Volume 247 — United States Reports

<p>Decided on the authority of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679.</p>

<p>Congress may conscript for military duty in a foreign country; the ■militia clause is not a limitation upon the war power. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, followed.</p> <p>Passages in appellant’s brief are ■found' -scandalous and impertinent, but it is deemed unnecessary to strike them from the files.</p> <p>Affirmed.</p>

Appeal and error to review an order denying petition of Perlman to restrain and enjoin the United States attorney for the Sputhern District of New York from taking into his possession or custody certain exhibits which had been impounded and deposited by order of the district court for that district with the clerk of the coiirt.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT .OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The .case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Upon petition, a rule was made upon the Judge of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, to show 'cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue to prevent further proceedings in an action brought, against a contractor and the petitioner as its surety, under the Act of August 13,1894, c. 280,28 Stat. 278, as amended. The decision was made upon the petition and respondent’s answer thereto.

Held: that these provisions as to the services of the expert were germane to the transaction as an interstate contract and did not involve the doing of local business subjecting the seller to regulations' of Texas concerning foreign corporations. Browning v. Waycross, 233 U. S. 16 , and General Railway Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246- U. S. 500, distinguished. 172 S. W. Rep. 206 , reversed.

<p>PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.</p> <p>The case is stated in. the opiniom</p>

Held: on conflicting.evidence, not to have been intended, nor to' have had the effect, of restraining competition illegally or to have brought it obnoxious power.

<p>ERROR to the superior court of imperial county, STATE OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in the circumstances of this case, not to have been made harmless by proof that more of the drug was added at the international boundary, where the whole prosecution was based upon the original shipment and such proof involved only one of the defendants, and cross-examination upon it was not allowed, and the source of the added drug was not shown. Reversed. The case is stated in the opinion.

The case is stated in the opinion. The statute does not apply to infants of tender years. In Barcolini v. Atlantic City & Shore R. R. Co., 82 N. J. L. 107, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the statute applied to an infant of the age of 21 months. The Court of Errors and Appeals (the- highest court of that State) has never passed upon the question, and the decision of the Supreme Court is. not binding upon the federal courts.

<p>The construction of .an act of Congress may be involved by implication so as to present a federal question.</p> <p>Evidence that, notwithstanding a tribal law of 1876 directing that marriages be solemnized by judge or preacher; it was customary among the Chickasaws to disregard such ceremonies, with evidence that two. Indians held themselves out as man and wife and were reputed married, held enough to warrant a finding of marriage contracted under the tribal customs, within the meaning of the Act of Congress of May 2,1890, ratifying marriages theretofore contracted under the laws or tribal customs of Indian nations of the Indian Territory.</p>

Held: that the transmission of the quotations remained interstate commerce until completed in the subscribers’ offices, and that an order of a Massachusetts commission, requiring the companies to cease discriminating against a wpuld-be subscriber whom the Exchange disapproved, was a direct interference with such commerce, hot sanctioned under the police power of the State or its power over streets crossed by the…

The case is stated in the opinion. besides dealing with the distinction to be drawn between income and a mere conversion of capital assets existent before the law took effect, presented the following on the nature of the company’s interest: It is said the Biwabik Mining Company’s interest in this property was obtained under a lease and that as such lessee it .was not the owner of the ore, and was not, therefore, when it sold the ore converting its capital assets into money.

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: and we think properly so, that foreign insurance companies occupy a relation to the State which is different from that of a domestic company. The latter has within the borders and taxing jurisdiction of the State a large amount of personal property, receiving protection, and subject to taxation.

, paragraph 1: “Such assessment is not conclusive upon any policyholder as to the question whether his relation to the company was such as to subject him to liability for an assessment.

The case is stated in the opinion. A tax upon income derived from exports, by whatever name it is called, is a tax upon exports, and is therefore unconstitutional. . Congress may no mote burden exports and exportation by indirection than by a tax directly upon the article exported; the substance and effect and not the form of a tax controls.

