Volume 251 — United States Reports

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OR APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.'</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Opinion or surmise, that oil might exist, at an unknown depth, from four to ten miles from its nearest known occurrence is not convincing proof that the conditions in Í904 “were plainly such as to engénder the belief that the land contained mineral deposits of such quality and in such quantity as would, render their .extraction profitable and justify expenditures to that- end.” Diamond Coal Co. v... United States, 233 U. S. 236, 240. .</p> <p>The “belief” here referred to must be a belief practically tantamount in its effect to actual knowledge, that is, a belief based on facts so complete as to exclude rational doubt. Even actual knowledge (or such a fully warranted belief) on the part of the railroad agents Would not justify the relief here asked by the Government if it went merely to, the existence of some oil somewhere Within the area sued for. This knowledge (or belief) must be shown to have also comprehended every element of location, quantity and quality which would have given this oil commercial availability and value under conditions then existing. Without such knowledge there could be no fraud, that is, there could be no consciousness that the Government was being deprived of land which it ought to retain. The case of the Government is based on a theory which .leaves out of consideration all questions of extent, position, availability or value of oil within the disputed areas. It frankly attempts to obtain a decree on the ground that every acre in suit has that nebulous thing termed an “oil value,” that is, a speculative value, because the surroundings are claimed to promise that perchance oil will be found somewhere in the Elk Hills.</p> <p>If hope or suspicion that oil might be found somewhere in the Elk Hills can give to the particular lands in suit the requisite mineral character to warrant cancellation, the railroad company may lose by judicial decree lands which subsequent drilling may prove to fall unquestionably within its grant. Such a result is hardly in accord with equity.</p> <p>Only those lands may be lawfully taken from the railroad company which were in fact mineral lands at the time of patent. Burke v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 234 U. S. 669, 679-680; Davis v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507, 524; Deffeback v. Hawke, 11-5 U. S. 392; Diamond Coal Co. v. United' States, 233 U. S. 236, 239.</p> <p>It is fair to assume that in the use of the two terms “mineral lands” and lands “not mineral” in the various acts of Congress for the disposal of the public domain, all public lands were intended to be described. “Mineral lands” were those which could be acquired under the mining laws. Lands “not mineral” were disposed of by the homestead, railroad, school and other “non-mineral” grants. Cf. Benjamin v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 21 L. D. 390.</p> <p>But, if the present contention of the Government is correct, there must be a third class not capable of disposal under any law. (see comment of Circuit Court of Appeals, on this, 249 Fed. Rep. 797). It is conceded that a mineral patent would not issue for a single acre in the Elk- Hills on the showing of mineral made by the Government in this case, because the evidence is not sufficient to prove a discovery of mineral. Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U. S. 313. If there was not a sufficient “discovery” of oil on these lauds to sustain a mining location, there obviously was not a discovery of oil sufficient tó establish them as actually “valuable” oil lands. The word “discovery” in the mining laws means simply the ascertainment of the existence of the mineral, its disclosure. Unless these lands were known in 1904 to be actually valuable for the oil that was in them, the Government suffered no legal damage by their loss and the railroad company gained nothing not due it under its contract. Without legal damage to the Government there can be no relief on the ground of fraud. Southern Development Co. v. Silva, 125 U. S. 247; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 285; United States v. Stinson, 197 U. S. 200, 205.</p> <p>The government case is founded entirely on the use of the word “belief” by this court in the case of Diamond Coal Co. v. United States, 233 U. S. 236, 239-240, without recognition, apparently, of the fact that the context indicates that what was there meant by “belief” was a conviction resulting from evidence so full and definite that it points with convincing force to a' conclusion which includes not only the fact of the existence of the mineral but its extent and value as well. United States v. Beaman, 242 Fed. Rep. 876.</p> <p>In the present case the mineral in question is oil, which is notoriously uncertain in its occurrence, extent and value as compared with coal; and the circumstances were such that a belief that these were valuable oil lands could not have been a conviction that merchantable oil existed.</p> <p>The fact that mere “indications” of the existence of oil are not proof of its existence or of its quantity or location has received judicial recognition on many occasions. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed, Rep. 801, 806; Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co., 98 Fed. Rep. 673, 675.</p> <p>It is unsound to say that decisions under the mining law are here inapplicable because that law requires .ocular demonstration of mineral in the land claimed. All that the word “discovery” means in that law (Rev. Stats., § 2320) is ascertainment of the existence of the vein or lode within the claim, and even in the case of a lode the exposure to the eye may be elsewhere. Brewster v. Shoemaker, 28 Colorado, 176, 182. .The statute concerning placer claims makes no special requirement as to the actual place of discovery. The special statute of 1897 for the location of oil claims makes no change in this respect except the requirement that the proof show that the claim is “chiefly valuable” for oil (29 Stat. 525). Under the placer law it has been held that evidence of gold appearing within the claim, held insufficient in itself to constitute a discovery, might be supplemented by evidence showing greater amounts of gold disclosed in adjacent' ground. These cases really hold that the evidence which actually constituted the full discovery came from without the claims. That such a condition might also exist as1 to an oil claim under exceptional facts is indicated by Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Miller, 97 Fed, Rep. 681, 688, 689. It is obvious that the practical question, with which the mining law is alone concerned, is whether there is valuable mineral within the claim. Evidence which certainly indicates this is discovery, no matter where the evidence is found, and the word “discovered” is used in the mining law. in exactly the same sense in which it was used by this court in the case of Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, 404. Mere indications do not suffice.</p> <p>Cases arising under the mining laws, in which it is held that oil is so uncertain in its occurrence and extent that surrounding conditions do not prove a discovery, are ■therefore directly in point. Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U. S. 313, 323; Miller v. Chrisman, 140 California, 444, 446; Olive Land Co. v. Olmstead, 103 Fed. Rep. 568; United States v. McCutchen, 238 Fed. Rep. 575, 591; Bay v. Oklahoma Oil Co:, 13 Oklahoma, 425; Weed v. Snook, 144 California, 439; New England &c. Co. v. Congdon, 152 California, 211; McLemore v. Express Oil Co., 158 California, 559; Dughi v. Harkins, 2 L. D. 721; Hutton v. Forbes, 31 L. D. 325, 330; Southwestern Oil Co. v. 'Atlantic &c. Ry. Co., 39 L. D. 335; Butte Oil Co., 40 L. D. 602.</p> <p>That belief not based on cleér demonstration is not proof of mineral character, see also Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Reynolds,-124 U. S. 374; Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Mike & Starr Co., 143 U. S. 394; Sullivan v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S. 431.</p> <p>Fraud cannot be predicated upon the expression of an opinion concerning the existence of hidden mineral deposits. 2 Addison on Torts, Wood’s-ed., §1186; Southern Development Co. v. Silva, 125 U. S. 247, 252; Gordon v. Butler, 105 U. S. 553; Holbrook v. Connor, 60 Maine, 578; Synnott v. Shaughnessy, 130 U. S. 572.</p>

