Volume 25 — United States Reports

Held: that in libels in rem, less certainty than what belongs to proceedings at the common law, will sustain a decree of condemnation, if the words of the statute are pursued, and the allegations point out the facts, so as to give reasonable notice to the party to enable him to shape his defence.

Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827) was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the president of the United States’ emergency powers and the authority to activate state militias for federal service. The court heard the case of Jacob E. Mott, a militia private who disobeyed orders to mobilize for service during the War of 1812 and then appealed his subsequent court-martial. The court's ruling against Mott had a significant impact on executive powers during national emergencies, according to legal scholars, and has been used to interpret the Insurrection Act of 1807.

Held: that the corporation was liable to the holder of a ticket in such a lottery for a prize drawn against its number, although the managers appointed by the corporation to superintend such lottery were empowered to sell, and had sold the entire lottery to a lottery dealer for a gross sum, who was, by his agreement with them, to execute the details of the scheme as to the sale of the tickets, the drawings, and the…

Held: that corporations aggregate could do nothing but by deed under their- common seal. *68 Eul this principle must always have been understood with many qualifications; and seems inapplicable to acts and vo^es Passe<I by such corporations at corporate meetings, It was probably in its origin applied to- aggregate corporations at the common law, and limited to such solemn proceedings as were usually evidenced under seal,…

<p>[C ONSTITUTIONAL LaW. PRACTICE.]</p> <p>Under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20., where-the construction of any clause in the constitution, or any statute' of the United States, is drawn in question, in any suit in a State ’Court, the decision must be against the title ortright set up by the party under such clause of the constitution- Or statute, or this Court has no appellate jurisdiction in the case. It is not sufficient that the construction of the statute was drawn in question, and that the-decision was against the title of the': party: it must appear that his tide depended upon the statute: •</p> <p>Where, in such á case; the validity of a statute of any State is drawn incpiestion, upon the ground of its being repugnant to the constitution of-the United States, and the decision has been in favour of-its validity, it is necessary to the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, that it should'distinctly appear that the title or right of the party depended upon the statute.</p> <p>The opinion of the Court, or the reasons given for-its judgment, (unless in the case of instruction, to the jury, spread upon the record by. a bill of exceptions,) form no part of the record within the * meaning of the above 25th section. • Nor are they made a part of the record in Tennessee, by the local law of that Stated requiring the judges to file their opinions in writing among the papers in the cause.</p> <p>No orders in the State Court, after the removal of the record into this Court,, (not made by way. of amendment, but introducing new matter,) can be brought into the record here. The cause must be heard and determined upon the record as it stood when removed.</p> <p>. The reasons Court for Its though0*' redúced tó wriwith’ "the 6pa-pers in the cause, fortuno part of therecori5’</p> <p>Orders made in. the cause subsequent^ part of°the record in this</p> <p>Compactjiot tion™qUe</p> <p>The validity whethertela”’ drawn in question.</p>

Held: that the exemption here set up being merely as to the form of the action, and no question arising as to the legal liability qf the defendants under-the act of Congress, this Court had no authority to re-eXamine the judgment, so far as respected the construction of that part of the act, which provides, that suits on marshals’ bonds “ shall he commenced and prosecuted within six years after the said right of action…

This-was an ejectment, originally brought in the Harrispn Circuit Court of the State of Kentucky,.by the plaintiffs ;u error, against the defendants in error, and judgment being rendered for the plaiulitfs, (he cause was carried, by writ of error, to the Court of Appeals, being the highest Court of law and equity of that State.

THIS was an action of debt, commenced in the Circuit Court fof the district of Georgia, by the District Attorney of the United States for that district, in the name of the Post Master General of. the United States, gainst the defendants, on a bond executed by them, in June. 1820, to the Post Master General of the United States, the condition of which, after reciting that Eleazer Early (one of the coobligors and defendants in the suit) is Post Master at Savannah, provides,…

Held: that Joseph took an estate in fee, defeasible in the event of his dying without issue in the lifetime of his brother; that the limitation over was good as an executory devise ; and on the death of Joseph, vested in his surviving brother Medcef.

