Volume 244 — United States Reports

This writ is directed to a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia which affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in mandamus commanding the Commissioner of Patents “to declare or direct to be declared an interference between the application of William E. Eowler, Sr., filed May 22, 1915, for Improvements in Car Floor Construction, and the application for a similar invention” qf an unnamed applicant “pursuant to the statute and…

Held: that no violation of due process was involved, since the original judgment satisfied due process and the reason assigned for upholding it, if erroneous, amounted only to a mistake concerning the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered. A decision of a state court upholding a judgment of another State raises no question in this court under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Held: with the effect of making such contract the measure of liability between, the parties. It is insisted' that inasmuch as-the bill of lading made St. Louis the point of destination, it is immaterial what the value of the property was in Chicago, to which point the goods were shipped, having been sold in transit to a company in that city.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE DISTRICT OP ARIZONA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The right to challenge the jurisdiction of the District Court over the person of the defendant is not waived by a special appearance for that purpose, by a .postponement of the hearing at the instance of the plaintiff for the purpose of enabling him to be fully heard on the subject of jurisdiction reserving the right of defendant to plead to the merits if jurisdiction be sustained, or by an order of the court, sua sponte, directing plaintiff to amend his complaint so as to disclose citizenship more fully before the hearing on the jurisdictional question.</p> <p>A motion to quash is a proper mode of attacking service and jurisdiction thereon depending in the District Court; the Conformity Act does not require resort to a demurrer for this purpose even though . the state procedure does. So held where the motion was based on the grounds that defendant corporation was not doing business or possessed of property in the State and on want of representative capacity in the person served.</p>

<p>Concurrent findings of state trial and appellate courts as to the fact. of negligence will not be overturned by this court in the absence of clear error. Baltimore & Ohio B. B. Co. v. Whitacre, 242 U. S. 169.</p> <p>A carrier’s printed form of contract for interstate transportation of livestock, plainly intending to adjust the rates in each case proportionately to valuations to be made by the shipper which should limit the carrier’s liability, specified minimum or primary valuations for various kinds of animals with corresponding tariff rates and left blanks for insertion of the shipper’s valuations connected with the statement that the same were declared by the shipper in order to avail himself of the alternative rates. In a case where the blanks for valuations by the shipper were left unfilled at execution but the rate charged and inserted in the contract was in accordance with the carrier’s tariff as applied to the primary valuations, Held that these were the valuations adopted by the'parties and that the carrier’s liability was limited accordingly.</p> <p>Failure to post rates which are duly made out and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission' does not affect their validity or the duty of a shipper to take notice of them.</p> <p>A clause in a carrier’s merchandise rate schedules providing that rates there must not be applied to livestock shipments, construed as intended to leave the provisions of the livestock schedule concerning rates and valuations for independent interpretation uninfluenced by provisions in the merchandise schedules.</p> <p>The effect of a contract made and signed by a shipper in lawful accord with established rate sheets may not be avoided by the suggestion that through neglect or inattention he did not read it.</p>

Held: that, in view of the Safety Appliance Act, negligence might be inferred from the mere opening of the couplers. A father who by the state law is entitled to the earnings of his son during minority may recover damages for the latter’s death upon a cause of ■ action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. 130 Minnesota, 33, affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: that without regard to whether the jurisdic- ■ tion over the reservation was, exclusively federal, the transport and deposit of the materials beyond its limits was such a doing of business in Kentucky as subjected the corporation to the' jurisdiction • of the courts of that State in a transitory action. *69 The corporation was sued in a Kentucky court for injuries suffered by an employee while engaged upon the work…

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that his cross w¡rit of error complaining of the reduction must be dismissed. Cro'ss writ of error to review 221 Fed. Rep. 912 , dismissed. *80 The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Edward S. Clark, with whom Mr. John C. Weadock and Mr. H. M. Gillett were on the briefs, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Thomas A. E. Weadock for defendant in error.

<p>An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission assigning a cause for hearing upon an issue of reparation is not an order in the sense Of § 1 of the Commerce Court Act, 36 Stat. 539; Judicial Code, § 207; and the District Court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the Commission from proceeding with such hearing. Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282.</p>

Held: that they were to be regarded as “classified as non-mineral at the time of actual Government survey,” for the purposes of lieu selection'by the Northern Pacific Railway Company under the Act of March 2, 1899, swpra.

Held: that, during the taking of proofs, defendant might properly be enjoined from disclosing the *101 processes to experts or other witnesses, the restraint not extending to his own counsel, and that the trial judge in his discretion might reveal them to such persons, at such times, and under such precautions as he might deem necessary in the progress of the case.

