Volume 243 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

breach of contract unjust enrichment summary judgment home construction issues of fact conversion self-serving affidavit App.R. 16(A)(7) appellant's burden.

Federal Arbitration Act arbitration agreement motion for protective order motion to stay discovery motion to compel arbitration. - Trial court's denial of appellants' motions to stay discovery and for a protective order while appellants' motion to compel arbitration remained pending was immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act, which applied to the arbitration agreements at issue, because the orders effectively denied appellants' motion to compel arbitration.

On workplace intentional tort claim, summary judgment to employer is appropriate where employee presents no facts to show that employer acted with specific, deliberate intent to injure him. Denial of Civ.R. 60(B)(3) motion for relief from judgment based on alteration of a form not an abuse of discretion where alteration was not material to the claim, not providing original form in discovery was an oversight, and where the act of altering the form supports the underlying claim, not fraud under 60(B)(3).

Subject-matter jurisdiction jurisdictional priority whole issue common pleas domestic relations divorce division of property tort injunction temporary restraining order. The plaintiff-corporation filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas seeking injunctive relief and damages for certain alleged torts, including conversion and fraud. The defendants argued that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction by operation of the jurisdictional-priority rule, because there was a pending divorce case in a domestic-relations court between one of the defendants and her husband. That defendant claimed that ownership of the plaintiff-corporation was an issue to be decided in the divorce case. We found that the jurisdictional-priority rule does not apply under the circumstances. The parties and claims were not the same between the two cases. The tort case did not present part of the same whole issue pending in the domestic-relations court. And the domestic-relations court does not have jurisdiction to give the plaintiff the relief to which it may be entitled. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

JOINDER SEVERANCE CRIM.R. 8, 12, 13, 14 EVID.R. 404(B) MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE RAPE RAPE SHIELD LAW. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by joining cases involving similar offenses, occurring separately, and with different victims because evidence of each offense would have been admissible at separate trials under Evid.R. 404(B). The defendant-appellant's rape conviction under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the victim's testimony regarding her prior sexual activity with the defendant-appellant.

SUFFICIENCY MANIFEST WEIGHT FELONIOUS ASSAULT SELF DEFENSE MISTRIAL 5TH AMENDMENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS INFERIOR-DEGREE-OFFENSE INSTRUCTION STAND-YOUR-GROUND LAW VERDICT FORMS SENTENCING REAGAN TOKES LAW. The defendant-appellant's felonious-assault conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the trier of fact did not lose its way including that the defendant-appellant did not act in self-defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant-appellant's motions for a mistrial because the prosecutor did not improperly address the defendant-appellant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or his pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. The trial court did not abuse in instructing the jury.

marital property, separate property, inter vivos gift, final appealable order

R.C. 2953.32 application to seal record of conviction competing interests abuse of discretion rehabilitation. The trial court abused its discretion in denying an application to seal a record of conviction where it conflated expungement with sealing a record and therefore improperly weighed the competing interests at play.

INSURANCE – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – DOCTRINE OF INFERRED INTENT – HARMLESS ERROR – DICTA – APPELLATE REVIEW – STANDING – AGGRIEVED PARTY: The trial court correctly assigned both insurers and the insured a burden to demonstrate they were entitled to summary judgment where both insurers and the insured sought a judicial determination of the scope of the insurance policies at issue and both insurers and insured moved for summary judgment in their favor. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of insurers and against their insured where the insurance policies at issue limit liability coverage to accidents and not intentional acts, and the trial court properly inferred the insured's intent to harm the plaintiffs in an underlying civil suit because the insured made payments to a terrorist organization knowing or intending those payments would be used to prepare or carry out acts of terrorism and those payments necessarily resulted in the harm to the victims of the acts of terrorism. The trial court properly granted summary judgment though it erroneously relied on an overruled legal test for inferring an insured's intent to injure because the error was harmless as the trial court arrived at the correct result. Though the trial court mischaracterized an argument by the insured as raising an affirmative defense that the court ultimately determined was nonviable, the error was harmless as the trial court's decision was otherwise correct. The trial court properly granted summary judgment though it held that dicta had precedential effect, because the dicta was ultimately correct and any potential error from relying on the dicta was harmless. Where the trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment in its entirety and awarded it the relief requested, the insurer was not an aggrieved party, and therefore, had no standing to appeal the judgment.