Held: that oral testimony to prove that his mother, not enrolled, was a full-blood Seminole was properly excluded. 225 Fed. Rep. 974 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Kearful for the United States. Mr. Harry H. Rogers, Mr. Joseph L. Hull and Mr. Nathan A. Gibson for appellees.

Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918), was a United States Supreme Court case defining gross income. The case held that gross income includes the gain on sale of assets, i.e., the proceeds less cost basis. An alternative theory that gross income should be the gross proceeds, and the cost basis should be allowed as a deduction, was rejected by the Court. The Court also held that the harvesting of timber was not an income recognition event until the timber was sold.

Held: That interest should not be added to the investment as a part, of the cost; (2) that so much, and only so much, of the advance as could be deemed to have accrued since December 31, 1908, was part of the company’s “gross income,.” within the act. Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., ante, 179. 230 Fed. Rep. 110 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. The Solicitor General, with whom Mr. Wm.

<p>certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the SEVENTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that a suit so arises where the carrier sues the consignee of an interstate shipment of live stock to collect a charge for disinfecting the cars, alleged to be due under tariffs approved and published as required by the Interstate Commerce Act, and where the consignee, admitting the interstate character of the shipment and propriety of the charges under the act, defends on the ground that the carrier by its acts is…

Held: That the amendment did not change the cause of action and did not constitute the beginning of a new case., (2) That, since the money relief prayed in the amended petition could properly have been sought as alternative relief in the original bill in equity, and since the transfer to the law side was made upon order of the court in the exercise of its discretion, plaintiff could not be held *208 to have made such an…

Held: that a further order in the case, restraining the defendant from prosecuting a suit of the character complained of which he subsequently began in a state court was in exercise of the power of the District Court to protect its existing jurisdiction and was not appealable under Jud. Code, § 266. Appeal dismissed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>Due to gradual increase in the market value of timber lands owned by a corporation, the market value of i‘s shares had increased to twice par value by March 1, 1913, when the Income Tax Act of that year took effect- Afterwards the company sold all its property and made final distribution of the proceeds to the shareholders on surrender of their certificates of stock, the amount received by each being twice the par value of his shares but. representing no increase since the effective date of the act. Held, that the value thus received in excess of par was not “income, gains, or profits” of a shareholder, subject to the tax, (a) because it represented merely a conversion of his existing investment, (b) because it did not “arise” or “accjue” after the act became effective.</p>

<p>•PETITION for writ of mandamus.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the decision was not arbitrary, and that a suit against the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, brought by the State before the patents issued, to enjoin their issuance and to quiet its title, would not lie. Lane v. Walls, 234 U. S. 525 , distinguished. Dismissed. *244 The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistant.

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), was a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court struck down a federal law regulating child labor. The decision was overruled by United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941). During the Progressive Era, public sentiment in the United States turned against what was perceived as increasingly intolerable child labor conditions. In response, Congress passed the Keating–Owen Act, prohibiting the sale in interstate commerce of any merchandise that had been made either by children under the age of fourteen, or by children under sixteen who worked more than sixty hours per week. In his majority opinion, Justice William R.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: (1). That the judgment was in a case arising under the criminal laws; (2) that it was not final; and (3) that for these reasons a writ of error under Jud. Code; § 250, would not lie. Writ of error to review 43 App. D. C. 44 , dismissed. The case is stated in the opinion. • Mr. Matthew E. O’Brien and Mr. Henry E. Davis, with whom Mr.. Walter Jeffreys Carlin was on the briefs, for plaintiff in error.

<p>A judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is not reviewable by writ * of error under Jud. Code, § 241, where the amount actually in dispute is less than $1,000.</p>

Held: that the proviso was a curative measure referring only to lands patented before the enactment and was no'protection for a patent procured afterwards by fraud.