Held: that a writ of error from this court must be dismissed. In the trial of an action against a carrier upon a contract for interstate transportation the plaintiff may be entitled to the presumption that the carrier filed such rates as were requisite to sustain the contract, the pleadings being silent on the subject- . Writ of error to review 38 Nevada, 156, dismissed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: that the returns were made by the employees in the course of their business and that an objection that the evidence was hearsay could not in justice be entertained. Held, further, that the two months of investigation afforded a basis for argument as to constant conditions.

Held: was not notice to him, and to make an order undertaking to deprive such person of his property would be to take it by a judgment to which the living person was not a party or privy; and it was held that jurisdiction did not arise from the mere finding of the court that the person whose property was thus taken was in fact deceased. In the present case the Government had jurisdiction over these lands.

<p>ERROR TO THE CITY COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This suit was instituted by James. Lewis, and revived upon his death by Josephine B. Lewis, as executrix, to recover the sum of $2,000 salary claimed to be due him from the United States as surveyor general of Louisiana for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1909, and ending June 30,1910, and to recover the further sum of $2,287.80 claimed to belong to him as perquisites of this office and paid over his protest into the Treasury of the United States between May 1, 1907, and…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT,. APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, ,OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO TÚE COURT OF ERRORS AND. APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the. opinion.</p>

<p>Section 7 of the Act of March 3,1891, e. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1099, lays upon the Secretary of the Interior a plain duty to cause a patent to be issued upon a homestead entry when no contest or protest proceeding has been initiated and no order has been made, in his Department, for the purpose of challenging the validity of the entry, within two years from the issuance of the final receiver’s receipt.</p> <p>An adverse report by a deputy supervisor of a National Forest, challenging a homestead entry within the forest for insufficiency of residence and cultivation, but merely filed in the General Land Office and not acted on until after the two year limitation period had expired, Held not a “pending contest or protest” within the meaning of § 7 of the Act of March 3, 1891, supra.</p> <p>Notwithstanding its reluctance to award or sustain a writ of mandamus against an executive officer, the court is constrained to do so where the duty sought to be enforced is plain and nondiscretionaiy and the situation exigent.</p>

<p>error to the supreme court op the STATE OP NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that a continuance of such occupancy under the same and later mesne conveyances, with knowledge of the decree, was not a trespass of the character forbidden by the act to prevent unlawful occupancy of public lands (February 25, 1885, c. *185 149, 23 Stat. 321 ), but came -within the exceptions of that act as an occupancy under claim and color of title made or acquired in gtfod faith. 20 N. Mex. 264, affirmed.

<p>The court is not called upon to consider state statutes passed for the enforcement of a provision in the state constitution, when the latter as construed and applied in the case by the state supreme court is self-executing and covers the judgment in question.</p> <p>As applied to a company engaged in both interstate and intrastate traffic, a state regulation, in respect of the latter only, which forbids any railroad company in general terms from charging more for a shorter haul than for a longer haul for the same class of freight over any portion of its lines within the State without regard to direction, circumstances or condition, and which allows the shipper an absolute right to recover any overcharges collected from him in violation of the prohibition, is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Interstate Commerce Acts, in the absence of special facts and circumstances warranting a different conclusion in the particular case. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503.</p> <p>To claim exemption from such regulations under the Contract Clause, the existence of a special protecting contract must be shown by the record.</p>

<p>ERROR TO TEtE SUPREME .COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH DISTRICT, OF THE STATE OF OHIO,</p> <p>The cases are stated in the opinion.</p>

Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the geographical extent of state workers' compensation laws. The Court held that the New York Workmen's Compensation Act, as applied to laborers in the New York Harbor, intruded on federal admiralty jurisdiction, and that civil suits arising within this jurisdiction were subject to the common law of the sea. The compensation statute passed by the state interfered with federal power and was therefore unconstitutional. The case is noted for the dissent written by Justice Holmes, specifically his dicta on the nature of the common law: The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified.

Held: that the New York Workmen’s Compensation Act is unconstitutional as applied to the case of a longshoreman employed by a steamship company engaged in interstate transportation by sea, who was injured while on board a vessel unloading her at her wharf in-navigable waters in New York. 215 N, Y, 529 , reversed. *256 The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OP ERRORS AND APPEALS OP THE STATE OP NEW JERSEY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>error to the circuit court of appeals for the SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That whether the guaranty were treated as having created an aggregation of as many obligations as there were bonds, each constituting a separate contract between the guarantor and the respective bondholder, or a-single-obligation for the benefit of the bondholders collectively, in either case there was a merger of the original cause or causes of action in the single judgment recovered by the trustee.

