Volume 25 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Appeal — Attachment—Appearance—Transcript of Record — Judgment Roll— Attorney. — When an appeal is taken from an order overruling a motion to set aside a judgment and cancel a bond given for dissolving an attachment on property of a defendant to secure the effectiveness of a judgment, it being alleged that an appearance in the said proceeding by an attorney in the name of the defendant was made without- the express or implied authorization of the latter, the transcript of the record should contain a copy of the judgment roll and a copy of the said proceedings in order that the court may know how the objectionable appearance was made.</p> <p>Id. — Estoppel—Record—Judicial Notice — Deficiency.—In the absence of something in the nature of the estoppel of a person desiring to take advantage of the silence of a record in order to allege matters which the courts know to be otherwise, courts of appeal will not take judicial notice generally of their own records, and they will not take judicial notice thereof solely for the purpose of supplying a deficiency in the record.</p> <p>Id. — Judicial Notice — Law of Case. — The courts will take judicial notice of matters decided in a previous appeal in the same case in order to prevent their being raised again by a party.</p> <p>Id. — Law of Case. — When the facts shown before the trial court and the theory of the appellant are different from those in a former case, the decision in the former case is not the law of the case in the latter, and the appellant should submit to the appellate court the record as it was considered by the trial court.</p> <p>Appearance — Attorney—Agent—Ratification.—WThen a defendant, after becoming advised that his presumed agent had employed an attorney to move to dissolve an attachment levied on his property, allows the proceedings-to continue without taking any action, such failure to act constitutes a ratification of the acts of the attorney.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Presumption.—The presumption that an attorney is authorized to represent a party is not lightly to be rebutted and his acts are susceptible of easy ratification. It is a principle in the interest of the whole bar. This presumption lies at the foundation of our court procedure, for otherwise at every stop the court would have to stop and question its attorneys as to their authority.</p> <p>Id. — Quasi-oontract.—The facts of this case have been considered as a quasi-contract under sections 1789, 1790, 1791, 1793 and 1794 of the Civil Code.</p>

<p>Expert Evidence — Findings of Fact — Error.—When a trial judge finds that concrete used in building -walls was not mixed in the proportions stipulated in the contract — that is, one part cement, two parts sand and four parts gravel — based exclusively on the testimony of an expert that the concrete had been mixed in different proportions, and the said expert e±plains the method employed by him to obtain the results found, and it is proved and found by the court that in following the said method the apparent volumes in which the materials were mixed are not obtained but only the absolute volumes in which they are found in the concrete, it is manifest error to reach that conclusion only because the said expert used the word “parts” and to assume that this word could only refer to the apparent volumes when it might well have reference, and probably did, to the absolute volumes, inasmuch as the expert testified that he employed the said method to ascertain the proportions in which the materials ve-e to be found in the concrete.</p> <p>Id. — Conflicting Evidence — Findings of Fact. — The plaintiff having alleged that the cement, sand and gravel used by him for the concrete in building certain walls were previously examined and accepted by ihe inspector of the defendant, and the latter having answered that the sand and gravel used were of inferior quality and had not been accepted, the decision of the court that it was unable to conclude that the said materials were bad, or that they had not been accepted prior to their use, is tantamount to finding that the defendant had not proved its allegation and that plaintiff’s eon-» tention was correct, thus deciding the conflict in favor of the latter.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Answer of Witness. — While the answer of an educated person is responsive .to the question put and an interrogation regarding the constituent parts of a mixture of concrete calls for a response regarding such parts, nevertheless if his reply shows that he referred to something else, it cannot be held that his answer was responsive to the question.</p>

<p>ApplicatioN for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Intervention and for an Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Public Justice — Assault and Battery — Information.—An information charging a crime against public justice by the violation of section 138 of the Penal Code is sufficient when it alleges that the defendant, being a public officer, a detective of the Insular Police charged with the maintenance of the peace and in the exercise of his ofüee, wilfully and criminally, under color of authority and without lawful necessity therefor, assaulted and battered a particular person.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Variance Between Information and Evidence — Res Gesmi. — It was alleged in this case that there was a variance between the information and the evidence in that the information set up that the alleged battery took place in a café, while some of the evidence sought to be introduced referred to acts which occurred in the street in front of the café. Held: That as the first assault charged took place within the café and all the subsequent acts shown in evidence were in close spiritual and physical connection therewith, the events in the street may properly be considered as a part of the res gestee.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Insular Policemen — Color of Authority. — In this case the accused, an Insular Police detective on duty, another detective and a captain of police were seated together in a café discussing an incident which occurred between a citizen and two detectives. The complaining witness, who was near them, casually overheard the discussion and, somewhat imprudently, addressed them, saying that they had no right to be talking in that way about the absent man and that they would not do so if he were present. The other detective then rose and struck the complaining witness. A scuffle ensued and almost immediately the defendant arose and struck the complaining witness on the head, at the same time ordering his arrest. A few minutes later and while the complaining witness, who had been arrested by another policeman, was in the street the defendant and the other detective came out of the café, the latter uttering imprecations and shouting, "Club him to jail!” while the defendant again struck the complaining witness, although the latter was continually protesting that he would go along quietly. From the evidence it was clear that the official character • of all the policemen was known to the complaining witness and to all tho other people in the café. Seld: That the police officials acted under color of authority.</p> <p>Id. — Abuse of Authority. — One of the ideas of the Legislature in enacting section 138 of the Penal Code was to protect citizens against officers who abuse their authority.</p> <p>Id. — Information—Objection—Administration of Oath — Technical Defect— Abuse of Discretion. — An objection to the information that it does not show before whom the witnesses were sworn, should be made before the trial, in conformity with section 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; for when a defendant demurs or pleads to an information he waives any defect in the swearing of the witnesses,' and the refusal of the court to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea for the purpose of raising a question of this kind will not he reviewed by this court except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion. The objection comes too late at the trial.</p> <p>Id. — Judicial Notice. — Courts may take judicial notice of the signature of the Chief of Police.</p>

<p>Public Justice — -Assault and Battery — Variance Between Information and Evidence. — Although there may be a variance between the information and the evidence in this ease in that the former charged assault and battery in the café while the latter showed that it occurred in the street, as the events which led up to the offense took place in the café and were in such close spiritual and physical connection therewith that it would be impossible for the defendant not to be able to identify the crime, it was held that said variance was neither material nor prejudicial and that the defendant was not misled.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Possessory Title — Mortgage—Capacity of Party. — When a property is recorded by virtue of a possessory title proceeding ih which it appears that the appellant was a widower at the time he acquired the property, the registrar is not authorized upon the subsequent presentation for record of a mortgage on the said property to examine other entries or documents of his office relating to a different property and showing that the appellant was married at the time of the acquisition of the property; for the registrar must determine the legality of the title from the documents presented, taking into account the other records in the registry relating to the same property.</p> <p>Id.' — Denial of Admission to Record — Grounds of Decision — Brief.—When a mortgage is refused admission to record for the reason that the legal character of the mortgaged property and, consequently, the capacity of the party to encumber the same as his own property cannot be determined, the registrar cannot assign another and different reason in his brief on appeal, as he has done in the present case, namely, that from other records in the registry it appears that the appellant was married when he acquired a part of the property which he mortgages while a widower; for the registrar should not assign the legal reasons for his decision in ‘his brief, it being his duty, under the imperative provisions of the law, to set them out clearly at the foot of the document presented. When the reason assigned in the brief is different from that set out in the decision appealed from, the reason assigned in the brief cannot be considered on appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in a Proceeding for Approval of a Bill of Costs in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Costs — Stenographer's Fees — Stenographic • Record. — When the party opposing a memorandum of costs does not deny an item for fees paid to the official stenographer for a copy of the stenographic record, there is no ground for considering whether such copy was necessary for the prevailing party; for inasmuch as the law provides that it forms part of the costs, it cannot he stricken from the memorandum if it were really obtained from the stenographer.</p> <p>Id. — Td.—Presumption.—The party claiming reimbursement for fees paid to an official stenographer is not required to prove that the amount disbursed represents the true value of the copy furnished; for the presumption is that the stenographer collected what was lawfully due him — namely, ten cents for each folio of one hundred words — unless the contrary be shown by the opposing party.</p> <p>Id. — Traveling Expenses. — As to whether the defeated party should pay the expenses incurred in traveling to another district depends upon whether or not the travel was necessary for the purposes of the action; but when the judge refuses to approve the same on the ground that the travel was unnecessary and nothing appears to the contrary in the proceedings on appeal, and the evidence produced at the trial, which the judge might have considered in deciding the matter, fails to show that it was necessary, his decision should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Expropriation — Complaint—Conclusion op Law — Error.—The refusal of the court to strike out a certain count of the complaint because it contained a conclusion of law in alleging that the defendants were adults, is not prejudicial error.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Motion to Strike — Demurrer—Misjoinder op Parties — The mention in the complaint that land belonging to the defendant-appellant had been segregated from other land belonging to the principal defendant, was not subject to a motion to strike out; nor was it error to overrule the motion. It might have been a ground for demurrer on the theory of misjoinder of parties defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Parties—Demurrer—Misjoinder oj? Parties. — The fact that the wife of one of several defendants is made a party in an action for expropriation does not prejudice the other proper and necessary parties, therefore a demur rer on the ground of misjoinder of parties defendant will not be sustained.</p> <p>Td. — Complaint—Public Utility. — A complaint in an action for expropriation is sufficiently clear and sets up a cause of action when it alleges that the work is of public utility, describes the property as well as the part segregated therefrom and recites the offer of payment made to all of the defendants and their refusal to accept the same. The declaration of the Executive Council as to the public utility of the work is generally conclusive in the absence of some clear showing to the contrary.</p> <p>Id. — Offer oe Payment. — The testimony of the mayor that offer of payment was made to the attorney who continuously represented the defendants before the Executive Council in the declaration of public utility and before the courts, is sufficient compliance with section á of the Act of March 12, 1908, for the purpose of proof of offer of payment.</p> <p>Id. — Summons of Owner — Appearance.—The fact that the owner of land declared of public utility was not summoned to appear before the Executive Council is not fundamental error if he appeared voluntarily.</p> <p>Id. — Value op Expropriated Land. — A court is not bound to find in condemnation proceedings that the price paid by a person when he purchased the property expropriated was its real value, or that the price agreed on in the deed was the actual price paid, or what was the value of the land at the time of the expropriation.</p>

