¶2I reluctantly concur in the result in this opinion for the reason that I think it and Hall v. State (February 1, 1971) 255 Ind. 606, 266 N. E. 2d 16, come very close to violating the general principal of appellate procedure that an appellate court should not weigh the evidence nor consider the credibility of the witnesses where there is a finding of fact supported by substantial evidence by the trial court. In other words, we should not substitute our personal views as to how we would have decided the facts in the trial court where there is conflicting evidence and the trial court heard the witnesses and considered the evidence. It is only where the evidence is without conflict that we may consider it a legal question on appeal.
¶3This principle applies to all hearings in the trial court with reference to a determination of the facts — not only the facts as to the merits of the case on trial, but also hearings as to the competency of witnesses, admissibility of evidence, or hearings on probable cause for the issuance of warrants.
“The trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence is presumably justified, and only the evidence tending to support the ruling will be considered, although the facts set forth in the motion must be accepted as true unless controverted ; on the other hand, if evidence has been suppressed and a search warrant quashed, the presumption is, in the absence of a contrary showing by the state, that the search was illegal.”
¶49 I.L.E., Criminal Law, Sec. 715, p. 212.
¶5We have no reason to consider the “burden of proof” in this opinion. That matter solely concerns the trier of the facts.
¶6I recognize that the United States Supreme Court at times has not followed this well settled principle of appellate review. The members of that Court frequently like to substitute their own personal opinions as to what the evidence proves, rather than to accept that of the trial court or lower court. I shall not knowingly violate that principle.
¶7In these two cases I concur because I conceive the evidence as being undisputed and without conflict that the alleged con*105fessions were obtained by coercion or threats. If there was substantial evidence denying that fact, then I would have to follow the trial court’s decision.
¶8In these times, when there is a continual erosion of the public’s right to protection against crime by enlarging the criminal’s rights under the Constitution, rather than the law-abiding citizen’s rights thereunder, I feel we should at least keep in mind the age-old principle of appellate review — that we do not substitute our personal opinions on the facts for those of the trial court.
¶9Note. — Reported in 267 N. E. 2d 165.