Held: that the use of the letters in the prosecution for the homicide was not violative of the constitutional provisions against compelling testimony from an accused and against unreasonable searches and seizures. P. 21. Affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. See also post, 380. Mr. Martin J. O’Donnell, with whom Mr. Isaac B. Kimbrell was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT, OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE' STATE OP MISSISSIPPI.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A distinction is to be drawn between the .powers of a city when acting in its governmental capacity, i. e.; .the police powers,- — -and those which belong to it in its proprietary or quasi-private capacity. P.38.</p> <p>Merely for the sake of establishing a lighting system of its own, a city has no right to displace or remove without compensation the fixtures of a lighting company already occupying the streets in virtue of rights guaranteed by its franchise. P. 37.</p> <p>Declarations in an ordinance to the effect that speedy establishment of a municipal lighting system, and therein the removal or relocation of'poles and other fixtures maintained in the streets by the owners of other lighting systems, are necessary for the public peace, health and safety, do not suffice to convert such acts of interference into a legitimate exercise of police power. Pp. 34, 38, • ' -</p> <p>A franchise to use the streets for supplying a city and its inhabitants ' with electric light, acquired under the California Constitution, Art. XI, § 19, before the amendment of 1911, conveys contract - rights which the city is not at liberty to destroy, and the property ' employed in their exercise can not be taken by the city without due process of law — the payment of compensation. P. 39. Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195.</p> <p>241 Fed. Rep. 912, affirmed.</p>

