¶1Concurring in Result
¶2I concur in the result of this opinion on the ground that the wife of James Greer gave her consent to the police officers to enter the house and when they did so they saw the items seized in plain view on the floor.
¶3However, I dissent from the holding that Robert Greer had no standing to object to the search of James Greer’s property. I believe Robert Greer’s standing is clearly guaranteed by Jones v. U. S. (1960), 362 U. S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697. In that case the United States Supreme Court held that in the case of a non-possessory offense, a defendant has standing to object to a search if the items seized are his or if *617he was legitimately on the premises searched. In this case Robert admitted he owned some of the objects seized and it is clear that he was legitimately on the premises several hours before the search. The court explicitly eliminated the idea that a defendant has no standing to object to the search of another’s property. This issue was correctly and thoroughly discussed in the dissenting opinion of Hadley v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 24, 238 N. E. 2d 888, reh. den., 251 Ind. 24, 242 N. E. 2d 357, and I need add nothing to that discussion.
¶4Neither do the two Indiana cases cited support the majority opinion. In Leonard v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 361, 232 N. E. 2d 882, the issue was whether the defendant had standing to object to the admission of bank records of his accounts subpoenaed from the banks. Obviously, the items seized were not defendant’s and he had no expectation of privacy with respect to them.
¶5Minton v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 307, 214 N. E. 2d 380, was clearly in error when it was handed down due to the decision of Jones v. U. S., supra. In Mintonthe defendant was charged with possession of narcotics and the court held that he had no standing to object to the search of the car conducted there. Jones v. U. S., supra, explicitly holds that in the case of a possessory offense, the allegation of possession in the indictment is sufficient to confer standing on the defendant to raise the issue of the legality of the search.
¶6In addition, I dissent from the majority view that this is a “hot pursuit” case. Under either the majority or dissenting opinion in Hadley v. State, supra, the police are required as a bare minimum, to have probable cause to believe a felony has been committed and probable cause to believe that the felon is in the house sought to be searched. There was no way the police could have had probable cause to believe that Robert Greer was in the house at 1020 River Avenue. He did not live there. The mere fact that his brother James did live there and they were both suspects in the robbery does not permit an *618inference that Robert was in James’ house. When Robert and James were seen at 1:30 A.M. by Officers Sandler and Viles at 1003 Marion, they were about ly^ blocks north of James’ house at 1020 River Avenue. Robert and James fled to 922 Marion where a gunfight ensued. This was north and away from James Greer’s house. James was captured moments later at 845 Birch which is still further north. Obviously, their line of flight was away from James Greer’s house.
¶7The majority cites four cases in support of their position but none of the cases does in fact support it.
¶8Capps v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 472, 229 N. E. 2d 794, and Manson v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 53, 229 N. E. 2d 801, are not hot pursuit cases at all. They merely involve the issue of whether there was probable cause to arrest the driver of a car.
¶9Wilson v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 454, 217 N. E. 2d 147, was clearly not a hot pursuit case, either. In that case a police officer, without a warrant, entered the decedent’s apartment, with consent of “someone in charge,” to investigate the killing which had been reported to the police. The killer was not thought to be on the premises and the police officer obviously was not pursuing a felon.
¶10Warden v. Hayden (1967), 387 U. S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, was a hot pursuit case, but there the police arrived at the house to be searched within five minutes after two cab drivers saw the suspect actually go into the house. That is the very element missing in our case, namely, any evidence that Robert Greer was in James Greer’s house.
¶11The majority cites no case where “hot pursuit” rationale was accepted where the necessary condition of probable cause to believe that the felon was in the house was not met.
¶12Note. — Reported in 255 N. E. 2d 919.