<p>Under the doctrine established by Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, and many cases decided since, a person traveling by railroad as a caretaker of live stock on a “free” or “drover’s” pass is a passenger for hire as to whom a stipulation that the carrier shall not be liable for personal injuries caused by its negligence is void.</p> <p>As applied to caretakers of live stock, § 1 of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, uses the term “free pass” in the sense which established custom had given it and judicial determination had sanctioned long before the act, viz., as meaning not a gratuitous pass but one issued for a consideration constituting the caretaker a passenger for hire, within the doctrine of the Lockwood Case. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 234 U. S. 576, distinguished.</p> <p>Where a connecting carrier, sued for personal injuries by a person traveling on a drover’s pass, based its defense on a release of liability for negligence contained in the contract of carriage issued by, and in accordance with the tariffs of, the initial carrier, under the Car-mack Amendment, Held that it was estopped from claiming also that under its own tariff the issuance of such passes was forbidden and unlawful and that therefore such traveler was unlawfully upon its train.</p> <p>A provision in a tariff that “free or reduced transportation shall not be issued for shippers or caretakers in charge of live stock shipments, . . . and'such shippers or caretakers shall" pay full fare returning,” is construed as implying that such transportation will be allowed to the destination of the shipment, but not for the return trip of the caretaker.</p> <p>When connecting interstate canias, in accordance with tariffs of the initial carrier duly filed and published, contract to carry & shipment of live stock with a caretaker for a specified rate in money, the carriage quoad the caretaker is a carriage for money, part of the total rate, and the mere fact that the part attributable to the caretaker is not stated separately in a passenger tariff does not render the contract to carry him invalid under the Act to Regulate Commerce.</p> <p>Separation of the rate in such a case is an administrative matter affecting the form of tariffs, which is committed to the Interstate Commerce Commission by § 6 of the Commerce Act, as amended, and concerning which the courts will not interfere in advance of application to the Commission.</p>

<p>The following patents, viz., No. 538,809, of May 7, 1895, No. 691,332, of January 14, 1902, and No. 721,644, of February 24, 1903, all granted to one Wolhaupter for alleged new and useful improvements in railroad tie plates, are here examined in respect of certain of their claims in comparison with the prior art, and are held invalid for want of novelty and invention.</p> <p>Flanges and teeth projecting from the under surfaces of tie plates, for the purpose of holding them to the ties, and flanges or shoulders on the upper surfaces, designed to receive and resist the lateral thrust of the rails and thus preserve the gauge of the track, having been described in earlier patents and become well known, invention in the Wolhaupter plates is left to depend upon the method of combining strength with economy-by providing flanges upon the upper surfaces for the rails to rest upon; but this feature also, besides having been in substance anticipated by earlier patents, is held to be no more than the product of ordinary mechanical skill, 'since resort to channels, grooves and corrugations was a familiar method of reducing the cost of iron plates by reducing their weight without decreasing their strength.</p> <p>A patentee is presumed to have had all prior patents before him when he applied for his patent.</p> <p>Mere carrying forward of the original thought, a change only in form, proportions or degree, doing the same thing in the same way, by substantially the same means, with better results, is not such invention as will sustain a patent.</p> <p>Patents claiming merely improvements in devices already well exploited in the prior art must be limited strictly to the forms described in the claims.</p>

Held: that there was such privity between the defendants that a judgment against the plaintiff rendered by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the suit against the manufacturer was res judicata as to the other suit, then pending before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the other circuit.

Held: that under Jud. Code, § 237, the writ of this court ran properly to the Court of Appeals. Stratton v. Stratton, 239 U. S. 55 .

It is sought upon this writ of error to reverse a judgment which sustained the validity of a patent issued by the United States to the defendant in error, Luttie B. Jones, under the homestead laws.

