Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

243 F.2d 432

Docket No. 16468.

Lowe v. Jacobs

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided April 22, 1957.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1957-04-22

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“28 U.S.C.A. § 1446 . “(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a verified petition containing a short and plain statement of the facts which entitle him or them to removal together with a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served upon him or them in such action.” * * * “(d) Each petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding, except a petition in behalf of the United States, shall be accompanied by a bond with good and sufficient surety conditioned that the defendant or defendants will pay all costs and disbursements incurred by reason of the removal proceeding should it be determined that the case was not removable or was improperly removed. “(e) Promptly after the filing of such petition and bond the defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the petition with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." (Emphasis supplied.) 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 . “ * * * “(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may order the payment of just costs. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by its c”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Losacco v. Serra, No. 073177 (Jun. 16, 1995), Cliff v. Bonner

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1441

Relies on 91 Ga. App. 571 - Allen v. Hatchett · Hopson v. North American Ins. Co. · Bean v. Clark

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1957-04-22

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently December 2015 · most notably George G. Allman v. W. H. Hanley (1962), Maseda v. Honda Motor Co. (1988)

10 federal appellate · 3 district · 13 state decisions

1001957196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Richard E. McDaniel, Center, Tex., for appellants.

¶2Howell Cobb, Beaumont, Tex., W. B. Patterson, Dallas, Tex., Robertson, Jackson, Payne, Lancaster & Walker, Dallas, Tex., Or gain, Bell & Tucker, Beaumont, Tex., of counsel, for appellee.

¶3Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BORAH and TUTTLE, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5This is an appeal from a preliminary injunction granted by the trial court restraining appellants and their attorney from proceeding further in a damage suit filed in a Texas state court after the *433defendant below had timely and properly1 removed the suit to the United States District Court. The appellants claim that the suit based on diversity was not removable under the joinder-of-action provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) and that therefore the state court had the right to proceed as if no removal had been accomplished. Appellee answers that this statute as amended in 1949 expressly deprives the state court of jurisdiction to proceed with any phase of litigation that has been properly removed unless and until the case is remanded, and that such remand is solely within the power of the United States court. We have no doubt that this is the effect of the law as it now stands. Prior to the amendment of 1949 this removal, to be effective, must be with respect to a case in which a party was “entitled to remove.” 2The language now employed is “A defendant desiring to remove

¶6We find no federal decision on this point, but do find several state court eases in which it has been held that the state court now loses all jurisdiction after compliance with the removal statute, until there has been a remand. Hopson v. North American Ins. Co., 71 Idaho, 461, 233 P.2d 799, 25 A.L.R.2d 1040; Bean v. Clark, Miss., 85 So.2d 588; State ex rel. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P., La.App., 90 So.2d 884, and see Allen v. Hatchett, 91 Ga.App. 571, 86 S.E.2d 662. No case to the contrary has been called to our attention and we find none.

¶7We thus do not come to the question whether the two suits brought in the state court were or were not separate and independent. That is a matter that can be passed on in the district court on motion to remand. In the present state of the record the trial court had authority to enjoin further proceedings in the state court.

¶8The judgment is Affirmed.

/243/f2d/432 · .json · Public domain