging in the furtherance of a cock-fight.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—The mere fact that a person has a eoek-pit, that some cocks are found in it prepared for fighting and that some persons are assembled there, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that they were assembled for the purpose of committing any of the acts which under the law constitute the unlawful act of cock-fighting.</p>
- 24 P.R. 591People v. Carrillo (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humaeao in a Prosecution for Petty Larceny.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 597Guardian Assurance Co. v. Acosta (1916)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Guayama in an Action of. Debt (Proceeding for Approval of Statement of Case).</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 601Pillot v. Domínguez (1916)
<p>INTERVENTION — Ownership—PROCEDURE.—In an action of intervention in ownership of real property the fundamental question of who is the. owner of the property attached or about to be sold in execution of some judgment, should be conclusively decided. The proper time for the parties to establish their rights in a ease of this kind is at the trial of the action of intervention, which should be conducted according to the procedure established by the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.—After examining all the evidence in this case as it appears from the statement of the ease approved by the trial judge, it was held that "as the intervenor proved her ownership of the attached house, her action should be sustained.</p>
- 24 P.R. 612Rivera v. North British & Mercantile Insurance (1916)
<p>Appeal — Statement oe Case — Extension oe Time — Transcript op Record.— On motion by the appellant the trial court granted an extension of time for presenting a statement of the case. The extension ivas indefinite and, therefore, null and void. The statement was presented after the expiration of the statutory period and the court refused to approve it. Held: That the time for filing in this court the transcript of the record on appeal from ■ the judgment runs from the date of filing the notice of appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—When the statement of the case is presented in due time or within an extension lawfully granted, the time for filing the transcript of the record in this court runs from the date of the final decision of the trial court approving or refusing to approve said statement of the case.</p>
- 24 P.R. 614Quiñones v. Ana María Sugar Co. (1916)
<p>Contract — Sale op Merchandise — Delivery op Thing Sold — Deposit op Purchase Price.. — Although section 1369 ol the Civil Code provides that the vendor is not bound to deliver the thing sold if the vendee haá not paid the price, nevertheless when it is tacitly agreed in a contract for the purchase and sale of sugar that, following the local custom, the price would be paid upon delivery of the sugar which was to be transported by the vendor at its own expense to the storehouse of the vendee, it cannot be held that the vendee should have delivered or deposited the price of the sugar in order to place himself in a position to enforce the contract.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Indemnity—Profit.—When the vendor fails to deliver the merchandise as stipulated in the contract, although it had not been paid for, the vendee has the right to be placed in the same position in. which he would have been if the merchandise had been delivered — that, is, according to section 1073 of the Civil Code, to be indemnified for the profit which he may have failed to realize, or, in the circumstances of this case, for the difference between the contract price and the market price on the date agreed upon for the delivery.</p>
- 24 P.R. 624Succession of Rosich v. Llorens (1916)
<p>Debt — Heirs—Partition—Joint Action. — The duly designated heirs and successors of .the deceased may bring an action jointly for the recovery of a debt due to the estate, although the estate may not have been partitioned, for they are presumptively the owners of the same.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Responsibility of HEirs — Debtors.'—When all the heirs join in an action and recover a debt due to the estate, they are responsible pro indiviso to any creditor. The rights of the debtors in such a case are protected when payment is made to the heirs. '</p>
- 24 P.R. 626Vives v. Board of Pharmacy (1916)
<p>Pharmacy — Board or Pharmacy — License to Practice — Examination.—An applicant for a license as pharmacist does not acquire any right of ownership of the certificate which authorizes him to practice the profession in this Island by the fact of having been examined and passed by the Board of Pharmacy in all the subjects required by law, if at the time he was enrolled he did not hold a diploma or document showing that he had passed an examination embracing all the scientific and literary subjects of the course at some high school of the Island or at some reputed similar or analogous institution of the United States or elsewhere, as required by law. At any time before issuing the certificate the board may correct its own errors and render its final decision in strict compliance with the law.</p>
- 24 P.R. 630People v. Colberg (1916)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Slander.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 637De la Cruz v. Registrar of Ponce (1916)