<p>Costs — Payment Under Error — Res Judicata — Identity of Subject-matter, Causes of Action, and Parties. — In this ease certain orders were entered approving bills of costs, disbursements and attorney fees, and the creditors therein assigned their rights to a third person who collected the amounts allowed from the party adjudged to pay the same. Later, the said party ’ sued the assignee for the recovery of the sum of certain items included in the bills and his complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Hold: That as the assignee was the successor in interest of the creditors, according to section 1219 of the Civil Code the litigants in this case are the same as those in the proceedings for the approval of the bills of costs; that there is a perfect identity of subject-matters and causes of action, inasmuch as the question considered and decided in the affirmative in said proceedings was whether the items included in the bills of costs should be allowed and the question involved in this case is the same, or whether they were justly paid; and that the only ground upon which this action could be sustained would be that the said items were paid under error, and this would nullify the former order which has the force of res judicata.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—Execution—Action to Set Aside.' — Judgment having been entered against a party for the payment of different items included in a ■ bill of costs, disbursements and attorney fees, a subsequent action will not lie for the recovery of items paid under error on the ground that there was no obligation to pay some of the items; for the litigants should avail them- * selves of all their means of defense in the respective actions in order to avoid confusion or uncertainty, which would arise if independent actions could be brought on the various grounds to which the parties might resort in order to attack a judgment after execution.</p> <p>Id. — -Discretion oe Court — Temerity or Malice. — When it is not shown that the lower court abused its discretion in entering an order for costs, its findings regarding temerity and malice on the part of the defeated party in prosecuting his suit will not be disturbed.</p>

<p>Libel — Justification.—The defendant was charged with having published and circulated the following handbill: “The hospital was not built because Jorge Romany, president of the municipal council, had some quarries leased in the ward of Sabana Llana and also had some carts and oxen for hire, on which he paid no taxes, and hoped to find a bidder for the work who would take his materials, but when he thought that he had succeeded he found that the bidder had already let the contract and was unable to take his inferior and expensive materials. He then began to plot and 'at last the contract was rescinded and nearly a year passed before things were again authorized, the work put up at a new auction and Romany could find his man. At last he found him and on November 20 called a special session at which an attempt was made to give the contract to Guerini, who had business connections with Romany.Held: That such charges, if not true, are clearly libelous.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Counter-libel.—The fact that discord existed "between two political factions and one of them circulated a handbill attacking the defendant does not justify the action of the defendant, a member of the opposing faction, in publishing and circulating another (the one on which the present charge is based) charging the leader of the other faction with acts constituting a crime. The fact that A is guilty of libel against B does not justify B in committing a libel against A.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Appeal.—A ruling of the lower court refusing to allow a witness to answer a question cannot be considered on appeal when the record does not show the question and the answer sought to be obtained.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Proceeding for the Appointment of an Administrator.</p> <p>The 'facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Ejectment and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Malicious Prosecution — Damages—Pbobable Cause — Malice.—Mere proof of the arrest and acquittal of the plaintiff and of- damages in an action for malicious prosecution is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case, for lack of probable cause and malice must also be proved. The arrest and. acquittal alone do not tend to show a lack of probable cause.</p> <p>Id. — Probable Cause — Evidence—Malice.—At the trial in this case the plaintiff proved his arrest and acquittal by certain documents from the record of the prosecution for embezzlement introduced during the testimony of the secretary of the municipal court where the prosecution took place, and also proved damages. Some evidence on the question of probable caus& was introduced by the defendant during the examination of the witness together with other documents from the same criminal reeord. Held: That, in such circumstances the plaintiff did not prove malice, which is a mixed question of law and fact.</p> <p>Id.- — -Nonsuit—Evidence.—When on cross-examination of his own witness the-plaintiff makes no objection to the introduction in evidence by the defendant of other documents in the possession of said witness, the proof so-admitted is generally considered as part of the complainant’s prima facie case for the purposes of a nonsuit; and the motion for nonsuit cannot be objected to on the ground that the defendant had introduced a part of hi» evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Judgment—Exception.—Although the plaintiff took no exception to the ruling of the court sustaining the motion for nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had not made out a prima, facie case, if the judgment i» directly responsive to the motion, the judgment, by section 213 of the Code-of Civil Procedure, is excepted to by the act of the law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in Dominion Title Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Purchase and Sale — Tax Sale — Record oe Title — Certificate op Sale. — When it appears from one of the clauses of a deed of sale, executed by the original owner and presented in the registry of property for record, that the property was sold at a forced sale for delinquent taxes, the registrar is justified in refusing to record the same, for its stipulations are binding upon the parties inasmuch as under article 18 of the Mortgage Law the registrar is required to determine the legality of the instrument from its contents; and the fact that the certificate of the sale issued to the purchaser at the tax sale has not been presented for record does not alter the case. *</p>

<p>Pleading — Motion to Strike — Irrelevant and Redundant Matter — Affidavit. — Section 123 of the Code of Civil Procedure refers only to motions to strike out irrelevant and redundant matter and does not contemplate a motion to strike out an affidavit because it had not been properly numbered and recorded in the registry of the notary who signed the jurat.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Frivolous or Dilatory Question — Construction of Law. — In the event of an arbitrary disregard by the trial court of a meritorious motion, this court might construe the expression "a motion to strike out or a demurrer to any pleading,” employed iu section 142 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1915, to include a motion to strike out the verification rather than the pleading itself; but the terms of said section will not be extended to cover a frivolous or dilatory question evidently raised for the sole purpose of temporarily evading instead of answering or demurring to the complaint.</p> <p>Id. — Construction of Law — Error.—Construing section 142a in connection with section 142, there appears no intention either to alter or limit in any way the plain duty imposed upon both the trial court and the Supreme Court as to errors or defects not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.</p> <p>Id. — Verification of Complaint — Affidavit—Registry of Affidavit. — An affidavit made before a notary in conformity with the Act of March 12, 1908, in verification of a complaint, is not void because it fails to bear the number of the corresponding entry in the registry, nor is this a defect affecting any substantial rights of the defendant; for, according to section 8 of the said act, it is the omission from the record, and not the failure, inadvertent or otherwise, of a notary to duplicate upon the document the number of the corresponding entry in the registry that vitiates the affidavit. The legal presumption is that the notary complied with the statute requiring him to record the instrument.</p> <p>Id. — Motion to Strike — Judgment by Default — Appearance—Notice.—Under section 323 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the mere appearance of a defendant foi the purpose of moving to strike out the verification of the complaint does not entitle him to notice of plaintiff’s motion for default. The usual caution is contained in the summons, and there is no statutory provision or principle of law that requires a double warning.</p> <p>Id. — Cause of Action — Assignment of Contract — Consideration.—The consideration for the cession and assignment to plaintiff of the contract sought to be enforced need not be alleged in the complaint in order to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; for, according to section 3244 of the Civil Code, the consideration is presumed to exist.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Larceny — Dismissal of Prosecution — Postponement op Trial — Presumption. — When a defendant moves to dismiss the prosecution on the ground that the trial was postponed without just cause for more than one hundred and twenty days from the date of the filing of the complaint, he should make a showing of the reasons for the postponements, or that they were made without any reason; for, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that' they were made with cause.</p> <p>Id. — Information—"Sustraer”—Demurrer.—The word “sustraer,” used in an information charging grand larceny, is a sufficient equivalent of one or more of the English words "taking,” "carrying,” "leading or driving away,” and no objection can properly be made to its use.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Bill op Particulars — Jurisdiction.—In the absence of a request for a bill of particulars an information is generally sufficient with regard to the place of the commission of the crime if it is shown to be within the. jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Demurrer.—Under sections 144 and 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a defect in the swearing of the witnesses to the information must lie demurred to before the trial and before the arraignment in the absence of special permission by the court.</p> <p>Id. — Pleading—Demurrer.—A motion to set aside an information must precede a demurrer. The filing of a demurrer, which must be done at the time of the arraignment or within such further time as the court allows, or a plea, waives all motions to set aside. A plea, which must be made before the day of the trial, waives a demurrer. A court is therefore justified in refusing to entertain a demurrer if first presented on the day of the trial. This court will be disposed to disregard a demurrer so presented for any matter that is not of a privileged nature, such as lack of jurisdiction or failure to charge a public offense.</p>

<p>Servitude — Denial of Servitude — Burden oe Proof. — In an action oí denial of a servitude, after tlie owner of tire servient tenement has. proved his title the burden is on the defendant to show the existence of the servitude.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Findings of Fact. — When in an action of denial of a servitude the appellant fails to furnish this court with an analysis of the proof, for the purpose of overcoming the finding of the lower court that up to the time of the sale the property had had a single owner and lienee that no question of servitude could arise, and that the said sale took place about forty years before the trial, which was proved positively by the defendant’s own witnesses, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Res Judicata — Identity of Subject-matter, Causes of Action and Parties.— The evidence shows the plaintiff and defendant to be the same in this as in a former action; that they litigated in the same capacity in each, the plaintiff, in his character of heir, claiming certain property from the defendant which he alleged the latter was under obligation to deliver to him, or its equivalent in money; that the subject-matter in both actions are the same; and, finally, that the causes of action are also identical. Held: That tlie judgment rendered in the first action, holding that the action had prescribed, being conclusive, the plaintiff is estopped under the doctrine of res judicata, as defined in section 1219 of the Civil Code, from bringing another action, regardless of any errors that may have occurred in the first.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce on Motion for Change of Venue in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Ponce in an Action for the Demolition of a Structure.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Servitude — Light and View — Public Thoroughfare — Private Wat. — The term “public thoroughfare,” employed in section 591 of the Civil Code in relation to section 589 of the same code, does not include a private way opened through a lot by its owner for the convenience of the persons living in an interior building belonging to the same owner.</p> <p>Id. — Td. —• Tolerance — Obstructive Act — Prescription. — Doors and windows opened in a wall which faces the property of another should be regarded as merely tolerated, except in case of an agreement therefor; and an easement of light and air can be acquired by prescription only by computing the prescription period from the time of the commission of some obstructive apt acquiesced in by the owner of the adjoining property and tending to deprive the latter of the right to build thereon.</p> <p>Id. — Joists—Poofs—Ceilings.—The horizontal beams of wood or other material placed on the wall-plates of a building to serve as the main connection and support of the different floors which separate the stories, are called joists (carreras or vigas). The roof is the exterior part exposed to the direct action of the elements, and the interior parts covering the rooms are the ceilings; therefore there are several ceilings in a building of several stories and hence as many sets of joists as ceilings.</p> <p>Id. — Windows with Direct View — Owner of Adjoining Property. — If the law provides that windows with direct views shall not be opened unless there is a distance of two meters between the wall in which they are built and the adjoining property of another, and that in a wall not a party wall adjoining another's tenement openings of thirty centimeters square may be made at the height of the ceiling joists, it impliedly recognizes also the right of the owner of the adjoining property to demand the fulfilment of such provisions in the courts. And if jurisprudence has established that the simple fact of opening doors and windows in contravention of the rules of law creates no right in favor of the owner of the building in which they are opened, and that the lack of opposition on'the part of the owner of the adjoining property should be considered as an act of mere tolerance, it is natural that the said owner has a right of action whenever he may see fit to exercise it.</p>

