254 Pa. Super. 211 - Commonwealth v. Taylor’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(d) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from: (1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney; (2) any continuance in excess of thirty (30) days granted at the request of the defendant or his attorney, provided that only the period beyond the thirtieth (30th) day shall be so excluded; Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 264 Pa. Super. 127 - Commonwealth v. Brown · 276 Pa. Super. 29 - Commonwealth v. Cox

2. ““[a] trial commences when the trial judge determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir dire, or to opening argument, or to the hearing of any motions which had been reserved for the time of trial, or to the taking of testimony or to some other such first step in trial.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 294 Pa. Super. 338 - Commonwealth v. MacHi · 262 Pa. Super. 151 - Commonwealth v. Jackson

3. ““ ‘The words “some other such” immediately preceding “first step in the trial” clearly indicate that the events specifically referred to in the comment are to be considered first steps in a trial for purposes of Rule 1100, see Commonwealth v. Boyle, 470 Pa. 343, 355 , 368 A.2d 661, 666 (1977), even though not all of these events are, strictly speaking, directly involved with the determination of guilt or innocence. For example, if a case were called to trial and, after determining the parties were present, the trial judge held a hearing on a suppression motion which had been reserved for the time of trial, presumably the trial would have commenced for purposes of Rule 1100. This leads to the conclusion that the principal concern behind Rule 1100 is simply that the commencement of trial be marked by a substantive, rather than a pro forma, event. Moreover, each of the events specifically referred to in the foregoing portion of the comment represents a degree of commitment of the court’s time and resources such that the process of determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence follows directly therefrom. Accordingly, the beginning of any stage which leads directly into the guilt-determining process is a “first step in the trial” for purposes of Rule 1100.’” Commonwealth v. Taylor, supra, 254 Pa.Super. at 214-15 , 385 A.2d at 986 , quoting Common wealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 248, 260 , 373 A.2d 1355, 1361 (1977) (Eagen, C. J. concurring) (emphasis added).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 276 Pa. Super. 29 - Commonwealth v. Cox