<p>Ganancial Property — Judicial Sale — Record of Title — Liquidation of Partnership — Conjugal Partnership. — When real property is acquired by a married man for a valuable consideration it belongs to the conjugal partnership, according to section 1316 of the Civil Code, therefore, although he is the lawful manager of the property, he cannot dispose of it after becoming-a widower until the said partnership has been liquidated; and the fact that the property was sold by a marshal does not change the situation, because, as the deed is executed in the name and representation of the debtor, his lack of capacity and the impediments originating in the registry affeet the marshal in the same manner as if the deed were executed by the debtor himself.</p> <p>Ib. — Conjugal Partnership — Debt Contracted During Marriage. — Although according to section 1323 of the Civil Code the property of the conjugal partnership shall be liable for the debts contracted during the marriage by the husband, when it is shown that the conjugal partnership was dissolved prior to the filing of the complaint and nothing appears in the document to indicate that the debt sued for was contracted by the husband during the marriage, or that the ganancial property was liable therefor, the said property cannot be applied to the payment of the debt.</p> <p>Id. — Civil Status — Judicial Sale — Record of Title. — Although the debtor may not be present when a marshal executes a deed in his name, his civil status and other personal conditions must be set out therein in order that his. capacity to convey may be known, and the omission of the same is a curable defect.</p>
- 24 P.R. 640Aguayo Bros. v. Zequeira (1916)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Preferment of Credit.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 641López v. Registrar of Caguas (1916)
<p>Possessory Proceeding — Entry of Ownership — Conflict—Record of Title.— When after a possessory proceeding is denied admission to record and a caveat is entered on the ground that an entry of ownership appears in the registry which is considered in. conflict with the possession whose record is sought, the registrar returns the possessory proceeding to the court which approve'd it, together with a certificate of the aforesaid entry, for further proceedings in accordance with article 393 of the Mortgage Law and by virtue of such further proceedings the previous decision is affirmed and the record of the possessory proceeding is ordered, such subsequent proceedings should bo passed on by the registrar independently of his first refusal to admit the possessory proceeding to record.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Personal Notice — Notice by Mail. — Article 3'93, in connection with paragraph fifth of article 391, of the Mortgage Law requires, whenever it is possible, personal notice to the persons who by virtue of the entry of ownership which is in conflict with the possession proved in the possessory proceeding may have some right to the property, and notice by mail is not personal notice.</p> <p>Id. — Ordinary Action — Notice.—Seetion S22 o£ tlie Code of Civil Procedure is strictly limited to ordinary suits between parties and does not refer to proceedings under the Mortgage Law.</p>
- 24 P.R. 645Figueroa v. Sepúlveda (1916)
<p>Unlawful Detainer — Appeal—Lease—Security—Damages—Costs. — An appeal in an action of unlawful detainer slrould be interposed within five days from the date of the judgment, and when the action is based on the expiration of the term of the lease it is an indispensable requisite for taking an appeal that security be given to cover damages and the costs of. the appeal, which security must be given within the time allowed for taking the appeal.</p> <p>In. — Id.—Jurisdiction—Security.—A municipal court has no jurisdiction to rule in an action of unlawful detainer that security given for an appeal is null and void, to allow the defendant time to give new security in the proper •form and to approve the latter after the expiration of the time within which the security should have been given.</p> <p>Jurisdiction. — Section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize any court to change jurisdictional periods.</p>
- 24 P.R. 650Castro v. Registrar of San Juan (1916)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Purchase and Sale.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 652People v. García (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Perjury.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 654León v. Alvarado (1917)
<p>Unlawful Detainer — Evidence—Possession.—In this ease the defendant-appellant assigned as error, but without argument, that the trial court had not weighed the evidence correctly; and it was held that there was no such error inasmuch as it was clearly proved, and not contradicted, that the property had been acquired by the plaintiff-appellee under an execution in an action between the same parties, and that the defendant was still in possession thereof without paying any rent therefor.</p> <p>Td. — Nullity of Title. — The fact that the defendant in an action of unlawful detainer pleaded the nullity of the action in which the plaintiff acquired the property sued for in the action of unlawful detainer, is no ground for holding that the plaintiff has not a sufficient title to support a judgment in his favor; for until the said action and sale are annulled his title is good and he continues as the owner with the right to compel the defendant to vacate the property.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Summary Proceeding. — The question of whether the plaintiff's title is void and prevents his exercising the rights originating therefrom cannot he decided in a special summary proceeding, like that of unlawful detainer, in which only the right of the apparent owner and possessor to dispossess the tenant in possession is involved.</p>