<p>STew Trial — Affidavit.—The Code of Civil Procedure contains.no provision re- - quiring that a motion for a new trial shall be verified. The English text of section 222 provides that, when it is made for a cause mentioned in the first, second and third subdivisions of section 221, it must be made upon affidavit.</p> <p>Id. — Minutes of Court — Statf,ment of Case. — When a motion for a new trial is made ujion the minutes of the court, as provided for by subdivision 4 of section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a statement of the case is not required. This is shown by section 224 of the same code. Subdivision 3 of section 223 is applicable only when the motion is made upon a statement of the ease, which should specify the errors assigned.</p> <p>Id. — Filiation—Information—Demurrer—Discretion of Court. — When an action of filiation is brought against several persons as members of a succession according to the title of the complaint, without any allegation showing how they derive their status as such members of the succession, and a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is overruled, the court commits manifest error ■which produces the result that the pdaiatiff goes to trial under the impression that the allegations of his complaint are sufficient; therefore the court does not abuse its discretion in granting him a new trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for the Demolition of Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Proceeding for the Approval of a Memorandum of Costs in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Attorney and Client — Substitution op Attorney — Compensation—Contingent Pee. — A client lias the right to terminate the relation between himself and his attorney at his election, with or without cause, subject only to the right of the attorney to compensation; and this right cannot be affected by a previous contract for a contingent fee.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Appeal.—An order of a district court substituting one attorney for another in an action pending before it is not one of the orders enumerated in section 295 of the Code of Civil 'Procedure and is not appealable.</p>

<p>Contract — Sale oe 'Property — Area oe Property — Consideration.—The plaintiff sold for a lump sum a property whose area was determined by metes and bounds. A subsequent purchaser by units of measurement had the property surveyed and it was found to contain a less area. Thereupon the last purchaser and the original owner executed a notarial act, stipulating that in order to avoid litigation the latter agreed to a resurvey by' a surveyor to be named by her, and that if any difference resulted it should be deducted from the balance due and owing by the present owner and secured by a mortgage, based on the price for which she sold it. Held: That this was the consideration of the contract which was not affected by the , fact that when the plaintiff signed the notarial act no action was pending against her on that account, or that she erroneously believed that she was under legal obligation to pay the difference between the number of cuerdas which she represented the property to contain and the number shown by the survey; for such error of law could not avail to annul the obligation freely contracted, since ignorance of the law neither excuses nor favors any one.</p>

<p>Appeal — Transcript op Becord — Statement of Case — Amendments.—A transcript of the record should be filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty days after the approval of the statement of the ease; and if not filed within the said period, the appeal should be dismissed unless an extension of time therefor has been granted (sections 299 and 303 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to rules 40, 58 and 60 of the Supreme Court). And the failure of the appellant to comply with the law will not be excused by the fact that the appellee moved to set a day for a hearing on proposed amendments to the statement of the ease, which was approved without setting such day, he having thus allowed the time fixed by law for filing the record on appeal to expire without taking any steps to set aside the order approving the statement of the case until the appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Statement of Case — Ignorance or. Neglect — Notice—Attorneys.—An appellant cannot plead ignorance or neglect of an order approving a state-ment of the ease on the ground of failure of the secretary to notify him thereof, for said order is not included among those falling within the exceptions to the rule laid down in Act No. 70 of 1911 and Aet No. 33 of 1915. The attorney, in this particular regard, is as .much an officer of the court as is the secretary and is presumed to attend the court, it being his duty to inform himself of the status of his cases.</p>

<p>BARTER — -Appeal—-Transcript op Becord — Good Cause. — When there is good cause for failure .to send up within the statutory period the transcript of the record from a municipal to a- district court for the purpose of an appeal to the latter from a judgment of the former, the appeal will not he dismissed.</p> <p>Id. — -Price op Bartered Articles. — In order to prove the existence of a contract of exchange it is not necessary to show that a price was given to the articles exchanged.</p> <p>Id. — Automobiles—Registry op Automobiles. — It is not sound doctrine that an exchange of automobiles in this Island cannot be considered valid unless it is duly registered in the Department of the Interior. The registry establishes a prima facie presumption that the property belongs to the person indicated therein; but if such person exchanges the property, the acquirer obtains the ownership when the contract is entered into and can show the existence of such contract and claim all rights derived therefrom although the automobile exchanged is still registered in the name of its former owner in the said department.</p>

<p>Intervention in Ownership — Contradictory Evidence' — -Passion, Prejudice, Partiality, or Manifest Error. — When there is a conflict "between the evidence introduced by the parties in an action of intervention in ownership and the court, whose province it is to adjust the conflict, finds against the ■ plaintiff, and it is not shown that it was influenced by passion, prejudice, partiality, or committed manifest error, the only eases in which this court would disturb the finding of the court of original jurisdiction, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Possessory Title.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in Certiorari.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Agricultural Loan — Grinding of Cane — Community Property — Consent of Wife. — In the present ease a married man, without the consent of his wife,, entered into a contract .for agricultural financing and grinding of sugar cane, by virtue of which he received a certain sum of money as a loan and agreed to plant a specified number of cuerdas of land in different properties to sugar cane for several crops, two of the said properties belonging to the conjugal partnership, the contract to be recorded in the registry and the products of the said properties to respond for the payment of the amounts received. Held: That the express consent of the wife was essential to the validity of' the said contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Statement oe Case — Boll oe Exceptions — Bules oe District Courts. — The purport of rule 17 of the district courts in criminal eases, is to consider the bill of exceptions and statement of the case identical as to the time within which they should be filed; for it is evident that if ten days is a reasonable time for filing a bill of exceptions, it is also a reasonable time for filing the statement of the case when no motion is made for an extension of time.</p> <p>Td. — Ib.—Discretion oe Court.- — -The district courts have discretional power to allow an appellant in a criminal ad ion to file the bill of exceptions and statement of the case after the statutory time has elapsed, for the limitation is directory in character.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Diligence oe Dependant. — The position of a defendant in a criminal case, in which his life or liberty is involved, is very different from that of one in a case where mere property rights are concerned, and the courts are inclined to be liberal when the appellant, upon failing to comply with the requirement of filing the bill of exceptions or statement of the case in time, shows that he is in some degree entitled to the indulgence of the1 court.</p> <p>Appeal — Discretion oe Court. — Appellate courts are extremely reluctant to reverse a case on the ground of an abuse of discretion, unless a bad motive is shown or a fundamental right is involved and the appellate court is in the same position as the trial court and practically has the same opportunities for judging the situation.</p> <p>Id. — Review on Merits — Diligence.—When it clearly appears that a defendant would be deprived of a review of liis case on the merits; that at least some attempt was made by his attorney to comply with the rules of procedure, and that he sped his case and showed no desire to retard the same, the concurrence of all these elements is a sufficient showing that the defendant exercised diligence.</p>

<p>Information — -Examination op Witnesses- — Material Defect. — Failure to show that the witnesses were examined by the district attorney does not constitute a defect which materially affects the rights of the defendant, and the omission should be pleaded in the lower court to entitle it to consideration on appeal.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Cigars in Stock — Revenue Stock-book. — An information charging that the defendant unlawfully, wilfully and maliciously had in his commercial establishment a number of manufactured cigars, which are taxable under the law, without having paid the taxes due thereon or entered the same in the licensed manufacturer’s revenue stock-book, manifestly comes under the provisions of section 22 of the act entitled “An Act to amend Chapter II, Title IX, of the Political Codé and to repeal certain sections of the Penal Code, and for other purposes,” approved March 9, 1905, as amended by Act No. 55 of March 9, 1911.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama in a Prosecution for Incest.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Damages — Railroad Crossing — Negligence op Employee. — When a railroad company voluntarily provides a chain and a watchman at a crossing of a street used by the public it has the same obligations as if legally required to do so and must attend to and maintain the service with ordinary care and prudence, and it is guilty of negligence when its employee fails to stop traffic by putting the chain in place upon the approach of trains or locomotives, the public being entitled to rely upon a proper performance of such duty.</p> <p>Id. — Contributory Negligence — Weight op Evidence. — When in its answer to the complaint the defendant company charges contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in passing a grade crossing without exercising due care and precaution and that this was the proximate cause of the accident, the onus proiandi is on it; and if there is no evidence in the record to support the plea and the judge makes no finding on that point, it cannot be held that the court erred in holding that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the watchman employed by the defendant in failing to put the chain in place upon the approach of the locomotive.</p>

<p>Tnsulae Police — Certificate op Chief — Evidence.'—A certificate issued by tbe Chief of Insular Police, stating that the accused was a detective at a certain time, is sufficient proof of that fact.</p> <p>Td. — Leave op Absence — Arrest.—A detective on leave of absence may make an arrest for a crime committed in his presence. He does not cease to be a detective by reason of the leave of absence and retains the authority inherent in his position.</p> <p>Id. — Assault—Public Justice. — According to section 138 of the Penal Code, an assault by a detective in the full exercise of his position, under color of authority and without- lawful eause, upon a particular -citizen by striking him in the face, is an offense against public justice and not assault and battery.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Intervention in Ownership.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in Proceedings for Administration.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action for the Delivery or Return of Money.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of’ Aguadilla in an Action to Eecover Taxes Paid Under Protest.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>Motion by Plaintiff-Appellee for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Default — Motion to Open Default — Affidavit.—Tlie mere fact-that'the verifi- . cation of a motion to open a default and the affidavit accompanying the same may be defective is not a sufficient ground for the reversal of the ruling appealed from, particularly when it is not shown that such question was raised •in the lower court. ■</p> <p>Id. — Excusable Negligence — Attorney.—The provision of section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the court; may ‘ ‘ also relieve a party, or his legal representative, from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” includes the excusable neglect of an attorney. As the inexcusable negligence of an‘attorney injures the party, the latter should receive the benefit of the excusable negligence of the former.</p> <p>Td. — Meritorious Defense. — Although neither the motion to open a default nor the affidavit accompanying the same may set out in detail the facts constituting the defense of the defendant, if in rendering-its decision the court have before it other documents, such as the demurrer, the answer and the counter-complaint, it may, by examining them, decide whether the defendant has a meritorious defense.</p> <p>Id. — Discretion of Court. — An order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, a default judgment is within the discretion of the court, and the appellate eourt will not reverse the same unless abuse of discretion be shown.</p>