<p>[Lex Loci. Probate or Testamentary Paper.']</p> <p>-A testamentary paper executed in a foreign country, even if executed so as to give it the effect of a last will and testament by the foreign law, cannot be made the foundation of a suit for a legacy in. the Courts of this country, until it has received prohate here, in the Court having the peculiar jurisdiction of the probate of wills and other testamentary matters.</p>

This was an action of ejectment, brought in the Court below by the defendant in error, Scott, to recover the possession of a house and lot in the town of St. Louis. At the trial, a special verdict was found, stating, that in the year 1816, John Little married Marie Antoinette Labadie, who was then seised in fee of the house and lot in question. She died without issue, leaving the husband seised in fee of a moiety of the premises.

<p>[Practice.;</p> <p>Where the burthen of proof of certain specific defences set up by the defendant is on him, and the evidence presents contested facts, an absolute direction from the Court, that the matters produced and read in evidence on the part of the defendant were sufficient in law to maintain the issue on his part, and that the jury ought to render th'eir verdict in favour of the defendant, is erroneous; and a judgment rendered upon a verdict purporting to have been given under such a charge will be reversed, although the record was made tip as upon' a bill of exceptions taken at a trial before the jury upon the matters in issue, no such trial ever having taken place, and the case having assumed that shape by the agreement of the parties, in order to take the opinion of .the Court upon certain questions of law.</p>

<p>[Bill op Exchange "and Promissory Note. Sale with Warranty.]</p> <p>An unconditional promise, by the endorser of a bill or note, to pay it. or the acknowledgment of his liability, after knowledge of his discharge from his responsibility by the laches of the holder, amounted to an implied waivei of due notice of a demand from the drawee, acceptor, or maker.</p> <p>Upon a sale with a warranty of soundness, or where, by the special terms of the contract, tbe vendee is at liberty to return the article sold, an offei to return it is equivalent to an offer accepted by the vendor, and the contract being thereby rescinded, it is a defence, to an action for the purchase money, brought by the vendor, and will entitle the vendee to recover it back if it has been paid.</p> <p>So, if the sale is absolute, and the vendor afterwards consent unconditionally to take back the article, the consequences are the same.</p> <p>But if the sale be absolute, and there be no subsequent consent to take back the article, the contract remains open, and the vendee must resort to his action upon the warranty, unless it be proved that the vendor knew of the unsoundness of the article, and the vcnd.ee tendered a return of it within a reasonable time.</p> <p>Questions prebln of excepuons.</p> <p>An uncondi^onaIp!^om‘¡T. mo“nts *° a tice,</p> <p>an ,-n-- or^e drawees ?.r. yudots;‘r’s the same «rrect'</p> <p>Knowledge of the factor the holder is eseharge the endoiser, upon aóknowfédg- * raent,</p> <p>Question as to the warranty ‘"hic})hUfors®1e¿ part of the of^he^ote?11</p> <p>How far it action on the note‘</p> <p>General result ' of the authorities.</p>

<p>[Practice.]</p> <p>Where an equity cause may be finally decided as between the parties litigant, without bringing others before the Court, who would, generally speaking, os necessary parties, such parties may be dispensed with in the Circuit Court, if its proofs cannot reach them, or if they are citizens of another state-</p> <p>Buttf the l ights of those not before the Court are inseparably connected with the claim of the parties litigant, so that a final decision cannot be made between them without affecting the rights of the absent parties, the peculiar constitution of tile Circuit Court forms no ground for dispensing with such parlies.</p> <p>But the Court may, in its discretion, where the purposes of justice require it, retain jurisdiction of the cause on an injunction bill as.between the parties regularly before it, until the plaintiffs have had an opportunity of litigating their controversy with the other parties in a competent tribunal, and.if it finally appear by thejudgment of such tribunal, that the plaintiff's are equitably entitled to the interest claimed by the other parties, may proceed to a final decree upon the merits.</p>

