Volume 243 — United States Reports

Held: that the certiorari must be dismissed. Writ of certiorari to review 41 App. D. C. 463 , dismissed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Levi H. David and Mr. Alexander Wolf for petitioner. Mr. Percival H. Marshall and Mr. Conrad H. Syme for respondent.

Held: reviewable ' in this court, as concerning matters inherently federal.

“This action was instituted in the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas, at Austin, on the 23rd day of February, 1910, by Allen Bond and William J. Buttfield, plaintiffs, against J. L. Hume, defendant, to recover the balance due upon an open account for money advanced to defendant, and paid, laid ;out and expended for his account, and for. services rendered and performed for defendant at his special instance and request at divers times between the…

The board of directors of a national bank have power under the National Bank Act to clothe the cashier with authority to sell corporate shares which have been acquired by the bank as the result of a loan made upon the shares as security.

Held: that the statute was not rendered violative of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by application to the case of an employee who had contracted with the owner to provide the safeguards the absence of which resulted later in his injury and death.

Held: that the transportation of the logs by the railroad was not interstate'or foreign commerce, and that an employee of the railroad, injured while engaged in unloading some of them at the tidewater terminus, was not employed in such commerce, within the Federal Employers’. Liability Act.

Held: that the defendant in error in hauling its logs from its own timber-lands over its own railroad to tidewater (origin, destination and transit all being in the same State) for sale to others who subse *41 quently disposed of them or their manufactured products partly in other States, was not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff while loading logs upon one of…

Held: That neither party was engaged in interstate commerce, quoad the injury, and that no cause of action existed under the Federa) Employers’ Liability Act. (2) That plaintiff’s cause of action, viewed as arising under the state law, was remediable only as provided by the Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act, Laws 1911, c. 74.

Held: that the suit must be dismissed as, in substance, a suit against the United States. Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70 . Semble, that the presence of the entryman as a party, he having purchased the land and paid the price, would be indispensable to the granting of the relief prayed. This court has no original jurisdiction of a suit by a State against citizens of other States 1 and citizens of the State complaining.

Held: That the decree should be construed, not as divesting any interest of the individuals or affecting their relations inter sese, but as adjudging that both were devoid of interest from before the beginning of the suit, and, consequently, (2) That the covenant of warranty between them attached by estoppel to the title when afterwards acquired by the warrantor.

Held: that the combination violated the Sherman Act. Common carriers are under a duty to compete, and are subject in a peculiar degree to the policy of the Sherman Act. A combination is not excusable upon the ground that it was induced by good motives and produced good results. The conduct of property embarked in the public service is subject to the'policies of the law.

Held: that the judgment was absolutely void under the Fourteenth Amendment. Qucere: Whether the judgment would have been good if a summons had been left at his last and usual place of abode in Texas while the -family was in that State and before the new domicile was acquired?

Held: that the construction had a rational basis in the statute and therefore could not be deemed to deprive the company of due process of law, even if it took it by surprise. O’Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 242 U. S. 20 , 26. When a power actually is conferred by a document, the party executing it takes the risk of the interpretation that may be put upon it *94 by the courts.

<p>Under the Choctaw-Chickasaw supplemental agreement of July 1, 1902, §§ 11, 12, 15 and 16, 32 Stat. 641, surplus lands, selected by a member of the Chickasaw Tribe, become alienable only with the expiration of the respective periods after patent fixed in § 16; these restrictions accompany the land when it passes to a tribal member by inheritance, and a conveyance by him while the periods are running is void. Mullen v. United States, 224 U. S. 448, distinguished.</p> <p>The Act of April 26, 1906, 34 Stat. 137, in providing that conveyances of allotments made after selection should not be declared invalid solely because made prior to patent, was not intended to validate deeds made before removal of restrictions on alienation; on the contrary it expressly declares them null and void.</p>

Held: That the transaction was a gross breach of defendant’s duty as receiver; (2) That he was estopped to claim that the purchase of the property was beyond the powers of the bank, Case v. Kelly, 133 U. S. 21 , distinguished; (3) That delay of the suit for sixteen years after the making of the contract and fourteen years after defendant’s resignation as receiver was not laches, in view of the find *115 ing that his…

<p>A suit brought by a trustee in bankruptcy under § 60b of. the Bankruptcy Act to set aside an unlawful preference is a controversy arising in á bankruptcy proceeding.</p> <p>In such controversies, judgments and decrees of the Circuit Courts of Appeals which might otherwise have come within the general appellate powers of this court as defined by the Judicial Code are, by the Act of January 28,1915, 38 Stat. 804, made final, and this court may review them only by certiorari.</p>

Held: that this court had no jurisdiction to review, although the state board’s adjudication was» challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held: That the life of the second franchise was not limited to twenty-five years, but was intended to endure while the corporate life of the grantee endured by extension beyond that period. (2) The fact that the first franchise was expressly limited to twenty-five years while the second was granted for' “the existence of the corporation” was evidence confirming this construction.