<p>Refund -of Taxes — Taxes Paid Under Protest — Summons—Repeal.—In passing Act No. 35 of 1911, authorizing actions in form against the Treasurer of Porto Rico for the recovery of taxes paid under protest, the mind of the Legislature was • directed in a general way to the subject outlined in. the title and to the matters expressly covered in the body of the bill rather than to the detail of process; and if the said act repealed the requirements of service upon the Governor contained in section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was by bare implication.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—Actions Against the People — Summons.-—Act No. 76 of 1916 manifestly includes an action to recover taxes paid under protest, and section 13 thereof is sufficient to repeal by implication any implied dispensation with service upon the Governor contained in Act No. 35 of 1911; for as the actions against the Treasurer authorized by the latter act are undoubtedly actions against The People of Porto Rico, a continuance in force of the implied repeal of subdivision 5 of section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure would contradict the plain terms of the later expression of the legislative will requiring service upon the Governor and the Attorney General, which requirement is in harmony with the procedure originally prescribed by the code.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Consent of People to be Sued — Summons.—Act No. 35 of 1911 was a formal consent by The People of Porto Rico to be sued for the recovery of taxes paid under protest; and exeept for the specific ratification of such express consent contained in section 10 of the law of 1916, the whole of the former act would have been repealed by section 2 of the latter, hence the former act is continued in force subject only to the restrictions and limitations of the latter.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Actions Against People — Actions Against Officials. — The Act of 1916 does not show the remotest inference of any intention on the part of the •lawmakers to exempt from the requirement as to service of process in any “action or proceeding against The People of Porto Rico” those very actions or proceedings when in form against any official in his representative capacity, and no exception should be read into section 13 of the said act which was never in the minds of its framers. Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere deb emus.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Actions Against People — Summons.—The Acts of 1911 and 1916 can stand together in harmony in so far as concerns the form of an action to recover taxes paid under protest, and they should be' construed, eaeh in connection with the other, to require triplicate service of the summons upon the Governor', the Attorney General and the Treasurer.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action to Annul a Deed and its Record in the Registry of Property, and for Damages.</p> <p>Motion by the Plaintiff-Appellee for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Bribery — Jury—New Panel — Discretion of Court. — The regular jurors of the first panel were in attendance, but a number of them had been challenged by reason of their having taken part in a similar prosecution. The court ordered another panel of twenty-four to be summoned and combined these with the eligible men of the first panel, so that there were more than thirty jurors in attendance. Seld: That this ivas not a violation of section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which limits the number of jurors to twenty-four, because the court has ample discretion under section 202 of the said code and the doctrine is well established that a greater number of jurors cannot prejudice the defendant; that similar statutes are merely directory, and that the courts will not reverse in the absence of a showing of prejudice.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Challense.—It is not error to overrule challenges for cause when th* defense does not exhaust its challenges. ></p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Discretion of Court. — The prosecution was attempting to prove in a case of bribery that a candidate copied different subjects from different students, and instead of showing first that the examinations were copied, by the candidate, the prosecution proved the model from which the • copy was made. The admission in evidence of one before the other is a precedence in proof within the discretion of the court and is not error unless abuse or prejudice be shown.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Board op Pharmacy — Deposit op Bribe — Corroborative Evidence.— The evidence stowed that the defendant was the president of the Board of Pharmacy and principally intervened in the matriculation of candidates for examination; that a candidate was matriculated and admitted to examination by the defendant without having the necessary qualifications therefor; that the candidate and his únele had interviews with the defendant with the understanding that the Board of Pharmacy should iiass the candidate on the condition that he send to the defendant $100 for admitting him and furnishing him with the questions and answers; that this sum .was paid by a cheek given to a son of the defendant and deposited to the account and credit of the latter, and that the examinations were copied from the papers of other students. Held: That this evidence was sufficient; that the fact that the check was not shown to have been delivered directly to the defendant was not important, for the jury had a right to infer from the deposit made to the account of the defendant and the manner of its deposit that it was for the benefit of the defendant; that the check was con-oborative evidence of its delivery, and that the fact that the defendant was in charge of the examinations has corroborative force.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Bribery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Conspiracy — District Judge — Jurisdiction.—The authority given to the Governor by the Act reorganizing the judiciary, of March 10, 1904, that -when the public service requires it he may order one district judge, to occupy the position of another who may be temporarily disqualified, is not limited to eases of legal disqualification but includes cases of disqualification by sickness, absence, or any other cause.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Oath of Office. — A district judge does not cease to be such judge while on leave of absence for a certain number of days, and, therefore, may administer the oath of office to the judge who is to substitute him, and the latter is not the judge of the court until he has taken such oath.</p> <p>Id.- — Information—Overt Act. — In this ease the information charged that, being a member of the board of examiners of candidates for licenses in pharmacy, the defendants combined and agreed to approve the examinations of certain such candidates, who were not lawfully qualified to be enrolled and admitted to examination, and furnished them with the answers which they had to give to the. questions of the examinations in order to obtain diplomas in pharmacy, with the understanding that copies of such answers would be returned to the defendants who would approve such examination and get the other members of the board to approve them in order thus to issue to the candidates licenses for the practice of the profession of pharmacists in this Island, these acts being prejudicial to the publie health and tending to pervert the due administration of the laws by issuing diplomas in pharmacy to incapable persons ignorant of their profession. Held: That the object of the conspiracy was to issue corruptly diplomas in pharmacy to incapable persons, and that, according to sections 62 and 63 of the Penal Code and section 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the information was sufficient, it not "being necessary to allege therein that the defendants committed the act of approving the examinations, for under the statutes it is sufficient to allege some act tending to the realization of the object of the conspiracy.</p> <p>Id. — Intent.—It is a fixed rule of law and jurisprudence that every person intends the natural consequences of his acts, "therefore charging one with intentionally entering into a conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces the result desired to be prevented by the statute is in law charging him with having intended the result.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.—There is strong circumstantial evidence tending to show that the defendants conspired to admit to examination persons not qualified tlierefor and to issue diplomas to persons ignorant of the profession of pharmacy, furnishing them with the answers because they did not know the subjects required by law, and that for this purpose some of the conspirators performed some acts and others othei--acts, which is sufficient to lead to the conclusion that there was a conspiracy among them for that purpose, and that is contrary to the public health and the due administration of the laws inasmuch as it is not necessary to prove the conspiracy itself, because generally it would be impossible to do so by direct evidence considering the secrecy with which such plans are adopted. Generally, the evidence consists of inferences and deductions derived from the acts committed; it being sufficient when one executes a parí of the plan of conspiracy and the other another part of the same in order to complete it, although they never united to agree upon the methods or to put the common purpose into practice.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—"Variance—Motive.—There is no variance between the information and the evidence in this case, for although the proof showed distinct acts of solicitation of money by the defendants for approving the examinations, of the candidates and admitting them to examination without their being qualified therefor, this was the manner of proving the acts which tended to the commission of the crime charged against them in the information. The particular motive of the conspiracy was not important, for any other motive than that of receiving money could have been proved provided that some motive were proved for the conspiracy of the defendants to commit acts contrary to the due administration of the laws and prejudicial to the public health.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Government Agent. — It is no defense that an agent of the Government may have pretended to give his consent by furnishing the means for the commission of a crime when it is not attempted to prove the said crime, but to prove that there was a general plan for the commission of criminal acts.</p> <p>■ Id. — Id.—Discretion oe Court. — The court has discretional power as to the order of admitting evidence, therefore a defendant is not prejudiced by the admission of the testimony of one witness before the admission of that of another.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Documentary Evidence. — A defendant is npt prejudiced by the admission of documentary evidence where the contents of the document are also testified to by witnesses.</p> <p>Td. — Id.—Hearsay Evidence. — When a case is tried to the judge and he admits hearsay evidence, stating that it will be given the weight which it may have in law, this is not reversible error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action for Nullity of Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in an Action for Temporary Support.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>.Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for the Correction of Eecords of Marriage and Death.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Bill, op Exceptions — Petition to Prove Exception. — In settling the bill of exceptions the trial judge ordered the elimination of the reasons or grounds given by the appellants in support of an exception to the order overruling a Emotion for nonsuit, and, basing their action on section 218 of tlie Code of Civil Procedure and Rule 64 of the Supreme Court, the appellants petitioned for permission to prove the exception as it appeared in the bill. The evidence is" contradictory as to whether at the trial the appellants stated the said grounds specifically. Held: That it not having been shown that in ordering the elimination the judge was actuated by passion, prejudice, or partiality or committed manifest error, his opinion should prevail and the bill of exceptions be left in the form in which it was approved by him.</p>

<p>Heirs — Execution of Deed — Recordarle Title — Record in Common — Segregation of Property — Private Document. — A property being recorded in the registry of property in common in the names of certain heirs, all of these must join in a conveyance to a purchaser of a segregated part of the property which was allotted to some of the heirs who are the vendors, which sale could not be recorded by virtue of the conveyance in a private document of a recordable title, according to article 20 of tbe Mortgage Law. The purchaser can compel the vendor heirs and all the other heirs to execute a deed of sale to the part segregated, according to sections 1246 and 1247 of the Civil Code, in the same manner that the vendor heirs could have compelled the other coheirs to execute in their favor a deed to the property allotted to them in satisfaction of their inheritance.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Adverse Interests — Necessary Parties — Misjoinder op Parties.— The facts alleged in the complaint in this ease determine the right of the plaintiff to obtain a recordable title to the parcel of land lawfully acquired by him; and as that parcel forms part of a larger property which is recorded as common property in the names of all the defendants, all of these have interests adverse to the interest of the plaintiff and are necessary parties to the action, there being, therefore, no misjoinder of parties ■ defendant.</p> <p>Clerical Error — Frivolous Demurrer- — Ambiguity.—When the complaint contains a clerical error in regard to the date on which the defendants were declared the sole and universal heirs of the predecessor in interest and this error could not affect the result of the trial, a demurrer on the ground of ambiguity and uncertainty is frivolous, especially where, as in this case, such error is removed by another allegation of the same complaint and the defendants can rectify it because it refers to a fact of which they are better informed than the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Contract — Rescission of Contract — Defraudation of Creditors — Judgment Against one Spouse — Conjugal Partnership. — Judgment being entered against the wife in an action brought against her only, an action will not lie for the rescission of a contract of sale entered into later by the conjugal partnership, of which the wife is a member, on the ground of a presumption that the sale was made to defraud the creditor, because the conjugal partnership is a distinct entity which was not bound by the judgment. Hence, the provision of section 1264 of the Civil Code is not applicable to said sale.</p> <p>Id. — Conjugal Partnership — Private Property. — In accordance with the clear provision of section 1319 of the Civil Code, a lot belonging to one of the spouses by acquisition before marriage ceases to be private property when after the marriage the conjugal partnership builds a house upon it.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Intervention in Ownership and for an Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Executor — Forced Heir — Property of Minors — Authorization of Court.— When there are forced heirs who are' minors the exeeutors named by the testator with authority to pay his debts cannot alienate real property for that purpose without being joined by said heirs after obtaining the authorization of the court required by law for the sale of property of minors.</p> <p>Id. — -Prescription.—The prescription referred to in section 1268 of the Civil Code is not applicable to a case where the executor is not joined by the heirs and does not obtain the authorization of the court.</p> <p>Adminitrative Appeal — Jurisprudence.—A decision rendered in an administrative appeal does not establish jurisprudence and therefore the court is not bound to follow it.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in-an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action of Filiation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Lease — Attorney in Fact — Record oe Title — Subsequent Purchaser. — When a deed of lease of a farm, executed by an attorney in fact, is presented in the jegistry for record and the registrar refuses to record it, but enters a cautionary notice which is canceled later, this decision of the registrar does not constitute an obstacle to the recording of the deed of lease later, although the property may be then recorded in the name of a subsequent purchaser, if the principal ratifies and confirms the lease and the purchaser acknowledges, accepts and agrees to the same.</p> <p>Id. — Record oe Title — Third Person. — Article 17 of the Mortgage Law prohibits the admission to record of titles transferring ownership or creating encumbrances where there is a subsequent record in favor of another person; but if the person in whose favor the record is made is not a third person, that article is not applicable.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing in Part to Record a Deed of Partition. .</p> <p>The facts aré stated in the opinions.</p>

