¶1Dissent
¶2I cannot agree with the majority opinion on two counts.
¶3*95First, there is insufficient evidence of probative value to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “Johnny Meadows,” deceased at the time of the trial, was the man who attempted the robbery.
¶4Lacking that proof, the conviction of appellant cannot be affirmed as the State did not establish the guilt of Johnny Meadows of the crime of attempted robbery, hence the finding and judgment of the court convicting appellant is contrary to law. Scott, Burton v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 667, 154 N. E. 2d 107; Coughlin v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 393, 92 N. E. 2d 718; Shonfeld v. State (1942), 219 Ind. 654, 40 N. E. 2d 700; Murphy v. State (1915), 184 Ind. 15,110 N. E. 198.
¶5-Second, the doctrine enunciated by the majority opinion
“. . . presence of one at the commission of a felony and companionship with another engaged therein, and a course of conduct before and after the offense, are circumstances which may be considered in determining whether aiding and abetting may be inferred. Roberts v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 185, 197 N. E. 2d 304.
¶6is foreign to the criminal code of this State and is predicated on a minority rule relied on by other jurisdictions. The rule in Indiana is that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶7Without further extending this dissent, it is sufficient to say the judgment of conviction should be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the motion for a new trial.
¶8Note. — Reported in 201 N. E. 2d 693.