- 24 P.R. 656Gordon v. Godreau (1917)
<p>Possessory Proceeding — Evidence—Passion, Prejudice, or Partiality — Manifest Error. — The evidence introduced by the plaintiff in this ease tends to show that she constructed the house in question with her own money, while the evidence of the defendant tends to prove that the house was built by his agent with money furnished by him for that purpose. Held: That the conflict in the evidence was decided against the plaintiff by the finding that the allegations of the complaint had not been properly established and the holding in the judgment that the invalidity of the possessory proceedings had not been proved, therefore the finding of the lower court should not be disturbed inasmuch as it has not been shown that it was influenced by passion, prejudice, or partiality, or that it acted in manifest error.</p>
- 24 P.R. 658Gautier v. Registrar of Humacao (1917)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Contract of Purchase and Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 660Dávila v. Registrar of Humacao (1917)
<p>Attachment — Lis Pendens — Cautionary Notice — Cancellation oe Becord— Conversion oe Cautionary Notice Into Becord. — The object of recording a Us pendens attachment in the registry is to advise third persons who may acquire thereafter any right in the property attached that they will lose it if the person levying the attachment should obtain judgment in his favor in the action in which the attachment originated. Article 20 of the Mortgage Law, which refers to records in general, is not applicable to such a case, but it is governed by article 71 which, while allowing the conveyance or encumbrance of the property without prejudice to the right of the person in whose favor the attachment was recorded, provides as a consequence that if such conveyance has been recorded, a certified copy of the final judgment in favor of the person levying the attachment shall be a valid title for its cancellation. This provision is developed in article 142 of the Regulations, which prescribes the manner in which a cautionary notice may be converted into a record upon final acquisition of the right attached.</p>
- 24 P.R. 664Banco Comercial de Puerto Rico v. Registrar of San Juan (1917)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Enter a Cautionary Notice of an Attachment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 667People v. González (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Conspiracy.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 670Jiménez v. Registrar of Aguadilla (1917)
<p>Mortgage — Record ojp Title — Curable Defect — Amount Secured. — Although a mortgage created on several properties affected by the same obligation cannot be recorded in the registry when the amount secured by each property is not determined in advance, the instrument may be admitted to record when it is stipulated that the debt shall be secured by the mortgaged properties in proportion to their areas, which are specified and the properties appraised for the purposes of the morgtage in the same amounts secured by them, but with the curable defect that the amount secured by each property is not stated in proper form; for the fixing of said amounts should not be left to the deduction of the registrar. The manner in which the defect may be corrected is defined in article 164 of the Mortgage Law Regulations..</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Personal Status — Age, Status, Profession, and Residence of Parties — Curable Defect. — When the notary who attests a public instrument only certifies that “he personally knows the parties,” without certifying to their age, status, profession, and residence, the registrar is justified in considering the said omission a curable defect for the purpose of recording the instrument.</p>
- 24 P.R. 673Cintrón v. Berríos (1917)
<p>Mandamus-^-Municipal Employee — Removal prom Office — Notice and Hearing — Just Cause. — An inspector of municipal charities is entitled to notice and a hearing "before being removed from office by the mayor for just cause, but the charges need not be made with such technical skill as is ordinarily-employed by a fiscal in drawing up an information; nor is it necessary that all the formalities of a trial be observed.</p> <p>Id. — Hearing—Defense—Waiver or Abandonment. — A hearing, as required by common justice, means that the official sought to be removed from office shall be given reasonable notice of the specific acts or omissions of which he is accused; that he be allowed a reasonable opportunity to defend himself by answering the charges and producing evidence, and that he be permitted to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, albeit he may waive or abandon any of these privileges.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—When a person who is entitled to he heard on charges made against him is deprived of such right without cause, he should, as in this case, be granted relief by mandamus.</p>
- 24 P.R. 683Torres v. Alfaro (1917)