<p>Pekjubt — Evidence—Pbesiimption.—In a trial for perjury under the Election Law the court allowed the district attorney, over the objection of the attorney for the defendant, to ask the defendant how many times' he had been accused of the same offense, and he replied that three informations had been read to him. Held: That it was prejudicial error to allow this question because an accusation or information is no proof or presumption of guilt and it tended to discredit the accused before the jury and influence a verdict of guilty.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for the Refund of Taxes Paid under Protest,</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Murder — Burglary.—Evidence—Information.—Under an information charging the accused with having taken the life of a human being unlawfully, wil-fully, with malice aforethought and with the fixed and deliberate purpose of doing so, showing a perverted and wicked heart, it may be proved that the murder was committed while in the act of committing burglary.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.—The accused contended that the evidence was insufficient to convict, but after examining said evidence it was' held that the verdict of the jury should not be disturbed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 137 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Assault and Battery — Jurisdiction—Pelony—Appeal.—A municipal court lias no jurisdiction of a complaint charging a felony; therefore the district court has no jurisdiction of such a case on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — -Id.—Misdemeanor—Pelony—Mayhem—Information—Trial by Jury.— Although the judgment of the municipal court may he for the misdemeanor of aggravated assault and battery, if the complaint charges the felony of mayhem it gives no jurisdiction to the district court on appeal, for while in a crime of this kind the accused may be-convicted of simple assault and battery or aggravated assault and battery, according to section 286 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by Act No. 22 of March 11, 1913, such privilege was given to the court having original jurisdiction of the crime of mayhem to be based on the result of the evidence, and that is the district court, in which an information is laid by the district attorney and the accused given the right to a trial by jury.</p>

<p>Professional Services — Medical Attendance — Conjugal Partnership — Authorization of Husband.' — In order that the wife may bind a conjugal partnership for professional medical services to a daughter who was emancipated by marriage and had established an independent home and entered into a distinct conjugal partnership with her husband with duties and obligations of its own, the authorization of the husband is necessary, for he is the manager of the property of the conjugal partnership, and such authorization must bo proved.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Partition of Inheritance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Injunction — Franchise—Impairment oe Contract — Rule oe Construction.— A grant of rights in public property accepted by the beneficiary amounts to a contract entitled to protection against impairment by action of the State. Although the grant must be made in jilain terms in order to convey private rights in public property and to prevent future control of such privileges in the public interest, it should receive a reasonable construction and not be so construed as to defeat the intention of the grantor, and the ambiguity must be such as is not removed by the settled rules of construction.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment.—A judgment is the conclusion of the law on the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts as found by the court or admitted by the parties or deemed to exist upon their default. That only is a judgment which is pronounced between the parties to the action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. It must be responsive not only to the proofs but to the issues tendered by the pleadings and will be void if it bé a departure from the pleadings and based upon a case not averred therein.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Theory op Case. — The theory upon which the case was tried m the court below must be strictly adhered to on appeal, and a party in the appellate court cannot assume an attitude inconsistent with that taken by him at the trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in Administration Proceedings — Accounting.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administration — Compensation.—According to section 53 of the Special Legal Proceedings Act of March 9, 1905, an administrator is entitled to he paid as compensation for his services 5 per cent on sums received amounting to .. one thousand.dollars or less; 2% per cent on sums up to ten thousand dollars, and 1 per cent on sums exceeding ten thousand dollars.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Annulment of Foreclosure, Recovery of’ Possession and Profits.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administration — Community—Intervention—Parties'—Appeal.—In this case two petitions were presented for the appointment of administrators, one by tlie Succession of Rufina Molinari and the other by the Succession of Ignacio Díaz, a community. Before administration was granted all the property was in the possession of Cividanes, the husband of Rufina Mo-linari. Administration was granted in both eases and finally Rafael Palés was appointed administrator. Cividanes appealed from the ruling in the first case, but not from that in the seeond. The appeal was decided in his favor and he was put in possession of the property under the first administration. He moved also to be put in possession of the property under the seeond administration. The court heard the motion with the intervention of the said community and its administrator and finally overruled it, from which ruling Cividanes appealed without giving notice of the appeal to the representative of the community, who moved for dismissal of the appeal on that ground. Seld: That the intervening joint owners were also necessary parties to the appeal with a right to be heard because they were in a position to gain or lose by reason of the appeal, and it was dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Nullity and Ejectment — Change of Venue.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Dominion Title — Possessory Title. — Article 393 of the Mortgage Law is limited to possessory title proceedings, and there is no provision of law which makes it applicable to dominion title proceedings.</p> <p>Id. — Contradictory Records — Cancellation of Record. — When it appears from the registry that the dominion title to the property sought to be recorded is recorded in the name of a person distinct from the petitioner, the latter's • title cannot be recorded until the record in favor of the other person has been canceled.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Ownership.—The cancellation of a contradictory record of dominion title can be ordered only in the proper proceeding after hearing the parties and not in a dominion title proceeding; for in such proceeding, according to article 395 of the Mortgage Law, the court can adjudge only that the ownership of the property in question has or has not been proved, otherwise the real nature of the proceeding would be changed. A cancellation so ordered is void and has no legal effect.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Record of Title — Appeal.—When a decision approving a dominion title proceeding is accepted by the parties thereto it constitutes a sufficient title for the record of the ownership, according to rule 5 of article 395 of the Mortgage Law, unless there is a contradictory record, it being unnecessary to wait for the expiration of the time allowed for appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Conveyance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Lease — Non-payment op Rent — Rescission—Solidary Surety — Damages.—In this case a contract was entered into for the lease of an urban property for a term of two years at a fixed monthly rental with solidary security. In clause 3 of the contract it was agreed that if two monthly instalments of rent should become due and not be paid, this fact alone would be understood to rescind the contract and give the lessor a cause of action in unlawful de-tainer against the lessee; and in clause 11 it was stipulated that the solidary surety should be bound to respond for eaeh and all of the obligations contracted by the lessee. Held: That the agreement set out in clause 3 does not imply that the solidary security should be limited to default in the payment of the rent for two months, for the rescission of the contract for failure to pay the rent for two months involves only the express recognition of the right which section 1459 of the Civil Code gives to the lessor and lessee; that the action to rescind the contract is a privilege which the lessor and lessee may exercise at their pleasure and it is optional with them to claim damages only, leaving the contract in force; that clause 11 is conceived in general terms and its effects cannot be limited by clause 3, which refers only to the lessor and lessee.</p> <p>Id. — Solidary Surety — Extinction op Debt — Bankruptcy.—When it does not appear that the debt for which a solidary surety is sued has been collected by the creditor in whole or in part, the claim which the creditor may have been able to make before the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico in bankruptcy proceedings against the principal debtor does not bar an action of debt by him against the solidary surety, and the burden is upon the latter to prove the total or partial extinction of the debt, as the ease may be.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Costs—Attorney Fees — Discretion op Court. — An appeal having been taken from the judgment because it did not impose the costs and attorney fees upon the defendant, it was held that in view of all the circumstances of the case the court did not abuse the discretion given it by section 327 of Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Act of March 12, 190S, and therefore its finding would not be disturbed.</p>

<p>Possessory Title — Summons—Service—Eetukn—Eecord op Title — Defects.— In every possessory title proceeding- it is a necessary requisite that the original summons issued for the citation of the owners of the adjoining lands and the fiscal be shown to have “been returned to the clerk’s office, for ohly by an examination of the return on the writ can the court know' whether these persons were duly summoned. Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, amended by Act No. 70 of 1911. Moreover, failure to state in the return on the writ that the person who made the services was not a party to the proceeding, and the place, day and hour where and when the services were made are defects which bar the admission of the proceeding to record.</p> <p>Id. — Civil Status op Petitioner — Time op Possession — Ganancial Property— Record op Title. — Failure to state in the initial petition in a possessory title proceeding and in the testimony of the wetnesses the time of the possession not only violates rules 4 and 6 of subsection 1 of article 391 of the Mortgage Law but also leaves it impossible to determine whether the property lias the character of ganancial property with the first wife or was acquired while a widower. These circumstances should appear in the registry and it is not sufficient for the petitioner to allege that he bought the property while a widower and the witnesses to testify that the allegations of the petition are true.</p> <p>Id. — Record op Title — Records op Other Properties — Documents not Presented — Appeal.—In recording or refusing to record an instrument the registrar should take into account only the documents presented to him and what appears from his books regarding the same property. He need not examine the records of other properties and the Supreme Court on appeal has not to consider documents which the registrar had not before him in passing upon the instrument.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence—Findings op Fact — Curable Depect. — The fact that the proceeding sought to be recorded does not set out that the witness did not present documentary evidence of their being landowners is no ground for refusing to record the proceeding or even to assign a curable defect, because the witnesses having testified under oath that they were landowners and the court having expressed its belief of their testimony by approving the proceeding, that finding should be accepted by the registrar.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Civil Status — Ownership.—It is not necessary to set out in the petition in a possessory title proceeding the civil status of the former owner and vendor in order to show whether, being married, he made the sale with the consent of his wife — that is, that the petitioner acquired by title sufficient to pass the ownership — because as it is sought to prove and record only the possession, this is the fact which should be alleged and proved.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar .of Property Refusing’ to Record a Proceeding Converting Possession into Ownership.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Purchase and Sale — Signature of Purchaser — Curable Defect — Ratification. — The signing of a deed of purchase and sale in 1899 in the name and at the request of the purchaser, who did not know how to sign, by a person who was not a witness to the deed is a curable defect, for such defect does not necessarily render the instrument null and void and may be cured by executing a new instrument setting out that the purchaser ratifies and accepts the contract, in the same manner as if he had not appeared at the execution of the former.</p>

<p>Survey — Ambiguous Petition — Evidence—Judgment on Pleadings.- — A verified petition for an order for the examination and survey of one property of the petitioner and two of the respondent cannot he considered ambiguous and uncertain when the petitioner alleges that the property belonging to him is included within those of the respondent and he seeks to ascertain the location of the same, for these allegations contain all the facts necessary to justify his claim according to section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and although paragraph 3 of the said section prescribes that the testimony must be produced in the same manner as provided for hearings on injunctions, that provision is applicable when the -interested parties offer evidence and not when the case has been decided on the merits, of the pleadings.</p>

<p>Possessory Title — Record of Title — Civil Status — Ganancial Property— Private Property. — Wlieu it appears that the petitioner in a possessory title proceeding was a widower when he filed the petition, but it does not appear that he was a widower when he acquired the right, it cannot be recorded in liis favor, for he may have been married when he acquired the right and in -that ease it. might be ganancial property and not private property.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Original Decisions of Court — Certified Copies. — In order to comply with paragraph 2 of article 3'92 of the Mortgage Law, which requires that in soliciting the record of a possessory title proceeding the original of the same shall bo presented in the registry, it is not necessary that the original decisions oí the court be included in the proceeding presented; but it is sufficient to include certified copies of the same if the said decisions were originally entered in the official books of the court.</p> <p>Td. — Id,—Third Persons.' — Although g'ood practice requires the court to state in its final decision in a possessory title proceeding that the possession is declared to have been proved “without prejudice to third persons having better rights,” the omission of this qualifying clause does not constitute a defect within the provisions of the Mortgage Law, for although not expressed the possession is always understood to be subject to this limitation imposed by the said law.</p> <p>Id.' — Id.—Evidence—Finding oe Pact. — When the witnesses testify under oath that they are landowners and residents of the place where the property is situated and the court finds that these facts were sufficiently proved in that manner, the registrar should accept such finding of the court.</p>