<p>¡'Fraud gdent Agreement. ;</p> <p>A question ol tact upon a bill filed to set aside the salo and assign inent of a land warrant, upon the ground that it was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation, and taking undue advantage of the party’s imbecility of body-and mind.</p> <p>Evidence deemed insufficient, and bill dismissed.</p>

<p>[Locad Law.]</p> <p>Under the act of North Carolina of 17B2, for the relief of the officers and soldiers in the continental line, &c., the commissioners having determined that the French lick was within the reservations of the statute, as public property, and having surveyed the said reservation in 1784, the same was protected from individual survey and location, although it exceeded the quantity of 640 acres.</p> <p>The French lick reservation has not been since subjected to appropriation, by entry and survey, as vacant land, by any subsequent statute, of North Carolina or Tennessep.</p>

IN this case, the judges of the Circuit Court of West Tennessee, after a judgment had been rendered in that Court. divided in opinion upon the question as to the amount of the security bond, to be given by the party applying for a writ of error, whether the amount of the bond ought to be sufficient to cower the whole debt, or only for the costs and increased damages on the party failing to prosecute his writ Of error with effect.

Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827), was a United States Supreme Court case that determined the scope of a bankruptcy law in relation to a clause of the Constitution of the United States. It is notable for its era in producing multiple opinions from the justices. Justice William Johnson delivered the majority opinion. Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice Gabriel Duvall, and Justice Joseph Story concurred in part and dissented in part to the Court's judgment, while Justices Bushrod Washington, Smith Thompson, and Robert Trimble dissented.

THIS ’ was an action of debt, brought in the Circuit Court: of Rhode Island, upon two several bonds given by the defendant, Haile, to the plaintiff, Mason, and one Bates, whom the plaintiff survives, one of which bonds was executed oft the 14th, and the other on the 29th of March, 1814.

Held: that this was a technical total loss, on account of the breaking up of the voyage. Whether a delay at a particular port constitutes a deviation, depends upon the usage of trade with reference to the object of selling the cargo.

<p>[Insurance.]</p> <p>Where an insurance was effected after a.loss had happened, though unknown to the assured, the master having omitted to communicate information to the owner, and having expressed nis intention not to write to the owner, and taken measures to' prevent the fact of the loss being known, for the avowed’purpose of enabling the owner to effect insurance, in consequence ef which information of the loss had not reached the parties at the time the policy was underwritten : 'Held/ that the .owner having acted with good faith, was not precluded from a recovery upon the policy on account of the fraudulent misconduct of the master.</p>

Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), was a significant United States Supreme Court case which interpreted the Import-Export and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution to prohibit discriminatory taxation by states against imported items after importation, rather than only at the time of importation. The state of Maryland passed a law requiring importers of foreign goods to obtain a license for selling their products. Brown was charged under this law and appealed. It was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court construed the Import-Export Clause. Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the court, ruling that Maryland's statute violated the Import-Export and Commerce Clauses and the federal law was supreme.