Held: that the use of such funds for advertising the resources and advantages of the State generally would be a breach of the trust and that the state land commissioner should be enjoined from so using them under authority of an act of the state legislature. P. 47. 246 Fed. Rep. 277 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: at which a communication from the loan company committee was presented, in substance the same as that previously presented to the Bank stockholders, and the resolution of the Bank stockholders thereon was read; and thereupon the directors authorized the president of the Bank, if he believed the claim of the loan company to be just, to proceed to settle it in such a way as he might deem to be to the best interest of…

The case is stated in the opinion. The goods are shipped from Ohio and sold and delivered at wholesale in Kentucky in the original packages; are always in.transit except during the short pause incidental to delivery; when shipped, they are appropriated in a practical, if not in a technical, sense to the fulfillment of contracts with certain specific existing customers, with whom a general understanding is previously had that plaintiffs in error will furnish them with such as…

<p>certiorari to the court of appeals op the state OF GEORGIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>error to the supreme court of the state of LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion The claimant carried the mails during the period involved with the distinct declaration that it would not accept the amount of pay offered by the Postmaster General as full compensation for the services, which declaration in writing was acknowledged by the Postmaster General, the mails, were then delivered for carriage, and the usual pay orders were issued thereon.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. .</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The casé is stated in the opinion:</p>

Held: in respect of liquors in bond, even if belonging to one who made and owned them before the *147 act was passed and paid revenue taxes upon them since June 30, 1919: (1) That the act was not an appropriation of such liquors for public purposes. P. 157.

The case is stated in the opinion. contended, in part, that, inasmuch as the court below found the new car, operated by one man only, quite as safe as the car in use when the ordinance was passed, when operated by two, the imposition of the cost of a second man on the new car, upon the ground that, in the opinion of the city council, even more safety and convenience would result, was nothing less than a burden on the business of the company taking its property without due…

Held: that the amendment was within the police power; and that a company whose plant was constructed and operated before the amendment under authority of a village ordinance granting it the right to use the streets, but which, without the consent of the village, after the amendment was passed, removed its poles and wires used for street lighting^ had no ground ■to complain that its franchise contract was impaired by the…

<p>A writ of error will not lie under Jud. Code, § 237, as amended, to review' a judgment , of a state court upon the ground that it erroneously sustained ap, amendment to the state constitution, where the'validity of such amendment under the Federal Constitution was first drawn in question by a petition for rehearing which was not entertained. P, 180.</p> <p>Writ of error to review 142 Louisiana, 812, dismissed.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM'THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the word “intoxicating” qualifies the terms preceding, thus excluding'from the prohibition beer which is not in fact intoxicating. P. 217. The act sought to prevent the manufacture of- intoxicating liquors . because their use might interfere with the consummation of the declared purposes, — to conserve the Nation’s man-power and increase efficiency in producing war materials. P. 219.

The case is stated in the opinion. Among the points presented by them was the following: ■. Assuming that the granting of the patent to survey No. 242 resulted from a mistake of fact and law in the minds of the officers of the Land Department, but without any act of fraud on the part of the'patentee, the complaint is open to demurrer for want of an allegation of the return or tender of the return of the consideration paid for the entry.

Held: that the obligation of the contract was not thereby impaired. Id. An appropriation of private property for a public purpose by an act of a state legislature is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment if a general law permits the owner, upon giving security for costs, to sue the State in her courts and provides that any judgment for his-damages and costs shall be paid out of the state treasury. P. 238.

Held: that the claim of the defrauded persons, against the individual partners, — as distinct from their claim against the firm and therein their right to participate as partnership creditors in any surplus that might remain of individual assets after payment of individual debts — was a claim in tort not provable in bankruptcy. 250 Fed. Rep. 6 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: that a second judgment of the latter court reversing and disposing of the cause was directly reviewable by this court, under Jud. Code, § 237, there being no opportunity for further review by the Supreme Court of the State. P. 258. A federal question first presented to the state court by a petition for rehearing which was overruled without more, is not a basis for review in this court.

Held: not to import a finding that 2.75 per cent, beer is nonintoxicating or to raise any equity in favor of an owner of beer manufactured after the President’s authority over the subject had ceased. P. 303. Affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>MOTION POE LEAVE TO PILE BILL OP COMPLAINT.</p> <p>The case is stated in, the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF INDIANA. .</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: The rates specified are the maxima; and the act leaves it discretionary with the Postmaster General, to fix lower rates in contracting with railroads. Holmes, J., p. 329; Pitney, J., p. 335.