<p>That provision of the “Blow-Post” law of Georgia (Civil Code, 1910, §§ 2675-2677), which requires railroad companies to check the speed of trains before public road crossings so that trains may be stopped in time should any person or thing be crossing the track there, is a direct and unconstitutional interference with interstate com- ' merce as applied to the state of facts specifically pleaded by the defendant interstate carrier in thjs case, whereby it appears that, to comply with the requirement, the interstate train in question would have been obliged to come practically to a stop at each of 124 ordinary grade crossings within a distance of 123 miles in Georgia extending from Atlanta to the South Carolina line, and that more than six hours would thus have been added to the schedule time of four hours and thirty minutes. Southern Railway Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524, distinguished.</p>

Held: that in thus rendering judgment against the defendant without affording opportunity to introduce evidence upon the question of benefit there was a violation of due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held: That a. request to charge that if plaintiff was using the tracks voluntarily for his convenience he assumed the risk, was too broad, in ignoring the circumstances which induced him to use them and in taking for granted his knowledge of the conditions, especially the possibility of negligence in backing the engine without warning.

<p>Under § 3438 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1913, as construed by the Supreme Court of the State, the owner of an irrigation canal may be compelled to bridge it to afford access between the lands of another which are intersected by it, although the canal was built across the lands by one who owned them at the time and who sold the separated parcels by successive conveyances to their present owner, after the canal had been long in operation and after it had been disposed of to another interest.</p> <p>In virtue of the right to affix conditions to grants of corporate power, the State of Nebraska, in granting appellant Irrigation District the privilege of obtaining lands for canals, etc., by condemnation, was justified in imposing, by the same law, the duty to build bridges without further compensation in the circumstances indicated in the preceding paragraph, and appellant, having accepted the privilege cum onere, can not complain that its property is taken in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the requirement is enforced, even though the right of way for the particular canal in question was acquired without resort to condemnation.</p> <p>A state law laying a duty upon all owners of irrigation canals to construct bridges over them for the benefit of abutting lands does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in not embracing canals devoted to other uses.</p>

Held: reasonable. and-valid.-. The right of parties to an interstate shipment to limit the carrier’s liability for damage to the goods-, in consideration of optional reduced *333 rates and in accordance with schedules and a form of contract duly-published and filed with the Commission, is well settled. Such provisions for notice of claim and limited liability bind the parties until changed by the Commission. Reversed.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the movement of the goods to the first place and its continuance thence to the second were connected parts of a continuing interstate commerce movement to the latter, and that plaintiff could not be subjected to an occupation or privilege tax under the law of Tennessee because of the sales consummated at either destination. Reversed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: that the company’s action in availing itself of the permission and proceeding with the construction work with knowledge of the manner in which the permission *352 had been obtained, and its acceptance of ensuing benefits, amounted to an implied ratification of its agent's agreement, binding the company either to execute the required stipulation or to discontinue the construction and operation of its railroad within…

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OP ERRORS AND APPEALS OP THE STATE OP NEW JERSEY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA, SECOND DIVISION.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that thereafter the District Court was without power to inquire into and assess the damages sustained by shippers or travellers by reason of the temporary and permanent injunctions, for the purpose of fixing liability on the temporary injunction bonds, at least as to persons who did not elect to appear and make claim; and that, therefore, a reference to that end could afford no basis for .an ancillary suit to enjoin…

Held: That in view of § 3737, Rev. Stats., the transfer could not effect an assignment of the contract but amounted at most to a subletting. (2) That as the responsibility of the contractor under the contract and the actual management of the business were hot changed, nor *377 the surety prejudiced, the transfer, did not operate to discharge the surety from past or future liability.

Held: that the shipper’s acceptance of the new bill was without effect upon the rights of the parties. Under the Carmack Amendment, acceptance by the shipper without consideration of a second bill of lading governing a part of the through transportation and which contains new terms more favorable to the carrier is without effect. 169 S. W. Rep. 1035 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>While the power of.the States over the railways within their borders is very great and comprehensive, the property of the railways is nevertheless protected by the fundamental guaranties of the Constitution, is entitled to as full protection as any other private property devoted to a public use, and can not be taken from its owners without'just compensation or without due process of law.</p> <p>An. attempt upon the, part of a state commission to exercise the power of regulation in such an arbitrary and unreasonable -manner as to prevent a railroad company from obtaining a fair return upon its property invested in the public service is repugnant to due process of law and void under the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>Upon the facts of this case, Held.that an order of the Mississippi Railroad Commission) requiring the appellee company to restore certain passenger trains to service on its line within that State, was arbitrary, unreasonable, in excess of the lawful powers of the commission, and void under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>The reasonableness of requiring a carrier to operate specified trains can not be made to depend upon the relation of the money return to the “out-of-pocket” cost, i. e., immediate outlay for wages and fuel, involved in their operation. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585.</p> <p>The action of the Railroad Commission in this case, though expressed •in a separate order as to each train directed to be restored, was based upon one citation and was intended by the commission, and treated by the court below, as in effect but one order for the restoration of all the trains; this court therefore treats it as a unity, without determining whether some improvement of the train service might not properly have been required.</p>