<p>(Slave Trade Acts. Evidence. Pleading.}</p> <p>Upon an indictment under the Slave Trade Act of the 20th oi April, 1818, eh. 373. against the owner of the ship, testimony of. the declarations of the master, being a part of the res gestee, connected with acts in lurtherance of the voyage, and within the scope of his authority, as agent of the owner, in the conduct of the guilty enterprise, is Admissible in evidence against the owner.</p> <p>Upon such an indictment against the owner, charging him with fitting out the ship with intent to employ her in the illegal1 voyage, evidence is admissible that he commanded, authorized, and superintended the fitment, through the instrumentality of his agents, without being personally present.</p> <p>It is not essential to constitute a fitting out, under the acts of Congress, that every equipment necessary for a slave voyage, or any equipment peculiarly adapted to such a voyage, should be taken on board; it is sufficient if the vessel is actually fitted out with intent to be employed in the illegal voyage.</p> <p>In such an indictment, it is- not necessary to specify the particulars of the fitting out; it is sufficient to allege the offence in the words of the statute.</p> <p>Nor is it necessary that there should be any principal offender to whom the defendant might be aiding and abetting. These terms in the statute do not refer ;o the relation of principal and accessory in cases of felony; both the actor, and he wild aids and abets the act, are considered as principals.</p> <p>It is necessary that the indictment should aver, that the vessel was built, fitted out, &c.- or caused to sail, or be sent-away, uithin the jurisdiction of the United States.</p> <p>An averment that the ship was fitted out, &c. “ with intent that tito said vessel should be employed” in the slave trade, is fatally defective, the words of the statute being, “ with intent to employ”'the vessel ih the slave trade, and exclusively referring to the inteht of the party causing the act,</p> <p>Objections to the form and sufficiency of the indictment may, in the discretion of the Court, be discussed, and decided during the trial • before the jury-; but, generally speaking, they ought regularly to be considered only upon a motion to quash the indictment, or in arrest-of judgment, or on demurrer.</p> <p>In criminal proceedings, the onus probandi rests upon the prosecutor, unless a different provision is expressly made by statute.</p> <p>.Admissibility of the testimo-</p> <p>Testimony of tions of the 0fe^ res gesta, ad-against the de-</p> <p>First mstrucnon prayed,as 'p-obmdi.</p> <p>Second in-</p> <p>Third instruction.</p> <p>'Kot essential that the equipment should be complete to constitute a fitting out under the statute.</p> <p>Fourth s*ruct',on'</p> <p>jjot necessary aI,ese the particulars of the fitting out.</p> <p>General rule, that it is suffident to allege the words6 of the statute, ceptions!° 6X .</p> <p>Fifth insumr..</p> <p>The doctrine and accessory! f?,onies>nos applicable to the present</p> <p>Seventh in-«ruction,</p> <p>Sixth instruc-</p> <p>Necessary to aver that the vessel was built, fitted out, &e. within the jurisdiction of the United States-</p> <p>Defective a-the'vcsseiAvas caused to sail, away, “ with said"1 ^vessel should beremployed in the llave trade,</p> <p>Objections to sufficiency &of tbe indictment, may, in the discretion of discussed'’dunng the trial; they "ought "to be considered upon a motion to quash the .i^'an'esT’ of judgment, o,r on demurrer.</p>

Held: at an early period, that the statute of Westminster did not apply to criminal cases; but, notwithstanding this, the usual practice prevailed, unless the Court directed a larger number to be returned. And it was not until the reign of George II. that a larger number was required by law to be returned at the assizes. The history of this branch of the subject is v.ery clearly stated in 3 Bac. Abr. tit.