<p>Judgment by Default — Summons—Service.—In accordance with section 92 of-the Code o"f Civil Procedure, in order that the default of a defendant may he entered and judgment rendered against him, it is absolutely necessary that the summons, by whomsoever served, be returned as served to the office of the secretary of the court, as provided for by law; for only by an examination of the return thereon can it be determined whether the court acquired jurisdiction by due service of the summons upon the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Jurisdiction.—In this ease when the default judgment was entered by the secretary the affidavit of the person charged with the service of the summons did not appear in the record, but it was filed eight days later. Meld: That, applying the foregoing doctrine, the said judgment and the subsequent proceedings were null and void because the court acted without jurisdiction.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Answer.—In order to determine whether the answer was filed within the time specified in the summons, as required by subdivision 1 of section 194 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court must have before it when it renders judgment the return showing the date on which the summons was served.</p> <p>Id.- — Jurisdiction.—When a judgment by default is void on its face because of lack of jurisdiction which appears from a simple examination of the record, it may be set aside at any time after its entry without regard to the time prescribed by section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Summons—Service.—In order that a court may know that it has acquired jurisdiction over a defendant according to section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it must have before it authentic proof of the service of the summons by means of the return made in accordance with law.</p>
- 24 P.R. 689People v. Río (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Attempted Rape.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 691Morales v. Díaz (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for the Rescission of a Contract and Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 695Goffinet v. Sánchez (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humaeao in Injunction Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 703Bracons v. Registrar of San Juan (1917)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Part of an Estate.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 710People v. Rodríguez (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 553 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 712People v. Borges (1917)
<p>False Representation — Evidence—New Trial — Doubt.—When there are good grounds for concluding that the district judge rendered a judgment of conviction without properly weighing all of the evidence, a new trial should be granted, especially if the Supreme Court, as in the present case, has grave doubts as to the guilt of the accused.</p>
- 24 P.R. 715Succession of Padró v. Lloreda (1917)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Arecibo in Actions of Intervention in Ownership of Real Property, Injunction and Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the Opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 719Colón v. Registrar of Caguas (1917)
<p>"Dominion Title — Record or Title — Boundaries or Property — Presíriptiox— Prior Record — Judgment.—It is proper to refuse to record in the registry of property a judgment establishing the ownership of a certain property which, to judge from some of its boundaries, may be presumed to form part of a larger property recorded in the name of a deceased person when the judgment does not show the fact that it was conveyed by the supposed predecessor in interest to the former owners named in the judgment, nor that the appellant had acquired it by prescription adverse to the heirs or successors in interest of the deceased, nor that tlie court had knowledge of such record in the name of a third person.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Reasonable Doubt. — A registrar should refuse to record a title, not only when he knows that the right sought' to be recorded is already recorded in the name of a person distinct from the one who executed the conveyance, but also when lie has a reasonable doubt as to that fact.</p>
- 24 P.R. 724Tettamauzi v. Zeno (1917)
<p>Execution — Judgment—Ordinary Procedure. — The fact that certain formalities aré prescribed by statute for the execution of judgments does not prevent recourse to the ordinary procedure to enforce fulfilment of the obligations adjudged therein.</p> <p>Pleading — Verification—Unlawful Detainer. — A person who is not a party to an action may verify any pleading filed therein in the case provided for by section 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure, said case not being limited to actions of unlawful detainer inasmuch as the authority given is general and courts should make no distinctions which have not been made by the Legislature.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Sworn Answer — Judgment on Pleadings. — The complaint in this ease having been duly verified, the defendant should have verified his answer and, having failed to do this, he cannot complain that the court, on motion of the plaintiff, rendered judgment on the pleadings.</p>