Held: in the case in which the State sought to set aside for fraud the same sale of the same lands involved in this litigation, 126 Louisiana, 59, that the “Legislature vested the absolute title to the lands in controversy in the Board of Commissioners of the Tensas Levee District, with full power to sell the same on such terms as the Board might deem proper.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mandamus will not lie to control the District Court upon a jurisdictional question when other modes of reviewing its decision (writ of error or certiorari) are provided by statute.</p> <p>This rule obtains even though the decision complained of be manifestly incorrect and though a direct review by mandamus might avert great inconvenience and expense. Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 363, explained and followed.</p> <p>So held where the object of the application was to require the District Court for the Northern District of New York to remand a case removed from a court of the State of New Hampshire.</p>

The case involvés the validity of provisions in the Federal Reserve Bank Act authorizing national banks to act as trustees, etc., when allowed by the Reserve Board and not in contravention of state law; also the jurisdiction of the state court to determine the authority of such banks in proceedings akin to quo warranto. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: therefore, *442 that his conviction was not sustained by the evidence and the sentence imposed upon him not justified, even though its doom be death. Upon the other question the record shows this: Gatmaitan was a witness for the prosecution.

<p>ON PETITION FOB WBIT OF PEOHIBITION.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A private party cannot maintain a suit for an injunction under § 4 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.</p> <p>Such action upon the part of a labor union as is involved in this case is not sub j ect to be enjoined under the laws of New York in a private suit.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>In view of the power reserved to add to, alter, amend or repeal the act granting land to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company (July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat.'292), and of the grantee’s failure to comply with the conditions as to construction, Congress, without violating any vested right and consistently with the Fifth Amendment, could lay upon the grantee the cost of surveying the lands granted and require payment thereof as a condition to the issuance of patents, as was in fact done, in respect of said company, by the general provision in the Act of July 31,1876, c. 246,19 Stat. 121.</p> <p>The construction placed by the Land Department upon the Act of 1876, supra, to the effect that it required the grantee to pay only a share of the cost of surveying and seetionizing a township proportional to the area of its granted lands (odd sections) within that township, was not only reasonable but, being undoubtedly known to Congress, must be deemed to have been approved by and in effect incorporated in the Act of June 25,1910, c. 406, 36 Stat. 834, which makes no change in the grantee’s obligation beyond advancing the time of payment.</p> <p>This view is corroborated by the Senate and House committee reports preceding and explaining the Act of 1910.</p> <p>As a demand by the Secretary of the Interior based on the Act of 1910, supra, that the railroad grantee make a deposit to cover the entire cost of surveying a township, in which only part of the lands belongs to such grantee, is clearly unwarranted by those acts, its effectuation may be enjoined if the other elements requisite to such relief are present.</p> <p>The claim evidenced by such a demand casts a serious cloud on the large areas of other unsurveyed land in the railroad grants and therein threatens the grantee with serious embarrassment; and the provision in the Act of 1910 for forfeiture if the demand be not complied with, to be followed by proceedings by the Attorney General, is also to be considered as a reason for equitable relief.</p> <p>The grantee is not required, in order to test the validity of such a demand, to adopt the hazardous and embarrassing course of ignoring it and defending such suit as the Attorney General may institute under the Act of 1910.</p> <p>The Secretary of the Interior having demanded under the Act of 1910, supra, an amount equal to the entire cost of surveying certain townships of which the railroad grantee could not lay claim to more than half, a tender of one-half the amount demanded was adequate.</p>