<p>[Construction op Statute. Jurisdiction.}</p> <p>The term “ concealed,” as used in the 63th section of the Duty Act of the ¡2d of March, 1799, ch.128. applies only to articles intended to be secreted and withdrawn from public view on account of the duties not having been paid, or secured to be paid, or from some'other fraudulent motive. The forfeiture inflicted by that section, does .not extend to a case where, the duties not having been paid or secured in any other manner than by giving the general bond, and storing the goods according to the 62d section of the act, the goods were fraudulently removed from the storehouse agreed upon by the collector and the importer, by some person other than the claimants, who were Iona fide purchasers of the goods, and without their knowledge and consent, to another port, where the goods were found stowed on board the 'vessel in whir h they were transported, in the usual manner of stowing such gods when, shipped fot transportation.</p> <p>Under the 62d section of the act, in the case of teas, the duties at e “ secured to be paid,” in the sense of the law, by the single bond of the importer, accompanied by a deposit of tl}e teas imported, to be kept under the lock and key of the inspector, and subject to the control of the collector and naval officer, until the duties are actually paid, or otherwise secured; and no forfeiture is incurred, under the 68th section, by the rerpoval and concealment of the goods on which the duties have_been thus “ secured to be paid.”</p> <p>To authorize the seizure and bringing to adjudication of teas, under the 48d section of the act, it is necessary, not only that the chests should be unaccompanied by the proper certificates, but also by the !marks required to be placed upon them by the 39tb section.</p> <p>The lien ot the government for duties, attaches upon the articles from the moment of their importation, and is not discharged by the unauthorized and illegal removal of the goods from the custody of the custom house officers</p> <p>Qiuere, Whether such lien can be enforced against a bona fide purchaser without notice that the duties were not paid or secured 1</p> <p>The lien for duties cannot, in any case, be enforced by a libel of information in the Admiralty; the revenue jurisdiction of the District Courts, proceeding in rein, only extending to cases of seizures for forfeitures under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States.</p> <p>But a suit at common law may be instituted in the District or Circuit Courts, in the name of the United States, founded upon their legal right to recover the possession of goods upon which they have a lien for duties, or to recover damages for the illegal taking detaining the same.</p> <p>Question as to ttlB &ll61[6u forfeiture, on the goods'1 being found concccilsdi “</p> <p>Lien of the government for the duties*</p> <p>Goods not Un‘“p^uíe 3ro“nd of the duties not baving been be®ul'Rd-</p> <p>The goods not feiture under the 43d sec-</p> <p>Whether the ^ síate^for the duties, be. asserted in tbe present case?</p>

<p>[Devise op lands charged with the payment op debts,]</p> <p>A devise: “I give and devise to my beloved son. E. W. G., two third parts of that my Ferry Farm,, so called,” &c. “ to him, the said E. W. G., and to his heirs and assigns for ever, he, my said son E. W. Gi paying all my just debts out of said estate. And Ido hereby order, and it is my will,"that my son E. W. G. shall</p> <p>!>ay all my just debts out of the estate herein given to him as aforesaid,” creates a charge upon the estate in the hands of the devisee.</p> <p>A bonafide purchaser, who pays the pui chase money to a person authorized to sell, is not bound to look to its application, whether in the case of lands charged m the hands of an heir or devisee with the payment of debts, or lands devised to a trustee for the payment of debts.</p> <p>But if the money be misapplied by the devisee or trustee, with the co operation of the purchaser, he remains liable to the creditors for the sum so misapplied.</p> <p>On a bill filed by an executor against a devisee of lands charged with the payment of debts, for an account of the trust fund, &e. the creditors are not indispensable parties to the suit. The fund may be brought into Court, and distributed under its direction, according to the rights of those who may apply for it.</p> <p>The creditors «able'parties?"</p> <p>The testator’s debts charged upon the* ferry estate' in the h^nds of the devisee, Ezeklel G.</p> <p>Effect of the local law of Rhode Island upon the charge created by the will.</p> <p>Huestiuu whether the estate remained fandf * of” the purchaser,</p>

<p>[Surety.]</p> <p>The act of May 15th, 1820, ch. 625. s. 2., which requires new sureties to be given by certain public officers on or before the 30th of September, 1820, does not expressly, or by implication, discharge the former sureties from their liability.</p> <p>The sureties are not responsible for moneys placed by the government in the hands of the principal, after the legal termination of • his office; but th'ey are responsible for moneys which came into his ' hands while in office, and which he subsequently failed to account for and pay over.</p> <p>In general, laches is not imputable to the government: But, quare, whether, in case there is an express agreement between the government and the principal,;'giving time to the latter, and suspending the right of the former to sufe, the sureties are not discharged as in a similar case between private individuals ?</p> <p>A mere proposition to give time, and.suspend the right to sue, upon certain conditions and contingencies, which are not proved to llave been complied1 with, or to have happened, will not discharge the sureties.</p> <p>The cases of the United States v. Kirkpatrick, (9 Wheat. Rep. 720.) and the United States v. Vanzandt, (11 Wheat. Rep. 184.) applied to the determination of the present case.</p> <p>Tim former discharged "by do 3Ct °f '</p> <p>Second in °</p> <p>Third instruction.'</p> <p>apply the ere-account e'th8f Right of the</p>