<p>Under the Income Tax Act of 1913, § G, (a), (b), as under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, the income taxable to a domestic corporation is limited to income “ received ” during the year. P. 345.</p> <p>Under these, statutes premiums collected in any year by the agents of an insurance company but not paid over to the treasurer of the company, are part of its income “received” in that year. Id.</p> <p>Where the Government imposed and collected the tax on all premiums' written during the year, the company, claiming refund of part as erroneously assessed on premiums not received, must show what premiums were received during the year. P. 347.</p> <p>Reserves which jreJequired by state insurance departments in the exercise of statutory authority, are “required by law” within the meaning of the Excise and Income Tax Acts, supra, where they provide that net additions, required by law to be made within the year to reserve funds, may be deducted from gross, in determining net income. P. 348.</p> <p>The term “reserve funds,” as used in these acts, held to include an “ unearned premium reserve,” to meet future liabilities on policies; a “ liability reserve,” to satisfy claims indefinite in amount and as to time of payment, but accrued, on liability and workmen’s compensation policies; and a “reserve for loss claims,” accrued on other policies; but not to include funds required by state authority to be maintained to meet ordinary running expenses, such as taxes, salaries, re-insurance and unpaid brokerage. P. 349.</p> <p>If an insurance company in one year makes an over-estimate of reserve requirements and so an excessive deduction from gross income, semble, that such excess may be treated, under these, tax acts, as income of the year in which it is subsequently released to the general uses of the company. P. 351.</p> <p>But amounts once deducted from gross income and added to reserves, under these acts, can be treated by the Government as income of a subsequent year for the purpose of computing the tax, only where it can be clearly shown that subsequent business conditions have released them to the free beneficial use of the company in a real, and not in a mere bookkeeping, sense. P. 35?</p> <p>A claim for refund of money paid with original returns made under the above-mentioned tax*acts, is barred if not presented to the Commissioner, as directed by Rev. Stats., § 3226, and sued on in the Court of Claims withbji the two-year limitation of § 3227; and these requirements are not’postponed or superseded as to such payments by the facts that the original returns were amended and the assessments increased and 'the original payments credited upon the increased assessments, by the action of the Commissioner. Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S.l 85, distinguished Act of September 8, . 1916, c. 463, § 14, 39 StatJ 772, held inapplicable. P. 353</p> <p>52 Ct. Clms. 201, 288; 53 idt 81, modified and affirmed.</p>

Held: that no such contract could be derived from the facts as found. Id. Such a contract could not be implied from the use of the cable service in transmitting government messages, when the Government paid *356 the rates, in part reduced but all as .fixed and charged by the company, and, through the Secretary of War, expressly, declined free service. P. 363.

Held: and we concur, that absence of an opinion by the Supreme Court did not affect the quality of its decision or detract from its efficacy as a judgment upon the questions presented, and its subsequent conclusive effect upon the rights of the Electric Company. Therefore the decree of the District Court is Affirmed.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE DISTRICT OP KANSAS.</p>

<p>The primary intent of the Act of January 11, 1915, c. 7, 38 Stat. 791, amending the Indian Depredation Act, was to remove the defense of alienage, and it is only cases dismissed on that ground that it provides for reinstating. P. 384.</p> <p>Assuming that, by omitting the word “band” from § 1 of the original act, the amendment recognized claims for depredations by hostile bands of friendly tribes, a claim of a citizen previously, dismissed because the depredating band was hostile, though the tribe was not, is not subject to reinstatement under the amendment; and, treated . as a new' claim, it is barred by the three years’ limitation of the original act’. Id.</p> <p>53 Ct. Chus. 32Ó, affirmed.</p>

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision in which Silverthorne had attempted to evade paying taxes. Federal agents illegally seized tax books from Silverthorne and created copies of the records. The ruling, delivered by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., was that any evidence obtained, even indirectly, from an illegal search was inadmissible in court. He reasoned that otherwise, police would have an incentive to circumvent the Fourth Amendment to obtain derivatives of the illegally obtained evidence. This precedent later became known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," and is an extension of the exclusionary rule. Chief Justice Edward Douglass White and Associate Justice Mahlon Pitney dissented without a written opinion.