New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that workers' compensation laws are not arbitrary and do not violate the Due Process Clause.

Held: permissible regulation in aid of the general scheme of the act.

Held: The act not being valid against employers if not valid as against employees, an employer may question its constitutionality in both aspects. (2) Viewed, from the standpoint of employees, the act is the same in principle as the act sustained in New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, ante, 188.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington was interlocutory and therefore not reviewable in this court under § 237 of the Judicial Code. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 138 U. S. 287 , questioned, if not overruled.

Held: partly on the authority of City Electric Ry. Co. v. Floyd County, 115 Georgia, 655, that whatever may have been the rights of the company origi *258 nally, the effect of the compromise agreements, and their execution, wás to substitute a temporary grant subject at all times to revocation.

<p>In the absence of consent, a corporation of one State may not be summoned in another, in an action in personam, unless it is doing business in the State where it is served in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there.</p> <p>The process must be served on some authorized agent of the corporation.</p> <p>•The questions whether the corporation was doing business and whether the person served was its authorized agent being vital to the jurisdiction, either, if duly raised, is subject to be reviewed directly by this court, as to findings of fact as well as legal conclusions, upon certificate from the District Court under § 238 of the Judicial Code.</p> <p>A railroad corporation not owning or operating any part of its railway, or holding other property, within a State, may not be said to be doing business there merely because cars shipped by it, loaded with the goods of its shippers, pass into that State, and are returned therefrom, over'the line of a connecting carrier (each carrier receiving only its proportionate share of the freight charged for the interstate haul,) or because the connecting carrier, within the State, sells coupon tickets and displays the other carrier’s name at its station and in the telephone directory, to promote, travel and public convenience.</p> <p>The fact that corporations subsidiary to another are doing business in a State does not warrant finding that the other is present there, doing business.</p> <p>Whether a corporation doing business in a State may be served there on a cause of action arising in another State and unrelated to the business in the first — not decided.</p> <p>An arrangement by counsel, designed merely to facilitate an attempted service of summons on the president of a corporation while passing through a State and engaged on his private affairs, does not estop the corporation from contesting the jurisdiction upon the ground that it was not doing business in the State.</p>

Held: where the property was the divorced husband’s bank account. . Property not subject to attachment at la,. may be reached in equity;' an injunction entered at the commencement of proceedings for divorce and alimony fnay operate as a seizure, in the nature of a garnishment, of defendant’s account in bank. 92 Ohio St., 517 , affirmed. *270 The cáse is stated in the opinion. Mr. Guy W. Mallon for plaintiff in error.

Held: that a decree of the District Court directing foreclosure sale, and that execution issue for any deficiency, was consistent with, and did not exceed, the affirmance. The amount of deficiency being fixed by the sale, the insertion of the amount in the execution was but a clerical^act. Under Rev. Stats, of Texas, Art. 1206, a suit against a corporation is not abated by its dissolution pending appeal.

Held: that under this arrangement the switch track was not to be regarded as a private track, but as a track of the railroad company. The court cannot be controlled by an agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of law. The court cannot decide fictitious cases.

<p>certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the NINTH 'CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in an action for damages under § 24 of the Judicial Code (derived from the Tucker Act): (1) That this amounted to a partial taking of the property. (2) That the United States was liable ex contractu to compensate the owner to the extent of the injury.

'The case is stated in the opinion. The act is constitutional as an hours-of-service law. It is constitutional if purely a wage law. From the beginning, Congress’s power, over interstate commerce has been declared to be supreme.

