¶1concurring.
¶2I agree with Mr. Justice Pomeroy that “section (f) of Rule 1100 limits the time within which a defendant may apply for an order dismissing charges to ‘any time before trial.’ ” However, I find it necessary to present my view of the proper analysis for deciding whether Lamonna waived his Rule 1100 claim by failing to raise the issue in timely fashion.
¶3Initially, it should be noted that Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(b) provides: “For the purpose of this Rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial.” The plain language of this section indicates that a trial commences for purposes of Rule 1100 when the case is literally called to trial. However, it is obvious that the purpose of Rule 1100 will not be served, nor its requirements met, by a proceeding in which all that transpires is that the case is literally called to trial. Hence, we must first interpret what the language of the Rule “calls the case to trial” means, and second, whether Lamonna’s motion to dismiss was filed before the instant case was “called to trial” in compliance therewith.
¶4Although the explanatory comments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure are not part of the Rules and have not been officially adopted or promulgated by this Court, they nevertheless are useful tools for the resolution of questions of interpretation under the Rules. The comment to Rule 1100 provides, in pertinent part:
“It is not intended that preliminary calendar calls should constitute commencement of a trial. A trial commences when the trial judge determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir *260dire, or to opening argument, or to the hearing of any motions which had been reserved for the time of trial, or to the taking of testimony or to some other such first step in the trial.”
¶5The words “some other such” immediately preceding “first step in the trial” clearly indicate that the events specifically referred to in the comment are to be considered first steps in a trial for purposes of Rule 1100, see Commonwealth v. Boyle, 470 Pa. 343, 354, 368 A.2d 661, 666 (1977), even though not all of these events are, strictly speaking, directly involved with the determination of guilt or innocence. For example, if a case were called to trial and, after determining the parties were present, the trial judge held a hearing on a suppression motion which had been reserved for the time of trial, presumably the trial would have commenced for purposes of Rule 1100. This leads to the conclusion that the principal concern behind Rule 1100 is simply that the commencement of trial be marked by a substantive, rather than pro forma, event. Moreover, each of the events specifically referred to in the foregoing portion of the comment represents a degree of commitment of the court’s time and resources such that the process of determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence follows directly therefrom. Accordingly, the beginning' of any stage which leads directly into the guilt-determining process is a “first step in the trial” for purposes of Rule 1100.
¶6There is no question instantly that it had been determined the parties were present when the Rule 1100 issue was first raised. But, apparently none of the events specifically listed in the comment were underway at that time. Thus, in determining whether Lamonna waived his Rule 1100 claim, the relevant inquiry indicated by the comment is whether “some other such first step in the trial” had begun before the motion to dismiss was made.
¶7Trial was originally scheduled in the instant case for January 27, 1975. On January 15, 1975, Lamonna’s mo*261tion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants was granted. On February 19, 1975, the date for commencement of Lamonna’s trial was extended to March 10, 1975. On that date the case was called to trial and Lamonna was formally arraigned. The trial court then recessed for the purpose of selecting a venire panel and for lunch. The motion to dismiss was filed during the recess.
¶8In my view these facts do not present a situation where a first step in the trial had begun before the motion to dismiss was filed. Arraignment does not lead directly into the guilt-determining process, see Pa.R.Crim. P. 317(b), nor does it represent a degree of commitment of the court’s time and resources equivalent to the stages referred to in the comment. For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the conclusion Lamonna did not waive his Rule 1100 claim by failing to raise it before trial.