<p>Civil Service — Information—Wording of Statute. — In an information upon a statute it is not sufficient to set forth the offense in the words of the statute, unless those words' of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished. The public offense should- appear in the information.</p> <p>Id.- — -Id.—Id.—If a statute creating an offense fails to set out the facts constituting it sufficiently to apprise the accused of- the precise nature of the charge against him, a more particular statement of the facts will be required in the information.</p> <p>I». — Public Employees — Contribution for Political Purposes. — To _ ask the members of a political party to contribute financially towards the success of a campaign or the continuance of an organization is a perfectly licit- proposal. If the solicitation is uniform, there is no wrong in including members of a party who may be perchance in the civil service; but the employee must not bo put “under an obligation” to contribute.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Voluntary Contribution. — A voluntary contribution by an employee is not prohibited in any sense. The wrong sought to be suppressed is that kind of solicitation which tends to create in the mind of a person in the civil service the fear that his refusal may result in his removal or other prejudice.</p> <p>Id. — Id.— Id. — Information.—In this case it was charged that on a certain date prior to the filing of the information, and in a certain city and judicial district the defendant unlawfully and wilfully solicited of a certain public employee, a graded teacher in a public school, a stated quota or contribution for political purposes. Held: That no public offense was charged in the information, inasmuch as no attempt was made to charge that a solicitation was made under the circumstances defined by the statute.</p> <p>Id. — Public-school Teacher. — A public-school teacher is an employee in the civil service whether classified or not.</p>

<p>Decided on the grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. 1084, People v. Wys, ante.</p>

<p>Decided on the grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. 1084, People v. Wys, ante..</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of the.Civil Service Law.</p>

<p>Decided on the grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. 1084, People v. Wys, ante.</p>

<p>Damages — Evjdence.—-Tlie evidence being contradictory and there being no pas- ■ sion, prejudice, or manifest, error on the part of the court in its findings, this court will not disturb its adjustment of tlie conflict-</p> <p>Id.- — Id.—Preponderance.—The preponderance .of the evidence does not consist in the fact that there may be more witnesses who testify to certain facts than ' there are who testify to the contrary, but it depends upon the effect of said testimony to induce the court to give it credit.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Deed of Segregation and Sale with Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Proceeding for Appointment of Tutor.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Inheritance — Partition .— Appraisement — Increased Value — Evidence —■ Affidavit. — A partition having been made on the basis of an appraisement which was not attacked at the time it was madej it cannot be annulled later on the sole ground that the appraisement was made eleven years before and the value of the property appraised has ‘notably increased, for the approval of 'the partition should be considered as of the date on which it was made and an affidavit of the opposer alone is not sufficient to show the supposed increased value of the property.</p>

<p>Appf.at, from the District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action for Rescission.</p> <p>Motion of Appellee for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>PetitioN for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District ■ Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Intervention.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tire opinion.</p>

<p>Appear from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refus- . ing’ to Record a Consummation of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>• Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Intervention.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Murder — Certiorari—Citizenship oe the United States — Extension op CitizeNship to Porto Rico. — Historically and legally the whole citizenship of the United States forms the people of the United States, and to ho a citizen is to he a part of the sovereign power. The sovereignty of the United States, in the objective sense, was extended to Porto Rico by the Treaty of Paris, and, in the subjective sense, or as the fundamental ruling power, by the Jones Act.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Treaty—Act oe Congress. — There is no radical difference between the effect of a treaty of the United States and an act of Congress, although sometimes a treaty may require congressional action; but if there were any difference, the act of Congress, where both Houses intervene, should be preferred; hence it follows that any interior regulation which may be effected by treaty may be effected also by an act of Congress. The effeet of a grant of citizenship made by an act of Congress is equal, if not superior, to a grant made by treaty.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Benunoiation op Citizenship. — There are no grades of citizenship in the United States; therefore it cannot be said that the collective citizenship granted to the people of Porto Bico by the Jones Act is restricted by reason of the proviso permitting its renunciation within six months from the approval of the act.</p> <p>Id. — Id. — Id. • — ■ Organized Territory — Incorporated Territory ■— Constitution. — Given the history of the United States and the history of Porto Bico. the grant of collective citizenship to the inhabitants of Porto Bico by section 5 of the Jones Act has converted this organized territory under the Poraker Act into an incorporated territory; ...therefore the Constitution is now in fuTTlorce and effect and with it the Fifth Amendment, which provides for indictment by grand jury in ease of capital or otherwise infamous erime.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.-—Id.—Id.—The elements which necessarily complete the incorporation of a territory are the /acquisition of the territory] Hhe citizenship of its inhabitants ~¿mjC<5r|íanized government, and even in some cases in which the first two exist, as in the case of Alaska, nothing more is required than some action on the part of Congress.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—No specific formula is necessary in order to incorporate a territory, but, if necessary, in the ease of Porto Bico, it is given in the Jones Act which states positively that “all citizens of Porto Bico * * * are hereby declared, and shall be deemed and held to be, citizens of the United States. ’ ’ The association of the inhabitants of Porto Bico with the people of the United States is made complete, and the people of the continent of the United States and the people of Porto Bieo- are citizens of a common country.</p>

<p>Maliciotts Mischief — Complaint—Verification of Complaint — Attest by Official — Appeal.—Wlien the defendant does not raise the question in the municipal court nor in the district court on appeal that the complaint is not properly verified because it is not attested by any official, it is too late to raise that question for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.—When in a prosecution for malicious mischief charging that the defendant -wilfully and maliciously tied a calf to ono of the complainant’s grapefruit trees -which was thus destroyed, it results from all the evidence for the prosecution, which was not strengthened by that for the defense, that if the calf injured the property it was not because of a malicious act of the defendant or the consequence of his intentional act, because it is • not shown that he placed the calf on the property in a situation to produce damage or that he tied the calf to the grapefruit tree, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction.</p>

<p>Debt — Liquidated Account — Evidence.-—In this ease, an aetion of debt, the evidence shows that the defendant purchased building materials from the plaintiffs on a cash understanding but did not pay cash for them; that an account was carried in whieh his purchases and payments were entered; that a statement of the balance due was passed to him and he made no objection to it;,that after the account was rendered and this aetion was brought the defendant made certain payments and nothing was debited. 3eld: That this being a liquidated account, the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment appealed from.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Violation of the Act Providing for the Organization of a Board of Medical Examiners.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>.Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Violation of the Automobiles Act.'</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Damages — Evidence—Preponderance—Estoppel—Contributory Negligence.— In this ease there was evidence tending to show that the car of the defendant was started negligently and that the plaintiff was thrown from it and received several wounds by the fall. The evidence of the defendant tended to show that the proximate cause of the accident to the plaintiff was due to her weak and swooning condition, as admitted by her before several witnesses. Seld: That the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of the plaintiff and that she was not estopped by her conduct, nor by her admission made so shortly after the accident, nor did these admissions tend to show contributory negligence.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the Executive Secretary of Porto Rico Commanding the Registration of the Corporation Capa del Médico, Inc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Violation of the Weights and Measures Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Contbact — Damages.—The words *1 approximate monthly consumptionJ} are equivalent to “a little more or less” and are interpreted as allowing a small excess or deficiency in proportion to the whole quantity.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Confiscation of Security. — When in a contract for furnishing some article for a year it is stated that the approximate monthly consumjDtion is of a fixed quantity and during the first four months there is delivered 8 per cent more than the whole quantity for the year, calculated on the approximate monthly consumption, it is held that this is a fulfilment of the contract on 1Le part of the bidder; that he is under no obligation to continue furnishing the article for the rest of the year; and that it was unlawful to confiscate the security given to guarantee the fulfilment of the contract.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of-Humacao in a Prosecution for Violation of the Weights and Measures Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 93 of .the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Debt — Attachment—Record of Title — Preference.—Article 71 of the Mortgage Law refers to a case where after an attachment has been recorded against a property the owner sells it. Its object is to proscribe that the recording of one or more attachments do.es not prevent the owner from disposing of or encumbering his property right, although the acquirer of the ownership or real right is subject to the consequences, of acquisition under the conditions mentioned in said article. But this statute is not applicable to a case in which a second attachment is levied by another person who seeks to recover from the first the amounts mentioned in the notice of his attachment under penally of canceling the record of ownership of the first, for this would be to. recognize in him a preference which the cautionary notice of itself does not give him.</p> <p>Id. — -Id.—Defects'—-Preference—Issue—Variance—Appeal.—Although the second attaching^ creditor discusses in this appeal defects alleged to exist in the levying of the attachment of the first, as well as the preference which he has over the latter, according to article 44 of the Mortgage Law, to recover out of the propierty attached by both, these questions will not be considered because they were not raised in the lower court and the terms of the issue cannot be varied on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Costs-—Attorney Pees — Discretion of Court. — As the imposition of costs, disbursements and attorney fees is discretional with the lower court, if it is not shown that such discretion was abused its holding on that point will not be disturbed.</p>

<p>Injunction — Servitude—Bight on Way — Record on Title — Complaint.—In an action for ah injunction to enjoin interference with a servitude of right of way over a property of which the defendant is lessee, it is not necessary to allege in the complaint that the plaintiff’s right is recorded in the registry if other facts are alleged therein showing its existence.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Outlets.—The fact that the dominant tenement has another outlet for its products, making it unnecessary to pass through the servient tenement, does not prevent the owner of the dominant tenement from continuing to pass through the servient tenement if such right was duly granted him by the owner of the latter.</p> <p>Id. — Td.—Id.—Encumbrances—Third Person — Lease.—The circumstance that in a lease of property it is set out that the property is free from charges or encumbrances does not make the lessee a third person for the purposes of the acknowledgment of a servitude of right of way imposed on the property by its owner, particularly when, as in this ease, the existence of the servitude is shown clearly from the registry.</p>

<p>Malicious Prosecution — Advice op Attorney. — The law protects a person against a civil action for malicious prosecution if before malting a complaint against another he reports fully and reasonably all the facts to an attorney of good reputation in the active practice of his profession and the attorney in good faith advises the client that he has grounds for causing the arrest of the offending person.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainee — Intervention—Evidence—Designation of Heirs. — When there are intervenors in an action of unlawful detainer claiming to he the owners of the property in controversy by title of inheritance, certificates of birth, marriage and death tending to establish the facts are admissible in evidence to prove the title of inheritance of the intervenors, and it is not necessary to present the judicial designation of heirs to establish the same.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Conflict of Titles — Ordinary Action. — When a real question of ownership is involved by reason of a conflict of titles, the plaintiffs alleging that the property was acquired by them at a public sale in a judicial proceeding and the intervenors that it belongs to them by title of inheritance, the proper action to establish the property rights claimed by the parties is not an action of unlawful detainer but an ordinary aetion.</p>

