Volume 255 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's application to seal his misdemeanor conviction for violating a protection order. Ohio's record-sealing process did not apply to that offense, which was ineligible to be sealed. Appellant's misdemeanor offense for criminal trespass also could not be sealed because the trial court never imposed a sentence after making a finding of guilt. In addition, the existence of the protection-order violation conviction precluded sealing of the criminal-trespass offense. Judgment affirmed.

quiet title – declaratory judgment – mortgage – statute of limitations – maturity date – satisfaction

The common pleas court did not err by denying appellant's appeal from a county board of revision's decision to uphold the county auditor's appraisal of certain property where the auditor was not acting systematically and intentionally discriminating against appellant by revaluing its property based upon appellant purchasing the property in an arm's length transaction.

CIV.R. 12(B)(2) — PERSONAL JURISDICTION — CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM — CIVIL CONSPIRACY — FRAUD — INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT: The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff bank's claims for fraud and civil conspiracy against certain defendant merchant cash advance entities where the complaint alleges that certain defendant merchant cash advance entities had actual knowledge of the financial insolvency of the borrower and actual knowledge that the borrower was unlawfully kiting funds from certain banks including plaintiff bank to repay debts, including repayment of the financing provided by the merchant cash advance entities, yet continued to advance substantial sums of money to the borrower only with shorter repayment periods and higher daily withdraw requirements. The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff bank's claim for interference with a security agreement where, regardless of whether all the other elements of the claim are met, the complaint failed to adequately alleged resulting damages. The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff bank's claims against certain defendant merchant cash advance entities for lack of personal jurisdiction where the complaint failed to allege any facts indicating that these entities transacted business in Ohio or caused tortious injury in Ohio, or that these entities were merely alter egos of other defendant merchant cash advance entities.

The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for relief from judgment, although the judgment is affirmed on different grounds. While the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to decide the motion for relief from judgment, it lacked authority to do so based on the law-of-the-case doctrine, because this court had already finally determined on direct appeal that plaintiff-appellant's claims were barred by absolute privilege. Judgment affirmed.

Crim.R. 48; Dismissal of criminal case by trial court; Exclusion of evidence on the basis of non-compliance with Crim.R. 41. The trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing one count of an indictment without adequate notice to the prosecution, and the trial court erred in excluding evidence at trial when a motion to suppress that same evidence was properly denied by the trial court.

Toxic tort, Federal Employers' Liability Act, necessity of expert testimony, reliability of expert testimony, summary judgment. In a Federal Employers' Liability Act lawsuit, plaintiff alleged that while working for defendants, he was exposed to diesel exhaust fumes that was a cause of plaintiff's developing a type of leukemia. In order to support his claim, plaintiff was required to produce expert medical testimony on both general and specific causation. Plaintiff produced medical expert on the issue of causation who opined that benzene is contained in diesel exhaust and because benzene is a known cause of cancers to include leukemia, the exposure to diesel exhaust was a cause of plaintiff's condition. The trial court granted defendants' motions to exclude plaintiff's expert's testimony on the grounds that it was unreliable. The trial court determined that the expert's testimony as to general causation was unreliable because the expert's method for finding and analyzing the scientific literature was unreliable and the expert did not support his opinion with scientific literature or explain the contradictory scientific literature that diesel exposure did not support an effect as to cancers such as leukemia. The trial court's grant of the motion to exclude the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion. After the expert testimony was excluded, plaintiff did not have evidence of general causation and summary judgment was properly granted in favor of defendants.

BREACH OF CONTRACT — RES JUDICATA — ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION — JURISDICTION — LIMITED REMAND —PREJUDGMENT INTEREST — R.C. 1343.03(A) — ABUSE OF DISCRETION — ATTORNEY FEES — BAD FAITH: The trial court did not err in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on his breach-of-contract and declaratory-judgment actions and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where defendant failed to establish either of its affirmative defenses of res judicata or anticipatory repudiation. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's and plaintiff's respective Civ.R. 60(B) motions on limited remand from the court of appeals, where the scope of the remand was limited to plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and prejudgment interest. The trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff prejudgment interest on his breach-of-contract claim from the date that it determined plaintiff's claim became ripe where, although the trial court's choice of accrual date was years later than it may have been, choosing the later date was not an abuse of discretion because plaintiff asked for that date; however, the trial court abused its discretion in setting the prejudgment interest rate at the applicable rate on the date that plaintiff's first lawsuit ended because the trial court did not base the rate determination on the plain language of the parties' contract. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for attorney fees where the trial court's finding that defendant did not litigate in bad faith was supported by the record.