The case is stated in the opinion. in support of the proposition that a tax on income of property or business, is a tax upon the property or business itself, cited Dobbins v. Erie County Commrs., 16 Pet. 435; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429; 158 U. S. 601; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 695; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S.…

Held: that such dividends were not taxable as income of the shareholding company within the true intent and meaning of the Income Tax Act of 1913, 238 Fed. Rep. 847 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Gordon M. Buck for plaintiff in error. *331 Tne Solicitor General, with whom Mr. Wm. C. Herron was on the brief, for defendant in error.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that there was no basis for invoking the equal protection clause, and that the ruling did not deprive of property without due process of law. Where private property is taken for public purposes, the fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is that the owner . shall not be deprived of the market value Under a pile of law. which makes it impossible for him to obtain-just compensation.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP MISSISSIPPI.</p> <p>The easels stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in a case brought in a state court of New York, and removed to the District Court, to recover full, common-law damages from a Delaware owner for injuries received at Sea on a voyage to New York.

<p>ERROR TO AND APPEAL PROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That the requirement of surrender :did not necessarily imply a return of the original paper. A requirement that a certificate of a fraternal benefit association shall be surrendered by the insured member before a new one is issued, is for the protection of the association, and, if waived by it or complied with to its satisfaction during the member’s lifetime, it cannot be availed of by a former beneficiary. 45 App.

, and opinion p. 474). In United States v. Huff, 206 Fed. Rep. 700 , the letters were sent to the judge while the case was pending. In In re Independent Publishing Co., 228 Fed. Rep. 787 ; 240 Fed. Held: except for the language of Justice Baldwin in In re Poulson, Fed. Cas., No. 11350, that the statute was intended as a limitation upon the inh

<p>CERTIORARI. TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.'</p>

Held: and it is evidenced by statutory enactments. The principle does not apply to statutes such as the one now in question. The English cases are predicated upon the fact that Statute 21 James I applied solely to actions at law, and therefore the chancery courts might ingraft exceptions in equity cases.

Held: that these . shortened lines, which were straight and parallel, were the end lines within the meaning of the mining law and for the purpose of determining the extralateral right, and that the truncating lines were parts of the side lines. x The extralateral right is a creation of the federal mining Ih^s and they alone must be looked'to in defining it.

<p>INTERLOCUTORY DECREE. IN EQUITY.</p>

<p>This court, will review and correct the error of a state supreme court, in assuming a state of facts without any support in the record as a basis for denying asserted federal rights.</p> <p>When the case has been disposed of on the pleadings, every uncontra- - dieted allegation by the unsuccessful party must be taken as true, in- ■ eluding denials.of material facts previously averred by his opponent.</p> <p>The sole ground upon which a judgment against a prior owner is conclusive against his successor in interest is that the estoppel runs with the property, that the grantor can convey no better right or title than he had himself, and that the grantee takes cum onere.</p> <p>Hence, a judgment holding a telegraph company bound by a license agreement with a city touching the use of the streets, but rendered in a suit begun after the company had conveyed to another, does not' estop its remote successor in interest from claiming against the city that the agreement was never accepted.</p> <p>While' res judicata ordinarily is a matter of state law, a decision of the state court which denies asserted federal rights through the application of a former judgment will not conclude this court, if such application be clearly inconsistent with the right to due process of law.</p> <p>It is a violation of the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment for a State to give conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who was neither a party, nor in privity with a party, therein.</p>

Held: that the reasonableness of this practice of routing was an administrative question within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, whose decision the state courts had no jurisdiction to anticipate. 133 Minnesota, 93; id. 461, reversed. Writ of error to review 136 Minnesota, 468, dismissed. The cases are stated in the opinion.

Held: a change of remedy, not impairing the obligation of the contract of purchase.

Held: Upon examination of the findings and evidence, • that the commission and the courts below were justified in holding the third company a mere agency or instrumentality of the other two; (2) that its technical corporate individuality and its technical ownership of the tracks in question did not entitle it to be treated as an independent carrier, and that the order did not deprive it or the other companies of property…

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico.</p>

<p>Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Delaware.</p>

<p>Appeals from the Court of Claims.</p>