Volume 254 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

Civ.R. 53(D)(3); Magistrate's Decision; Objections; Summary Judgment; Assured Clear Distance Ahead; Peripheral Object; Sudden Emergence. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure give a party fourteen days from the issuance of a magistrate's decision to file written objections with the trial court. With the exception of raising a claim of plain error, a party may not assign error on appeal unless that party previously filed a corresponding objection to the magistrate's decision in compliance with Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). Thus, the failure to file objections to the magistrate's decision waives all but plain error on appeal. When a tractor-trailer was driving in the only eastbound lane on a roadway and activated its turn signal before making a wide-right turn, the tractor-trailer was clearly indicating that it was going to remain in the line of travel ahead of the motorcycle following behind it until the right turn had been completed. For this reason, the tractor-trailer was not a peripheral object that suddenly emerged into the assured clear distance of the motorcycle.

Ohio Court of Claims properly granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant state university on grounds that the plaintiff did not file his claims within the two-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2743.16(A) and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the continuing violation doctrine or 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) and was not extended by R.C. 2305.19(A).

post-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea, Crim.R. 32.1, Crim.R. 11, manifest injustice

Appellant failed to file a transcript when he objected to the magistrate's decision granting judgment to appellee in his small claims action. As such, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's objections and entering judgment in favor of appellee. Judgment affirmed.

Administrative appeal; Zoning; Variance; Unnecessary hardship. The trial court erred in affirming a township board of zoning appeals' grant of a variance application relating to setback requirements when an unnecessary hardship was not established and where the trial court utilized an inapplicable legal standard.

Negligence; premises liability; trip and fall; open and obvious doctrine; where a plaintiff admits that they would have seen a hazard if they had looked down and the hazard is otherwise open and obvious, no recovery.

Summary Judgment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

JURISDICTION – MOOT – STAY OF SENTENCE – ABANDONMENT OF ANIMALS – R.C. 959.01 – SUFFICIENCY AND WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE: Where the trial court elected to exercise its discretion not to impose a monetary or community-control sentence on appellant's conviction for abandoning animals, an appeal from that conviction was not moot where appellant requested, and the trial court denied, a stay of sentence pending appeal. Appellant's convictions for abandoning animals in violation of R.C. 959.01 were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence established that appellant intentionally abdicated her responsibility towards the animals and did not intend to care for them herself, and where, at the time of their recovery, the animals had not been cared for in four days and one was found in a locked crate in a room filled with inches of cold water.

TRIAL EVIDENCE - PLAIN ERROR - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT - CONSECUTIVE FIREARM SPECIFICATION SENTENCES - REAGAN TOKES LAW: Trial court did not plainly err in admitting other-acts evidence, stipulated autopsy photographs of the deceased infant victim, or victim-impact evidence in drive-by shooting case where multiple eyewitnesses identified appellant as the shooter and CSLI evidence indicated appellant's presence at the scene when the shooting occurred. Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial court and prosecutorial misconduct are likewise without merit because appellant fails to show prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal. Trial court did not err in exercising its discretion when it imposed consecutive three-year prison sentences on all three of the firearm specifications for which appellant was convicted under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). Based on State v. Hacker, 173 Ohio St.3d 219, 2023-Ohio-2535, however, it was plain error for the trial court to sentence appellant to definite prison sentences on his two attempted murder convictions when those offenses were subject to an indefinite prison term under the Reagan Tokes Law. Accordingly, the appellant's definite prison terms for the attempted murder counts are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Law.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, finds that the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion summary judgment under the doctrine of laches and because appellant's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; FRAUD. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees and dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' fraud claim. Because plaintiffs-appellants failed to read the loan documents before signing them, plaintiffs-appellants cannot establish justifiable reliance on representations made by defendants-appellees regarding any prepayment penalties contained in the documents.

Bribery, R.C. 2921.02, sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, plain error

R.C. 2901.22(A); Definition of "purposely"; Jury instruction on "purpose" in attempted murder; Mistrial; Non-admitted exhibits submitted to jury; Manifest weight of the evidence; Proof of firearm. The judgment of conviction and sentence entered in the Logan County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL — REVIEW OF SANCTION — DENTAL LICENSE SUSPENSION — CAUSATION — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the Ohio State Dental Board's order suspending appellant-dentist's dental license and increasing the sanction recommended by the hearing examiner even though one of the agency's reasons for increasing the penalty based on the outcome of the dental surgery could only be interpreted as referring to the death of the appellant's patient and there was no evidence in the record establishing a causal connection between the patient's death and appellant's violation of the standard of care, because appellant failed to challenge the agency's separate and independent basis for increasing the sanction and was therefore unable to demonstrate error as courts must defer to an agency's sanction provided that sanction is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.