<p>Equity has jurisdiction to enjoin unlawful tax proceedings, which cloud the plaintiff’s title and threaten irreparable injury and a multiplicity of suits.</p> <p>The principle settled in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, to the effect that a suit to restrain state officials from enforcing an unconstitutional state statute in violation of plaintiff’s rights and to his irreparable damage is not a suit against the State, applies also when the statute itself is constitutional but the attempted administration of it is not.</p> <p>In a case in which the jurisdiction of the District Court is properly invoked upon a substantial controversy arising under the Constitution of the United States, the jurisdiction of that court, and of this court on appeal, extends to the determination of all questions involved, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the federal question and of whether it be found necessary to decide it at all.</p> <p>Where the relief to which plaintiff might be entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as that allowed him by the federal court upon a proper construction and application of the state constitution and laws, the question whether the acts complained of violate the Amendment need not be decided.</p> <p>Under the so-called franchise tax provisions of Kentucky (Ky. Stats., §§ 4077-4079) relating to railroad and other corporations exercising special or exclusive privileges or franchises, what is termed the “capital stock of the corporation” (§ 4079) includes its entire property, tangible and intangible, and what is termed a “franchise tax” is nothing else than a tax upon the intangible property of the corporation in Kentucky.</p> <p>Semble, that no provision is made by the Kentucky statu fces for taxing franchises under §§ 174 and 181 of the state constitution.</p> <p>The provision in § 182 of the Kentucky Constitution, permitting the General Assembly to provide by law “how railroads and railroad property shall be assessed, and how taxes thereon shall be collected,” relates only to the mode of assessment and collection and does not authorize a departure from the-uniformity in valuation and rate required by §§ 171 and 174.</p> <p>Discrimination resulting from an assessment.of the intangible property of a railroad corporation by the Board of Valuation and Assessment at 75 per cent, of its actual value while the property of individuals and other classes of corporations, taxed at the same rate, is generally and systematically assessed by other and independent taxing authorities of the State at not more than 60 per cent, of actual value, is violative of the provisions of the Kentucky Constitution requiring uniform taxation in proportion to value and an identical rate as between corporate and individual property (§§ 171, 174); and this has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the State.</p> <p>A decision of the state Supreme Court holding that such discrimination is not subject to correction in the courts of the State, and that the equality and uniformity provisions of the state constitution may be enforced only by selection of proper assessing officers, is not binding upon the federal courts.</p> <p>The courts of the United States, their jurisdiction being properly invoked, may afford relief against discriminatory state taxation, contravening the state constitution, when the discrimination results from divergent action of different assessing boards whose assessments are not subject to any process of equalization established by the State, and where the diverse results are the outcome, not of express agreement, but of intentional, systematic and persistent undervaluation by one body of officials, presumably known to and ignored by the other body, so that, in effect, the two bodies act in concert.</p> <p>Sections 171 and 174 of the Constitution of Kentucky require uniform taxation according to value, and an identical rate as between corporate and individual property; and the provision of § 174 that “all corporate property shall pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property” means that not only the percentage of the rate, but the basis of the valuation, shall be the same.</p> <p>Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation; and this equality cannot exist without uniformity in the basis of assessment, as well as in the rate of taxation.</p> <p>The principal if not the sole reason for adopting “fair cash value” as the standard for valuations is as a convenient means of securing equal taxation, and, since, when the standard is systematically departed from in respect of certain classes of property, its observance in respect of others (the tax rate being uniform) would serve to frustrate its very object, it follows that, in such cases, the duty to assess at full value is not supreme but yields to the duty to avoid discrimination.</p> <p>Section 162, Kentucky Statutes, does not afford an adequate legal remedy against discriminatory assessments for both state and local taxes, because, as construed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, it does not authorize correction of erroneous assessments, and also because it applies only to state, and not to local, taxes. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, distinguished.</p> <p>When the bill seeks relief as to state and local taxes based on the same assessment, and an adequate legal remedy exists as to the former class only, equity- will retain and dispose of the entire case, doing justice completely and avoiding multiplicity of suits.</p> <p>A railroad company whose intangible property is assessed by the Board of Valuation and Assessment, and which is subjected to discrimination through undervaluation of other property by county assessors, is not afforded an adequate remedy through §§ 4115-4120, 4123, Ky. Stats., providing for readjustment of the latter class of assessments through the County Board of Supervisors.</p>

Held: That this method of valuing the shares could not be held fundamentally wrong, although there was evidence that their intrinsic value was much greater than the estimate thus obtained.

<p>APPEALS PROM THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The cases are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP MISSISSIPPI.</p> <p>The case is stated in tlie opinion.</p>

Held: Engaged in interstate commerce, within the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. The mere fact that the employee was engaged in interstate commerce when called aside by the event which led to his injury does not stamp his employment at the time of injury as an employment in' interstate commerce.

Held: That the proviso, fairly construed, meant the laws as they should from time to time exist.

<p>EEEOE TO THE SUPEEME COUET OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTÍORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OE APPEALS FOR THE . ■ THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a Washington state law that prohibited employment agencies was unconstitutional.

<p>EEEOE TO THE SUPEEME COUET OP THE STATE OP SOUTH DAKOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia^</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska.</p>

<p>In .error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.</p>

<p>On certificate from and writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.'</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.</p>