<p>[SuRETr.j</p> <p>A. W. M‘G. gave a bond to the Bank of the United States, with sureties, londiimned for the faithful performance of the duties of the office of cashier of one of the offices of discount and deposit during the term he should hold that office. . The picsidenf and directors of the bank having discovered that be had heen guilty of a gross breach of trust, passed a resolution, at Philadelphia, on the 27tbof < >ctober, 1920 “ that A. W. M*G , cashier, &c. be, and he is hereby suspended from office, lili the further pleasure of the board be known:” and another resolution, “ that the president of the office! at Middletown, be authorized and requested to receive into his care, from A. W. M‘G., the cashier, the cash, bills discounted,- books, papers, and other property in said office, and to take such measures for having the duties of cashier discharged, ;as he may deem expedient.” These resolutions were immediately transmitted by mail to the president of the office at Middletown, who received them on the morning of Sunday, the 29th of the same month, but did not communicate them to the cashier, nor carry them imo'effect,. until the afternoon of the 30th, between four and five o’clock: Held, that the • sureties continued liable for his defaults until that time.</p> <p>On such a bond, the recovery against the sureties is limited to the pe- . nalty.</p> <p>Partial payments having been made by the sureties, (subject to all questions,) the application of these payments was made by deducting them from the penalty of the bond, and allowing interest on the balance thus resulting, from the commencement of the suit, there having been no previous demand of tne penalty, or acknowledgment that the whole was due.</p> <p>But interest was refused to the sureties on the payments,</p> <p>Liability of tilo sureties.</p> <p>Application of the payments,</p>

Held: that a judgment against a master for damage, from the negligence of his servant, was good evidence against the servant in an action against him, by the master, for the same negligence ; the recovery in the one case being dependant upon that in the other. (See also Stark. Ev. 188, 189.).

<p>'[Construction oftreatv. Local law.]</p> <p>A grant made by the British governor of Florida, after the de-. claration of independence within the territory lying between the Mississippi and the Chatahouchee rivers, and between the Slst de- . gree of north latitude, and a line drawn from the mouth of the Ya-zoo river due east to the Chatahouchee, is invalid as the foundation of title in the Courts of the United States.</p>

<p>[Construction op Treaty. Local Law.J</p> <p>Spanish grants, made after the treaty of peace of 1782, between the United States and Great Britain, within the territory east of the rivei Mississippi, and north of aline drawn from that river at the 31st degree of north latitude, east to the middle of the-river Apalachicola, have no intrinsic validity, and the holders must depend for their titles exclusively on the laws of the United States.</p> <p>No Spanish grant, made while the country was w.rongfully occupied by Spain, ^can.be valid, unless it was confirmed by the compact between the United States and the Státe of Georgia, of the 24th of April, 1802, or has been laid before the board of commissioners constituted by the act of Congress of the 3d of'March, 1803, ch. 340. and of March 27th, 1804, ch. 414.</p>

THIS is the same cause which is reported ante, vol. X. p. 66. and vol. XI. p. 413. and was again brought before the Court upon a further appeal, and certificate of a division of opinions as to the proceedings of the Court below in execution of the former decrees of this Court.

Held: that a treaty for d day between the holder and acceptor,fripon terms which were not finally accepted, did,not discharge the defendant, although an actual delay had taken place during the negotiation, because there was no binding contract which precluded the plaintiffs from suing the acceptor at any time.

Held: that the endorser was discharged by the negligence of the holders.