<p>Assault and Battery — Aggravated Assault — Adult Male. — The words “adult male” appearing in subdivision 5 of section 6 of the Act of March JO, 1904, which malíes an assault and battery committed by such person on the person of a female or child an aggravated offense, signify a person over twenty-one years of age — a fact which must be proved at the trial.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Impeachment.—The Government may not introduce a witness and without showing surprise bring incriminating hearsay evidence before the court under the guise of contradiction.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action to Establish the Better Eight of a Third Person.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Attobnets — Disbarment—Notaries Public — Will.—An attorney who in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by his -license to practice as notary attests that a person executed his last will before him, when, in fact, such person was moribund and could not and did not express his will, should not be allowed to continue to practice as attorney.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—-Presumption.—When evidence is voluntarily suppressed by a party it must be presumed that it would be adverse to him if introduced.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Consummation of Sale.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale and Mortgage.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Intervention in Ownership of Eeal Property. .</p> <p>Motion by Defendant-appellees for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Debt — Promissory Note — Negotiable Instrument — Indorsement—Payments Before Maturity. — When a promissory note payable to order is endorsed for value received to the plaintiff, who is a holder in good faith, without knowledge of any payments made by the debtor to the original creditor before it fell due, said holder is entitled to recover the total amount of 4he note together with the stiuplated interest; for, being payable to order, t -the note is negotiable by endorsement and there is no need to notify the ■debtor of the transfer. The fact that the debtor stated at the foot of the mote that it was payable t,o order is immaterial.</p> <p>"Id. — Id.-—Commercial Credits. — By making a note payable to order it becomes ■ negotiable and no notice of transfers or endorsements need be given to the debtor, this formality being required only when commercial credits are not negotiable nor payable to bearer, as provided by article 347 of the Code of Commerce.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Commercial Transaction — Good Paith. — As a promissory note made to order and containing the requisites enumerated in article 531 of the Code of Commerce is deemed a commercial transaction, the provisions of said code and not those of the Civil Code are applicable under the first clause of article 2 of the Code of Commerce, even though it is shown that the note did not originate in a commercial transaction; for such showing, although good between the parties to an instrument to overcome. the presumption that the promissory note is commercial, cannot be deduced against a person who in good faith purchases the note which by its terms is commercial.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—Payments to Original Holder. — A person who signs a negotiable note has no right to assume that it has not been endorsed or transferred and that payments made by the debtor to the original holder before the note matures will destroy the rights of a purchaser in good faith. It is the duty of a person making payments on a negotiable note before it falls due to take precautions to prevent its circulation, and if he .pay one who is not the owner of the note at the time of such payment, merely taking a receipt therefor, he will not be protected against the real owner of the note even should he make such payment .before the note is transferred, because the note continues in full force as security for the debt and he allows it to remain in such shape that it can be circulated and acquired ( in good faith for the whole amount of the debt.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Partial Payments. — Partial payments made on a note should be shown on the note itself so that a person acquiring it may know the amount to which it is reduced.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Defense of Payment. — Tt is not unfair to reject a defense that payment on a note to order which has been indorsed was made before its maturity, for although the creditor might possibly transfer the instrument in connivance with another person so that the latter could recover the amounts already paid, it is also true that the debtor might connive with the creditor to simulate payments which have never been made.</p>

<p>Murder — Degree of Grime — Evidence — Premeditation and Deliberation. — Both the direct and circumstantial evidence in this ease showed that a body badly hacked up and eaten by dogs was found and identified; that the death was due to violence and caused by numerous wounds inflicted with a cane-knife and a dagger; that the defendants, one of whom was the slain man’s son who had left his home with two weapons and returned with one only and with bloodstains on his shirt, which was washed by his mother, were seen carrying the body of the victim by the head and feet, he being helpless and complaining; that they inflicted wounds on the victim with a cane-knife 'and a dagger and later carried the body to the place where it was found; that they then washed their cane-knives at the side of a stream. There was also evidence tending to show that quarrels had occurred between father and son; that other attacks had preceded the one mentioned above; that on the day of the occurrence the victim went out to make some sales, and that the pockets of his trousers were found turned' out. Held: That the foregoing was sufficient evidence to show the deliberation and premeditation necessary to classify the crime as murder in the first and second degrees of which the - defendants were convicted.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions to Jury — Exception—Fundamental Error. — A judgment will not be reversed for alleged errors in the instructions to the jury when no exception is taken, unless it clearly appears that a fundamental error was committed.</p> <p>Id. — Accomplice.—The mere silence of a man who does not aid or abet and who has no intent to aid the felon does not make him an accomplice.</p>

<p>Corporation — Doing Business — License—Information.—The whole theory of section 353 of the Political Code is the doing of business in Porto Eieo and, therefore, an information charging only that a corporation failed to pay into the Treasury of Porto Eieo. the annual license fee for a particular ■fiscal year, without alleging that it did business in Porto Eieo during that year, charges no crime.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Eents—Pasturing Cattle. — The mere receipt of rents by a corporation for pasturing cattle does not constitute the doing of business in Porto Eieo, unless it is first shown that pasturing cattle is a part of the particular business of the corporation.</p> <p>Id. — Agent.—The .mere uncorroborated statement of a person that he is • the agent of a corporation is not sufficient to bind the corporation, especially in a criminal case.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for a Judgment of Patria Potestas and to Set Aside the Appointment of Tutors, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Debt — Certiorari — Intervention — Association not eor Profit — Quasi-parties — Interested Parties.- — -When an association of planters organized not for pecuniary profit brings an action of debt, not in its own name but in behalf of its members, 'and includes without their consent a number of the members who represent-more than half of the amount sought to be recovered and who, therefore, have an interest in the subject-matter of the suit, being-not only quasi-parties but the real parties in interest, and the said parties ask for leave to intervene as defendants on the ground that they are interested in the action and that the exclusive and personal right which they have in the subject-matter of the action has not heen transferred to the plaintiff or to any other person, they should be allowed to intervene.</p> <p>Id.- — Id.—Id.—Id.—There is no principle of law that obliges individual members of an association organized to foster agriculture in general, extending aid, defense and protection to its members when necessary, who have an interest therein, to choose between joinder as plaintiffs and absolute exclusion, or that forbids them to deny the truth of the averments made in their names and on their behalf, if the plaintiff association is without authority to represent them.</p> <p>Id. —- Id. — Id. — Quasi-parties. — Even in the Federal Court, where intervention can be had only in equity actions and where the rule is more stringent against the admission of parties occupying an attitude hostile to the original plaintiff, the general rule prohibiting the introduction of new parties defendant, when the plaintiff objects, does not apply with full force where the person who wishes to come in belongs to the class known as quasi-parties, under which term are included those who are already represented in the suit, or who come within the compass of the proceedings pendente lite. Such persons are entitled to be heard by the court in respect to any matter affecting their interests, and the court will either hear them on motion or petition, or if necessary will admit them as active litigant parties.</p> <p>ON RECONSIDERATION.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Right to be Heard. — A petition to intervene should generally show an interest, but when the interest appears from the complaint, the qiarties who do not want a suit to be prosecuted in their names or in their behalf have a right' to be heard, be it as complainants or defendants, if for no other reason than to disclaim or prevent a prosecution in their supposed interest.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Dominion Title — Cancellation of Eecord — Third Persons — Partition—Conveyance — Sale by Succession. — In a proceeding to establish dominion title the court cannot order the cancellation of a record in the names of third persons in the registry of property, and this proceeding is not the proper method for obtaining the partition of ,an estate, or to compel the joint heirs interested therein to execute a formal deed of conveyance to any portion thereof; but it does not follow from either proposition that the owner of a parcel of land segregated and sold by the members of a succession nearly twenty years prior to the filing of the proceedings for dominion title may not establish the facts showing such ownership and obtain his decree.</p>

<p>Debt — Account Current — Monthly 'Payments — Liquidation oe Account — Fixed Partial Payments. — In this case the defendant, in a public instrument, acknowledged that he owed the plaintiffs a certain sum of money secured by mortgage for a period of only four years, and the plaintiffs agreed to furnish him up to a certain sum over and above the acknowledged, indebtedness for agricultural financing, the total to form an account current and the defendant binding himself to make monthly payments in settlement of the debt. The defendant failed to make one monthly payment and upon the liquidation of the account admitted the balance shown in favor of the plaintiffs,' — Seld: That no time having been fixed for the payment of the acknowledged indebtedness, or of the additional sums to be advanced by the plaintiffs, and the defendant having failed to make one monthly payment, he was under obligation to piay the balance shown in the liquidation of the account current, for the question involved is not one of the payment of a debt by instalments, but of the collection of the balance of a current- account opened by the agreement of both parties.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Liquidation of Account. — Accounts current are always understood to be liquidated accounts, as their liquidation depends upon a simple arithmetical operation.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Contract.—When an account current is agreed to and accepted by the parties it constitutes a binding contract between them under section 1245 of the Bevised Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Pleadings—Construction.—According to section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the pleadings in an action must be liberally construed for the purpose of determining their effect with a view to substantial justice between the parties.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action for Eescission of Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humaeao in an Action to Secure a Declaration of Nullities and of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Reooed of Title — Signatures to Deed. — The fact that a notary before whom an instrument is executed states at the end that the vendors not knowing how to sign, the witnesses, at their request, sign for them, and only one of them is shown to have signed the instrument, does not constitute a fatal defect and, therefore, the instrument is recordable.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Embezzlement—Conversion—Jurisdiction.—Conversion, as a necessary element of-the offense of embezzlement, is the fraudulent appropriation of another’s property to one’s own use, and the jurisdiction of the crime, in the absence of statute, is the State in which the property was converted although it may be received in another State.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Criminal Intent — Evidence.-—The intent to embezzle may be manifested by the practice of any form of deceit, or running away with the money, or expending it for one’s own use contrary to directions, or otherwise diverting the course of the money to make it one’s own, and such intent may be made to appear from circumstantial--as well as from direct evidence.</p>

<p>Seduction — Evidence—Corroboration—Carnal Intercourse — Promise op Marriage. — While it is true that the testimony of the prosecutrix- need not he corroborated in all its details, nor even perhaps as to the minor ingredients of the offense as defined by our Penal Code, yet in order to support a conviction she must be corroborated upon two vital issues, namely, (1) the carnal intercourse and (2) the promise of marriage.</p> <p>Id. — Ip.—Promise op Marriage. — The mere fact that a witness testifies that he saw the accused and the prosecutrix walking together and that he knows that they were engaged because he had heard her say that after marrying the defendant they would go to live in the country, is not a sufficient corroboration as to the promise of marriage.</p>