<p>A legacy paid over by the executor to the legatee, or to himself as trustee under the will for an ascertained beneficiary, is vested in possession, within the meaning of the tax-refunding Act of June 27, 1902, c. 1160, § 3, 32 Stat. 406, although the payments are made before expiration of the time for proving claims against the estate.</p> <p>53 Ct. Clms. 641, affirmed.</p>

<p>A common carrier cannot, under the Fourteenth Amendment, be compelled by. a State to continue operation of its railroad at a loss. P. 399.</p> <p>Where a railroad serving the public is owned and operated by a lumber company in connection with its lumber business, it is the business of the railroad and not the entire business of the company which determines whether the railroad may be abandoned as unprofitable. Id.</p> <p>A mere suggestion in the opinion of a state court unsupported by evidence, cannot be taken as a finding of fact in determining the scope and ground of its decision. Id.</p> <p>Nor can a statement that the court has not jurisdiction to consider relief claimed under the Federal Constitution, because the plaintiff has not complied with formalities under the state law, be taken as placing the decision on a state ground, when the court actually passes upon and denies the merits of plaintiff’s claim, gives relief against plaintiff, and devotes its opinion almost entirely to explaining and . justifying such course. P. 400.</p> <p>Forms imposed by local law cannot enable courts and commissions to do what the Federal Constitution forbids. Id.</p> <p>144: Louisiana, 1086, reversed.</p>

<p>Acceptance of a license from the Philippine Government to engage in the coastwise trade does not oblige the licensee to fulfill a condition imposed contrary to the Philippine Bill of Rights. P. 404.</p> <p>In licensing vessels to engage in the Philippine coastwise trade, the Philippine Government is authorized to require, as a condition, free transportation of mails. P. 405.</p> <p>Such authority is found in its continuous exercise by the local military and civil governments without interference by Congress; in failure of Congress to disapprove local legislation, giving it effect, which under the Act of July 1, 1902, must be reported to Congress; and in its . recognition by the Act of April 15,1904, which authorizes the local government to regulate transportation between local ports and places until American registry of Philippine-ownéd vessels shall have been authorized-by Congress. Id.</p> <p>The Philippine Government having thus authority from Congress to impose the duty to cárry the mails free as a condition to engaging in coastwise trade, its law imposing such condition does not deprive the licensée of rights without due process, or take property for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Id. .</p> <p>The Constitution does not limit the power of Congress when legislating for the Philippines as when legislating for the United States. P. 406.</p> <p>Reversed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the power attained by the United States Steel Corporation, much greater than that of any one competitor, but not greater than that possessed by them all, did not constitute it a monopoly i Id. The fact that a corporation, alleged to be an illegal combination, during a long period after its formation persuadfed and joined with its com *418 .petitors in efforts, at times successful and at times not, to fix and…

Held: that the falsity of such publications, • within the meaning of the statute, depended on the fact and purpose of the alterations and the resulting tendency of the articles to weaken zeal and patriotism and thus hamper the United States in raising armies and conducting the war; that the determination of such falsity, the evidence being sufficient, was clearly for .the jury and not for the court; and that the court…

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion;</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the imposing of a lien for the charge thus incurred by the tenants, under charter provisions operative when the lease was made, did not deprive the owner of property without due process of law. P. 517. Constitutional rights cannot be based on error in prior court decisions. P. 518. 177 App, Div. 647 , affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion.

The case is stated in the opinion.' They relied largely on the following authorities, decided before and since the Act. of June 23,1910, as sustaining the proposition that a charter-party which requires the charterer to furnish supplies to the ship withdraws from the master the power to order supplies for which the materialman, with knowledge of the terms of the charter-party, may assert a lien. The'XJnderwrit&r, 119 Fed. Rep. 713; The Francis J. O’Hara, Jr., 229 Fed.

Held: That directors, serving gratuitously, who were without knowledge of the cashier's negligence or of the possibility of such a fraud, and who had assurance from the president, as from the bank examiners’ reports, were not negligent in accepting the cashier’s statements of liabilities, like his statements of assets, which always Were correct; and were not bound to inspect the depositors’ ledger or call in the…

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana;</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Special .Sessions of - the City of New York for County of Kings, State of New York.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court of the United States for the .'Southern District of Texas.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the Státe of Virginia.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia.</p>

<p>Application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis for the purposes of a petition for certiorari to and an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. '</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals, Harrison County, Seventh Appellate District, of the State of Ohio.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>Error to the Superior Court of the State of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>On petition for a writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Contra Costa.</p>

<p>Appeals from the Court of Claims.</p>