<p>The power to regulate the use of the lands of the United States, and to prescribe the conditions upon which rights in them may be acquired by others,' is vested exclusively in Congress.</p> <p>The inclusion of such lands within a State does not diminish this power,' or subject the lands or interests in them to disposition by the state power; and, therefore, such lands, within a State, or ways across them, are not subject to be occupied or used for private or quasi-public purposes, under state laws, save such laws as have been adopted or made applicable by Congress.</p> <p>The Act of May 14, 1896, c. 179, 29 Stat. 120, relating exclusively to rights of way and the use of land for electric power purposes, covering the subject fully arid specifically and containing new provisions, was evidently designed to be complete in itself, and therefore, by necessary implication, superseded the provisions of Rev. Stats., §§ 2339 and 2340 (derived from the Acts of 1866 and 1870), in so far as they were applicable to such rights of way.</p> <p>The legislation embodied in Rev. Stats., §§ 2339 and 2340, granted rights of way for ditches, canals and reservoirs only, and did not cover power-houses, transmission lines, or subsidiary structures.</p> <p>Sections 18-21 of the Act of March 3,1891, c. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, relate to rights for ditches, canals and reservoirs for the purpose of irrigation and call for the filing of maps, to be effective when approved by the Secretary of the Interior; the Act of May 11, 1898, c. 292, 30 Stat. 404, permits the rights so approved under the Act of 1891 to be used for certain purposes, including power development, as subsidiary to the main purpose of irrigation; but neither act applies where no maps have been filed or approved, where the rights claimed include power-houses, sfibsidiary buildings and transmission lines, and where irrigation is neither the sole nor the main purpose of the use.</p> <p>Whether or not the Act of February 15, 1901, c. 372, 31 Stat: 790, superseded other earlier right of way provisions, it obviously took the place of the Act of May 14,1896, supra.</p> <p>TheAct of February 1, 1905, c. 288, 33 Stat. 628, makes no provision for electric power-houses, transmission lines or structures subsidiary thereto, the rights of way granted being only for ditches, canals and reservoirs for diverting, storing and carrying water.</p> <p>The purposes for which rights of way may be obtained under the Act of February 1, 1905, supra, viz., municipal or mining purposes and for milling and reduction of ores, do not include the generating of electricity for general, commercial disposition even though some part of the current is sold in adjacent or distant towns for power, lighting and heating, or to persons engaged in mining, milling or reducing pres.</p> <p>The United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit. So held in regard to an alleged agreement for the use of federal lands by a power company.</p> <p>As a- general rule, laches or neglect of duty on the part of government officers is no defense to a suit to enforce a public right or protect a public interest.</p> <p>If this rule has exceptions, they in turn are limited by the principle which places on different planes an ordinary private suit over title and a suit maintained by the United States to enforce its policy respecting land held in-trust for all the people. Causey v. United States, 240 U. S. 399, 402.</p> <p>The discretion of Congress to control the use of federal lands through administrative regulations is not narrowly confined.</p> <p>Where such regulations exceed the power of or authorization by Congress, they may be disregarded as void, but not so where they are merely illiberal, inequitable or unwise.</p> <p>Parties whose occupancy and use of federal lands can be legitimated only by complying with the Act of February 15, 1901, supra, may not be heard to complain of the regulations adopted in its execution ' until they seek a license or permit under the act and conform, or appropriately offer to conform, to all of the regulations which are lawful. ' ’</p> <p>The acts of Congress providing or recognizing that rights to the use of water in streams running through public lands and reservations may be acquired in accordance with local laws do not authorize the appropriation of rights of way through lands of the United States.</p> <p>In a suit by the United States to erfjoin unlawful occupancy and use of its reserved lands, compensation measured by the reasonable value of the occupancy and use, considering its extent and duration, should be included in the decree.</p> <p>The compensation should not be measured by the charges prescribed for like uses by governmental regulations when the regulations have not been accepted or assented to by the defendants.</p>

<p>The District Court is without jurisdiction over an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, negative in substance and form, in which the Commission declined to exercise its authority under the “Panama Canal Act” of August 24, 1912, c. 390, § 11, 37 Stat. 560, 566, to extend the period fixed in the act for the divorcement of railroad and water carriers. Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282.</p>

<p>When the decision of the state court in the application of state laws to real property is controlled by a construction of federal statutes concerning the title, which were relied on by the party complaining, this court has jurisdiction to review the judgment.</p> <p>When a forest reservation is made to include a school section previously surveyed, the State may waive its right to the' section and select other lands in lieu, under §§ 2275, 2276, Rev. Stats., as amended by the Act of March 3, 1891, e. 384, 26 Stat. 796.</p> <p>This court will not readily disturb a construction of a land law by the Land Department which, though differing from an earlier one, has been adopted on full consideration and long consistently adhered to by the Department, and upon the faith of which large acreages' have been acquired and large expenditures have been made.</p>

<p>ERROR TQ THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), is a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a ten-hour work day, which was accepted for both men and women, but the state minimum-wage laws were not changed until 20 years later. Future Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter, along with future Oregon Supreme Court justices George M. Brown and John O. Bailey, represented Oregon on the appeal. W. Lair Thompson and former Senator for Oregon Charles W. Fulton represented Bunting.