<p>[Practice.j</p> <p>An injunction outóf the Circuit Court, to stay proceedings ón a judgment at law in that Coutt, may issue, notwishstanding the pendency of a writ of error on the judgment m this Court.</p> <p>An injunction issued by order of the District Judge, expires ac the next teim of the Coutt. unless continued by the Court; but the denial of sever a! successive motions to dissolve the injunction, may, under circumstances, be considered, a.- equivalent to an order for renewing it.</p> <p>Fi'-st cause cient.</p> <p>. Injunction standing the penqency ot ihe w.itof «■- ror it) the ao ticm at law.</p> <p>An injunction District Judge*5 expires at the the1 1 CRcuU Court, ui.less contmucd by the Court.</p> <p>But, under the circumstances ot the present ■case, held to be tmued.by the nemalof sevetal successive toireit.</p>

This, was an action of assumpsit brought in September, 1822, by the plaintiff against the defendants, for goods sold, &c. to their intestate.

<p>[Sai.is.Ü</p> <p>Question as to the sufficiency of a notice of sale of real property under a deed of trust.</p> <p>Vo particular form of such a notice is prescribed by law;- it is'sufficient if the description of the. land is reasonably certain, So as to inform the public .of the property to be sold.</p>

<p>[Chancery. Local Law.':</p> <p>A question of fact, in a suit in equity, respecting the proprietary interest in an entiy ot lands within the Military District of Ohio.</p> <p>Rule of equity, that where land is sold'as for a certain quantity,- a Court of Equity relieves if the quantity be defective, only applicable to contracts for the sale of land in a settled country, where the titles are complete, the boundaries determined, and the real quantity known, or capable of being ascertained by the vendor.</p>

<p>[Local Law.}</p> <p>A question in equity as to the title to a lot ofland in the town of Lex- ' ington, Kentucky, reserved as public property, and claimed as having been appropriated by the plaintiff’s ancestor. Bill dismissed under the circumstances of the case.</p>

<p>[Local Law.]</p> <p>The act of May 8th, 1820, ch. 595. “ for the relief of the legal representatives of Ileniy Willis,” did not authorize them to enter lands within the tract, surveyed and laid .off for the town of Claiborne, in the State of Alabama,</p>

<p>[Local Law.]</p> <p>On the construction of the statute of Virginia, emancipating slaves brought into that .State in 1792, unless the owner removing with them should take á certain oath' within sixty days after such removal, the fact of,the oath having been taken may be. presumed by the lapse of twenty years, accompanied with possession..</p>

<p>[Locái. Law.]</p> <p>Under the statute Of Virginia, giving to debts due on protested bills of exchange, the rank of judgment debts, a joint endorser, who has paid more than his proportion of the debt, has a right to satisfaction out of the a^setsof his co-endorser, with the priority of a judg- ■ ment creditor. •</p>

<p>[Local Law.]</p> <p>A concession of lands made by the Spanish authorities ht Mobile in the year .18*6, cannot be given in evidence.ro support an ejectment in the Courts of the United States, the same not having been recorded, or passed upon by the board of commissioners,, or register of the land office, established by the acts of Congress, relating to land titles in that country.</p>

<p>[Practice.]</p> <p>The bail is fixed by the death.of the principal after the return of the.ca. sa. and before the return of the scire facias; and the bail is not entitled to an exoneretnr in such a case.</p>

<p>[Chancery.]</p> <p>Relief in equity against a judgment at law, upon certain bonds given for the indemnity of the obligee, as endoiser of notes drawn by the obligor, the consideration having failed.</p> <p>The assignee of such bonds takes them subject to all equities existing between the original parties.</p> <p>The plaintiff below entitled ,e having a compíete nnn ade(pmte remedy law’</p> <p>, . iiót bound to statutToflimitations.</p> <p>The assignee hel<íbtto btake tfiero, subject tie”, existing origina” parties.</p> <p>Rema¡n¡ng inquiry, whe. '¿ccdpted or, and dis-p^hniff.</p>

This was a libel filed in the District Court, by the appellant,- Ramsey, against the respondent,'Allegre, alleging that the appellant? at the special instance and request of the respondent, owner, ship’s husband, or consignee of the schooner Dorothea, had performed various work and labour, and found and provided various materials for the use of the said schooner, to equip and prepare her for a voyage on the high seas, amounting to the sum pf 2,428 dollars, 84 cents; that the…