<p>Damages — Foreclosure — Demand for Payment —• Death of Mortgagor — Heirs. — Under article 128 of the Mortgage Law and article 171 of the Regulations for its execution, the demand for payment should be made upon the owner of the mortgaged property if he resides in the place where the estate is located or his residence is known; but when the owner dies before the foreclosure proceeding is brought the demand for payment should not be made upon the person in charge of the property in any legal capacity, but upon the heirs, who continue the personality of the deceased and substitute him in all his transferrable rights, both active and passive, and such personal demand on the heirs is excusable only when they do not reside in the place where the mortgaged property is situated and their residence is unknown.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.'—-Widow of Debtor. — Failing a demand for payment upon the heirs in a foreclosure proceeding, a demand upon the widow of the debtor who is in charge of the mortgaged property is not valid when the demand i« not made upon her as the attorney in faet of adult children or the representative of minor children.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Succession—Heirs—Members of Succession — Parties.—-Under outlaw a succession is not a juridical person. A succession may be a party plaintiff or party defendant only after it has been individualized by stating the names of those who compose it. It is- not a legal entity distinct from the heirs. The heirs form the succession and they should appear as plaintiffs or defendants.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Sale of Property — Publication of Notice — Void Sale. — The formalities required by article 128 of the Mortgage Law and article 171 of its Regulations for advertising the first sale should be complied with also in subsequent sales; therefore when less than the time fixed by law has elapsed between the first publication of notice of sale and the sale itself, the conveyance of the mortgaged property to the creditor in payment of the debt is void. The present case is distinguished from that of Henna et al. v. Saurí Subirá, 22 P. R. R. 776, for the position of a junior mortgagee is not the same as that of the principal debtor. ,</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Notice of Sale — -Publication of Notice. — Article 172 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law does not leave the publication of notices in the public places referred to or in the Gazette of the Island to the option of the creditor, for this would be contrary to the general provision of paragraph 3 of article 123 of the Mortgage Law, which expressly orders that thirty days after demand for payment has been made the notice shall be published in the Gazette of the Island.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—-Ejectment.—In an action for damages based on the nullity of a foreclosure proceeding by virtue of which the property was conveyed to the foreclosing mortgagee (defendant herein) because of the legal disability of the plaintiff to bring any action against the actual possessor for the reason that the latter had acquired it in good faith from the defendant without knowledge of such nullity, it is sufficient to allege these facts and those upon whieh the nullity is based; for the plaintiff was not bound first to ask for a declaration of the nullity in order to be able to claim damages, nor was he obliged to ask for said nullity in case he could bring suit-in ejectment against the defendant in regard to the property sold.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Prescription.—Eor the reasons stated in -the treatment of a similar-question in the case of Carmona et al. v. Cuesta, 20 P. R. R. 215, and ratified in 23 P. R. R. 636, the plea of prescription in this case, based on para-' graph 2 of article 1968 of the Spanish Civil Code, is overruled.</p> <p>Id.- — Id.—Statement of Case.- — The fact that the statement of the case contains only the evidence introduced at the trial regarding the questions involved in the judgment and the appeal therefrom and does not include the evidence introduced with regard to damages, is not a legal ground for affirming the judgment appealed from in view of the faet that the grounds alleged as causing such damages exist. It is incumbent upon the lower court to determine and fix the damages for which indemnity is sought.</p>

PetitioN by tlie Attorney General for Disbarment of the Defendant from the Practice of the Professions of Attorney and Notary. „ The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Offense Against Public Justice — Destruction of Milk Intended for Sale— Obstructing Public Justice. — When upon the approach of an official charged by law with the duty of inspecting milk to ascertain whether it is of the degree of purity required by law, a person engaged in the sale thereof to the public maliciously and wilfully destroys the milk, a part of which he had already sold, thus preventing the said official from fulfilling his duties, he is guilty of the offense of obstructing public justice, penalized by section 137 of the Penal Code.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing To Record a Possessory Title.</p> <p>The facta are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action to Annul Titles and of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Decided on the grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. -1499, Martorell et al. v. J. Ochoa' # Brother et al., ante.</p>

<p>PetitioN for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Aguaclilla in a Proceeding for Appointment of an Administrator.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Injunction — Intervention—Title.—Judgment Lien. — It appears from the evidence that in an action of debt against a succession the defendants obtained judgment, which was entered ini the judgment record and index; tliat after the entry the plaintiff filed a complaint in debt against the same succession and also obtained judgment in the execution of which several properties were sold and conveyed to him, the marshal informing him of the entry made in favor of the defendants. When the defendant firm undertook 'to execute its judgment and the sale of the properties was announced, a complaint of intervention in ownership and this petition for an injunction were filed. Seld: That the plaintiff has no clear title which would warrant the granting of the injunction he seeks, inasmuch as the properties were already encumbered by the judgment lien in favor of the defendants when the plaintiff acquired them and were purchased by him subject thereto, a fact which he knew, not only because he was notified by the marshal, but also and principally because the. registry is public and gives notice to everybody, and that he could release the properties only by paying the amount of the lien, as provided by article 71 of the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Judgment Lien — Eecokd of Judgment — Preference.—When a judgment is entered in the judgment record and index in the books of a registry of property in accordance with section 8 of the Act of March 8, 1906, it has the effect of a lien on all the real property of the defendant not exempt from execution within the district where it is recorded and on all property subsequently acquired in the said district, such lien having the scope and preference provided for in subdivision 3 of section 1824 of the Civil Code.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of. Intervention in Ownership of Real Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Unlawful Detainer — Appearance—Summons.—Section 4 of the Unlawful Detainer Act does not provide for the entry of a formal order or instructions. in writing to the secretary signed hy the judge and filed among the papers of the case, but simply prescribes that after the filing of the complaint “the plaintiff and defendant shall be ordered to appear for a hearing, which must be held within ten days after the commencement of the action. ” Therefore the setting of the case by the court implies an authorization to the secretary for the issuance of the summons to the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — -Id. — Summons- — Service. — Municipal judges are authorized to administer oaths to servers of process on the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Technicalities—Prejudice.—Technical questions of detail in the . form of the summons, without showing prejudice or any defense on the merits, do not disclose a proper case for relief by certiorari if it appears that the defendant had actual notice of the proceedings and was cautioned against the consequences of his default.</p>

<p>Murder — Evidence—Medical Expert — Jury.—The opinion given by a medical expert during a trial for murder in the first degree to the effect that wounds in the back were first inflicted should be excluded from the consideration of the jury and the jury should be left absolutely free to draw its own conclusions on this point.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Deliberation and Premeditation. — After examining the evidence in this ease it was held that the circumstances do not show the deliberation and premeditation necessary to sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Grand Larceny.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Murder — Information - — • Affidavit —• Objection. ■— In the absence of objection, made in the lower court and not for the first time on appeal, an affidavit by the prosecuting attorney to an information stating that it is based upon, the testimony of witnesses examined under oath and that he solemnly believes that there is just cause for presenting the same, is sufficient.</p> <p>Id. — -Malice, Premeditation and Deliberation — Motive of Oreme. — There is no obligation on the part of the Government to establish an adequate cause or reason for the commission of a crime if it clearly appears that the homicide was committed by the defendant with malice and after premeditation and deliberation.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Dominion Title.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>Motion of the Appellees for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Title.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the 'opinion/</p>

<p>Possessory Title — Record oe Title — House Built on Municipal Lot. — A proceeding to prove possession as owner' of a house built on a lot belonging to a municipality which has not been recorded as a separate property in the registry is not recordable, for inasmuch as the land is the principal and the building its accessory, the house cannot be recorded unless the lot has .been first recorded.</p> <p>Segregation oe Property — Record oe Title. — According to the present system of recording titles to property, when a pareel is segregated from the main property it becomes a separate property and as such is recorded anew in the registry.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in an Action for ' Divorce.</p> <p>Motion for Change of Venue.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from file District Court of Arecibo in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 162 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Lease of Community Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Voluntary Mortgage — Acceptance—Agent—Curable Defect. — According to the provision ol article 138 of the Mortgage Law, a voluntary mortgage may be created validly not only by the agreement of the parties but also by the exclusive act of the owner of the property on which it is imposed, and no showing is required of the acceptance by the person in whose favor the lien is created. For this reason the fact that it was not duly shown in the deed presented in the registry for record that the person appearing therein as the creditor’s agent was in fact such agent, is not a curable defect.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Filiation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Agricultural Contract — Record oe Title — Lease.—Although according to section. 14 of Act No. 37 of March 10, 1910, relating to agricultural financing and milling of sugar cane, a previous record of the property in the registry of property is not required, it is essential that, among other things, the tenant should justify his tenancy in some way. Therefore, in the present case the public instrument explaining and ratifying the private contract for agricultural financing and milling of sugar cane, in which the tenant stated that he held as lessee also by private contract, is not recordable for failure to show that this contract really existed.</p>

<p>Agricultural Contract — Record of Title. — In order to record in the registry a contract for agricultural financing wherein the planter of the sugar cane, or colono, referred to in section 14 of the Act of March 10, 1910, purports to be the owner of the property affected by the contract, it is not necessary that the document should show that the property had not been previously recorded, or else that the title of acquisition should be presented.</p>

<p>Larceny — Finding Lost Articles. — In this ease the complainant lost a number of ducks and reported the fact to the police. Later he found three of the ducks in the possession of another person who had purchased them from the defendant. He identified the ducks as one of them had a mark and the others were of a similar race. The complainant and a policeman testified that the defendant told them that he had found the ducks in a brook and thought that they were wild ducks. The defendant took the witness stand and denied that he had made such statements and insisted that he had bought three duck eggs from' a boy and gave a detailed account of how he hatched and raised the ducks from these eggs. Held: That the manner in which the said ducks disappeared and were found by the defendant is so shrouded in doubt that it is impossible to bring the case under sectioh 433 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Id. — Possession oe Stolen Goods — Presumption—Corpus Delicti. — The fact that a person charged with larceny tells inconsistent stories in accounting for the possession of objects recently stolen may tend to aid a presumption connecting him with the offense charged, but there must be independent proof also of the corpus delicti.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Cancel an Annuity.</p> <p>The facts are stated -in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Proceeding for the Approval of Accounts of an Administrator in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gruayama in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Embezzlement.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Information — Demurrer.—Even when the defendant does not set out in writing: the grounds for Ms demurrer that the facts alleged in the information do not charge a public offense, the court should not refuse to consider the demurrer as it is of a privileged character, but that fact cannot serve as a basis for obtaining the reversal of the judgment appealed from inasmuch as the defendant had an opportunity to argue the demurrer on its merits before this court and failed to do so. Moreover, an examination of the information shows ‘ that it charges the defendant with the offense defined and punished by section 162 of the Penal Oode.</p> <p>Offense Against Election Law — Registering While Under Age — Evidence.— The defendant in this ease was charged with the offense of registering as a voter before attaining the required age. The fiscal produced in evidence a certificate of birth from the civil registry showing that the defendant was born on April 26, 1896. The defendant offered in evidence a certificate of' baptism showing that the child Juan Toribio was baptized on June 23, 1885, besides which the father of the accused testified that his son was baptized on May 16, 1995 (sic). Held: That inasmuch as it was a question of the weight to be given the evidence and the trial judge had an opportunity to observe the defendant personally before deciding the question of whether he was twenty or thirty-one years of age, his decision should not be disturbed by this court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Renunciation of Rights and Interests.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion. .</p>