- 24 P.R. 729People v. Carrasquillo (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Cruelty to Animals.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 733Succession of Rodríguez v. Succession of Torres (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action to Annul Foreclosure Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 743Paganacci v. Lebrón (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District (hurt of Guayama in an Action for Malicious Prosecution.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 758Rivera v. Rodríguez (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action to Annul a Foreclosure Proceeding, and Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 759Hernández v. Zequeira (1917)
<p>Certiorari — Change of Venue — Appeal—Spat op Proceedings — Supersedeas.— According to section 298 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal from an order refusing a change of venue does not stay the proceedings in the action; and although the filing of a supersedeas bond is part of the perfecting of an appeal in California and Idaho, from whose codes the said section was. taken, this is not the ease in Porto Rico.</p>
- 24 P.R. 760Tilén v. Mena (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, on Motion for a New Trial in an Action of Unlawful De-tainer.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 763Vidal v. Martínez (1917)
<p>Withdrawal op Action — Oounter-complaint—Conditional Waiver — Attorney Fees. — Although section 192 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants every plaintiff the right to -withdraw his action before trial upon the payment of costs, provided a counterclaim has not been made or affirmative relief sought by the cross-complaint or answer of the defendant, if, as in this ease, a cross-complaint has been filed and it is waived only on the condition, which is not accepted by the plaintiff, that the latter be adjudged to pay the attorney fees of the defendants, the action will not be dismissed.</p>
- 24 P.R. 765Belaval v. Todd (1917)
<p>Mandamus — Removal from Office — Damages—Salary—Judgment—Presumption — Jurisdiction—Execution.—Although in a petition for mandamus for reinstatement of the petitioner in his office or employment damages are claimed also under section 11 of the Mandamus Act, to be measured by the salary withheld from him, if the judgment only orders the reinstatement of the petitioner and is silent as to the damages, the presumption is that damages were not proved at the trial and that the question was decided adversely to the petitioner, the trial court having no jurisdiction to enter an order later for the collection of said salary in execution of the judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Damages.—It is clearly understood from section 11 of the Mandamus Act that the indemnity to which the petitioner is entitled for damages sustained should be ascertained by the court simultaneously with or prior to the issuance of the peremptory writ.</p> <p>Id. — Pleading and Practice — Judgment—Presumption.—In the absence of a showing to the contrary the presumption is, under the elementary law of pleading and practice, that in its ' judgment the court determined all the issues between the parties, or that those which the judgment did not show as determined were found adversely to the petitioner.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence—Trial—Reconsideration.—The parties must present their proofs at the trial and when a case is submitted to the court for decisión the defendant is released from further attendance at the trial, it being the almost invariable rule not to reopen a case to supply a deficiency.</p> <p>on reconsideration.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Salary—Power to Execute — Duties Publici Juris — De Facto Official — Quaere.—When in a proceeding for mandamus against a mayor for the reinstatement of a petitioner in his office of director of hospitals and for mandamus, no specific claim for said damages is set up in the petition and the action is not one for the recovery of salary, the question of salary is excluded and the mayor cannot be commanded to pay the same by reason of the nature of the proceeding, the terms of the petition and the capacity of the official against whom the writ was issued; for the Mandamus Act provides that the person to be coerced must have power to execute the act, and the mayor is not the official who pays the salaries of the employees. To say that the damages should be measured by the salary does not make the two terms convertible. The only acts subject to mandamus are duties puhlici juris and never an obligation to pay a specific sum awarded by judgment. Qtiaere: Whether the payment of the salary to a de facto official would bar recovery of the same by the petitioner?</p>
- 24 P.R. 777Oliver v. Jayuya Development Co. (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo on Motion for Change of Yenue in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 779Vivas v. Hernaiz, Targa & Co. (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Intervention in Ownership.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 786Ochoa v. Manzano (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in a Proceeding for Mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 790People v. Rivera (1917)