Held: That the agent caused the mailing, within Criminal Code, § 213, providing ’punishment for those who “place or cause to be placed” matter in a post-office for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud. (2) That the scheme was not executed on delivery of the documents to the local superintendent. 235 Fed. Rep. 1019 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: vacating the former order of substitution granted without discussion, that the action for an injunction against the enforcement of the tax abated upon the death of Croom, Comptroller, and there being no statute covering such cases no order of- substitution could be made,. and thereupon dismissed the appeal for want of a proper, party to stand .in judgment.

The case is stated in the opinion. The preexisting national guardianship over mixed-blood Indians of .the White Earth Reservation was not terminated by the Clapp Amendment. Only those mixed bloods who actually lived the Indian .tribal life were recognized as members of the tribe. Treaty of August 2, 1847, 9 Stat. 904, 905; Treaty of March 19, 1867, 16 Stat. 719, 720. The Treaty of 1867 treated full bloods and mixed bloods alike as dependent Indians.

Held: not a grant in 'prcesenti. Such| a provision calls for no acceptance other than such a? would be implied from taking the patent when issued, *465 A direction by Congress that a patent be issued an individual for land assigned him as an Indian allotment is to be regarded, not as a pro- ■ posal by the Government which upon acceptance makes a1 contract, but as a law amendable and repealable at the will of Congress,…

United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that an immigrant to the United States had no right to naturalization unless all statutory requirements in the Naturalization Act were strictly complied with. In the particular case, a judge staging the final naturalization hearing in their chambers rather than an open courtroom invalidated the proceedings, so the government rescinded Ginsberg's citizenship.

Held: That the rights which candidates for nomination for the office of Senator of the United States may have in such a primary come wholly from'the state law; and a conspiracy to deprive them of such rights by debauching the primary with illegal votes for an opposing candidate is-not within the scope of § 19 of the Penal Code (formerly Rev. Stats., § 5508) designed for the protection of rights and privileges, secured by…

The case is stated in the opinion. The manner by which the plaintiff obtains the benefit of its patent is by delivering the physical thing, accompanied by á specifically limited use license affixed thereto, on payment by the licensee of a certain initial or cash royalty as a sine qua non to the passing of any title or right of possession or use.

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), is United States Supreme Court decision that is notable as an early example of the patent misuse doctrine. It held that, because a patent grant is limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent, the patent law does not empower the patent owner, by notices attached to the patented article, to extend the scope of the patent monopoly by restricting the use of the patented article to materials necessary for their operation but forming no part of the patented invention, or to place downstream restrictions on the articles making them subject to conditions as to use. The decision overruled Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., which had held such restrictive notices effective and enforceable.

Held: That the proceedings concerning which the alleged contempt was committed were not impeachment proceedings. (2) That, whether they were impeachment proceedings or not, the House was without power by its own action, as distinct from such action as might be taken under criminal laws, to arrest or punish for such acts as were committed by appellant.

<p>ON CERTIFICATE FROM AND CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that this court had jurisdiction'to review. Charter and state laws authorized a corporation to build and operate an electric railroad, to condemn water power and employ it in gen- . erating electricity for use in running the road, to sell the surplus of current so generated and, in connection' with these objects, to construct buildings and factories, and operate machinery.

<p>error to the district court of the united states for THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR. TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP SOUTH CAROLINA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

The ease is stated in the opinion. The ease is governed by the Act to Regulate Commerce, with amendments. The rights and immunities, duties and obíigátions of the parties, are therefore determined by federal law. St. Louis &c. Ry. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265, 274-277; Norfolk Southern R. R. Co. v. Ferebee, 238 U. S. 269-273; Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632; Cincinnati &c. Ry. Co. v. Bankin, 241 U. S. 319. The right to sue follows the title to the goods.

<p>Decided on authority of Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Olivit Brothers, ante, 574.</p>

Held: that the affirmance was not in violation of düe process of law. A right of appeal is not essential to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and where it is allowed the State may prescribe the conditions and procedure. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. John Randolph Cooper and Mr. T. A. Wallace for appellant. Mr. Clifford Walker, Attorney General of the State of Georgia, for appellee.

Held: That the stipulation merely required the consignee to give notice within the time fixed of intention to claim damages, without ascertaining and specifying the amount. (2) That the stipulation was reasonable and that non-compliance therewith excused the initial carrier from liability.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP GEORGIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>IN EQUITY.</p> <p>It is ordered that this case be restored to the docket for re-argument.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Arizona.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, State of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.</p>