<p>Statement op Case — Bill op Exceptions — Refusal to Settle — Mandamus.— An order refusing to settle a bill of exceptions and statement of the case because they were presented after the expiration of the time allowed by law, does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant and therefore eannot be appealed from under the provisions of subdivision 3 of section 347 of the Code of Criminal 'Procedure. The remedy is by mandamus to compel the trial judge to rule upon the main question and by petition to this court to approve the facts and exceptions as provided for by rule 64.</p>
- 24 P.R. 793Figueroa v. Registrar of Arecibo (1917)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property Befusing to Eecord a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 796Lange v. People (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagliez in Habeas Corpus Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 800Latorre v. Torres (1917)
<p>Findings op Fact — Appeal.—The failure of the trial court to make particular findings of fact cannot be pleaded as error on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Fraudulent and Simulated Contract — Selp-serving Declaration — Evidence. — When the administrator of an estate sues to recover the amount due on a mortgage and all the evidence tends to show that the contract was fraudulent and simulated and the court so holds, the fact that the deceased testified to the contrary during his lifetime in other actions between the defendant, the defendant’s wife and the deceased, cannot affect the conclusion reached from the evidence, such testimony being in the nature of a self-serving declaration.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Administrator.—The administrator of an estate cannot be in a better position to set up a claim on a fraudulent contract than his intestate would have been. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendeniis. The courts should lend no aid to a simulated contract. ISx dolo malo non oritur actio.</p>
- 24 P.R. 804Lizardi v. Registrar of Caguas (1917)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 809Pizá v. Ramis (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Cancellation of Mortgage.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 812Shaw v. Rodríguez (1917)
<p>Evidence — Error—Brief—Beview of Facts. — When it is alleged that the lower court erred in weighing the evidence, the elements of proof introduced at the trial should be reviewed in detail 'in the brief so as to convince this court of the truth of the allegation.</p> <p>Id.- — Obligation — Burden op Proop — Extinction op Obligation — Presumption. — In accordance with section 1182 of the Civil Code, which is in harmony with section 108 of the Law of Evidence, the proof of an obligation devolves upon the person claiming its fulfilment and that of its extinction upon the one opposing or denying it; and the fact that the creditor holds a document or promissory note evidencing the obligation constitutes a presumption against the extinction of the obligation until destroyed by proof to the contrary.</p> <p>Id. — Brief—Error.—It having been assigned as error at the hearing on the appeal that the complaint did not set up a cause of action because it failed' to allege that the promissory note was not only signed by the debtor but had been delivered to the creditor, and the said assignment not having been included in the brief as required by rule 42, it was held that as said error was not fundamental and the rights of the appellants were not prejudiced by the omission, it should be disregarded in the decision of the case in conformity with rule 43.</p> <p>Judgment — Appeal-—Amendment op Judgment — Order Nunc pro Tunc. — A judgment against the defendants for payment to the plaintiff of the amount of the promissory note sued upon having been appealed from and after-wards amended by the trial court to include the payment of the interest claimed in the complaint without any opposition on the part of the defendants, the Supreme Court is not deprived of jurisdiction of the judgment appealed from because of the amendment, but has jurisdiction to review both the judgment and the amendment, for the original judgment is not substituted or annulled by the amended judgment, and the date of the original judgment controls, as the subsequent amendment should be regarded as an order nunc pro tuno.</p>
- 24 P.R. 817Torres v. Ramírez (1917)
<p>Malicious Prosecution — Probable Oause — Advice oe Counsel. — One of tlae essential elements in an action for malicious prosecution is lack of probable cause, because the law protects a man against an action for malicious prosecution if, before he complains of another, he makes a full and fair disclosure of all the facts to an attorney of good reputation and in active practice and the latter, in good faith, advises the client that he has cause to have the alleged offending person arrested.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Advice of Counsel — Criminal Intent. — The parties were having a dispute with respect to the ownership of a piece of land and the plaintiff, maintaining that it was his, gathered eoeonuts from the palms on the disputed property and converted them to his own use. The defendant, believing in good faith that the plaintiff had taken the coconuts in defiance of the former’s rights and warning, consulted an attorney and as a result of his advice charged the plaintiff with larceny and had him arrested. Held: That although the arrest was unusual and extraordinary, inasmuch as the ownership of the property was in dispute and the attorney should have known of the lack of criminal intent and the impossibility of securing a conviction, the client was protected by the unsound advice of his counsel; and the plaintiff cannot benefit by the fact that the defendant, when testifying as a witness for the plaintiff, admitted that he had a good opinion of the latter and that even before the arrest he had not considered him a thief but only a person acting with temerity, for the defendant was not bound to communicate such impression to his attorney but merely all the material facts known to him.</p>
- 24 P.R. 819Gutiérrez del Arroyo v. Registrar of San Juan (1917)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Cancellation of Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 821García v. Córdova (1917)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 826People v. Trinidad (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 828Gaztambide v. Municipality of Sabana Grande (1917)
<p>Boundaries — Acquiescence—Reservation iop Rights — Judgment.—When a defendant acquiesces in a complaint, asking that certain rights he reserved to him, and the other party does not object and the reservation is not contrary to law, the same should he set out in the judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Costs—Attorney Fees — Discretion op Court — Temerity.—The imposition of costs, disbursements and attorney fees lies in the sound discretion of the court which renders the judgment; hut according to the statutes governing the matter (Acts of 1908, p. 50), in order that such discretion may he exercised there must be some degree of temerity on the part of the party upon whom they are imposed. There is no degree of temerity on the part of a defendant who acquiesces in the prayer of a plaintiff that a boundary be established when it is not alleged that the former had objected to the same previously and for that reason the latter was obliged to bring the action. It is natural that the party who prays for and obtains the establishment .of the boundary in such circumstances should pay the expenses occasioned thereby.</p>
- 24 P.R. 831Porto Rican Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Registrar of Guayama (1917)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Contract for Agricultural Financing and ■ Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 835Longpré v. Registrar of San Juan (1917)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Deed of Sale with Curable Defects.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 839Rivera v. North British & Mercantile Insurance (1917)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce on an Order to Strike Out the Statement of the Case in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 24 P.R. 843Daubón v. Dávila (1916)
- 24 P.R. 843People v. Soto (1916)
- 24 P.R. 843Acevedo v. López (1916)
- 24 P.R. 843Jiménez v. Martínez (1916)
- 24 P.R. 843People v. Casas (1916)
- 24 P.R. 843People v. Flores (1916)
- 24 P.R. 843People v. Balzac (1916)
- 24 P.R. 844People v. Arana (1916)
- 24 P.R. 844People v. García (1916)
- 24 P.R. 844People v. Mclinary (1916)
- 24 P.R. 844People v. Pagán (1916)
- 24 P.R. 844People v. Pulliza (1916)
- 24 P.R. 844People v. Trinidad (1916)
- 24 P.R. 845Carrera v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co. (1916)
- 24 P.R. 845Forestier v. Forestier (1916)
- 24 P.R. 845People v. Balsells (1916)
- 24 P.R. 845People v. Coconut Product Industrial Co. (1916)
- 24 P.R. 845People v. Maldonado (1916)
- 24 P.R. 845People v. Romero (1916)
- 24 P.R. 846Calderón v. Rossy (1916)
- 24 P.R. 846People v. Araujo (1916)
- 24 P.R. 846Ramos v. Molina (1916)
- 24 P.R. 847Belaval v. Dávila (1916)
- 24 P.R. 847Capó v. Manzano (1916)
- 24 P.R. 847González v. Succession of Virella (1916)
- 24 P.R. 847Negrón v. Succession of Jiménez (1916)
- 24 P.R. 847People v. Cartagena (1916)
- 24 P.R. 847People v. Franquis (1916)
- 24 P.R. 848Fernández v. Pérez (1916)
- 24 P.R. 848González v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. (1916)
- 24 P.R. 848People v. García (1916)
- 24 P.R. 848People v. López (1916)
- 24 P.R. 848People v. Sánchez (1916)
- 24 P.R. 848Succession of Molfulleda v. Succession of Ramos (1916)
- 24 P.R. 849Coll v. De la Cruz (1916)
- 24 P.R. 849Fernández v. Geyls (1916)
- 24 P.R. 849Manrique de Lara v. Garrossi (1916)
- 24 P.R. 849Nadal v. Mary (1916)
- 24 P.R. 849People v. Antongiorgi (1916)
- 24 P.R. 849People v. Burgos (1916)
- 24 P.R. 849Sein v. Domenech (1916)
- 24 P.R. 850Díaz v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. (1916)
- 24 P.R. 850People v. Ochart (1916)
- 24 P.R. 850People v. Tejera (1916)
- 24 P.R. 850Santiago v. Rodríguez (1916)
- 24 P.R. 851Dipini v. Pérez (1916)
- 24 P.R. 851People v. Chavarri (1916)
- 24 P.R. 851People v. Lange (1916)
- 24 P.R. 851People v. Ochart (1916)
- 24 P.R. 851Rodríguez v. Melero (1916)
- 24 P.R. 851Villamil v. Lloreda (1916)
- 24 P.R. 851People v. Márquez (1916)
- 24 P.R. 852Ortiz v. Guardian Assurance Co. (1917)
- 24 P.R. 852Padovani v. Foote (1917)
- 24 P.R. 852People v. Ricci (1917)
- 24 P.R. 852People v. Rivera (1916)
- 24 P.R. 852Rivas v. Cruz (1916)
- 24 P.R. 852Rodríguez v. Infanzón (1916)
- 24 P.R. 852People v. Barros (1917)
- 24 P.R. 853People v. Ríos (1917)
- 24 P.R. 853Amador v. Lloreda (1917)
- 24 P.R. 853New Córsica Centrale Corp. v. Foote (1917)
- 24 P.R. 853Aguayo Bros. v. Quiles (1917)
- 24 P.R. 853People v. Félix (1917)
- 24 P.R. 853People v. Pérez (1917)
- 24 P.R. 853Villamil v. Marrero (1917)
- 24 P.R. 854Marín v. People (1917)
- 24 P.R. 854Martínez v. Crosas (1917)
- 24 P.R. 854People v. Dones (1917)
- 24 P.R. 854People v. Orden (1917)
- 24 P.R. 854People v. Vélez (1917)